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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20205L0401999-04-0909 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Relief Requests for Inservice Insp Second 10-year Interval for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 ML20203E1181999-02-10010 February 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Plant,Units 1 & 2 Quality Assurance Program Description ML20199F5341998-12-29029 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Requests 1-TYP-3-B3.140-1, 1-TYP-3-B5.70-1,1-TYP-3-RH-E-1-1,1-TYP-3-B-G-1, 1-TYP-3-APP-I-1,1-TYP-3-UT-1,1-TYP-3-N-509,1-TYP-3-N-521, 1-TYP-3-N-524,1-TYP-3-B3.120-1 & 1-TYP-3-C6.10-1 ML20198K8551998-12-21021 December 1998 SER Granting Relief Request PRR-5 for Third 10-year Inservice Testing for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198A1631998-12-0909 December 1998 SER Approving Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Facility That Has Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request ML20195J3131998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting First & Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief ML20154R9121998-10-20020 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes to QA Program Description in Chapter 17.2 of BVPS-2 Ufsar.Proposed Changes Would Modify QA Organization to Allow Warehouse QC Inspectors to Report to Manager of Nuclear Procurement Dept ML20154P7491998-10-19019 October 1998 SE Accepting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief RR-1-TYP-2-B5.40-1,Rev 0,for Plant, Unit 1 ML20154C6711998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Model Identified in Dl Submittal Was Appropriate for Analysis of Installed Conduit Ampacity Limits.Determined That There Are No Outstanding Safety Concerns with Respect to Ampacity ML20202B8571997-11-18018 November 1997 SE Approving Relief Requests for Second 10-Yr Interval for Pumps & Valves Inservice Testing Program for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 2 ML20199F4641997-11-13013 November 1997 SER Related to Reactor Pressure Vessel,Pressurized Thermal Shock Assessment for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 2 ML20212G4961997-10-28028 October 1997 SER Accepting Pressurized Thermal Shock Assessment for Beaver Valley Unit 2 Reactor Vessel ML20217J5311997-10-0808 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Re First,Second & Third 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20217J5891997-10-0707 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Related to Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 ML20211D8441997-09-17017 September 1997 SER Approving SG 90-day Rept Submitted by Duquesne Light Co for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1,per GL 95-05 ML20216J5861997-09-0404 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Third 10-year IST Program.Approves Valve Relief Requests 1,3 & 4.Valve Relief Request 2 Not Required.Authorizes Pump Relief Requests 1,2,3 & 4 ML20148E1051997-05-28028 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License DPR-66 ML20137X1441997-04-0909 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to RPV Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule ML20057B0641993-09-13013 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief for IST of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pumps of Plant ML20056F3561993-08-12012 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee 930607 Request for Relief from Certain ASME Code Requirements for Temporary Repairs to Svc Water Sys ML20126H7601992-12-30030 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Valve Relief Requests VRR-27, VRR-43 & VRR-44 & Will Provide Reasonable Assurance of Operational Readiness of Valves to Perform Intended Functions.Relief Request PRR-11 Cannot Be Approved ML20127P2081992-11-20020 November 1992 SER Accepting Util Commitment to Entire GIP-2,including Both SQUG Commitments & Implementation Guidance ML20248D7681989-09-29029 September 1989 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Actions in Response to Open Items in 890510 Safety Evaluation Re Plant Safety Monitoring Sys ML20247N3561989-05-30030 May 1989 SER Supporting Util Actions to Comply W/Item 4.5.3 of Generic Ltr 83-28, Reactor Trip Sys Functional Testing ML20246M1791989-05-10010 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Verification & Validation Plan for Plant Safety Monitoring Sys.Hardware Design of Sys Found Acceptable.Verification & Validation Plan Found Incomplete & Unacceptable.Software Design Process Inadequate ML20246D5501989-04-26026 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Submittals on Natural Circulation Cooldown for Unit ML20206G0431988-11-17017 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That All Issues Raised Under Item Resolved & Item 4.3 Closed ML20153C0911988-08-17017 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee 870731 Comments on Sser 5, Section 9.5.1.Fire Protection in Cable Rooms & Containment Constitutes Acceptable Deviations from Branch Technical Position Cmeb 9.5-1 ML20205T0021988-08-10010 August 1988 SER Accepting Util 831104,840330 & 870504 Responses to Item 2.2.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20154R4451988-05-31031 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Compliance W/Atws Rule 10CFR50.62.Util Proposed Design Acceptable Subj to Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20154P4341988-05-24024 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Proposed Tech Spec Change Acceptable.No Amend Issued Since Conditions Resulting in Need for Amend to License NPF-73 No Longer Exist ML20154F9901988-05-12012 May 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee 880322 Response to Open Issues Identified in 860722 Draft Technical Evaluation Rept of 840330 Submittal Re Salem ATWS Event Action Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review Satisfactory ML20154F9841988-05-12012 May 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee 851114 Response to Open Issues Noted in 851017 Draft Technical Evaluation Rept of 831104 Submittal Re Salem ATWS Event Action Item 1.2, Post-Trip Review Satisfactory ML20153B6291988-04-25025 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 870616 & 871110 Requests for Inservice Insp Relief for Welds on Nonregenerative Hxs,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20148K5231988-03-18018 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Inservice Testing Program & Requests for Relief ML20234E0531987-12-0808 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Design Changes to Be Implemented During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Fuel Reload.Tech Spec Change Unnecessary ML20236X4941987-11-0909 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Granting Util 860617 Relief Request from Performing Volumetric & Visual Exam Requirements of ASME Section XI for Reactor Coolant Pumps Casing Welds & Internal Surfaces ML20237B1651987-10-21021 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Elimination of Primary Component Support Snubbers from Primary Coolant Loops ML20204H7181987-03-18018 March 1987 Interim Safety Evaluation Re Pump & Valve Operability Assurance (SER Confirmatory Issue 13).Pages from Pvort Audit Encl ML20206G2231987-03-12012 March 1987 SER Accepting Licensee Request to Use Damping Values from ASME Code Case N-411 Per Conditions Outlined in Util ML20207P6551987-01-0202 January 1987 SER Accepting Licensee Compliance W/Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1,Part 2 Re Vendor Interface Program for Reactor Trip Sys (RTS) Components & Item 4.5.2 Concerning RTS Online Reliability Testing ML20212B0111986-11-30030 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Exemptions from App R Requirements Re Separation of Cables & Equipment & Associated Circuits ML20205G4491986-08-31031 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events ML20204G9281986-07-31031 July 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 860502 Submittal of Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation,Beaver Valley Nuclear Plant,Unit 1 Cycle 6 ML20203G2371986-07-28028 July 1986 Interim SER Re Dcrdr Summary Rept & Preimplementation Audit on 860211 & 12.Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 Generally Satisfied.Several Items Remain to Be Completed ML20206H4931986-06-19019 June 1986 Safety Evaluation on Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.2.3 & 4.2.4, Preventive Maint Program for Reactor Trip Breakers/Life Testing. Licensee Position Unacceptable ML20205N1151986-04-22022 April 1986 Interim Rept Re Review of Util Response to Generic Ltr 85-12 on Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Criteria.Addl Info Required ML20202C5721986-04-0303 April 1986 Sser Accepting Util 860304 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28, Item 4.3, Seismic Qualification of Shunt Trip Components ML20214E3631986-03-17017 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 2 to CPPR-105 ML20154N7451986-03-10010 March 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850819 Request to Withdraw Original Commitment to Provide Steam Leakage Collection Sys Around Certain Steam Valves 1999-04-09
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARL-99-154, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 199 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 199 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with L-99-139, LER 99-S01-00:on 990813,uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect within Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone Occurred.Caused by Procedure non-compliance.Involved Personnel Received Counseling Re Event.With1999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990813,uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect within Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone Occurred.Caused by Procedure non-compliance.Involved Personnel Received Counseling Re Event.With L-99-140, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with L-99-126, Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With L-99-107, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20209D9531999-06-27027 June 1999 Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999 L-99-096, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for BVPS Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for BVPS Units 1 & 2. with L-99-078, Special Rept:On 990326,seismic Monitoring Instruments Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Resolution of Potential TS Compliance Issue & Work Scheduling Issue.Instrumentation Was Returned to Svc Following Calibr & Declared Operable1999-05-0303 May 1999 Special Rept:On 990326,seismic Monitoring Instruments Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Resolution of Potential TS Compliance Issue & Work Scheduling Issue.Instrumentation Was Returned to Svc Following Calibr & Declared Operable L-99-079, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205L0401999-04-0909 April 1999 SER Accepting Util Relief Requests for Inservice Insp Second 10-year Interval for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 L-99-054, Special Rept:On 990320,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Calibration Completed by Vendor Did Not Adequately Cover Full Operating Range of Sensors.Removed Sensors & Sent Offsite1999-04-0505 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990320,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Calibration Completed by Vendor Did Not Adequately Cover Full Operating Range of Sensors.Removed Sensors & Sent Offsite L-99-058, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20196K7981999-03-25025 March 1999 Rev 4 to COLR, for Cycle 8 L-99-038, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20203E1181999-02-10010 February 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Plant,Units 1 & 2 Quality Assurance Program Description L-99-019, Special Rept:On 990120,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Processor Card for Sensor Locked Up & Needed to Be Reset.Heater That Fit Around Shaft of Sensor Replaced1999-02-0505 February 1999 Special Rept:On 990120,meteorological Tower Wind Speed Sensors Declared Inoperable.Caused by Processor Card for Sensor Locked Up & Needed to Be Reset.Heater That Fit Around Shaft of Sensor Replaced ML20196F7011999-01-31031 January 1999 BVPS Unit 2 Heatup & Cooldown Limit Curves During Normal Operation at 15 EFPY Using Code Case N-626 ML20203D4811999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2, in Accordance with NRC GL 97-02.With ML20207E6631999-01-28028 January 1999 Rev 0 to EMECH-0713-1, Operational Assessment of SG Tubing at Beaver Valley Unit 1,Cycle 13 ML20210G7041999-01-22022 January 1999 BVPS Unit 1 Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for 980123-990122 ML20207E5861998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Toledo Edison ML20207E5601998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Pennpower ML20198B9021998-12-31031 December 1998 BVPS Unit 1 Simulator Four Yr Certification Rept for 1995-1998 ML20207E5901998-12-31031 December 1998 Dqe 1998 Annual Rept to Shareholders ML20199C9971998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20207E5521998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Ohio Edison ML20207E5761998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept 1998 for Illuminating Co ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20199F5341998-12-29029 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Requests 1-TYP-3-B3.140-1, 1-TYP-3-B5.70-1,1-TYP-3-RH-E-1-1,1-TYP-3-B-G-1, 1-TYP-3-APP-I-1,1-TYP-3-UT-1,1-TYP-3-N-509,1-TYP-3-N-521, 1-TYP-3-N-524,1-TYP-3-B3.120-1 & 1-TYP-3-C6.10-1 ML20198K8551998-12-21021 December 1998 SER Granting Relief Request PRR-5 for Third 10-year Inservice Testing for Beaver Valley Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198A1631998-12-0909 December 1998 SER Approving Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Facility That Has Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request L-98-229, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20195J3131998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting First & Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief L-98-210, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20206G0291998-10-31031 October 1998 BVPS Unit 2 Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period 971101-981031 ML20154R9121998-10-20020 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes to QA Program Description in Chapter 17.2 of BVPS-2 Ufsar.Proposed Changes Would Modify QA Organization to Allow Warehouse QC Inspectors to Report to Manager of Nuclear Procurement Dept ML20154P7491998-10-19019 October 1998 SE Accepting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Request for Relief RR-1-TYP-2-B5.40-1,Rev 0,for Plant, Unit 1 ML20198F7611998-10-0606 October 1998 Duquesne Light Co,Beaver Valley Power Station 1998 Emergency Preparedness Ingestion Zone Exercise, Conducted on 981006 ML20154C6711998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Revised Model Identified in Dl Submittal Was Appropriate for Analysis of Installed Conduit Ampacity Limits.Determined That There Are No Outstanding Safety Concerns with Respect to Ampacity ML20154D5001998-09-30030 September 1998 Special Rept on Overview of BVPS-1 & BVPS-2 TS Compliance Issues & Corrective Action Taken L-98-197, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154E2171998-09-28028 September 1998 Follow-up Part 21 Rept Re Defect with 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50 App B Program. Westronics Has Notified Bvps,Ano & RBS & Is Currently Making Arrangements to Implement Design Mods L-98-188, Special Rept:During 1998,Unit 2 SG Eddy Current exam,26 Tubes Were Improperly Encoded in SG 2RCS-SG21C During Previous Outage.Use of Independent Databases to Track New Indications Being Implemented as Preventive Measure1998-09-21021 September 1998 Special Rept:During 1998,Unit 2 SG Eddy Current exam,26 Tubes Were Improperly Encoded in SG 2RCS-SG21C During Previous Outage.Use of Independent Databases to Track New Indications Being Implemented as Preventive Measure L-98-178, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2. with ML20155B5871998-08-28028 August 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to 51-5001925-01, Risk Assessment for Installation of Electrosleeves at BVPS & Callaway Plant ML20236X2351998-08-0505 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Associated W/Westronics 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50,App B Program.Beaver Valley,Arkansas Nuclear One & River Bend Station Notified.Design Mod Is Being Developed L-98-168, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 L-98-157, Special Rept:On 980423,inoperability of Seismic Monitoring Instrument Noted.Caused by Obsolescence of Instrument & Inability to Obtain Necessary Spare Parts.Design Change Is Being Pursued to Obtain Replacement Product1998-07-29029 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980423,inoperability of Seismic Monitoring Instrument Noted.Caused by Obsolescence of Instrument & Inability to Obtain Necessary Spare Parts.Design Change Is Being Pursued to Obtain Replacement Product L-98-139, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 L-98-119, Monthly Operating Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 1999-09-30
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/ %, UNITED STATES
[, g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7,,
'E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l
1 ENCLOSURE i q
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION K
RELATED TO NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN BEAVER VALLEY P0hdR STATION UNIT 2 DUQUE5NE LIGHT COMPANY {
DOCKET NO. 50-412 j l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Branch Technical Position (BTP) RSB 5-1, " Design Requirements of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System," requires that test programs for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) include tests with supporting analysis to (1) confirm that ,
adequate mixing of borated water added prior to or during cooldown can be !
achieved under natural circulation conditions and permit estimation of the times required to achie,'e such mixing, and (2) confirm that the cooldown under natural circulation conditions can be achieved within the limits specified in the emergency operating procedures. In addition, the plant is to be designed so that the reactor can be taken from normal operating conditions to cold shutdown using only safety-grade systems. A comparison of performance to that of previously tested plants of similar design may be substituted for these tests. >
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 (BVPS-2) is classified as a Class 2 plant with regard to the implementation of the above BTP. i A natural circulation / boron mixing /cocidown test was performed at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 on March 28-29, 1985. By letter dated March 3, 1987, the staff informed the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 licensee that its systens meet the intent of BTP RSB 5-1 for a class 2 plant.
By letter dated May 11, 1987, the licensee for SVPS-2 submitted a Westinghouse l analysis to show the applicability of the Diablo Canyon cooldown test results to BVPS-2, rather than conduct such a test at its plant. The Westinghouse analysis, WCAP-11461, " Beaver Valley Unit 2, Natural Circulation Boron Mixing .
Evaluation Program Report," supports FSAR Section 5a, which relates to the capability of BVPS-? to successfully achieve cold shutdown conditions under the requirements of BTP RSB 5-1.
By letter dated January 3,1989, the licensee provided a list of FSAR ,
references and an analysis to support the estimated time to borate the RCS until cold shutdown conditions were reached. 4 The staff safety evaluation for Diablo Canyon Unit 1, with its associated Brookhaven National Laboratory technical evaluation report entitled " Technical Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon Natural Circulation, Boron Mixing, and i Cooldown Test," identified the plant parameters that may affect application of J the test results to other plants. These parameters are the basis for the evaluation and are discussed below.
890S100260 890426 ~
DR ADOCKOSOOg2
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i- J 2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Natural Circulation Diablo Canyon Unit 1 is rated at 3338 megawatts thermal (MWt) and has four ;
loops in its reactor coolant system (RCS). BVPS-2 is rated at 265? MWt and l has three loops in its RCS. The general configuration of the piping and l components in each reactor coolant loop is the same for BVPS-2 and Diablo Canyon Unit 1. Both plants have the Model 51 steam generators and Model 93A reactor coolant pumps.
i The predicted natural circulation flow versus decay heat was compared for the I two plants. The comparison, on a normalized basis, used the methodology of '
the Westinghouse Owners Group " Emergency Response Guidelines" (ERG), Revision 1, September 1983. Included were the effects of elevation, hydraulic flow resistance, and decay heat levels, which varied at power levels ranging from 1 ,
to 6 percent of full power. The results were nearly identical and demonstrate that BVPS-2 should exhibit similar natural circulation performance as Diablo Canyon with all steam generators available. To support use of the methodology, the calculations were compared with Diablo Canyon RCS startup test data, flows and loop temperature differentials (delta Ts), for power levels ranging from 1 to 3 percent and two to four active loops. The test results showed that the natural circulation flow rates and delta Ts predicted for Diablo Canyon were conservative. On the basis of the licensee's evaluation, the staff finds that the ERG methodology will conservatively predict the BVPS-2 natural circulatfor.
{
flow. '
The licensee used the same methodology to evaluate natural circulation with one of the three steam generators isolated. Reducing the number of active steam generators, at the same power level that was used with all steam generators available, results in a decrease in the predicted natural circulation flow and an increase in the predicted loop delta T. To support these results, the licensee provided a summary of steam generator isolation test data from Sequoyah 1, Salem 2, and McGuire 1. The staff finds this acceptable since it is supported by test data of plants with a similar design.
RCS Cooldows The capacity of the atmospheric steam dump (ASD) valves control cooling of the RCS at a specified rate, assuming a sufficient supply of auxiliary feedwater and a subcooled RCS. Steam flow through these valves removes the sensible heat and decay heat throughout the cooldown period. At the end of the cooldown period, when the steam generator pressure is low, the capacity of the valves is most limited. The energy to be removed is determined by the water inventory and the amount of structural material in the RCS, the level of decay heat, and the cooldown rate.
BVPS-2 has four safety-grade electrical / hydraulic valves available for cooldown. Each steam generator has a single ASD valve sized so that only two of three steam generators and their ASD valves are required for cooldown to
. l residual heat removal (RHR) initiation conditions. An additional, larger capacity, ASD valve (residual heat release valve) is located in a common header that is tostream of the main steam isolation valves. Power for the residual heat release valve is provided by one Class 1E bus. Power for the other three ASDs is provided by another Class IE bus. When power from the Class 1E bus powering the three individual ASDs is lost, the coumon residual heat release valve has adequate capacity to permit cooldown to RHR initiation conditions.
The staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the ASD valves.have the capacity to cool down the RCS to the RHR initiation temperature in a reasonable time; therefore, the ASDs are acceptable.
Bypass Flow and Upper-Head Cooling Westinghouse plants may be divided into two groups according to the magnitude of the bypass flow: Thot and Tcold plants. Sufficient core bypass flow exists in the Tcold plants to make the temperature of the upper-head fluid essentially equal to the cold-leg temperature. On the other hand, for the Thot plants, which includes Diablo Canyon and BVPS-2, the bypass flow is much less, resulting in the upper-head temperature ranging between the cold-leg and hot-leg temperatures, and raises a possibility of void formation in the upper-head region.
A potential exists for void formation in the upper-head of the reactor vessel during the cooldown/depressurization under natural circulation conditions if the upper head is relatively isolated from the rest of the RCS, or its fluid temperature remains higher than the coolant temperature in the main flow paths of the RCS. Upper-head cooling under natural circulation conditions is influenced by core bypass flow and mixing in the upper head.
BVPS-2 has a safety-grade reactor vessel head letdown path to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT), which provides a means for venting gases from the vessel head region. Intermittent use of this path to vent any gases augments RCS pressure control during a natural circulation cooldown. The staff finds this acceptable.
The licensee's emergency operating procedures that provide instructions for cooldown of the RCS under natural circulation conditions are:
ES 0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown l
ES 0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Reactor Vessel-With Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System i (With RVLIS)
ES 0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Reactor Vessel (Without RVLIS) l Although the staff considers natural circulation cooldown without voids desirable, the staff has reasonable assurance that there is no undue safety problem during this mode of operation, since the licensee has procedures that account for cooldown with voids.
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Boron Mixing The Diablo Canyon boron mixing test evaluation demonstrated adequate boron mi,ving under natural circulation conditions when highly borated water was injected into the RCS. The mixing effect created as the flow passes through the reactor coolant pumps and the _ steam generator tubes further diffuses the boron. The ability to achieve the proper shutdown margin, however, depends mainly on the injection rate of boron relative to the total inventory of water in the RCS. During the test, the required change in concentration of about 300 ppm was achieved in'less than I hour.
The boric acid tanks (BATS) and refueling water storage tank (RWST) supply the boron for BVPS-2. Because these tanks have boron concentrations
, significantly less than those of Diablo Canyon, a larger quantity of borated water needs to be added over a longer time to reach the desired concentration change. The licensee's calculated results showed that the time required to !
borate the RCS to reach cold shutdown conditions without letdown is about
, 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. On-the basis of this calculation, the staff finds that there'is reasonable assurance that sufficier,t time exists to achieve boron injection and mixing within the required shutdown margin. The staff further expects that there will be adequate boron mixing at BVPS-2 because its natural circu- i lation flow is similar to that of Diablo Canyon Unit 1. '
The boric acid is pumped from the BVPS-2 safety-grade BATS by safety-grade boric acid transfer and centrifugal charging pumps and injected to the RCS either through the normal charging line and reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals, or through redundant safety-grade injection lines. The RWST provides the backup supply of boric acid.
The injection of additional mass into the RCS without letdown has the potential to increase RCS pressure during the boron mixing period. However, if both the normal and excess letdown lines are unavailable for the RCS inventory control, letdown may be accomriished by means of the safety-grade reactor head vent letdown flow path, with throttling control, to the pressurin r relief tank. The staff finds this acceptable.
Depressurization The Diablo Canyon Unit I test demonstrated that the RCS could be depressurized from cooldown conditions to the RHR initiation pressure under natural circulation flow conditions using the pressurizer auxiliary spray and/or pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs). However, at BVPS-2, q depressurization will be accomplished through the use of the normal i pressurizer spray valves or the pressurizer auxiliary spray systems. These i valves are not safety grade, and thus may not be available for the RCS j depressurization per BTP RSB 5-1. The pressurizer PORVs, however, which are i safety grade and Class-1E-operated, are available for depressurization. l
, Three safety or discharging (grade pressurizer venting) PORVs arerelief to the pressurizer provided, tank of whichisonly (PRT), one for required depressurization. The PORVs are included in the environmental qualification program which was reviewed and approved by the staff (see Supplement 5 of NUREG-1057). In addition, since these valves also meet the intent of NUREG-0737, item II.B.1, the staff concludes that the PORVs are properly protected to perform the depressurization of the RCS after cooldown.
At the end of the depressurization, when the RCS is at approximately 400 psig, the RHR system may be placed in service.
The staff finds there is reasonable assurance that adequate means are available for depressurization and reaching cold shutdown conditions.
, Cooling Water At Diablo Canyon, the condensate storage tank (CST) provides the auxiliary feedwater supply to the steam generators. At BVPS-2, auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators is provided by the safety-grade auxiliary feedwater system and the condensate is drawn from the primary plant demineralized water storage tank (PPWST). Additional sources of auxiliary feedwater for BVPS-2 are the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) and the seismic Category I service water system (SWS). If the water supply from the PPWST is not sufficient, the auxiliary feed pump suction is manually switched to the DWST. j Should this backup source be unavailable, the SWS will be cross-connected to the auxilicry feedwater system.
The technical spec';fication (TS) minimum capacity of the BVPS-2 PPWST is 200,000 gallons. The capacity of the DWST is 600,000 gallons; normally it contains about 593,000 gallons. Together, the DWST and SWS provide a large
' backup supply of cooling water at BVPS-2. Therefore, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that sufficient cooling water inventory exists to meet the proposed plant cooldown method.
3.0 CONCLUSION
The staff assessed the capability of BVPS-2 to meet the guidance of RSB BTP 5-1, and has identified and evaluated the plant parameters that may
- affect the application of the Diablo Canyon natural circulation test results l to BVPS-2.
l l On the basis of the licensee's submittals and the staff's evaluation above, the staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the Diablo Canyon natural circulation tests are applicrble to BVPS-2 and that the plant complies
! with the guidance of BTP RSB 5-1.
l Principal Contributor: Don Katze
, Dated: April 26,1939 I
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