ML20244B921

Rev 1 to Electrical Cable Separations Rept

ML20244B921
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/26/1989
From:	Belew M, Jay Collins, Robert Williams TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
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ML18033A785	List: ML20244B921
References
NUDOCS 8906140041
Download: ML20244B921 (114)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 l

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1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT l

ELECTRICAL CABLE SEPARATIONS REPORT (Revision 1) t Prepared by b Date [2M/W y -

Reviewed by 4 Date d'- 2 M " 8 7 Reviewed by #l Y ) A R D 1kr Date 5-14-89 Reviewed by /A Date T!o75!97 oo .

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'M 09 B89 cc (Enclosures):

Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Browns Ferry Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000

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1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to document the TVA actions taken to evaluate and resolve nonconforming conditions related to the divisional separation requirements to ensure physical independence for safety-related and non safety-related electrical cables.

The results of these evaluations were used to determine necessary corrective actions to prevent recurrence and to review for compliance to l R' the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant FSAR Chapter 8 and the Browns Ferry l Nuclear Plant Design Criteria BFN-50-728 R1 entitled " Physical i Independence of Electrical Systems" (reference 6.1.1).

2.0 BACKGROUND

TVA has identified instances where the electrical separation requirements have not been met as identified in Chapter 8 of the BFN FSAR and the BFN Design Criteria BFN-50-728. These discrepancies were documented by the issuance of condition adverse to quality reports (CAQRs) ga.nerated as a result of various review programs being performed as part of the BFN restart effort. As a result, TVA has undertaken an extensive evaluation to determine the total extent of the identified condition.

The corrective actions for the discrepancies are required, either before restart or post restart, as indicated. Corrective actions are grouped into two categories: (1) physical plant changes and (2) nonphysical plant changes. Physical plant changes include the addition of redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices or cable rerouting.

Nonphysical changes include the retagging of raceway or cable. In a December 2, 1988 letter, TVA concluded that the modifications required could be deferred beyond fuel load without impacting plant safety. In this letter TVA also committed to completing these modifications before restart of unit 2.

For the purpose of this report and the ensuing evaluations, TVA has summarized the discrepancies into the following categories:

Field verified cable routing data from TVA's ampacity program and l Appendix R program has resulted in routing discrepancies which lE questioned the adequacy of the cable and conduit schedule, on which l much of the separation criteria compliance is based. l Cables designated with an "IE" suffix or an "IES" suffix should have been designated either divisional or nondivisional and separated as such.

Nondivisional cable has been routed in both divisional raceways without consideration to circuit protection.

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Nondivisional cable originating from a divisional power supply has been routed in opposite division raceways or terminated in opposite division panels or enclosures.

The design criteria requirement to route nondivisional circuits only on one division of raceways has been applied on a cable-by-cable basis and not on a circuit-by-circuit basis.

F The project Q-List (Reference 6.2) has identified cables with no divisional suffix as safety-related. If these cables were required to be divisional, their raceway routing was questionable.

Evaluations consisted of identifying populations of cable within the areas of concern for the identified discrepancies, followed by performing either a 100 percent review of the population, a generic analysis to demonstrate the absence of adverse interactions between safety-related circuitry and associated (physically or electrically) nonsafety-related circuits, or a random sample of the cable population.

The random sampling approach as used by TVA in sections 4.3, 4.5, 4.9, and 4.10 was based on providing a 95-percent confidence that the population quality level is 95 percent. Tne criteria for a discrepant l R.

item was established as any problem that is in noncompliance to the plant l design basis. The sample size and number of discrepant items is based on l the following equation: l R = 1 -

A(x) 100 (Reference 6.4) 2n where - R = confidence level n = sample size A(x) = factor based on number of discrepant items No. of Discrepant Items (x) Factor A(x) 0 5.991 1 9.488 2 12.592 3 15.507 4 18.307 5 21.026 6 23.685 7 26.296 8 28.869 9 31.410 10 33.924 All samples were chosen using a TVA developed random sample computer program.

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( 3.0 DISCUSSION Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant has two major categories of electrical circuits:

(1) Nondivisional, nonsafety-related, circuits are non Class 1E and are not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event.

These non Class IE circuita become associated circuits when they share power supplies, enclosures (including electrical penetrations), or raceways with Class 1E circuits (2) Class 1E circuits are circuits that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, containment and reactor heat removal; or are essential in preventing significant releases of radioactive material to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Class 1E circuits are further divided into redundant divisions or channels to ensure physical and electrical independence in accordance with IEEE Standard 279-1968 entitled " Proposed IEEE Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems."

These cables are further segregated into five voltage levels (1) Vcitage level 5 (VS) for 4160-V cables, (2) Voltage level 4 (V4) for 480-V power cable, lighting cabinet feeder cables, and low voltage power cables carrying 30 amperes or more, (3) Voltage level 3 (V3) for low voltage power and control cable applications, typically 120 V ac or 250 V de, that provide motive and control power for alternating current motors, motor-operated and solenoid valves, and control power for relays, closing circuits, and trip circuits, (4) Voltage level 2 (V2) for medium-level signal cables for digital input to and outputs from the Ocmputer, instrument transmitters, recorders, and (5) Voltage level 1 (V1) for low-level signal cables from thermocouple, strain gauges, vibration detectors, thermal converters, and resistance temperature device (RTD).

As a result of the discrepancies identified in Section 2.0, TVA performed evaluations for the following populations of cables (applicable section of report is in parenthesis):

• Field verified cable routing data from TVA's cable ampacity program lR and Appendix R program (Subsection 4.1). l

• V4 and V5 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.2).

• Nondivisional V4 and V5 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.3). j i

• Nondivisional V3 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.4).

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• Nondivisional V3 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.5).

• . Nondivisional V1 and V2 cables which originate from both safety-related and nonsafety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.6).

• Divisional and nondivisional cables designated with an "IE" suffix (Subsection 4.7).

• Nondivisional V4 and V5 cables contained in the project Q-List l_ (Subsection 4.8).

• Nondivisional V3 cables contained in the project Q-List (Subsection 1 4.9).

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• Nondivisional V1 and V2 cables contained in the project Q-List (Subsection 4.10).

• Divisional V1 and V2 cables (Subsection 4.11) l l

• Evaluation of cables contained in divisional and nondivisional cable l trays that physically connect (Subsection 4.12) l Other than potential discrepancies in the "IE" cable population and those nondivisional V3 cables in the project Q-list, no known design separation discrepancies existed for V3 divisional cables. Therefore, these cables were not chosen as a separate population to review.

TVA recently issued Design Input Memorandum (DIM) BFN-50-728-1 which is an advance revision notice to design criteria BFN-50-728. This DIM allows exceptions for nonsafety-related power cables to share a power supply and enclosure with one safety-related division and an enclosure or raceway with the other safety-related division if the circuit is provided with protection consisting of two safety-related electrical protection devices to prevent it from degrading safety-related circuitry. A safety-related protection device may consist of a qualified Class IE breaker or a qualified or non-qualified fuse because of its operation (fails safe).

Exceptions are also allowed for nonsafety-related instrumentation and low voltage control circuitry to be routed with both safety-related divisions when an analysis demonstrates the absence of adverse interactions between safety-related circuitry and associated nonsafety-related circuits.

Each of the specific cable population evaluations considered this DIM to be either an acceptable method for satisfying the separation criteria or an acceptable corrective action for any discrepancies that might be identified. The methodology used in these evaluations and the results are contained in Section 4.0 of this report.

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.4.0 SPECIFIC EVALUATIONS Based on the categories of discrepancies identified in section 2.0, TVA undertook specific evaluations to determine the extent of the electrical separation discrepancies. Since the majority of the evaluations relied on the existing design output documents as input to confirm cable rout,ing and circuit configurations, it was concluded that the field verified cable routing data from the ampacity program and. Appendix R and any discrepancies identified 'nust be adequately resolved to confine the

. adequacy of'this input data. This consideration is discussed and confirmed in subsection 4.1 with the remaining subsection's utilizing this confirmation.

4.1 Evaluation of Field Verified Cable Routing Data from TVA's cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R 4.1.1 Purpose The purpose of this effort was to evaluate field verified cable routing data from TVA's ampacity program and Appendix R and any discrepancies between the design routing and the as-installed routing as a result of this data. The results-of this data would then be used to develop a statistical analysis to determine the acceptance of the conduit and cable database.

4.1.2 Methodology This activity began by first identifying the source of field verified data. This data was determined to be available from bg the following verification a'etivities:

• Walkdowns and signal tracing performed by Ebasco Services, Incorporated (ESI) to verify cable locations for the cable ampacity program

• Signal tracing for Appendix R cables These populations of cables were then categorized as the following:

• V4/VS cables verified as a result of the cable ampacity program and Appendix R program

• V3 cables verified as a result of the cable ampacity program and Appendix R program I

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4 Each discrepancy identified during this evaluation was then documented and evaluated using the following definitions:

Discrepancy - Actual cable installed configuration does not agree with design requirements.

Design Significant - A design, construction, or records

.related discrepancy which, is found to be in nonconformance with the applicable code, standard, or licensing requirements (FSAR/ Design Criteria).

Safety Significant - A design significant discrepancy which, if remained undetected, could result in-the loss of capability of the affected system or structure to perform its.

hg intended safety function.

Violations of separation criteria were reviewed to confirm that the failure modes affecting the design significant cables did not affect the capability to safely shutdown the plant or mitigate an accident.

4.1.2.1 V4/VS Cables Verified as a Result of the Cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R Program Since the objective of the amtacity program was to verify locations of Q-list V4/VS cables and to perform cable ampacity calculations for these cables, this activity was initiated by first reviewing the existing plant Q-list, Q-list additions, and deletions contained in Quality Information Releases (QIRs) to establish an accurate listing of safety-related cables requiring ampacity calculations.

.The number of V4/V5 cables field verified and contained in the ampacity program was confirmed to be 936. Of this 936, a total of 359 safety-related cables existed, with 195 of these requiring an ampacity calculation to support unit 2 restart, and 577 nonsafety V4/V5 cables were field verified.

Also for this activity, Appendix R cables which had L been signal traced were included (11 safety cables and 4 associated cables). The total population of V4/VS cables with field verified data was 951. For these cables, a documentation package was prepared.

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For cables contained within the ampacity program, cable signal tracing was performed in accordance with Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction (SEMI)-62 (reference 6.5), and visual verification was performed by actual in plant observations (conduit and tray entry / exit points) in accordance to Task Instruction TI-E036-01 (reference 6.6).

Walkdown packages were prepared which contained appropriate data sheets, sketches, Maintenance Requurts, and drawing discrepancies. The method of verification was determined by the walkdown data or compilation of walkdown data contained in each cable package. For the Appendix R cables, signal tracing was performed in accordance to SEMI-49 (reference 6.7). The extent of each field verification is documented in the walkdown package.

Each cable package also contains a copy of any drawing discrepancy initiated as a result of the field verification and an evaluation of the discrepancy for design significance to the cable separation requirements contained in the plant design criteria BFN-50-728 El entitled " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems" and Chapter 8 of the FSAR. This evaluation was performed by senior electrical engineers with second party verification.

These cable packages and evaluations are documented by QIR TEPBFN89038.

For each design significant discrepancy a safety significant evaluation was performed and is also documented in the above QIR.

4.1.2.2 V3 Cables Verified As a Result of The Cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R Within the cable ampacity program, 144 V3 cables were required to be field verified because of their location. Seventy-three of these cables were identified by reviewing the ampacity data base for voltage level and load; these V3 cables are control cables 277 volts and less with a protective device setting of 30 amps or less. 122 V3 cables (113 safety; 7 associated; 2 nonsafety) were field verified for Appendix R. These cables were routed on 158 individually identified cable trays (58 Divison I; 49 Division II; 51 non-divisional).

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< Page.8 of'39 Cable packages containing the same information l as that.for V4/V5 were also prepared for these cables.

These cable packages.and evaluations are also documented by QIR TEPBFN89038.

For each design significant discrepancy a safety.

significant evaluation was performed and is also :

, documented in the above QIR.

4.1.3 Results For this total number of cable, 408 drawing discrepancies were identified.- Eight V4/VS drawing discrepancies and three V3 drawing discrepancies were

~ determined to be design significant because the as-installed configuration did not comply with the design criteria or FSAR.' The problems identified in these discrepancies are listed below:

DIV CABLE.

NON-DIV ROUTED IN ,

.DIV CABLE CABLE ROUTED NON-DIV TRAY CABLE. TOTAL DESIGN ROUTED IN NON- IN BOTH DIV AND IN BOTH POPULATION SIGNIFICANT DIV RACEWAY RACEWAY DIV RACEWAY V4/V5 8 6 1* 1 V3 3 1 2 0

• This cable (PL1237) has been upgraded to divisional as a result of the review in section 4.8.

VOLTAGE SEPARATIONS CABLE NUMBER LEVEL DISCREPANCY DEVIATION B522-IE 4 Designed cable route Cable in division I stopped at tray tray, division II IF-ESI. Installer conduit, and added conduit nondivisional tray.

2ES3243-II to reach MOV board 28.

IES3100-II 4 Designed cable route Divisional cable stopped at tray in nondivisional EN-ESII. Installer conduit added conduit IPL387 .

to reach MOV board IB.

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VOLTAGE SEPARATIONS CABLE NUMBER __ LEVEL DISCREPANCY DEVIATION 2ES3915-II 4 Required route was Divisional cable EU-ESII, conduit. in nondivisional Actual route was tray EP; conduit. . Trays, EU-ESII and EP are parallel.

3PC504-II 4 Required route was Divisional cable FK-ESII, FN-ESII, in nondivisional conduit. Actual tray route was FK-ESII, FK, conduit. FN-ESII and FK are parallel, side-by-side, and on the top of two stacks of trays.

i' ES2652-II 4 Required route was Divisional cable GGH-II, ES2652-II. in nondivisional Actual route was tray GGH-II, WFA, ES2652-II 1ES475-I 4 Required route was Divisional cable FN-ESI, 1ES475-I. in nondivisional Actual route was tray FN-ESI, FN, con 6 tit..

PL1237* 4 Required route was Nondivisional cable

. . . FN-I, FK, HR, routed in both 3PL2075. Actual divisions route was . . . FN-I, FK, FK-II, 3PL2075.

1ES3910-II 4 Required route was Divisional cable

. . . FN-II, EF-II. routed in Actual route was nondivisional

. . . EN-II, EF-II, tray air, EG, 1ES3634-II, IES3910-II.

FE4938 3 Required route was Nondivisional all in nondivisional cable routed in raceway. Actual both divisions route was . . . non-div, KXV-I, . . .,

DJ-II.

• This cable has been upgraded to divisional.

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j VOLTAGE SEPARATIONS GABLE NUMBER LEVEL DISCREPANCY DEVIATION K3214 3 Required route was Nondivisional

. . JA-I, SAF . .. cable routed in {

Actual route was both divisions J

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l 3ES445-II 3 Required route was Divisional cabic I panel 9.3, JAQ-II. in nondivisional Actual route was tray.

panel 9.3, JD, JAQ-II.

4.1.4 verification of Data The compilation of this data was audited by Engineering Assurance (EA). The EA audit concluded that the cable

( 24 listing and the quantity of cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate count of field-verified cable routing information and that the cable verification packages are consistent with the data on the cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.

This technical audit BFP89903 is documented by memorandum from A. P. Capozzi to J. D. Hutson dated May 5, 1989 (B05 890505 004) and is included as Attachment 1.

An additional site quality surveillance was conducted to assess the validity of the Appendix R signal trace data performed in accordance to SEMI-49. This included a sample walkdown by Engineering of 13 cables selected from the original SEMI-49 walkdown data with QA monitoring the walkdown. The sample walkdown cable routes were compared to the original walkdown routes and both were in agreement. This is documented in surveillance report QBF-S-89-0983 contained as Attachment 2.

4.1.5 Summary Results and Corrective Action i

As a result of these eleven discrepancies, a safety signification evaluation was performed to determine if the identified conditions would pose a nuclear safety I concern. This evaluation confirmed that none of the l identified separation discrepancies posed a safety l concern because the single failure criteria and functional redundancy were met. These evaluations are i included as Attachment 3..

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In addition TVA also performed an analysis to determine if the eleven design significant deficiencies had a common root ,

cause. Since the majority of the cables were installed during the original construction prior to initial fuel loading, a rigorous analysis could not be accomplished due to the unavailability of change documentation for early cable installations. The result, of this analysis indicated that the eleven discrepancies were not the result of a single specific cause but rather occurred at various stages in a loosely controlled change control process. The process has now been upgraded to procedurally control changes to ensure deviations from design output are reviewed and approved by engineering and are incorporated into the design documents.

This analysis is documented by QIR EEB BFN 89002.

These problems have been documented by CliQRs BFP881105 R1 and BFP870860 R3.

To correct the separation discrepancies, the following corrective actions will be taken:

• Before Unit 2 restart:

TVA will either reroute the divisional cables or have an evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions. The nondivisional cables will either be rerouted or provided with redundant overcurrent protective devices or have an evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 4.

This evaluation is documented by Quality Information Release QIRTEPBFN89038.

From the V4/V5 population (UO U1, U2, U3) 951 field verified cables were sampled. Eight discrepant cables were determined to be design significant as a result of this sample. It can therefore be asserted with 95% confidence that 98% or more of the V4/V5 cables are routed consistent with the design criteria.

From the total V3 population (UO, Ul, U2, U3) 266 field verified cables were sampled. Three discrepant cables were determined to be design significant as a result of this sample. It can therefore be asserted with 95% confidence that 97% or more of the V3 cables are routed consistent with the design criteria.

The above confidence level / quality level percentages are approximate because the population of V3 and V4/V5 cable samples were selected opportunistically rather than randomly (i.e., the sample does not meet the statistical criterion of a random sample). However, this is concluded to be acceptable because of the following:

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V3 Samp1_e

• Approximately 55 percent are cables whose routings are not in agreement with design documents.

• The frequency of occurrence of such discrepant cables in the V3 sample is estimated to be between 2-1/2 times greater than in the V3 cable population as a whole.

• The occurrence frequency of cables having a design significant discrepancy should be highest in that group of cables whose routing deviates from the design documents.

• Since the V3 sample is " enriched" with these types of cables, it is expected that population quality levels are apt to be worse than would be inferred from a true random

,\ sample.

• Therefore, the population V3 statistical inferences are likely to be wrong, but in the conservative direction.

V4/V5 Sample

• The V4/VS sampic size is very large from the statistical viewpoint.

• population quality levels inferred from the sample should be very close to the true population quality level based on the size of the sample.

These statistical analyses were performed by Bechtel North American power Corporation for TVA and are documented in Bechtel Calculation HNG-050 (B22 890509 341) entitled,

" Statistical Analysis - Cable Routing Discrepancies."

This statistical analysis concluded the following:

• Both samples substantiate at least 95 percent confidence of at least 95 percent conformance of the V3 and V4/V5 cable populations with relevant design criteria and FSAR commitments relating to divisional and associated cable separation. The collective routings are in substantial conformance with design and FSAR acceptability criteria.

• Cables containing a design-significant routing deviation may exist in the unsampled elements of the two sampled ,

populations. However, their occurrence frequency is small based on the availablo sampling evidence. Redundancy and conservatism used in the design of commercial nuclear power plants provide margin for the occurrence of some deviant conditions that exceed normal design allowables.

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• No safety-significant deviations were observed in either of the cable samples, despite the large sizes of the samples and the comparatively large proportion of sampled cables whose routing differs from the design specification.

Collectively, the sampling evidence suggests that personnel who installed the cables were cognizant of the design criterin requirements pertaining to divisional and

\ associated cable separation. Where deviations from the design routing occurred, in the vast majority of cases, the re-routed cables are in literal conformance with divisional l and associated cable separation criteria.

In conclusion this evaluation provides the confidence level necessary to allow the conduit and cable design database be used as input for all other evaluations.

4.2 V4 and V5 Cables Which Originate From Safety-related Power Supplies 4.2.1 Purpose This evaluation was performed by ESI to identify electrical separation discrepancies for power cables which originate from safety-related power supplies. This evaluation consisted of 100 percent of the total population of these cables.

4.2.2 Methodology The V4/VS separation evaluation consisted of three separate efforts. The first effort consisted of evaluation of the V4/VS cables contained within the cable ampacity data base. The second effort consisted of a review of V4/VS cables connected to safety- related power sources which were not contained within the cable ampacity data base. The third effort consisted of a review of the circuit path for V4/VS nonsafety-related i cables which did not connect directly to a load device to detenmine if the circuit met the separation criteria.

This analysis was performed utilizing design drawings, the ampacity data base, and the TVA raceway loading report. Additionally, the unit 3 computer-generated cable and conduit schedule was used to evaluate any unit 3 cables routed in unit 2 raceways.

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4.2.3 Results 4.2.3.1 Evaluation of Cables Contained In The Ampacity Data Base Using a tabulation of the trays containing power i cables required for restart, an evaluation was j performed to determine if any cables originating in one division were routed in an opposite division tray. These discrepancies did not meet the requirement that nondivisional cables or circuits (once associated with one division either in a panel, enclosure, or raceway) would not become associated with the opposite division in another panel, enclosure, or raceway.

4.2.3.2 Evaluation of Cables Not Contained In The Ampacity Data Base A review of the connection diagrams for boards providing safety-related power was performed to identify power cables not contained / evaluated in the separation review of the cable ampacity data base. Cable routes were obtained by review of the cable and conduit schedule, or the unit 3 computer cable list as appropriate. This review identified a number of cable tray sections which had not been evaluated for separation discrepancies. The Raceway Loading Schedule was subsequently reviewed to ensure that a power cable originating in one division was not routed with a safety cable of the redundant division.

No separation discrepancies were identified from this review.

4.2.3.3 power Circuit Analysis The cables evaluated during the ampacity and the non-restart review as discussed above were screened to determine which cables did not connect directly to a load device (pump, fan, Motor Operated Valve (MOV), etc.). Each cable connected to a junction device that may have another cable connected (i.e., junction box, disconnect switch, local starter, etc.) was checked to assure any connected cable was not associated with the redundant division.

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Pegs 15 cf 39 Cables were identified that do not terminate in a load device, but terminate in a junction device such as a junction box. These cables were evaluated for separation discrepancies on the premise that other cables terminating in the same junction device may be routed in opposite divisional trays. This evaluation revealed eight cables where the circuit

• route involved both cable tray divisions.

4.2.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions pg l This evaluation identified 101 separation discrepancies.

In addition, the evaluation also identified separation discrepancies associated with previously identified drawing discrepancies and cables with "IE" suffix. These are discussed in subsections 4.1 and 4.7 The discrepancies problems have been documented by CAQRs gg BFP881105 R1, BFP881106 RO, and BFP870860 R3.

The following corrective actions will be taken:

• Before Unit 2 restart:

Sixteen cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation. ,

Eighty-five cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the non-safety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional i dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit g\ l function are identified in Attachment 5.

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• After Unit 2 restart l

The sixteen cables that had been de-energized for restart l gg

] will be modified as appropriate.

i l This evaluation is documented by the TSI report to TVA

. dated November 11, 1988 (B22 881112 244).

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4.3 Nondivisional V4 and VS Cables which originate from

-Nonsafety-Related Power Supplies 4.3.1 Purpose This evaluation was performed by TVA. The purpose of the evaluation was to identify electrical separation discrepancies for nondivisional power circuits Which .

originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.

4.3.2 Methodology This evaluation consisted of two random sample lots consisting of 58 cables in each lot from a total population of 1713 cables. The reason for performing two sample lots was because the total population of cables was not fully established until after the initial sample lot had been determined. The second sample lot was chosen from these additional cables and added to the total population. This evaluation'was performed in accordance with the sampling approach defined in Section 2.0 After the cables were identified, TVA then prepared circuit

. block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. From the block diagrams, the electrical separation of the complete circuit was eva7aated for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.

4.3.3 Results From the evaluation of the circuit block diagrams, no separation discrepancies were identified.

4.3.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions The review results (no separation discrepancies) provide a 95-percent confidence that 95 percent of the circuits within the population meet the separation criteria. Therefore, no corrective actions are required. This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.

4.4 Nondivisional V3 Cables Which Originate From Safety-related Power Supplies 4.4.1 Purpose This circuit analysis was performed by ESI. The evaluation addressed typical nondivisional circuits which originate in safety-related power supplies [i.e., 4160-V ac shutdown boards, 480-V de reactor motor operated valve (MOV) boards, 250-V de reactor MOV boards and power distribution panels NPK2 - 6617W

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(PDP)] to hasure that a fault on a nonsafety cable, combined with a single failure of its protective device, will not cause degradation of both safety-related divisions. For those cases Where analysis of the circuit could not assure that the fault would not propagate to both safety-related divisions, the circuits were evaluated to assure that no association with both divisions exists.

This evaluation consisted of 100 percent of the total population of these cables / circuits.

4.4.2 g,ethodolor.y V3 control circuits are supplied by control power feeds from combination starters at MOV boards, control circuit feeds for 4160V ac and 480-V ac shutdown boards or power distribution feeders. A review of the circuit configuration design was performed to determine if any nonsafety cables terminated inside the panel did not meet the separation criteria. I '.s o ,

due to previously identified problems at drywell penetrations, the nonsafety related circuits connected to V3 division II penetrations in unit 2 were evaluated for single-failure criteria compliance.

4.4.3 Results 4.4.3.1 480V ac MOV Boards, 480V ac Control Bay Vent Boards, 480V ac Diesel Auxiliary Boards, 480V ac Standby Gas Treatment Boards, 250V DC MOV Boards, 480V and 4160V Shutdown Boards.

The results of this evaluation showed that any V3 centrol circuit originating from the above boards which may be routed in the redundant division raceway is protected from faults by two redundant overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fault in a nonsafety related circuit combined with a single protective device failure will not degrade redundant safety divisions.

4.4.3.2 Power Distribution Panels (PDP) (Panel 9-9)

Safety control power for miscellaneous loads is supplied by the Unit Battery Boards located in the control bay and the power distribution panels located in the main control room of each unit. The connection diagrams for the battery boards and the main control room Power Distribution Panels (PDPs) were reviewed to determine which nonsafety circuits originate in the safety sections of these boards.

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Page 18 of 39 Each cable identified.within these circuits was evaluated for (1) cable routing in the. opposite division or (2)! connection to a circuit with an opposite division.

cable or cable routed in an opposite division.= If the circuit was associated with redundant divisions without redundant overcurrent protective' devices, it was considered a separation discrepancy.-

This review identified 27. instances where the nondivisional cables or. circuits originate in a divisional panel and then become associated with the opposite division either in a panel, enclosure, or raceway without redundant overcurrent protection.

4.4.3.3 Drywell Penetrations Review A review of the unit 2 V3 safety-related electrical penetrations for separation discrepancies was performed. Four V3 safety-related penetrations were reviewed (EE, EA,'EB, and EC). TVA had previously identified that nonsafety-related drywell. blower circuits connected to Penetration EE and routed in opposite division raceways. violated the existing g) separation criteria.

The review identified an additional 33 nondivisional circuits connected to'these divisional penetrations which did not meet the separation criteria because the cables terminated in one divisien penetration and were routed in opposite division raceways.

Of these 33 circuits, 25 are considered acceptable because the cable is provided with protection consisting of two safety-related electrical protective devices in series. .This prevents the nonsafety-related circuitry.

from degrading safety-related circuitry as a result of a-postulated fault in the nondivisional circuit. One circuit was evaluated and found to have insufficient electrical energy during either normal operation or i during a postulated faulted condition to'cause fault propagation to other-circuits routed in the penetration or raceway. In addition, one circuit for motor differential current transformers was evaluated to be acceptable because backup protection is provided by an overcurrent trip circuit or ground fault relay which will trip the load breaker.

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.: . Pago 19 cf 39 ,

The remaining six circuits were deemed to be unacceptable because they were protected by single protective devices. This could potentially result in a failure in the penetration and subsequent.

failure in the redundant raceways if the single protective device did not properly operate during a postulated, faulted condition.

l 4.4.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions l

The evaluations performed and described in Subsection 4.4.3.1 revealed that control circuits from MOV boards and switchgear are protected by two overcurrent protective devices and are therefore not subject to a single failure during a fault condition on the nondivisional cable. The remaining evaluations in Subsections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3 identified 49 discrepancies. These problems have been documented by CAQRs gl BFP881105 R1 and BFP881106 RO.

The following corrective actions will be taken:

• Before restart:

Eight cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 operation.

The remaining 41 cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 5.

l

• After restart:

Eight cables will be appropriately corrected that were de-energized for~ restart.

This evaluation is documented by the ESI report to TVA dated November 11, 1988 (B22 881111 245).

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. , Pzgs 20 cf 39 ,

4.5 Nondivisional V3 Cables which Originate from Nonsafety-related power Supplies 4.5.1 Purpose This evaluation was performed by TVA to identify electrical separation discrepancies for nondivisional control cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.

4.5.2 Methodology TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (438). This evaluation was performed in accordance to the sampling approach defined in Section 2.0.

After the cables were identified, TVA then prepared circuit block diagrams which identified cach cable within the circuit, ite. source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. From the block diagrams, the electrical separation of the complete circuit was evaluated for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.

4.5.3 Results From the evaluation of the circuit block diagrams, no separation discrepancies were identified.

4.5.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions The review results (no separation discrepancies) provide a 95-percent confidence that 95 porcent of the circuits within the population meet the separations criteria. Therefore, no corrective actions are required. This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.

4.6 Nondivisional VI and V2 Cables Which Originate From Both Safety-related and Nonsafety-related Power Supplies 4.6.1 Purpose The purpose of this evaluation was to perform an analysis to demonstrate that failure (short or open circuit) of any non-class IE, VI or V2 routed cable will not result in the disabling of redundant Class 1E circuits. This analysis was performed on typical circuits representative of the BFN VI and V2 circuit population. This eliminated the need for individual circuit analyses. This evaluation was performed by ESI.

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A.6.2 Methodology TVA Design Criteria BFN-50-758, " power, Control, and Signal Cables for Use in Class I Structures" (reference 6.1.2) defines the types of cable and circuit functions for V2 as follows:

1. Signal cables for input to and output from the computer (other than thermocouple)

2. Instrument transmitter circuits

3. Recorder circuits

4. RTD circuits greater than 100mV

5. Tachometer circuits

6. Indicator circuits

7. Rotor eccentricity and vibration detector circuits

8. Shielded annunciator cables used with solid-state equipment l

Cable type and circuit functions for type V1 are defined by the same criteria as follows:

1. Thermocouple low-level signal cable

2. Strain gauge low-level signal cable

3. Thermal converter low-level signal cable

4. RTD circuits less than 100mV Other circuit types not addressed by the criteria, but routed in V1 or V2 raceways, or operating at a voltage level consistent with the V1 or V2 definition, were also evaluated. Examples are Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) instrumentation and telephone and communication circuits.

Typical representative equipment / devices, circuit configurations, and cable applications were examined to determine if any internally or externally generated fault in a V1 or V2 circuit is capable of producing sufficient energy or voltage potential to degrade the safety function of adjacent cables.

The evaluation did not individually address all BFN circuits associated with each application reviewed. Typical devices, application, and circuit configurations were reviewed in conjunction with conservative estimates of available short circuit current and cable current capacity. These typical evaluations were considered representative of BFN nonsafety-related V1 and V2 circuits.

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From a review of the possible cable types used for V1 and V2 applications, the cables were categorized as follows:

Application Mark Number Series Wire Size Range Thermocouple WU Series #16 or #20 AWG Telephone and WT Series #18 - #22 AWG Pairs Communications #12 - #26 AWG Coax General Signal and WV Series and #12 - #22 AWG Instrumentation certain WW series Wire size selection for V1 and V2 application is generally not based on current carrying capacity, but rather on circuit resistance. However, for the purpose of this evaluation, it was desirable to establish a " worst case" circuit current limit to assure integrity of circuits and coaxial calle circuits. The smallest wire size designated for use in V1 and V2 applications is #22 AWG. Telephone and communications circuits are not considered because these circuits are power limited and pose no electrical srfetye hazards. Cable deterioration due to circuit current cannot result from fault conditions. This conditica is recognized by NFPA 70-1987, Article 800 (Reference 6.3) which does not stipulate an insulation voltage rating for this cable application.

The current limit for this evaluation was established as 500 mA which is supported by a calculation. The evaluation was then performed using the typical circuit applications and i determining available short circuit currents, and comparing these to the 500mA current limit. Applications with short circuit currents less than f00mA were considered incapable of causing cable insulation deterioration and propagation of damage to adjacent cables. For applications with available short circuit currents above 500mA, actual cable sizes were analyzed or actual routing and separation investigated.

4.6.3 Results 4.6.3.1 Computer Input / Output (I/0) Circuits l This evaluation found that multiple unit power supplies, when analyzed to produce worst case short circuit currents, are capable of currents in excess of the 500mA limit for #22 AWG. However, upon l examination of the specific applications and actual l wire sizes used for each application, it was I l determined that fault currents provided by these l power supplies would not result in deterioration of I

that circuit's cable insulation or insulation for f

any other cable. I NPK2 - 6617W I  ;

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4.6.3.2 Instrument Transmitter Circuits l The evaluation determined that typical transmitter L maximum.available output currents are 60 to 125 mA which is well below the 500mA limit established'in Section 4.6.2. The energy produced by the transmitters-is less than the power supplies;.

therefore, the worst case short circuit current in these circuits is between the power supply and transmitter and was addressed by the evaluations in Subsection 4.6.3.1.

It can therefore be concluded that available short circuit currents in instrument transmitter circuits will not result in cable insulation deterioration to the shorted cable or any adjacent cables.

4.6.3.3 Recorder Circuits Recorders and indicators are load devices which convert analog process signals to operator display information and therefore do not contribute any electrical energy to the circuit. In the event of a short circuit, their presence adds impedance which would assist in limiting short circuit currents.

Analysis of short circuit currents in recorder and

. indicator circuits obtains the same results as those in subsection 4.6.3.1.

4.6.3.4 RTD and Strain Gage Circuits Power sources for these devices are designed to operate in the 4-20mA de range with current limiting features to facilitate use of NFPA 70 Class 2 and 3 wiring.

Typical output is 0.035V de at 35mA using a 10 ohm RTD element. Power source maximum available output current is well below the 500mA limit established in Subsection 4.6.2. In addition, RTD and strain gage operating circuit voltages and currents comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and are classified as an

" inherently limited power source" (Class 2 circuit).

It can therefore be concluded that available short circuit currents in RTD and strain gage circuits will not result in cable insulation deterioration to the shorted cable, or any adjacent cables.

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4.6.3.5 Circuits for Eccentricity, Vibration Detector and Other Miscellaneous Measurements A review of sensor devices Uhich provide input to the amplifier boards shows that signals are smaller in magnitude than the amplifier outputs (with the exception of tachometer generators which have circuits routed as control (V3) voltage level) and therefore pose no problem with respect to short circuit currents.

In addition, the operating circuit voltages and currents for the sensors and amplifiers comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can be classified as an

" inherently limited power source" (Class 2 circuit).

4.6.3.6 Annunciator Circuits The current for these circuits exceeded the 500mA lbmit previously established. This required that the actual annunciator circuit cabling be investigated. The smallest size annunciator circuits typically consist of 2/C-#18 AWG cabling.

For this evaluation, the current limit was established as 4.0A which is supported by calculation which includes an appropriate safety margin.

A comparison of the current limit for #18 AWG cable and the maximum available short circuit current for the Browns Ferry annunciators shows that cable insulation deterioration will not result. In addition, the annunciator circuit voltages and currents comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can be classified as an " inherently limited power source" (Class 2 circuit).

4.6.3.7 Thermocouple Circuits Recorders and millivolt to current (mV/I) transmitters used with thermocouple inputs are designed with high input impedance and do not contribute voltage or current to the thermocouple section of the circuit. Millivolt to current transmitters typically have 4-20mA or 10-50mA outputs and are current limiting. This design is similar to instrument transmitters; therefore, the analysis in Subsection 4.6.3.2 applies.

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+

The maximum available short circuit currents in thermocouple circuits are well below the 500mA limit previously established and therefore cannot result in cable insulation deterioration to the faulted cable or any adjacent cables.

The operating currents and voltages for thermocouple circuits comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can be classified as " inherently limited power source" (Class 2),

4.6.3.8 NSSS and Specialty Instrumentation Circuits Certain NSSS and specialty instrumentation circuits are routed in V1 or V2 raceways. Examples are acoustic valve position indicator circuits, humidity recording circuits, neutron monitoring circuits, and control rod position indication circuits.

The maximum available short circuit currents for these circuits are well below the 500mA limit previously established, and therefore cannot result in cable insulation deterioration to the shorted cable or any adjacent cables.

4.6.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actiong The following conclusions can be drawn:

a. For all circuit applications except de power supplies for process instrument loops and annunciator circuits, the maximum available short circuit current is well below the i

allowable current carrying capacity of the smallest wire

(#22 AWG) used at BFN for V1 and V2 applications (other than telephone / communications or data transfer).

b. For the exceptions noted in a) above (de power supplies for instrument transmitters and annunciator circuits),

current capacity cf actual wire sizes used in those circuits was determined and compared to maximum available short circuit currents. The maximum available short circuit currents are less than the current limits established for actual wire sizes.

c. As a result of conclusions a) and b) above, it can be further concluded that failure (short or open circuit) of any non-class 1E V1 or V2 routed cable will not result in the disabling of redundant class 1E circuits in a manner that would degrade their intended safety function.

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In summary, the results of the analysis demonstrate that I power sources for V1 and V2 cables are " power limited" and consistent with the NFPA 70 Article 725 and 800 definitions for Class 2 and communications circuits, respectively. These circuit categories have limited requirements for overcurrent devices (i.e. not required or permitted as an integral part of the power supply). Detailed analysis of typical circuit applications with V1 and V2 cable routing has demonstrated that short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable insulation even in the event of simultaneous fuse and isolation failure of power supplies.

This evaluation is documented by the ECI report to TVA dated November 11, 1988 (B22 881111 244).

4.7 Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Designated With An "IE" Suffix 4.7.1 Purpose The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate each circuit / cable designated as "IE" or "IES" and determine whether or not this cable is safety-related or nonsafety-related, determine the appropriate division of separation, and to evaluate the circuit routing for compliance to the separation criteria.

4.7.2 Methodology As stated in Section 3.0, safety-related divisional cables at BFN are divided into redundant divisions or channels.

Safety-related cables are those cables that are necessary for safe shutdown, are powered from Class IE sources, have divisional assignment, and are routed in divisional raceways.

During the design at BFN, certain cables were identified as "IE" cables. Originally, these cables powered supporting auxiliaries (i.e. basically the normal and alternate feeders for the safety related electrical power system) and were designed such that the normal and alternate supplies would not share the same raceway. This design was appropriate since automatic transfers between the normal and alternate feeders provided, the required redundancy. However, due to the removal of the automatic transfers this redundancy was eliminated. In addition, later designs inappropriately utilized the IE suffix to maintain special separations for nonsafety-related equipment.

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1 An additional unique suffix "IES" was also used in the design. The cable / conduit number suffix "133" was used to identify the normal circuits providing nechr.ary power to HPCI division I and ADS division I (from ist V de reactor HOV boards to their source: de-battery; ac-diesel generator).

The alternate supply is designated with suffix "IE" and complies with the requirements stated above. The "IES" suffix identifies those circuits that were to be routed in their own individual conduit with the conduit also receiving the "IES" suffix.

TVA began this evaluation by identifying the total population of cables (647 cables) with either an "IE" or an "IES" suffix. TVA then reviewed each circuit function to determine which of these circuits / cables performed a safety-related or nonsafety-related function. After this review, the circuit was evaluated to determine if the cable / circuit was appropriately routed in accordance to the existing separation criteria.

l 4.7.3 Results The results of this review identified 126 cables that should be designated as divisional and 521 cables that should be nondivisional. For the 126 cables that should have been divisional, TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. The circuit block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements. This evaluation identified 20 cables that were inappropriately identified and were routed in divisional and nondivisional raceways and 106 cables that were routed in the correct raceways or dedicated raceways but inappropriately identified as "1E" or nondivisional.

For the 521 cables that should have been nondivisional, TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway systems.

The circuit block diagram was then used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements. This evaluation identified 23 discrepancies in that the cables did not meet the separation criteria by sharing a power supply, enclosure, or raceway with one

.g, division and tnen subsequently sharing an enclosure or raceway with the opposite division.

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4.7.4 Summary Results and Corrective Action This evaluation was conducted for two groups of cables within this population: 1) those that should be designated as divisional and 2) those that should be designated as nondivisional. The "IE" or "IES" designated cables that require upgrade to divisional have been documented by CAQRs BFP881105 R1, BFP881106 RO, and BFP870860 R3.

The following corrective actions will be taken:

• Before Unit 2 restart:

Five cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during Unit 2 plant operation.

Two cables will be deleted.

b Thirty-six problem cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the non safety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function

$\l are identified in Attachment 6.

• After Unit 2 restart:

After restart, 604 of these cables will be corrected by retagging both the cable and the appropriate raceway.

gg Five cables which had power removed for Unit 2 cperation ,

will be appropriately corrected.

This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095. .

4.8 Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List 4.8.1 Purpose The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q-List (issued as a Phase I Q-list)is a list of permanent plant features that are identified as being safety-related or nonsafety-related. The Q-List contains safety-related components and a limited number of nonsafety-related components. This Q-List has identified a number of V4 and V5 cables designated as nondivisional as safety-related.

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The purpose of this evaluation was to determine if the V4 and V5 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related are in fact safety-related and therefore required to be designated as Class 1E and to

. evaluate the adequacy of cable / circuit separation if it is determined to be safety-related.

4.8.2 Methodology The total population of these type cables on the Q-List was i 226. Due to the small quantity involved, TVA chose to perform a 100 percent evaluation of these circuits. After the cables were identified. TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. These block diagrams, issued system design criteria, the project 10CFR50.49 list, the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the circuit performed a safety-related function. If the circuit / cable was determined to be nonsafety-related, no further evaluation was performed because separation evaluations for these cables would be included in the evaluations contained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. If the circuit was determined to be safety-related, the cable block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.

4.8.3 Results From this evaluation. TVA has determined that 27 circuits involving 119 cables should have been designated as Class IE safety-related and cable numbers should contain appropriate divisional suffixes. Based on the requirement that i divisional cable not be routed in nondivisional raceway, the 119 cables do not meet the separation criteria.

4.8.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions From the 100 percent review, TVA identified 119 V4/VS cables that must be upgraded to divisional. In addition, 18 control cables require upgrade and rerouting due to their support cf the V4/VS power system function and are included in the following numbers.

The following corrective actions will be taken:

• Before restart:

Twenty eight ca*1es (10 V4/VS; 18 V3) will either:

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. n Page 30 of 39 Be rerouted.into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective I,

devices added in series to prevent _the non safety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.

Have evaluations-in place to justify optional dispositions These deficiencies are documented.by CAQRs BFP881105 R1 and 08l BFP881106 RO.

In addition, TVA identified one nondivisional cable that was inappropriately connected to another nondivisional cabic that was routed in the redundant division's raceway. This condition is documented by CAQR BFP870860 R3. The corrective action for these cables will involve the rerouting of this cable to another breaker.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in' Attachment 7.

• After restart:

One-hundred and nine cables will be corrected by retagging p,\ both the cable and the appropriate raceway.

TVA will revise the project Q-List to. remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional and to add divisional suffixes, as required. It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with Site Director's Standard Practice (SDSP) 3.10, "Use of Q-List."

This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.

4.9 Nondivisional V3 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List 4.9.1 Pu rpose The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q-List has identified a number of V3 cables designated as nondivisional as safety-related.

The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate these V3 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related to determine if the cable is in fact safety-related, and to evaluate the cable / circuit separation to ensure appropriate routing.

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. . Pig 3 31 cf 39 . j 4.9.2 Methodology '

TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (818). This evaluation was performed in accordance to the sampling approach defined in Section 2.0.

After the cables were identified. TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. These block diagrams, issued system design criteria, the project 10CFR50.49 list, the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the primary function of the circuit performed a safety-related function. If the circuit / cable was determined to be non safety-related, no further evaluation was performed because separation evaluations for these cables would be included in the evaluations contained in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. If the circuit was determined to be safety-related, the circuit block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.

During the evaluation of these 58 cables, one nondivisional cable was identified that was routed in division I, division II, and nondivisional raceways. Because of this problem TVA expanded this sample to 95 cables even though the acceptance criteria for failure was not violated. This problem was also identified by the ESI evaluation in Section 4.4.

4.9.3 Results From this sample evaluation of 95 cables TVA has determined that none of the cables evaluated should have been designated as class 1E safety related. However, one nondivisional cable that was routed in division I, division II, and nondivisional raceway was identified by TVA, as well as by the-ESI evaluation discussed in Section 4.4.

4.9.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions From this sample evaluation TVA has determined that none of the cables evaluated should have been designated as Class 1E safety related.

The following corrective action will be implemented after restart:

TVA will revise the project Q-List to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional. It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with Site Director's Standard Practice (SDSP) 3.10. "Use of Q-List."

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This sample provides a 95 percent confidence level that 95 percent of the cables within the population are nondivisional.

This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.

4.10 Nondivisional VI and V2 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List 4.10.1 Purpose The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q-List has identified a number of VI and V2 cables designated as nondivisional as safety-related. The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate these V1 and V2 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related to determine if the cable is in fact safety-related and therefore required to be designated as Class 1E and to evaluate the cable / circuit separation if the cable was determined to be safety-related.

This evaluation was performed to supplement the ESI evaluation performed in subsection 4.6.

4.10.2 Methodology TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (549). This evaluation was performed in accordance to the sampling approach defined in Section 2.0.

After the cables were identified, TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. These block diagrams, issued system design criteria, the project 10CFR50.49 list, the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the primary function of the circuit performed a safety-related function. If the circuit / cable was determined to be nonsafety-related, TVA then evaluated the physical circuit connections and circuit function to determine if the cable was physically interconnected to a divisional circuit.

TVA then evaluated the circuit / cable to determine if it was electrically isolated from the divisional circuit.

4.10.3 Results From this sample evaluation TVA has determined that none of the circuits evaluated should have been designated as Class 1E safety-related. The physical connection evaluation and functional evaluation determined that either the cables within the sample are not physically connected to divisional circuits or they are adequately isolated to prevent potential damage to the safety-related circuitry in the event of cable failure.

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4.10.4 Summary of Results and Corrective Actions I i

From the sample review, TVA identified no circuits that required upgrade to divisional. A review of the physical i connections and function of the circuit verified that no )

adverse interactions between nonsafety-related circuits and j safety-related circuits existed. "

The following corrective action will be done after restart: i TVA will revise the project Q-List to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be i nonsafety-related and nondivisional. It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10. "Use of Q-List."

This sample provides a 95 percent confidence that 95 percent of the circuits within the population are nondivisional and have no adverse impact on safety-related circuits.

This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.

4.11 Divisional VI and V2 Cables 4.11.1 Purpose The purpose of this evaluation was to perform a similarity ,

analysis of divisional VI and V2 cables to show they have similar cirnuit functions as those analyzed in section 4.6 concluding that any internally or externally generated fault

is not capable of producing sufficient energy or voltage J

potential to degrade the safety function of adjacent cables.

The only potential for cable damage would then be from an kkg external source, i.e., fire, pipe whip, jet impingement.

4.11.2 Methodolor3 This evaluation was performed as follows:

• Review of the ESI report for nondivisional V1/V2 cables (section 4.6) to determine if similar types of circuits existed for divisional cables.

• Review existing pipe rupture evaluations to determine the degree and depth of review.

• preparation of V1/V2 Appendix R cable list.

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• Verification of cable routing for the' Appendix R V1/V2 cables Which require spatial separation in accordance to Section III.G of-Appendix R. This verification will be performed in accordance to Walkdown Data Package No.

EEB-006 entitled " Cable Routing Verification" (Attachment 8)~and shall be accomplished by one or more of

-the following methods:

Visual trace of the conduit (s) and/or cable-tray (s) that the cable is routed in from cable origin point to cable.

destination point.

If the entire' route cannot be visually traced, the-conduit (s) and/or cable tray (s) that the cable is routed in'shall be identified by reading conduit tagging, tray

. labeling, or drawings, and the cable entry and exit' points verified.

fb .If cables are routed in flamastic coated trays the routing.

does not have to be visually verified or verified by radiodetection if the routing can be determined from the cable tray entry and exit points.

4.11.3 Results The results of this evaluation confirmed that:

• The circuit types discussed in the ESI report can be L applied to Class IE circuits with the-exception of radiation monitors. .The radiation monitor circuits were evaluated and the short circuit current was within the requirements defined in the ESI. report.s s

• Existing pipe rupture evaluations have adequately documented that no unacceptable pipe whip / jet impingement interactions involving cables exist.

• Sixty-two V1/V2 Appendix R cables exist (two cables were removed from the required cable list on May 16, 1989 as a result of revised calculations for Appendix R shutdown requirements).

• The 62 Appendix R V1/V2 cables were verified to be located as chown on design output drawings.

4.11.4 Summary Results and Corrective Antions As demonstrated in section 4.6 power sources for V1/V2 cables are " power limited" and an analysis of typical circuit applications has demonstrated that short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable insulation even in the event of simultaneous fuse and isolation failure of power supplies.

This evaluation is documented by QIR BFEBFN89054.

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Pega 35 of 39 The only potential source of damage to divisional V1/V2

~

cables is from an external source such as pipe rupture or fire. TVA's pipe rupture evaluations have confirmed that safety is not compromised as a result of a pipe break. This-evaluation is' documented in Civil Engineering Branch Report CEB 88-06-C entitled " Pipe Rupture Evaluation. Program for Inside and Outside Primary Containment for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2" (B41 881114 005). The only source of damage is from an external fire. Therefore, TVA has field verified and evaluated the 62 V1/V2 Appendix R required cables identified in QIR TEPBFN89038. No corrective' actions are required. This field verification is documented by QIR BFEBFN83055.

4.12 Evaluation of Cables Contained in Divisional and Nondivisional Cable Trays that Physically Connect 4.12.1 Purpose fl While perfotning the evaluation of field verified cable data in section 4.1, drawing' discrepancies for unit 3 cables were identified where divisional cable was routed on nondivisional cable tray. The reason for this is that in some instances divisional trays and'nondivisional trays are physically attached as shown in Figure 4.12 with a common intersection node point in the Unit 3 computer cable routing program.

Since the Unit 3 computer cable routing program automatically routes cables, it was possible for nondivisional cables to route undetected through these divisional /nondivisional intersections and then route in an opposite division tray.

The purpose of-this evaluation was to identify these situations and evaluate the cables common to these intersections to determine conformance to the separations criteria.

4.12.2 Methodology This evaluation was first begun by identifying the cable tray nodes from the unit 3 computerized cable routing program that have nondivisional and divisional trays with the same node assignment. From this node listing the physical cable tray drawings were reviewed to determine if the nondivisional and divisional cable trays physically connected. If a condition existed such as that shown in Figure 4.12 computer printouts of the nondivisional cables which passed through the common-node point where obtained. These cables were then evaluated to determine if they associated with any cables of the opposite redundant division.

4.12.3 Results and Corrective Actions This evaluation identified 30 individual nodes that consisted of nondivisional/ divisional connections. Evaluation of these nodes identified three configurations that required a detailed review of the cables passing through the NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/35/ BEN "T "----____m _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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1 intersection. From a review of the nondivisional cables it "

was determined that two additional cables, other than those previously identified in the preceding sections, violated the l separation criteria. These problems have been documented by CAQR BFP870860. The following corrective actions will be taken:

G Before restart:

The two cables will either be rerouted into appropriate raceways, have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry, have their power removed, or have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 5. Since the Unit 1 and 2 cables are manually routed, this problem is not applicable to Units 1 and 2.

j This evaluation is documented in QIR TEPBFN89042.

5.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Summary From the twelve evaluations discussed in Section 4.0, TVA identified kl the following types of discrepancies associated with conformance to the electrical cable separation criteria:

Failure to control the routing of nondivisional cables to ensure that once a nondivisional cable becomes associated with one division in a panel, enclosure, or raceway, it does not become associated with the opposite division.

Failure to apply an appropriate criteria for cables with "IE" suffix.

Failure to categorize certain cables / circuits as safety-related.

Failure to adequately control the installation of divisions 1 cables in the appropriate raceways.

The evaluations consisted of the following:

1. A review of field verified cabic routing data from TVA's cable gl ampacity program and Appendix R program.

2. A 100-percent review of V4/V5 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies.

3. A random sample of nondivisional V4/V5 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.

4. A 100-percent review of V3 nondivisional cables which originate from safety-related power supp1 des.

i 1

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5. A random sample of nondivisional V3 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.

6. A generic analysis of typical nondivisional V1/V2 circuits which originate from both safety-related and nonsafety-related power supplies.

7. A 100 percent review of cables designated with an "IE" suffix.

8. A 100 percent review of nondivisional V4/V5 cables contained in the project Q-list.

9. A random sample of nondivisional V3 cables contained in the project Q-list.

10. A randcm sample of nondivisional V1/V2 cables contained in the project Q-list.

11. A generic analysis of typical divisional Vl/V2 circuits.

fl 12. A review of unit 3 divisional and nondivisional cable trays that physically connect.

A complete review of V3 divisional cables was not performed because no known design separation discrepancies existe; at the time the evaluations were started except for the potential that "IE" cables and V3 nondivisional Q-list cable may have been improperly designated. The results of the reviews performed further substantiates that such a review was unnecessary to confirm the adequacy of V3 divisional separation.

The evaluations required the preparation of three reports by ESI, and the evaluation of over 2500 cables by TVA to ensure conformance to the electrical separation criteria.

From these evaluations TVA identified 947 cables that did not meet the existing separation criteria of which 263 require upgrade to safety-related with complete divisional separation. Two hundred and thirty-four of these discrepancies require potential physical plant f changes such as cable rerouting, the additica of redundant protective devices or a technical evaluation to justify optional dispositions prior to restart and 713 required nonphysical changes such as retagging after restart. Thirty cable reroutes will be performed after restart on cables that were de-energized for restart.

In addition, TVA identified two additional conditions which violate the single failure criteria and are outside the scope of this report: (1) divisional circuits powered from an opposite division power supply and (2) nondivisional circuits that perform redundant safety functions powered from the same divisional source.

Corrective actions will be determined and implemented in accordance with the existing TVA CAQR procedures.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/37/BFN

________._______s

Paga 38 cf 39 TVA has grouped any modifications required to correct these separation discrepancies into two categories: 1) physical plant changes and 2) nonphysical plant changes and into two milestones:

(1) restart and (2) after restart.

Physical plant changes which include the addition of redundant protective devices or the rerouting of cable will be performed prior to restart. Non-physical changes associated with exceptions to design criteria or other input documents that are required as input for design changes will also be completed as required by the design change milestone. Non-physical changes associated with retagging of conduit, cable tray, or cables will be completed post restart.

5,2 Conclusien TVA has performed an extensive evaluation to resolve discrepancies identified as a result of inadequate electrical sepatation. These evaluations consisted of a review of twelve separate cable categories as described in Section 4.0. (One category incomplete at time of report submittal.)

These evaluations, along with implementation of the corrective sctions identified, provide the following conclusions:

1. Nonsafety-related low-voltage power and control cables can be associated with both safety-related divisions if redundant overcurrent protection is provided for the nonsafety cable.

2. Except for Appendix R cables, separation of medium-level and low-level instrumentation circuits are of no concern because short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable hg insulation even in the event of simultaneous fuse and isolation failure of pcwer supplies.

3. Pipe break evaluations have confirmed that safety is not comprised as a result of pipe break.

4. Safety-related cab.es are properly identified as such, inclu$ lag the division to which they are associated, and properly routed in raceways.

5. The cable and conduit schedule, on which much of the separation criteria compliance is based, is sufficiently accurate to use as input for these evaluations. Discrepancies in the cable and conduit schedule have been shown to have no safety impacts.

In conclusion, as a result of these extensive evaluations and with concurrent implementation of the resulting corrective actions TVA has the confidence level necessary to ensure that the routing of cables at BFN will meet the existing separation criteria; therefore, providing safe operation of unit 2.

NPK2 - 6617W

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6.0 REFERENCES

l 6.1, Design Criteria

-6.1.1 BFN-50-728 R1.(B30880531001) Physical Independence of Electrical Systems 6.1.2 BFN-50-758 R0 (B30870731020) Power, Control, and Signal Cables for Uca in Class I Structures 6.2 ~ Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Phase I Q-List, Drawing Number 47A302-1.R000 issued February 26, 1988 6.3' National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-1987, National Electrical Code 6.4 Probability and Statistics for Engineers, Prentice-Hall second edition, 1977, by I. Miller and J. E. Fruend.

6.5 Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction (SEMI) 62 " Cable Route Verification"

- \ 6.6' Task Instruction TI-E036-01 R7 "Ampacity Walkdowns for TSD-Ello and Cable Issues for TSD-E036" 6.7 Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction (SEMI) 49 " Routing Verification of Cables Associated with 10CFR50 Appendix R.

Section III.G. Compliance" 7.0 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Engineering Assurance Technical Audit BFT89903 -

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Electrical Cable Verification Attachment 2 - Site Quality Assurance Quality Surveillance Assessment of Cable Verification by SEMI-49 Attachment 3 - Safety Significant Evaluation of Design Significant Drawing Discrepancies

$\ Attachment 4 - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for Field Verified Cables Requiring Corrective Actions Attachment 5 - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for V3 Nondivisional cables Powered From Safety-related Power Supplies and V4/VS Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Powered From Safety-related Power Supplies Requiring Corrective Actions Attachment 6 - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for "IE" Derignated Cables Requiring Corrective Actions Attachment 7 - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for V4/VS Nondivisional Q-List Cables Requiring Corrective Actions Attachment 8 - Walkdown Data Package - Cable Routing Verification -

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I Attachment 1 Engineering Assurance Technical Audit BFT89903 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant' Electrical Cable Verification 4

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• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

' Memorandum n Recod TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORIk'Y B05 '89 0 50 5 004 l TO  : J. D. Hutson, Chief Electrical Engineer WT llc 68I-K ] {

FROM  : A. P. Capozzi, Engineering Assurance Manager, WT 12B 34H-K DATE  : MAY 5 1989

SUBJECT:

ENGINEERING ASSURANCE TECHNICAL AUDIT BFT 89903 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) ELECTRICAL CABLE VERIFICATION I. PURPOSE The purpose of this memorandum is to transmit the results of audit BFT 89903 conducted April 10 through May 3, 1989.

II. BACKGROUND This audit was conducted by Engineering Assurance (EA) to evaluate the cable data assembled by Electrical Engineering. This data was subsequently used to develop the cable listing, the categories,'and quantities of field-verified cable routings for the Browns Ferry cable separations program.

The audit was conducted as planned, and the postaudit conference was conducted on May 4, 1989.

The attached audit report summarizes the results of the audit and provides recommendations from the audit team.

III. CONCLUSIONS The cable listing developed by Electrical Engineering and the quantity of cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate count of field-verified cable routing information.

The cable verification packages are consistent with the data on the cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.

Deviations identified during the field walkdowns of cables and the preparation of the verification packages were appropriately evaluated and categorized by Electrical Engineering.

Minor documentation inconsistencies were observed and corrected during j the audit.

Three areas requiring improvement and follow-up were noted (these areas do not affect the above conclusions):

1. The Appendix R field walkdowns identified cable routings which were in disagreement with the conduit and cable schedule drawing (45C800 drawings), but no drawing discrepancies (DDs) were initiated.

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

. 2 J. D. Hutson Pt4Y 5 1989  !

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ENGINEERING ASSURANCE TECHNICAL AUDIT BFT 89903 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) ELECTRICAL CABLE VERIFICATION i i

2. Inconsistencies with several cable's cafety classification were noted I that conflict with the ampacity program.

3. Several cables were found by the project to be routed according to 4 design drawings, but the design drawings were in error with respect to separation requirements. There was no evidence that these errors were being dispositioned according to the NEP-9.1 process via existing CAQRs. Electrical Engineering has agreed to revise the existing CAQRs as necessary to correct this area.

Additional detail on the above areas is contained in the attached report.

IV. RESPONSE REOUEST A response is required for the three items identified as areas for improvement in section II of the report. Responses should be provided to EA within 30 days of the issue date of this memorandum. If you have any jj questions concerning this report, please contact J. Semore at extension 2376.

6 A.'P.'Capod21 JWS:KRM Attachment cc (Attachment):

RIMS, ET SLE 26P-K T. E. Burdette, LP AN 65E-C  ;

D. P. Burrell, NE, Al2-EDB, BFN W. H. Hannum, BR IN 77B-C S. L. Hunt, WT 12B 45H-K K. R. Major, WT 12B 47H-K L. E. Martin LP AN ASA-C F. L. Moreadith, WT 12A 12A-K G. R. Mullee, BR SS 168A-C J. F. Rinne, NE. EDB D1, BFN

• M. L. Rollins, LP AN,81A-C D. J. Skridulis, PAB-C, BFN R. J. Smith, NE A10. BFN G. G. Turner, NQA, BFN H. H. Weber, Site Director's Of fice, PAB-E, BFN

0. J. Zeringue PAB-E, BFN NPK1 - 3747I EA 5-4-89

.____-__-__a

.;.m.;. QA Record ADDIT TITLE: Engin03 ring As!uranco T2chnical Audit, Browns Ferry Elsetrical ,

'- Cable Verification AUDIT NUMBER: BFT89903 DATES OF AUDIT CONDUCT: April _10 through May 2, 1989 I. PURPOSE This audit was conducted by Engineering Assurance (EA) to evaluate the cable data assembled by Electrical Engineering which was subsequently used to develop the cable listing, the categories, and quantities of field verified cable routings for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) cable separations program.

II.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS The audit results indicate:

• The cable data collection and evaluation were performed in a systematic, thorough manner and the cable listing developed by Electrical Engineering and the quantity of cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate count of field verified cable routing information.

• The-cable verification packages are consistent with the data on this cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.

• Deviations identified during the field walkdowns of cables and the preparation of the verification packages were appropriately evaluated and categorized by Electrical Engineering.

Minor documentation inconsistencies were observed and corrected during the audit. In addition, three areas requiring improvement and follow-up were noted (these areas of improvement do not affect the above conclusions):

1. The Appendix R field walkeowns identified cable routings which were in disagreement with the conduit and cable schedule drawing (45C800 drawings). The discrepancies were appropriately recognized and evaluated by the project; however, no drawing deviation (DD) was initiated to correct the conduit and cable schedule drawings. DDs should be initiated to ensure correction of the conduit and cable schedule drawings.

2. Inconsistencies with several cable safety classifications were noted. The cable separations summary list identified some cables as

" safety," while the cable verification package identified the cabic as " Associated." The inconsistencies resulted because the ampacity l program defined associated cables as cables not required for unit 2 l but routed in raceways with unit 2 required cables. Electrical Engineering correctly classified the cable as safety or associated in the cable listing.

, NPK1 - 3704I I EA 5/2/89 L

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EA b21 icv 3 that th3 ccf;ty cic sificcticn inconnicttncies cra e source of confusion which should be corrected in the cable ampacity program to be consistent with the proper definition of associated cables.

3. Several cables such as P284, 3ES3686-II, IPL2052, 2PL5575, 2ES3026-II, and 3B193-IE were found by the project to be routed according to the design drawings but the design drawings were in error with respect to maintaining the separation requirements. For example, cables P284, 3ES3686-II, IPL2052, and 2PL5575 were associated with one divisional power source and subsequently routed in the opposite divisional trays, while safety cables 2ES3026-II and 3B193-IE were routed in nondivisional trays. An evaluation of these cables verified that they were in fact routed according to the design drawings; however, it was not apparent that these design errors had been dispositioned according to the NEP-9.1 process.

Subsequently, Electrical Engineering has agreed to revise the existing CAQRs BFP870860, BFP881105, and BFP881106 to include these design errors as necessary.

III. APPROACH AND RESULTS Using the Appendix R and cable ampacity prograns as sources. Electrien1 Engineering developed a listing of field verified cable. For each cable, the listing identified the voltage level, the safety classification, field verification method, etc. The team independently reviewed this listing and the cable verification data packages to verify that there was no duplication of cable numbers and the number of cables in each category agreed with the number presented by Electrical Engineering. The quantities arrived at from EA's review of the cable listing agreed with the quantities presented by Electrical Engineering.

To assemble the cable data, Electrical Engineering prepared cable verification data packages. A verification package was developed for each field verified cable. The package included: pertinent walkdown package information; a summary sheet (identifying, for example, the cable number, voltage level, field verification method, drawing discrepancy involving the cable); a discrepancy evaluation sheet (if a discrepancy existed in the walkdown package or had been previously identified to involve the cable); and a verification package cover sheet.

To assess the accuracy of the data collection, EA selected a sample of 145 verification cable packages from the V4/V5 cable listing and 45 from the V3 listing, compared the walkdown information and discrepancy evaluation sheets to the summary sheat data, and to the summary cable listing information. The objective was to confirm for the samples selected that the information in the verification package regarding cable number, voltage level, safety classification, field verification method, etc., is consistent with the walkdown package and the cable listing. (Sample sizes and cables reviewed are identified on attachment 1.) EA's review determined that the cable verification packages were consistent with the data on the cable list and support the evaluation of deviations.

UPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89

s . . .:

l A camplo cf enblo verification pick gra was also technically rr, viewed to' deterinine if discrepancies had been properly identified, evaluated, and appropriately categorized (i.e. , nondesign significant, or design significant). (Sample sizes and cables reviewed are identified'on attachment 1.) Except for two areas requiring improvement discussed above, discrepancies were found by EA's review to be appropriately identified, evaluated, and categorized by Electrical Engineering.

In addition, a sample of verification packages that included cable routings that were identified as " partial walkdown" were evaluated to i determine if the walkdown provided adequate assurance of the partial.

cable routing. The field verified walkdown data assembled for those cables where only a partial routing was verified was judged by EA to provide reasonable assurance of the cable's partial routing.

IV. RESPONSE REQUIREMENT You are requested to submit a response for each of the three areas for-improvement discussed in section II of this report. Responses should be provided to EA within 30 days of the issue date of this audit report.

l NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89 i

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Attachment 1 Page l'of 4 AUDIT SAMPLE SELECTION The EA review of the cable verificati0n packages as selected by the Task Project for confirmation of field routing was performed in two parts. Part A involved comparing the verification package information to the cable listing information. Part B involved technically evaluating the categorization of discrepancies and partial walkdowns. One hundred percent of the cables evaluated by the project to have design significant discrepancies were included in the EA Team's review sample. The cables selected for audit and extent of the audit are presented below.

V3 Part A V3 Parts A and B

1. 27 cables were reviewed. 1. An additional 18 cables were reviewed.

2. This represents 10% of the cables 2. This represents 6% of the cables available, available.

3. See page 2 of Attachment 1 for the 3. See page 2 of Attachment 1 for a listing of cables reviewed. listing of the cables reviewed.

Voltar.e level V4/V5 (Part A) V4/VS Parts A and B

1. 95 cables were reviewed. 1. An additional 50 cables were reviewed.

2. This represents 10% of the cables 2. This represents 5% of the cables available. available.

3. See page 3 of Attachment 1 for 3. See page 4 of Attachment 1 for a the listing of cables reviewed. listing of the cables reviewed.

Note: Verification packages were not prepared by the project for V1/V2 cable because of the icw energization level available to these cables. The team agreed with this decision. The team reviewed all 64 of the V1/V2 Appendix R listed cables.

NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89

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Attachment 1

• Page 2 of~4 CABLES REVIEWED V3 Part A 1ES 105-I IV2778 PL All 1ES 125-I 2ES 1189-I' LTG-WR (LC51) 1ES 2976-11 2ES 3670-11 LTG-WR (LC50) 1ES 488-1 2ES 541-I 1ES 30-I 1ES 58-I 2ES 547-I 1ES 452-I

'1ES 80-I ES 104-I 2ES 315-I 1PP 629 ES 3258-II 3PP 569 IV 2182 ES 3259-II A556.

IV 2626 M 144 P295 V3 Parts A and B A 557 ES 1347-I FE 4937 K 2571 ES 1355-I FE 4938 K 3214 ES 1709-IA 1ES 100-1 P 283 ES 3256-II 1ES 1167-I P 284 ES 79-I 3ES 3686-II P 294 FE 4936 3ES 4453-II NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89 ,

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Attachment 1

.Page 3 of 4

' CABLES REVIEWED V4/VS Part A ES 2588-II 1ES 2950-II 1ES 3671-II ES 3700-II 1ES 2962-II 1K 575 ES 88-I 1ES 300 'i 1PC 1003-II

1. PL 1225 1ES 3000-II IPC 504-II PLL 1 1ES'3013-II 1PL 474 PLR 2012 1ES 3026-II IPL 545 PLW 444 IES 3038-II 1PL 575 PLW 620 1ES 3305-II 1PL 635-I N/0-1-4EA-I 1ES 3325-II 1PL 650-IE 1ES 1150-1 1ES 3338-II 1PL 691 1ES 2900-II 1ES 3635-II 1PL 704 1ES 2925-II 1ES 3650-II 1PL 754 1PL 769 IPL 5149 IV 2460 1PL 812 1PL 5637 1V 2465 1PL 817 IV 1950 IV 2500 1PL 875 IV 2150 IV 2508 1PL 900 IV 2160 IV 2516 1PL 953 IV 2170 2B77-IE 1PL 967 IV 2180 2B81-IE 1PL 1069 IV 2235 2B89-IE 1PL 1075 IV 2300 2B 92-IE 1PL 3800 IV 2308 2K 575 1PL 5140 IV 2317 2ES 2850-II 2PC 700-I 3ES 600-1 3ES 4070-II 2PL 1075 3ES 3700-II 3ES 4365-II 2PL 2450 3ES 3712-II 3ES 4450-II 2V 2170 3ES 3720-II 3PL 2014 3G 476 3ES 3725-II 3PL 2040 3G:901 3LS 3735-II 3PL 5600-IE 3ES 500-1 3ES 4040-II 3PL 285 3ES 513-1 3ES 4050-II 3PP 732 3ES 526-I 3ES 4060-II NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89

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6-Attachment 1 Page 4 of 4 CABLES REVIEWED V4/V5 P. arts A and B B 226 1ES 3075-II IPL 5650 B 230 1ES 3100-II IV 125 8 522-IE 1ES 3188-II IV 133 ES 141-I 1ES 3910-II IV 2412 ES 2652-II 1ES 475-I IV 2437 ES 2850-II 1PL 2052 2B 88-IE PL 1237 IPL 2055 2B 93-IE IB 81-I 1PL 468 2ES 2900-II 1B 84-I 1PL 809 2ES 3013-II 1B 88-I 1PL 818 2ES 3175-II 1B 89-I IPL 825 2ES 3660-II 1ES 2975-II 1PL 5135 2ES 3725-II 3B 193-IE 3ES 3188-II-SP 2ES 3915-II 3K 80 3ES 450-I 2ES 688-I 3V 2450 3ES 4780-II 2K 618 3ES 3026-II-SP 3ES 4782-II 2PL 5575-IE 3ES 3188-II 3PC 504-II 3

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Attachment 2

'h Page 1 of 2-i

- Electrical Engineering l Audit Team Members Representatives l

R. Harvey. .

J. Hutson

, D. L. Malone.(Team Leader) R. C. Williams

i. J. W. Samore l: M. Von Schimmelmann W. D. Webb Preaudit Conference Attendees (April 7, 1989)

J. Hutson D. L. Malone J. W. Samore-M. Von Schimmelmann Postaudit conference Attendees (May 4, 1989 via telecon)

D. L. Malone J. Hutson R. C. Williams a.

NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89

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Attachment 2 Page 2 of 2 i"V j

t dr/O D. L. Malone, Audit Team Leader Date 6ki k Ar S/5/M g - < .

R. Harvey, Audit Team Member Date

i. &). 4/ne r/r/M J. W. Semore, Audit Team Member Date E.r.wA '-] Yhff?

M. J. Von Schimmelmann, Audit Team Member Date l

W b . 9(/b h b 5/Q/gq W. D. Webb, Audit Team Member Date NPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89 l

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Attachment 2' Site Quality Assurance Quality Surveillance

~ Assessment Report of Cable Verification by SEMI-49.

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3 txnEn STATES covEnx.vE" R24 8 9 04 24 99.0 Memorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

-TOl  : R. J. Smith, Engineering Manager, Nuclear Engineering, Browns Ferry Engineering Project, EDB A10 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

'FROM  : G. G. Turner, Site Quality Manager. PSB K. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant o^"  :

MAY u 41983

SUBJECT:

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) DEPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R TO SPECIAL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT Reference Your memorandum to me. April 12, 1989 (B22 890421 002, Attached)

QS was requested by Nuclear Engineering (NE) to perform a surveillance of SEMI-49 and samples of completed walkdown packages on the Appendix R cable separation walkdown.

Surveillance QBF-S-89-0852 involved the review of SEMI-49 to the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N18.7 requirements for quality related inspections (walkdowns). Also, a review was performed on 13 completed walkdown packages that were performed in 1985.

SEMI-49 did not meet the ANSI N18.7 requirements in the following six areas.

1. Acceptance criteria not specified.

2. Use of calibrated measuring and test equipment.

3. No requirement for training and qualifications of walkdown personnel.

4. No requirement for second party or independent ' verification.

5. Package be uniquely and sequentially numbered.

6. No method for identifying and tracking nonconformances.

The data packages did not meet the requirements of ANSI N18.7 and SEMI-49 in the following five areas.

1. No documented training.

2. No listing of cable radio-detection equipment. "

3. Packages not uniquely identified and pages not sequentially numbered.

• 4 No data cover sheets, as required by SEMI-49, for documented reviews and approvals (packages not complete as QA records).

S. SEMI 49 data coversheet required justification for exceptions provided. Letters "C" and "D" were given as justification, however, "C" and "D" were not explained.

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. 8 R. J. Smith h5Anf 0 41939 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) DEPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R TO SPECIAL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT Also, NE requested a survey (QBF-S-88-0937) of Appendix R walkdown packages that were performed in 1987. Forty-seven packages were reviewed. The same programmatic problems existed in these packages because they were performed to the same SEMI-49. The following documentation problems were identified.

1. No disposition for conduits not tagged.

2. Cable routes not listed

3. Same mode point listed twice.

4 No cable function diagram.

5. Data sheet signed that cable routes were verified, however, documentation indicated otherwise (example - Cable not installed.

A potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR), BFA890332, was written during the first surveillance (QBF-S-89-0852) for the packages performed in 1985. The CAQR has been invalidated. NE has committed not to use the data for any design input (calculations, as-built drawings, etc). The data will be used only as additional information for cable separation assessment.

Because of the procedural and documentation problens identified, questions were raised concerning the accuracy of the data to address this issue. NE agreed to perform a sample walkdown of 13 cables selected from the original SEMI-49 walkdown. This sample was approximately 10 percent of the original total cables walked down (126 cables). QS performed monitoring of the sample walkdown. The monitoring involved the walkdown of two cables (3ES151-I and 1ES2867-II) and a separate walkdown surveillance of cable ES3259-II. .

A review of all 13 completed packages was performed to ensure the requirements to the walkdown procedure (WDP-006, revision 0) were met. One Corrected-on-the-Spot item was identified. This involved the data package for cable IV12625 where the cable route did not match the drawing. A drawing discrepancy was issued when reported

• by QS to the responsible NE management.

l No other condition adverse to quality was found during the reviews and monitorings of the sample walkdowns. QS compared the sample walkdown cable routes tc the original walkdown routes and they both agreed. The above findings are reported in surveillance QBF-S-89-0983.

1 , .

j (op.w A4 8 5)

STATES cover.wEsr 822 '89 0421 002 h107dn d um QA Record TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY TO  : G. C. Turner, Site Quality Manager, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, PSB K-BFN FROM  : R. J. Smith, Project Engineer. Browns Ferry Engineering Project, Nuclear Engineering, EDB A10-BEN APR 211959

SUBJECT:

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - APPLICATION OF DATA RETRIEVED USING SPECIAL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI)-49

Reference:

Potential Condition adverse to Quality Report (CAQR)

BFQ890332 This memorandum responds to an action item from the ecview of the referenced potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) which occurred on April 20, 1989. Specifically, clarification is provided as to how the data retrieved using SEMI-49, " Routing Verification of Cables Associated with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III, C Compliance" will be used by Nuclear Engineering.

As stated in this CAQR review board meeting on April 20, 1989, the data retrieved using SEMI-49 will be used in support of the Cable Separations Discovery Program at BFN. This information will not be used as direct design input for design documents.

If you have any questions concerning this subject, contact D. T., Langley at extension 5150 for assistance.

[ R.' J. Smith DTL:BtD cc: RIHS, ET SLE 26P-K '

J. D. Hutson, WT 11C 68I-K J. H. Rinae, EDB Dl-BFN H. H. Weber, PAB E-BFN 1

g 0215c/83 bI

"-lf

Bw, U.S. Savines Bonds Recularly on the Payroll Savin.ns Plan

.___ a

2'  :. -

-3 R. J. Smith fA40( 0 41980 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) DEPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R.TO SPECIAL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT w

Based on the results of'the surveillance / monitoring of the sample walkdown and the verification that the sample agrees with the original walkdown data, the original data should be acceptable to be used in support of the Cable Separation Discovery program at BFN.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY G. G. Turner LWJ:RRB:JMH:BKG

- cc: RIMS, MR AN 72A-C D. P. Burrell, ED A12 BFN l J. H. Rinne, PAB BFN H. H. Weber, PAB E. BFN 2284J 6

i

y .

R22 890503 9.5 2 qic so2.s n= 5 ATTACHbENT 1 Page 1 of 2 g

- or-eg %

Uv luu

@ f.- Y b--M g; g 'p Page I of Y

, , saowns rEnRY SITE QUALITY SUWEILLANCE 1mEITORINC REPORT

SUBJECT:

bc3 *4n B a343ft.)3lMd:WAJ,* h rv D)*_ /) A b C beA dl/ " R

S E MT- 4 '1  %)a /tdm a . '

REPORT NUMBER: 6SF 5-9#f- 09 73 DATE CONDUCTED: '/ A l #1 to [-FF9 PREPARED BY: U)lh/t. 4 'IE4*J REVTEVED BY: Q/f/78/ha-RETEREECES: 1))W-ECA - 6 6 6 PW di SEMI Y 9 , V503 A ? ? J. ~1

.5CM.T -61. A A SCOPE:*7he. bur-pose o A--Eli! MCMNiaQ Ld31 do 6 b 3e w '. ; Ad Ve >I.!v '

-b&c. <as-plf. 4'a2 12 A n u a a/>>" R " c;s}A* s- uJ *.)k&t%3 AJ -b Y il . /r Ctk%d ~$ .*_.

or, r? u i / WoD*ad tr"W 'EoAT -4+ LU '.Jk&etu 4 dA h J h e y e r>* en lMo , e y 4 e "D e r b Q t # .$

• S 9 - 0 1 T 7. Dos > d O GF .S = ? 9'= 0 9 3 ~) ,Ha d,*.". .* d r e s. ems / ~

ces arann3? C an& dahv n ,-e hiso *5 V /

RESULTS: on t. ad1 ov ce. rnielr'A vJ w-n eb ad'A's d -de r .a e 4/a ;s isir.a.%r;.,,a 2 / rnas :Jo,aM, kJ Def 4.he aefu,z J r aud e JL,- cah 9 v s /,1 s ,4,, s '

a,d co r er in : 4 t. +1,e des : end < d r c ude- , dent,* f,' _ W ,,,a Jw Cs a *hh.ded duw .% 9. Se e t~'h 7 s i Je w Q 13 f gcr - o 91 3 - f .

C LS*rwed 4ses. vmEA se Ve vrficah or) eA r M d.*r 3C=1/T/-Z JE!hsy7-R' Goud u) n/JedCu/ No vsdeeA ATUSP4 oc/,3e> poJ aur,M

Ji s d.

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37/*oow p ori % u o / 41 *. ADD *w)'lr ' 'P ~ **E~Ar?- 4 9 LO ; /Hnu & 243 M/

4- h s 1 R $ 2 m/* rn J V./e U *U da h r*>?s/etd 4 hod J k~ s M / r c o d e

. c r r e e. . JJ're) a es v . e r J

• A Ot 13 W 9 !t. N C/>4 m n. r-e rt1/k j J.*J& 441_. :o -# 4eus u D sc2w.T * ~

.% *e e - de di e v.: b ress.o ~-

.  :.4 DD - G e ta 00 6 kJ. O . <*s a 6da.orm,f:nMJr or. / A.ro-- /. '< A b ' e e fy& s .

' k'o r , s. k j -d kW Der se.~,v o l m J,'c. . S ;i. su" r ,< * -4e.

w y er 2 u n b.v :

Er e - c 11 s J w ,' + h He e ,b r al L ,'" a re o a r-e he o .J7' s : **Ss s *:- 6 ' hi. /

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e JAn. 44siv f /J 75 s ho.1 GBF-s-T9- 6 9 t3 -/ s ro 9 -W r- sd,*er.ss

, co.sde A 'e J ex ,Wo & d*,' d

/b .-

l / R. R. Baton ~

,i Attachoent cc (Attachment):

'l RIMS, MR 4K 12A-C i

3. T. Satites, PSB P, BTE j C. C. CampbeL1 III. POB C BFN Da u,*d 7' L w o/.,.s. '

C}) n-Osy, /37sP L. S. Clard , PSB K. BrM L. W. Jones, B E. BFN l u - w rlata == y, nrw N

' C. T. Shell,'LP 141E-C 5 4- M

_ File 0053f 4 I

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continuation sheet: Pase .d. of 'l I'

Lt- Resort stanber: OB/~.5-FCf-09FJ

, , Besults: (Continued) ,

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j. 'j !? l UNI 602.6 tov 5 ATTAOGIENT 1 I  ! Page 2 of 2 t~

-Page 1 of 1

)

aEPot? WUMBER: #BE-S-99-09rJ EVALUATOR: OECANIZATION: PERSCWWEL CONTACTED: OSCANIZATION:

th llI/t 4 e % *s OJ 1%~d' '7 L aMI) DC-CT 7)H.thae/ lbroaf m 1.A betEW-

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91 '

A,rt Fr ,

/ / k), A. aTb AJAd AfDDes. Dire %?/

r / / / /

/

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/ A T- HIT /d 3;3f M'/wA7" ^// w 6

/ / /* f-J ~B'1 /s &J-91

,/ / ,/ -

/

2 CHECELIST CHECELIST ATTRIBUTE ATTRIBUTE ORG CORRECTIVE ACTICW CAUSE NUMBER REY. LEVEL CODE DOCUMENT CODE I , P.FPLEr BFG)'L

• CO7S 08F-$-59 o 97.$-/ 2,j_ .

/ I / /

/. I / /

/ I / /

i .

/ / / /

I /

WII d'

/ / /

W/ w wf al A p / AT s/ w/T

/r c-m dA /t s-J-17 .

,/+ T-3 -n I/ 9(H7

/ / _. / / I I / / I

'l / / /  ;

v I '

4

/ / .I 7 ,

. TOTAL WO. OF ATTRIBUTES /00 (compteted by QS supervisor)

NRC NUMBER: /f>/3 BATIO CODE: b (A/O UNIT: 1 SYSTEM:!/r>,:w 3 i

SURVEY PREPARATION TIME: .C SURVEY DOCUMENT REVIEW TIME: //, .T l SURVEY MARDWARE/FIELO TIME: /O SURVEY REPORT PREPARATION TIME: / I i

This monitoring was perfor:ned to the latest revision of the listed references. Applicable Condition Adverse tn Quality Reports and previous

~

surveillance were reviewed for areas of concern.

TWu McWITOC'JC REPORT KAS BEEN CLOSED BASED UPOW THE CLOSURE CODE 1 CHECKED:

e

(1) so DEFICIENCIES WERE IDEwTIFIED OTHER AFFECTED ERC(s)

/

I i

X (2) otrICIEvCIES WEaE MIsot arD COTS v e

/r (3) CAQRs WERE INITIATED

.l' . .

l d 0053f 1 e -i

g. '..

j *'. . .

QMI 602.6 Rav 5 -

f'- -

Att.achment 7 PaSu I of I l

L Pa58 '/ of Y CORRECTED ON THE SPOT (COTS) REPORT Surveillance Monit orins Report Number QBF-S e* .S f!" E Number of COTS items identified on report: /

DESCRIPTION / RESOLUTION OF CONDITION:

. }. OBF-S- 99 -49 P3 - /

n,,, e r. :nJ. s.s .c 1 es,> }.'.!. :u ; !_ .v ~'r- .i 4 ,4Jz ye,u:

e n .,~lc:

i S b5P-2 'rE 'l vvv a fo .{.( ni A . e// .?A:4g u) =.>/r d'e:.w e r- ea v,o y : . .,. a so ,.s , I .

, doo f,'.C Oa..;

y M-e enc: . ,a # . sha-% '. re es i <

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• dl: v's a [j &.,o a 3 D,3 CY S. D Narc // . ,et e y .

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• d4 E-h o a3 &a36 vcA d' dv:>>w,: ~j..

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NOTE: COTS ITEMS AS A MINIMUM SHALL CONTAIN DESCRIPTION / RESOLUTION OF CONDITION.

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Attachment 3 Safety Significant Evaluation'of Design Significant Drawing Discrepancies NPK2 - 6617W

1 e ..

This attachment is a duplicate document contained in QIR TEPBFN89038 as Attachment 6. The safety significant evaluation of the eleven cables listed in Attachment 4 are contained herein. In order to easily identify these cables within this attachment, the following cross references should be utilized.

Att. 4 Cable Att. 3 Att. 3 L Item No. No. Item No. Sheet No. j 1 1ES475-I 2 4 .

2 3ES4453-II 3 4 3 PL1237 7 7 4 B522-II 9 11 5 1ES3100-II 14 15 6 2ES3915-II 10 12 7 3PC504-11 15 16 8 ES2652-II 13 15 9 1ES3910-II 16 17 10 FE4938 11 14 11 K3214 12 14 The remaining cables evaluated in this attachment were discovered to be in violation cf the separations criteria because of incorrect design.

They are documented in other sections of this report as follows:

Cable No. Report Att.

Section No.

3ES3188-II 4.2 5 3K80 4.2 5 P294 4.2 5 1B84B25 4.7 6 3B193II3D 4.7 6 1511E/36

r -

(

MDc t o

_ of G y PypFOSE3 -

, ' Evaluata tha cffcct cn Unit 2 cf tha - ght micrcuted cablea .

shown on cttcchment 1. This analysis is to show that even though (p" these eight cables are outside there are no safety concerns.

the statistical significance that

\

These eight cables can be grouped into two categories as follows. Those safety cables that are misrouted into nondivisional cable trays, and those nondivisional cables that are routed first in cne division and then in the other division. For the first category the redundant function for the misrouted cable must be identified Cnd then it must be proved that these cables are not commonly routed in the identified nondivisional cable tray nor with any of the cables in that tray (only power cables are a problem since all V4 control circuits are double fused). For the second category of cables all of the circuits routed in the divisional cable trays that the misrouted cable connects must be identified to determine if there are redundant functions effected in the two trays.

ASSUMPTIONS:

only power circuits can propagate a fault because all control circuits in V4 are double fused so that no single failure will prevent clearing a potential cable damaging fEult.

For the second category circuits only the cables in the trays offected require examination since it is assumed that if a cable is in a divisional cable tray it will stay with that division and

' because it would require more than one failure to propagate from one divisional tray to the other then to an additional tray.

The review of cables in common cable trays was performed on computer printouts of non-QA design database.

METHOD:

For the first category circuits the routing of all cables in the common cable trays that were misrouted into will be defined (computer program printout of as designed cable schedules), then the r:dundant functions to the misrouted cables will be identified, their cables defined, and the routing of these cables determined.

-Then a review of the routings will be made to show that these r quired of cables the cables in do thenot route trays into the trays of interest or with any of interest. The reason for examining i

the commonly routed cables is because the single failure of it's circuit breaker is assumed to occur allowing the propagation of a fault in one tray to the other. -

PREPARED O I L /Jo / 87 CHECKED l/f,1. /%fw j1f u /W t

+ , as

, *E '

~ ::;d.W; 2$l$w 0%:QSQ'$y.

MId.$NbbhE$h,5b$$E

U tha diviOicnn1 trcya ch511"b3 id:ntificd a d d 2(stcrmination mad 3  !

• cf th3 cxict:nca cf r:dundCnt functiona in cra traya.  !

. 1

REFERENCES:

"s

( The design drawing system was consulted to identify cables for redundant functions (schematic and connection. drawings) and the l

cable' conduit schedules were reviewed to identify cable routing of {

J' cpecific cables. The mainframe cable schedule was used to identify ~

the cables in the common cable trays.

45N771-4 info only 45N779-8 info only 45C800-2ES-58 R12 y 45N779-111nfo only 45N779-13 info only -2ES-28 RA 45N2751-5 RC 45N2751-2 R7 -2ES-20 R12 45N3751-5 R1 45N3751-2 R3 - ES-31 R11 45N3750-5 R7 45N3750-9 R1 -1ES-20 R6 45N1751-8 R6 45N1751-2 R7 - ES-131 R3 45N1750-5 R11 45N1750-16 R8 -1ES-120 R9 2-45N2750-9 R0000 45N2750-5 R16 - 1B-4 R8 45N2749-6 RC 45N2749-12 RA - 2B-4 R12 2-45N2749-13 R001 45N2749-8 RC - 3B-10 3-47E865-8 R001 45N779-20 R3 - P-12 R7 45N2760-2 RA 45N2749-4 RA 2-45C800-2ES-120 R001 45N2749-8 RC 45N701-1 R15*. - -2ES-13 R000 45N702-1 R11 45N703-1 R15 3-47E866-5 R003 ANALYSIS:

ITEM 1: The 250VDC normal control power supply cable effects the operability of the 3ED 4KV board. Since unit 3 is shutdown the only major 4KV loads required to operate are the SBGT board, RHRSW pumps supporting EECW, and the 480V shutdown boards to support the Diesel aux boards (and diesel generators) and the HVAC system. The 4KV 3ED board only supports the SBGT board normaly but if the EECW support pumps are realigned then they could be on boards 4KV 3EC and 3ED. The SBGT building housing the three trains of SBG is located adjacent to the unit i reactor building. It can be resonably assumed that the SBGT trains powered from unit one/two do not route cables into unit 3. The control power to the 4KV shutdown boards will be examined to insure that there are no interactions with the misrouted unit 3 cable.

PREPARED b V! ;* 6C

( ll / 2d/ ?g' CHECKED g 2,, /g

..3.' %1rMk$;6h?!#75fb l5?

$NNb hbbbbf$5dbb

1595-IE 4KVA 1B96-IE 4KVB -

3B97-IE 4KVC s 2B98-IE 4KVD 3B180-IE 4KV3EA 3B247-IE 4KV3EB 3B188-IE 4KV3EC s THERE WERE FIVE CABLE TRAY SEGMENTS IDENTIFIED AS HAVING THE MISROUTED CABLE (GJ, EA, EAJ, EAB, IQ, EP) .

It should be noted that it has already been recognized that the "IE" designated cables have not been adequately handled.

These cables are divisional cables but have been routed in nondivisional cable trays, one hundred percent of the "IE" cables are being reviewed to determine their divisional assignment and those that are divisional are going to be rerouted in that division.

There were three other cables that could couple damage from one tray to the another due to the single failure of that cables circuit breaker. Below are representations of these cases. .-

The normal alignment of EECW pumps is to the 3A, 3B, C, D 4KV boards so none are lost by the case on the left. The 2 unit 1/2 SBGT trains are available (all trays in figures

' below examined and no unit 1/2 SBGT nor RERSW were found) and only 2 of 3 are required. The two cases on the right are the same as above except that one RHRSW pump will not have power, but only 2 of the 4 are required.

3817 3-1 BBTPJE 3Am.R 381P*E 3 003-ZE - ,-

. g , EAJ -

=9

.1 p g L

o EM 3 Mt EAa 3pr. 3 ,,,.3g

" ' LkT ,s%g

%^h a fk It should be noted that these discussions relate to the normal alignment of RHRSW pumps. Under other alignments it is possible to loose power to two RHRSW pumps in unit 3 but only 2 of 4 are required and power is still available to the -

two unit 1/2 pumps.

PREPARED b ( /2 / 2oj37 CHECKED -r?,1 7% [ t-t /_t y / g

'{,* *

' 7'?.

• f lt Y

, *h

+%$$$5hul$$$kSi

( gm

+L ITElif. 2: 'Tho EECW C2ctionnlizing. valva 3 era

esd to inolcto portions

" of tho'EECW hSad2r if thtra:ic a bre k or leak in it. This

• is not.a safety function since crediti is.taken for the other header. The north header valve.should.be shown to be

^

separated from the south header valves-.or-from all,of,the

i. -

, :other' north header valves. By closing this particular valve the only effect is to-isolate one of-the pumps from' .

supplying unit 2 for the north header. That pump will still provide Diesel Generator cooling and'the other pump is available to support unit two long-term shutdown cooling requirements. The cables associated with the other sectionalizing' valves are:

e J

i-NORTH HDR SOUTE HDR ES752-I 1ES2975-II ES753-I 1ES2976-II FCV-67-18 ES754-I FCV-67-13 1ES2977-II ES755-I 1ES2978-II ES756-I. 2ES2975-II

2ES475-I 2ES2976-II 2ES476-I , 2ES2977-II FCV-67-22

'2ES477-I FCV-67-21 -

2ES2978-II 2ES478-I 2ES2979-II 2ES480-I ES3255-II 3ES475-I ES3256-II 3ES476-I ES3257-II FCV-67-14 3ES477-I FCV-67-25 ES3258-II 3ES478-I ES3259-II-3ES480-I 3ES2975-II 3ES2976-II 3ES2977-II FCV-67-26 3ES2978-II-3 3ES2979-II None of the cables for the south header sectionalizing valves with theare routed cables withcommon in the the misrouted cable tray northFN. header valve.nor ITEM 3: The HPCI' system valve is a. bypass around an isolation valve.

The redundant function is the other isolation valve in series (FCV-73-2) and the associated cables are.:

2ES1428-I 2ES1429-I DW 2ES1430-I -

2ES1431-I DW 2ES1432-I PREPARED G /pg CHECKED 72 g d g_u /g O

e

, Is=' ...

. , , ** I* 4 * . /'

i!Mh!.hh hI} bib 3$ihNSbA

.o ..

spaK) EEOBNLW3B Gyp 903 vnhva nur wi h tha cablh5 in3h3 c2mmon

, c;blo trny JD.

r ITEM 4: Tha RHR valva 13 O TORUS co2 ling valvp with thn cth"ar leop:3 7 valves being FCV-74-57 and 59. The TORUS cooling function

(~. is a long term requirement for decay heat removal. The cables for these valves are: -

s FCV-74-59 2ES305-I 2ES306-I 2ES307-I 2ES690-I 2ES693-I FCV-74-57 2ES675-I 2ES676-I 2ES677-I 2ES678-I 2ES680-I -

None of the cables for the torus cooling valves are routed with the redundant torus cooling valves nor with the cables in the common cable tray GJ.

ITEM 5 . ,

CABLE: 3K80

. This cable is routed in both division I and II cable trays.

Reviewing the printout for cable tray GH-II, the only required function in this tray for Unit 2 operation is the EECW sectionalizing valve FCV-67-26. This valve is normally open and its safety function is to be open. Therefore, loss of power due to this failure introduced by misrouting this non ivisional cable is acceptable.

ITEM 6 Cable: P294

.- This cable is routed in Unit 3 division II trays AND through 4kV shutdown board 3EA (Division I). The as designed routing has this cable II, EGS-II, and GJ-II.

going through division II trays FK-and additional tray GH-II. Drawing This discrepancy 292 picked drawing discrepancy up does not introduce any new problems, (nondivisional cables crossing between division I and division II). The'following ~

analysis shows that this problem has the potential of PREPARED TJ f CHECKED d4 U

!1 / g p

_ gy jy pg sea $$ f -

r1/w / W D 6^-&

h cHeekeQ n /w/77 e

1. 1. 4b g 4. ae ** .- ,

e:;:..'-g-$N%~aa. m e sAy;. .y y e ;.."

.-~ - a : ---s -

@KnBNEg (BD WW&s Bor GRR four 4kV " Shutdown Boardis. Tha cnalyaio alca chowa that tha dice pancy of adding tray GH-II h d no cffect to thic probicm. ,

Reviewing the affected trays shows t[ie,se required functions for unit 2:

\ s EGS-II 4j CABLE FUNCTION 3ES 4780 II CHW CIRC PMP MOTOR 3A-2 EL595.25 3ES 4782 II CHW CIRC PMP MOTOR 3B-2 3ES 4784 II AHU 3A-2 MECH EQ RMB 595.25 U3 3ES A786 II AHU 3B-2 MECH EQ RMB 595.25 U3 3ES 4790 II WATER CHILLER 3A-2 MECH EQ RM B 3ES 4791 II WATER CHILLER 3B-2 MECH EQ RM B GJ-II NOTHING REQUIRED FOR U2' FK-II NOTHING REQUIRED FOR U2 '-

GH-II s CABLE FUNCTION 3ES 2975 II FCV-67-26 EECW SOUTH HEADER SECTIONALIZING VALVE Reviewing the printout for cable tray GH-II, the only required function in this tray for Unit 2 operation is the EECW sectionalizing valve FCV-67-26. This valve is normally open and its safety function is to be open. Therefore, loss of power due to this failure introduced by misrouting this

, nondivisional cable is acceptable.

The as designed routing for cable P294 from cable schedule 45C800 sheet P-12 rev 7 shows that this cable was design routed through division II cable trays and terminating on the division I 4kV Shutdown Board. This design alone has the potential to disable both divisions of 4kV Shutdown Board room HVAC.

PREPARED 72 4 -

cz. / c o / q CHECKED FJ UL_uMy /1 /_pj j g 1

x..  : , . .. .;.c.

. w.. . .

. k* v l.W'2 n:< Y

• O*2s.

'~,, ,

'GDc11uco,c9 GI60 GG0ign,-tha affsc sd I ceblos in trdy kGS- I A- e- ;that provida powar.to tho diviolc X 4. II:HVAC for ths Unit 3~

4kV Shutd wn B:arda hmva a r:dunda

-with tho, affect 3d divicien I' beard.: a function ascaciatnd s- s. <

3 Lcsiitg one; division of the 4kV board r'oom air conditioning c system (see drawings 45N779-20, 3-47E865-8, 3-47E866-5) is acceptable if the'other division is shown to be functional.

Since'.tlie misrouted cable is routed % rough the-opposite-division'4kV supply.this is, difficult to prove. The

required redundant equipment-is supplied.-by 480V Reactor MOV board-3A. Rmov-Board 3A is supplied:by 4kV board 3EA.

Therefore, tne only-acceptable solution is:" (1) The intruder cable does;not disable the entire 4kV board and-

~

(2) Given.(1) the. intruder cable is not routed with the; feeder to the 480V Shutdown Board which isithe feeder for the'480V RMOV board. Cable P294 supplies: power to motor heats for RHR pumps A and C and.CS pumps A and C, the circuit cables doing this move between section of both 4kV boards 3EA and 3EC. Therefore, (1) above cannot be shown to be true. A. Condition Adverse to Quality Report'will be written to resolve this design problem.

The. problems associated with this cable are due to design problems not.the drawing discrepa,nc'y.

ITEM 7 I

l ' Cable: PL 1237-II This cable.is routed in Unit 1,2 divisions I AND II cable trays.

From printout for tray FK-II the functions that are' required are:

CABLE FUNCTION 2B 88 IE 2B 92 IE 480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2A NORMAL SUPPL 2ES-2775 II 480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 2B NORMAL SUPPLY FCV-73-3 SUPPLY

' 2ES 2788 II. FCV-73-16 2ES 3000 II FCV-75-53 SUPPLY 2ES'3013 II- FCV-75-51 SUPPLY PL 1210 SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1A SUPPLY PREPARED j # y g., /p CHECKED TJ ikt,,.JP ggy

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3geg v -7 gp m,z7-R;vi& wing th3 printout for tray F -I5AND EFN-I thsrs ara'no r:dund2nt functions to thn onsa 1 ted abovo in these trcys.

l ,

, Within thaza trays thero ora cable that cnuno problems.

4 CABLE

. j FUNCTION-1B 92 IE 480V SHUTDOWN BOARD 1B NORMAL SUPPLY

(-

1B 95 IE 4160 SHUTDOWN BOARD A NORMAL SUPPLY 1Bj96 IE j 4160 SHUTDOWN BOARD B NORMAL SUPPLY j y ~

\

I There is a design problem with cables 2B 88 IE and 2B 92 'IE cables being routed together in the same tray. Shutdown Board 2A is division I and Shutdown Board 2B is division II.

Additionally, this cable tray interaction would disable both  ;

division I 4kV boards and the division II 480V Shutdown Board 2B. This is a recognized generic problem with all required IE suffixed cables. This problem is to have 100%

review of design and correction by divisionalizing the required cables.

Since.the misrouted cable did not cause the interaction (these ' cables already routed together) the 100% design review will be acceptable.

ITEM 8:

Cable 1384-D2S (250VDC normal feeder to RMOV board IC.) is l field routed in cable trays EP,and EG while the design  !

drawings show that it should als~o have been. routed in a conduit 1B83. There are no problems of divisional interaction created by not routing in the conduit. In addition a review of 45N712-3 R15 shows that there is no equipment required to support unit 2 safe operation or ,

j shutdown supplied by this cable.

JUMMARY OF RESULTS:

For the first category of cables; None of the required cables are directly routed through the common misrouted cable trays.

Although there are three cables that couple the 2$0VDC breaker control power of multiple 4KV boards in unit 3 there is no loss of safety function required to shutdown unit 2.

~ The "IE" category cables are those that are causing this problem in nondivisional cable trays. It has already been recognized in other sections of the separations program that the "IE" cables have been mistreated and 100% of them have been examined. Those that are divisionaly associated are being rerouted in divisional trays. The remainder are not routed with cables from the common cable trays. ~

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There were-no interactions' caused y the misrouted cables, qr - although while investigating the misroutad-cables other design

-( problems were discovered and are being handled by the.CAQR program.

ij. -

s CONCLUSIONS: ),i '

Although there were couplings of unit 3 4KV boards that "

could result in loss of rore than one DG in unit-3 there were no safety concerns identified due to the drawing-discrepancies.

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B522-IE 4kV Shutdown' Board.D b

250 VDC Control Power I Battery Charger

. The discrepancy for this cable was that,it left cable tray j IF-ESI and entered 480V RMOV Board 2B through conduit 2ES324-II which was not shown in the conduit and cable schedule. This drawing discrepancy was not a separations violation. However, a-design deficiency was discovered by the ampacity program.

The 250 VDC control power battery charger cable (B522-IE) for 4 kV Shutdown Board D is routed with a redundant 250 VDC control power battery charger cable B514-IE for 4 kV Shutdown Board B.

This separations violatlon was corrected by DCN-WO481. Cable B522-IE was routed in conduit by itself from the 480V RMOV Board.

to the battery charger.

Prepared by M A 8; y s

Checked by '

a  ! hJ fl.Ghlit LIAM S ,

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Item 10 Cable . .e I 2ES3915-II '

(

The RHR System minimum flow by pass valve supply (FCV-74-30) is.

a safety related cable routed on non-dTvisional tray EP. A redundant counterpart to.this valve is FCV-74-7. The routing of each cable routed in tray section EP was compared with the routing of the supply to FCV-74-7 (cable 2ES1150-1) to determine if any-interactions existed. One interaction with the drywell -

sump pump was identified. The detailed routes are as follows:

Cable 2ES1150-I 2ES1166-I EY-ESI

, EV-ESI Cable 2ES3915-II EP FS-II HO-II EU-II Gtt.-II 2ES3649-II

, Cable 2PL2275 IF-ESI EP FP-ESI IR EX-ESI

+ EY-ESI EU-ESI IX Cable 2 PL2275 interacts with cable 2ES1150-I in trays EY-ESI and EU-ESI. Cable 2PL2275 interacts with cable 2ES3915-II in tray EP, therefore it' interacts with both redundant valves.

The RHR mir.iflow by pass valves were then evaluated for safety impact. The RHR miniflow bypass valves are normally open.

Failure of the power feed'would leave the valve open and analysis exists to show that the 500 gpm loss through loss through the bypass does not impact the RHR safety function.

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There is no failure mechanism 'fo the vasve which can prevent RHR from operating in the LPCI mode. If the pumps were shutdown and

{f k

the valves remained closed due to a cable failure, the valves would not reopen. However, the only operational mode which could then be required is torus cooling. In this mode the operator would manually align the systelii using valves FCV-74-71 and FCV-74-73 for Division II. The power cables for these valves are 2ES3175 and 2ES3910-II. The routes of these cables are:

3ES3175 2EU-II 2ES3634 2ES3241 2ES3910-II FS-ESII HO-ESII EU-ESII GU-ESII 2ES3634-II 2ES3944-II These valves do not hav any interaction with the Division I miniflow or tray EP. While the pumps may be started with the bypass valves closed, GE has provided documentation which verifies that the pump may be operated against a dead head for at least 20 minutes. The manual, alignment to the torus cooling is presently covered in the operating procedures.

There are no failure modes in the LPCI or torus cooling modes which prevent RHR from performing its intended function.

References:

1. GE Letter G-ER-5-172 "TVA Appendix R - Additional Information on RHR Minimum Flow Valve and RHR Room Coolers.

2. Schematic 2-45E779-9

3. Schematic 1-730E920 4 Schematic 45N779-13

5. Control Diagram 2-47E2610-74-1 Prepared by .- / ~- M (EC Llo L LI.rn S .8 shy Checked by W u % A II %r 0329V3 .?

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[ T Sheet #

of 's

, a14. erin' 22c9S i; 2.

~ ,

t ANALYSIS: ,

s Items 11 & 12 The two mis-routed cables are FE4938 and K3214. Both cables are non-divisional but have been routed in both divisions of cable trays.

Item 11: Cable-FE4938' From schematic 45E644-1 RA-this cable provides one leg of the power supply to this circuit. The circuit loops through many contacts and eventually goes to relays or indicating. lights in the control bay. Since these end devices are located in a mild environment, there are no accident event related effects that'will disable these components. This circuit arrangement does not have a single failure coupled with and event that will bypass the load and disable the 15 amp

~

circuit protection breaker. If the breaker is considered to be the single failure, then the

(

load is in place and current is limited. If the load relay is the single failure, then the circuit-breaker will function to open the circuit.

Therefore, the circuit arrangement prevents any

. damage to the circuit. Even though the cable is mis-routed there are no situations that cause.a safety concern.

Item 12: Cable K3214 This cable is a 3 twisted pair #19 for the security system and is routed between door 298 premise control box and the Central Alarm Station. Not only is this cable routed in both divisions, it is rou'ed in a higher voltage level trays. The maximum circuit voltage for these cables is approximately 6Vdc. Since this PREPARED f[ u I//2/P7 CHECKED /dd/th]/w 4 / 24 / E'9 e

4 e

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ M

y- -- - - - -

..+ ..

Qt EcB 5M 6*P09 6 f%

N is such a low power circuit, there is no

- potential for damage due to a fault of this circuit.

However, if the event causes a cable in one of the divisional trays to fault and the single failure is the circuit breaker for the faulted equipment, then a hot short on the low power <

cable can impose a high voltage on this cable.

If the equipment can withstand this high voltage, then the current draw will be limited. If the equipment cannot withstand the imposed voltage, then the it will open before any cable damage will occur. This security equipment is designed for 6Vdc operation. It will not sustain imposed V3 or V4 voltages long.

Having a fault, & single failure, a selected cable to cable hot short between two selected conductors within the cables, and a sustained current draw sufficient to cause damage to the redundant division cables is not considered credible.

( Item 13i Cable ES2652-II This division II cable is mis-routed in a non-divisional cable tray WFA. Reviewing the cables and their routing for tray WFA shows that no cable is design routed through this tray and a division I tray. Therefore, there is no divisional interaction and no safety concern.

, Item 14: Cable 1ES3100-II This division II cable was mis-routed in a non-divisional conduit. A walkdown of this conduit showed that all of j the cables in the conduit were division II. Since all i cables were division II there.are no interactions with redundant equipment from division I. Therefore, there are'no safety concern from this mis-route.

PREPARED 7 I[ - //g ,P7 e CHECKED L &s)A. 4 /st fg l

1 O

e

_.____m__m- _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

a QIR EEBBFN88095,'R2

'N' SHEET C/O ~ _

f .

s-Item 15: Cable 3PC504-II s

- This division II cable is mis-routed on non-divisional tray FK. This cable is for valv'e FCV-69-12. This valve does recieve an auto-isolation signal. However, this valve is in the RWCU return line and is between the pump and a check valve. Per design criteria BFN-50-7069 R1-section 3.9, the check valve is sufficient for isolation.

Therefore, valve FCV-69-12 is not required to operate.

Therefore, there are no safety concerns for this cable.

4 l

n-PREPARED /d 9/ 7F/ P7 CHECKED /d W A 4 -_= 4/21/Pi

=======*--- -+%.= ==*e -

. ,7 .,.

QIR EEBBFN88095,-R2

' \, ,

SHEET C/O I

v Item 16:: . Cable 1ES3910-II <

This division II cable going to. valve FCV-74-73 is mis-

. routed on non-divisional tray,-.EG. A review of tray's-printout, attachment D, shows that there are no cables routed to FCV-74-73's division I counterpart, FCV-74-59.--

If FCV-74-73 were to spurously open, the flow path to the suppression pool would be isolated by the normally closed ~

valve FCV-74-71 which is in series with FCV-74-73. The supression pool. cooling flow paths through-FCV-74-71(57) and FCV-74-72(58) are not effected.for either division II(I). Therefore, there is.no safety concern.

e

• e e

e PREPARED e 9 / 28 / Fi CHECKED J2&2Ae l'W- - s/ / t 9 / H O g e

d L .

I-

. Q wee 6 ;~'??c?S A:a

• s

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS: ,

s Even though these cables were mis-routed, it has been shown that there is no potential to damage the cables due to a single failure,that the routing is acceptable as is, there are no interactions with redundant divisions, or the events that would propagate a fault to redundant divisions is not credible.

CONCLUSIONS:

Even though the cables were mis-routed, there are no safety Concerns.

l 6

l^

l PREPARED 8 s _ Y/ /2 / P7 CHECKED /2n) & y/2r/99

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ll l

ll Attachment 4

\

l h cable Identifier and Circuit Function for Field Verified Cables Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2 Restart NPK2 - 6617W

__._a- ..__ . - - -_ _ - - - - - . - __ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ _ - . _ _ - - _ . _ - - . _ - - . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ - - . _

l .

ATTACHMENT 4 .

FIELD VERIFIi!D CABLES REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR UNIT 2 RESTART EB-102 CABLE NO. DD- SYS FUNCTION 1 1ES475-I 0400 67 EECW NORTH HEADER U-1 SECTIONALIZING VALVE l FCV-E7-17 SUPPLY 2 3ES4453-II 0231 73 HPCI FCV-73-81 CONTROL 3 PL1237* 0246 31 SHUTDOWN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A SUPPLY

- \ 4 B522-IE 0012 NORMAL CONTEOL POWER SUPPLY FOR 4160V SHUTDOWN BD D 5 1ES3100-II 0449 75 CORE SPRAY PUMP IB SUCTION VALVE FCV-75-30 SUPPLY 6 2ES3915-II 0390 74 FCV-74-30 SUPPLY 7 3PC504-II 0220 69 FCV-69-12 SUPPLY 8 ES2652-II 0164 CAD SYS B HTR SUPPLY 9 1ES3910-II 0480 74 RHR TEST VALVE FCV-74-73 SUPPLY 10 FE4938 0360 26 FIRE PUMP START 11 K3214 0423 PREMISE CONTROL, DOOR 298 - PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM

• Cable upgraded to divisional as a result of the V4/VS Q-list review in section 4.8.

NPK2 - 6617W

z  :

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I,, -

~~

Attachment 5

\ Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for V3 Nondivisional Cables

h. Powered from Safety-related Power Supplies and V4/VS Divisional and Non-Divisional Cables Powered from Safety-related Power Supplies Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2-. Restart

-1 i

l 1

l i

NPK2 - 6617W

._____-________________-___-_A

T , '

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.', ^ ,

7. .,

2 *'

t ATTACHMENT 5- . .;

n _.  !

~ CABLE IDENTIFIER AND CIRCUIT FUNCTION FOR V3 NONDIVISIONAL CABLES POWERED FROM SAFETY-RELATED POWER SUPPLIES AND'

'~

xV4/VS DIVISIONAL AND NON-DIVISIONAL CABLES POWERED FROM-

^

SAFETY-RELATED POWER' SUPPLIES REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR UNIT 2 RESTART

- E CABLE NO. _DIV SYS FUNCTION a-

-1 PLS87 .ND 32 SERVICE & CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR D SUPPLY il l2 1PL2200 ND 68 RWCU DEMIN HOLDING PUMP 1A SUPPLY .

3 IPL691 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP A SUPPLY 4 1PP602 ND 58 GEN PROT M-G SET 1B CONTROL 5 L529 ND 247 EMERGENCY LGT CAS (LD-1) EMERGENCY FEEDER.

6 '2PL660- ND 70 CCW PUMP 2A SUPPLY 7 3PP285 ND 85 CRDH FEED PUMP 3B SUPPLY 8 2PL691 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP 2A SUPPLY 9 2PL716 ND 69 RWCU PUMP RECIRC PUMP 2A SUPPLY 10 3PL2014 ND. 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 3&A ASSEMBLY C SUPPLY 11 3PL2015 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 2&5 ASSEMBLY C SUPPLY

, 12 ~3PL2016 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 1&6 ASSEMBLY C SUPPLY 13 K321 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM NORMAL SUPPLY 14 'P276 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY

'- 15 1PL2052 ND 247 TB EMER LTG XFMR SUPPLY 16 -P286 ND 211 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 17 PL1205 ND 49 SERVICE BAY FAN ROOM AIR COMPRESSOR ALT SUPPLY 18 3V2235 ND 74 RHR FLUSH DISCHARGE VALVE FCF-74-62 SUPPLY 19 2PL2014 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 3&4 ASSEMBLY Al SUPPLY NPK2 - 6617W

___ )

ATTACHMENT 5 (Continu:d)

&' CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 20 2PL2015 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 2&5 ASSEMBLY A2 SUPPLY 21' '2PL2016 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 1&6 ASSEMBLY A3-SUPPLY 22 P294 ND 211 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY-23 3PL2210 ND 69 RWCU DEMIN HOLDING PUMP 3B SUPPLY 24 2PL2011 ND 47 TURBINE TURNING GEAR 25 2PL2001 ND 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING GEAR PIGGY-BACK MTR SUPPLY 26 2PL2051 ND 268 RB EMERGENCY LTG IFMR (LS204) 27 '2PL2052 ND 247 TB EMERGENCY LTG IFMR (LS259) 28 2PL474 ND 231 UNIT PREF MC SET 2 NOR SUPPLY 29 2V2235 ND 74 RHR MAIN COND FLUSH VALVE FCR-74-62 SUPPLY 30 P284 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 31: 1PL2350 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 1B 1PL2351 SUPPLY 32 1PP477 ND~ 47 GEN PROT MG SET 1A CONTROL 33 K322 ND 244 EVAC ALARM SYS ALT SUPPLY l-Rl 34 1PL2400* II 31 SH BD RM EMER COOLING UNIT 1 SUPPLY )

35 1PL5575 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1A-2 SUPPLY 1PL5576 36 1PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-2 SUPPLY IPL5588 37 1PL670 ND 70 CCW PUMP 1B SUPPLY 38 1PL680 ND 70 CCW PUMP 1C SUPPLY 39 1PL734 ND 69 RWCU RECIRC PUMP 1B SUPPLY 40 IV2475 ND 70 FCV-70-48 SUPPLY

.gg '

• Divisional suffix assignment under review.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/49/BF;I l

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E

• ATTACHMENT 5 (Continu:d)

N0. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION

41. ES1387* I 31 BD RM EMERG SUPPLY FAN 3B SUPPLY l 42' 1PL1745* II 31 SHDN BD RM EMER COOLING U1 SUPPLY TO-TRANSFER 43 2ES106 I 1 AUTO RELIEF VALVE (2-71G) PCV-1-30 NORMAL SUPPLY a

44 2ES56 I 1 AUTO RELIEF VALVE (2-71E) PCV-1 NORMAL SUPPLY 45 2PL2210 ND 69 REAC WTR CLEANUP DEMIN HOLD 46 1PL475 ND 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING CEAR OIL PUMP SUPPLY 47 1PL2300 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN SUMP PUMP 1B SUPPLY 48 3PL2001 ND 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING GEAR NORMAL SUPPLY 49 P292 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 50 3PL716 ND 69 RWCU PUMP 3A SUPPLY 51 1PL474 ND 252 UNIT PREF MMG SET 1 NOR SUPPLY 52 1PL5625 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1A-4 SUPPLY 1PL5626 53 1PL2250 ND 268 PSC WATER HEAD TANKS PUMP 1B SUPPLY 54- PL4550 ND 219 RHRSW PMP A1, A2 & EECW STRAINER A TRACE HEATER SUPPLY 55- 1PL2025 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 8&9 ASSEMBLY B1 SUPPLY 56 1PL2026 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 7&10 ASSEMBLY B1 SUPPLY 57 1PL5562 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-1 SUPPLY 1PL5563 58 1PL5612 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER IB-3 SUPPLY IPL5613 59 1PL2275 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP SUMP PUMP 1A SUPPLY IPL2276

• Divisional suffix assignment under review.

((

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/50/BFN

l2-3,

-ATTACHMENT 5 (Continu:d)- -

E. CABLE NO. DIV- S,,.IE , FUNCTION 60- 2PL2275- ND 77 - DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN' SUMP PUMP 2A SUPPLY 2PL2276' 61 3PL2275 ND 77 DRYWELL SUMP DRAIN PUMP 3A SUPPLY 3PL2276 62 3PL2325 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 3A SUPPLY 3PL2326

.63- 1PL2325 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 1A SUPPLY IPL2326 64 2PL2325 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2A SUPPLY 2PL2326 65 2NM1171- ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL C

.2NM1170-66 2NM1181 ' ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL D 2NM1180-

'67 PL2085 ED 27 U1, 2, 3 CCW DISCHARGE SUMP PUMP &

VALVES SUPPLY

-68 PL2314 ND 66 STACK' SAMPLING ROOM HEATER SUPPLY 69 'PL2390 ND 65 SGT HEATER B SUPPLY 70 PL2407 ND 66 STACK FILTER CUBICLE EXH FAN SUPPLY 71 'PL2425 ND 82 DIESEL GEN SUMP PUMP B SUPPLY 72 PL2500 ND 65 SGT BLDG SUMP PUMP SUPPLY 73 PL2466 ND 273 RAD WASTE BD ALT SUPPLY 74 3PL474 ND 252 UNIT PFD MG SET 3 40-HP NORMAL FEEDER 75 3PL475 ND 47 MAIN TURB TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP SUPPLY 76 2PL5175 ND 68 REACTOR RECIRC PMP MOTOR 2A HTR SUPPLY 2PL5177 77 2ES3592 II 74 RHR SHDN COOLlNG OUTBOARD VLV FCV-74-47 (2ES3685) SUPPLY 78 2PL2063 ND 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATFORM OUTLETS SUPPLY NPK2 - 6617W

w s.

ATTACHMENT 5 (Cnntinu:d) ,

NO. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 79 2PL2060 ND 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATFORM OUTLETS SUPPLY 2PL2061-80 2PL2062 ND 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATFORM OUTLETS SUPPLY 81 2PL5180 ND 68 REACTOR RECIRC PUMP MOTOR 2B HTR SUPPLY 2PL5182 fl 82 2ES2838* II 73 HPCI/RCIC TEST RETURN VLV FCV-73-36 SUPPLY 83 FE699 ND 39 CO2 STORAGE TANK REFIG UNIT SUPPLY 84 2PL2300 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2B SUPPLY 2PL2301 85 2PL2350 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2B SUPPLY 2PL2351 86 1PL2401*- 31 SHBD RM EHER COOLING U-1 SUPPLY Q II 87 R100 ND 253 UNIT 1 I&C BUS A SUPPLY TO PNL 9-36 88 PL2701 ND 65 SGT BLDG PWR OUTLET SUPPLY 89 PL2699 ND 82 DGB POWER OUTLET SUPPLY 90 PL2694 ND 111 0FF GAS STACK HOIST SUPPLY 91 PL2696 ND 66 0FF GAS STACK POWER OUTLET 92 2NM1191 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL E 2NM1190 93 PL2576 ND 66 0FF GAS STACK DIL AIR FAN 1B 94 PL2698 ND 82 DGB POWER OUTLET SUPPLY

.95 PL2524 ND 239 STACK LTG TRANS SUPPLY l

96 PL2613 ND 301 SEWAGE TREATMBNT SYSTEM SUPPLY 97 2NM1151 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL A 2NM1150 l: 98 2NM1161 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL B l 2NM1160 99 2LT44 ND 244 PAGING SYSTEM 2LT45 81

• Divisional suffix assignment under review.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/52/BFN

t L

E..J '.

ATTACMMENT'S (Crntinutd) .

l '

WO. CABLE NO. DIY SYS FUNCTION r

100 FE1895 ND 39 PNL 3-25-303 101 1PL1382 ND 69 PNL 25-3 102 1R671 ND 3 PNL 9-29-1A 103 1R1579~ ND 75 PNL 9-18 L 104 1R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-62 105 1R3250 ND 74 RHR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURE INDICATOR SUPPLY 106 2PL1381 ND 69 PNL 25-3 e

107 2PP491 ND 68 SCOOP TUBE MG-2A 108 2R877 ND 90 AIR MONITORING 109 2R1579 ND 75 PNL 9-19 110 2R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-6 111 3NM1158 ND 90 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL A

-112 3NM1168 ND 90 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL B 113 3R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-62 114 3R3005 ND 43 PNL 25-103 115 3V1550 ND 66 0FF GAS ' ISOLATION SYS BUS A SUPPLY 116 PL4575 ND 23 RHRSW PUMP D1, D2 & EECW STRAINER A TRACE HEATER SUPPLY 117 ES364 I 67 EECW STRAINER D SUPPLY ,

118 IV1822 ND 74 RAW COOLING WATER TO RHR PMP D 119 2R3250 ND 74 RHR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURE INDICATOR SUPPLY 120 2PL5662 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-5 SUPPLY 2PL5663 121 R175 ND 253 UNIT 1 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-36 NPK2 - 6617W

.8 6, ATTACHMENT 5 (Cantinurd) ,

No. . CABLE No. 'DIV SYS' FUNCTION 122 3R3250 ND 74 RHR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURE INDICATOR SUPPLY 123 3R877 ND 90 RE-90-55 SUPPLY 124 R400 ND 253 UNIT 2 I&C BUS C SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 125 1V1875 ND 253 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 126 2V1875 ND 253 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 127 3V1875- ND 253 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 128 K355 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 129 3K605 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 130 1K605 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 131 3PL819 ND 264 PLUG RECEPTACLE SUPPLY 132 3PL828 ND 264 PLUG RECEPTACLE SUPPLY 133 K306 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 134 K307 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 135 2PC516 II 69 FCV-69-2 SUPPLY 136 2PC460 'II 1 FCV-1-56 SUPPLY 137 PL1210* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 1A SUPPLY 138 PL1211* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 1A CONTROL 139 PL1212* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 1A CONTROL i

140 PL1213* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 1A CONTROL 141 PL1238* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL 142 PL1239* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL l , 143 PL1240* II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL 144 IPL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-4 SUPPLY 1PL5638 R, I

• Divisional surrix asstEnment unoer review.

NPK2 - 6617W 03040/54/BFN

[ ..-.a_.._ . .

l

L . .. 3 ATTACHMENT 5 (Continu:d) .

WO. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 145 1PL5662 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-5 SUPPLY 1PL5663 146 3PL5662 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3B-5 SUPPLY 3PL5663 147 1PC516 II 69 FCV-69-2 SUPPLY 148 3PC516 II 69 FCV-69-2 SUPPLY 149 3ES3198 II 74 RHR TEST VALVE SUPPLY (FCV-74-73) 150 3K80 ND 244 EVAC ALARM SYS 151 PL1163 ND 31 SPREADING ROOM EXHAUST FAN MOTOR RI 152 3PL575 ND 60 RECIRC MG SET OIL PMP 3B-3 NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/55/BFN

" " ' * ^

a

- Attachment 6 Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for "IE" Designated Cables Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2 Restart l

l l

NPK2 - 6617W

_ , . = __ _ .. - . _ _ .

ATTACHMENT 6 -

"IE" SAFETY CABLES REQUIRING PHYSICAL CHANGES NO. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 1 B518 IIC 248 NORMAL CONTROL POWER SUPPLY FOR 4KV SHDN BD C 2 1B7 B1 248 BATTERY BD 1 CMARGING LEAD 3 1B80 B3S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 1B 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 4 1B84 B2S 281 250V DO R MOV BD 10 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 5 2B76 B2S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 2A 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 6 2B80 B3S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 2B 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 7 2B84 BIS 281 250V DC R MOV BD 2C 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 8 3B7 B3 248 BATTERY BOARD 3 SUPPLY 9 3B80 BIS 281 250V DC R MOV BD 3B 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER l

10 3B8A B2S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 3C 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 11 3B88* 13A 231 480V SHDN BD 3A 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 12 3B180* I3A 211 4160V SHDN BD 3EA 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 13 3B188* II3C 211 4160V SHDN BD 3EC 250V NORMAL FEEDER 14 3B193* II3D 211 4160V SHDN BD 3ED 250V DC NORMAL FEEDER 15 1MI I 253 I&C BUS A NORMAL SUPPLY 16 3M4 I 253 I&C BUS A NORMAL SUPPLY

% l17 1PL435* I 248 BATT CHG 1A NORMAL SUPPLY

[1ll*Divisionalsuffixassignmentunderreview.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/57/BFN

6- .,

. '. ATTACHMENT 6 (Continu d) ,

30. CABLE N0. DIV SYS FUNCTION s 18 2PL435* I 248 BATT CHGR 2A NORMAL SUPPLY l 19 2PL437* II 248 BATT CHGR 2B NORMAL SUPPLY 20 3PL3780* II 30 U-3 SHDN BD RM EXH FAN SUPPLY "IE" NON-SAFETY CABLES REQUIRING PHYSICAL CHANGES NO. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 1 PLR2400 ND 78 U-2 REFUELING BELLOWS HIGH LEAKAGE PLR2401 INDICATING LIGHT

2. 3PL660 ND 70 CLOSED COOLING WATER PUMP 3A SUPPLY 3 3PL691 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP 3A SUPPLY 4 2PL5562 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-1 SUPPLY 2PL5563 5 2PL5575 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2A-2 SUPPLY 2PL5576 6 2PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-2 SUPPLY 2PL5588 7 2PL5612 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-3 SUPPLY 2PL5613 8 2PL5625 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2A-4 SUPPLY 2PL5626 9 2PL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-4 SUPPLY 2PL5638 10 ~ 3PL5562 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3B-1 SUPPLY 3PL5563 11 3PL5575 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3A-2 SUPPLY 3PL5576 12 3PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3B-2 SUPPLY 3PL5588 13 3PL5612 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3E-2 SUPPLY 3PL5613 Rt *oivisional surrix <ssisnment under review.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/58/BFN

1

. '. ATTACHMENT 6 (Continu:d) ,

NO. CABLE NO. DIV SY$ FUNCTION 14 3PL5625 ND 70' DRYWELL BLOWER 3A-4 SUPPLY 3PL5626 15 3PL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3B-4 SUPPLY 3PL5638 16 IV1887 ND 70 DRYWELL ATMOSPMERE COOLING COIL AIR OUTLET DAMPERS CONTEOL 17 2V1882 HD 70 DRYWELL COOLING AIR INLET DAMPERS CONTROL 18 2V2825 ND 78 F. P. MAKEUP FROM RMR THROTTLING INBD VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-61) 19 2V2831 ND 78 F. P. FILTER DEMIN INBD ISOL VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-63) 20 2V2838 ND 78 F. P. FILTER DEMIN BY-PASS VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-66) 21 2V2850 ND 78 F. P. FILTER DEMIN INBD ISOL VLV SUPPLY-(FCV-78-68) 22 2V2863 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING AND DEMIN SYSTEM 23 3V1881 ND 70 DRYWELL ATMOSPHERE COOLING COIL AIR 3V1882 OUTLET DAMPERS CONTROL NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/59/BFN

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4-.

Attachment 7 1

Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for V4/V5 Nondivisional Q-List Cables Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2 Restart

• I NPK2 - 6617W

ATTACHMENT 7 -

V4/VS Q-LIST CABLES WITHOUT A SUFFIX ON A SAFETY BUS NO. CABLE NO, DIV SYS FUNCTION 1 3PL1880* I 254 DG 3A BATT CHGR A SUPPLY f(g . 2 3PL1884* I 254 DG 3B BATT CHGR A SUPPLY 3 3PL1888* I 254 DG 3C BATT CHGR A SUPPLY 4 3PL1892* I 254 DG 3D BATT CHGR A SUPPLY 5 2V2450 II 70 FCV-70-47 SUPPLY 6 1PL2435* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B SUPPLY 7 1PL2460* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B SUPPLY 2PL2435*

{l 8 II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B SUPPLY 9 2PL2460* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B SUPPLY 10 PL1225* I 31 SHUTDOWN BOARD ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2A SUPPLY CONTROL CABLES REQUIRING UPGRADE AND/OR REROUTING DUE TO THE POWER CIRCUIT FUNCTION UPGRADE NO. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 1 2M1 II 253 UNIT 2 I&C BUS B ALTERNATE SUPPLY 2 2V2453 II 70 FCV-70-47 CONTROL 3 1PL2436* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EIRAUST FAN 1B CONTROL 4 1PL2437* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B CONTROL 5 1PL2438* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN 1B CONTi10L 6 1PL2461* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL fk

• Divisional suffix assignment under review.

NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/61/BFN r_ .. . . . _. _

r - - - _.

- .. : y . _-

.=.

ATTACHMENT 7 (Continu:d) .

50. CABLE NO. DIV SYS FUNCTION 7 1PL2462* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL-8 1PL2463* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL i -

9 1PL2464* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL 10 2PL2436* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST FAN 2B CONTROL 11 2PL2437* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST-1 FAN 2B CONTROL 12 2PL2438* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM CIMAUST FAN 2B CONTROL 13 2PL2461* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 14 2PL2462*~ II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 15 2PL2463'* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 16 2PL2464* II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD' BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 17 PL2311* II 30 DG XFMR TBD EIH FAN CO2 INTERLOCK CONTROL 18 PL2358* II 30 DG XFMR TDE RM EXH FAN CONTROL kl

• Divisional suffix assignment under review.

NPK2 - 6617W 03040/62/BFN 4e

Attachment 8 RI Walkdown Data Package - Cable Routing Verification - EEB-006 NPK2 - 6617W

- ~ ~ - - - . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ . . . . . , _ . . . _ _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ , , , _ _ _ _ . _ . _ , _ . . ._ , ,._ )

4

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-Tennessra Valley Authority. Form Page 1 of 1

' Browns Terry Nuclear Plant Form SDSP-196 Site Director' Standard Practice jgg Q 213*d6 SDSP-9.8 Torm SDSP<196 WAIXDOWN-DATA PACKAGE

! 4 Package No. EEB-006 Revision R0 Title CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION 4

Responsible Contract Manager (if applicable) N/A Phone N/A Reference ISD (if applicable) N/A

, gl;C 3/IE/E f Prepared PBy: hMM 'I!< ?  ?

Task Engineer ReviewedBy:fQualityRepresentat

8. r-Approvals / Review: ,

m responsible DNE'Engi 4- o,A

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dpervisor I Phone bN Date h 9!TT _

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s Phone 6~0/3 Date /4/h.

, ect t ' nage nt Coordinator '/

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w:e ' dYs Ski-/R9 2 hone X $/W Date 3 */ 3 -Q T g ical R'evieweg ,

Id- (Ltn 1 -

Phone i 33 M~ Date ,3 lb Quality Assurance Managbr < D' I /

k i

ect Shift Operations Supervisor Plant Manager ,

Site Quality Surveillance .

= DNE Task Engineer for DNE generated WDP

• • = Contractor Quality Representative for contractor generated WDP or Reviewer, per,NEP-5.2, for DNE generated WDP's.

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-* PAGE 1 OF 4 WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE .................................... Page 2 2.0 SCOPE....................'................... Page-2 l

3.0 DEFINITIONS ................................. Page'2 4.0 . PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . ........ Page 2 5.0 . REQUIRED EQUIPMENT ......................... Page 2 6.O INSTRUCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES . . ........

Page 3 7.O ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS / CRITERIA ........... Page 3 8.0 DOCUMENTATION .............................. Page 4

9.0 REFERENCES

................................. Page 4 ATTACHMENTS

, ATTACHMENT A ........... CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION FORM

• ATTACHMENT B ........................... TRAINING ROSTER ATTACHMENT C . ............................ REVIEW SHEET O

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0

_ ._ ._ __ _ _ __1.____________________

PAGE 2 OF 4 WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this walkdown is to provide Nuclear Engineering (NE) with cable routing information required for the resolution of Nuclear Regulatory Commission-(NRC) concerns en electrical cable separation.

2.0 SCOPE The scope of this walkdown will include verification of cable routing to provide Nuclear Engineering (NE) with information required for resolution of NRC concerns on electrical cable separation. This verification will be done either by visual inspection or by using radiodetection (signal trace) equipment in accordance with SEMI-62.

3.0 DEFINITIONS .

1 See SDSP 9.8 s 4.0 PERSONNE_L QUALIFICATIONS / TRAINING

) 4.1 Walkdown Personnel shall be familiar with the requirement of this walkdown procedure and those specified in SDSP 9.8. Personnel performing this walkdown should be knowledgeable of plant areas and locations of cable end devices.

4.2 Walkdown Personnel shall possess the minim'um

~

educational requirements of a High School education or equivalent. Personnel participating in the walkdown shall consist of at a minimum one Journeyman Electrician and one NE representative.

4.3 Walkdown Personnel shall be trained to be knowledgeable of this walkdown procedure and SDSP 9.8.

This shall be documented on Attachment B of this walkdown procedure prior to performing any walkdowns.

1 5.0 REOUIRED EOUIPMENT Plant required personnel safety equipment shall be used by each individual on the walkdown. Electrical Craft personnel shall be required to furnish screwdrivers, nutdrivers and other hand tools required for opening panels compartments, junction boxes, etc. , and radiodetection (signal trace) equipment as required to verify cable routing. . .

4

n. ?6 e 9 s

PAGE 3 OF 4 WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 6.0 INSTRUCTIONS &HD RESPONSIBILITIES 6 .1 - Walkdown teams will be responsible for the following:

6.1.1 Perform walkdown in accordance with this WDP and compile walkdown information on the walkdown data sheet (see Attachment A).

6.1.2 Determine the need for access to panels, compartments, junction boxes, etc., and initiate Maintenance Requests (MRs) as required. Notify the Shift Operations Supervisor(UO)

Operator (SOS)ior pr to entry.and the appropriate Unit 6.1.3 Determine the need for scaffolds and/or ladders.

6.2 Verification of cable route shall be accomplished by

.one or.more of the following methods:

6.2.1 Visual trace of the conduit (-s) and/or cable tray (s) that the subject cable is routed in from cable origin point to cable destination

- point.

) 6.2.2 Where the entire route cannot be visually traced, the conduit (s) and/or cable tray (s) that the subject cable is routed in shall be identified by reading conduit tagging, tray labeling, or drawings, and the sub3.ect cable entry and exit points-verified.

~

6.3 Where cables are routed in flamistic coated trays the routing does not have to be visually verified or verified by radiodetection if the routing can be determined from the cable tray entry and exit points.

6.4 A sketch of the subject cable route or a cable block diagram may be attached to the walkdown data sheet (Attachment A) for clarification purposes.

l 7.0 ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS / CRITERIA' Data collected o'n this walkdown shall be recorded on Attachment A to this procedure and signed First and Second Party Verified in a timely manner. If a sketch or block diagram is attached, it shall be signed First and Second Party Verified also. Data sheets may be compiled in a single package or several smaller packages using Attachment C. , Attachment C shall be signed by an NE representative to verify the completeness of the package.

9

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. _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - . -u_-- ___.___w

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l PAGE 4 CF 4.

WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 7.0 ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS / CRITERIA (CONTINUED)

There are no explicit Engineering requirements for the walkdown data collected as this is an information gathering walkdown only.

NOTE: QS will perform surveillance on approximately 10% of the walkdowns.

8.0 DOCUMENTATION 8.1 Cable routing data collected shall be documented on Attachment A. All data collected shall have an independent first and second party verification. At a minimum the second party verification shall be performed by an NE representative.

8.2 Record retention shall be in accordance with SDSP 9.8 section 9.0. ,

9.0 REFERENCES

SEE SDSP 9.8 ,

)

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PAGE 1 OF 1 .

l

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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION FORM CABLE NO. Vl[ ] V2[ ] V3[ j V4[ ] V5[ ]

SAFETY RELATED? Y[ ] N[ ]

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i SOURCE: BUILDING UNIT l

COLUMN ELEVATION SOURCE DESCRIPTION DESTINATION: BUILDING UNIT COLUMN ELEVATION DESTINATION DESCRIPTION

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ROUTE: PER DRAWING REV ACTUAls ROUTE:

RADIODETECTION EQt)IPMENT USED: Y[ ] N[ ] IF YES, ATTACH COPY OF SEMI-62 DATA SHEET.

ATTACHMENTS: PAGES

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FIRST PARTY VERIFICATION DATE

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SECOND PARTY VERIFICATION DATE i

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• < 4, PAGE 1 OF 2 J ATTACl! MENT C BROWHS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT REVIEW SHEET PACKAGE NO .--- -

REVISION TITLE TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES ATTACHED CABLES VERIFIED:

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PACKAGE CONTENTS COMPLETE /

E!1GINEERING VERIFIER DATE 6

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REVISION ._.-_-

PACKAGE 110. -

TITLE _ -

CABLES VERIFIED: ~

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-ENCLOSURE 2 .

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SUMMARY

LIST OF COMMITMENTS

1. Evaluation of Field Verified Cable Routing Data from TVA's Cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R Program.

The following corrective actions will be taken:

Before unit 2 restart TVA will either reroute the divisional ~ cables or have an evaluation'in.

place to justify optional dispositions. The nondivisional cables will either be rerouted or provided with redundant overcurrent protective devices or have an. evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions.

~These cabl'e identifiers and their-particular circuit function are identified in attachment 4 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

. 2 .~ V4 and VS Cables Which Originate From Safety-Related Power Supplies The following corrective actions will be taken:

Before unit 2 restart Sixteen cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.

Eighty-five cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the

. safety-related circuttry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

After unit 2 restart The sixteen cables, that had been de-energized for restart, will be modified as' appropriate.

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' E ENCLOSURE 2 Page 2 of 4 .

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3. Nondivisional V3 Cables Which Originate From Safety-Related Power Supplies The following corrective actions will be'taken:

Before' unit 2 restart

Eight cables will have their power removed because the function is not-p required during unit 2 plant operation.

The remaining 41 cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added-in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the' safety related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable-identifiers and their particular circuit-function are identified in attachment 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

After unit 2 restart Eight cables, that had been de-energized for restart, will be modified as. appropriate.

4. Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Designated With An "IE" Suffix The following corrective actions will be taken:

Before unit 2 restart five cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.

Two cables will be deleted.

Thirty-six problem cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 6 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

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ENCLOSURE 2 Page 3 of 4 -

• After unit 2 restart' After' restart, 604 of these cables will be corrected by retagging both the cables and the appropriate raceway.

The five cabiss, that had been de-energized for restart, will be modified as appropriate.

5. Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List The following corrective actions will be taken:

Before unit 2 restart Twenty eight cables (10 V4/V5; 18 V3) will either:

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.Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.

Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.

In addition, TVA identified one nondivisional cable that was inappropriately connected to another nondivisional cable that was routed in the redundant division's raceway. This problem is documented by CAQR BFP 870860R3. The corrective action for this cable will involve the rerouting of this cable to another breaker.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 7 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

After unit 2 restart After restart, 109 of these cables will be corrected by retagging both the cable and the appropriate raceway.

In addition, TVA will revise the project Q-list to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional and to add divisional suffixes, as required. Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10.

6. Nondivisional V3 Cables Contained in the Project Q-List The following corrective actions will be taken:

After unit 2 restart

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ENCLOSURE 2 Page 4 of 4 -

TVA will revise the project Q-list to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional. Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10.

7. Nondivisional VI and V2 and Cables Contained in the Project Q-List The following corrective actions will be taken:

After unit 2 restart TVA will revise the project Q-list to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional. Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10.

8. Evaluation of Cables contained in Divisional and Nondivisional Cable Trays that Physically Connect Before unit 2 restart Two cables will either:

Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.

Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.

Have their power removed, or have evaluations in place to justify '

optional dispositions.

These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.

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