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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20212G2241999-09-27027 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License DPR-68 ML20212E6341999-09-23023 September 1999 Suppl to SE Resolving Error in Original 990802 Se,Clarifying Fact That Licensee Has Not Committed to Retain Those Specific Compensatory Measures That Were Applied to one-time Extension ML20212D3831999-09-20020 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to Withdrawal Schedule for First & Third Surveillance Capsules for BFN-3 RPV ML20210N1221999-08-0202 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request 3-ISI-7, Pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20209J0771999-07-16016 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Provided Adequate Information to Resolve ampacity-related Points of Concern Raised in GL 92-08 for BFN & That No Outstanding Issues Re GL 92-08 Ampacity Issues for Browns Ferry NPP Exist ML20196F8811999-06-23023 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves ML20205F9341999-04-0101 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee 990108 Relief Request PV-38,from Requirements of ASME BPV Code Section XI IST Testing,Valve Program for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20153H3141998-09-28028 September 1998 SE Accepting Util Proposed Alternatives as Contained in Relief Requests 3-SPT-3 & 3-SPT-4 for Second Interval & Code Case N-546 ML20247M1901998-05-20020 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Related to Browns Ferry,Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant Individual Plant Exam ML20217E5431997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Re Flaw Evaluation of Core Spray Internal Piping for Plant,Unit 3 ML20217C2191997-09-11011 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 249 to License DPR-52 ML20149L2301997-07-28028 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting License Relief Request from Certain ASME Code Requirements Delineated in Change to 10CFR50.55a for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20148U3291997-07-0808 July 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Relief Request 3-ISI-1.Based on Review,Nrc Concludes That Licensee Does Not Have Sufficient Basis for Relief from Code Required Successive Exam ML20136D7831997-03-10010 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Use of ASME Code Case N-416-1 ML20132B2701996-12-11011 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Emi/Rfi site-survey Consistent W/Industry Stds & Practice ML20077E0531994-12-0707 December 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License DPR-52 ML20058K2411993-12-0707 December 1993 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Structural Steel Thermal Growth Design Critera at Plant ML20058J1091993-12-0303 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 921228 Submittal of Suppl Response to GL 88-01, NRC Position on Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping ML20062J9121993-11-12012 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License DPR-52 ML20059C2451993-10-22022 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting IST Program Requests for Relief ML20044H0191993-05-27027 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Current BWR Operating License & Const Permit Holders,Criteria of NEDO-31558 ML20035A2911993-03-19019 March 1993 Suppl SE Finding Licensee Commitment to Implement GIP-2, Including Both SQUG Commitments & Implementation Guidance Acceptable for Resolving USI A-46,based on 930119 Response to GL 87-02 & 930303 Telcon ML20101N6261992-07-0202 July 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 202 to License DPR-52 ML20084U9551991-04-15015 April 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting TVA Corrective Action Plan Deviations.Corrective Action Plan for 22303-SQN-01 Should Be Given to NRC ML20070K0531991-03-0606 March 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-52 ML20067D8111991-02-0606 February 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License DPR-52 ML20070B6791991-01-24024 January 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179,188 & 151 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20066D6281991-01-0909 January 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 185 to License DPR-52 ML20069Q4461991-01-0303 January 1991 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 178,184 & 149 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20062E1981990-11-0505 November 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176,179 & 147 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20059H4001990-09-0707 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 175,178 & 146 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20033G7851990-03-30030 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 174,177 & 145 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20011E7821990-02-0808 February 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation on Util Conformance to Rev 3 to Reg Guide 1.97 Re Emergency Response Capability.Facility Design Acceptable Except for Variables for Core Spray Flow, LPCI Flow,Rhr Sys Flow & HX Outlet Temp ML20248D2771989-09-18018 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 171,173 & 142 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20248C8841989-09-13013 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 172 to License DPR-52 ML20245H7461989-08-0707 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 80 to License NPF-12 ML20248D5211989-08-0303 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,170 & 141 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20245F6501989-08-0202 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 169,169 & 140 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20245G2191989-08-0202 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 169,169 & 140 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20246F1961989-07-0707 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-52 ML20247H9021989-05-19019 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 166,165 & 137 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20247J6801989-05-19019 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 167,166 & 138 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20247F8241989-05-16016 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-52 ML20246M3891989-05-0909 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 890317 Proposed long-term Solution to Correct Rust Problems in Containment Spray Headers ML20245H3371989-05-0101 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) About Vendor Interface Program ML20245D5711989-04-19019 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Rust in Lower Containment Spray Header Due to Leaking Isolation Valves ML20244D4651989-04-13013 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 165,163 & 136 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20245E9561989-01-19019 January 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 163,160 & 134 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively ML20205E8341988-10-21021 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Exemptions to App R,Subsections Iii.L & Iii.G to 10CFR50 Re Plant Fire Protection Plan ML20247K5561988-09-23023 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 155,151 & 126 to Licenses DPR-33,DPR-52 & DPR-68,respectively 1999-09-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18039A9041999-10-15015 October 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990917,automatic Reactor Scram on Turbine Stop Valve Closure Occurred.Caused by High Water Level in Main Steam Moisture Separator 2C2.Unit 2C2 Reservoir Level Transmitter & Relays Were Replaced & Tested Satisfactorily ML18039A8981999-10-14014 October 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990915,manual Reactor Scram Was Noted Due to EHC Leak.Caused by Failure of Stainles Steel Tubing Connection.Removed Damaged Tubing & Connection Plug ML18039A8951999-10-0808 October 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990905,HPCI Was Inoperable Due to Failed Flow Controller.Caused by Premature Failure of Capacitor 2C3.Replaced Controller & HPCI Sys Was Run IAW Sys Operating Instructions ML18039A8751999-09-30030 September 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990901,SR for Standby Liquid Control Sampling Was Not Met.Caused by Deficient Procedure for Chemical Addition to Standby Liquid Control.Revised Procedure.With 990930 Ltr ML20217F9671999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML20212G2241999-09-27027 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License DPR-68 ML20212E6341999-09-23023 September 1999 Suppl to SE Resolving Error in Original 990802 Se,Clarifying Fact That Licensee Has Not Committed to Retain Those Specific Compensatory Measures That Were Applied to one-time Extension ML20212D3831999-09-20020 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Rev to Withdrawal Schedule for First & Third Surveillance Capsules for BFN-3 RPV ML20212B8561999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.With ML18039A8821999-08-31031 August 1999 Increased MSIV Leakage Tech Spec Change Submittal - Seismic Evaluation Rept. ML18039A8391999-08-0606 August 1999 BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts. ML20210N1221999-08-0202 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request 3-ISI-7, Pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210R0931999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML18039A8201999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990625,facility Core Spray Divisions I & II Inoperable at Same Time Due to Personnel Error.Electrical Supply Breaker to Core Spray Division II Pump 3B Returned to Normal Racked in Position ML18039A8171999-07-20020 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990623,discovered That SR for Monitoring of Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration Had Not Been Met. Caused by Failure of Operators to Adequately Communicate. Required Surveillances Were Performed.With 990720 Ltr ML18039A8161999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990618,noted That Main Steam SRV Exceeded TS Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Pilot Vlve disc-seat Bonding.Util Replaced All 13 SRV Pilot Cartridges with Cartridges Certified to Be Witin +/-1%.With 990719 Ltr ML20209J0771999-07-16016 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Provided Adequate Information to Resolve ampacity-related Points of Concern Raised in GL 92-08 for BFN & That No Outstanding Issues Re GL 92-08 Ampacity Issues for Browns Ferry NPP Exist ML18039A8121999-07-12012 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990617,ESF Actuation & HPCI Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Reset HPCI & Returned Sys to Operable Status with 25 Minutes.With 990712 Ltr ML20209H4381999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML18039A8101999-06-28028 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990530,safety Features Sys Actuations Occurred Due to RPS Trip.Caused by Failure of MG Set AC Drive Motor Starter Contractor Coil.Licensee Placed 2B RPS Bus on Alternate Feed & Half Scram Was Reset ML20196F8811999-06-23023 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves ML18039A8071999-06-14014 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990515,automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip Was Noted.Caused by Failure of Mechanical Trip Cylinder to Latch When Hydraulically Reset.Operations Crew Stabilized Reactor Following Scram ML18039A8021999-06-14014 June 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990501,SRs for Single CR Withdrawal During Cold SD Were Not Adequately Implemented.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Revised Applicable Plant Surveillances.With 990614 Ltr ML18039A8011999-06-14014 June 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990515,automatic Reactor Scram Occurred Due to Tt.Caused by Failure of Mechanical Trip Cylinder to Latch When Hydraulically Reset.Operations Crew Stabilized Reactor Following Scram.With 990614 Ltr ML20196B8051999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML18039A7791999-05-0606 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990408,declared Plant HPCI Sys Inoperable Due to Loose Wire.Caused by Failure to Properly Tighten Screw at Some Time in Past.Loose Wire Was Tightened ML18039A7761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for TVA Browns Ferry Unit 3. ML20206R0731999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Bfnp.With ML18039A7561999-04-23023 April 1999 Bfnp Risk-Informed Inservice Insp (RI-ISI) Program Submittal. ML18039A7671999-04-0808 April 1999 Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Cycle 11 Colr. ML18039A7461999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990308,determined That Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Were Inoperable.Caused by Trip C SGT Blower Motor Breaker.Initiated Shutdown of Plant,Reset C SGT Blower Motor Breaker & Declared Train Operable ML20205F9341999-04-0101 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee 990108 Relief Request PV-38,from Requirements of ASME BPV Code Section XI IST Testing,Valve Program for Plant,Units 1,2 & 3 ML20205N8341999-04-0101 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Automatic Switch Co Nuclear Grade Series X206380 & X206832 Solenoid Valves Ordered Without Lubricants That Were Shipped with Std Lubrication to PECO & Tva.Affected Plants Were Notified ML20205S0601999-03-31031 March 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 with Status Change from Previous Update,990331 ML20205T5441999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Bfnp.With ML20205S0661999-03-31031 March 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 with No Status Change from Previous Update,990331, Atlas Corp ML18039A7361999-03-11011 March 1999 Rev 4 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bfnp,Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr. ML20204C7891999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3.With ML18039A6951999-02-19019 February 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990122,LCO Was Not Entered During Calibration Testing of 3D 480 Volt Rmov Board.Caused by Personnel Error.Tva Has Briefed Operations Personnel to Preclude Recurrence of Event.With 990219 Ltr 05000259/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990115,inoperable CR Emergency Ventilation Sys During Post Maint Testing Was Noted.Caused by Failure of Procedure Writers & Reviewers.Returned a Crev to Operable State & Revised B Crev Train Procedures.With1999-02-12012 February 1999
- on 990115,inoperable CR Emergency Ventilation Sys During Post Maint Testing Was Noted.Caused by Failure of Procedure Writers & Reviewers.Returned a Crev to Operable State & Revised B Crev Train Procedures.With
ML18039A6871999-02-12012 February 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990114,Unit 3 HPCI Was Noted Inoperable. Caused by Oil Leak on Stop Valve.Corrective Maint Was Performed to Repair Oil Leak.With 990212 Ltr ML18039A6941999-02-0303 February 1999 Rev 1 to TVA-COLR-BF3C9, Bfnp Unit 3 Cycle 9 Colr. ML18039A6931999-02-0303 February 1999 Rev 3 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bfnp Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr. ML18039A6671998-12-31031 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 981202,SR Intent Was Not Adequately Implemented.Caused by Procedural Inadequacy.Revised Procedures to Provide Proper SR Implementation.With 981231 Ltr ML18039A6661998-12-31031 December 1998 Ro:On 981215,HRPCRM 2-RM-90-273C Was Declared Inoperable. Caused by Downscale Indication.Containment RM Will Be Utilized as Planned Alternate Method of Monitoring Until Hrpcrm 2-RM-90-273C Can Be Returned to Operable Status ML20199F2721998-12-31031 December 1998 ISI Summary Rept (NIS-1), for BFN Unit 3,Cycle 8 Operation ML20199K8951998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.With ML18039A6471998-12-15015 December 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 981116,unplanned ESF Following Loss of 4kV Unit Board 3B Occurred.Caused by Temporary Energization of Lockout Relay on 4kV Unit Board 3B When Resistor on Relay Monitoring Lamp Circuit Shorted.Replaced Resistor ML18039A6371998-12-0707 December 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 981116,MSSR Valves Exceeded TS Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Pilot Valve Disc/Seat Bonding. Installed SRV Pressure Switches During Unit 3,cycle 8 Outage.With 981207 Ltr ML20199F2791998-12-0303 December 1998 Bfnp Unit 3 Cycle 8 ASME Section XI NIS-2 Data Rept 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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h['%g/t UNITED STATES j
'j NUCLEAR REGULAiORY COMMISSION W
.c WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 4001
.....,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELIEF FROM ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL COD 9 SECTION XI REQUIREMENTS: RELIEF REQUEST NO. 3-IS1-7 FOR TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER: 50-269 o
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Technical Specifications (TS) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 (BFN-3) state that the inservice inspection of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, i
and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&FV) Code and applicable addenda as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR) Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i). Section 50.55a(a)(3) states that alternatives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if (i) the proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficuttly without a compensating increas3 in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the preservice examination requirements, set forth in the ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first 10-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) 12 months prior to the start of the 120-month interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable edition of Section XI of the ASME Code for the BFN-3 second 10-year inservice inspection (ISI) interval is the 1989 Edition.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5), if a licensee determines that conformance with an l
examination requirement of Section XI of the ASME Code is not practical for its facility, l
information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request l
made for relief from the Code requirement. After evaluation of the determination, the Commission may, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), grant relief and may impose alternative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law, will not endnger life, property, or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest, giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could r0sult if the requirements were imposed.
9908110026 990802 PDR ADOCK 05000296 G
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2-By letter dated March 26,1999, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), submitted Request for i
Relief No. 3-IS1-7 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3 (BFN-3). The request relates to examinations of reactor vessel-to-nozzle welds.
The information provided by TVA in support of Request for Relief 3-ISI-7, from Code requirements has been evaluated and the findings are presented below. The Code of record for the BFN-3 second 10-year ISI interval,is the 1989 Edition (No Addenda) of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 Code Reauirement The Code requires essentially 100 percent examination of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) nozzle to-vessel welds as defined by Figure IWB-2500-7.
2.2 Relief Reauest TVA determined that nine components have nondestructive examination (NDE) coverage limitations (90 percent or less coverage completed), which exceeds that specified in ASME Code Case N-460, " Alternative Examination Coverage for Class 1 and Class 2 Welds,Section XI, Division 1." The components are Code Category B-D, item B3.90, nozzle-to-vessel welds for which the calculated NDE coverage completed varied for each component, from 64 to 77 percent. Request for Relief 3-ISI-7 applies to these nine components. (Request for Relief 3-ISI-7 is similar to Unit 2 Request for Relief 2-ISI-6, which was granted February 23,1999.
Request for Relief 2-ISl-6 encompassed 19 vessel-to-nozzle welds and an instrument nozzle inside radius section.)
2.3 Basis for Relief The licensee. basis for relief states:
The design configuration of the RPV nozzle-to-vessel welds precludes an ultrasonic examination of essentially 100 percent of the required volume. The component design configuration limits ultrasonic examination coverage of the welds to the percentages listed in Table 1.
(Note: Information from the licensee's Table 1 is included in the attached table.)
2.4 Alternative Examination in lieu of the Code-required essentially 100 percent volume ultrasonic examination, TVA proposes an ultrasonic examination of accessible areas to the extent practical given the component design configuration of the RPV nozzle-to vessel welds and nozzle size.
i l
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. 2.5 Justification for the Grantina of Relief The licensee's justification for granting of relief states:
(1) The design configuration of the nine vessel-to-nozzle welds precludes an ultrasonic examination of essentially 100 percent of the rcquired volume. Access to the vessel-to-nozzle welds is by a series of doorways in the concrete biological shield wall. Insulation behind these doorways is designed for removal around the nozzle circumference. In order to examine the welds in accordance with the Code requirement the RPV would require extensive design rnodifications. The physical arrangement of the nozzle-to-vessel welds precludes ultrasonic examination from the nozzle side. The limitations are inherent to the barrel-type nozzle-to-vessel weld design and is compounded by the close proximity of the biological shield wall.
Scanning from the r.ozzle surface is ineffective due to the weld location and the asymmetricalinside surface where the nozzle and versel converge. Coverage f
was increased by scanning from the outside blend radius of the weld where practical. Experience from the automated ultrasonic examination performed from the inside surface has shown that the nozzle-to-vessel weld coverage will not be greatly improved even if performed from the inside surface utilizing the current state-of-the-art techniques.
The configuration of the nozzle-to-vessel welds precludes ultrasonic examination from the nozzle side due to the weld location and the asymmetric inside surface where the nozzle and vessel converge. The extent of examination coverage from the vessel side provides reasonable assurance that no flaws oriented parallel to the weld are present. The areas receiving little or no examination coverage are locaiad toward the outside surface of the nozzle outside blend radius. (The blend radius restricts the scanning movement and/or transducer contact.) The reactor vesselinner-half of the thickness and inside surface are interrogated with the ultrasonic beam. Degradation located at the inside surface or inner half of the vessel would be Ic::ated. It should be noted that the nozzk.
inside radius section received essentially 100 percent examination coverage for these nozzles.
(2) Radiographic examination as an alternate volumetric examination method was determined to be impractical due to the radiological concerns. Gaining access to the inside surface of the RPV to place radiographic film would require off-loading of the core and draining of the vessel below the welds to be examined. This would expose examination personnel to high radiation doses (in excess of 400 millrem per hour) due to the high radiation and contamination levels. Also, due to the varying thickness of the outside blend radius of the weld, several radiographs may be required of one area to obtain the required coverage and/or film density. The additional Code coverage gained by radiography is impractical when weighed against the radiological concerns.
Therefore, TVA concludes that performing an ultrasonic volumetric examination of essentially 100 percent of the nozzle-to-vessel full penetration welds in the RPV would be impractical. Further, it would also be impractical to perform other volumetric examinations (i.e. radiography) which may increase examination I
. \\
coverage. A maximum extent ultrasonic examination of the subject areas provides an acceptable level of quali.y and safety. TVA concludes that significant degradation, if present, w >uld have been detected during an ultrasonic examination performed to de maximum extent practical of the subject welds. As a result, reasonable assurance of operational readiness of the subject welds has been provided. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iii), TVA requests that relief be granted for the BFN Unit 3, Second 10-Year Inservice inspection interval.
I 3.0 STAFF'S EVALUATION The Code requires 100 percent volumetric examination of the subject RPV nozzle-h-vessel welds. However, complete examination of these areas is limited by component configuration (i.e., outside blend radit.s and set-in barrel design) and adjacent physical obstructions (i.e.,
biological shield wall, thermocouples, and ir.sulation supports). These restrictions limit access and make the Code coverage requirements impractical for the nino nozzle-to-vessel welds. To meet the Code coverage requirements, design modifications would be necessary to provide access for examination. Imposition of the Code requirements would result in an undue hardship on the licensee.
The licensee has performed the Code-required examinations to the extent practical and has maximized coverage by performing supplemental manual scans. As a result, coverages of 64 to 77 percent have been achieved for the subject nozzle-to-vessel welds. This level of coverage should have detected any existing patterns of degradation and provides reasonable assurance of the continued structuralintegrity for the RPV nozzles at BFN-3.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff evaluated the licensee's submittal and has concluded that the Code-required examinations are impracticai to perform to the extent required by the Code. Furthermore, the examinations performed by the licensee provide reasonable assurance of the continued inservice structural integrity of the subject components. Therefore, Request for Relief No. 3-IS1-7 is granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(l). Granting the relief is authorized by law, will not endanger life, property, or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest, giving due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were imposed.
Principal Contributor: W.O. Long, NRR Date: August 2, 1999 I
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