ML19327B458
| ML19327B458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1989 |
| From: | Belew M, Hollingsworth, Robert Williams TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18033B000 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8910310232 | |
| Download: ML19327B458 (111) | |
Text
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,e ENCLOSURE 1 i
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stoWuS FRERY WUCLEAR Pt. ANT h
l ELECTRICAL CABLE SEPARATIONS REPORT (Revision 2) i.
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j TABLE OF CONTENTS
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i Section P_RLt l
1.0 PURPOSE..............................................................
1 i
t I
2.0 BACECROUND...........................................................
1 i
i 3.0 DISCUSSION...........................................................
3 r
4.0 SPECIFIC EVALUATIONS.................................................
5 4.1 Evaluation of Field Verified Cable Routing Data from TVA's l R1 Cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R..........................
5 l
4.2 V4 and V5 Cables which Originate from Safety-Related Power Supplies
...........................................:.u........ 14 l
4.3 Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cables Which Originate from Nonsafety-Related Power Supplies..............................
16 i
4.4 Nondivisional V3 Cables which originate from Safety-Related
[
Power Supplies................................................
17 4.5 Nondivisional V3 Cables which originate from Nonsafety-Related Power Supplies..............................
20 f
4.6 Nondivisional VI and V2 Cables which Originate from Both Safety-related and Nonsafety-related Power Supplies...........
21 4.7 Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Designated with an i
"It" Suffix...................................................
26
+
t 4.8 Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cables Contained in the Project Q-List.
29 i
(
4.9 Nondivisional V3 Cables Contained in the Project Q-List.......
31 1
4.10 Nondivisional V1 and V2 Cables contained in the Project Q-List.
32 Divisional V1 and V2 Cables...................................
33 l
4.11 l R1 :
4.12 Evaluation of Cables contained in Divisional and l
Nondivisional Cable Trays that Physically Connect.............
35 l
i 5.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS.............................................
35 i
l l
l l
6.0 REFERENCES
39 f
7.0 ATTACMMENTS.........................................................
39 l
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P 331 cf 39 i
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1.0 PURPOSE l
The purpose of this report is to document the TVA actions taken to evaluate and resolve nonconforming conditions related to the divisional l
l l
separation requirements to ensure physici.1 independence for i
safety-related and non safety-related electrical cables.
l y
l The results of these evaluations were used to determine necessary corrective actions to prevent recurrence and to review for cos91ance to lk.i ;
1 the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant FSAR Chapter 8 and the Browns Ferry l
t Nuclear Plant Design criteria BFN-50-728 R1 entitled " Physical Independence of Electrical Systems" (reference 6.1.1).
i 2.0 SACKCROUND e
TVA has identified instances where the electrical separation requirements have not boon met as identifiod in Chapter 8 of the BFN FSAi~and the RFN l
Design Criteria BFN-50-728. These discrepancies were documented by the I
issuance of condition adverse to quality reports (CAQRs) generated as a result of various review programs being performed as part of t5e arW l
restart effort.
As a result, TVA has undertaken an extensive evaluation to determine the total extent of the identified condition.
f The corrective actions for the discrepancies are required, either before l
restart or post restart, as indicated. Corrective actions are grouped into two categories:
(1) physical plant changes and (2) nonphysical p
i plant changes.
Physical plant changes include the addition of redundant I
safety-related overcurrent protective devices or cable rerouting.
[
Nonphysical changes include the retagging of rnceway or cable.
In n December 2, 1988 letter, TVA concluded that the modifications required could be deferred beyond fuel load without impacting plant safety.
In this letter TVA also consmitted to completing these modifications before restart of unit 2.
I For the purpose of this report and the ensuing evaluations. TVA has sununarized the discrepancies into the following categories:
Field verified cable routing data from TVA's ampacity progran,and l
Appendix R program has resulted in routing discrepancies which lg questioned the adequacy of the cable and conduit schedule, on which l
much of the separation criteria compliance is based.
l l Cables designated with an "IE" suff1x or an "IES" suffix should have been designated either divisional or nondivisional and separated as such.
I Wondivisional cable has been routed in both divisional raceways without consideration to circuit protection.
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Wondivisional cable originating from a divisional power supp1'y has been routed in opposite division raceways or terminated in opposite j
division panels er enclosures.
l i
The design criteria requirement to route nondivisional circuits only i
on one division of raceways has been applied on a cable-by-cable f
basis and not on a circuit-by-circuit basis.
j The project Q-List (Reference 6.2) has identified cables with no k
divisional suffix as safety-related.
If these cables were required I
to be divisional, their raceway routing was questionable, f
Evaluations consisted of identifying populations of cable within the
{
areas of concern for the identified discrepancies, followed by performing either a 100 percent review of the population, a generic analysis to demonstrate the absence of adverse interactions between safety-related
{
circuitry and associated (physically or electrically) nonsafety-related circuits, or a random sample of the cable population.
The random sempting approach as used by TVA in sections 4.3, 4.5, 4.9, l
and 4.10 was based on providing a 95-percent confidence that the population quality level is 95 percent. The criteria for a discrepant 1
i item was established as any problein that is in noncompliance to the plant (RI.
design basis. The sample size and nueber of discrepant items is based on l
the following equation l }
l 1
A(x) 100 (Reference 6.4) l R
=
1 2n l
R
= confidence level where n
= sangle size
[
A(x) = factor based on number of discrepant items l
L 30..of Discrepant
{
Items (x)
Factor A(x) i f
0 5.991 1
9.488 2
12.594 i
3 15.507 1
4 18.307 i
5 21.026
{
6 23.685 7
26.296 8
28.869 9
31.410 10 33.924 All samples were chosen using a TVA developed random sample computer f
program.
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3.0 DigCUSSION l
Browns Ferry Nuclear plant has two major categories of electrical i
circuits:
l l
(1) Nondivisional, nonsafety-related, circuits are non Class It and are l
not required to mitigate the consequences of a ded gn basis event.
l These non Class it circuits become associated cirsuits when they
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share power supplies, enclosures (including electrical j
penetrations), or raceways with Class It circuits i
(2) Class it circuits are circuits that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling,
{
containment and reactor heat removal; or are essential in preventing l
significant releases of radioactive material to the environment in i
the event of a design basis accident.
Class 1E circuits are further divided into redundant divisions or channels to ensure physical and electrical independence in accordance with Ittt standard 279-1968 t
entitled " proposed Ittt criteria for Nuclear power plant Protection Systems."
These cables are further segregated into five voltage levels (1) Voltage level 5 (V5) for 4160-V cables, (2) Voltage level 4 (V4) for 480-V power cable, lighting cabinet feeder cables, and low voltage power cables carrying 30 amperes or more, (3) Voltage level 3 (V3) for low voltage power and control cable applications, typically 120 V ac or 250 V de, that provide motive and control power for alternating current motors, motor-operated and solenoid valves, and control power for relays, closing circuits, and trip circuits, (4) Voltage level 2 (V2) for medium-level signal cables for digital input to and outputs from the computer, instrument transmitters, recorders, and (5) Voltage level 1 (V1) for low-level signal cables from thermocouples, strain gauges, vibration detectors, thermal converters, and resistance temperature device (R7D).
{
l As a result of the discrepancies identified ir Section 2.0, TVA performed l
evaluations for the following populations of cables (applicable section i
of report is in parenthesis):
Field verified cable routing data from TVA's cable ampacity program W
(
and Appendix R program (Subsection 4.1).
l
)
V4 and V5 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.2).
l Wondivisional V4 and V5 cables which originate from t
nonsafsty-related power supplies (Subsection 4.3).
l I
(
Nondivisional V3 cables which originate from safety-related power supplies (Subsection 4.4).
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pago 4'cf 39 Wondivisional V3 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies (subsection 4.5).
'g Wondivisional V1 and V2 cables which originate from both 1
safety-related and nonsafety-related power supplies (subsection 4.6).
Divisional and nondivisional cables designated with an "It" suffix
)
(Subsection 4.7).
)
1 Wondivisional V4 and V5 cables contained in the project Q-t.ist (Subsection 4.8).
1 Wondivisional V3 cables contained in the project Q-1.ist (subsection i
4.9).
Wondivisional VI and V2 cables contained in the project Q-1.ist (subsection 4.10).
~..
Divisional V1 and V2 cables (Subsection 4.11)
RO Evaluation of cables contained in divisional and nondivisLonal cable trays that physically connect (Subsection 4.12)
Other than potential discrepancies in the "It" cable population and those nondivisional V3 cables in the project Q-list, no known design separation discrepancies existed for V3 divisional cables. Therefore, these cables were not chosen as a separate population to review. However, during the course of the Appendix R and ampacity reviews, a total of 168 i
safety-related V3 cables were field verified and their routing gl evaluated.
The results of those evaluations did not reveal any new t
problems which would indicate any further review was required, l
j r
TVA recently issued Design Input Memorandum (DIM) BFN-50-728-1 which is
[
an advance revision notice to design criteria BFN-50-728. This DIN allows exceptions for nonsafety-related power cables to share a power supply and enclosure with one safety-related division and an enclosure or raceway with the other safety-related division if the circuit is provided with protection consisting of two safety-related electrical protection devices j
to prevent it from degrading safety-related circuitry.
A safety-related l RF protection device may consist of a qualified Class 1E breaker or a qualified or non-qualified fuse because of its operation (fails safe).
Exceptions are also allowed for nonsafety-related instrumentation and low
[
voltage control circuitry to be routed with both safety-related divisions when an analysis demonstrates the absence of adverse interections between safety-related circuitry and associated nonsafety-related circuits.
r Each of the specific cable population evaluations considered this DIM to be either an acceptable method for satisfying the separation criteria or an acceptable corrective action for any discrepancies that might be i
identified. The methodology used in these evaluations and the results are contained in Section 4.0 of this report.
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4.0 SpgCIFIC EVALUATIONS
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tased on the categories of discrepancies identified in section 2.0. TVA undertook specific evaluations to determine the extent of the electrical separation discrepancies.
Since the majority of the evaluations relied on the existing design output documents as input to confirm cable routing and circuit configurations, it was concluded that the field verified cable routing data from the ampacity program and Appendix R and any discrepancies identified must be adequately resolved to confirm the adequacy of this input data. This consideration is discussed and confirmed in Subsection 4.1 with the remaining subsection's utilizing this confirmation.
4.1 svaluation of Field Verified Cable Routina Data from TVA's Cable
^-ecity Program and Appendix 1 4.1.1 purpose The purpose of this effort was to evaluate field verified cable routing data from TVA's ampacity program and Appendix R and any discrepancies between the design routing and the as-installed routing as a result of this data. The results of this data would then be used to develop a statistical analysis to determine the acceptance of the conduit and cable database.
4.1.2 Nothodolony l
i This activity began by first identifying the source of field verified data.
This data was determined to be available from bg the followin$ verification activities
- Walkdowns and signal tracing performed by Ebasco Services, t
Incorporated (gSI) to verify cable locations for the cable ampacity program l
- Signal tracing for Appendix R cables These populations of cables were then categorized as the f
fo11owings j
- V4/VS cables verified as a result of the cable ampacity program and Appendix R program e V3 cables verified as a result of the cable ampacity program and Appendix R program WPK2 - 661N
i pcg3 6 'cf 39 a
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sach discrepancy identified during this evaluation was'then 9
documented and evaluated using the following definitions klacrepancy - Actual cable installed configuration does not agree with design requirements.
Resian sinnifiennt - A design, construction, or records related discrepancy which, is found j
to be in nonconformance with the l
applicable code, standard, or licensing requirements (FsAR/ Design Criteria).
l safety sinnificant - A design significant discrepancy which, l
if remained undetected, could result in the loss of capability of the affected t
system or structure to perform its l
hg intended safety function.-
(
)'
Violations of separation criteria were reviewed to-confirm that the failure modes affecting the design significant cables did not affect the capability to safely shutdown the plant or nitigate an accident.
4.1.2.1 14/V5 Cables Verified as a Reruit of the Cable l
Amencity Promram and Amoendix R Program i
Since the objective of the ampacity program was to l
Verify locations of Q-list V4/V5 cables and to
[
perform cable ampacity calculations for these cables, this activity was initiated by first reviewing the existing plant Q-list, Q-list additions, and deletions contained in Quality Information Releases (QIRs) to establish an accurate listing of safety-related cables requiring ampacity
[
calculations.
l The number of V4/VS cables field verified and contained in the ampacity program was confirwed to l
be 936. Of this 936, a total of 359 safety-related cables existed, with 195 of these requiring an ampacity calculation to support unit 2 restart, and i
577 nonsafety V4/V5 cables were field verified.
F Also for this activity. Appendix R cables which had l
l been signal traced were included (11 safety cables and 4 associated cables).
The total population of i
V4/V5 cables with field verified data was 951.
For
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these cables, a documentation package was prepared.
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,[i For cables contained within the ampacity program, cable signal tracing was performed in accordance with Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction i
(gEMI)-62 (reference 6.5), and visual verification l
l was performed by actual in plant observations l
(conduit and tray entry / exit points) in accordance i
to Task Instruction TI-E036-01 (reference 6.6).
Walkdown packages were prepared which contained appropriate data sheets, sketches, Maintenance l
Requests, and drawing discrepancies. The method of verification was determined by the walkdown data or compilation of walkdown data contained in each cable package.
For the Appendix R cables, signal tracing i
was performed in accordance to ssNI-49 (reference 6.7).
The extent of each field verification is documented in the walkdown package'..-
gach cable package also contains a copy of any
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i
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drawing discrepancy initiated as a result of the field verification and an evaluation of the discrepancy for design significance to the cable separation requirements contained in the plant design criteria BFN-50-728 El entitled " physical Independence of Electrical Systems" and Chapter 8 of l
the FsAR. This evaluation was performed by senior electrical engineers with second party verification.
These cable packages and evaluations are documented l
by QIR TEPBFN89038.
For each design significant discrepancy a safety significant evaluation was perforned and is also i
documented in the above QIR.
4.1.2.2 V3 Cables Verified As a Result of The Cable Ampacity I
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Protram and Appendix R Within the cable ampacity program, 144 V3 cables
(
were required to be field verified because of their l
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l location.
geventy-three of these cables were identified by reviewing the ampacity data base for i
voltage level and load; these V3 cables are control cables 277 volts and less with a protective device setting of 30 amps or less.
122 V3' cables (113 safety; 7 associated; 2 nonsafety) were field l
l verifled for Appendix R.
These cables were routed on 158 individually identified cable trays (58-Divison I; 49 Division II; 51 non-divisional).
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Page 8 of 39
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Cable packages containing the same information I
as that for V4/V5 were also prepared for these l
cables.
5 These cable packages and evaluations are also l
documented by QIR TEPBFN89038.
i i
For each design significant discrepancy a safety significant evaluation was performed and is also documented in the above QIR.
4.1.3 Results i
For.this total number of cable, 40s drawing i
discrepancies were identified. Eight V4/V5 drawing
{
discrepancies and three V3 drawing discrepancies were determined to be design significant because the j
as-installed configuration did not comply with the i
design criteria or FSAR.. The problems identified in these discrepancies are listed below:
}
DIV CABLE NON-DIV ROUTED IN j
DIV CABLE CABLE ROUTED NON-DIV TRAY CABLE TOTAL DESIGN ROUTED IN NON-IN BOTN DIV AND IN BOTH f
POPULATION SIGNIFICANT DIV RACEWAY RACEWAY DIV RACEWAY I
V4/V5 8
6 1*
1 V3 3
1 2
0 l
- This cable (PL1237) has been upgraded to divisional as a result of the review in section 4.8.
L VOLTAGE SEPARATIONS l
CABLE NUMBER LEVEL DISCREPANCY DEVIATION r
BS22-IE 4
Designed cable route Cable in division I i
stopped at tray tray, division II IF-ESI.
Installer conduit, and added conduit nondivisional tray 2ES3243-II to reach t
M0V board 28.
- ES3100-II 4
Designed cable route Divisional cable j
stopped at tray in nondivisional EN-ESII.
Installer conduit i
added conduit 1PL387 to reach MOV board 1B.
t 0728c-3 i
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VOLTAGE SEPARATION 8' f -
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CABLE NUMBER
. LEVEL DISCREPANCY DEVIATION '
j i
2ES3915-II 4
Required route was Divisional cable EU-ESII, conduit.
in nondivisional l
Actual route was tray l
EP; conduit. Trays,
[
EU-ESII and EP are parallel.
Required route was Divisional cable FK-ESII FN-ESII, in nondivisional
[
conduit. Actual tray route was FK-ESII, l
FK, conduit.
FN-E811 i
and FK are parallel, side-by-side, and
}
on the top of two stacks of trays.
f.
I E82652-II 4
Required route was Divisional cable l
GGH-II, ES2652-II.
in nondivisional Actual route was tray j
OGH-II, WFA, l
ES2652-II i
1E8475-I 4
Kequired route was Divisional cable
~
FN-ESI, 1ES475-I.
in nondivisional Actual route was tray i
FN-ESI, FN, conduit.
l PL1237*
4 Required route was Mondivisional cable
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... FN-1, FK, HR, routed in both 3PL2075. Actual divisions route was...
FN-I, FK, FK-II, 3PL2075.
I
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I 1ES3910lII 4
Required route was Divisional cable i-
. FN-II, EF-II.
routed in Actual route was nondivisional
. EN-II, EF-II, tray air, EG, 1ES3634-II, 1E83910-11.
l l
l FE4938
'3 Required route was Nondivisional all in nondivisional cable routed in raceway. Actual both divisions i
t route was... non-div KKV-I, I
DJ-II.
- This cable has been upgraded to divisional.
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t VOLTAGE SEPARATIONS '
CABLE NUMBER LEVEL DISCREPANCY
_.OtVIAT193 4
K3214 3
Required route was Mondivisional
.. JA-1, SAF.
cable routed in Actual route was both divisions
. JA-1, SAF.
NG-II, 3384453-11 3
Required route was Divisional cable panel 9.3, JAQ-II.
in nondivisional Actual route was tray panel 9.3, JD, JAQ-II.
4.1.4 Verification'of Data The compilation of this data was audited by Engineering g)
Assurance (EA). The EA audit concluded that the cable listing and the quantity of cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate count of field-verified cable routing information and that the cable verification packages are consistent with the data on the cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.
This technical audit SFT49903 is documented by memorandum from A. p. Capozzi to J. D. Hutson dated May 5, 1989 (505 890505 004) and is included as Attachment 1.
An additional site quality surveillance was conducted to assess the validity of the Appendix R signal trace data performed in accordance to SEMI-49. This included a sample walkdown by Engineering of 13 cables selected from the original SEMI-49 walkdown data with QA monitoring the walkdown.
The sample walkdown cable routee were compared to I
the original walkJown routes and both were in agreement.
This is documented in surveillance report QBF-S-89-0903 contained as Attachment 2.
In addition, quality monitoring of ampacity program walkdown activities indicated a fully acceptable performance, i
4.1.5 Summary Results and corrective Action As a result of these eleven discrepancies, a safety significant evaluation was performed to determine if the j
(
l identified conditions would pose a nuclear safety concern. '
This evaluation confirmed that none of the identified separation discrepancies posed a safety concern because the single failure criteria and functional redundancy were met.
These evaluations are included as Attachment 3.
l l
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Y pago 11 cf 39 In addition TVA also performed an analysis to determine if the eleven design significant deficiencies had a common root I
cause. Since the majority of the cables were installed during the original construction prior to initial fuel i
loading, a rigorous analysis could not be accosylished due to the unavailability of change documentation for early cable installations. The result, of this t.nalysis indicated that the eleven discrepancies were not the result of a single specific cause but rather occurred at various stages in a loosely controlled change control process. The process has now been upgraded to procedurally control changes to ensure deviations from design output are reviewed and approved by engineering and are incorporated into the design documents.
This analysis is documented by QIR ggt BFW 89002.
1 These problems have been documented by CAQRs BFP881105 R1 and SFP870860 R3.
To correct the separation discrepancies, the following corrective actions will be taken
- Before Unit 2 restart:
TVA will either reroute the divisional cables or have an evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions. The nondivisional cables will either be rerouted or provided with I
redundant overcurrent protective devices or have an i
evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions.
l These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 4.
l This evaluation is documented by Quality Infomation Release I
QIRTapBFW89038.
From the V4/VS population (U0, U1, U2, U3) 951 field verified cables were sampled. ~ gight discrepant cables were determined to be design significant as a result of this sample.
It can I
therefore be asserted with 95% confidence that 98% or more of the V4/VS cables are routed consistent with the design criteria.
i From the total V3 population (UO U1, U2, U3) 266 field verified cables were sampled. Three discrepant cables were l
determined to be design significant as a resuit'of this t
sample.
It can therefore be asserted with 95% confidence i
that 97% or more of the V3 cables are routed consistent with the design criteria.
The above confidence level / quality level percentages are approximate becausa the popuidtion of V3 and V4/V5 cable samples were selected opportunistically rather than randomly (i.e., the sample does not meet the statistical criterion of a random sample). However, this is concluded to be acceptable because of the following:
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l pag 3 12'cf 39 V3 Sample t
e Approximately 55 percent are cables whose routings are not in agreement with design documents.
- The frequency of occurrence of such discrepant cables in the V3 sample is estimated to be between 2-1/2 times greater than in the V3 cable population as a whole.
l
- The occurrence frequency of cables having a design j
significant discrepancy should be highest in that group of cables whose routing deviates from the design documents.
1
- Since the V3 sample is " enriched" with these types of cables, it is expected that population quality levels are J'
apt to be worse than would be inferred from a true random
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saiaple.
~..
- Therefore, the population V3 statistical inferences are likely to be wrong, but in the conservative direstion.
V4/V5 s - le o The V4/V5 sample size is very large from the statistical i
viewpoint.
l e population quality levels inferred from the sample should be very close to the true population quality level based on the size of the sampia.
j i
i These statistical analyses wera performed by Bechtel North
.i l
American power Corporation for TVA and are documented in l
Bechtel Calculation MNG-050 (B22 890509 341) entitled, l
" statistical Analysis - Cable Routing Discrepancies."
7 This statistical analysis concluded the followings t
- Both samples substantiate at least 95 percent confidence of 6
at least 95 percent conformance of the V3 and V4/VS cable i
populations with relevant design criteria and FSAR consnitments relating to divisional and associated cable
[
separation. The collective routings are in substantial i
conformance with design and FSAR acceptability criteria.
i' e Cables containing a design-significant routing deviation may exist in the unsampled elements of the two sampled populations. However, their occurrence frequency is small I
based on the available sampling evidence.
Redundancy and conservatism used in the design of conumercial nuclear power plants provide margin for the occurrence of some deviant conditions that exceed normal design allowables.
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' e No safety-significant 6eviations were observed in 'either of the cable samples, despite the large sizes of the samples
{
and the comparatively large proportion of sampled cables 4
Whose routing differs from the design specification.
Collectively, the sampling evidence suggests that personnel who installed the cables were cognizant of the design criteria requirements pertaining to divisional and j
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associated cable separation. Where deviations from the
{
F design routing occurred, in the vast majority of cases, the
}
re-routed cables aro in literal conformance with divisional I
and associated cable separation criteria.
l In conclusion this evaluation provides the confidence level necessary to allow the conduit and cable design database be used as input for all other evaluations.
i 4.2 V4 and V5 Cables Which Oriainate From Safety-related' Power Supeling l
l 4.2.1 Purpose
\\
This evaluation was performed by as! to identify I
electrical separation discrepancies for power cables which originate from safety-telated power supplies. This l
evaluation consisted of 100 percent of the total i
population of these cables.
j i
4.2.2 Methodology i
The V4/V5 separation evaluation consisted of three I
separate efforts. The first effort consisted of
[
evaluation of the V4/V5 cables contained within the cable ampacity data base.
The second effort consisted of a review of V4/VS cables connected to safety-related power sources which were not contained within the cable i
ampacity data base. The third effort consisted of a review of the circuit path for V4/V5 nonsafety-related cables which did not connect directly to a load device to determine if the circuit met the separation criteria.
I b
This analysis was performed utilising design drawings, l
the ampacity data base, and the TVA raceway loading report. Additionally, the unit 3 computer-generated I
cable and conduit schedule was used to evaluate any i
unit 3 cables routed in unit 2 raceways, t
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f m.m
,_,.,._.m..
..,...__,.,-._.m,,
Pag 3 14' Cf 39 i
4.2.3 Results
'f 4.2.3.1 svaluation of Cables Contained in The Ampacity Data Base Using a tabulation of the trays containing power j
cables required for restart, an evaluation was performed to determine if any cables originating in one division were routed in an opposite division tray.
These discrepancies did not meet the requirement thet nondivisional cables or circuits (once as.ociated with one division either in a panel, enclosure, or raceway) would i
not become associated with the opposite division in another panel, enclosure, or raceway.
i 4.2.3.2 svaluation of Cables Not Contained,4n The Ampacity Data Base A review of the connection diagrams for boards providing safety-related power was performed to identify power cables not contained / evaluated in J
the separation review of the cable ampacity data base.
Cable routes were obtained by review of the cable and conduit schedule, or the unit 3 computer cable list as appropriate.
This review
)
identified a number of catie tray sections which had not been evaluated for separation l
discrepancies.
The Raceway Loading Schedule was subsequently reviewed to ensure that a power cable originating in one division was not routed with a safety cable of the redundant division.
{
Wo separation discrepancies were identified from l
this review.
f y
4.2.3.3 Power Circuit Analysis f
i The cables evaluated during the ampacity and the i
non-restart review as discussed above were
[
l screened to determine which cables did not l
connect directly to a load device (pump, fan, Motor Operated Valve (MOV), etc.).
sach cable l
connected to a junction device that may have L
another cable connected (i.e., junction box, disconnect switch, local starter, hte.) was checked to assure any connected cable was not associated with the redundant division.
i i
WPK2 - 6617W l
paso 15 cf 39 i
i l
Cableswereidentifiedthatdonottersk'natein a load device, but terminate in a junction device such as a junction box. These cablen were evaluated for separation discrepancies on the premise that other cables terminating in the same Junetton device may be routed in opposite i
divisional trays. This evaluation revealed eight cables where the circuit route involved both cable tray divisions.
{
4.2.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actiong r
pl This evaluation identified 101 separation discrepancies.
In addition, the evaluation also identified separation discrepancies associated with previously identifled l
drawing discrepancies and cables with "!E" suffix. These i
are discussed in subsections 4.1 and 4.7 i
The discrepancies problems have been documented by CAQRs pg BFP881105 R1, BFP881106 R0, and BFP870860 R3. -
The following corrective actions will be then:
l
- Before Unit 2 restart l
Sixteen cables will have their power removed because the I
function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.
M Eighty-five cables will either:
l l
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective I
devices added in series to prevent the non-safety-related cable from degrading the safety I
related circuitry.
j Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
l These cable identifiers and their particular circuit r
pl function are identified in Attachment 5.
- After Unit 2 restart I
gg The sixteen cables that had been de-energized for restart f
l~
will be modified as appropriate.
This evaluation is documented by the ESI repo:t to TVA dated November 11, 1988 (B22 881112 244).
T l
l NPK2 - 6617W
i pag 315er39 e.3 Mondivialonal V4 aad V5 Cables which Orininete from Nonsafety-Related Power Supplies 4.3.1 Purpose
'h, This evaluation was performed by TVA.
The purpose of the evaluation was to identify electrical separation discrepancies for nondivisional power circuits which origi'ste from nonsafety-related power supplies.
4.3.2 Esthodology This evaluation consisted of two random sample lots consisting of 58 cables in each lot from a total population of 1713 cables. The reason for performing two sample lots was because the total population of cables was not fully established'until after the initial sample lot had been determined. The second sample lot was chosen from these additional cables and added to the total population.
This evaluation was per formed in accordance with the sampling approach defined in Section 2.0 After the cables were identified, TVA then prepared circuit block disgrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or terminktion point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system.
From the block diagrams, the electrical separation of the complete circuit was evaluated for conformance to the established design criteria requirenants.
4.3.3 Results From the evaluation of the circuit block diagrams, no l-separation discrepancies were identified.
4.3.4 Summary Results and Corr'ective Actions The review results (no separation discrepancies) provide a 95-percent confidence that 95 percent of the circuits within the population meet the separation criteria. Therefore, no corrective actions are required. Thic evaluation is documented by QIR EEBNFN88095.
L 4.4 Wondivisional V3 Cables Which Oritinate From Safety-related Power Supplies l
4.4.1 Purpose l
This circuit analysis was performed by ESI.
The evaluation addressed typical nondivisional circuits which originate in safety-related power supplies (i.e., 4160-V ac shutdown boards, 480-V de reactor motor operated valve (MOV) boards, 250-V de reactor MOV boards and power distribution panels WPK2 - 6617W
pag 3 17'cf 39 (PDF)] to assure that a fault on a nonsafety cable, c'ombined
)
with a singis failure of its protective device, will not I
cause degradation of both safety-related divisions. For
{
those cases where analysis of the circuit could not assure l
that the fault would not propagate to both safety-related I
I divisions, the circuits were evaluated to assure that no f
association with both divisions exists.
i This evtL.y,lon consisted of 100 percent of the total I
population of these cables / circuits.
.i 4.4.2 Reihodel.on V3 control circuits are supplied by control power feeds from i
combination starters at MOV boards, control circuit leeds for 4160V ac and 400-V ac shutdown boards or power distribution i
feeders. A review of the circuit configuration. design was performed to determine if any nonsafety cables terminated l
inside the panel did not meet the separation criteria. Also, i
due to previously identified problems at drywell f
penetrations, the nonsafety related circuits connected to V3 division Il penetrations in unit 2 were evalustad for single-failure criteria compliance.
4.4.3 Results 4.4.3.1 480V ac MOV Boards, 480V ac Control bay Vent Boards, f
480V ac Diesel Auxiliary Boards, 480V ac Standby Cas Treatment Boards, 250V DC MOV Boards, 480V ac.d 4160V Shutdown Boards.
[
The results of this evaluation showed that any V3 I
control circuit originating from the above boards which may be routed in the redundant division raceway is protected from faults by two redundant overcurrent protective devices. Therefore, a fault l
in a nonsafety related circuit combined with a single protectivo device failure will not degrade redundant safety divisions.
[
i 4.4.3.2 Power Distribution Panels (PDP) (Panel 9-9) l Safety control power for miscellaneous loads is
[
supplied by the Unit Battery Boards located in the control bay and the power distribution panels i
i located in thrt main control room of each unit.
The
{
connection diagrams for the battery boards and the main control room Power Distribution Panels (PDPs) were reviewed to determine which nonsafety circuits originate in the safety sections of these boards.
l WPK2 - 6617W
]
k Pag 3 18 cf 39
'.f.
Each cable identified within these circuits was evaluated for (1) cable routing in the opposite division or (2) connection to a circuit with an opposite division i
cable er cabid routed in an opposite division.
If the
)
circuit was associated with redundant divisions without J
redundant overcurrent protective devices, it was l
considered a separation discrepancy.
6 This review identified 27 instances where the nondivisional cables or circuits originate in a divisional panel and then become associated with the opposite division either in a panel, enclosure, or i
raceway without redundant overcurrent protection.
i 4.4.3.3 Dryve11 Penetrations Review I
A review of the unit 2 V3 safety-related eiectrical penetrations for separation discrepancies was performed. Four V3 safety-related penetratio,as were reviewed (EE, EA, EB, and EC). TVA had previously identified that nonsafety-related drywell blower circuits connected to Penetration EE and routed in i
opposite division raceways violated the existing l
g\\
separation criteria.
}
The review identified an additional 33 nondivisional circuits connected to these divisional penetrations I
which did not meet the separation criteria because the i
cables terminated in one division penetration and were i
routed in opposite division raceways.
of these 33 circuits, 25 are considered acceptable because the cable is provided with protection consisting of two safety-related electrical protective devices in series. This prevents the nonsafety-related circuitry from degrading safety-related circuitry as a result of a postulated fault in the nondivisional circuit.
One circuit was evaluated and found to have insufficient electrical energy during either normal operation or during a postulated faulted condition to cause fault propagation to other circuits routed in the penetration or raceway. In addition, one circuit for motor differential current transformers was evaluated to be acceptable because backup protection is provided by an overcurrent trip circuit or ground fault relay which will trip the load breaker, t
t 0728c-1
$\\
.-n
-.,-n, n.,
p ge 19' Cf 39 Theremainingsixcircuitsweredeemedtobb unacceptable because they were protected by single protective devices. This could potentially result j
in a failure in the penetration and subsequent i
failure in the redundant raceways if the single Protective device did not properly operate during a postulated, faulted condition.
]
j 4.4.4 Br---
ry Results and Corrective Actions The evaluations performed and described in subsection 4.4.3.1 i
revealed that control circuits from NOV boards and switchgear are protected by two overcurrent protective devices and are
{
therefore not subject to a single failure during a fault i
condition on the nondivisional cable. The remaining i
evaluations in subsections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3 identified 49 l
discrepancies. These problems have been documented by CAQRs
)
BrpS81105 R1 and DFp881106 R0.
pl The following corrective actions will be taken
- Before restart tight cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 operation.
l h
The remaining 41 cables will either:
j t
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
i f
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.
l Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions
{
i l
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function i
are identified in Attachment 5.
l l
- After restart:
l i
l --
l p
Eight cables will be appropriately corrected that were de-energized for restart.
l This evaluation is documented by the ESI report to TVA dated f
November 11, 1988 (B22 881111 245).
[
I i
l, NPK2 - 6617W t
F j
r.
1 pago 20 cf 39 4.5 Mondivisional V3 Cables which Oriminate f rom Monsafety-relatind Power pussties i
4.5.1 Purpose 1
i This evaluation was performed by TVA to identify electrical separation discrepancies for nondivisional control cables i
which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.
4.5.2 Methodoloar i
TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (438). This evaluation was performed in 1
i accordance to the sampling approach defined in section 2.0.
{
l After the cables were identified. TVA then prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing i
within the conduit and cable tray raceway system.
From the block diagrams, the elect rical separation of the complete i
circuit was evaluated for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.
t 4.5.3 Results l
From the evaluation of the circuit block diagrams, no separation discrepancies were identified.
4.5.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions The review results (no separation discrepancies) provide a 95-percent confidence that 95 percent of the circuits within the population meet the separations criteria. Therefore, no corrective actions are required. This evaluation is t
documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.
l 4.6 Mondivisional VI and V2 Cables Which Oriminate From Both i
l Safety-related and Nonsafety-related Power Sucolies f
l 4.6.1 Purpose
[
j The purpose of this evaluation was to perform an analysis to i
i demonstrate that failure (short or open circuit) of any L
non-class 1E, VI or V2 routed cable will not result in the disablirit of redundant Class 1E circuits. This' analysis was performed on typical circuits representative of the 8FN V1 j
and V2 circuit population. This eliminated the need for
(
individual circuit analyses. This evaluation was performed by ESI.
NPK2 - 6617W l
l PCg3 21 Cf 39 i
4.6.2 Methodolony
't i
~
i TVA Design Criteria DFN-50-758, Power, Control, and signal f
Cables for Use in Class I stavetures (reference 6.1.2)
{
defines the types of cable and circuit functions for V2 as i
follows:
1.
Signal cables for input to and output from the computer i
(other than thermocouples) i 2.
Instrument transmitter circuits l
3.
Recorder circuits 4.
RfD circuits greater than 100mV 5.
Tachometer circuits
[
6.
Indicator circuits 7.
Rotor eccentricity and vibration detector circuits 8.
Shielded annunciator cables used with solid-state i
equipment i
Cable type and circuit functions for type V1 are defined by l
the same criteria as follows:
I t
1.
Thermocouple low-level signal cable 2.
Strain gauge low-level signal cable 5.
Thermal converter low-level signal cable 4.
RTD circuits less than 100mV Other circuit types not addressed by the criteria, but routed in V1 or V2 raceways, er operating at a voltage level consistent with the V1 or V2 definition, were siso i
evaluated.
Eramples are Nuclear Steam Supply System (WSSS)
I instrumentation and telephone and conumanication circuits, j
Typical representative equipment / devices, circuit configurations, and cable applications were enamined to l
determine if any internally or externally generated fnuit in a VI or V2 circuit is capable of producing sufficient energy or voltage potential to degrade the safety function of adjacent cables.
~
The evaluation did not individually address all BFW circuits i
associated with each application reviewed. Typical devices, l
application, and circuit configurations were reviewed in i
conjunction with conservative estimates of available short i
circuit, current and cable current capacity. These typical l
evaluations were considered representative of BFW nonsafety-related VI and V2 circuits.
t f-l l
(
NPK2 - 6617W i
pago 22' cf 39
[
[
t From a review of the possible cable types used for V1 and V2 applications, the cables were categorized as follows:
)
i Application
[tark number series Wire size manae
[
i TherN eouples WU series
- 16 or #20 AWG j
l Telephone and WT series
- 18 - #22 AWG pairs Comununications
- 12 - #26 AWG Coax j
f General signal and WV series and
- 12 - #22 AWC Instrumentation certain WW series j
i Wire size selection for VI and (2 application is generally l
not based on current carrying capacity, but rather on circuit resistance. However, for the purpose of this evaluation, it l
was desirable to establish a " worst case" circuit current j
limit to assure integrity of circuits and coaxial cable circuits. The smallest wire siss designated for use in V1 j
and V2 applications is #22 AWG. Telephone and consnunications j
circuits are not considered because these circuits are power i
limited and pose no electrical safety hazards. Cable deterioration due to circuit current cannot result from fault conditions. This condition is recognized by NFPA 70-1987, l
Article 800 (Reference 6.3) which does not stipulate an insulation voltage rating for this cable application.
I i
The current limit for this evaluation was established as
[
500 mA which is supported by a calculation.
The evaluation was then performed using the typical circuit applications and dotermining available short circuit currents, and comparing l-these to the 500mA current limit.
Applications with short circuit currents less than 500mA were considered incapable of l
causing cable insulation deterioration and propagation of i
damage to adjacent cables.
For applications with available i
short circuit currents above 500mA, actual cable sizes were analyzed or actual routing and separation investigated.
f f
4.6.3 Results 4.6.3.1 Computer Input / Output (I/0) Circuits l
l This evaluation found that multiple unit power supplies, when analyzed to produce worst case short circuit currents, are capable of currents in excess of the 500mA limit for #22 AWG.
However, upon l
examination of the specific applications and actual l
wire sizes used for each application, it was l
determined that fault currents provided by these L
l power supplies would not result in deterioration of l-that circuit's cable insulation or insulation for l
any other cable.
l l
WPK2 - 6617W l
i l
l t
r l
i l
I p:g3 23 cf 39
)
4.6.3.2 Instrument Transmitter Circuits The evaluation determined that typical ?ransmitter i
maximum available output currents are 6a to 125 mA j
s which is well below the 500mA limit established in j
Section 4.6.2.
The energy produced by the j
transmitters is less than the power supplies; therefore, the worst case short circuit current in
(
these circuits is between the power supply and l
[
transmitter and was addressed by the evaluations in i
Subsection 4.6.3.1.
I It can therefore be concluded that available short circuit currents in instrument transmitter circuits I
will not result in cable insulation deterioration to l
the shorted cabis or any adjacent ca.bles.
j 4.6.3.3 Recorder Circuits l
Recorders and indicators are load devicer which convert analog process signals to operator display information and therefore do not contribute any electrical energy to the circuit.
In the event of a i
short circuit, their presence adds impedance which would assist in limiting short circuit currents.
Analysis of short circuit currents in recorder and l
indicator circuits obtains the same results as those in subsection 4.6.3.1.
j 4.6.3.4 RTD and Strain Gage Circuits l
power sources for these devices are designed to operate in the 4-20mA de range with current lir.iting features to facilitate use of NFPA 70 Class 2 and 3 wiring.
Typical output is 0.035V de at 35mA using a 10 ohm RTD element.
Power source maximum available output j
current is well below the 500mA limit established in Subsection 4.6.2.
In addition, RTD and strain gage operating circuit voltages and currents comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and are classified as an
" inherently limited power source" (Class 2 cir'cuit).
It can therefore be concluded that ava'ilabic short circuit currents in RTD and strain gage circuits will not result in cable insulation deterioration to the shorted cable, or any adjacent cables.
NPK2 - 6617W
L I
PCgo 24 Sf 39
)
I i
4.6.3.5 Circuits for gecentricity, Vibration Detector and l
Other Miscellaneous Measurements
(
l A review of sensor devices which providel, input to j
~
the amplifier boards shows that signals are smaller in magnitude than the' amplifier outputs (with the exception of tachoneter generators which have i
circuits routed as control (V3) vn1tage level) and i
therefore pose no problem with respect to short l
circuit currents.
In addition, the operating circuit voltages and currents for the sensors and amplifiers comply with i
NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can be classified er an
{
" inherently limited power source" (Class 2 circuit).
4.6.3.6 Annunciator Circuits 1
The current for these circuits exceeded the 500mA-limit previously established. This required that the actual annuncistor circuit cabling be investigated. The smallest size annunciator circuits typically consist of 2/C-#18 AWG cabling.
For this evaluation, the current limit was-i established as 4.0A which is supported by i
calculation which includes an appropriate safety I
margin.
A comparison of the current limit for #18 AWG cable and the maximum available short circuit current for r
the Browns Ferry annunciators shows that cable insulation deterioration will not result.
In addition, the annunciator circuit voltages and l
eurrents comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can be classified as an " inherently limited power source" (Class 2 circuit).
{
4.6.3.7 Thermocouple Circuits s
Recorders and millivolt to current (mV/I) transmitters used with thermocouple inputs are i
designed with high input impedance and do not contribute voltage or current to the thermocouple section of the circuit. Millivolt to current transmitters typically have 4-20mA or 10-50mA outputs and are current limiting.
This design is similar to instrument transmitters; therefore, the analysis in Subsection 4.6.3.2 applies.
WPK2 - 6617W P
.n
,,--w.
---n.
-.-,.w.,.----.,---,.
,.-r--.,..,-n-,-,-nm_v.
-,.--,.ec.-. - - -,<+.,--.---.,- -
I P:33 25 cf 39 i
L I
I The maximum available short circuit currents in thermocouple circuits are well below the 500mA limit previously established and therefore cannot reruit i
in cable insulation deterioration to the. faulted f
cable or any adjacent cables.
l The operating currents and voltages for thermocouple l
circuits comply with NFPA 70 Table 725-31(b) and can i
be classified as " inherently limited power source" (Class 2).
4.6.3.8 NSSS and specialty Instrumentation Circuits Certain NSSS and specialty instrumentation circuits i
are routed in V1 or V2 raceways.
Examples are acoustic valve position indicator ci.rcuits, humidity l
i recording circuits, neutron monitoring tircuits, and t
control rod position indication circuits.
f 1
The maximum available short circuit currents for I
these circuito are well below the 500mA limit previously established, and therefore cannot result in cable insulation deterioration to the shorted
'l cable or any adjacent cables.
4.6.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions l
The following conclusions can be drawn:
a.
For all circuit applications except de power supplirs for i
process instrument loops and annunciator circuits, the maximum available short circuit current is well below the allowable current carrying capacity of the smallest wire
(#22 AWG) used at BFW for V1 and V2 applications (other than telephone / communications or data transfer).
7 I
L b.
For the exception's noted in a) above (de power supplies l
for taistrument transmitters and annunciator circuits).
I current capacity of actual wire sizes used in those circuits was determined and compared to maximum available i
short circuit currents. The maximum available short
[
circuit currents are less than the current limits t
established for actual wire sizes.
c.
As a result of conclusions a) and b) above,'it can be i
further concluded that failure (short or open circuit) of any non-class IE VI or V2 routed cable will not result in L
the disabling of redundant class IE circuits in a mann'er that would degrade their intended safety function.
1 i-NPK2 - 6617W h
ptgo 26 cf 39 l
In summary, the results of the analysis demonstrate that power sources for V1 and V2 cables are " power limited" and consistent with the NFPA 70 Article 725 and 800 definitions for class 2 and communications circuits, respecti'wely.
These 1
circuit cat *gories have limited requirements for oisrcurrent devices (i.e. not required'or permitted as an integral part j
of the power supply).
Detailed analysis of typical circuit applications with V1 and V2 cable routing has demonstrated I
that short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable insulation even in the event of simultaneous fuse and isolation f ailure of power supplies.
1 This evaluation is documented by the ESI report to TVA dated November 11, 1988 (B22 881111 244).
'4.7 Divisional and Mondivisional cables Desinnated With An "IE" Suffix j
4.7.1 Purpose
\\
The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate each circuit / cable designated as "IE" or "IES" and determine whether or not this cable is safety-related or nonsafety-related, determine the appropriate division of separation, and to evaluate the circuit routing for i
compliance to the separation criteria.
4.7.2 Methodolony As stated in Section 3.0, safety-related divisional cables at BFN are divided into redundant divisions or channels.
Safety-related cables are those cables that are necessary for safe shutdown, are pornrod from Class 1E sources, have divisional assignment, and are routed in divisional raceways.
During the design at BFN6 certain cables were identified as "IE" cables. Originally, these cables powered supporting auxiliaries (i.e. basically the normal and alternate feeders for the safety related electrical power system) and were designed such that the normal and alternate supplies would not share the same raceway. This design was appropriate since automatic transfers between the normal and alternate feeders provided, the required redundancy. However, due to the removal of the automatic transfers this redundancy was eliminated.
In addition, later designs inappropriately utilized the IE suffix to maintain special separations for nonsafety-related equipment.
NPK2 - 6617W S.
1 p:g3 27 cf 39 l
An additional unique suffix "IES" was also used in the design.' The cable / conduit number suffix "IgS" was used to identify the normal circuits providing necessary power to l
HPCI division I and ADS division I (from 250 V do, reactor MOV boards to their sources - de-batteryl ac-diesel gen'erator).
The alternate supply is designated with suffix "IE" and complies with the requirements stated above.
The "IES" r
suffix identifies those circuits that were to be routed in their own individual conduit with the conduit also receiving-the "IES" suffix.
i I
TVA began this evaluation by identifying the total population of cables (647 cables) with either an "IE" or an "IES" suffix. TVA then reviewed each circuit function to determine i
which of'these circuits / cables performed a safety-related or nonsafety-related function. After this review, the circuit was evaluated to determine if the cable /circult was appropriately routed in accordance to the existing separation
- riteria.
t 4.7.3 Results The results of this review identified 126 cables that should be designated as divisional and 521 cables that should be nondivisional. For the 126 cables that should hara been divisional. TVA pecpared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system. The circuit block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the I-established design criteria requirements. This evaluation identified 20 cables that were inappropriately identified and I
were rvated in divisional and nondivisional raceways and 106 cables that were routed in the correct raceways or dedicated raceways but inappropriately identified as "IE" or nondivisional.
For the S21 cables that should have been nondivisional, TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway systems.
The circuit block diagram was then used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements. This evaluation identified 23 discrepancies in that the cables did not meet the separation criteria by sharing a power supply, enclosure, or raceway with one division and then subsequently sharing an enclosure or i
raceway with the opposite division.
NPK2 - 6617W.
4
+-r-e
,e--
,r-
r 1
i U
P:ge 28, of 39 h
'4 7 4 B"---rv neaulta and Corrective Action This evaluation was conducted for two groups of cables within this population:
- 1) those that should be designated as divisional and 2) those that should be designated,as nondivisional. The "IE" or "IES" designated cable's that require upgrade to divisional have been documented by CAQRs BFP881105 R1, BFP881106 R0, and BFP870860 R3.
The following corrective actions will be takent-
- Before Unit 2 restart:
Five cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during Unit 2 plant operation.
Two cables will be deleted.
~
p(7 Thirty-seven problem cables will either:
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways, or Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the non safety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry, or 4
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 6.
In Attachment 6, cc.ble L
3B92-B3 was added.
I This occurred because of the followings i
Cable 3B88-IE and cable 3B92-IE are redundant cables and l
were orignally designed to be routed together in conduit 3B94-IE thus failing.the BFN electrical separations criterie. Corrective action per DCN H2655 was to reroute 3B88-IE in a dedicated conduit (3B88-IE was chosen because it was a safety-related cable routed in non-safety tray FK by which also failed the criteria). As a result of the Appendix R Walkdown, it was determined that 3B92-IE was l
also routed in non-safety tray FK (per drawing discrepancy l
3-87-0648).Although not previously identified as being I
routed with 3B88-IE in tray FK, this is the same condition as having both cables in the same conduit as originally designed. A revision of the Q-List from revision 0 to L
revision 1 upgraded cable 3B92-IE from non-safety related l.
to safety-related. Since 3B92-IE was upgraded to safety-related and routed in non-safety tray FK, it is not i.
in compliance with the electrical separations criteria and will also require corrective action. Therefore, 3B92-IE is added to the list of failures requiring corrective action.
0304e/30 l
1
P se 28s of 39
- After Unit 2 rcctert:
After restart, 604 of these cables will be corrected by retassing both the cable and the appropriate raceway.
Five cables which had power removed for Unit 2 operation will be appropriately corrected.
1, This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.
4.8 Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cablea Contained in the Proiect 0-List l
4.8.1 Purnose The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q-List (issued as a Phase I Q-list)is a list of permanent plant features that are identified as being safety-related or nonsafety-related. The Q-List contains safety-related components and a limited number of nonsafety-related components. This Q-List has identified a number of V4 and V5 cables designat.ed as nondivisional'as safety-related.
I t
s
,~'
L 1
l 0304e/31 4
?
e
-a
-ee
-w--
.en a,m-e v
.--e.
e
- s. -
m.,,-,.w..
e
(,
di P:ss 29 cf 39-I
?
i The purpose of this evaluation was to determine if the V4 and V5 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related are in fact safety-related and therefore required to be designated as Class it and to evaluate the adequacy of cable / circuit separation'if'it is determined to be safety-related.
4.8.2 Nothodolony I
The tota 1' population of these type cables on the Q-List was 226.
Due to the small quantity involved. TVA chosa to i
perform a 100 percent evaluation of these circuits.
After the cables were identified. TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the conduit and cable tray raceway system.
These, block diagrams, issued system design criteria, the project 10CFR50.49 list, the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the circuit performed a safety-related function. If the circuit / cable was determined to be nonsafety-related, no further evaluation was performed because separation evaluations for these cables would be included in the evaluations contained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
If the circuit was determined to be safety-related, the cable block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.
(
4.8.3 g,esults 1
I From this evaluation, TVA has determined that 27 circuits 1
involving 119 cables should have been designated as Class IE safety-related and cable numbers should contain appropriate divisional suffixes.
Based on the requirement that divisional cable not be routed in nondivisional raceway, the 119 cables do not meet the separation criteria.
l l
4.8.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions l
L From the 100 percent review, TVA identified 119 V4/VS cables that must be upgraded to divisional.
In addition, 18 control cables require upgrade and rerouting due to their support of the V4/V5 power system function and are included in the following numbers.
The following corrective actions will be taken:
- Before restart:
gg l Twenty eight cables (10 V4/V5; 18 V3) will cither:
NPK2 - 6617W
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Page 30 of 39 Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
[
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent prote*ctive devices added in series to prevent the non safety related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions These deficiencies are documented by CAQRs BFP881105'R1 and BFP881106 RO.
In addition TVA identified one nondivisional cable that was inappropriately connected to another nondivisional cable that was routed in the redundant division's raceway.
This condition is documented by CAQR BFP870860 R3., The corrective gg action for this-cable will involve rerouting to enother breaker.
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in Attachment 7.
- After restart:
One-hundred and nine cables will be corrected by retagging both the cable and the appropriate raceway.
TVA will revise the project Q-List to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional and to add divisional suffixes, as required.
It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with Site Director's Stagdard Practice (SDSP) 3.10. "Use of Q-List."
This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.
4.9 Nondivisional V3 Cables Contained in the Pro 3ect 0-List 4.9.1 Purpose The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q List has identified a number of V3 cables designated as nondivisional as safety-relat'ed.
The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate these V3 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related to determine if the cable is in fact safety-related, and to evaluate the cable / circuit separation to ensure appropriate routing.
0304e/33 NPK2 - 6617W
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'l l
peso 35cf39 4.9.2 llsthodology 1
TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (818)..Thisevaluationwas[performedin accordance to the sampling approach defined in Sechon 2.0..
1 After the cables were identified, TVA prepared circuit block disgrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its source or termination point, and its routing within the i
conduit and cable tray raceway system. These block diagrams, issued system design criteria, the project 10CFR50.49 list, the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the primary function of the circuit performed a safety-related function.
If the circuit / cable was determined to be non safety-related, no further evaluation was performed because separation evaluations for these cables would be included in the evaluations contained in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
If the circuit was determined to be safety-related, the circuit block diagram was used to evaluate the circuit for conformance to the established design criteria requirements.
During the evaluation of these 58 cables, one nondivisional cable was identified that was routed in division I, division II, and nondivisional raceways. Because of this problem TVA expanded this sample to 95 cables even though the acceptance criteria for. failure was not violated. This problem was also identified by the ESI evaluation in Section 4.4.
4.9.3 Results From this sample evaluation of 95 cables TVA has determined that none of the cables evaluated should have been designated as class IE safety related. However, one nondivisional cable that was routed in division I, division II, and nondivisional raceway was identified by TVA, as well as by the'ESI evaluation discussed in Section 4.4.
L i
4.9.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions From this sample evaluation. TVA has determined that none of I-the cables evaluated should have been designated as Class 1E safety related.
The following corrective action will be implemented aft'er restart:
l TVA will revise the project Q-List to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional.
It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with Site Director's Standard Practice (SDSP) r 3.10. "Use of Q-List."
NPK2 - 6617W
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P go 32 cf'39 o
This sample provides a 95 percent confidence level that 95 percent of the cables within the population are nondivisional.
This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN880151.
4.10 Nondivisional VI and V2 Cables Contained in the Proiect 0-List p
4.10.1 Purpose l
The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Q-List has identified a number of VI and V2 cables designated as nondivisional as safety-related. The purpose of this evaluation was to evaluate these VI and V2 nondivisional cables now contained in the Q-List and designated as safety-related to determine L
if the cable is in fact safety-related and therefore required to be designated as Class lE and to evaluate the cable / circuit separation if the cable was determined to be
~
safety-related.
This evaluation was performed to supplement the ESI evaluation performed in subsection 4.6.
4.10.2 Methodolony TVA performed a random sample evaluation of 58 cables from the total population (549). This evaluation was performed in accordance to the sampling approach defined _in Section 2.0.
After the cables were identified TVA prepared circuit block diagrams which identified each cable within the circuit, its I
source or termination point, and its routing within the Ls conduit and cable tray raceway system. These block diagrams, L
issued system design criteria, the project 10CFRSO.49 list, I
the FSAR, and other design input documents were used to determine if the primary function of the circuit performed a J
safety-related function.. If the circuit / cable was determined L
to be nonsafety-related' TVA then evaluated the physical l
circuit connections and circuit function to determine if the l
cable was physically interconnected to a divisional circuit.
l TVA then evaluated the circuit / cable to determine if it was I
electrically isolated from the divisional circuit.
4.10.3 Results From this sample evaluation TVA has determined that none of the circuits eve.luated should have been designated as Class l
1E safety-related.
The physical connection evaluation and functional evaluation determined that either the cables within the samplo are not physically connected to divisional L
circuits or they are adequately isolated to prevent potential
[
damage to the safety-related circuitry in the event of cable l
failure.
l l
WPK2 - 6617W
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t p;so-33 cf 39
{
4'.10.4 Summarv of Results and Corrective Actions
f' l
From the sample review, TVA identified no circuits that required upgrade to divisional. A review of the physical connections and function of the circuit verified that no adverse interactions between nonsafety-related circuits and safety-related circuits existed.
(
The following corrective action will be done after restart:
TVA will revise the project Q-List to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional. It should be noted that additional Q-List reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10. "Use of Q-List."
This sample provides a 95 percent confidence that 95 percent of the circuits within the population are nondivisional and have no adverse impact on safety-related circuits.
This evaluation is documented by QIR EEBBFN88095.
4.11 Divisional VI and V2 Cables l
l 4.11.1 Purpose The purpose of this evaluation was to perform a similarity analysis of divisional VI and V2 cables to show they have similar circuit functions as those analyzed in section 4.6 j.
concluding that any internally or externally generated fault is not capable of producing sufficient energy or voltage
-potential to degrade the safety function of adjacent cables, The only potential for cable damage would then be from an
+
, bg external source, i.e.,
fire, pipe whip, jet impingement.
p l
4.11.2 Methodolorv This evaluation was performed ac follows:
L
- Review of the ESI report for nondivisional V1/V2 cables (section 4.6) to determine if similar types of circuits existed for divisional cables.
I,
- Review existing pipe rupture evaluations to determine the degree and depth of review.
- preparation of V1/V2 Appendix R cable list.
P H
l NpK2 - 6617W l'
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P:so 34 ef 39
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1
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L, o Verification of cable routing for the Appendix R V1/V2
]
cables which require spatial separation in accordance to Section III.G of Appendix R.
This verification will be s
performed in accordance to Walkdown Data Packg e No.
EEB-006 entitled " Cable Routing Verificetion" (Attachment 8) and shall'be accomplished by one or more of the following mathods:
l Visual trace of the conduit (s) and/or cable tray (s) that J
the cable is routed in from cable origin point to cable
' destination point.
If the entire route cannot be visually traced, the i
conduit (s) and/or cable tray (s) that the cable is routed in shall be identified by reading conduit tagging, tray labeling, or drawings, and the cable entry and exit points verified.
RI If cables are routed in flamastic coated trays the routing does not have to be visually verifLed or verified by radiodetection if the routing can be determined from the cable tray entry and exit points.
4.11.3 Results The results of this evaluation confirmed that:
l
- The circuit types discussed in the ESI report can be applied to Class IE circuits with the exception of radiation monitors. The radiation monitor circuits were evaluated and the short circuit current was within the l
requirements defined in the ESI report.
l
- Existing pipe rupture evaluations have adequately documented that no unacceptable pipe whip / jet impingement I-interactions involving cables exist.
i 1
y
- Sixty-two V1/V2 Appendix R cables exist (two cables were removed from the required cable list on May 16, 1989 as a result of revised calculations for Appendix R shutdown j
requirements).
- The 62 Appendix R V1/V2 cables were verified to be located as shown on design output drawings.
l-4.11.4 Summary Results and Corrective Actions As demonstrated in section 4.6 power sources for V1/V2 c' ables are " power limited" and an analysis of typical circuit j
applications has demonstrated that short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable inculation even in the event of l
simultaneous fuse and isolation failure of power supplies.
This evaluation is documented by QIR BFEBFN89054.
I NPK2 - 6617W n
r P z i P:go 350 cf 39 l
i The only potential source of damage to divisional V1/V2 cables is from an external.,ource such as jet impingement.
[
pipe whip.missle, seismic event, or fire.
TVA's pipe rupture l
evaluations have confirmed that safety is not comprised as a
' bg result of jet impingement (both inside and outside"
/
$1.
containment), pipe whip (both inside and outside containment), and externally generated missles inside L
containment. This evaluation is documented in Civil Engineering Branch Report CgB 88-06-C, entitled " Pipe Rupture Evaluation Program for Inside and Outside Primary Containment for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2" (B41881114005).
TVA has evaluated the Vl/V2 cables for potential damage from missles outside containment and concluded'that only one train could be impacted in any area susceptible to externally t
generated missles. This review is documented by QIR g
BFEBFN89086 (B22890928009). All raceway in Ca,tegory 1 structures are seismically supported.
The only comaining source of damages is from an external fire. TVA has field verified the 62 V1/V2 Appendix R required cables identified in QIR TEPBFN89038. No corrective actions are required.
This field verification is documented by QIR BFEBFN89055.
4.12 Evaluation of Cables Contained in Divisional and Wondivisional Cable ILars that Physically Connect 4.12.1 Purpose While performing the evaluation of field verified cable data in section 4.1, drawing discrepancies for unit 3 cables were identified where divisional cable was routed on nondivisional
@)
cable tray. The reason for this is that in some instances divisional trays and nondivisional trays are physically attached as shown in Figure 4.12 with a common intersection node point in the Unit 2; computer cable routing program.
Since the Unit 3 computer cable routing program automatically routes cables, it was possible for nondivisional cables to route undetected through these divisional /nondivisional intersections and then route in an opposite division tray.
The purpose of this evaluation was to identify these situations and evaluate the cables common to these intersections to determine conformance to the separations criteria.
0304e/38 NPK2 - 6617W a
4-
i5 P:go 35'b cf 39 4.12.2 pathodoloar This nvaluation was first begun by identifying the cable tray nodes from the unit 3 computerized cable routing p,cogram that have nondivisional and divisional trays with the sams node assignment. From this node listing the physical cable tray drawir.gs were reviewed to determine if the nondivisional and.
b\\
divisional cable trays physically connected.
If a condition existed s'mh as that shown in Figure 4.12 computer printouts of the condivisional cables which passed through the common node point where obtained. These cables were then evaluated to determine if they associated with any cables of the opposite redundant division.
4.12.3 Results and Ccrrective Actions This evaluation identified 30 individual nodes'that consisted of nondivisional/ divisional connections. Evaluation of these nodes identified three configurations that required a detailed review of the cables passing through the
~
1' l
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I l
l-L i
i 0304e/39 NPK2 - 6617W
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Peg 3 35c cf 39
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t, i
t GJ-ESII m, g EAC-ESII
/
,\\
s e
i IO GJ l
T (wooaivi.toaa1>
(Typical) p#
I1 Cable l
I.
I I
I I
L I
i L
I
\\
6..
/
L
\\
GH-ESII"'
-EGH-ESII (oivi ional)
(Typical)
FIGURE 4.12 DESIGN ROUTE DID NOT INCLUDE DIVISIONAL /NON-DIVISIONAL TRAY INTERSECTION L
i
-1 i
-r f
P233 36 cf 39 1
intersection.,From a review of the nondivisional cables it was determined that two additional cables, other than those l
previously' identified in the preceding sections, violated the i
separation criteria. These problems have been documented by CAQR BFP870860.
The following corrective actiont.adil be taken 4 Before restart:
The two cables will either be rerouted into appropriate raceways, have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to. prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry, have their power removed, or have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
i These cable identifiers and their particular-circuit function are identified in Attachment 5.
Since the UniY 1 and 2 l
cables are manually routed, this problem is not applicable to Units 1 and 2.
4 j
This evaluation is documented in QIR TEPBFN89042.
5.0 'SUlt%RY AND CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Summary From the twelve evaluations discussed in Section 4.0, TVA identified h(l the following types of discrepancies associated with conformance to the electrical cable separation criteria:
Failure to control the routing of nondivisional cables to ensure r
that once a nondivisional cable becomes associated with one division in a panel, enclosure, or raceway, it does not become associated with the opposite division.'
Failure to apply an appropriate criteria for cables with "IE" suffix.
t Failure to categorize certain cables / circuits as safety-related.
Failure to adequately control the installation of divisional cables in the appropriate raceways.
The evaluations consisted of the following:
['>l A review of field verified cable routing data from TVA's cable 1.
ampacity program and Appendix R program.
2.
A 100-percent review of V4/V5 cables which originate from i
safety-related power supplies.
3.
A random sample of nondivisional V4/V5 cables which originate from nonsafety-related power supplies.
4.
A 100-percent review of V3 nondivisional cables which originate from safety-related power supplies.
NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/36/BFN
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Pega 37 ef 39 i
5.
A random sample of nondivisional V3 cables which originate from
]
nonsafety-related power supplies.
6., A' generic analysis of typical nendivisional V1/V2 gircuits which i
originate from both safety-related and nonsafety-rdig ed power supplies.
q
- 7. 'A 100 percent review of cables designated with an "IE" suffix.
E 8.
A 100 percent review of nondivisional V4/V5 cables contained in i
the project Q-list.
9.
A random sample of nondivisional V3 cables contained in the I
project Q-list.
i l
- 10. A random sample of nondivisional V1/V2 cables contained in the H
project'Q-list.
- 11. A generic analysis of typical divisional V1/V2 circuits.
I-
- 12. A review of unit 3 divisional and nondivisional cable trays that physically connect.
A' complete review of V3 divisional cables was not performed because no known design separation discrepancies existed at the time the evaluations were started except for the potential that "IE" cables and V3 nondivisional Q-list cable may have been irproperly designated..The results of the reviews performed further L
substantiates that such a review was unnecessary to confirm the l
adequacy of V3 divisional separation.
i l,
The evaluations required the preparation of three reports by ESI, I>
and the evaluation of over 2500. cables by TVA to ensure conformance l
to the electrical separation criteria.
l
?
From these evaluations, TVA id.entified 947 cables that did not tieet the existing separation criteria of which 263 require upgrade to safety-related with complete divisional separation. Two hundred and thirty-four of these discrepancies require potential physical plant h
changes such ar, cable rerouting, the addition of redundant protective devices or a technical evaluation to justify optional i
dispositions prior to restart and 713 required nonphysical changes such as retagging after restart. Thirty cable reroutes will be performed after restart on cables that were de-energized for ' restart.
In addition, TVA identified two additional conditions'which violate the single failure criteria and are outside the scope of this report:
(1) divisional circuits powered from an opposite division power supply and (2) nondivisional circuits that perform redundant safety functions powered from the same divisional source.
Corrective actions will be determined and implemented in accordance with the existing TVA CAQR procedures.
l NPK2 - 66177 0304e/37/BFN l'
u
p;so 38'cf 39 TVA has grouped any modifications required to correct these S separation discrepancies into two categories:
- 1) physical plant changes and 2) nonphysical plant changes and into two milestones (1) restkrt and (2) after restart.
i physical plant changes which include the addition of redundant protective devices or the rerouting of cable will be performed prior to rastart.
Non-physical changes associated with exceptions to design criteria or other input documents that are required as input for desi6n changes will also be completed as required by the desir.n change allestone. Non-physical changes associated with retagging of conduit, cable tray, or cables will be completed post restart.
5.2 Conclusign TVA has performed an extensive evaluation to resolve discrepancies identified as a escult of inadequate electrical separation. These evaluations consisted of a review of twelve separate cable categories as described in Section 4.0.
(Ora category incomplete at time of report submittal.)
These evaluations, along with implementation of the corrective actions identified, provide the following conclusions:
1.
Nonsafety-related low-voltage power and control cables can be associated'with both safety-related divisions if redundant overcurrent protection is provided for the nonsafety cable.
2.
Except for Appendix R cables, separation of medium-level and low-level instrumentation circuits are of no concern becau::e i
short circuit currents are not capable of damaging cable hg -
insulation even in the event of simultaneous fuse and isolation failure of power supplies.
3.
pipe break evaluations have confirmed that safety is not comprised as a result of pipe break.
4.
Safety-related cables are properly identified as such, including the division to which they are associated, and properly routed in raceways.
5.
The cable and conduit schedule, on which much of the separation criteria compliance is based, is sufficiently accurate to use as input for these evaluations.
Discrepancies in the cable and conduit schedule have been shown to have no safety impacts.
In conclusion, as a result of these extensive evaluations and with concurrent implementation of the resulting corrective actions. TVA has the confidence level necessary to ensure that the routing of cables at BFN will meet the existing separation criteria; therefore, providing safe operation of unit 2.
NPK2 - 6617W m-e-
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P 33 39 cf 39
6.0 REFERENCES
A 6.1 DesL5n Criteria
,.k 6.1.1 BFN-50-728 R1 (B30880531001) Physical Independence of i
Electrical Systems 6.1.2 BFN-50-758 R0 (830870731020) Power, control, and Signal Cables for Use in Class I Structures 6.2 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Phase I Q-List, Drawing i
Number 47A302-1 R000 issued February 26, 1988 6.3 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-1987, National Electrical Code i
6.4 Probability and Statistics for Engineers, Prentice-Hill second edition,1977, by I. Miller and J. E. Fruend, t
6.5 special Electrical Maintenance Instruction (SEMI) 62
'" Cable Route Verification"
- \\
6.6 Task Instruction TI-E036-01 R7 "Ampacity Walkdowns for TSD-E110 and Cable Issues for TSD-E036" l
6.7 Special Electrical Maintenance Instruction (SEMI) 49
" Routing Verification of Cables Associated with 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Section III.G. Compliance" 1
)
i 7.0 ATTACHMENTS L - Engineering Assurance Technical Audit BFT89903 -
l Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Electrical Cable Verification l - Site Quality Assurance Quality Surveillance Assessment of Cable Verification by SEMI-49
! - Safety Significant Evaluation of Design Significant Drawing Discrepancies E
$b - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for Field Verified L
Cables Requiring Corrective Actions Attachraent 5 - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function tot V3 Nondivisional Cables Powered From Safety-related Power l
Supplies and V4/V5 Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Powered From Safety-related Power Supplies Requiring Corrective Actions j - Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for "IE" Designated Cables Requiring Corrective Actions - Cable Identifier and circuit Function for V4/V5 Nondivisional Q-List Cables Requiring Corrective Actions b - Walkdown Data Package - Cable Routing Verification -
~
EEB-006 NPK2 - 6617W
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Engineering Assurance Technical Audit BFT89903 I
Browns Ferry Bluclear Plant Electrical Cable Verification l
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l-NPK2 - 6617W l
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. ' eva u c:.e.es g Reced
~ UNITED STATES GOVEFNMENT Memorandum.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY B05 '89 050 5 004 TO-
-J. D. Hutson, Chief Electrical Engineer. WT 11C 681-K
]
q l
-FROM
's A. P. Capozzi, Engineering Assurance Manager, WT 128 34H-K MAY 5 1989 i
DATE.
BUBJECT: ENGINEERING ASSURANCE TECHNICAL AUDIT BFT 89903 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT l
'(BFN) ELECTRICAL CABLE VERIFICATION I. PURPOSE The purpose of this memorandum is to transmit the results of audit i
BFT 89903 conducted April 10 through May 3, 1989.
TT. BACKGROUND This audit was conducted by Engineering' Assurance (EA) to evaluate the cable data assembled by Electrical Engineering.
This data was subsequently used to develop the cable listing, the categories, and quantities of field-verified cable routings for the Browns Ferry cable separations prograta, i
The audit was conducted as planned, and the postaudit conference was conducted on May 4, 1989.
The attached audit report sumarizes the results of the audit and provides recommendations from the audit team.
III. CONCLUSIONS i.
L The cable listing developed by Electrical Engineering and the quantity of l
cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate I
count of field-verified cable routing information.
The cable verification packages are consistent with the data on the cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.
Deviations identified during the field walkdowns of cables and the preparation of the verification packages were appropriately evaluated and categorized by Electrical Engineering.
Minor documentation inconsistencies were observed and corrected during the audlt.
Three areas requiring improvement and follow-up were noted (those areas do not affect the above conclusions):
1.
The Appendix R field walkdowns identified cable routings which were in disagreement with the conduit and cable schedule drawing (45C800 drawings), but no drawing discrepancies (DDs) were initiated.
P, NPK1 - 374 71 EA 5-4-89 L.
Ruv fl.S. Savines Bands Recidarly on the Parroll Savines Plan
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2 t
J. D. Hutson HAY'5 1989 ENGINEERING ASSURANCE TECHNICAL. AUDIT BFT 89903 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) ELECTRICAL CABLE VERIFICATION 2.
Inconsistencies with several cable's safety classification were noted that conflict with the ampacity pre ram.
.1 3.
Several cables were found by the project to be routed according to design drawings. but the design drawings were in error with respect to separation requirements. There was no evidence.that these' errors were being dispositioned according to the NEP-9.1 process via existing CAQRs. Electrical Fngineering has agreed to revise the existing CAQRs as necessary to correct this area.
Additional detail on the above areas is contained in the attached report..
IV. RESPONSE REQUEST l
l A response is required for the three items identified as areas for improvement in section II of the report.
Responses should be provided to' EA within 30 days of the issue date of this memorandum.
If you have any j,
questions concerning this report, please contact J. Semore at extension 2376.
t A.' P. Ca{foliT
~
I JWS KRM Attachment ec (Attachment):
T. E. Burdette, LP AN 65E-C 1.
D. P. Burrell, NE, A12-EDB, BFN l'
W. H. Hannum, BR IN 77B-C S. L. Hunt, WT 12B ASH-K K. R. Major, WT 12B 47H-K L. E. Martin, LP 4N 45A-C F. L. Moreadith, WT 12A 12A-K L
J. F. Rinne, NE. EDB D1, BFN M. L. Rollins, LP 4N 81A-C D. J. Skridulis, PAB-C. BFN L.
R. J. Smith, NE, A10, BFN G. C. Turner, NQA, BFN H. H. Weber Site Director's Office. PAB-E, BPN
- 0. J. Zeringue, PAD-E, BFN
~
E 5-4-89 1
l l '..
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GA Recon!
AUDIT TITLE:
Engineering Assurance Technical Audit, Browns Ferry Electrical Cable Verification AUDIT NUMBER:
BPT89903 b..
DATES OF AUDIT CONDUCT:
April 10 through May 2, 1989 bc I.
. PURPOSE This audit was conducted by Engineering Assurance (EA) to evaluate the cable data assembled by Electrical Engineering which was subsequently used to develop the cable listing, the categories, and quantities of field verified cable routings for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) cable-separations program.
II.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The audit results indicate:
- The cable data collection and evaluation were performed l'n a systematic, thorough manner and the cable listing developed by Elaetrical Engineering and the quantity of cables in the various voltage level categories represent an accurate count of field verified cable routing information.
The cable verification packages are consistent with the data on this L
cable listing and support the evaluation of deviations.
Deviations identified during the field walkdowns of cables and the preparation of the verification packat.es were appropriately evaluated and categorized by Electrical Engineering.
l Minor documentation inconsistencies were observed and corrected during the sudit. In addition, three areas requiring improvement and follow-up were noted (these areas cf improvement do not affect the above l-conclusions):
1 1.
The Appendix R field walkdowns identified cable routings which were in disagreement with the conduit and cable schedule drawing (45C800 drawings). The discrepancies were appropriately recognized and evaluated by the project; however, no drawing deviation (DD) was initiated to correct the conduit and cable schedule drawings., DDs should be initiated to ensure correction of the conduit and cable l
schedule drawings.
l 2.
Inconsistencies with several cable safety classifications were noted. The cable separations summary list identified some cables as
" safety," while the cable verification package identified the cable as " Associated." The inconsistencies resulted because the ampacity y
program defined associated cables as cables not required for unit 2 but routed in raceways with unit 2 required cables.
Electrical Engineering correctly classified the cable as safety or associated in the cable listing. NPK1 - 3704I L
EA 5/2/89
7_
p" EA believ:s that the enfety cic3alficaticn inconDist:ncisc cr3 o source of confusion which should be corrected in the cable ampacity program to be consistent with the proper definition of associated
. cables.
i Le 3.
- Several cables such as P284, 3E83686-II, 1PL2052, 2PLS$75, 2ES3026-II 'and 38193-IE were found by the project to bi-couted according to the design drawings but the design drawings were in c
error with respect to maintaining the separation requirements. For example, cables P284, 3ES3686-II, IPL2052, and 2PL5575 were associated with one divisional power source and subsequently routed' in the opposite divisional trays, while safety cables 2ES3026-II and-3B193-IE were routed in nondivisional trays., An evaluation of these cables verified that they wore in face routed according to the design drawings; however, it was not apparent that these design errors had been dispositioned according to the NEP-9.1 process.
Subsequently, Electrical Engineering has agreed to revise the existing CAQRs BFP870860 BFP881105, and BFP881106 to include these design errors as necessary.
III. APPROACH AND RESULTS
~
Using the Appendix R and cable ampacity programs as sources, Electrical Engineering developed a listing of field verified cable. For each cable, the listing identified the voltage level, the safety l
classification, field verification method, etc. The team independently reviewed this listing and the cable verification data packages to verify that there was no duplication of cable numbers and the number of cables in each category agreed with the number presented by Electrical Engineering. The quantities arrived at from EA's review of the cable listing agreed with the quantitles presented by Electrical Engineering.
I To assemble the cable data. Electrical Engineering prepared cable verification data packages. A verification package was developed for each field verified cable. The package included pertinent walkdown package information; a summary sheet (identifying, for example, the
[
cable number, voltage level, field verification method, drawing e
discrepancy involving the cable); a discrepancy evaluation sheet (if a discrepancy existed in the walkdown package or had been previously identified to involve the cable); and a verification package cover sheet.
L L
To assess the accuracy of the data collection, EA selected a sample of 145 verification cable packages from the V4/VS cable listing and 45 from the V3 listing, compared the walkdown information and discrepancy evaluation sheets to the summary sheet data, and to the summary c-able listing information. The objective was to confirm for the samples selected that the information in the verification package regarding cable number, voltage level, safety classification, field verification method, etc., is consistent with the walkdown package and the cable listing.
(sample sizes and cables reviewed are identlfled on attachment 1.)
EA's review determined that the cable verification packages wore consistent with the data on the cable list and support the evaluation of deviatlons. WPK1 - 37041 EA 5/2/89
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A samplo sf.ctblo v:rifisctirn p:ck:sts was clan technically rcviewed to O..
determine if discrepancies had been properly identified, evaluated, and appropriately categorized (i.e., nondosign significant, or design I
significant).
(Sample sizes and cables reviewed are identified on attachment 1.)-
Except for two areas requiring improvement discussed above, discrepancies were found by EA's review to be appropriately identified, evaluated, and categorized by Electrical Engindbeing.
j In addition, a sample of verification packages that included cable routings that were identified as " partial walkdown" were evaluated to determine if the walkdown provided adequate assurance of the partial cable routing. The field verified walkdown data assembled for those cables where only.a partial. routing was verifled was judged by EA to provide reasonable assurance of the cabla.'s partial routing.-
i IV. RESPONSE REQUIREMENT You are requested to submit a response for each of the three areas for improvement discussed in section II of this report.
Respo,nses should be provided to EA within 30 days of the issue date of this audit report.
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Pa66,f-AUDIT SAMPLE SELECTION l
The EA review of the cable verification packages as selected by the Task Project for confirmation of field routing was performed in two parts.
Part A involved comparing the verification package information to the cable listing information. Part B involved technienlly evaluating the categorization of i
discrepancies and partial walkdowns.
One hundred percent of the cables evaluated by the project to have design significant discrepancies were included'in the EA Team's review sample. The cables selected for audit and extent of the audit are presented below.
V3 Part A V3 Parts A and B 1.
27 cables were reviewed.
1.
An additional 18~ cables were reviewed.
2.
This represents 10% of the cables 2.
This represents 6% of the cables available.
available.
3.
See page 2.of Attachment 1 for the 3.
See page 2 of Attachment 1 for a listing of cables reviewed.
listing of the cables reviewed.
Voltate level V4/VS (Part A)
V4/VS Parts A and B 1.
95 cables were reviewed.
1.
An additional 50 cables were reviewed.
- 2..This represents 10% of the cables 2.
This represents 5% of the cables t
'available.
available.
l 3.
See page 3 of Attachment 1 for 3.
See page 4 of Attachment 1 for a the listing of cables reviewed.
listing of the cables reviewed.
Note: Verification packages were not prepared by the project for V1/V2 cable because of the low energization leve1'available to these cables. The team agreed with this decision. The team reviewed all 64 of the V1/V2 Appendix R
~
listed cables.
1 l-4 l
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l CABLES REVIEW 5D
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V3 Part A 1ES 105-1 IV2778 PL 411 1ES 125-I 2ES 1189-1 LTG-WR (LC51) 1ES 2976-II 2ES 3670-11 LTG-WR (LC50) 1ES 488-1 2ES 541-I 1ES 30-1 1ES 58-I 2ES 547-I 1ES 452-1 1ES 80-I ES 104-1 2ES 315-I IPP 629 ES 3258-II 3PP 569 IV 2182 ES 3259-11 A556 1V 2626 M 144 P295 V3 Parts A and B A 557 ES 1347-I FE 4937 K 2571' ES 1355-I FE 4938 K 3214 ES 1709-IA 1ES 100-1 P 283 ES 3256-II 1ES 1167-I P 284=
ES 79-I 3ES 3686-II P 294 FE 4936 3ES 4453-II I'
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CABLES REVIEWED J
9 V4/V5 Part A ES 2588-11 1ES 2950-II 1ES 3671-II ES 3700-11 1ES 2962-II 1K 575
(
ES $8-I 1ES 300-1 1PC 1003-11 PL 1225 1ES 3000-II IPC 504-11 PLL 1 1ES 3013-II IPL 474 PLE 2012 1RS 3026-11 1PL 545 PLW 444 1ES 3038-11 1PL 575 PUW 620 1ES 3305-11 1PL 635-I W/O-1-4EA-I 1ES 3325-11 1PL 650-IE L
1ES 1150-1 1ES 3338-11 1PL 691 1ES 2900-11 1ES 3635-11
~1PL 704 188 2925-II 1ES 3650-II 1rL 754 I
l' 1PL 769 1PL 5149 IV 2460 1PL 812 1PL 5637 IV 2465 IPL 817 IV 1950 IV 2500 1PL 875 IV 2150 1V 2508 IPL 900 IV 2160 IV 2516 1P!. 953 IV 2170 2B17-IE 1PL 967 IV 2180 2B81-IE 1PL 1069' IV 2235 2B89-IE 1PL 1975 IV 2300 2B 92-1E 1PL 3800 IV 2308 2K 575 1PL 5140 IV 2317 2ES 2850-II J
2PC 700-I 3ES 600-1 3ES 4070-11 2PL 1075 3ES 3700-11 3ES 4365-11 2PL 2450 3ES 3712-II 3ES 4450-11 2V 2170-3ES 3720-11 3PL 2014 3G 476 3ES 3725-11 3PL 2040 L
3G 901 3ES 3735-II 3PL 5600-IE E
3ES 500-1 3ES 4040-II 3PL 285
(
3ES 513-1 3ES 4050-11 3PP 732' 3ES 526-1 3ES 4060-11 l-l-
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Att chment 1 Page 4 of 4 CABLES REVIEWED i
V4/V5 Parts A and B b
B 226 1ES 3075-II 1PL 5650 B 230 1ES 3100-II IV 125 B 522-It 1ES 3188-1I IV 133
.ES 141-1 188 3910-II IV 2412 ES 2652-II 1ES 475-I IV 2437 ES 2850-11 1PL 2052 2B 88-IE PL 1237 IPL 2055 2B 93-IE IB 81-I IPL 468 2ES 2900-II 1B 84-1 1PL 809 2ES 3013-II 1B 88-I 1PL 818 2ES 3175-11 IB 89-1 1PL 825
_2ES 3660-II l
1ES 2975-II 1PL 5135 2ES 3725-11 3B 193-IE 3ES 3188-II-SP 2ES 3915-II-3K 80 3E's 450-1 2ES 688-I 3V 2450 3ES 4780-II 2K 618 3ES 3026-II-SP 3ES 4782-II
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2PL 5575-IE 3ES 3188-11 3PC 504-11 I
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Electrical Ensineering l
E' Audit _TennLMeinhorn meeresentatives i
J. Hutson l
R. Harvey
.D. L. Malone (Team Leader)
R. C. Williams J.
W." 3esnore.
M. ' Von Schinunelmann W. D. Webb
/
Prosudit Conference Attendees j
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'(April 7, 1989)
I J. Hutson D. L. Malone i
J. W.'Samore M. Von Schimmelmann 1
r Postaudit Conference Attendees (May 4, 1989 via telecon) t D. L. Malone J. Hutson R. C. Williams 5
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WPK1 - 3704I EA 5/2/89 l
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i Site Quality Assurance Quality Surveillance Assessment Report of Cable Verifiestion by SENI-49 t
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cmr.a mTE, cover.x.yExt R24 8 0 04 24 99 0 l
Memorand ton rtxxnsste vattty aurnor:iry I
70 R. J. Smith, Engineering Manager, Nuclear Engineering, Browns Terry
(
Engineering Project, ED8 A10, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant l
FROM C. C. Turner, Site Quality Manager PSB X, Browns Terry Nuclohr Plant i
MAY v 4 E00
"^
SUBJECT BROWS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY ASSURANCE
(
(QA) DLPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R TO SPECIAL ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT l
f Reference Your memorandum to me. April 12, 1989 (B22 890421 002 Attached) l r
QS was requested by Nuclear Engineering (NE) to perform a ' --
[
surveillance of SEMI-49 and samples of completed walkdown packages on the Appendix R cable separation walkdown.
l i
Surveillance QBF-S-89-0852 involved the review of SEMI-49 to the i
American Ustional Standards Institute (ANSI) W18.7 requirements for i
quality related inspections (walkdowns).
Also, a review was i
performed on 13 completed walkdown packages that were performed in 1985.
SEMI-49 did not meet the ANSI N18.7 requirements in the following six areas.
1.
Acceptance criteria not specified.
2.
Use of calibrated measuring and test equipment.
3.
No requirement for training and qualifications of walkdown Personnel.
4.
No requirement for second party or independent ' verification.
5.
Package be uniquely and sequentially numbered.
6.
No method for identifying and tracking nonconformances.
i 4
The data packages did not meet the requirements of ANSI N18.7 and SEMI-49 in the following five areas.
1.
No documented trainirs.
2.
No listing of cable radio-detection equipment.
3.
Packages not uniquely identified and pages not sequentially l
numbered.
4.
No data cover sheets as required by SEMI-49, for documented reviews and approvals (packages not complete as QA records).
5.
SEMI 49 data coversheet required justification for exceptions provided.
Letters "C" and "D" were given as justification, however. "C" and "D" were not explained.
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R. J. Smith l
MAY 0 4 $39 9
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY ASSURANCE l
(QA) DEPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R TO SPECIAL
[
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (S*.MI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT l
t I
Also, NE requested a survey (QBF-8-88-0937) of Appendix R walkdown packages that were performed in 1987.
Forty-seven packages were reviewed. The same progransnatic problems existed in these packages because they were performed to the same SEMI-49.
The following l
documentation probler,? were identified.
j 1.
No disposition for conduits not tagged.
j 2.
Cable routes not listed 3.
Same modo point lir,ted twice,
~
4.
No cable function diagram.
5.
Data sheet signed that cable routes were verified, however, documentation indicated ocherwise (example - Cable not installed.
l
~
A potential condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR), BFA890332, l
was written during the first surveillance (QBF-S-89-0852) for the i
i packages performed in 1985.
The CAQR has been invalidated.
WE has l
consmitted not to use the data for any design input (calculations, l
l as-built drawings, etc). The data will be used only as additional I
information for cable separation assessment.
i Because of the procedural and documentation problems identified, i
l questions were raised concoming the accuracy of the data to address this issue. WE agreed to perfom a sample walkdown of 13 cables selected from the original SENI-49 walkdown. This sample was approximately 10 yercent of the original total cables walked down (126 cables). QS 7erformed monitoring of the sample walkdown. The I
monitoring involved the walkdown of two cables (3ES151-I and 1ES2867-II) and a separate walkdown surveillance of cable ES3259-II.
A review of all 13 completed packages was perfomed to ensure the requirements to the walkdown procedure (WDP-006, revision 0) were i
met. One Corrected-on-the-Spot item was identifled. This involved l
the data package for cable IV12625 where the cable route did not match the drawing. A drawing discrepancy was issued when reported f
by QS to the responsible NE management.
No other condition adverse to quality was found during the reviews and monitoring' of the sample walkdowns.
QS compared the sample i
l walkdown cable routes to the originel walkdown routes and they both i
agreed. The above findings are reported in survelliance l
QBF-S-89-0983.
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B22
'89 0 4 21.002 mTES CovERxxEx, 1
dMOrdMdum QA Reewd TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY k
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70 C. C. Turner Sita Quality Manager, Browns Ferry Nuclear Piant, PSB K-BFN FROM R. J. Smith, Project Engineer, Browns Ferry Engineering Profest, l
Huclear Engineering, EDB A10-BFN
- APR 211999 SUBJECT BR0'a*NS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - APPLICATION OF DATA RETRIEVED USINC SPECIAL F.LECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI)-49 l
Reference:
Potential Condition adverse 'to Quality Report (CAQR)
BFQ890332 This memorandum responds to an action item from the review of the referenced potentini Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) which occurred on April 20, 1989. Specifically, clarification is provided as to how the data retrieved using SEMI-49, " Routing Verification of cables Associated with 10CFR50 Appendix R, S'ction
{
e III C Compliance" will be used by Nuclear Engineering.
l As stated in this CAQR review board meeting on Apell 20, 1989, tho data retrieved using SEMI-49 will be used in support of the Cable i
separations Discovery Program at BFN.
This information will not be used as direct design input for design documents.
If you have any questions concerning this subject, contact D. T. Langley at extension 5150 (or assistance.
i i
D f
[ R."J. Smith DTL BCD cc RIMS, ET SLE 26P-K i
J. D. Hutson, WT 11C 68I-K J. H. Rinne, EDB D1-BFN H. H. Weber, PAB E-DFN 4
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Den U.S. Savines Bonds Recularly on the Parroll Sar in~< Plan 6
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3 R. J. Smith MAY 0 41980 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - SITE QUALITY - QUALITY AqSURANCE (QA) DEPARTMENT - QUALITY SURVEILLANCE (QS) - APPENDIX R TO 'SfgCIAL j
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTION (SEMI) QS ASSESSMENT REPORT w
Based on the results of the surveillance / monitoring of the sample walkdown and the verification that the sample agrees with the original walkdown data, the original data should be acceptable to be used in support of the Cable Separation Discovery program at BFN.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY G. G. Turner LWJ RRB:JMH:BKG ces RIMS, MR AN 72A-C-D. P. Burrell, ED A12. BFN J. H. Rinne. PAB BFN H. H. Weber, PAB E, BFN 2284J
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ATTRitutt ATTt18UTE ORG CORRECTIVE ACT100 CAUSE NUMBtt REV. LEVEL CODE DOCUMENT CODE
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MRC IfuMBER: /7*/3 EA*10 C00t:
64 (A/O UNIT: 1 SYSTEM: F.:Tr.:w 3 l
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This monitoring was perfonned to the latest revision of the listed, t
references.
Applicable Condition Adverse to Quality Reports and previous e
sur veillances were reviewed for areas of concern.
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i THIS ROWITORtWC REPORT HAS SEEN CLOSE3 SASED UPOW THE Ct.OSUtt CODE 1
CHECKED:
(1) 30 DEFICIENCIES WERE IDENTIFIED OTHtt AFFECTED NBC(s) 1 X (2)
DEFICttNCIES WERE MIWCE AND COTS A#
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CAQEs WERE INITIATED 0053f I 4
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Number of COTS items identified on report:
DESCRIPTIOW/ RESOLUTION OF CONDITION:
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i WOTE: COTS ITEMS AS A MINIMUM SMALL CONTAIN DESCRIPTION / RESOLUTION OF CONDITION.
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Safety Significant Evaluation of Design
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Significant Drawing Discrepanties i
R2 Resulting From Cable nigroutes O
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NPK2 - 6617W t
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cf /b PURPOSS-Evaluate the affect on Unit 2 of the eleven misrouted cables shown on attachment 6.1.
This analysis is to show that even though these eleven i
cab,les are outside the statistical significance that there are no safety concerns due to the misrouting.
i These eleven cables can be grouped into two categories as follows: Those safety cabidsethat are miscouted into nondivisional cable trays, and those i
nondivisional cables that are routed first in one division and then in the other division. For the first category, the redundant function (including
}
support equipment if in that tray) for the miscouted cable must be identified and then it must be proved that these redundant cables are not routed in the identified nondivisional cable tray nor with any of the i
cables in that tray (only power cables are a problem since V4 control circuits are doub!e-fused). For the second category of cables, the circuits routed in the divisional cable trays containing the nondivisional cable must be identified to determine if there are redundant functions (including support equipment) that would be adversely affected as a result i
of a fault in the nondivisional cable.
l ASSUMPTIONS:
f Only power circuits can propagate a fault because all control circuits in V4 are double fused so that no single failure will prevent clearing a l
potential cable damaging fault.
In addition, the only credible fault which can impose a sustained high current fault on the control circuit is Q
l -
a fault imposed by the V4 power feeds. V4 cables from safety-related boards are protected by safety-related protective devices. V4 cables from nonsafety-related boards which have crossed redundant divisions have been identified and are being modified by adding redundant safety-related i
protective devices or are being rerouted such that the V4 cables are in l
compliance with the BFN separations criteria. Since the control transformers are fed from the load side of the protective devices, no credible failure from the V4 power feeds can impose a high current fault on the control circuit.
METHOD:
For the first category of circuits the routing of cables in the nondivisional cable trays containing the erroneously routed safety cables will be identified (non-QA computer program printout of as designed cable schedules), then the redundant cables to the miscouted cables and their routing will be determined.
A review of the routings will be made to show T
that these required cables do not route into the trays of interest or with any of the cables in the trays of interest. The reason for examining the commonly routed cables is because the single failure of it's circuit breaker is assumed to occur allowing the propagation of a fault in one tray to the other.
For the second category of circuits the routing of the cables in the divisional trays will be identified,and a determination made of the existence of redundant functions in these trays.
prepared Ed Bradley Date 12/20/88 Checked R. L. Brehm Date 12/20/88 prepared / M *- dl. M M Date /d-d - U 0428e/1 Checked SM & M/rk.
Date /o /44 /<PC7 K
Sheai f of3l
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She desiga lag system was consulted to identdfy embles for j
$sedundant (sehematis and commestima drawings) and the enh1=3 7'" h== massieved.ta tansak.iey -M-n 4== ag,,,,,
enhies.
The amintrama enkle schedule was, esse to identify enkles it thus'.oommon enkle trays.
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I 45N771-4 info only 45N779-4 info only 45C500=RES-55 R12 45N779-111afo only 45N779-13 info only
=235-25 RA 45N2751-5 BC 45N2751-2 R7
=235-30 R12 45N3751-5 R1 45N3751-2 R3
= 35-31 R11 45N3750-5 27 45N3750-9 R1
-135-30 R$
45N1751-8 R$
45N1751-2 R7
= EB-131 R3 l
45N1750-5 R11 45N1750-15 RB
=1E5-120 RS 2-45N2750-9 20000 45N2750-5 316
= 15-4 25 45N2749-4 BC 45N2749-12 RA
= 25-4 R12 l
2-45N2749-13 2001 45N2749-8 BC
= 35-10 3-47E565-8 2001 45N779-20 R3
= P-12 R7 i
3-45C500-SEE-120 R001 45N2749-5 BC 45N701-1 R15 *
=125:13 R000 i
I 45N702-1 R11 45N703-1 R15 3=47EB64-5 1003
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===**===14=4=q vm19es ese eget to imelate 'M of the E555 h=ada* 12 these is a
- Tank er tank in it.
This is not a safety Sometion sinos asedit is taken ter the other header.
The north header valve should be ehmun to be ted tiram the meeth h=ad** valves er trem all of the north header valves.
By closing this par *i - u valve the enty effect is-to-leehf the-pumpe-from.
sepplying unit 2 for the north header.
that pomp will still j
provide Diesel Generator cooling and 'the other pump is available' ha' support. unie twcr-rong ters shursown cochng requiremente.
The embles associated with the other see*4== i=4=l' valves ares j
1332975-IZ ES752-Z ES753-Z 1E32976-12 FCV-47-18 ES754-Z 7C7-47-13 1ES2977-IZ
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ES755-Z 1ES2978-II ES756-I 2E52975-IZ 2ES475-I SES2976-IZ SE3474-Z 2ES2977-ZZ. FCV-47-22 2ES477-I FCV-47-21 2ES2978-II SE3478-Z IIS3979-ZZ l
2ES480=I ES3255-II l
2ES475=I ES3256-II SES476-I ES3257-II FCV-47-14 i
3ES477-I FC7-47-25 ES3258-II l
3E5475-1 ES3259-II 3ES480-I 3ES2975=II i
3ES2976-II 3ES2977-II FCV-67-26 3ES2978-II 3ES2979-II None of the cables for the south headme sectionalizing valves are routed with the misrouted north header valve nor with the cables in the common cable tray FN.
i 2.
Cable 3ES4453-II The NPCI systen valve is a bypass around an isolation valve.
The redundant function is the other isolation valve in series (FCV-73-2) and the associated cables are 2ES142s-I 2ES1429-I DW 2ES1430-I i
2ES1431-I DW 2ES1432-I BE'o7the embles for the isolation valve are roeithd'wlth the misroutad bypass valve,nor with the cables in the common cable tray JD.
PREPARED 4
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S h e e t + o f L't., l 1
3 cable:
22, 1237-12 L
This omble is routed in Unit 1,3 divisions I AND ZZ oable trays.
L From printout for tray FE-ZZ the functions that are Wequired I
are canza rum m aN as'e8 ZE 480V SRUTDONN 30ARD 2A NORMAL SUPPLY 1
35 92 ZE 480V SHQTDONN BOARD 2B NO30EAL SUPPLY l
l SES 3775 ZZ FCV-73-3 SUPPLY J
2ES 2788 ZZ FCV-73-16 2E5 3000 ZZ FCV-75-53 SUPPLY 2ES 3013-ZZ FCV-75-51 SUPPLY h-PL 1210 SRUTDOWN BOARD 200N EXHAUST FAN 1A SUPPLY
'suirisering the Soup %es@ W E b Er > E there are as redundant to tens enes Nabove in these tro I
Within thSee trays these are emblass tAbstr camste,peeblems. ys.
ShEgg inerront
- m 15 92 23 4807 SEPEDDIN EDARD 13 NOMIkL SUPPLY l
13 SE II 4160 55fE0015 3 DRED & NOMIhL SUPPLY j
14196 23 4160 SMFEDDQB 3DARD 3 lBONEhL SUPPLY p
i There is e design pueblem with ambles 25 SS II and 25 92 'ZE l
omblims being routed togetAmr in the emme tray.
Shutdown Board 2A is divisica I and shutdeum.Soard 23 is division 22.
Additionally, this emble tray interaction would disable both division E 4kV boards and the division ZZ' 480T Sluutdown L
teard 23.
This is a recognised pueblem with all required 23 suffimed cables.
problem is to have 100%
review of design and aesrestion.kg divisionalising the the interaction (thesw o,the missouted emble did not causembles already routed required cables.' sinos 100% design review will be sooeptable..
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4 BSSS-II 4kT m atdous Board B 250 TBS Centrol fewer I..
, Battery aseger l
the diesesposey for this emble was that,it left emble tray
- Iy-Est med entered 4807. RMOT Seard 23.through esadmit,2ES3th-II,
j whiek wee est eheva la the eendait and emble sehedste. 'thie drevies dineroposey was est a separatione violattaa.
Bewever,e l
design defieleser was dissevered by the espagity progres.
I the 250 100 esotesi power battery abarger emble (8523-1E) for 4 W shandown Board D is rested with a redundant 250 TDC eentrol power battery sharger cable 3514-1E for 4 kT Shatdown Sinard 3.
This separations vio14tten was corrected by DcN-410441. Cable 3512-1E was sosted in eenduit by itself from the 400V RMOV Seard j
to the battery charger.
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This division ZZ omble was mis-routed in a non-divisional conduit.
A walkdown of this conduit showed that all of the sables in the conduit were division ZZ.
Since all cables. were division ZZ there are no interactions with redundant equigrant from division I.
Therefore, there are no safety ooneern from this mis-route.
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SEB3915-tI
, the RBLSystem mLaisans flew by pese volve supply (fpf-74-30) is a enfety seisted emble souted on mem diethicasi' troy EF.TC
- sedundant enunterpart to this vaise le 759-747. The sentin
..eneh emble seated is. tray.seettee.W uas eenpared with the,,,g of i
senting of the empply to FCT-74-7 (emble 3E81150-1) to deters'ine,,,
if amt internettens esisted.
een internation with the drywell eumy pug was identified.
The dotatted soutes oreias follows:
Cable 2E81150-1 SEB1166-L L
RE Cable 2E83915-11
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BO-tI l
EU-II t
gy-It SES3649-11 Cable SPL1175 f*!
IF-EB1 EP l
FP-ESI 1R EK-ESI i
II-sal EU-Est LX Cable 1 PL1275 interacts with cable 1ES1150-t in trays EY-Est and EU-ESI.
Cable 1PL2175 Interacts with emble 2Es3915-tt in tray EP, brefore it interacts with both redundant valves.
The RER maniflow by pass valves were h e evaluated for safety i
1mpset.
The RER miniflow bypasa velves are normally open.
' Failure of the power feed'would leave the velve open and analysis esists to show that the 500 gym loss through loss through the bypass does not impact the RER safety function.
There is as failure mechanism of L
- va h which can prevent RER l
from operating in the LFCI mode.
If the pumps were shatdown and the valves remained closed due to a cable failure, b valves would not roepen.
Bowever, b only operational mode which eould then be required is torus cooling.
to this mode the.
i operater westd'usaustly htign' tan systusruslag valves-FOT-74 and FCV-74-73 for Division II.
M 33s;,are.tES3175,,and 2g 3910-11.The power embles for these The.'rentes,of_these ca_bles_
are 4
3ES3175 IEU-!T.2ES3634 2Es3241 t
RES3910-1I FS-Es!I NO-ESII EU-ESII CU-EstI 1E83636-II 1ES3944-11
L(tenfel)
These valves de met any internaties with the Divistem I miniflow or tray EP. White-the pumpe may be started with the j
bypass valves.siesed. OE has provided desumentation which verifies that the pump may be operated against a deed head ene..
I at least 30 minuter. The mannah alignment to the torus eseling
)
is presently severed in the operating procedures.
there are no failure modes in the LPCI or torus ecoling modes which prevent RER from performing its intended function.
l
References:
1.
OE Letter G-ER-5-171 "TVA Appendix R - Additional taformation om RER Minimum ylew Valve and RRR Room Coolers.
2.
sebematis 2-45EF79-9 3.
schematie 1-730E920 I
4.
schematis 45NT79-13 5.
Centrol Diagram 147E2610-74-1 Prepared by I
ac.un,- s sy W Checked by W% A fIe YL-m e
Shed o of
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- 7. ' cable'spesos-rr
-his is mis-reeted on non-divisimpal skis division.R Ele is ter iPElvin~FCTW13.
trayrFK.
this en
- i. volve -
l does recieve an auto-iselation signal.. Bowever, this l
valve is la the mucs robara line and is between the ans a shook valTre.
Per design eriteria ars-so-70ss section 3.9, the check valve is sufficient for isolation.
l Therefore, valve FCV-49-12 is met required to operate.
Therefore, there are no safety'eenceras for this,emble.
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Y/ TF/ P1 CHECKED
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i 8, cable asassa-ZZ l
t mis division ZZ omble is mis-routed in a non-divisicinal l
omble tray wrA.
noviewing the embles and their routing i
for tray wrA shows that no ashie is design routed through l
this tray and a division I tray.
m erefore, there is no j
divisional interaction and no safety concern.
l
&N//>'f
/JJU ct rnxennxD CRECKED
_ A f>> l JL -
4 Jg,g_) R l
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T, Cable 1ES3910-II l
This division II cable going to valve FCV-74-73 is miscouted on t
l nondivisional tray EG.
A review of the tray's pe!ntout Attachment D, j
shows that there are no cables routed to FCV-74-73's Division I counterpart, FCV-74-59.
If FCV-74-73 were to spuriously open, the flow l
path to the suppression pool would be isolated by the normally closed valve FCV-74-71 which is in series with FCV-74-73.
The suppression pool l
cooling flow paths through FCV-74-71(57) and FCV-74-72(58) are not i
affected for either Division II(I).
Therefore, there is no safety concern.
e PREPARED
- C N l D l f.1-CHECKED J2 Auld" =
d l Y!l D l
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the two mis-routed. embles mes FE4938. ape E3214.
Both i
omh19s are non-divisional but have been'routsid'in Beth"*
divisions of emble trays.
l
- 10. Cable FE4938 l
From sabesatio 453644-1 Rh this emble provides ene leg of the supply to this aircuit.
The sircuit loops many contacts and l
eventum11y goes to relays.or indianting lights in the control hay.
Sinoe these end devices are located in a mild environment, there are-no i
aooident event related effects-that will disable these components.
This circuit arrangement does t
l not have a single fai1*are ocupled with and event i
that will hypass the load'and disable the is amp oircuit protection besaker.
If the breaker is considered to be the single failure, then the load is in place and surrent is limited.
If the i
load relay is the s la failure, then the oircuit breaker will on to open the j
t circuit.
t Therefore, the circuit arrangement prevents any
}
l damage to the circuit.
Even though.the cable is l
mis-routed there are no situations that cause a safety concern.
i
//, cable E3214 This cable is a 3 twisted pair fit for the security system and is routed between door 298 l
premise control box and the Central Alara station.
Not only is this cable routed in both divisions, it is routed in a higher voltage level trays.
The maximum circuit voltage for l
these cables is approximately sydc.
since this i
PRxPARED
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stR5thRY OF MES M S8 Per the first ostegory of cablest L
i None of the respaired cables are diractly routed through the common misrouted cable trays.
1 Although there are three cab)es that couple the 280VDC breaker control power of amitiple 4EF boarde in unit 3 there is no loss of safety function required to shutdown unit 2.
The "ZE" ontegory cables are those that are causing this j
probles in nondivisional cable trays.
It has already been recognized in other sections of the separations program that the "IE" cables have been mistreated and 100% of them have been examined.
Those that are divisionaly associated are.being rerouted in divisional trays.
The remainder are not routed with ombles from the common emble trays.
- M M 880034 6' Of' Sthles#.,
.:. y f u r.. ;. '. u....
n:.wW)'M,were ne' h omas.9 W W '
eg although while investiga the mierseted enh1as other design problems were disoevered are being - by the ChgR program.
,n.,
,.-- d,..-
- Al
- 'there vers ocuplings of unit 3 4EF boards that'"
eeu1E t in loss of more than 'one' De is unit s' there' vere no safety concerns identified due to the emering d8- -
-- 4 CJ d '
a j,jgp Fazpanzo cnzc m pssr
,,,, w g 4
i L
i ame or.nz, m s,.....
r 1,,.
it has been shaam that i
td
'tf6 Mitt wezu u sr-rou e. -
there is no potential to enange the ombles dois to a single i
failure,that the is sooeptable as is, G ere are no interactions with divisions, or the events that would propagate a fault to redundant divisions is not credible.
00N e sIONS i
Even though the cables were mis-routeT, there are no safety
)
concerns.
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Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for l
Field Verified Cables Requiring Corrective Actl.ons for Unit 2 Restart i
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NPK2 - 6617W
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ATTACHMENT 4 J
FIELD VERIFIED CABLES REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR UNIT 2 RESTART k
Es-CABLE Wo.
RIL-jH FUNCTION l
l 1
1ES475-1 0400 67 EECW NORTH HEADER U-1 SECTIONALIZING VALVE 1
hl FCV-67-17 SUPPLY l $1 i
2 3ES4453-II 0231 73 HPCI FCV-73-81 CONTROL
]
3 PL1237*
0246 31 SHUTDOWN BD RM EKMAUST FAN 3A SUPPLY l
4 5522-IE 0012 WORMAL CONTROL POWER SUPPLY FOR 4160V SHUTDOWN SD D l
5 1ES3100-II 0449 75 CORE SPRAY PUMP IB SUCTION VALVE FCV-75-30 I
SUPPLY t
~
6 2ES3915-II 0390 74 FCV-14-30 SUPPLY l
7 3PC504-II 0220 69 FCV-69-12 SUPPLY f
8 ES2652-II 0164 CAD SYS B HTR SUPPLY 9
1ES3910-II 0480 74 RHR TEST VALVE FCV-74-73 SUPPLY 10 FE4938 0360 26 FIRE PUMP START h
11 K3214 0423 PREMISE CONTROL, DOOR 298 - PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM
- Cable upgraded to divisional as a result of the V4/V5 Q-list review in i
section 4.8.
- [
0304e/48 NPK2 - 6617W
L 1%.
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Cable Identifier and circuit Punction for V3 Nondivisional Cables b
Powered from Safety-related Power Supplies and V4/V5 Divisional and Non-Divisional cables Powered'fcom Safety-related Power Supplies Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2 Restart 1
1 4
NPK2 - 6617W.
~
i ATTACHMENT 5 CABLE IDENTIFIER AND CIRCUIT FUNCTION FOR V3 NONDIVISIONAL CAB E'S POWERED FRON SAFETY-RELATED POWER SUPPLIES AND V4/V5 DIVISIONAL AND NON-DIVISIONAL CABLES POWERED FROM SAFETY-RELATED POWER SUPPLIES REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR UNIT 2 RESTART l
4 h.
E CABLE No, R11 111 FUNCTIOE 1
PLS87 ND 32 SERVICE & CONTROL AIR COMPRESSOR D SUPPLY 2
1PL2200 ND 68 RWCU DEMIN HOLDING PUMP 1A SUPPLY 3
IPL691" ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP A SUPPLY 4
1PP602 ND 58 CEN PROT W-C SET 1B CONTROL 5
L529 ND 247 EMERGENCY LGT CAS (LD-1) EMERGENCY FEEDER
-6 2PL660 ND 70 CCW PUMP 2A SUPPLY
~
7 3PP285 ND 85 CRDH FEED PUMP 3B SUPPLY 8
2PL691 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING PUMP 2A SUPPLY 9
2PL716 ND 69 RWCU PUMP RECIRC PUMP 2A SUPPLY 10 3PL2014 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 3&4 ASSEMBLY C SUPPLY 11 3PL2015 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT IUMP 2&5' ASSEMBLY C j.
SUPPLY l.
I 12 3PL2016 ND 47 TURBINE BEARINC LIFT PUMP 1&6 ASSEMBLY C l
SUPPLY 13 K321 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM NORMAL SUPPLY 14 P276 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 15 1PL2052 ND 247 TB EMER LTG XFMR SUPPLY j,
-16 P286 ND 211 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 17 PL1205 ND 49 SERVICE BAY FAN ROOM AIR COMPRESSOR L
ALT SUPPLY l
l:
18 3V2235 ND 74 RHR FLUSH DISCHARGE VALVE FCF-74-62 l
SUPPLY 19 2PL2014 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 3&4 ASSEMBLY Al SUPPLY l
NPK2'- 6617W l
'I i
ATTACHMENT 5 (Continu:d)
CABLE No.
DJY III FUNCTION f
20 2PL2015 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 2&S ASSEMBLY A2 SUPPLY
(...
21 2PL2016 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 166 ASSEMBLY A3 8dPPLY 22-P294 ND 211 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 23 3PL2210-ND 69 RWCU DEMIN HOLDING PUMP 3B SUPPLY 24 2PL2011 KD 47 TURBINE TURNING GEAR 25 2PL2001 ND 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING GEAR PIGGY-BACK MTR SUPPLY 26 2PL2051 ND 268 RB EMERGENCY LTG KFMR (LS204) 27 2PL2052
~
ND 247 TB EMERGENCY LTG XFMR (LS259) 28 2PL474 ND 231 UNIT PREF MG SET 2 NOR SUPPLY 29 2V2235 WD 74 RHR MAIN COND FLUSH VALVE FCR-74-62 SUPPLY
+
30 P284 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 31 1PL2350 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 1B 1PL2351 SUPPLY 32 1PP477 ND 47 GEN PROT MG SET 1A CONTROL 33 K322 ND 244 EVAC ALARM SYS ALT SUPPLY l()
34 1PL2400*
II 31 SH,IH) RM EMER COOLING UNIT 1 SUPPLY 35 1PL5575 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1A-2 SUPPLY IPL5576 36 1PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-2 SUPPLY IPL5588 37 1PL670 ND 70 CCW PUMP 1B SUPPLY 38 IPL680 ND 70 CCW PUMP 1C SUPPLY 39 1PL734 ND 69 RWCU RECIRC PUMP 1B SUPPLY 40 IV2475 ND 70 FCV-70-48 SUPPLY Rg
- Divisional suffix assignment under review.
WPK2 - 6617W 0304e/49/BFN lL
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'ATTACMMENT 5 (Continued)
P CABLE NO.
P.IY, '
111 FUNCTION 41.
ES1387* -
I' 31 BD RM EMERC SUPPLY FAN 3B SUPPLY ll
'42 :
1PL1745*,
II 31 SHDN BD RM ENER COOLING U1 SUPP b TO TRANSFER 43' 2E8106 I
1 AUTO RELIEF VALVE (2-71G) PCV-1-30
'1 NORMAL SUPPLY f
i 44 2ES$6 I
1 AUTO RELIEF VALVE (2-71E) PCV-1-22 NORMAL SUPPLY 45 2PL2210 ND 69 REAC WTR CLEANUP DEMIN HOLD 46 1PL475 ND 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP SUPPLY 47 1PL2300 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN SUMP PUMP 1B SUPPLY
[
48 3PL2001 WD 47 MAIN TURBINE TURNING GEAR NORMAL.. SUPPLY 49.
P292 ND 281 MOTOR HEATER CIRCUITS SUPPLY 50 3PL716 ND 69 RWCU PUMP 3A SUPPLY 51 1PL474 WD 252 UNIT PREF MMG SET 1 NOR SUPPLY r
52 1PL5625 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1A-4 SUPPLY IPL5626 53 1PL2250 WD 268 PSC WATER HEAD TANKS PUMP 1B SUPPLY 54 PL4550 ND 219 RH8tSW PHP A1, A2 & EECW STRAINER A TRACE HEATER SUPPLY l_
'55 1PL2025 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 8&9 ASSEMBLY B1 SUPPLY 56 1PL2026 ND 47 TURBINE BEARING LIFT PUMP 7&l0 ASSEMBLY B1 SUPPLY l
57 1PL5562 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-1 SUPPLY l
1PL5563 58 1PL5612 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWSR 1B-3 SUPPLY l
1PL5613 59 1PL2275 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP SUMP PUMP 1A SUPPLY 1PL2276 l
f l*Divisionalsuffixa.ssignmentunderreview.
NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/50/BFN
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i ATTACHMENT 5 (Crntinu:d)
I CABLE NO.
Dl1 311 EPNCTION t
60 2PL2275 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN SUMP PUMPt2A SUPPLY 2PL2276
'ks-61 3PL2275 ND 77 DRYWELL SUMP DRAIN PUMP 3A SUPPLY 3PL2276 62 3PL2325 WD 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 3A SUPPLY 3PL2326 63 1PL2325 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUFP 1A SUPPLY IPL2326 64 2PL2325 ND 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2A SUPPLY 2PL2326 h
65 2NM1171 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL C 2Nh1170 66 2NM1181 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL D 2NM1180 i
l 67 PL2085 ND 27 U1, 2, 3 CCW DISCHARGE SUMP PUMP &
VALVES SUPPLY 68 PL2314 ND 66 STACK SAIIPLING ROOM HEATER SUPPLY
[
69 PL2390 ND 65 SGT HEATER B SUPPLY I
70 PL2407 WD 66 STACK FILIER CUBICLE EKH FAN SUPPLY 71 PL2425 ND 82 DIESEL GEN SUMP PUMP B SUPPLY 72 PL2500 ND 65 SGT BLDG SUMP PUMP SUPPLY 73 PL2466 ND 273 RAD WASTE BD ALT SUPPLY j
L 74 3PL474 ND 252 UNIT PFD MG SET 3 40-HP NORMAL FEEDER L
75 3PL475 ND 47 MAIN TURE TURNING CEAR OIL PUMP SUPPLY 76 2PL5175 ND 68 REACTOR RECIRC PMP MOTOR 2A HTR SUPPLY l-2PL5177 1:
77 2ES3592 II 74 RHR SHDN COOLING OUTBOARD VLV FCV-74-47 (2ES3685)
SUPPLY 78 2PL2063 ND 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATFORM OUTLETS SUPFLY NPK2 - 6617W 1
ATTACHMENT 5.(Crntinued)
t:
casLE no.
211 su ruscTIou 79 2PL2060 ND 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATF0kN OUTLETS SUPPLY 2PL2061 80 2PL2062 WD 57 EQUIP HANDLING PLATFORM OUTLETS SUPPLY 81 2PL5180 ND 68 REACTOR RECIRC PUMP MOTOR 2B HTR SUPPLY 2PL5182
$l 82 2ES2838*
II 73 MPCI/RCIC TEST RETURN VLV FCV-73-36 SUPPLY i
83 FE699 ND 39 CO2 STORAGE TANK REFIG UNIT SUPPLY i
84 2PL2300 ND 77 DRYWELL EQUIP DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2B SUPPLY 2PL2301
~
85 2PL2350 WD 77 DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN SUMP PUMP 2B SUPPLY 2PL2351
_Rg 86 1PL2401*
II 31 SRBD RM ENER COOLING U-1 SUPPLY t
87 R100 ND 253 UNIT 1 I&C BUS A SUPPLY TO PNL 9-36 t
88 PL2701 ND 65 SGT BLDG PWR OUTLET SUPPLY 89 PL2699 ND 82 DGB POWER OUTLET SUPPLY 90 PL2694 ND 111 OFF GAS STACK HOIST SUPPLY 91 PL2696 MD 66 0F/ GAS STACK POWER OUTLET 92 2NM1191 MD 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL E 2NM1190 i
1:
l 93 PL2576 ND 66 OFF GAS STACK DIL AIR FAN 1B 44 PL2698 ND 82 DGB POWER OUTLET SUPPLY 95 PL2524 ND 239 STACK LTC TRANS SUPPLY 96 PL2613 ND 301 SEWAGE TREATMENT SYSTEM SUPPLY 97 2NM1151 UD 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL A 2NM1150 98 2NM1161 ND 94 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL B 2KM1160 99 2LT44 ND 244 PAGING SYSTEM 2LT45 El,^ Divisional suffix assignment under review.
NPN2 - 6617W 0304e/52/BFh
F
,w' '
l ATTACHNENT 5L(CIntinu d)l u
CABLE NO.
DH JH FUNCTION j
100 PE1895 ND 39 PNL 3-25-303
'p 1
101 1PL1382-ND 69 PNL 25-3 102 1R671 ND 3
PNL 9-29-1A 103' 1R1579 WD 75 PNL 9-18 i
104 1R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-62 105 1R3250 ND 74 RHR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURE INDICATOR l
SUPPLY 106 2PL1381.
ND 69 PNL 25-3 107 2PP491 WD 68 SCOOP TUBE KG-2A 108 2R877 ND 90 AIR MONITORING 109 2R1579 WD 75 PNL 9-19 110 2R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-6 t
111 3NM1158 ND 90 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL A 112
'3NM1168 ND 90 TIP CALIBRATION SYSTEM CHANNEL B i
113 3R1746 ND 74 PNL 25-62 114 3R3005 ND.
43 PNL 25-103 115-3V1550 ND 66 0FF GAS' ISOLATION SYS BUS A SUPPLY 116 PL4575 ND 23 LHRSW PUNP D1, D2 & EECW STRAINER A TRACE HEATER SUPPLY i
117 ES364 I
67 EECW STRAINER D SUPPLY 118 IV1822 WD 74 RAW COOLING WATER TO RHR PKP D 119 2R3250 ND 74 RHR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURE INDICATOR SUPPLY 120 2PL5662 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-5 SUPPLY 2PL5663 121 R175 ND 253 UNIT 1 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-36 r
NPK2 - 6617W
ATTACHMENT 5 (C:ntinu:d) l CABLE NO.
EY,
- III, FUNCTION 122 3R3250 WD 74 RNR/ CORE SPRAY TEMP & MOISTURElINDICATOR SUPPLY
'123 3R877 ND 90 RE-90-55 SUPPLY 124 R400 ND 253 UNIT 2 I&C BUS C SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 125 IV1875 WD 253 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 126 2V1875 ND 253 ISC BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 l
127 3V1875-ND 253 I&C BUS B SUPPLY TO PNL 9-25 128 K355 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM
~
129 3K605 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 130 1K605 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 131 3PL819 ND 264 PLUG RECEPTACLE SUPPLY t
132 3PL828 ND 264 PLUG RECEPTACLE SUPPLY 133 K306 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM 1
134 K307 ND 244 EVACUATION ALARM SYSTCM 135 2PC516 II 69 FCV-69-2 SUPPLY 136 2PC460 II 1
FCV-1-56 SUPPLY 1
137 PL1210*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 1A SUPPLY l-138 PL1211*
II 31 SHDW BD RM EKHAUST FAN 1A CONTROL 139 PL1212*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EKRAUST FAN 1A CONTROL 140 PL1213*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EKHAUST FAN 1A CONTROL 141 PL1238*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL 142 PL1239*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EXHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL 143 PL1240*
II 31 SHDN BD RM EKHAUST FAN 3A CONTROL 144 1PL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 1B-4 SUPPLY IPL5638 hy-l*Divisionalsuffixassignmentunderreview.
WPK2 - 6617W 0304e/54/BFN
i f
ATTACHMENT 5 (Continued)
- i..
L.
t
.E' CABLE No, P.H III.
PUNCTION
[
145 1PL5662' ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 18-5 SUPPLY
'h L..
1PL5663 t
f' 146 3PL5662-ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 38-5 SUPPLY 3PL5663 147
.1PC516' II 69 PCV-69-2 SUPPLY 148 3PC516-II 69 PCV-69-2 SUPPLY 149 3E83188 11 74 RHR TEST VALVE SUPPLY (FCV-74-73) 150 3E80 ND 244 EVAC ALARM SYS 151 PL1163 WD 31 SPREADING ROOM EXHAUST FAN N0 TOR
' R I
'152 3PL575-ND
.68 RECIRC MG SET OIL PMP 38-3 4
e 6
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Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for "II" Designated Cables Requiring Corrective Actions for l'ait. 2 Restart I
I I
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NPK2 - 6617W l
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l ATTACHMENT 6 "IE" SAFETY CABLES REQUIRING PHYSICAL CHANGES i
CABLE NO.
PH IH FUNCTION b.
A B518 IIC' 248 BATTERY CHARGER SB-C SUPPLY s
2 187 B1 248 BATTERY BD 1 CHARGING LEAD 3
1880 838 281 250V DC R MOV BD 1B 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER
! 81 4
1884 B2S 281.
250V DC R MOV BD IC 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER b2 5
2B76
'B2S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 2A l R1 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER
>6 2B80 B38 281 250V DC R MOV BD 28
~
250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER bl 7
2B84 BIS 281 250V DC R MOV BD 2C 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER R2 8
387 B3 248 BATTERY BOARD 3 SUPPLY 9
3B80 Bis 281 250V DC R MOV BD 3B 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER SA 10 3B84 B2S 281 250V DC R MOV BD 3C g
250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER 11 3B88 B1 231 480V SHDN BD 3A 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER l R2 8I 12 3B180 B1 211 4160V SHDN BD 3EA L
gg 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER 81 13 3B188 B3 211 4160V SHDN BD 3EC 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER N1 14 3B193 B2 211 4160V SHDN BD 3ED 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER R2 15 1M1 I
253 I&C BUS A NORMAL SUPPLY 16 3M4 I
253 I&C BUS A NORMAL SUPPLY Rl 17 1PL435 B1 248 BATT CHG 1A NORMAL SUPPLY R2 0304e/59 SA NPK2 - 6617W
1 ATTACHMENT 6 (Continu d) l l
~&
CABLE NO, 911 EXE FUNCTION 18 2PL435*
B2 248 BATT CHCR 2A NORMAL SUPPLY
- k.
I 19 IPL437*
H 248 BATT CHGR 2B NORMAL SUPPLY Al g
20 3PL3780-30 UNIT 3 DGB STAIRWELL & 4KV SHDN BDS 3EA, SED, 3EC, 3ED BD RMS EKHAUST FAN SUPPLY r
i 21 3892 B3 231 480V SHDN BD 3B 250V DC CONTROL POWER NORMAL FEEDER i
"It" NON-SAFETY CABt.ES REQUIRING PHYSICAL CHANGES CABLE NO.
911 111 FUNCTION
.1 PLR2400.
ND 78 U-2 REFUELING BELLOWS HIGH LEIKAGE PLR2401 INDICATING LIGHT 2
-3PL660 ND 70 CLOSEDCOOLINGWATERPUMP3ASUPi'LY 3
3PL691 ND 78 FUEL POOL COOLING P'JMP 3A SUPPLY 4
2PL5562 ND 70 DRWELL BLOWER 2B-1 SUPPLY 2PL5563 5
'2PL5575 ND 70 DRWELL BLOWER 2A-2 SUPPLY l
2PL5576 L
l 6
2PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-2 SUPPLY 2PL5588 j.
7 2PL5612 ND 70 DRWELL BLOWER 28-3 SUPPLY 2PL5613 8
2PL5625 ND 70 DRWELL BLOWER 2A-4 SUPPLY i
2PL5626 9
2PL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 2B-4 SUPPLY 2PL5638 10 3PL5562 ND 70 DRWELL BLOWER 3B-1 SUPPLY l
I 3PL5563 11 3PL5575 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3A-2 SUPPLY 3PL5576 l
12 3PL5587 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3D-2 SUPPLY 3PL5588 13 3PL5612 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3B-3 SUPPLY 3PL5613 Al
- Divisional suffix assignment under review.
0304e/60 NPK2 - 6617W l
L
~.
s ATTACHNENT 6 (CIntinutd)
CABLE NO, HY, H1 FUNCTION i
~14
'3PL5625
.ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 3A-4 SUPPLY 3PL5626
(- @
15 3PL5637 ND 70 DRYWELL BLOWER 35-4 SUPPLY 3PL5638 16 IV1887 ND 70 DRYWELL ATMOSPHERE COOLING COIL AIR OUTLET DAMPERS CONTROL' I
17 2V1882 ND 70 DRYWELL COOLING AIR INLET DAMPERS CONTROL-T 18.
2V2825 ND 78 F. P. MAKEUP.FROM RHR THROTTLING INBD VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-61) 19 2V2831 ND 78 F. P. FILTER DENIN INBD ISOL'VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-63) 20 2V2838 ND 78 F.P.FILTERDEMINBY-PASSVLVh~UPPLY (FCV-78-66) 21 2V2850 ND 78 F. P. FILTER DEMIN INBD ISOL VLV SUPPLY (FCV-78-68) 22 2V2863 ND 78 FUEL POOL C00 LING AND DEMIN SYSTEM 23 3V1881 ND 70 DRYWELL ATN0 SPHERE COOLING COIL AIR 3V1882 OUTLET DAMPERS CONTROL i
NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/59/BFN
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Attschment 7 Cable Identifier and Circuit Function for V4/V5 Nondivisional Q-List Cables Requiring Corrective Actions for Unit 2 Restart f
1 1
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'i
i ATTACHNENT 7 l
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V4/V5 Q-LIST CABLES WITHOUT A SUFFIK ("I A SAFYTY BUS i
30.
CABLE NO,
- DIY, 3,[J.
FUNCTION I<
hv 1
3PL1880*
I 254 DG 3A BATT CHGR A SUPPLY
{g 2
3PL1884*
I 254 DG 38 BATT CHGR A SUPPLY c
3 SPL1888*
I 254 DG 3C BATT CHGR A SUPPLY t
4 3PL1892*
I 254 DG 3D BATT CHGR A SUPPLY 5
2V2450 II 70 FCV-70-47 SUPPLY 6
1PL2435*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EKHAUST FAN 18 SUPPLY 7
1PL2460*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 18 SUPPLY l
8 2PL2435*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROON EKHAUST l
FAN 2B SUPPLY 9'
2PL2460*
II' 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROON SUPPLY FAN 2B SUPPLY 10 PL1225*
I 31 SHUTDOWN BOARD ROON EKHAUST FAN 2A SUPPLY CONTROL CABLES REQUIRING UPGRADE AND/OR REROUTING DUE TO THE POWER CIRCUIT FUNCTION UPGRADE pa, CABLE NO.
DIV SYS FUNCTION 1
'2H1 II 253 UNIT 2 I&C BUS B ALTERNATE SUPPLY 2
2V2453 II 70 FCV-70-47 CONTROL 3
1PL2436*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOH EKKAUST FAN 1B CONTROL 4
1PL2437*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOH EKHAUST FAN 1B CONTROL 5
1PL2438*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EKHAUST FAN 1B CONTROL 6
IPL2461*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL
- Divisional suffix assignment, under review.
NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/61/BFN
e_'
ATTACHMRNT 7 (Continu-d)
A.
i CABLE 50, 911
- 113, FUNCTION 7
1PL2462*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROQN SUPPLY' y
FAN 15 CONTROL Q.
8
- IPL2463*
II 31 250V SHUTDOW BOARD BATTERY ROON SUPPLY FAN 1B CONTROL 9
- IPL2464*-
II 31 250V SHUTDOW BOARD, BATTERY ROON SUPPLY I
FAN 15 CONTROL 10-2PL2436*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROON EKHAUST FAN 2B CONTROL i
11 2PL2437*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROON EKHAUST FAN 2B CONTROL 12' 2PL2438*
II.
31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM EIHAUST FAN 2B CONTROL 13 2PL2461*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROON SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL f
14 2PL2462*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 15 2PL2463*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 16 2PL2464*
II 31 250V SHUTDOWN BOARD BATTERY ROOM SUPPLY FAN 2B CONTROL 17 PL2311*
II 30 DG XFMR TBD EXH FAN CO2 INTERLOCA CONTROL 18:
PL2358*
II 30 DC KFMR TDE RM EXH FAN CONTROL 4
f
[l
- Divisional suffix assignment under review.
4 NPK2 - 6617W 0304e/62/BFN
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. Walkdown Data Package - Cable Routing Verification - EEB-006 I
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T:nnssste Valley Authsrity Form Page 1 of 1 i Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Form SDSP 196
)
Site Director Standard Practice JUR 021988 SDSr-9.8 s
Form SDSP-196
('
f WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE Package No.
EEB-006 Revision R0 Title CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION s
Responsible Contract Manager (if, applicable)
N/A Phone N/A Reference TSD (if applicable)
N/A
,,Y;C J//f/f f-Prepared By: h%b ReviewedBy:[QualityRepresenta 9
e Task Engineer Approvals / Review:
1 m
em
}ll YI Phone
!kl Date E b k 1 _
fResponsible DNFEngi
'r dpervisor NE & Jhelt1 A A AA)
Phone 50/3 Date S /f'h,
s ec t t ' ag' nt Coordinator
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Phone
)( $/49 Data
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ical Re' vieweg N
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Phone i.M M~
Date 3 \\(e
, i Quality Assurance Managbr < "'
/
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Shift Operations Supervisor Plant Manager Site Quality Surveillance 4
DNE Task Engineer for DNE generated WDP i
=
- = Contractor Quality Representative for contractor generated WDP or i
Reviewer, per NEP-5.2, for DNE generated WDP's.
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f PAGE 1 OF 4 i:
l.
l WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 u.-
j-e n
i TABLE OF CONTENTS L
1 b
1.0' PURPOSE.....................................Page 2
2.0 SCOPE..................................... Page 2 i
Paye 2 3.0 DEFINITIONS t
4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Ptge 2 5.0 REQUIRED EQUIPMENT......................... Pa.ge 2 6.O INSTRUCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Page 3 7.O ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS / CRITERIA........... Page-3 p
L 8.0 DOCUMENTATION Page 4
9.0 REFERENCES
Page 4 ATTACHMENTS
')
ATTACHMENT A............
CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION FORM
. ATTACHMENT B........................... TRAINING ROSTER ATTACHMENT C............................. REVIEW SHEET e
6 4
8 9
9 e
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PAGE 2 OF 4 l
i i
' WALKDOWN DATA PAC 1; AGE EEB-006
$(,,
1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this walkdown is to provide Nuclear Engineering (NE) with cable routing information required for the resolution of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) l concerns on electrical cable separation.
[
t 2.0 SCOPE The scope of this walkdown will include verification of cable routing to provide Nuclear Engineering (NE) with information required for resolution of HRC concerns on electrical cable separation.
This verification wil3 be done either by visual inspection or by using radiodetection (signal trace) equipment in accordance with SEMrs62.
3.0-DEFINITIONS See SDSP 9.8 4.0 PERSONNEL OUALIFICATIONS/ TRAINING j
)
4.1 Walkdown Personnel shall be familiar with the requirement of this walkdown procedure and those L
specified in SDSP 9.8.
Personnel performing this l'
walkdown should be knowledgeable of plant areas and
}
l locations of cable end devices.
4.2 Walkdown Personnel shall possess the minim'um educational requirements of a High School education or equivalent.
Personnel participiting in the walkdown shall consist of at a minimum one Journeyman Electrician and one NE representative.
4.3 Walkdown Personnel shall be trained to be knowledgeable of this walkdown procedure and SDSP 9.8.
[
This shall be documented on Attachment B of this walkdown procedure prior to performing any walkdowns.
5.0 REOUIRED EOUIPMENT Plant required personnel safety equipment shall be used by each individual on the walkdown.
Electrical Craft personnel shall be required to furnish screwdrivers, nutdrivers and other hand cools required for opening panels compartments, junction boxes, etc.
and radiodetection (signal. trace) equipment as required to verify cable routing.
)
)
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a
' M' PAGE 3 OF 4 J
WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006
{
L I
6.0 INSTRUCTIONS &ED RESPONSIBILITIES i
r -
6.1 Walkdown teams will b'e responsible for the following:
6.1.1 Perform walkdown in accordance with this WDP t
and compile walkdown information on the walkdown data sheet (see Attachment A).
j' 6.1.2 Determine the need for access to panels, compartments, junction boxes, etc., and initiate Maintenance Requests (hrs) as required.
Notify the Shift operations Supervisor (SOS)ior to entry.and the appropriat~e Unit 1
Operator (UO) pr i
n 6.1.3 Determine the need for scaffolds and/or ladders.
6.2 Verification of cable route shall be accomplished by one or more of the follcwing methods:
L 6.2.1 Visual trace of. the conduit (s) and/or cable that the subject cable is routed in tray (s)ble origin point to cable destination from ca point.
3, 6.2.2 Where the entire route cannot be visually traced, the conduit (s) and/or cable tray (s) that the subject cable is routed in shall be J
identified by reading conduit tagging, tray i
p labeling, or drawings, and the subject cable y
entry and exit points verified.
6.* 3 Where cables are routed in flamistic coated trays the routing does not have to be visually verified or L
verified by radiodetection if the routing can be determined from the cable tray entry and exit points.
6.4 A sketch of the subject cable route or a' cable block i
diagram may be attached to the walkdown data sheet (Attachment A) for clarification purposes.
l 7.0 ACCEPTANCE REOUIREMENTS/ CRITERIA' Data collected on this walkdown shall be recorded on Attachment A to this procedure and signed First and Second Party Verified in a timely manner.
If a sketch or block diagram is attached, it shall be signed First and Second Party Verified also.
Data sheets may be compiled in a single package or several smaller packages using Attachment C.
Attachment C shall be signed by an NE representative to verify the completeness of the package.
~
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i 4
PAGE 4 OF 4 WALKDOWN DATA PACKAGE EEB-006 b(,
. 7.0 ACCEPT &Hgg REOUIREMENTS/ CRITERIA (CONTINUED) 9 There are no explicit Engineering requirements for the walkdown data collected.as this is an information gathering walkdown only.
NOTE: QS will perform surveillances on approximately 10% of-the walkdowns.
8' O DOCUMENTATION 8.1. Cable routing data collected shall be documented on Attachment A.
All data collected shall have an independent first and second party verification.-
At a r
minimum.the second party verification shall be performed by an NE representative.
8.2-Record retention shall be in accordance with SDSP 9.8 section 9.0.
9.0 REFERENCES
SEE SDSP 9.8 l
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j-ATTACHMENT A PAGE
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-r, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT CABLE ROUTING VERIFICATION FORM i
tJ CABLE NL, Vl( )
V2( )
V3[ ]
V4( )
V5[ ]
SAFETY RELATED?
Y( )
N( )
i SOURCE:
BUILDING UNIT COLUMN ELEVATION SOURCE DESCRIPTION l
DESTINATION:
BUILDING UNIT COLUMN ELEVATION
' DESTINATION-DESCRIPTION 1
. ROUTE: PER DRAWING REV b
ACTUAL ROUTE:
RADIODETECTION EOUIPMENT USED:
Y[ ]
N( )
IF YES, ATTACH COPY OF SEMI-62 DATA SHEET.
ATTACHMENTS:
PAGES
/
FIRST PARTY VERIFICATION DATE t
]
/
SECOND PARTY VERIFICATION DATE 1
,a
m 2
NSE BLACK INE-ONLT - SEE NOTE 1 ENGI M ERIM TERININ NOSTER COURSE TITLE AND NO.:
~ RET:
DATE:
START TINE:
LENGTR OF CONRSE:
NONR(S) 1ACATION:
(FOR FORNAL OR INFORMAL)
INSTRUCTOR (PRINT):
INSTRUCTOR OR SNPERTISOE (SIGNATNRE):
TTPE OF TRAINING: D FORMAL 0 INFORMAL 0 READIM (Check one)
BRANCN SI';WATURE PROJECT.
DATE OF SOCIAL MANE (PRINT)
(IRPORTANT:
JOB TITLE DISCIPLINE OR STAFF EWIATEE READIM SECURITT NO.
LAST FIRST HI STE NOTE 2)
SCNED/ GRADE C
E N
N ASSInamutuf TVA CONTRACT ONLT i
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' Usa this column only when using form to record reading knowledge.
1.
DO NOT OBLITERATE ANY INFGENATION ON THIS ROSTER - Use single line-through, initial, and date when a 7%5 5g?
change is made.
2.
FOR READING KNOWLEDGE ONLT - Signature acknowledges that I have read and understand this informatloa.
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7 PAGE 1 OF 2 F
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j-ATTACllMENT C-1, i
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT REVIEW SHEET PACKAGE NO.
REVISION TITLE TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES ATTACHED CABLES VERIFIED:
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PACKAGE CONTE!1TS COMPLETE
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ENG111EER111G VERIFIER DATE t
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ENCLOSURE'2
!y Page 1 of 4 C
SUMMARY
?.IST OF COMMITMENTS 1.
Evaluation of Field Verified Cable Routing Data from TVA's Cable Ampacity Program and Appendix R Program.
The following corrective actions will be taken:
Before unit 2 restart TVA will either reroute the divisional cables or have an evaluation in place to justify optional dispositions.
The nondivisional cables'will either be rerouted or provided with redundant overcurrent protective devices or have an evaluation in plac'e to justify optional
' dispositions.
.These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 4 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.
2.
V4 and V5 Cables Which Originate from Safety-Related Power Suppli.es The following corrective actions will be taken:
Before unit 2 restart Sixteen cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.
Eighty-five cables will either:
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.
After unit 2 restart The sixteen cables, that had been de-energized for restart, will be taodified as appropriate.
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h ENCLOSURE 2 Page 2 of 4 h
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3.
Nondivisional V3 Cables Which Orlainate From Safety-Related Power Supplies The following corrective actions w1?) be taken:
t.
-Before unit 2 restart
, Eight cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.
The remaining 41 cables will either:
r Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added in series to Drevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.
'After unit 2' restart 4
Eight cables, that had been de-energized for restart, will he modified as appropriate.
4.
Divisional and Nondivisional Cables Designated With An "IE" Suffix i
The following corrective actions will be taken:
Before unit 2 restart Five cables will have their power removed because the function is not required during unit 2 plant operation.
Two cables will be deleted.
Thirty-seven problem cables will either:
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added L
in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 6 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.
ENCLOSURE 2 Page 3 cf 4 L
After unit 2 restart f'
After restart, 604 of these cables will be corrected by retagging both the' cables and the appropriate raceway.
The five cables, that had been de-energized for restart, will be modified as appropriate.
("
5.
Nondivisional V4 and V5 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List The following corrective actions'will be taken:
a p
Before-unit 2 restart Twenty eight cables (10 V4/V5; 18 V3) will either:
k Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcuraent protective devices added in series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety related circuitry.
Have evaluations in place to justify optional dispositions.
.In addition, TVA identified one nondivisional cable that was inappropriately connected to another nondivisional cable that was routed In the redundant division's raceway.
This problem is documented by CAQR BFP 870860R3.
The corrective action for this cable will involve the rerouting of this cable to another breaker.
These cabie identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified in attachment 7 of the Electrical Cable Seperations Report.
After' unit 2 restart After restart, 109 of these cables will be corrected by retagging both the cable and the appropriate raceway.
In addition, TVA will revise the project 0-list to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and nondivisional and to add divisional suffixes, as required.
Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10.
6.
Nondivisional V3 Cables Contained in the Project 0-List The'following corrective actions will be taken:
After unit 2 restart m
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' ENCLOSURE 2 Page 4 of 4 h,
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r TVA will revise the project C. list to remove:the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and r
nondivisional. Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in l
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accordance with SOSP 3.10.
7.
Nondivisional VI and V2 and Cables Contained in the Project 0-list
{.
The'following' corrective actions will be'taken:
After unit-2 restart C
TVA will revise the. project 0-list to remove the sample cables determined from this evaluation to be nonsafety-related and
- nondivisional. Additional Q-list reclassifications will be handled in accordance with SDSP 3.10.
F 8.
Evaluation of Cables contained in Divisional and Nontiivisional Cable Trays that Physically-Connect y,
L Before unit 2 restart Two cables will either:
Be rerouted into appropriate raceways.
Have redundant safety-related overcurrent protective devices added In series to prevent the nonsafety-related cable from degrading the safety-related circuitry.
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Have their power removed, or have evaluations in place to justify
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3 optional dispositions.
c.
(T These cable identifiers and their particular circuit function are identified
- in attachmerit 5 of the Electrical Cable Separations Report.
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