ML20238E548

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Safe End Replacement:Util Perspective
ML20238E548
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/31/1987
From: Fox J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18032A690 List:
References
NUDOCS 8801050221
Download: ML20238E548 (51)
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{{#Wiki_filter:l s \\ i ) i l SAFE END REPLACEMENT: A UTILITY PERSPECTIVE i 1 a 3 I vernment publication and not subject to cop rig t " 871231 8801050221ADOCK0500g0 PDR

ABSTRACT SAFE END REPLACEMENT: UTILITY APPROACH Replacement of recirculation inlet safe ends has been performed at Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This replacement was effected because of intergranular attack of the safe ends originating in a creviced region between the safe end and thermal sleeve. These safe ends had been in service since initial operation of the unit in 1975. Automated ultrasonic methods were critically optimized for this configuration and were employed for detection and sizing of the corrosion attack. All ten safe ends were examined, and indications, of attack were noted on each safe end. The indications noted involved 48 to 93 percent of the circumference of the safe ends. Sixty areas of attack were sized for through-wall penetration, which averaged 31.8 percent of the wall thickness. Options for continued operation, repair / mitigation, and replacement were l developed to assist TVA upper management in the decision for corrective action. TVA's decision to replace the safe ends was based primarily on ' risk aversion and cost considerations. Additionally, TVA elected to use, to the maximum

extent, its own nuclear construction forces to perform the replacement.

Following the decision to replaco, NRC was consulted on issues between TVA and NRC identified relative to this replacement. The replacement was performed under 10 CFR 50.59, per guidance of Generic Letter 84-07. Replacement was performed on the safe ends and a portion of the upstream piping, which included the adjacent spool piece, elbow, and upper portion of the ' tis e r piping. Corrosion-resistant cladding was added to the existing piping adjacent to the riser closure weld, and stress improvement was effected on all pressure boundary welds. The welds were inspected by radiography, which on some welds was augmented by specialized radiographic techniques. The replacement safe ends eliminated the thermal sleeve to safe end crevice and was fabricated from 316 NG stainless steel. The drywell activity -duration was approximately 134 days including workstops for problem resolution. Approximately 500 Man-Rems of exposure were incurred as a result of this replacement, and the cost of the replacement was approximately $10 million. Preliminary results of destructive examination of the removed safe ends is in substantial agreement with the nondestructive examination findings. Through-wall cracking of the thermal sleeve adjacent to the attachment weld was also observed. P _._._.________._______a

_1_ 1.0 Introduction In May 1986, TVA elected to ultrasonically reinspect the thermal sleeve attachment area of the Browns Ferry unit 2 recirculation inlet safe ends. Prior to this time, the safe end thermal sleeve attachment area was inspected by sampling 2 to 5 inlet safe' ends per. refueling outage. No indications were revealed by the earlier sample inspections.. The ~ decision to reinspect the se Je ends was influenced by the discovery of indications of corrosion damage at other similar facilities,- a recommendation made by General Electric

Company, and (with the assistance of the EPRI NDE Center) TVA's critical waluation of previous-BFN inspections.

It was determined that earlier inspections were not optimum for detection of crevice attack in the configuration that. was present on these safe ends. The corrosion damage which had been noted in similar configurations was cracking of the safe end in. the creviced region adjacent to the thermal sleeve attachment. The remainder of the reactor attached piping on this unit had been inspected 'for IGSCC, repaired, and stress improvement mitigated. 2.0 Previous Examination Performance ( 1977-19 8 t)., Early examinations of the crevice regions were performed using conventional ultrasonic techniques. These techniques were manually applied to the safe ends for the detection of IGSCC in the crevice region. No special technique research or calibration fixtures were employed to accomplish these examinations. The results of the examinations indicated that no cracking was detected in the areas examined. Later examinations were performed using new technology developed because of the increased concerns over IGSCC detection. The following describes the equipment utilized to perform these examinations o Ultrasonic instrument: USL-38 o Recording device: Video cassette recorder (VCR) o Manipulator: Virginia Corporation ALARA I scanner o Transducer KBA DUCG Dual element 1.5 mHZ .375 inch x.750 inch focused beam With the exception of the VCR and the Virginia Corporation manipulator, this was the equipment TVA had chosen to qualify under IE Bulletin No. 83-02 for the detection of IGSCC. The Virginia Corporation scanner was determined to be an " extension" of the operator's hand and did not require special qualification or requalification. i 1 l i l i 1_..-_-- _ - - _ _ - _ - - - -.

-2 Results of these examinations. showed no ' sign of IGSCC to exist.In'the crevice areas of the five safe ends examined. It was determined that. the examinations were performed in the most effective manner, and the results were accurate and acceptable using what was the most current-technology. 3.0 Recent Examination Performance (June 1986) Examinations for detection As a result of a joint. discussion between : EPRI, TVA, and General. Electric Corporation, a recommendation was"made for reexamination' of the creviced safe end regions utilizing all of the current ' technology applicable to these types of component examinations. Certain' requirements were identified to perform the most meaningful examination ~ and to be able to accurately interpret the examination data. These requirements weret l o automated equipment was required to ensure a proper l coverage of the affected area, and to assist in segregating the geometric responses.from crack signals; o a calibration fixture which represented the exact configuration of the component under examination should be fabricated; o actual location of the thermal sleeve weld must.be identified to accurately analyze the results of the examination data and to ensure the proper region was examined. In support of the recommended examination requirements, TVA. complied information from all available' resources to assist in development of an optimum examination technique and to prepare. an examination procedure based on the results of this development. This effort was accomplished and proven with the assistance of the EPRI NDE Center using safe end samples which contained thermal sleeve attachments similar to those at ~ Browns Ferry. An information request was prepared and sent to the ISI Inspection Section onsite at Browns Ferry for. acquiring data necessary for f abricating the calibration block. As a result of the study performed at EPRI, it was determined that the placement of the thermal sleeve veld in the calibration fixture was not necessary because of the recording conventions employed by TVA's examination system. l l The following describes the equipment selected by TVA to perform the crevice examinations for the detection of IGSCC: o TVA's automated examinations system - Instraspect/98 (I/98) o Transducers selected: KBA.500 - 2.25 mHZ 45 degrees and 60 degreerr AMDATA booted 2.25 MHZ 45 degrees normal SwRI compound angle (special) AMDATA compound angle (special) l Based on the information compiled and the true component configuration, a total of eight scanning patterns were selected to be performed for optimum results. These scanning patterns consisted of o KBA 45 and 60 from thin side - axial scan for cire flaws o KBA 45 and 60 from thick side - axial scan for cire flaws o AMDATA 45 boot from thin and thick - a,xial scan for circ flaws o AMDATA 45 boot from thin and thick - circ scan for axial flaws o SwRI compound angle from taper area - circ scan for axial flaws o AMDATA compound from taper area - circ scan for axial flaws Data acquisition using these scan patterns was completed in seven days with the analysis results as follows: N0ZZLE ID PERCENT CIRC CRACKING NUMBER AXIAL CRACKS N2A 93% (37.2") 17 N2B 85% (32.0") 10 N2C 69% (27.6") 19 N2D 47.9% (19.2") 13 N2E 51.8% (20.7") 3 N2F 83.4% (33.7") 34 N2G 54.7% (21.9") 28 N2H 55.9% (22.4") 18 H2I 81.8% (32.7") 0 N2J 51% (20.4") 6 Performance of these examinations and the analysis of the data acquired were witnessed by an NRC Region II representative. By his reported

comments, the inspector indicated his concurrence with the examinations.

He indicated that "TVA's procedure was well written and covered all pertinent ASME Code and regulatory requirements," and that "The Intraspect/98 system demonstrated an excellent capability to l acquire examinations data. .", and concluded that "the examiners were well qualified within the area of their certification." Examinations for sizing Based on the flaw pattern and signal response recorded, five areas on N-2A were selected to be sized rnanually and independently by two TVA/EPRI certified ultrasonic Level II technicians. Using as many as nine different transducers, various techniques for flaw sizing were applied to optimize the recognition of the tip defracted signals. The results of the sizing were as follows: XND # LQEATIQH RECORDED DEPTH 1 3.85" 0.190" 2 9'05" 0.160" 3 5.00" 0.220" 4 31.00" 0.180" 5 34.95" 0.220" A test scan was performed using the I/98 to reproduce and confirm some of the crack tip data reported manually. The results of this scan indicated that the I/98 system had great potential in performing sizing scans when proper steps were taken to ensure optimum technique selection. At the request of the site management, a " third party" confirmation was performed by an outside service company. Universal Testing Laboratories provided three EPRI certified technicians to perform sizing confirmation on the same five areas sized by TVA. The results of the examination indicated that cracking did exist in'the safe end crevice region, and that sizing could be recorded at the areas identified by TVA. The results of their examinations in the five areas weret IND # LOCATION RECORDED DEPTH 1 3.90" 0.197" 2 9.05" 0.196" 3 5.10" 0.190" 4 30.70" 0.216" 5 '34.20" 0.216" l In addition to the third party confirmation, independent analysis was performed on all data sets by several certified and qualified personnel, with some of the data sets sent to outside agencies for postprocessing analysis. Af ter the results of the manual sizing and the confirmation results had been completed, it was requested that full volume sizing data be acquired utilizing newly developed sizing techniques and the I/98 i system. The sizing techniques chosen for application were as follows: o 45 degrees PATT - 3.5 mHZ KBA.500 inch diameter (Shear) o 52 degrees SPOT - 5.0 mHZ Automation (Shear) i o 52 degrees PATT - 5.0 mHZ Automation (Shear) o 55 degrees SPOT - 4.0 mHZ KWU (Long.) o 55 degrees PATT - 4.0 mHZ KWU (Long.) o 60 degrees PATT - 4.0 mHZ RTD (Long.)

., I o 70 degroes PATT.- 4.0 mHZ RTD (Long.) o O degrees Creeper - 2.0 mHZ RTD o O degrees PATT - 2.0 mHZ KBA MSEB o 0 degrees PATT - 4.0 mHZ KBA MSEB Each technique had a specific application of examination area as determined by the location. of the thormal sleeve attachment weld. The following shows the results o f. the sizing data - recorded by the I/98' systems NOZZLE ID NUMBER OF AREAS MIN MAX N2A 5 .160 .220 N2B 1 .210 .210 N2C 7 .210 .350-N2D 4 .120 .400 N2E 3 .300 .310 N2F 12- .220 .410 W2G 12 .250 .400 N2H 7 .210 .400 N2I 6 .350 .420\\ N2J 8 .210 .390 The sizing-analysis report is limited to circumferential cracking. only. Because the axial indications were located underneath the taper, sizing could not be performed. Indication depth reported is subject to a 0.100" tolerance as identified by EPRI sizing ~ standards. Additional detail on these examinations has - been published by EPRI; NP-5169LD, development of Automatic Ultrasonic Examination Techniqutg for ISI of Creviced Safe End Usina the IntraSoect/98 System 2 April 1987. 4.0 Destructive Examination Confirmation of Sizina Destructive examinations of the safe ends are ongoing at this time. Preliminary results indicate substantial confirmation of .the nondestructi ve results' with respect to existence. of cracking and the predicted depth. 5.0 E.yaluation of Options TVA Division of Nuclear Engineering was tasked with evaluating ~ the -{ corrosion damage indicates on the safe ends, identifying technically feasible options and providing a. recommendation to TVA upper 1 management. The objective of this evaluation was to determine which repair option best met the following criteria:

1) effectiveness for a minimum of four fuel cycles;
2) acceptability to regulators; 3) acceptable impact on Browns Ferry;
4) minimization of risks, including rinks associated with future rework;
5) acceptable performance record; and i

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l 6) acceptable cost, including costs associated with risk. l Evaluation of the NDE findings indicated that operation in the "as-is" condition was not feasible since predicted growth of the flaws would soon exceed end-of-cycle allowable size. Additionally, stress mitigation whi::h can be employed en some flaws was determined to be inappropriate. Weld overlay, mechanical clamps, and combinations of overlays and clamps were developed and evaluated as repair options. Residual concerns over the long-term serviceability of the thermal sleeve attachment and inspectability of the repaired configuration diminished the attractiveness of these repair options. Consideration of the technical features of each opt!.on, ' implementing costs, and costs associated with risks resulted in TVA Engineering's recommendation to upper man ageme~.:,t for replacement. TVA upper management accepted and concurred with this recommendation. 6.0 Scope of Replacemer}t TVA had previously purchased a replacement piping system for Brr$wns Ferry unit 1, including tuning fork-type safe ends. Since the unit 1 piping is largely interchangeable with unit 2, considerable flexibility was available to determine the extent of piping to be replaced..The unit 2 piping system, in general, had not been strongly attacked by IGSCC, primary mitigation (stress improvement) had been applied, and additional mitigation (hydrogen water chemistry) had been scheduled; therefore, this piping system is very likely to be serviceable for the remaining licensed life of the unit. It was on this basis that the scope of the replacei %t was limited to the safe ends and attached piping upstream to an intermediate point on the risers. Other considerations were access and dose management for the safe end part of the work and elimination of other features in this area of the piping system that were significant dose contributors. Other features of the replacement were corrosion resistant cladding of the old pipe interface I joint and stress improvement of all field welds. 70 F_eplacement 4 In consideration of the scope of the planned replacement and TVA's desire to gain in-house experience in pipe replacement work, upper i management elected to use TVA Division of Nuclear Construction to the I maximum extent for performance of this work. Significant contractor involvement was limited to cutting and machining, and specialty contractors were also employed for problem resolution. This effort was started in December 1986 and completed mid-April 1987. Work was stopped for seven weeks to resolve a radiographic anomally which is described in detail in the following section. TVA labor expended on this project totaled 127,376 man-hours, and staff and machining contractor man hours were approximately 40,000. Total man hours expended in radiologically controlled areas were 23,115. The project cost was approximately $9.7 million. 8.0 Radicaraphic Anomally Resolution An unidentifiable condition was detected by radiography during the safe end replacement. The radiographic image produced by the condition was very subjective in nature and could not be confidently identified using standard code radiography. Various radiographic techniques, 1 l ultrasonics, and mockupa were requiged to resolve the identity of the suspect image. Also, consultation with other owners and contractors provided supporting information that aided in the resolution. The welding of the safe ends to the inlet N-2 nozzles on the BFN unit 2 reactor pressure vessel recirculation system was initiated on January 4, 1 1937. The exicting safe ends had been removed and a "J" bevel weld prep machined on the nozzle forgings. The replacement safe ends contained the same "J" bevel weld prep. The weld metal was deposited using an automatic gas tungsten arc welding process (GTAW) with a "K" type j consumable insert weld root. The safe end-to-nozzle assembly also included a thermal sleeve that precluded access to the weld root inner surface. Radiographs of the first safe end-to-nozzle welds Nos. 2RF1, 2RG1, and 2RJ1, after insert consumption and two filler layers, revealed a linear radiographic image in each weld that could not be readily characterized. A stop work action was immediately issued until the condition could be resolved. The suspect image was located immediately adjacent to the consumable insert weld root on the nozzle side and was only observed in the upper 180 degree segment of each ' weld. The appearance of the suspect image indicated that the condition could possibly be caused by undercut, root geometry, or lack of fusion, with the image attributes indicating most likely undercut or root geometry. An extensive evaluation process was immediately initiated to determine the cause and disposition of the suspect image. Radiographs of initial pipe-to-pipe mockups that were fabricated for veld technique development were reviewed and found not to contain the suspect image. The welding parameters developed and used on the mockups I were identical to those used on the production welds. This generated a theory that the actual production weld may have experienced greater restraints resulting from the large nozz?e mass as compared to the less massive pipe-to-pipe mockups. To determine if the condition could be caused by geometric restraint effects, the General Electric Company performed an analysis using a finite element model (ANSYS Finite Element Computer Program). The weld residual stress analysis and elastic calculations concluded that the condition could not be caused by the geometric constraint from the nozzle.

Also, a full scale mockup consisting of a nozzle from the canceled Phipps Bend Plant was fabricated (using established weld parameters) and did not produce the suspect radiographic image.

The next attempt to identify the condition was initiated by performing an excavation in weld Nos. 2RFl and 2RJ1. The metal in both welds was ground and examit.ed in incremental steps until only the root layer remained. There was no indication of weld discontinuities present; however, radiography of the root layer in the excavated area continued to contain the suspect image. It was also noted that the aspearance of the weld root width as depicted on the radiographs indicated adequate melt of the consumable insert and that the presence of nonfusion was highly improbable. The radiographs containing the suspect image were digitally processed in hopes that the identity of the condition would become apparent. Unfortunately, as a result of the nature of the radiographic image, the process was unable to provide any substantial information as to the identity of the suspect image. A parallax radiographic technique was then applied to aid in determining the location of the condition causing the suspect image. The parallax method can accurately determine the depth of a discontinuity by noting the shift of the shadow of the discontinuity when the radiation source is moved from one position to another. The parallax technique can also be used to demonstrate that no unacceptable indications are masked by the suspect image as indicated in ASME Interpretation III - 1-83-88. The technique indicated that the suspect condition in all three safe end welds was located at the inside surface of the weld root. To compliment the radiographic examinations, weld No. 2RG1 was welded complete and surface prepared for an ultrasonic examination utilizing the Intraspect/98 system. A 45 degree refracted longitudinal wave RTD dual element search was used to penetrate the highly attenuate stainless steel weld metal. The examination results indicated that there were no discontinuities in the weld volume that correlated with the suspect radiographic image; however, a persistant ultrasonic signal from the root inner surface did correlate and plotted in the same location as indicated in the previous parallax radiographic technique. With the parallax technique and ultrasonic examination both indicating a root geometrical condition, the remaining objective was to determine the cause of the weld root condition. The specific mechanism that caused the geometric condition could not be readily determined because the thermal sleeve liner precluded a direct visual examination of the weld root inner surface. Since an exploratory excavation through the weld root would result in a weld repair that could induce additional stresses and increase the probability of intergranular stress corrosion cracking, it was decided to attempt to recreate the condition in a mockup. Additional mockups were then fabricated in an effort to generate the same condition as in the production welds. Various welding parameters (amperes, volts, travel speed, insert position, etc.) were altered in an attempt to reproduce the condition, but were unsuccessful. It was apparent that a more indepth review was necessary to identify the mechanism causing the condition. A complete review of all applicable procedures, specifications, drawings, and inspections was reinitiated. It was during the visual reinspection of the nozzle weld preps that the cause of the condition was discovered. A small chamfer had been machined on the inner surface of the nozzles at the root land interface in preparation for fit-up and welding. The purpose of the nozzle chamfer was to assure a uniform land thickness and concentricity between the nozzle ano safe-end. It was noticed during the reinspection that the chamfer angle appeared to be greater than the 12 degrees regrited by the drawing. Because of the small annulus between the thermal sleeve and inner nozzle surface, it was extremely difficult to accurately measure the chamfer angle with conventional measuring equipment.

_9_ A special tool was fabricated and the chamfer angle on the remaining nozzles measured and recorded. It was found that the nozzles contained different chamfer angles ranging from 12 to 18 degrees, with the chamfer existing intermittently around the nozzle inner surface. The presence of the chamfer was dependent upon the inner surface contour and roundness. To address the inspection finding, a discrepancy report was immediately issued and prompted the submittal of a field change request to engineering. An engineering evaluation was performed, resulting in-approval allowing a maximum 18 degree chamfer angle. Mockup "T" was then fabricated with an 18 degree chamfer and radiographer after insert melt and two filler layers. The radiographs revealed the same condition as had been observed in production welds 2RF1, 2RG1, and 2RJ1. It was also noted that the suspect image only occurred in the upper 180 degree segment of both mockup and production welds. This was attributed to gravity aiding the formation of root reinforcement in the upper 180 degree segment and ~a flattening of the weld in the lower 180 degree segment. It was concluded that the conditions necessary to produce the suspect image required both a weld root reinforcement and a chamfer angle greater than 12 degrees. This accounts for. the inability to reproduce the condition in previous mockups that contained a chamfer of only 12 degrees. A radiograph of mockup "T" also contained an area identified as a lack of fusion (LOF) and appeared adjacent to the weld root opposite the suspect image. The parallax technique was used to locate the LOF in the weld volume and determined the location to be within the filler layer, .3 inch from the inside surface of the weld. The mockup was then sectioned and sent to the EPRI NDE Center for a metallurgical evaluation. The metallography showed complete fusion of the insert ~and confirmed the location of the LOF between the first and second filler layer (see figure 3). This substantiated that the parallax technique could discriminate between the weld root geometrical conditions and a volumetric discontinuity by accurately indicating the location of the radiographic images. With the cause of the condition identified, it was decided to selectively proceed welding another safe end-to-nozzle. Nozzle "B", which virtually contained no chamfer, was selected for welding on February 11, 1987. As expected, the radiograph after insert melt and two filler layers revealed no indication of the suspect image. Nozzle "H" with an 18 degree chaafer was then selected and after welding was found to contain the suspect image in the upper 180 degree segment. Two additional nozzles were welded which further supported the conclusion. The evaluation process was then considered complete with the cause and effect of the condition determined. The remaining nozzles and safe ends were released for welding on February 27, 1987. The evaluation' process in the above scenario was necessary to provide an understanding of the radiographic images produced from the weld root geometry. Without this knowledge, the film evaluation may have resulted in the incorrect acceptance or rejection of a weld. With the discrepancy of the chamfer angle identified and subsequently determined to be acceptable, the radiographic images produced by this conditior-were interpreted as nonrelevant. The parallax technique was used on all final welds containing the condition to assure that uo discontinuities were masked. 9.0 Summary It is apparent to TVA, from this experience, that continued dilligence in managing IGSCC is required, to ensure continuance of the successful record of the industry in the IGSCC area. Critjeal evaluation of past inspection activities in light of now information, application of state of the art technology to problem areas, and thoughtful examination of the configurations -for additional potential-problem areas are requirements in a successful IGSCC management strategy. i

APPENDIX 7 ANALYSIS OF REVISED MOMENTS AND STRESSES AFFEC".*ING WELDS KR-2-14, KR-2-41, KR-2-36, AND GR-2-15 i i l 1 l

ATTACHMENT TO APPENDIX 7 The calculations contained in this Appendix are based on loads and stresses which were provided in QIR-CEB-87-057 (RIMS #B22 870206 016). A revised set of loads and stresses have since been transmitted by OIR-CEB-87-131RO (RIMS #B22 871027 008). Our assessment of the impact of these revised loads and stresses on these calculations is that the pertinent conclusions will not change. A formal determination of the acceptability of these revised loads and stresses will be performed by the Civil Engineering Branch (Knoxville). l l l

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-Vo r. Lak ( Loads c ,,,,,,,, q c u 3 -I 3-tr7 .f_Q IR - C E 8 -] 7 - O R7)_ _ - _,.u,,, Q _,,,, p ; p kcis so-s -er __Sou ce e s _e5 De s 4 a Iapui In 5.e u c~nL v (r efe r e ve e s ) ( e uv1,*n u e'cl ) i / 3. EN, DES Co.lccla./,h, T N/e ; $ammary o[ Plpe As~Ims'sv. H one sfs '. ed 5%esus a f) I G 5 c c. c Affeded h)eIels ('822 9'50401 20I) / e5aer1]hpk___hc4,fA kleld k R 2.-14 Tevi se <l ' Now owf.s O ries'n al M o w e d 5 (1e Se re r e < l) ( RMe rmee. 2. ) ~ My M, Hv Ml (4-hl) [G-IL \\ [G Ik ) [T+ -lO 7)ead W4 '65oI '3019' '6540' -2222.' Tk e r uni -+55[<7 I5342. -47473 I 6 II 9 OBE-XY 2.5P/ 2F55 2467 244/ OBE Y2 4022 367F 3 506 3 / clo SSE - X Y 42.05 4619 4-Il5 H 34 SS E - YZ. 5ct 3 7 542.1 5l73 4683 4 SL/,, k o7 -?&35 52.4/ i kle /c/ kR 3 6 Reyned Momeds Onken./Mwedr i na (Aele, e e ccJ.) (My R utO i My M H t z (R'll) (S1 tb) .(H-lL _R-tif D c J k/f. -34/4 Id72 3 53 I 22. Ther m i 37462 l15_23 358IO I2325 08E XY 7255 6550 5999 5097 0 8 E - YZ. 5738 5[r42 4797 5050 SSE-xY 9&47 8497 2454 7355 SSE-YZ 5146 M24 7042. 7524 54 c'r k e__, e /44 32.5 ~

Enqiweev;ng C. leu /diow '/, 'De mon sfra/e S/rac.bd Ideor;4w of Fb,ecI R/elcl3 k'R - 2.- l 4, M A 2 - 3 s CE 8 CQS -3 a nct " k' RI-2.- 4 / b Laf es'l L eaJs ' ,,,,,,,,,3f0) ...._ 3-/ 7 8 7 ( GIR -CEB - F 7- 057) y..... _Tg_...fz=-7-- ,--rc.e /o.s -e 7 Des t Tnp u'i. Dda (eod;nua J) y / We(c( K R 41 Revised Maue.wir O r ic,in a./ l%ds ('R cSer e w cc 0 (R4 t et wce. 2.') My M, My M 7 (9 -IL) (9-lk) 'DeoJ tuf. 3359' -3 2. G F ' (4t-l b ) (W-lk) 2975 - 333I' Tk ~ y,,. I 40447 -5%C 42.68I - G 75_?_ e O BE-xY SI59 7325 4514. 4591 o GE YZ 2577 2522. 2.853 2.745 S SE-xY G506 913 9 577G 92tG FS6 Y2 3769 N FP 4155 39P9 5hr,n Lu7 e IS 4.o _ko_q.ywenovflpH of Assumpi!0xs (See Assunp)l oms) 94.i Ab'oh5 We !J MR 2-11 1 Co~far!sak o { (re ekt Geeu.,fL I.ucts (SusiceJ LvQ CAJ WegA4 + TLem.J + si,-31o_g ' Rev;s,J Momed 07fgi n~I Mcme rt G,5 - 4 5.c ) = 39. I d (G. 6 - 4 7. 4 - 3. 2l = 44. <C ~~ M y N -- - 3.0 + 15. 3 = 12.. ? < - 2.2. + I 6. I -f-5 2 = l 9. / Tb e. re fo r e.'V A p ro ie c kJ <.Pca k )J Ibc rowik Is d/lf 2eN reGsec( s a_do : n memeds Iess beccm se c .re

o. w

.,r;m s _ J a s A l%J m e-A 0 3 1

Enceneerin3 Calcu.O/ou -. - --. I. .o.. s 1.'Desowsfrde_$/ruc{uto. i d qw',4q el Flowel We ld s k'R-2.- I 4; KR-Z-36 CJJ - car 33 I a wd" k R"-2.- 4I_ -Tor La'lesi louJ 3 c....f f 4)... 3 - l '3 7 7 1 fQ t R.- C E B 0 57)._ c......rd..,, s_. Q _ui-..._ ,<ce is.s -e r bompA a#_ch3 [h u t cow R/eIJ KR-2.-I4 (cowfc ued ) r / Co~pa viso m & ShI,lda L oads (Peinar Loald (%1 We.,ld 4 %eud d+ 08 E + L; kleh / 4 J. Revised Momewf driqiwa l. Nomewf, Mr (5 - 45.c f 4.0 / = 43. / <. 6.6 d47.4 t 3. 5-F.3/= SP./' s f - 3.o + t5.3 3.7.= / e. o <. - 2.2 + t 4.t 3.z +5.2 - 22.3 %ehe. s Lb:(

s d
ll a ssure el beeau se W u

rev; se J <in a vu JL~ h a re le ss % % orlad a e,a a c., ' ~ ~ & 1 \\ Ale id E R ? t C e ~ pa e:s eu of Cnek Gev4 Loads (S d :v d Loads) CieJ we;W + ThermJ + Skr;w k J J 1/ %:uJ u.J-ocia J mo~eJ My - 2.4 + 3 7. 5 - 2 4 I <- - 3. 5' +- 3 8. 7 + o. / = 3 5.4 Mz !.7 + I!.5 = i3.2 '- !. ! + 12.+ + 0. 2 = 14.C %. fv ew #e_preaded c raJegr_04L is d:ll ze ro heeuw s r' % e rebised su.sLaed ~ one ds o ve_Le.ss LL c ric,in d s a s %d n on< ds. V C ~ w, s,n .f si d ;/; ( i n Js (~Peinu n L ea Jg ~ ~~~ Dhd A'yW + LJo.l3 08 E + %d4ap Rev.n.J thed ~ p or/6/ hom,J Iviv - 3.4 + 3 7.5 2 7. 3 = 4 l.4 = - 3. 5 5 38.? t 4. 0 + C. / = 41.4 Mb I.7 + l15 2 6.C = I9.2 h I9 12.4 t 5. l + 0. 3 = 19. 7

.Eyineer,n, Ca le u Ic.-l;0 l-io~~be n o b 05 Sh-] < a] Et a.s e J O9 ) Ideav% dd Flawed Welds KR-2-14 kR-2-3c CEB-cas 33

e. aJ "14 RJ 2 4 i G e La fes f L oads lQ ! R - C L B-P7- 0 5 7L

. n....b. qs O.... 3 - t 3 - 2 7 e A ~~ i ,=c.e io-s -n Lomp M;ou s (e d,'n u rd,) Ide ld KR 3 d (Cen Nn ued) \\ / A ccd,seJ ee:maeu m o ~ e ~Ts o e ,as1slljd_lu ceJw n c'u &0 c e i.,in a / _o rin, dk ~ ekeds. Leve e, ib is r t uld 'c]; Ffe6 c e will nd inau & sfas'ilik of 4kis w e /cl />eca u e VA e re ir b c4 m aecr;n Lef{hees the allowa ble Flaw s]2e and & %e:fu.) fla w si1.e s ( see % <e 4-c Re f'e rew e 2) Swee, ct.%-<< is i Ln:sc.,. / n.) 1 .y e Neld k R __2_- 4 / G ~pa v;s om & Crol Growil Louir (LsYa:~dlcads) CDead We:c.id + Theenal + su 4a;d / // hevised Mo~ed ori inal Mowed ~ Mv 3.4 + 4-0.4 = 43.2 <. 3.o+'f2.1 + o.02.= 45.1/ Mb l - 3. 3 - 5. 5l = 2. 2 < l - 3.3 - 6.8 + 6. o f = l 0. / TheceLye He o eoite}e.] e ec. ele secwi4 i, g hij zey, b3e_ca_c e '% e'e v!s1c{.__su sh ln c$_.m_ow eds a re le L th e oei,c,inal susfa:ne,( ~ ~e s Cc ~ pa r', m & S L V,li / L oa h ( P e, % e, G acts ) (li d toe j k f4 The rn$l + 6 BE +1&rin]hge) ea Re vi seel Ma ~<J ~ n = 47.o <. 3.d< inaf Ftne nt c* M 3.4 4 4o.y 4UY ss+ c.oz= 4 9.c - p Mu] - 3. 3 .ss t 7.3 l = t_Gl <l-3. 3 - c. 8 t 6. c + 0.0 % i&.7 - l TAe re by s/al;/Ng is s1l.// a surecl 6e caus, VAe \\ ee v t, e ci o e;w !%_ msds co e las # dhe _ I c r ip t ' p ein,cq ~ ~ e ds. \\

~ v _E n cr o*n e e <*, na Ca lc u la li an lo De wo n s fe {e~ Sleu ehn / c, Tn%r;fu hi Flawecl kleids kR-2-l+ Ktv2-3 c CE 8 - cos-31 a ncl %R:' 2-4/ b Lave 3/_L eacts 4 f LJ .... _ 3 - / 3-P 7 $2I R C E B 0 5_7 ) c,g... M 7.s ;e rg /a io-hG m M o tte 05 SeSuI 3 v The resulls cf 4kis e a lc u ld h k /e m on s /ra it thal /.he revised le Js Tor welds k R - z - t 4. i< R - 2. -3 t a nd l< R 4 / a // nd impad 1%e e euil)rouR a uch, si s eTeee-ce 2 There b e, fhe e y a e.1 aow& fo) +Aese >n r e v; sect Ieads w;ll d;// 'be far%h of Hese e zm welcis. Als o. +Ae resa lis de rnc asiede lhd4he re n sec) loads % lue/Js k R 19', }<R 3c a nd KR 4 / will m.i ira a d +he siab;(:+u' ann /msts t-eeke n ee e. TheceF.k & a,uiced LJEsk deu yLas o ve s4> // nainia:ned. an f sIe a k ea/V intenn;lu is cien,vndeJeal % eact w;ld, 4 6 Asins .1-t i s reasou d le lo exr>cd e c d:n u e d_opra Ho u % a tona ce riocl o-T lim e ' wLil n o fueller de c ea cid,'o n r due 4L 1G sc C, a nJ no redu J:cu lea is 6efore - .n Leea k rnaca ins velab_e io p la d.s w;H, pipin c, nd s u s c-ep+a b ly h I G s c c. J -'"Nw e5

    • "Wmumy. amen.e, I

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vuvmEn'lneer*.dn (c. lcu ldibn s w Suppd eh a Ril Nrudkra / Ov,bl% k/e lel G R-2 -I 5 bLANT/UNarfemf[A ~ e PREPARING ORGAld2ATION u-5 KEY NOUNS (Consult RIMS DESCRIPTORS LIST) C Cff-CAS [G.5'CC, WELD CVEELAY / BRANCH / PROJECT IDENTIFIERS Each 1'me these calculations are nsued. preparers must ensure that the o ~ nurnber es f ailed sn. scon Rev <CEB-&q.S-323 (for RIMS' usel RIMS accession number aa B41 '87 1106 00 3 j APPLICABLE DESIGN DOCUMENTi$1 R _,. h )?f f $ $ U N R.- SAR SECTIONts) UNID S YS TEMIS) 69 Revision 0 R1 R2 i ECN No. lor andacate Not ApptecaOle) R3 Safety < elated ? YesS No O g 7 Statement of Problem

  • Vk(z/$1P'/d' Th overl for we lel G Pe 2-li as Jesihkl hsgcl a I..ds jq g. mf/Vn w e.L w e fransu.fhd 1,3 Reviewed mur o nJ u,e 6.w N.R.bs ley E P.

'Z$~~~/A r+7 io h,R. H ll cl. fed Ard it NS App;pvec' ( B 2 2. Vd 55 0 312: 003). A rev'seb sef of joad 1; have. since becw Date II~ W 0 f res nc.thJ b QlR-<ts 27-oS7 fr IG. Chuf n o

4. R.C.W6 r List all pages added (152.2 27020c oI4). The "as bu'e lV e

by this revision. e ve r lci htcJi Vo be gs.a ls f'el gj List all pages deleted l,gy l g ylg g-by this revision. N! List all pages changed M M 5t rc V8 Sed [0 S. by this revision. Abstract These calculations contain an unverified assumption (s). that must be verified later. YesO No$ TM, e nic u ldk. ele n dr J <. s %[rudu ral cver la y base d e + f he k,ll "o ve ylaD held C&2IS qua V. %.c as 08 Gull cs - s L' revised InJs ~ k;r L were kro s s r. He d l-G IR - C E B 057. The bd, If ove r l y will prov;cie fhe re pireel sa fe13 mar ' ins her swu b p ff Cfts bi o f t P ci f & n boweVer, ne over h ml45 C he. j u s {;hl't cf fey OY'L

  • nSftC-YO H $.

rc YN/A ndALCH4 s'IECM /$ Of/NG' /J.$ u f Q 7"f4Pgyg,W fpg q,, 6*/w w 17 /AM/v5 4 t'//wa _r7x acpyg,pg ,.,.y g, Vff) f~/CAf/GN W/Nd-Ff& wFE p7EC /4h'/c s MU,*/4,>s /g / Yf lEffA#W ES $f//!-SU&, s'.S* A .5".7W63*$ dmyJ V.37 y,appyg l 70 7y AGE - /??E7//A H2d/c'/1.! s' doc /f pr e,ypyyg;,y,, O M cronim ano store caicutai cai sa alus s'r >c' c'a- O M.crofilm and return calculations to: /V/. CCSN u.croim dad d''ov. O RIMS, il 26 C K Address: gy'/j/84 C -/F

i Erswgez/x+ c & uu now w sWAuf ei A REVlSiON LO< Riu.srcucrtiraiti. ovenuty F ore w z o s e. 2-is-C6 8 -CQS-33: "'1'.'*" DESCRIPTION OF REVISION b App nv b orna u-s-r t 4 l l l TV A 10534 (EN OES 418)

s En.;ne e riw Cdcded.6w in Supod of a Full .2 1 Stlu du ea h_Ove e la % kleid.._GR l5 CEB CQS-31 + -,..py .... yzg1 n n_ n + r n.. _ : L y e 'Rroose ,G%'- to{t3/77 _The ourpose o5 il,is calc u ldion i.s le de mandea le b /' ' bJ,lf"overla-wgd/ GR IS. _ ihe as d,f~,I laaels ca h il s i r u e l u r cJ o v s.e l s u ksed on L u as a v;se, \\ wk;J usere + ra n, n:, tie J din Q,.alif _Tnfomo};ow Re / case l -Q t R - C E '8 057, \\ . A51umphn3 T k overI.e p lied

n a c c o rda n e< w'oik TVA %wina 1

wa.s a 67 M 47 % 2.408-I filled Mechan;enl Ree;resla.llon SustL kjeld GR-2-15 Qve rlav. ln ovJee fo r overiam to ' '{ au ulk e L ll s%:lu ru / o ve ela o,, ellhe a beiainall weid er k ea4 MeJeel earki 'eu a he een s;deeed none in % desian enle u (J,bv s. % ause d L g eiu;nal none weld hLi Meded e.ne

s ecus;dre<<Lin 4ke ct'e st-a or ca lc u M ia n s and 4he G TA W n, der;al is su.Hieiella J

bo k, st e daru (fkermall__s_itusu__need noY he ccdbideWJ tr "clevermin;ne, VA reauGeJ overlau VAlc k ness. S s1 s b ste, i Jo n 1 cMec/0 4 he,Ie dia besasae %e k ieke r s sl s /_ress e, o%i!' I,9 L a,. e n o ce to w e >- sgfein'Fueiors re au,ee cl 2 Ecr SSE loadin u s Jdl L,'deF s uMu fn k 'r.sr_tclL % [_]cwey G B E_shsn as cena ec7u; r e el b CBE locci'n 1n I s u n.s)) ' OE E sikue.1 p ua p r e s s_ w e o nd Lead br, l wasl L deknink -lhe eeg9,esJevee1a)iId sire s5 a a re AJ: ness, i i i Sou.rees o{ besic,u Tn o ul In forucdien ( rehre nc e s) I. Qu l:I 1n%~dow km $ 7.G. C h ro nRe lea se. _QlR - C E B - p 4e (82_'L 870 20 t cid) R. C. k le X c _ d d e c L l e L 6,1 9 9 7 1 / _2. WA ha n, g 7 M 473 zqop- / Ree*,ce u (4,vud5 s l~ kle Iel G R - 2 Ts ec h, n ce, / (q o ve r la., V

.... z. . R. __Egeer;dn,4leuM;om in Su_poelof'a - Fu Il-Sb<J u r Ove ele Or Wel GR 1-15 C68-CQS-33: O ....,.. % Q/ .,. ?.=/LM7 7 - [ e... W c. .... f y, ?se ~~7 -soucce, a ki.8 % J L f. ~ J :. > T re % - c s ) ( cl&.-ci)

3. NUREG 0313

'Re v; sion 2 Iv ae IWG (Dec+H) etsd NRC Geaene L e~i+er 24-Il. /

4. "PC -C R A C k. Weslou 1.1 1 mar I5 8 L Fra v

te %%;u 'SeL ee rd- %sen cd> Conp Je rs, hu Kdeal Idea +-LAssoc lJes (ve' vi4;ed' code ) d v v j 5. AS/HE Bc;/e r ud Passare \\4sse /~Gde. Sedo'au XI 19 2G Eddeu

l. EPRI Reporf NP-242 3 - L_D 1

7, [Afoy k Pty (4)P) 2c9g-gg Der y h J.Dda ~ Sites 1es (Seb re a c< l) 'Peessute. G':,- C.32/ 'ksi (leniLd:nal s Yress ) 3ead (US$Ul(Ty: /.9 2 y ksc' The rni.' 0% =

2. 4 4'? k s 't 7AmJ ' 2; g'

/ 3.2 of_]g / = GDJ-XY 0~~dwy ~ 7.494 kri ] O BE-Y2, tr ggp : 2.6 67 kr/ o SS E - X Y, cc,,g., = I 1. 6 3 o k g *t _1S_E - Y Z, (7'syf g = 3.77 o ks i j P pe & d,' u h p + Ne s [ Reft re a c e 2 _ o t 2 ', s - % h e J w le P O O&iele ~Dtan,eiev,_CD = l225 ine.l Th iJ. n e s s. i - o.s 79 i, J (n en ina,]) Se<R u NeJulu ) _=_C4.5 in.' ~ ____m.--------"--^-'-'

., s & w n e e v', n Cu le u ledau ;n SupoucYa5a Futl ~ n ~ SindureIJ()nxlw fo r kle id 'DR-2. 's C E 3 - cas -z J -..,.. ' M u .... z / z ; / r .... n},M/1.y T.?de ~ Desly L,pd h fa (Con'/ nu J ) Atl. usa l, te S M ss ( Re Te re nc e 5) Sm /t.(75 Ari Or T o d S A,'n le s r S b / ed derly le ~preda re 575*F = .Dosumiu' flav of ' flss un f lo v s W %n. ~ d % . < ; e. t u I ue id o e heJ MLLI t e.a e is consid J i >, 4Ae des;nn ealeu ld:cu s ad W G TA W m eilh suWe ;NL loue b seesdm (Reem ni) sLs s neeci no'l be e ou s;Iele ve/ '$ lhe W ents9: oms To r- ~;n: mum o ve vL 4kie u (RJare uc e 3). V _Lempaledkus 1Ah Ivis v Lods(rhesser) used la ve e; fu lhe reciaired overla u 4M&n kss. b a s'e J c u lim;/ /cd % /k se ' (Ju d:le L h e) y a ne a r ma ra leads. 77,e se in <. lu h ,_asel ' e is m ;[ 4 h ssu re' L h e,le, W M w brane S ir-ss. Tn = C.12/ ksi Peulin Sk sv la Wl = /.92 9' + 7.4 9 4 n J D een 1 = 'P N / r A rt These. SMm3 a re 5 a s e c/ cr / 2_J, r - Sc AeAle PC o(n se &{6.u py3(>_e r1,'es : CD = and 2 = 6 4. 5 lJ. l 225_b,., 'f = 0.5 7 9;y "IAe m ia lm os ha,'/Y " Y 4lc kne n _e / /4e ove_rIquwas g 3_ m ea s a d ___ fo Le

0. 351

>, J. 7% " u s h u *, I i " m e a s u e, ~ A lr _ pad of tvP-2 0 9t -P f a re o

c. ~l ar.ta._pa>J/ of

& ne <2mnen 1 re c o rds. L s ed o x 4Ae475(.i ct u.'n;n,3 - 4 /N/< nc 3 r -& -lobl Ykec/c n e si cd Oc 0'i n e c n,J - o ve rlo w d

s=es, on Gconeer;n Cc/culu/,'6w in Suppor/ o F Full e SNuciued Overlaw for k)elJ GR-2-15 CEE CD 333 0 !E 62 .... _ 2/2 ?/P 7 c. ...Csea- ..,z m g -a... ,M /yf.s/r7 %puh%s/Annlusi 5 (C&lm.<J) v / _ w o u l el Ln be

0. 57 9 + Q. 3 5 6 = 6.*135 inch.

% So llo uinn ede u ia$ iou is pc VNorned 40 ve ri(w khe ove rlo5us NIcl< n N3 c b a se c) a'ilowable Sta e dq 1L 4a -lk;elc

e. die.

eu Men kra n e Shess = [0 579/0.9tgh d. 22 / - U I43 k O v L B e u d,'a %e s s = (* '7'f/c. 933) 7.4/8 - 5.832./ ks i u / J The a llowe.b le % c/edh 40 h *cle n e s s ex6 is cleienmineel \\ 4 le he

0. c3 71.

(See' 'PC-CR A C k e e n a u}e y,t> r : J o u l L I w ) ~ / GR-2-15 . NALL THICl:NE55= 0.?:50 VE4/r/EL) EY s*04 u 7"/ow' CF MEMBRANE STRESE= !..?143 M##8 6~@(/ A Wa S fCv.C J(#B-MVC, v - BENDING STFEEE= 5.9321 4# tgz/ g g 7EO f4r E/* T I- . STRESS RATID= 0.5E45 ALLOWAPLE ETFEEE= 16.6750 = S EE#tdr~ M M f=- y#hg m - FLOW STRESS = 50.0250 = 3,0 Y S

  1. d i

g s L/ CIRCUM l 0.00 0.10 0,20 C.30 0.40 0,50 . ALLOWABLE-A/T 0.7500 C.7500 C.7500 c.7500 0.7500 0,e!.75 W, s pin losi exhaphEo; J Ta ble 11lB-36 41 -t. % 1 os e

0. 31871n d.p,re d cuvet ah e eihicknes_s l

m i n *, mm l't - 0.63ZQ O.935 = ecc ,s Th JLou Tox_[e,1; \\ ( e u e. l;< e e g e (<

0. 3 5C - 0. 23 cF] = _O. o l 7hwe, n e.L V /

cr e.ow&,) is ~0 Talle IV)B - 3C41-l ', s based eu Oe m e n b ru ne $ he ss l /v

0. 5 S a r,cl ben &

b h e,'n e, ec .1?s s,f g 3 ulu ni u e n b ra n e ph s knJU shass h ux m n o

s. ~ e o f %

eva,er.<disn k kke, od o f & ,n e,n aLve mJc u lo /,W L re va-b h & sou rc e e pf,;>m k L hr~ ne ihe a llowdb l< %ddepK h +hiele nep / mem 4 ra eake. k ccwse rva b

s removed by

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SHEE,

.F bMc< /_Se t)r$ n (a!Cl4 f a eh [M b DPf C _ Fo.Il SNuc) C ve r I.u for keld GR-2-15 CES CQS-333 V ....,...) c N /2 syrf s~ua fe-y __f o wpa$cd4s s //k(v sis ((culiuued q / ~ _o f 3.9/43 k J; And fAe a cNa [ $e we/' uo, sIress cY 5.2321 ksi 'n}o 4be tource e n dsh s. d Bu 'a sln. -//e i fou t c e e c/ qchs'o u s a ncI [H ok Y H e be acfuaf ffrest Ybe crll oucb le Slcru) cheDN Yo N'r e.- ne3S ra$io is cls erNIneck o A o.65/4. ( Sa. PC CR ACk c e m ule r,wiwiod he low) I J GR-2-15 ~ WALL THICKNE55=. O.?!50 MEMBRANE ETFE55= 0 c 14-' SAFETY FACTOR = 3.0000 EENDING STRESS = 5.8021 SAFETY FACTOR = 3.0000 STREES FATIO= 1.7505 ALLOWAPLE STRESS = 16.6750 FLOW STFE55= 50.0250 L/CIFCL'M O.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0,50-0,70 ALLOWABLE A/T 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1. 0000 0,5;E9 G. - -.5 4 O.6EO7 C.6572 0.e0 0.90 1.00 vwmo & Om i~ f

0. 6514 h6514}y "N ALLOWABLE A/T O.6514 tmar s,osawu p

he m in,*,y w rc eru a r e d e ve r la u O'oc.leness wlel fle w l> < (I - 0.G514 ) 6.935 '= 6. 3259 lu el) he a llousuu-for Ltcoe bc I;c <u.k., eud4 ) 4 .M5( - C3.259 = 0.o 3cL/.'n d c g a The $si;e ,Luts der;wl %n o re ssg,Q are her le_ading.s hur r< S/rev = (' "%vs) c.n_( = 3.91 4 3 k,; Ther n i Sirex = (o 5796. f $13.2cr = 8.179 i 6si ?3 c//c M sr : / 2.6934 kse Ne aximum__rllo w< d c_ta els clep.[h i s

0. 6 51 % (0.135] =

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o o Endneer,'u Calcula$on in Sup SLehrd! Overlag h wel)p4 J q Fal/ n G R-2 -15 CES-Ccts - 33 3 6 .....,,,Q C 6) .. 1 h WP7 ./ g //47 / f e .c.,o o.,, /C fhs"7 h a daksm /Anu lu ris (C.vi,sueJ,) H k 5, n e, C - CRAC k a ncl o ee rA ousm ?he . o r, nlou f ,n W/ou;. V GR ~-15 CRACK MODEL:CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK I'N CYL'NDER(T/R=0.1) WALL THICKNESS = 0.9250 STRESE COEFFICIENTS CASE ID CO C1 C - s 1 12.09:4 O.0000 O.0000 .O.0000 CR Cf

--- - S T RE S S INTENSI TY FACTOR---

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1 4 e. APPENDIX 8 INDUCTION HEATING STRESS IMPROVEMENT ACTIVIrygg i l i 1 9 - ~ - ~ - -_. N

APPENDIX 8 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 2, Cycle 5 Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) of IGSCC Susceptible 304 Stainless Steel (SS) Welds 1.0 First IHSI Effort 1.1 Introduction The results of the ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed in the fall of 1984 on the recirculation, residual heat removal (RHR), core spray, and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) piping systems indicated that only five welds contained IGSCC. It was decided l to perform IHSI on all accessible, susceptible 304 SS Class 1 welds, l In those systems to prevent the initiation of IGSCC. IHSI was also performed on four of the welds with IGSCC indications to prevent the propagation of cracking. The General Electric (GE) Company was contracted to perform IHSI under a two-phase workplan. Phase I consisted of a site survey to evaluate the implementation of IHSI on candidate welds. Phase II included coil development, scheduling, equipment setup, and all other work necessary to complete the IHSI treatments on welds identified as treatable in Phase I. 1.2 Phase I - Site Survey l The site survey was conducted from December 10, 1984 through December 20, 1984. The following work was performed during the surveys - Evaluation of candidate welds designated by TVA for treatment: - Collection of weld contour data; - Verification of weld accessibility and identification of obstructions; and - Measurement of piping systems - study of potential IHSI equipment locations. The survey information was then evaluated and a workplan for Phase II was laid out. 1.2.1 JESI Workscong It was determined that IHSI could be implemented on l 156 welds. The treatable welds are listed in Tables 1 through 5. During the course of IHSI implementation, welds DSRWC-2-7 and DRWC-2-4 were deleted from the l workscope.' The elbow containing these walds was cut' 'out and replaced to effect repair of the crack'in the weld DRWC-2-4. The total number of welds in the IHSI q workscope was therefore reduced to.154. The velds j excluded from the workscope are listed in Table 6. The recirculation nozzle-to-safe end welds, the core spray nozzle-to-safe end welds,'and welds DCS-2-12, DCS-2-3, i DRHR-2-12, DRHR-2-3 were excluded because they were untreatable by the IBSI methods generally available when the requisition was prepared._ The other core' spray and'- 4 RHR welds which were excluded are carbon steel and are j not considered susceptible to IGSCC. They will require -] no further disposition. 1.2.2 Eaulpment The equipment requirements and locations were determined during the_ survey. Equipment needed for IHSI consisted of a 4160/480V three-phase transformer, a frequency converter (power supply), work stations, a cooling. . water system, and a data acquisition system. Each work station consisted of a voltage-reducing transformer, a capacitor bank, and a variable transformer that matches-the converter ouput power to the impedance of the induction coil. The cooling water system was a self-I contained closed loop supplying cooling water to the 1 frequency converter, work station, coils and electrical cables. The data acquisition system monitored and documented the pipe temperature during each IHSI treatment. Thermocouple were attached to the pipe's outer surface and connected to the data acquisition system. Sixty-two-induction coils were required to complete the workscope. Two work stations were located outside of the drywell,. j one at each equipment hatchway. The IHSI control room, which housed the data acquisition hardware as well as the process control panel, was located at the personnel air lock. The power supply and cooling supply system pump skid were pla:ed on elevation 593. 1 In addition, a direct line communication system was established between the power supply, pump skid, heati station, and IHSI control room. A communicar*on line between the IHSI control station and the reactor control room was also established. I 1 i i i j 1.3 Phase II-IHSR Treatments The IHSI treatments were performed from January 14.1985 through March 31, 1985. The following table shows the time taken to complete each system. No. of Date First Date Last Successful Thermocouple Thermocouple System Treatments Installed Removed l RWCU 12 1/10 3/24 CS-9 1/15' 1/24 Recirc 99 1/21 3/31 RHR 29 3/6 3/29 In general, the treatment sequence for each weld included thermocouple (TC) installation, coil installation, low-power idle run, coil adjustment, IHSI treatment, coil removal, TC removal, and dye penetrant examination of TC tack weld removal area. Selected welds were also ultrasonically examined following the IHSI treatment.- The actual process control parameters for each weld were reviewed by the Materials Engineering Section. Any deviations from the specified values were evaluated to determine whether: minimum requirements were. met. Records of the TC locations, time temperature charts for each TC, and other relevant data were compiled for each weld. An overall average of 2.9 treatments were performed each day. GE was unsuccessful in treating recirculation welds KR-2-4, KR-2-1, KR-2-26, KR2-23, and RWCU weld DRWC-2-5A. A total of 149 welds were treated successfully. 1 1.3.1 -Post IHSI Ultrasonic Examination A 25-percent sample of IGSCC susceptible welds were ultrasonically examined following the IHSI treatments. The welds were selected for examination based on the following factors: 1. Welds which had recordable indications and/or underwent evaluation and were found to have geometric reflectors during initial examination for IGSCC. 2. Welds in the same location where defects were found during the unit 1, cycle 5 3GSCC examinations. The welds in the sample are listed in Appendix 2. Additional inspections of the RWCU and recirculation welds were performed later in the outage. These are also reported in Appendix 2.

_ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - 1.4.1 Conclusion of First IHSI Effort DespJte schedule delays caused by labor shortages, weather, and loss of cooling water, the first IHSI effort undertaken on BFN unit 2 was successfully completed. Most of the IGSCC susceptible 304 SS welds lu board of the penetrations on the subject systems received successful IHSI treatments. The susceptible welds which were excluded from the scope and those that were unsuccessfully treated were treated later in the outage. 2.0 Second IHSI Effort 2.1 Introduction Following completion of the first IHSI effort, the cycle 5 outage was extended and plans were made to replace the recirculation inlet safe ends and riser piping. This created the opportunity to perform IHSI on the welds which were omitted or dropped from the previous workscope. It also created the need for IHSI on the new welds which would result from the replacement. Nutech Engineers (NUTECH) was contracted to perform IHSI under a two-phase work plan. Phase I consisted of a site survey to evalute the implementation of IHSI on candidate welds. Phase II included coil development, scheduling, equipment setup, and all other work necessary to complete the IHSI treatments on welds identified as treatable in Phase I. 2.2 I-hase I - Site Survey The site survey was conducted from April 16, 1987 through April 17, 1987. The following work was performed during the survey: - Evaluation of candidate welds designated by TVA for treatment; - Collection of weld contour data; - Verification of weld accessibility and identification of obstructions; and - Determination of IHSI equipment location. The survey information was then evaluated and a workplan for Phase II was devised. 2.2.1 IHSI Workscope It was determined that IHSI could be implemented on all 41 candidate welds. The welds in the workscope are listed in Table 7. Thirty of the 41 welds were new recirculation welds resulting from the safe end and riser replacement, while the remaining 11 were core spray, RWCU, or recirculation welds which had been dropped or omitted from the first IHSI effort. 2.2.2 Equipment The equipment required for this effort was similar to that described 1n section 1.2.2. During the survey, it was decided to locate most of the equipment near the drywell personnel entrance on elevation 565. Because of the small number of welds in the workscope, only-one work station was needed.. The work station, power-supply, and control console were placed near the personnel air lock, while the cooling supply pump station was located near the southwest corner of the reactor building. A direct line communication system was established between.the power supply, control console, pump station, and heat site. 2.3 Phase II - IHSI Treatment The IHSI treatments were performed from June 16, 1987 through June 29, 1987. An overall average of three treatments were performed each day. l l In general, the treatment sequence for each weld included TC, installation, coil installation, lower power test heat, coil adjustment, IHSI treatment, coil removal, TC removal, and dye penetrant examination of TC tack weld removal area. The low power test heat and coll' adjustment steps were omitted during some of the treatments.when.a good heat rate had been achieved on the first attempt and coil adjustments were unnecessary. The actual process control parameters for each weld were reviewed by the. Materials Engineering Section. Any deviation from the specified values were evaluated to determine whether minimum requirements were met. Records of the TC locations, time-temperature. charts for each TC, and other relevant data were compiled for each weld. All 41 welds were successfully treated by the IHSI process. All of the welds in this workscope received ultrasonic or radiographic examinations following IHSI. 2.4 Conclusions With the completion of the IHSI effort, all of the accessible susceptible stainless steel welds in unit 2 recirculation, RHR, RWCU, and core spray systems have been successfully IHSI treated. No other IHSI work is planned'for this unit. The only welds which have not received IHSI treatments are the RHR core spray, and RWCU penetration welds. These welds, listed in Table 8, are externally inaccessible. Inspection and cladding of these welds with resistant material from the inside, using a " pipe-crawler" inspection and welding device, is being considered. IHSI has been shown to offer a level of mitigation against - IGSCC. Treatment of IGSCC susceptible welds will provide additional cycles of operation with freedom from cracking and associated repair activities. Current speculation is that IHSI combined with other mitigation measures, such as hydrogen water chemistry, can provide life of plant immunity to IGSCC.

I TABLE 1 WORKSCOPE OF FIRST IHSI EFFORT RECIRCULATION LOOP A SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 28 STP/SE GR-2-53 28 STP/LREL KR-2-45 28 STP/LREL GR-2-54 28 STP/LREL KR-2-47 28 STP/LREL KR-2-2 28 STP/ TEE GR-2-55 28 STP/ TEE KR-2-46 28 STP/ TEE KR-2-3 28 VLV/LREL GR-2-56 28 VLV/LREL GR-2-3 28 VLV/STP GM-2-57 28 VLV/STP GR-2-2 28 STP/SREL KR-2-48 28 PMP/SREL GR-2-58 28 STP/PMP GR-2-1 28 CRS/ RED KR-2-11 28 CRS/ TEE GR-2-8 22 EDR/ECP KR-2-15 22 HDR/CRS KR-2-12 22 HDR/CRS GR-2-18

TABLE 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP A (Continued) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 22 HDR/VLV GR-2-25 22 HDR/VLV GR-2-26 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-14* 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-13 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-19 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-20 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-9 12 STP/SQL GR-2-12 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-19 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-22 12 STP/SE GR-2-11 12 STP/SE GR-2-14 12 STP/SE GR-2-17 12 STP/SE GR-2-21 12 STP/SE GR-2-24 12 STP/ RED GR-2-15** 12 STP/LREL GR-2-10 12 STP/LREL GR-2-13 12 STP/LREL GR-2-16 12 STP/LREL GR-2-20 12 STP/LREL GR-2-23 12 STP/LREL KR-2-16 12 STP/LREL KR-2-17 12 STP/LREL KR-2-18

TABLE 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP A (Continued) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 12 STP/LREL KR-2-21 12 STP/LREL KR-2-22 4 ECP/WLT GR-2-7 4 ECP/WLT GR-2-4 4 WLT/STP KR-2-4 4 WLT/STP KR-2-1 6 FLN/STP KR-2-49

  • Weld with indication of crack
    • Throughwall crack discovered after IHSI 1

TABLE 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP B SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 4 WLT/ECP GR-2-33 4 WLT/ECP ~ GR-2-30 4 WLT/STP KR-2-26 4 WLT/STP KR-2-23 6 FLN/STP KR-2-53 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-41* 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-42 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-35 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-38 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-45 12 STP/ SOL GR-2-48 i 12 STP/SE GR-2-37 12 STP/SE GR-2-40 12 STP/SE GR-2-43 12 STP/SE GR-2-47 12 STP/SE GR-2-50 12 STP/ RED GR-2-41 12 STP/LREL GR-2-49 12 STP/LREL GR-2-46 12 STP/LREL GR-2-42 12 STP/LREL GR-2-39 12 STP/LREL GR-2-36 12 STP/LREL KR-2-44 I I l w-______-___.

TABLE 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP B (Continued) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID tTUMBER 28 STP/SE GR-2-59 28 STP/LREL KR-2-50 28 STP/LREL GR-2-60 28 STP/LREL KR-2-51 28 STP/LREL KR-2-24 28 STP/ TEE KR-2-25 28 STP/STP GR-2-61 28 VLV/LREL GR-2-62 28 VLV/LREL GR-2-29 28 VLV/STP GR-2-63 28 VLV/STP GR-2-28 28 STP/SREL 'KR-2-52 28 PMP/SREL GR-2-64 l ) 28 STP/PMP GR-2-27 1 28 CRS/ TEE GR-2-34 28 CRS/ RED KR-2-33 22 HDR/ECP KR-2-37* i 22 HDR/CRS KR-2-34 22 HDR/CRS GR-2-44 i 22 HDR/VLV GR-2-51 22 HDR/VLV GR-2-52 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-35 22 HDR/ SOL KR-2-36* l l 1 L---__ -

TABLE 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP B (Continued) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 12 STP/LREL KR-2-43 12 STP/LREL KR-2-40 12 STP/LREL KR-2-39 12 STP/LREL KR-2-38 5 WLT/ECP GR-2-63A 5 WLT/STP GR-2-63B

  • Weld with indication of crack

l TABLE 2 WORKSCOPE OF FIRST IHSI EFFORT RHR LOOP A (SUCTION) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER-20 STP/ TEE DRHR-2 20 STP/LREL DSRHR-2-9 20 STP/LREL DSRHR-2-10 20 STP/LREL DSHHR-2-11 20 LREL/VLV DRHR-2-21 20 STP/VLV DRHR-2-22 20 STP/VLV DRHR-2-23 20 STP/ SOL DSRHR-2-8 I

TABLE 3 WORKSCOPE OF FIRST IHSI EFFORT RHR LOOP B (DISCHARGE) SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION HELD ID NUMBER 24 TEE /STP DRHR-2-18 24 STP/VLV DRHR-2-17 24 VLV/SREL DRHR-2-16 24 SREL/STP DSRHR-2-7 24 STP/STP DSRUR-2-6 24 STP/VLV DRHR-2-15 24 SREL/VLV DRHR-2-14 24 SREL/STP/SREL DSRHR-2-5A 24 SREL/STP/SREL DSRHR-2-5 24 STP/SREL DRHR-2-13 RHR LOOP A (DISCHARGE) 24 STP/ TEE DRHR-2-9 24 STP/VLV DRHR-2-8 24 SREL/VLV DRHR-2-7 -24 SREL/LREL DSRHR-2-4A 24 STP/LREL DSRHR-2-4 24 STP/STP DSRHR-2-3 24 STP/VLV DRHR-2-6 24 VLV/LREL DRHR-2-5 24 STP/LREL DSRHR-2-2 24 STP/SREL DSRHR-2-1 24 STP/SREL DRHR-2-4 i u

TABLE 4 liORKSCOPE OF FIRST IIISI EFFORT CORE SPRAY SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 12 STP/STP DCS-2-13 12 STP/LREL DCS-2-13A 12 LREL/LREL DCS-2-7 12 STP/LREL DSCS-2-9 12 STP/VLV DCS-2-14 12 STP/STP DCS-2-4 12 STP/LREL DSCS-2-1 12 STP/LREL DSCS-2-2 12 STP/VLV DCS-2-5 I i

TABLE 5 WORKSCOPE OF FIRST IHSI EFFORT REACTOR WATER CLEAN-UP SIZE (IN.) CONFIGURATION WELD ID NUMBER 6 SOL /VLV

  • DRWC-2-1A/DSRWC-2-1B 6

VLV/STP DRWC-2-2 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-1-1 6 LREL/VLV DRWC-2-2 6 VLV/STP DRWC-2-3 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-2-1A 6 LREL/STP DSRWC-2-2 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-2-3 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-2-4 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-2-5 6 LREL/STP DSRWC-2-6 6 STP/LREL DSRWC-2-7 6 STP/LREL DRWC-2-4 6 FLUED HEAD /STP DRWC-2-5A 6 STP/ VALVE DRWC-2-5B

  • 0NE WELD ONLY I

TABLE 6 WELDS EXCLUDED FROM FIRST IHSI WORKSCOPE Recirculation System N-2 Nozzle-to-Safe-End Welds (10) N-1 Nozzle-to-Safe-End Welds (2) Core Spray System DCS-2-12 TCS-2-426 DCS-2-3 TCS-2-401 TCS-2-417 TCS-2-403 TSCS-2-418 TCS-2-402 TCS-2-419 TSCS-2-404 TSCS-2-420 TCS-2-405 TCS-2-421 TCS-2-406 TCS-2-422 TCS-2-407 TCS-2-423 TSCS-2-408 TSCS-2-424 TSCS-2-409 TSCS-2-425 TCS-2-410 RHR System TRHR-2-191 TRHR-2-192 DRHR-2-12 DRHR-2-3 TRHR-2-194 i TRHR-2-193 l TABLE 7 WORKSCOPE OF SECOND IHSI EFFORT Recirculation Size Configuration Weld ID Number 28" N-SE N1-A 28" N-SE ~ N1-B 4" x 28" P-WOL KR-2-1 4" x 28" P-WOL KR-2-4 4" x 28" P-WOL KR-2-23 4" x 28" P-WOL KR-2-26 4 12" N-SE 2RA1 12" N-SE 2RB1 12" N-SE 2RC1 12" N-SE 2RD1 12" N-SE 2RE1 12" N-SE 2RF1 12" N-SE 2RG1 12" N-SE 2RH1 12" N-SE 2RJ1 12" N-SE 2RK1 12" P-SE 2RA6 12" P-SE 2RB6 ( 12" P-SE 2RC6 12" P-SE 2RD6 12" P-SE 2RE6 12" P-SE 2RF6 12" P-SE 2'RG6 12" P-SE 2RH6 12" P-SE 2RJ6 12" P-SE 2RK6 12" P-P 2RA5 12" P-P 2RB5 12" P-P 2RCS 12" P-P 2RDS 12" P-P 2RES 12" P-P 2RF5 12" P-P 2RG5 12" P-P 2RHS 12" P-P 2RJ5 12" P-P. 2RKS Core Spray 12" N-SE TCS-2-417 12" P-SE TSCS-2-418 12" N-SE TCS-2-401 12" P-SE TCS-2-403 1 E.W_Cil I i 6" P-FH DRWC-2-5A TABLE 8 HELDS INACCESSIBLE FOR IHSI Core Spray DCS-2-12 DCS-2-3 BBR DRHR-2-12 DRHR-2-3 t l RWCtJ Penetration Weld (No ID Number) l l 1 l l I i _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ -}}

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