ML20217E714

Responds to NRR Work Request, by Providing TS Branch Comments Re Events at Fermi 2 on 990504

ML20217E714
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	06/17/1999
From:	Becker K NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Craig C NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
Shared Package
ML20217E572	List: IA-99-323, Discusses Agreement to Fermi Action with Respect to Violations ML20217E567 ML20217E618 ML20217E641 ML20217E688 ML20217E699 ML20217E714 ML20217E750
References
FOIA-99-323 NUDOCS 9910200047
Download: ML20217E714 (10)

Text

I T] [{ f _)) ~ 1 y i UNITED STATES

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s j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

w '.. ,  ;

"s% j WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 4 001 *

, June 17, 1999 - .

i MEMORANDUM TO: Claudia' M. Craig, Section Chief . ., ,

Project Directorate Ill, NRR . /pd' ' ~'

FROM: William D. Beckner, Chief M '

Technical Specifications Branch, NRR

SUBJECT:

. FERMI 2 - T!A FROM REGION ll! TO EVALUAV BOTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIRCATIONS 3.8.1.1.c.

REFERENCE:

NRR Work Request, PD lil TO TSB, dated 6/11/99 in the rgferenced work request, the Technical Specifications Branch (TSB) was requested to evaluate the issue and prepare a response to the TIA from Region Ill. The TSB has reviewed

~ the information provided with the subject TIA. The following are our comments regarding the events at Fermi 2 on May 4,1999.

With specific reference to the question posed by Region lil in their TIA, TSB is.of the opinion that the licensee was in vblation of TS 3.8.1.1.c when he did not commence a plant shutdown after EDG11 became inoperable with Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system B inoperable. It is the TSP view that TS 3.8.1.1.c addresses all systems / components covered by TS without regard to whetheir or not they are credited in the mitigation of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

The SLC system is required by TS, as well as by regulation. Therefore, the SLC system is subject to the provisions of TS 3.8.1.1.c. It is also the TSB view that the Fermi TS Bases do not alter the above positions, The Bases address the " safety function of critical systems." The Bases do not elaborate on what constitutes a critical system and, as such, do not limit the TS applicability to systems / components credited for mitigating the consequences of a DBA.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the SLC is a critical system because it is covered by TS and required by regulations.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. E. B. Tomlinson of my staff on 301415-3137.

1 9910200047 991014 FOIA PDR j CHAPMAN 99-323 PDR

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m du/y Fermi 2 Standby Llauld Control (SLC) Issue Background.

The Firmi 2 SLC system has orie tank, common piping up to the 2 pumps, common p,iping between the pumps and the 2 injection (squib) valves, and then common piping from the squib

. valves into the vessel. The "A" pump and "A" squib valve are powered from essential Division 1

'_ power and the "B" components from Division 2. However, the pumps are physically side-by-si'd e (i.e., lack separation).

Ryan.t At 1830 on May 3,1999, the circuit that monitors the continuity of the "B" squib valve failed. The licensee felt that the system would function and that only indication was lost. However, the licensee did not perform an operability determination and instead decided to declare the "B" squib valve inoperable. This put them into a 7-day action statement (3.1.5, Action a.1).

A During the early morning hours of May 4,1999, the licensee was preparing for a planned outage ,

_ .on emergency diesel generator (EDG) 11(Division 1). They recognized that the "B" squib valve J

had been declared inoperable but they believed the system would function. In addition, the CRMP showed that this was a low-risk combination in interviews after the event, operators also stated that they did not consider GLC to be divisional due to the lack of separation.

At 0300 on May 4,1999, the licensee took EDG 11 out of service. The licensee did not consider

. themselves to have " failed" the requirement to verify that equ;pment powered by the opposite division be operable. Therefore, they continued to operate in this mode for more than a day.

Basic Question: Should the licensee have considered the "B" squib valve to meet the criteria of

" required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices that depend on the remaining onsite division" in TS 3.8.1.1, Action c7 Based on the response to that question, should the licensee have been in the shutdown action?

It Gets Worse At 1830 on May 4,1999, the licensee opened the breaker that supplies power to the "B" SLC pump and squib valve in order to perform troubleshooting. At this point the "B" components ,

were clearly inoperable.' Does this in any way change the answer to the basic question?

The SLC "B". breaker remained open until 1015 on May 5,1999, when, in response to questions from the NRC, the licensee closed it, declared SLC "B" operable, and exited the action statement. By approximately 1600 on May 5,1999, the licensee had restored EDG 11 to an operable condition and had also completed an Engineering Functional Analysis that confirmed that the failed continuity indicator did not cause the SLC "B" quib valve to be inoperable.

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