ML20217K057
| ML20217K057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Clinton, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1997 |
| From: | Kraft D NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE |
| To: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217K048 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710220415 | |
| Download: ML20217K057 (31) | |
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?)fh b' L NUCt. EAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE f
P O. BOX 1637 . EVANSTON, ILLINOIS 60204-1637 i (847)S89 7650; -7058 (FAX) l August 9,1997 i
Dr. Shirley Jackson Chairperson U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 RE: GAO report on NRC regulation
Dear Chairperson Jackson:
I am forwarding a packet which NEIS has submitted to the Illinois delegation to Congress and Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois expressing our concerns about NRC's lack of assertiveness in regulating Comed and Illinois Power in Illinois.
We have noted and are pleased that NRC has mcently taken a much tougher public stance towards Comed's continued poor performance, as evidenced by more numerous and larger fines, and commitment to keep reactors like Zion shut until they meet regulatory standards. At the same time NRC has continued to allow the utility a gmat deal of latitude to continue operating when even NRC has publicly conceded that there is no historical evidence that gives you confidence that Comed is to be believed.
I am referring here specifically to Comed's response to your January 50.54 letter, to their under-oath written reply and plan, and to the NRC transcript of the April 25th meeting in Washington, D.C. between the Commission and Comed management. Our analysis appears in the enclosed report.
We have analyzed the events above in the context of the fimdings of the GAO report, NUCLEAR REGULATION: Pwwnting PwNern Plants Rajuises Mom EITectiw NRC Action, GAO'RCED-97-14.% released in May,1997; and the Arthur Anderson evaluation, Recomauxfations to Impmm the Scolor Management Mxting Paus released in late December,1996. Both of these investigations contain assessments and recommendations that NEIS has suggested and documented for years, and examples of conditions which currently clearly exist at Illinois reactors.
Most importantly, in spite of continued chronic poor performence from Comed and IP and your repeated requests that they improve, NRC still has not utilized its most powerful leverage on either Comed or IP to force their compliance -- license suspension or revocation. NRC has tolerated continued poor performance over long periods of time at several facilities -- most notably Dresden and Zion. Since the utility
-- in this case Comed - has " called your bluff' several times in the past with NRC's acquiescence, the poor performance you now rail against is in part due to NRC's own I
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reluctance' to insist on total compliance,- and to follow through swiftly and in a timely fashion with logical and severe consequences.
We sincerely hope that NRC will no longer tolerate continuation of this pattern in the future.
If NRC itself expects to have credibility with the public and Congress, in a sense it must be held to the same standards it has insisted on for~ Comed: 1.) greatly improved performance and adherence to its own regulations and standards 2.) over a l sustained period of time. To date, NRC has evidenced neither.
In short continued scoldings, fines, threats, and more inspections aren't enough- to protect the health and safety of the public, environment and economy _ of Illinois.
' NRC has " conditioned" the utilities into not taking you seriously, since you've only
" pulled the_ plug" once 'in the entire history of. your agency, and your continued
, tolerance of poor po-formance (eg., Dresden's 6-year stint on the " watch list") only reinforces their perception. While the utilities know you're acting tougher, they know that historically "you blink." NRC did it on- April-25th, and again in July. (" watch list").
We ask that you examine our report and conclusions. We are willing to discuss any of our conclusions and recommendations with you, if you desire. We offer these with the intent of improving the long-term regulatory attitude and posture of NRC, and with the hope of ending-Illinois' nuclear " Comed y of Errors" - as one recent cartoon in a Chicago paper put it -- once and for all.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
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David A. Kraft Director cc: ' _ A. Bill Beach, Region III Administrator, NRC files 2
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NUCt. EAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE P.O. BOX 1637. EVANSTON. ILUNOIS 60204-1637 (847)869-7650; .7658 (FAX)
IL'LINOIS' " RADIOACTIVE DECAY":
An Assessment of Illinois' Nuclear Reactom and the Nuclear Regulatory 3 Commission's Inability to Regulate Assertively Prepared July. 24, 1997 I. Summary and Recommendations:
Since 1993 NEIS has observed and documented a dramatic decline in the safety and performance levels of Illinois' 13 operating nuclear reactors -- 12 by Comed, a subsidiary of
- Unicom, and one by Illinois Power (IP). Illinois reactors have been placed regularly on the Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) "close watch" and " trending downward" lists for poor performance and declining safety. They have experienced an increase in the number 3 and size of fines from NRC for poor operating practices. ,
i This decline has emerged under and in spite of the " watchful" eyes of onsite inspectors of both the NRC and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS). It has occurred after NEIS twice alerted the Illinois Delegation to Congress and Govemor Jim Edgar of the trend (in July, 1993, and October 19%). It continues at a time when the Federal General Accounting Office (GAO) has just completed a preliminary investigation into NRC's inability and dis-inclination to regulate the nuclear industry in an assertive manner.
In conclusion conditions at Illinois nuclear reactors are deteriorating, and the regulators charged with monitoring these conditions and ordering nuclear utilities to reverse this deterioration are found not to be regulating assertively or effectively. Taken together, these conditions represent 31 a major threat to the health and safety of the Illinois public, environment and the economy.
Recent petition gathering efforts initiated by NElS have demonstrated that nuclear safety is a major concern of the Illinois public from all parts of the State. The public is calling for regulators to take stronger measures against nuclear utilities demonstrating consistently poor performance.
NEIS recommends that the Federal NRC and State IDNS implement recommendations formulated both in the recently released GAO repo-t, NUCLEAR REGUIATION: Peventing PioNem Plants Requim More E/Tective NRC Action (GAO/RCED-97-145, May 1997), and the recommendations to improve NRC regulatory capability solicited by the office of Sen.
I D Carol Moseley-Braun provided by NEIS in February,1997. These recommendations call for stronger sanctions against repeat offenders and poor operators of nuclear plants, incluung increased use of suspension and revocation of nuclear plant operating licenses until such time as sustained improvements can be demonstrated at the offending facilities (see attached documents).
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. II.
Background:
NE!S first began reporting about the decline in reactor performance and safety in July,1993, with the release of the Public Citizen study, NUCLFAR LEMONS: An A ce "m at of Amerk:s's Worst Nuckar Power Phots 4th Edition. The study examined relative performanm of Ill'U.S. nuclear reactors over the years 1990-92, using 11 safety and performance crite.m, E many of which are used by both NRC and the nuclear industry. Statistically, compared to their peers in the U.S. nuclear industry, Comed's 12 and Illinois Power's (IP) one operating ,
reactors fared poorly. Seven of 13 reactors placed in the bottom third in overall ranking compared to the other 98 U.S. reactors. Many reactors placed in the "10-worst" in selected categories, or in the " bottom-third" in a majority of the categories (see enclosed chart).
NElS sent this analysis to Governor Jim Edgar, selected State Cabinet heads, and the Illinois delegation to Congress. Concurrently, thousands of signatures on petitions calling for State action were sent to Govemor Edgar, and received no reply. Letters to Congress calling for greater pressure on the NRC to force better performance from Comed and IP also received no response.
In October,19%,.Public Citizen released its 5th edition of NUCLEAR LEMONS and the results for Illinois reactors were even worse. Not only did Illinois reactors rank poorly 8 compared to other U.S. reactors; their rankings for the years 1993 95 dropped dramatically compared to their own previous performance in the same categories. A new category measuring the number of times NRC used " license discretion" on enforcing its own regulations showed that many Illinois reactors had their standards altered more often than other U.S.
reactors (see enclosed chart).
From January,1996 to the present conditions at Illinois reactors worsened dramatically. Since January,1997, six of Comed's 12 operating reactors (Dresden 2 & 3, already on the list a record-setting 5 consecutive years; LaSalle 1 & 2; and Zion 1 & 2) were placed by NRC on its "close watch list" for poor performance and operating conditions requiring additional NRC supervision. IP's Clinton I reactor was placed on the " trending downward" list for similar e but not as severe problems. All reactors remained on these lists an additional six months after the NRC review in July,1997.
During this period these reactors suffered a long series of embarrassing and potentially dangerous incidents, mishaps, operator errors, management errors and oversights, techni-cal / materiel problems, and procedure violations (see enclosed list).
The number and size of fines also increased during this period. Comed and IP reactors were fined 12 times for a total of $1,750,000 (13% of all finen and 25% of all dollar amounts since nuclear plants first opened in Illinois). Both utilities received the largest fines in their history during this period (Comed's LaSalle 1&2 was fined S650,000 in January,1997; IP's Clinton I received a S450,000 fine in June,1997).
NRC sent numerous wamings to Comed management about the chronic and repeated appearance of certain reactors (most notably Dresden 2&3 and Zion 1&2) on these lists. NRC even went as far as to call Comed's top managers and Board of Directors to Washington, D.C., ' two occasions. These meetings resulted in severe scoldings and threats, but in no der ae action or sanctions from NRC.
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., it was also during this period that NRC itself was coming under criticism for its lack of ability or dis-inclination to regulate assertively. Two articles a year apart in TIME magazine portrayed a regulatory agency averse to regulating the nuclear industry, and to even follow its own regulations and standardt with consistency. Worse NRC was portrayed as an agency with a tendency to punich esen members of its own staff when those people followed NRC regulations too vigorously for the tastes of officials higher up in the chain of command, These charges against NRC were strengthened by two reports issued in 1997. The first, O Rewmmendations to Improw the Senior Mangsncot Meetits!r Proass (Dtwrber .M,19%),
was a study conducted by Arthur Anderson, Inc., which analyzed NRC's proced;nes and methodology for placing reactors on its "close watch" list and for assessing conditions at reactors. The report found that while NRC decisions were " logical" and " risk averse," they were also highly subjective, lacked consistent, understandable and objective criteria, and were
" reactive" to problems rather than anticipatory.
The second study by the General Accounting OfTice (GAO; NUCLEAR REGUIATION Pmmating Probkm Plants Requires Mom EITectin NRC Action, GAOIRCED-97-145, May, 1997) was commissioned in 19% at the request of Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr. (D.-DE). The results of this study were released in May,1997, and were very critical of NRC in a number of key O
regulatory areas:
e NRC failed to take aggressive enforcement actions relating to safety requirements; e NRC too often merely took the word of non-complying nuclear utilities to take corrective actions, then rarely followed up on the utilities to make sure these actions took place; i e NRC's lack of aggressive action when problems were first reported and identified actually contributed to the worsening conditions at the case-study plants reviewed in the report; e When NRC did finally act, their interventions were too late or too little; e NRC cannot verify with existing documentation whether the reactors in operation are actually operating in accordance with their " design basis" -- and hence cannot objectively and conclusively state if reactors are actually operating safely.
e In its evaluations and inspections NRC does not even assess whether or not nuclear plant management is competent.
In February,1997, NEIS was contacted by the office of Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun to submit suggestions as to how NRC could better regulate the nuclear industry. NEIS compiled suggestions from several nationally recognized safe-energy and nuclear power watchdog organizations, and submitted these to the Senator's office (see enclosed, and below). In addition both the Anderson study and the GAO report had its set of recommendations for improvinF NRC's regulatory attitude and abilities.
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, III. Analysis:
Based on these observations and results, two conclusions are apparent:
1.) Comed and IP.'s 13 operating reactors are deteriorating, and if not improved, represent a threat to the health and safety of the public, environment, and evonomy of Illinois; and 2.) The NRC has not been doing an adequate job to regulate 8 the nuclear industry in an assertive and proactive manner.
We present the following analysis to support these conclusions:
A. Comed and IP's 13 operating reactors are deteriorating, and if not improved, represent a threat to the health and safety of the public, environment, and economy of Illinois:
By whatever criteria one selects, whether those of NEIS which openly favors the closure of nuclear pir.nts, or,those of the NRC whose own criteria and abilities NEIS questions below, conditious at Comed's 12 and IP's single reactor are poor, worsening, and without improve- G-ment, represent a major thraat to Illinois.
NRC's own documentation " watch list" placements, fines, SALP reviews, transcripts of meetings with Comed's Board and management, etc. -- is replete with the eno.mous list of failings on the part of Comed and IP to run their reactors well. A brief chronological summary of these incidents our the past two years is included in this report.
B. The NRC has not been doing an adequate job to regulate the nuclear industry in Illinois in an assertive sad pro-active canner:
While the increase in fines and frequent and lengthy placement of reactors on NRC " watch ,
lists" might seem to indicate that the NRC is "getting tough" on Comed and IP and regulating more forcefully, the oppcsite actually seems to be the case. The reasons for this conclusion stem from the findings of the GAO report as they apply to recent events in Illinois.
1.) Fines and public embarrassm:nt are ineffective:
If fines and placement on " watch lirts" resulting in greater scrutiny by regulators were supposed to either force or embarrass CcmEd and IP to improve conditions at reactors, they have failed in this mission. Over time, the number and size of fines have increased, as have the number of reactors on the NRC " watch' lists. At this time, 7 of 13 Illinois reactors are on either the "close watch" or " trending downward" list. If the utilities were actually 8 improving and responding to the fmes imposed or the concomitant public embarrassment, these numbers should be going down, not up.
The GAO report concluded that often fines are administered so long after the fact that they cease to have a meaningful corrective impact on operation, and are too far removed in time from the original problem for them to serve as a punishment or deterrent for improper actions. Utilities simply do not get the "cause effect" message that fines are supposed to impart.
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, One also must question the assumptions 'that fines and public embarrassment might efTect improvement in reactor operation on corporate grounds as well. It does not seem logical to assume that fines of tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars will have much of a financial impact on a utility like Comed which claims around $21 billion in assets, and which annually boasts around $6 bill. ion in sales, and $11.5 billion in profits.
If management is the problem - as NRC has c6ntended frequently over the past four years -
then only the shareholders can remedy it, and they have shown no inclination to do so thus 3 far. Each year the same people remain in top management positions at Comed, regularly re-elected by the shareholders. Indeed, many of the major shareholders are these same top ,
managers themselves. Even the recent spate of lar'ge fines has not had an appreciable enough impact -on shareholder dividends to effect change in management. And ratepayers have absolutely no effect on corporate decision making.
As a result Comed management is virtually insulated from outside efforts to induce corporate change; and so little has come, in spite of the frequent requests from NRC. '
Finally, it is also important to note that public embarrassment is not listed as an official sanction for NRC',s use in the Code of Federal Regulations. It should therefore not be relied D upon by the agency.
2.) NRC must shoulder some responsibility for reactor decline:
The documented downward trend in reactor safety and performance has occurred in spite of
- the fact that NRC has always had onsite inspectors at each reactor. In 1994 Illinois added ,
its own IDNS onsite inspectors. While the number of observers have increased, the conditions ;
at these reactors has worsened. This observed increase in problems and fines is not merely ,
a function of having more eyes with which to see, a On-occasion NRC has publicly stated that it is not its job to identify problems at nuclear reactors for the utilities. NRC claims to see its role as one of regulator and observer,
, There is considerable dissonance between what NRC says and what it does in these self-
! professed roles. The GAO report and current Illinois reactor problems illustrate the degree i of this disconnect between NRC's words and its actions. While always in possession of j increasingly powerful sanctions to force better reactor operation and performance and utility l compliance with regulations, NRC has consistently chosen to avoid using its most powerful j means to- do so: reactor license suspension or revocation. As a result it has become an i ineffective regulator when- the utilities call NRC's bluff, and fail to comply with NRC
! regulations or orders in a complete or timely manner.
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This unwillingness to demonstrate its authority weakens NRC's role as an observer, since even
. ' _- when NRC points out corrective measures to a utility, as it did in 1996 during an emergency j at Comed's LaSalle reactors, the utilities have received an implicit yet clear message that i NRC's observations can be disregarded and actions deferred.
- The NRC has always had at its disposal 1.) the means (its onsite inspectors and regional
- administrators), and 2.) the authority (its regulations and sanctions) to regulate nuclear reactors
! in Illinois and elsewhere in an assertive and pre-emptive manner. It has simply chosen not
- to do so, and as a result NRC has tolerated poor performance on the part of the utilities far
- longer than it should have.
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. In the incicasingly expensive world of reac' tor operations and maintenance, and even more so in the upcoming world of utility deregulation, unless a utility is forced to make an expend-iture, eitper by economics or regulations, it will not do so. A continued laid-back approach to regulation by NRC could lead to increasingly serious incidents in the future.
This situation does not serve to protect the public or the environment.
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The following are recent examples of poor reactor operation in Illinois that correspond to the points raised by the OAO's recent report: ,
e OAO Report: NRC failed to take aggressive enforcement actions relating to safety requirer'.ents:
Perhaps the most egregious example of this criticism is the long-standing residency of the Dresden 2&3 reactors on the NRC's "close watch" list. Dresden resided on this list for six consecutiteyears as of July,1997 -- an ignominious industry record. Since placement of the reactors on this list is supposed to mean the reactors are receiving added NRC oversight, Dresden's excessive and continuous duration on the list begs two questions: .
G 1.) Just how badly deteriorated is a reactor that must receive 6 years worth of " extra" NRC oversight? If the deterioation is this bad, why wasn't it spotted by NRC inspectors before, so that preventive measures could have been implemented?
2.) Just what does it actually maan - to the utility, to the NRC, and the public -
for a reactor to be on a " watch list," if a reactor can reside there indefinitely while continuing to operate? Put another way, at what point can and should NRC pull the license on the Dresden reactors, which have resided on the NRC " watch list" for 7 of their 25 years of operation?
e OAO Report: NRC too often merely took the word of non-complying nuclear g.
utilities to take corrective actions, then rarely followed up on the utilities to make sure these actions took place:
While many examples of this criticism come to mind with Comed's reactors recently, the most blatant and distressing example of this dis inclination to regulate occurred this past Spring after NRC placed six Comed reactors in its "close watch" list. In addition NRC ordered Comed to submit in writing, under oath, and within 60 days the answers to two fundamental questions:
"(a) Information explaining why NRC should have confidence in Comed's ability to operate six nuclear stations while sustaining perform-ance improvements at each site. ,
(b) Criteria that (Comed] ha[s] established or plan to establish to measure performance in light of the concerns identified above and your proposed actions if those criteria are not met." [ emphasis ours; Source:
NRC " Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Performance at Commonwealth Edison Company Nuclear Stations, January 27, 1997]
Comed submitted its 80-page reply to NRC on March 28. NRC then reviewed the 6 8
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. Comed response, and convened a ' meeting between Comed top management and the l NRC Commission and Region staff in Washington, D.C. on April 25th. The following l excerpts from the transcript of this meeting are very revealing of NRC's abdication of regulatory responsibility and divinclination to regulate assertively:
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'1.) Comed faded to answer questica #1, and NRC acknowledged this fact, yet j aarpted the Comed propasal to continie operation:
A line of questioning by NRC Chair resulted in her asung NRC staff whether Comed's reply answered Question #1 of the 50.54(f) letter:
MR. FRANK MARAGLIA (NRC Deputy Director, NRR): "I think the answer to that is yes, we've said that [ Comed has) established measures in the program which, if effectively implemented. will give us that basis to be able to have concrete evidence and indicators....So it is in some respects a commitrmnt and a pmise for the future, and to have a plan and a progra n by which it can be menitored."
MR,. JOSEPH CALLAN (EDO, NRC): "...the types of things that...Com.
'O monwealth Edison is proposing...are variations on processes that harc unIked at other facilitica over the years....So the programa. we have a relatively high confidence level that the programs themselves are solid.
The issue again...is the implementation aspects of the program, and if we just go on history, then ac shouldn't haYc much confidence lin ComFd] gnilc frankly. The performance of Comed over the years in implementing programs has been fairly dismal....there is very little
[ Comed] can point to themselves to give us confidence that this time, these programs...will work at Commonwealth." [ Source: NRC Commis- -
sion Meeting Transcript, April 25, 1997]
3 2) NRC acknowledged that it does not possess and has not destloped a means to actually track Comed improvement at multiple stations:
NRC Chair Shirley Jackson made a critically astute observation in questioning her NRC staff on the level of Comed's compliance to their 50.54(f) letter:
CHAIR JACKSON: "Given [ Comed's) cyclic performance...can [NRC staff] discuss the effectiveness of the NRC inspection program and our enforcement policy in identifying and taking appropriate regulatory action concerning the cyclic performance of [ Comed]?...can [NRC's] process be improved relative to identifying and preventing cyclical or declining
, performance?...is it additional NRC resources that if focussed on [ Comed) any earlier or on a continuing basis have helped to mitigate or change the declining or cyclic performance?....since we are coming off of a history...of over a decade of a certain kind of weak performance, it does beg the question of the effectiveness of INRC's] inanection and enforcement pnhcy in addressing these sorts of issues
"...a lot of focus of what we've talked about this morning relate in some part to the second part of the question, namely to explain criteria that (Comed) established or plan to establish to measure performance.
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. But... strung through all this' but not explicitly addressed is what is the answer to the first question, and that is why NRC should have confidence on [ComEdi.] ability to operate its nuclear stations while sustaining performance .mprovements at each site....How is [NRC] stair going to review and integrate the site-specific assessment finding to reach an n.verall conclusion as to whether [ Comed) has effectively implemented its performence improvement pitm but in a way where they sustain performance at all of the sites?...it's not the parrow issue of did they specifically address what they've been asked to address...but, inherent #
in that is zhy NRC should hayn confidence nn ComFd's anility in operate ila stations whde mustairiing nerformance improvement at nach site. So I want you to tell me how the various things [NRC staff j has) outlined , which seem very site specific, okay, is going to allow an assessment cornorate-wide ...What is it today that's giving us confidence in [ Comed's] ability to do that?" [ Source: as above; emphasis ours)
MR. JOSEPH CALLAN: " I think if you look at the history of
[ Comed) and just look at specific plants, I would argue that the NRC inspection and enforcement programs worked reas nably well....What our inspection and enforcement programs scIn no.1 and arc not equipped S in da unil is to step back and look at several stations simultaneously and Innk 11 corporate nerformance. and the issuance of this [50.54(f)]
letter to Commonwealth is perhaps maybe the first time that we have systematically done that with a licensee, with a corporate entity." [ Source:
as above; emphasis ours)
This discussion illustrates that to a certain extent, NRC suffers from the same kind of operational problems they accuse Comed of having, only from the regulator's standpoint. It has taken both NRC and Comed over 20 years of reactor operation in Illinois to begin to identify and come to grips with this situation.
In the end, while NRC staff was able to praise the initiatives selected by Comed for implementation. they could offer no justification why NRC should accept Comed's proposal. They could not offer Chair Jackson any concrete evidence existing today, as she requested, why Comed's plan should be believed, only the following assurance:
MR. CALLAN: "...we've said that [ Comed has) established measures in a program which, if errectively implemented. will give us that basis to be able to have concrete evidence and indicators that demonstrate
[ performance)...." (emphasis ours]
This is precisely what NRC settled for in its 1994 discussions with the Comed Board and management. #
3.) NRC pointed out the lock of detait quantiBable amasuras, and tiedines in the ComFA plan, yet found it acceptable:
NRC Commissioners Rogers, Diaz, and McGafligan all-pointed out lack of sufficient detail from which to assess both what Comed was measuring, and whether this would result in improved performance. McGafligan pointed out that Comed failed to provide a baseline of performance today at Comed's 12 reactors over the seven performance 8 4 l
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. indicators Comed presented as areas for future improvement and evaluation.
In_ what is becoming an all too familiar pattem, NRC: once again severely criticized -
Comed's performance; ordered Comed to reply to NRC's criticism, this time under oath, which _ Comed failed to do completely; and then accepted yet another Comed
' pledge to perform better in the future, oiTering no rational, logical, objective, historic, 4 or even much of a subjective rationale fo'r doing so. As one Chicago Tribum headline 3 put it, "NRC gives Edison stem lecture, then another pass."
e OAO Report: NRC's lack of aggressive action when problems were first reported and identified actually contributed to the worsening conditions at the case-study plants reviewed in the report:
While no Comed or IP reactors were used in the case studies in the GAO report, the criticism is certainly valid in Illinois, as can be seen from the following illustration at.
Comed's Zion reactor. '
Zion had been on the NRC's "close watch" list in 1991-92. At a meeting with Comed
) Board and, Management in February,1993, then NRC Chair Ivan Selin raised concems about Comed's intention to transfer the station manager of Zion, Tom Joyce, to j another post in the organization: l CHAIR SELIN: "You [ Comed's Mike Wallace] should know that .
there's some skepticism about, as the [ regulatory] attention gets 1 clsewhere and [ station manager] Tom Joyce leaves the plant, that - l Zion will stay at the level it's achieved [o rf the " watch list"). !
Selin and NRC had noticed a trend at Comed to send a quality person to make 1 rapid change at reactors under NRC scrutiny or criticism, then transfer them to another plant once the emergency performance was over, and NRC was no longer D- critical of site operation.
Comed reassured Chair Selin that the other station personnel could handle Zion's improvement. Tom Joyce did leave Zion in'early 1993. By July,1993, _ Zion had experienced two fires, and began the downward spiral resulting in its repeat on the
" watch list" in January,1997.
NkC did not use its intuition nor its authority to head oft Zion's downward slide back on the " watch list."
e GAO Report. When NRC did finally act, their interventions were too late or j_ too little:
While NRC has yet to ac, decisively on Comed's current round of reactor and management problems discussed with Comed's management and Board at the April 25, 1997 meeting in Washington, it is important to remember that NRC had called Comed's management to Washington before, on February 28, 1994, to complain about many of the same problems.
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., NRC was given similar promises of improved performance and increased allocation of resources. At this 1994 meeting, then NRC Chair Ivan Selin told Comed's manage-ment, "In the two and. a half years that I've been in this job, it's always been one something or something else (with Edison's performance). I have to
( say that I don't think (the Comed] Board has done its job. I think that the NRC has trad to do things that the Board should-have done earlier about calling your attention to the problems. I don't think #
management has done its job." ,
Yet, three years later Comed fads half of its reactors on the "close watch" list, and four reactors down indermitely. Whatever NRC did after this meeting in 1994, it clearly was "too little, too late" to prevent the 1997 Comed relapse.
In another instance involving the Byron nuclear plant, the NRC nagged Comed for three years before Comed took action to dredge silt out of Byron's cooling tower pool, a problem which had safety implications in case of emergency at the reactor.
NRC also fmed Comed $100,000 for the violation.
O e GAO Report: NRC cannot verify with existing documentation whether the reactors in operation are actually operating in accordance with their " design basis" - and hence cannot objectively and conclusively state if reactors are actually operating safely:
NRC has ordered all nuclear utilities to reassess whether they are in compliance with their original or amended design basis for operation. NRC then plans to review these results as utilities submit them.
In Illinois Comed has asked to defer completion of this task at the LaSalle reactors -
- both currently on the NRC's " watch list" - until May,1999. They also intend to g-re-start these reactors prior to completion of this reassessment.
e GAO Report: In its evaluations and inspections NRC does not even assess whether or not nuclear plant management is competent:
The dialogue above concerning NRC's historic inability to assess corporate management performance is notable again here.
In addition though, at the site level, NRC's historic " watering down" of its primary assessment tool -- the Systematic Assessment for Licensee Performance, or "SALP" rating - has further eroded the ability of NRC to make assessments on the competence of site management. In the early 1980's, SALP assessments occurred in 14 distinct 8 areas of reactor site operations. By the mid-80's this was reduced to 11, then to seven, and in the 1990's, the SALP assessments occur over four very broad areas of plant operation.
This dilution has hindered assessment both in sufficient detail in the present, and in making comparisons of plant performance over time. It has rendered the SALP virtually useless as a reliable assessment tool.
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, IV. Conclusions and Recommenda'tions:
A well documented decline in the operation, performane, and safety at Illinois 13 operating nuclear reactors is underway which increases the probability that Illinois could suffer a serious nuclear power accident. The two nuclear utilities in illinois - Comed and Illinois Power --
must take full and primary responsibility for the operating conditions at their renctors.
g At the same time the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been under criticism by members of Congress, the GAO, and local Illinois environmental and safe-energy organizations for its lack of assertiveness in regulating the operators of these reactors. It must also accept some of the blame for poor reactor performance siemming from poor regulatory perfomiance.
Current law invests NRC with both final authority on reactot safety issues, and its own power of self-monitoring. As a result the public has lost faith in the existing and inadequate mechanisms to petition NRC to regulate more forcefully and pro-actively.
As a result only Congress has the authority to challenge NRC's complacency and abdication of its regulatory responsibilities.
O For this reason, EIS calls upon the Illinois delegation to Congress to support a continued and thorough investigation of the NRC, to assess its standards and regulations, and to provide the public with a means to challenge its historic dis-inclination to regulate in the public interest. NEIS urges implementation of the recommendations found in the recent GAO report on NRC, and of the recommendations for regulatory change it forwarded to Sen. Carol '
Moseley-Braun in February,1997.
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)[ - w 3 NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE P.O. BOX 1837. EVANSTON. ILUNOIS 60204 1637 (647)S60-7650; 7658 (FAX)
ILLINOIS' " RADIOACTIVE DECAY":
A Brief Chronology of Significant Reactor Incidents 1996-97 Prepared July 24, 1997
. Nov. Dec. Investigative reporter Duane Pohlman from Milwaukee Adcotspes his Alm crew's 1995 wcurity breach at the Zion, IL, and Point Beach, Wl, reactors. NRC ofTers to conduct enhanced inspection of event at urging of Wisconsin Congressmen.
February, Two months after the November security breach, NRC gives Zion a SALP 1996 rating of *2" - 'sood" or ' adequate" - in plant Jecurity.
M3y 29, NRC Chair Shilley Jackson gives Comed option to 'perhaps shut yourselves .
1996 down" if Comed can't solve Dresden problems 'once and for all."
June 28, Comed's Dresden remains on NRC 'close watch" list for record setting 51/2 1996 -
consecutive years.
July 1, Maintenance error gums up backup emergency cooling water equipment at 1996 LaSalle reactors, forcing shutdown.
Augrst' 20, NRC probes theft of the reactor operator license exam on July 7, at Comed's 19 % Dresden nuclear station.
August 27, NRC fines Comed $50,000 for five violations occurring between February and 1996 May at Zion nuclear station. ~{
September 5, Illinois Power's Clinton reactor shut after a recirculating pamp leak resulted in 1996 spilling 7,000 gallons of radioactive water into reactor building.
October 19, Six Comed reactors rank in ' bottom 25' hi nation, according to Public Citizen 1996 reactor safety report, NucAnar Im November 14, Comed shuts one of two Dresden reactors Oct. 26 during enhanced NRC 1996 inspection; cannot pin point the problem causing shutdown.
December 12, NRC announces ' improvement" at Comed's Dresden 2&3 reactors.
1996 January 2, Independent Safety Analysis of LaSalle reactors conunissioned by Comed finds 1997 them dencient in all areas of operation.
) January 25, NRC fines Comed $650,000 for July,1996 incident at LaSalle reactors, the 1997 largest fine in Comed history.
January 29, NRC places 6 of 12 ComEu reactors - Dresden 2&3, Zion l&2, and LaSalle 1997 1&2 on its "close watch" list requiring additional NRC supervision and oversight; and places Illinois Power's Clinton 1 on its " trending downward" list.
Comed told to submit within 60 days in wrhing and under oath its plan to reverse poor operation, and why NRC should believe Comed can reverse the negative trends while operating other rcactors.
February 5 Comed's Byron reactors cited for violation, refusal for 3 years to clear silt 1997 buildup out of cochng tower pool.
February ll, Chicyo Tnbune r: ports two reactor operator crews at LaSalle misdiagnosed -
O 1997 a c'mul:ted reactor incident in 1996 test, c:using NRC staff to ' question the ability of personnel to operate the plant safely."
. February 21, independent Assessment Teams conunissioned by Comed give highly negative
-1797 evaluations of the Zion and LaSalle stations.
February 22, Experienced reactor operator at Zion violates shutdown procedure; NRC 1997- Regional Director A. Bill Beach states, "It doesn't get any worse. No one was in control." Comed reactor chief Tom Malman states, "This is perhaps the l
most embarrassing career situation I have ever been in."
February 27 NRC Tmes Comed $100,000 for violations at Bgon reactors relating to three- g!
1997 year silt build up in cooling tower pool.
l March 13, NRC lines Comed $100,000 for 1996 engineering and safety violations at Zion 1997 station.
March 19, NRC criticizes Comed for radiation handling procedures violations at Zion 1997 reactors.
March 25, In the wake of the February 22 reactor operator error, Comed announces it 1997 will to fire, transfer, or retrain 180 reactor operators at Zion station.
March 29, +
Comed submits its deply to NRC's demand for plans to fix " watch list" 1997 reactors, and why NRC should believe them. O April 2, Twenty five of 31 control room operators at LaSalle fail a simulation test of 1997 their ability to handle " abnormal" reactor problems.
April 17 Comed announces plans to prematurely retire the two 2. ion reactors in the c 1997 year 2005 to avoid the enormous cost of replacing steam generators.
April 25, NRC accepts Comed's under oath testimony to improve reactor performance in 1997 spite of receivirig no reason as to why Comed shouki be believed.
May 27, NRC reports 17 violations - five with safety implications - uncovered at Zion -
1997 during investigation into Feb. 21st reactor operate mishap.
June 10 NRC fines Illinois Power $450,000 - the largest in IP's history - for violations 1997 relating to Sept. 5,1996 incident at its Clinton reactm.
1 June 17 NRC criticizes Comed for having a disabled leak detection system for four 1997 months at its Byron station.
June 23, NRC discovers Comed has ignored flaws for almost two decades in over 1,200 1997 switches at its LaSalle reactors.
June 24 Comed notified that the 1cvel of its cooling lake at the LaSalle reactors was 1997 above maximum level allowed by regulatory standards for over two weeks, that equipment designed to fix the problem was broken, and that Comed was C unaware of the correct water level for years.
June 25, Six Comed reactors - Dresden 2&3, Zion 1&2, and LaSalle 1&2 - remain on 1997 NRC 'close watch" list.
June 27 NRC fines Comed $100,000 for violations at Zion and Quad Cities reactors .
1997 July 3 NRC criticizes Comed for allowing a bubble of nitrogen to build up for 16 1997 days without taking action at the Zion reactor in March, C
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NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE P.O. BOX 1637 . EVANSTON. ILLINOIS 60204-1637 (847)869-7650; 7658 (FAX)
July 16,1997 Sen. Carol Moseley Braun D U.S. Senate 324 Hart Senate Olike Bldg.
Washington DC 20510 -
Dear Sen. Moseley Braun:
NEIS is an Illinois environmental organization dedicated to watchdogging the nuclear power industry. On behalf of our organization, its Board and members, and the petitioners whose names are enclosed, we wish to call to your attention an issue of 3 dire and immediate consequence to the health and safety of the people, environment and economy of Illinois, which we believe requires your action.
It is now well known that in July, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced that it would keep six of twelve Comed reactors - two each at Zion, LaSalle, and Dresden -- on its "close watch list," and Illinois Power's Clinton 1 reactor on its "downwardly trending" list for poor performance and operation. These same 7 reactors (out of 13 operating in Illinois) had originally been placed on these lists by NRC in January of this year. Dresden 2 & 3 have been on the " watch list" now for owr S comwutim Jws - a nuclear industry nzoni.
O What is not as well known is that in June, the Government Accounting Office released a study originally commissioned by Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr. (D. DE) to determine why the NRC had abdicated its regulatory responsibilities to regulate in an assertive and pre emptive manner, and whether the NRC's standards -- and hence its regulatory pronouncements and decisions -- were sufficiently protective of the public health and safety. The results of this study were ominously negative (see enclosed).
To state the obvious: In summary,1.) 7 of 13 Illinois reactors are performing poorly, both compared to their peers in the U.S. nuclear industry, and compared to their own previous performr.nce, and 2.) the federal agency responsible to regulate these reactors O and protect the public health and safety itself cannot be trusted to accomplish its mission; nor can it state that it has adequate objective measures currently in place to assert with confidence and credibility that these reactors in fact are safe to continue operating. The second of these assertions comes not only from the GAO's investiga-tion, but is reflected in the transcript of the meeting between NRC Commissioners and the Comed Board of April 25,1997 (NRC Commi.ssion Meeting Transedpt, April 25, 1997, pp.84 85).
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. Independently, each of these observati6ns should warrant concern and action oss the part of the Illinois delegation to Congress, representing as they do the most nu; lear-reliant state in the U.S. Together, they potentially represent the opportunity of making one of Comed's poorly performing reactors into the nuclear industry's equivalent of ValueJet, and NRC into the FAA. We are not attempting to minimize the tragedy I of the ValueJet accident; but merely wish to point out that the potential level of consequence for Illinois of a serious nuclear accident stemming from Congressional or regulatory inaction would be orders of magnitude greater. O It is important to note that this downward trend of reactor performance, which NElS has called to the attention of the Illinois delegation hrst in 1994, and then again in October,1996 (see enclosed) has occurred under the " watchful" eyes of full time, onsite NRC and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) inspectors. While such poor reactor performance is deplorable, and primarily the responsibility of Comed and Illinois Power, it's current magnitude begs the obvious question of how such poor performance could have occurred, and to such a degree, if NRC had been doing an adequate job of observing and regulating in the first place.
To be fair, in her short tenure to date NRC Chair Shirley Jackson has worked hard to get NRC as an agency to regulate more forcefully. Unfortunately for her, she has inherited an agency which has deliberately attempted to institutionalize the exact opposite approach for the past 15 years. Progress has been slow and uneven. We believe without Congressional intervention, it will be neither sustained nor institutional-ized. Illinois interests will not be served unless it becomes both.
Earlier this year, aner NRC initially placed the seven Illinois reactors on their respective enhanced supervision lists, Sen. Carol Moseley Braun's staff contacted our omce to seek suggestions and options to improve NRC's desire and capability to regulatory assertively. We submitted our suggestion list to her omce (see enclosed). #
These suggestions, plus the GAO recomcundations, should serve as a forceful blueprint to get NRC back into the mode of regulating assertively, and to get failing and inept nuclear utilities to either improve their reactors, or shut them down.
Representing as you do the most nuclear reliant State in the U.S. -- and by extension, the one with the highest probability of negative impacts from reactor operations - we urge you to take the following actions:
1.) Please review the enclosed materials, and contact us if you have any questions.
We will be happy to provide you with additional information, and to meet with e you or your staff when possible; 2.) Obtain a copy of the GAO report, and contact Sen. Biden's omce to ofter support for assertive regulation of the nuclear industry. The staff member in his omce is Matt Krusko, (202)224-5042; 2
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D-3.) Incorporate the GAO and NEIS' recommendations into Congressional action to get NRC to regulate more assertively.
As you can see from the enclosed petitions, and the many more we will forward to your office over the next six months, nuclear plant safety and operation is a concern of the people of Illinois. These people understand that only Congress has sufficient power and influence to get NRC moving in a direction that adequately protects them.
? They ask and expect that the representatives of the most nuclear reliant state take a leadenhip position on this issue. We urge you to do so, i I expect to be in Washington, D.C., from July 25th 28th, and will be calling for appointments with as many of you as time permits to discuss this issue. Please feel free to contact me in adve,ce if you require more information.
Gratefully, for a safe environment, 4
}l m David A. Kraft Director J cc: Sen. Joseph Biden Illinois delegation ,
Gov. Jim Edgar fdes enclosures 4 O
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NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE
- P.O. DOX 1637. EVANSTON. ILLINOIS 60204-1637 (847)869 7650; .7658 (FAX)
PRESS RELEASE For immediate release Contacts: David A. Kr.,ft, (847)869 7050 Friday, April 25,1997 ,
, COM-ED " CONS," NRC CAVES IN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY PLAN v
EVANSTON-With the eve of the 11th anniversary of the Chemobyl accident as a backdrop, the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) once again walked away from its responsibility as cilef regulator of
.7e nuclear Industry by announcing today that it has accepted Comed's proposed plan to improve puformance and safety at its 12 deteriorating nuclear reactors.
"The 80-page Comed plan was more of the same, and NRC fell for it all like naive children instead of professional regulators," asserts David. A. Kraft, director of the Evanston based Nuclear Energy Information Service, Illinois' sole nuclear power watchdog organization.
O "we expected more'of them, more forceful action this time around. Just like Comed, NRC talks the talk, but can't walk the walk," Kraft notes.
At issue was NRC's decision to accept the Comed plan as satisfactory to address problems at 12 lilinois nuclear reactors, six of which were placed on the NRC's "close-watch list" In January. Today's NRC action was its response to Comed's under-oath testimony in which the utility was to explain two things:
1.) "...why NRC should have confidence in Comed's ability to operate six nuclear stations while sustatning performance improvements at each site." and 2.)
- Criteria [ComEo has) established to measure performance in light of the concerns identified [in NRC's m January 27, 1997 letta to Comed) and / Comed'sf proposed schons # those cnteria are not met" u
- Edison gave N_RC ' paper snd promises' to do better. And if they oon't do better, they promised someone else higher up in the Company would take ever and promise to do better. What kind of action plan is that?
"It's virtually no different than the other plans and pledges Comed has sold NRC over the past five years. Only the names have been changed to create the illusion of improvement, or perhaps identify the next round of scapegoats," Kraft states.
Some of the more obvious criticisms of Comed's under-oath response to NRC are:
absence of timelines, due dates, or deadlines for completion of many of the programs outlined; O -
many ' plans' expressed are merely re-statements of the problems, with pledges to impiove or take actions at a future date; vague, subjective or absent temporary or permanent reactor " shut-down" criteria, if Comed cannot reach
'its own performance goals.
In addition, Comed's admission of so many fallings, previous unwillingness to use their newly proposed industry-wide standards and criteria, and adoption as "new" of what has been used elsewhere for so long begs for an explanation and justification as to why Comed did not do these things before, when so many O( 1 y
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., other utilities did, and when it was obvious by SALP and
- watch list" rankings that the methods Comed was employing clearly were not working.
The issue of NRC's confidence in Comed's ability to operate twelve nuclear reactors simultaneously also seemed to be resolved against Comed by the utility's own recent actions and announcements, first to close the two Zion reactors by the year 2005 the latest, and,this week's recent admission that Comed is unable to get the two LaSalle reactors in good enough shape to operate before mid 1998, 9
- Dese announcements to closs or not operate 4 of 12 reactors confirmed everything that nuclear critics tiave said all along - that Comed cannot simultaneously,.run 12 reactors safely without breaking the bank.
NRC got a direct answer, yet failed to act decisively," Kraft said.
Kraft po!nts out that the NRC itself must shoulder some of the blame for the sorry state of Illinois r: actors by tolerating such low levels of performance for so long without meaningful consequences.
'The Comed Plan report is replete with numerous admissions of fallings and poor performance, all .
apparently done under the allegedly ' watchful' eyes of the NRC site inspectors all this time. Could NRC's satisfaction with the Comed plan merely be a smoke-screen to get the scrutiny for poor regulation off their g
shoulders by publicly reassuring everyone that Things are under control again'?" Kraft asks.
NRC itself has been criticized this past year, not just by safe-energy activists, but by Congress for its unwillingness to regulate more assertively. In September,1996, Sen. Joseph Blden (D. DE) asked the j Govemment Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate NRC's oversight and regulatory responsibilities at nuclear r: actors. Two articles appearing In Ilms magazine demonstrated NRC's disinclination to challenge the nuclear Industry and punish its own employees who blow the whistle when NRC doesn't do its regulatory bb. A third report, 'Who the Hellk Regulating Who? - The NRC's Abdkstbn of Responsibility,' released by the Project on Govemment Oversight in Septembat,1996, suggested the same conclusion:
"Our regulators refuse to regulate. If the only consequence was to waste tax dollars, this might be O merely unfortunate. But to threaten the public health, safety and environment with nuclear incompetence is intolerable. The only recourse left for the public is to take this issue up with Congress." Kraft observed.
MEDIA NOTE: NElS' Director David A. Kraft will be available to comment on the NRC decision at the NElS program comemmorating the 11th anniversary of Chernobyl,12 noon, Saturday April 26, at the Evanston Public Ubrary,1703 Orrington, Evanston, Nuclear Energy information Service is an Evanston based, environmental, energy education organization -
founded in 1981 to provide the public with crodible information on nuclear power and radiation hazards, and ,
viable attemative energy choices to the continued use of nuclear power.
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Illinois reactors:
D 96 fines D
$7,226,000 0
{as of 7/15/97}
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, FINES Comed Reactors:
Braidwood 1 & 2: 8 $612,500 !
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- Byron 1 & 2
- 10 440,000
- Dresden 1, 2, & 3: 25 1,648,500
- LaSalle 1 & 2: 10 1,370,000 Quad Cities 1 & 2: 18 1,281,500 '
Zion 1 & 2: 17 921,500
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- TOTALS
- 87 $6,274,000 l-l lilinois Power:
Clinton 1 8 952,000
PERFORMANCE RANKING OF ILLINOIS REACTORS BY Sa. eTY CATEGORY (based ca 109 raar*vs nationwide for years 1993-95; the smaser the nurnber, the worse the perfomunce)
REACTOR capacrry concro ten. oau sareTv sysms ses.naa. suasar. sate viotAns. wc= wen adorics FACToft OUTA JS Costs ACTIV1"M. FadListES EVENTS AATude E)EPOsumE ENF DesC.
Braidwood 1 43 52 53 100 57 38 44 42 44 73 92 32" Braidwood 2 55 32" 82 100 57 38 44 16* 44 73 92 9 Byron 1 34" 70 71 104 84 62 .81 42 101 6 66 9 Bron 2 87 95 100 104 57 62 44 42 101 98 66 32" Clinton 1 51 42 81 31" $4 79 101 42 51 82 23* 9 Dresden 2 4 11* 4 14* 37 7 101 42 1 76 2 54 Dresdarf 3 9 10 8 14* 37 5 8 42 1 78 2 32" ia9ase 1 34 " 21* 26' 85 16* 14* 16- 7 9 90 11* 19*
LaSaBe 2 32" 70 48 85 7 14* 2P 7 9 87 11* 54 cuad caies 1 1r 13* 3t" 1P 84 6 81 16- 1: 95 5 54 cuad cases 2 8 9 31" 1P 57 3 8 16* 1 95 5 54 Zion 1 19* . 25* 21* 59 37 38 44 42 11* 105 36" 1 Zion 2 18* 100 59 59 57 79 101 42 11* 106 36" 3 Boki-faced numbers (eg., 8.) indicate plant is among the ten worst in the country in that category
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- Indicates plant is among the bottom quarter of plants in the country in that category
- " indicates the plant is among the bottom third of plants in the country in that category Source: #h Imanons- An Assess *nant of Amedes's Hbrst Commen:is/ Mucinar Pbemer Plants 5th Edriart Crlhca! Mass Energy Project.
Public Citizen, Washmglon, D.C., October 9,1996.
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NUCLEAR ENERGY IWORMATION SERVICE P.O. BOX 1837 . EVANSTON, IL1JNOIS 802041837 (847)A66-7850; -7658 (FAX)
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PERFORMANCE RANKING OF ILLINOIS REACTORS BY SAFETY CATEGORY (based on til reactors nationwide for years 1990-92; the smauer the number, the worse the im.'un.ance)
REACTOR CAPACCY FORCED LERs O&M SAFETY SYsTBS SCRAMm SpeF. SALP VKXADE. wofuGER FACTOR ouTAoES COSTS ACTNT"N FAILURES EVENTS RAT 98G EN Braidwood 1 43 24* 56 101 37" 69 28* 10 61 72 94 Braidwood 2 52 75 100 101 75 95 19* 30" 61 75 94 J
Byron 1 64 101 92 96 75 86 41 30" 98 80 92 Byron 2 57 94 94 96 53 104 84 30" 98 84 92 Clinton 1 24* 30" 73 29" 75 69 41 10 23* 69 22*
Dresden 2 19* 16' 5 58 26* 24* 28* 1 8 17* 10
, Dresden 3 17' 58 56 58 103 19* 56 30" 8 26* 10 LaSalle 1 -
82 98 64 91 75 40 56 66 33" 54 17*
LaScl:e 2 60 53 60 91 37" 60 13* 30** 33" 45 17' Ouad Cities 1 34" 34" 11* 50 103 4 70 30** 23* 31" 23*
Quad Cities 2 38 42 39 50 26* 5 70 30" 23* 69 23*
Zion 1 3 6 31" 75 6 52 70 66 1 22* 3f" Zion 2 11* 8 89 75 53 42 41 30" 1 45 37" l
Bold-faced numbers (eg., 8.) indicate plant is among the ten worst in the muntry b that category
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- indicates plant is among the bottom quarter of plants in the country in that category
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- indicates the plant is arnong the bottom third of plants in the country in that catevviy -
Source: Nuclear Lemorts: An Amiisst of Amerce's nbrst Cu -i m&lNucker Pbwer Pfarrtz 4th EdtbL Critn.at Mass Energy Prciect, Public Citizen, Washington, D.C., July 8,1993.
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- D CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS ON NEEDED CHANGES AT THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION prepared by David A. Kraft, Director, NElS February .7,1997 9 1. Introduction Recent events at U.S. nuclear reactors have called attention not only to the poor safety conditions and performance at many U.S. reactors, but to the adequacy, competency and desire of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to effectively regulate the nuclear power industry in a manner that is protective of the health and safety of the public, the environment, and the economy. For years many environmental organizations and individuals have questioned the adequacy of NRC's regulations and standards; the agency's lack of commitment to regulate in an assertive manner; and the perfunctory, ineffective, and disingenuous efforts that have passed historically as NRC's public participation practices and regulations on Intervention.
Because of the federal pre-emptive status NRC holds over states and other levels of government on issues involving nuclear power safety and licensing; because the NRC has, by its historic actions and inactions, rendered useless the only statutorib available avenue the public has to question nuclear power plant safety (the "2.206 provision" of 10CFR); and because the NRC has abdicated so much of its authority, and/or delegated it to the nuclear power industry, it is clear that the only recourse left for substantive positive change in nuclear safety is the Congress.
Even members of Congress have recently questioned NRC's ineffectiveness. Sen. Joseph Blden (D. DE) has asked the Government Accounting Office to investigate NRC's regulatory performance. A report is expected out in May,1997.
In the meantime, Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun (D. It.) - the senior Senator from Illinols, the most nuclear rellant and affected state in the nation - has requested guidance on possible avenues of Congressionalintervention to insure that NRC carries out its regulatory mandate.
The following recommendations are a synthesis of comments from environmental and nuclear power experts and watch-dogs from around the country. They serve as a guide to the most urgently required areas of change, ll.
SUMMARY
OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES O lt is recommended that the Congress use what authority it has to achieve the followin7
. Empower a better " checks and balances" system regarding nuclear safety issues by 1.) authorizing shared oversight with other levels of stato and local govemment, and other federal agencies; and/or 2.) repealing the federal pre-empCon clauses of the Atomic Energy Act, thus making NRC's standards and regulatioru the minimum stanoards to insure reactor safety, cnd enabling states to set higher standards.
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. Order NRC to take stepped up enforcement actions - particularly license suspension or revoca'.cn - against nuclear utilities with chronic or immediately serious safety violatims and issueJ, using the regulations that are on the books already.
. Eliminate the NRC Office of Investigations (01) and transfer all Investigative functions and resources to the NRC Inspector General (IG).
. Enact " citizen suit" provisions on reactor safety issues, as are currently in effect in other major federal laws governing environmental safety and quality (eg., Clean Air G Act, Clean Water Act).
. Either radically change and strengthen, or else scrap the curren' "2.206 Petition Process" governing the rights of the public to challenge the operating license of a nuclear reactor, in one of the following ' ways:
1.) provide an adjudicatory process for public petitions filed under 10 CFR 2.206, requiring an evidentiary hearing and appeals process of NRC decisions; 2.) perhaps replace it with the " citizen suit" process mandated in othar major federal laws goveming environmental safety and quality (eg., Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act).
. Order NRC to require all reactors to attain " design basis" specifications within a specified period of time, or face revocation of operating license until compliance is met. Rescind NRC's currc .i policies of " design basis amnesty,"
- enforcement discretion," and " generic rulemaking."
. Underaccruement of reactor decommissioning funds, particularly in the upcoming world of early reactor retirement and electric utility deregulation should be addressed in one of the following ways:
1.) any nuclear related " stranded costs" granted n" clear power utilities by state PUC's in the course of enacting utility "de-regulation" schemes (or gr6nted through federal FERC action, where states do not act on de regulation) will be placed in a dedicated #
escrow account to insure that sufficient reactor decommissioning funds will exist, no matter when a reactor is forced to close; 2.) provide incentives for private insurers to unden,vrite portions of the outstanding decommissioning debt.
. Strengthen protection of all nuclear whistle-blowers, inside or outside of NRC.
. Revise 10 CFR 50 and/or 10 CFR 72 to clarify the confusion / lack d regulatory direction regarding the problem created when nuclear reactors are closed (eg.,
Dresden 1, Haddom Neck) and yet need to continue the ongoing operation and active supervision of their spent fuel pools. 9 9
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Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
http //www.senste gov /~biden ---
g ST TEMENT DY SEN. JOSEPli R. BIDEN, JR. '
GAO REPORT PRESS CONFERENCE JUNE 17,1997 O f We are here te" lay to talk about some very serious problems within the Nuclear country. Regulatory Commission. There arg 110 nuclear power plants in this Ensuring that they operate in a safe manner is an awesome responsibility . the ramifications of just one serious accident are enormous. In my view, there is no greater public trust.
'Yet the NRC is not doing its job. For those of you who don't alreadv know, my interest in how well the NRC does its job goes back more than lb years '.. in 1983, a serious accident at Salem located in Salem, New Jersey, -
and the resulting NRC investigation raised serious questions about NRC's ability to safeguard the public. . -
Like Nero fiddling while Rome burned, the nrc has since stSod idly by O while salem has stumbled through a decade and a half of mismanagement, safety violations, and NRC fines. Year af ter year, mishap af ter mishap, I called the NRC.for tougher regulatory scrutiny -- only to be paid lip service by In fact, it was the utility . PSE&G -- that voluntarily shutdown Salem 1 and 2 id June 1995 because they -- not the NRC -- realized how unsafe the plants had become. My own frustrations have been shared by Senator Liebeman -- time and time again we have heard reports frou NRC
- i whistle complacency blowerson and concerned the part citizens pointing toward ineptitude and of the NRC.
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Safety violations go unreported or uncorrected. Potentially catastrophic accidents are narrowly averted. Whistle blowers are n intimidated and harassed. Tnere is a crisis of confidence in the NRC. In s February 1996, Senator Lieberman and I asked the General Accounting office to look into NRC's oversight of nuclear power plants, particularly the Salem plants, and the Hillstone, and Cooper plants, sin Connecticut and Nebraska, respectively.
I I The GAO report that we are releasing today confirms what we've been l saying for the past 15 years: that there is an attitude within the NRC, a
" culture of tolerating deteriorate, year af terproblems,*
year. that has allowed nuclear plants to NRC's complacency is sit.. ply inexcusable. We have been very it,rtunate that we have not had nere serious nuclear accidents in this country; but, and this report proves, that may have been more the result of luck than of etfactive regulatory oversight.
Among the findings:
The NRC has failed to take aggressive enforcement action when it came to safety requirements.
When violations were uncovered, NRC often relied on the plants' promises to make changes -- yet rarely followed-up to ensure that .
corrective measures were taken.
NRC's lack of aggressive action when problems were first reported compounded the worsening condition of the plants studied. For example:
CAO foundreactors the salem that of the can43be deficiencies restarted, that must all but be addressed 5 existed before when the reactor was operating.
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.O When the NRC did act, it was often too late: roughly half of the plants on the problem plant list were known by the NRC to be poor performers long before they received additional regulatory attention.
On a more basic level, sloppy record keeping by utilities and the NRC alike, make it virtually impossible for the nre to be sure that all plants are still operating in accordance with their designs and thus within adequate safety margino.
o Finally, competent plant management, which everyone agrees is key to oafe operations, is not even assessed directly in nre inspectione and reports.
In short, this agency has repeatedly turned a blind eye'.to long-otending problems and poor management. It has placed the public unnacessarily nntional oversight at risk and has compromised its own credibility to manage a program. !
ycer to Now,address to bethese fair, the NRC has taken some positive steps over the past problems, l and I commend the current chairman and f commission for taking these issues seriously. But I remain cautious. '
Chairman Jackson will not always be at the helm -- the american people must g ba able to trust an agen y, not just a person. And I am still convinced thnt there public safety remains concerns.a mind set within the NRC that is not responsive to So what do we do to rebuild the public's trust in the NRC and make curo that these plants are operated safely? First, I believe that there f aought to be congressional hearings to further explore NRC's shortc omin gs cnd what I the commission can do immediately to address these failings - the commission Secondly, should welcome this cpportunity to restore the public's faith.
the NRC should conduct a top-to-bottom review of its inspection processes and do a much better job of seeing to it that problems are dotceted and dealt with in'a timely manner, er Thirdly, the NRC must m nngement. While we want assess the competency and performance of plant to encourage more effective industry self-policing, we need to have the mechanisms in place to make sure that we navar have a lax management team running any nuclear plant. ,
NRC, Unfortunately, I remain convinced that an industry bias' permeates the and that safety concerns come second. Troubled nuclear plants are not old the carsground with -- malfunctioning and accidents are gauges not and bald tires that can be driven into Nuclear plants are 3xtremely complex instruments that mustthe equivalents of fender-benders.
operate at the highest possible levels of precision and safety, e
NRC must its failures take this report seriously, stop tempting fate, and address
-- immediately! The american public has a right to demand and expoct chould be only of the highestimportance.
paramount of standards from a regulatory agency where safety With many plants approaching the end of their licenses approaching, time to correct and deregulation of the electricity industry fast have a second chance. these problems is running out. We may not,
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