ML20217D532

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Forwards Partially Withheld Background Briefing Package in Preparation for 951116 Meeting Between Commission & Senior Comed Mgt.Purpose of Visit to Discuss Performance at Each of Sites & Challenges & Issues Needed to Be Addressed
ML20217D532
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/09/1995
From: Capra R
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Mccree V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20217D413 List:
References
FOIA-97-178 NUDOCS 9710030266
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Text

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- LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY I D 5

[ pac t UNITED STATES

  • ;' W. ,)f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r WASHINGTON. o.C. 80MH001

%. ,* November 9 .'.995 Commission Briefina Paner NEMORANDLM T0: Victor M. McCree Chief Regional Operations Staff Office of the Executive Director for Opera ons FROM: Robert A. Capra, Director /7 Project Directorats !!!-2 ( { ' {'

Division of Reactor Projects - 1 1/!

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

VISIT BY COMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY EXECUTIVES MR. JAMES O'CONNOR AND MR. MICHAEL WI.LLACE, WITH THE CCMilSSION Enclosed is a background briefing package in preparation for the meeting between the Comission and senior Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) management on November 16, 1995. Mr. James J. O'Connor Chairman and Chief and Mr. Michael J. Wallace Executive Officer)f o Comed will pokespersons be thet primary for Comed. s(Vice Other Pres (de Nuclear Comed Officer)in personnel attendance will be J. Stephen Perry (BWR Executive Vice President), Kenneth A. Straha (PWR Executive Vice President), Jean-Pierre Mercier (Operations and Maintenance Support Vice President), John B. Hosmer (Engineering Vice President), John C. Brons (Nuclear Support Vice President),

Dennis L. Farrar (Nuclear Regulatory Services Manager), Irene M. Johnson (LicensingOperat$onsDirector),andMarciaT.Lesniak(CorporateNuclear Licensing Administrator).

The purpose of the visit is to discuss the performance at each of the sites, and the challenges and issues that the licensee believes needs to be addressed.

The following items are attached in the briefing package:

Names and Resumes of the Comed Officials

,

  • Cor> orate Organization Chart
  • Bac(ground of Comed Plant Perfonnance
  • Cerrent Issues and Concerns
  • Points to be Emphasized Suggested Questions to be Asked of the Utility Management The Most Recent Semiannual Plant Performance Assessment for Each Site Informata ia trh re:ctd was W.cd in a: cst.:c: dM lb f v.v.ia d !r.iormahon ) ,

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flons WhMui)I e3 9710030266 970930 PDR FOIA LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY PARADIS97-170 PDR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY g V. McCree .

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Should you require any additional information, please contact either me (415-1395) or Mr. George Dick (415-3019).

Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456, STN 50-457, 50-237, 50-249, 50-373, 50-374 E0-254, 50-265, 50-195, 50-304 Attachments: As Stated cc: W. Russell F. Miraglia R. Zimmennan A. Thadant J. Roe H. Miller, R-!!!

B. McCabe Distribution: PDI!!-2 r/f R. Assa G. Dick R. Latta R. Pulsifer C. Shiraki J. Stang C. Moore R. Capra P. Erickson 011B20 W. Axelson, RI!!

L. Miller, RI!! M. Farber, RIII B. Clayton, RI!!

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.)0CUMENT ,MME: G:\C0fflBR.R3 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY  ;

LINITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9.

JAMES J. O'CONNOR Chairmen and Chief Executive Officer EXPEFJENCE o Unicom/ Commonwealth Edison Company Present - 1980 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 1980 1978 Member of Board of Directors 1978 1977 President 1977 - 1973 Executive Vice President 1973 1970 Vice President 1970 - 1967 Assistant Vice President 1967 - 1966 Division Commercial Manager at Chicago North 1966 1963 Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committee e United States Air Force 1963 - 1960 'nute years of ' active duty EDUCATION e JD - Georgetown law School,1963 MBA Harvard University,1960 BS - Holy Cross College, major in economics,1958 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS e Director of Nuclear Energy Institute, Chairman of the Advance Reactor Corporation Director of Edison Electric Institute, past Chairman Board of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, past Chairman Member of Board of Directors of American Nuclear Energy Council ATTACHMENT 1

Michael 1 Wallace

. Seni:r Vice President Chief Nuclear Officer

}

EXPERIENCE

  • Commonwealth Edison Company Present 1993 Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer 1993 - 1993 Vice President, Chief Nuclear Officer 1993 - 1992 Vice President, Chief Nuclear Operating Officer 1992 - 1990 Vice President, Nuclear PWR Operations 1990 - 1989 Manager of Engineering and Construction 1989 - 1987 Manager of Projects and Construction Services 1987 - 1982 Assistant Manager of Projects, and Braidwood Project Manager 1982 - 1981 Superintendent, Waukegan Station 1981 - 1979 Assistant Superintendent, State Line Station 1979 - 1978 Project Coordinator, Byron Project 1978 - 1977 Field Cost Engineer, LaSalle, Byron, and Braidwood Projects 1977 - 1974 Quality Assurance Engineer, NSSS Programs
  • United States Navy 1974 1969 Line Officer, Nuclear Submarine Force U.S. Navy ED. UCATION
  • MBA - University of Chicago,1978 BS Marquette University in Electrical Engineering,1969 OTHER OUALIFICATIONS
  • Registered Professional Engineer PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

. Advanced Reactor Corporation, Vice President Commonwealth Research Corporation, Vice President and Director NPOC Ad Hoc Comnittee for New Nuclear Power Plant Deployment

. Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee Nuclear Strategic Issues Steering Group Utility Management Board for the Advanced Light Water Reactor First of a Kind Engineering Program American Nuclear Society

4 y -

J. STEPIIEN PERRY Senior Vice President -.

EXPERIENCE Commonwealth Edison Cnnpany Present - 1994 Vice President BWR Operations lilinois Power Company 1994 - 1992 Senior Vice President 1992 - 1989 Vice President Nuclear Operations 1989 1988 Assistant Vice President, Clinton Power Station 1988 - 1984 Manager of Nuclear Power Coordination a United States Nasy Served as Commanding Officer of nuclear powered submarine and as Commanding Officer of a submarine repair sh;p. Additionally, Mr. Perry served as senior member of the Nuclear Power Examining Board with responsibility for conducting inspections of all Pacific Fleet nuclear powered ships for proper and safe reactor plant operation.

EDUCATION

  • MS - Naval Post Graduate in computer Management,1971 BS U.S. Naval Academy,1961

Kenneth A. Stmhm Vice President of PWR Operations EXPERIENCE .

Commonwealth Edison Company Present 1994 Vice President of PWR Operations, reverse loanee from INPO, responsible for PWR Operations and the Site Vice Presidents for the Braidwood, Byron and Zion Stations Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1994 to 1990 Executive Vice President 1990 to 1988 Group Vice President of Evaluation and Assistance 1988 to 1986 Group Vice President of Training and Education 1986 to 1985 Vice President and Director of Training and Education 1985 to 1982 Director of Training and Education 1982 to 1981 Manager Human Resources and Development 1981 to 1980 Evaluation Manager United States Navy 1980 1957 23 years of service duties included: Commanding Office of USS Ray, Commanding Officer of the U. S. Naval Nuclear Power School, Orlando Florida and Senior Member of the Naval Nuclear Prepulsion Examining Board Atlantic Fleet.

EDUCATION

- MBA - Naval Postgraduate School,1968 BS - U.S. Naval Academy,1957 i

JEAN-PIERRE MERCIER

. Commonwealth Edison Company Present - 1995

. Electricite de France, Paris 1994 - 1989 Vice President, Operations and Maintenance Engineering EPRI 1989 1987 Maintenance Advisor

. Electricite de France, Paris 1987a 1979 Director, Corporate Maintenance Department

. Bugey Nuclear Generation Center (5 nuclear units) 1979 - 1974 Station Manager and Deputy Centa Manager

. Corporate Maintenance Department, Paris 1974 - 1967 Head, Nuclear and Fossil Boiler Group c Blenod Nuclear Generating Plant (4 coal units) 1967 - 1965 Maintenance Superintendent

. Blenod Nuclear Generating Plant (4 coal units) 1 % 5 - 1964 Operations Superintendent

o *

. Strasbourg Generating Plant (2 coal units) 1964 1962 Maintenance Engineer

. Military Service French Air Force, Fighter Command EDUCATION

. Mechanical Engineering Graduate, Ecole Nationale Superieure de Mecanique,1959 em

. '. JOIIN IIOSMER Engineering Vice President EXPERIENCE

. Commonwealth Edison Cornpany Present - 1994 Engineering Vice President Morida Power & Ught - Ditector of Nuclear Engineering '

1988 - 1994 Director of Nuclear Engineering

. TVA 1987 - 1988 Sequoia Project Engineer

. Bechtel Power Corporation 1973 - 1987 Senior Engineer Nuclear Group Supervisor Assistant Project Engineer Project Manager SONGS 1 Return to Senice Project Engineer - Taiwan Yenlino Project Chief Mechanical, Nuclear & Environrnental Engineer

. Military Branch 1 % 1 - 1972 Lieutenant United States Navy EDUCATION o 4 MBA - California State University,1977 BS/MS - Chemical Engineering Purdue University,1968

JOIIN C. BRONS Vice President Nuclear Support EXPERIENCE Cornmonwealth Edison Company Present 1994 Vice President Nuclear Support New York Power Authority 1994 1993 Senior Policy Advisor 1993 1991 President and Chief Operating Officer 1994 1988 Executive Vice President. Nuclear, Long Island Power Authority 1993 1993 President Empire State Electric Energy Research Corporation (ESEERCO) 1993 1991 New York Power Pool Executive Committee 1991 - 1987 Executive Vice Present Nuclear Generation 1987 1985 Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation 1985 - 1980 Resident Manager, Indian Point Three EDUCATION MS - Management , Rensselaer Polyteer e Institute,1971 BS - General Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy,1959 OTHER OUALIFICATIONS Certified Senior Reactor Operator (PWR),1980 1

DENNIS L. FARRAR Nuclear Regulatory Senices Manager EXPERIENCX

  • Commonwealth Edison Company Present .1992 Nuclear Regulatory Senices Man 8er Nuclear Licensing ,

Emergency Preparedness 1992 1989 Nuclear Services Manager Emergency Preparedness Chemistry Radioactive Waste Management Radiation Protection Nuclear Fuels Services Production Training Center l 1989 1987 Technical Senices Manager  ;

Emergency Preparedness Radiation Protection Chemistry 1987 1983 Director of Nuclear Licensing 1983 1980 Asst. Superintendent, Dresden 1980 - 1978 Tech Staff Supervisor, Dresden 1978 1975 Asst. to Tech Staff Supervisor, Dresden 1975 1974 Statistical Research, Senior Analyst 1974 1973 Nuclear Fuel Services Department, Principle Engineer EDUCATION

  • MS Sloan School at MIT,1973 NE - MIT, Nuclear Engineering Department,1971 BS . U.S. Naval Actdemy,1964 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
  • American Nuclear Society Member

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IRENE Ma JOIINSON Nuclear Licensing Director EDERIENCE -

6 Commonwestth Edison Company Present - 1994 Nuclear Licensing Director 1994 1989 Emergency Preparedness Director 1939< 1986 Nuclea Licensing Administrator

!986 - L98: Welear Communications Coordinator 1983 1942 6eneral Engineer, Station Nuclear Engineering Department 1982 1979 Engineer, Station Nuclear Engineerirq; Department EDllCATION BS Engineering Sciences /Erwironmental Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology,1979 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

. American Nuclear Society Member w

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BACKGR00m INFORMATION ON CentD The performance of Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed) plants has been .

inconsistent and a concern to the NRC, CosEd has traditionally promoted from within and as a result benefitted little from outside experience. Durin '

ambitious plant construction program during the 1970's and early 1980's,g manyits of the company's more talented managers were moved from site to site to complete construction and get the units licensed and started up. Likewise, corporate attention and resources were focused on the newer units while they were in the latter stages of construction and licensing. As a result, the older plants eenerally got fewer resources and less quality management attention. Plant material condition and operating standards and practices declined.

SECY-92-228, ' Performance of Cosmonwealth Edison Company Plants,' dated June 25, 1992, described CosEd's major weaknesses. These weaknesses were:

(1) lack of effective management attention and a weak corporate oversight of nuclear operations; 3 pplication of resources- (2)poorproblem and failure to ensure lasting corrective actions (; )(4) lack of adequate engineering support; and (5) an inability or reluctance to learn from experiences at Comed and other utilities.

In recent years, the cyclical performance of Comed plants has concerned the Commission and NRC staff. Dresden was on the Watch List from June 1987 until December 1988 and was returned to the Watch List in January 1992. Zion was on the Watch List from January 1991 until January 1993; however, following removal from the watch list the rate of performance improvement was not sustained. Decilning performance at Quad Cities was discussed at the June i

assessment was 199.1 andthere performed Junein 1993 the fallSMs; a Diagnostic of 1993. Both QuadEvaluation Cities and Team (DET)LaSalle were issu Trending Letters in January 1994 and aflain in June 1994. Significant problems were even noted at Dresden, Unit 1, wh'ch was permanently shut down in 1978.

Specifically, in January 1994 a significant freezing event on Unit 1 identified a nunoer cf management oversight weaknesses. In Jandary 1995, Quad Cities received a third Trending Letter and LaSalle was removed from the Trending Category. Braidwood has been an average performer

  • however personnel andequipmentproblemsindicatethatperformancemaybedeclining. Byron's performance has been excellent and it was identified as a Good Performer at the January 1994, June 1994 and January 1995 SMs. Presently Dresden is the only one of the Comed plants on the Watch List. However, the performance at LaSalle, Quad Cities, Zion, and Braidwood remains a staff concern.

Only within the last several years has Comed begun to take significant steps to improve performance. These steps included reorganizing to clearly establish responsibilities for plant operation and oversight; increasing the company's engineering capability; improving craft skills; benchmarkinti their performance against other utilities; and management individuals from outside the co(mpany.may w mostinc These individuals importantly) uded hir'np several corporate vice presidents, site vice presidents, plant managers, and various senior and mid-level plant management individuals. A number of the managers hired early in this process had no experience in improving the Attachment 3

2-performance of probles plants and were not effective in doing so at CosEd.

This resulted in numerous senior management changes at the morer performing '

plants. More recently, managers with preven track records gave been hired and same improvements in expectations and performance have been noted, particularly at Quad Cities.

b 0

6

Current Issues and Concerns

  • plant Perfomance Comed still faces significant opera ional challenges. During the last 3 years, the licensee has implemented both corporate and site reoiganizations and has brought in considerable management talent from outside Comed. However, the older stations Dresden, Quad Cities and Zion) continue to be challenged by longstand(hng material condition an:i human performance problems.

Quad Cities has had an efiective management team in place for almost a year and appears to be making progress in raising standards and accountability, most notably in conduct of operations in the control room. The most recent Unit 2 outage significantly in) roved some major equipment deficiencies. However, the maintenance bac(log remains high and the work control process has been ineffective.

Dresden management has been changed frequently and has continued to struggle with power operation and outage performance. While there has been some improvement at Dresden, it has been sporadic. The Site Vice President, Mr. Tom Joyce, is a long-tern Comed employee and just recently was assigned to INPO for a 6-month developmental assignment.

Mr. Stephen (Steve) Perry, BWR Vice President, is actively fil ing the position dur9ng Mr. Joyce's absence. Some progress has been made, particularly conduct with large rotating equipment, the maintenance backlog, and of operations. Operations improved significantly from the Senior Vice President's initiative to require all licensed operators to attend conservative decision making training.

Comed has tried to address problems at Zion with a unproven mana team consisting largely of individuals from within the company. gement While performance is now improved from that in the 1990 time frame (when the NRC performed a DET assessment), it has stagnated for the last few years. Zion has a very high corrective maintenance work backlog, and has not taken effective corrective action to reduce it.

LaSalle has brouqht in several capable managers from outside Comed and there has baen s'ow human performance. , but steady improvement in material condition and Braidwood, long considered a good performer, has had recent equipment problems due to a high threshold for identifying problems, and weak engineerin declined. g and corrective actions. As such, material condition has Byron is a good performer, but has lost several key management individuals to other Comed staticas. It will be a challenge for the new managers to maintain the current level of performance.

Attachment 4

+ Steam Generators ,

tubes are subject to The outsideByron 1 andstress diameter Braidwood I steam corrosion generator cracking (005C (SG)C) at the tube support

. As a cor. sequence both plants have approximately 10% of plates (TSPs) thstr tubes p lugged as of the fall of 1995.005CC at the TSPs is attributable to the use of carbon steel TSPs, the tyn of crevice between the tube and TSP, and prior secondary side cseatstry control.

The licensee's long-tem solution is to replace the steam generators; Braidwood is scheduled to be done in the fall of 1998 and Byron in the spring of 1999. 5 At present, the licensee is required by the TSs to repair or remove from service those tubes that have confirmed oddy current voltages greater than 1 volt. The licensu has requested staff approval by November 1995, to use a voltage repair limit of 3.0 volts to be applied to the Braidwood I and Byron 1 SGs only. Braidwood 1 is presently in a refueling outage. Byron I has shut down for a mid-cycle inspection of its SG tubes. This pending request deviates from the 1 volt authorized by the staff in GL 95-05, thereby involving technical questions not previously reviewed by the staff. The licensee estimates that if it can not implement the 3.0 volts criteria it will lose between $50M and $60M in power revenue over the remaining life of these steam generators.

Braidwood Insnection Results The SG inspection at Braidwood I during the present refueling outage has been completed. It included an eddy current inspection of the tubes as well as visual inspection of the SG internal components relied upon to limit the deflection of the eleven TSPs under postulated accident conditions. No visible degradation was found.

Th eddy current inspection of the SG tubes found a total of 686 SG tubes with 00 SCC indications in the range of 1.0 volt to 3.0 volts with only one indication above 3.0 volts at 3.56 volts. The approval of the pending license amendments will result in the plugging of only one tube for 00 SCC fitws.

The eddy current inspections have shown indications of circumferential cracking of the SG tubes at the top of the tube sheet. The staff has encouraged Comed to conduct a ald-cycle Braidwood 1 SG inspection late next spring for circumferential cracks to provide assurance that SG tubes with indications of cracking, found in the next SG inspection, retain adequate structural margins. The staff has also determined that some of the tubes found with circumferential crack indications have axial crack indications (mixed mode). The licensee has been requested to address the impact th1s may have on tube structural integrity and on the appropriate operating time until the mid-cycle inspection.

4 i

3 Avron Insoection Rasults As of 11/08/95, approximately 805 of the Byron 1 SG tube inspection

, results have been analyzed. To date 1465 indications of I circuaferential ciacking were found In the tubes at the top of the tube sheet and about 95 indications of axial cracking have also been found.

Some of these indications were mixed mode. . This is significantly larger than the 132 circumferential cracks found in the last $G inspection in ll/M.

i The licensee is currently planning on sleeving the majority of the defective tubes and plugging the remainder. The number and location of sleeved and plugged tubes will be detemined by thersohydraulic analysis with respect +o reactor coolant system flow. However it is expected that the repairs will result in derating of the plant's power generation capacity. The licensee is also considering pulling some of the tubes with the largest indications for destructive metallurgical examination.

Such an examination is expected to provide inforwation to help determine t the appropriate length of subsequent operating cycles.

Additionally, 770 00 SCC indications between 1.0 and 3.0 volts have been i found to date at Byron I with only one bobbin indication above 3.0 volts. The approval of the pending license amendments will result in the plugging of only one tube for 005CC flaws.

  • Technical Snecification Unarades All of the Comed sites are upgrading their Technical Specifications (TS). Dresden and Quad Cities whick han custom TS are converting to the old version of the Standard Technical specifications.

Implementation is scheduled for completion by the end of the year for Dresden and June 1996 for Oud Cities. Zion is converting to the I iSTS) with full roved Standard lesentation scheduled Technic.a1 Specifications for June 1996. App (lications from Byron, Br idwood, and LaSalle for conversion to 1STS are expected in June 1996.

4

. rearaency Onerations Facility (EOF)

In March 1993, Comed requested, that in the event that E0F activation is required for a site, the corporate EOF in Downers Grove be used as an interin E0F until the nearsite E0F is activated. The submittal was made following concerns identified by Region III inspectors regarding Com'd's '

ability to staff its E0Fs within the I hour goal specified in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. Because the corporate EOF is more than 20 miles from an change.yThe of the technical Comed issues sites,have Commission approval been resolved; the is required staff for the is preparing a Commission Paper reconnending approval.

4 In anticipation of receipt of Commission approval for the interim E0F .

the licensee has requested approval for the consolidation of the near, site E0Fs into one single central EOF Iocated at Downers Gruve. To date, no review has been initiated pending resolution of the interim E0F.

. Comoany Restructured In June J994 the company was restructured. Comed became a wholly owned subu diary of Unicos, the stated purpose being to permit the company to compete in an unregulated environment. The stockholders of Ca=Ed became the consnon stockholders of Unicom in the sa:ne proportion as they previously held Comed stock. NRC staff review of the restructuring concluded that there was no detrimental effect on the operation of the nuclear units.

  • Potential ' staff Reductions Although there have been no off t:tal announcements regarding staff reductions at any specific nuclear sites, Comed has indicated that it will be reducing its staff in order to improve the company's competitive position. Reductions of 2 000 to 2,500 bargaining unit positions are planned over the next couple of years. These reductions will be company-wide and their impact on the nuclear division is not yet known.

Reductions in professional staff were made recently in the corporate offices of Coned's Nuclear Operating Division following a detailed functional and personnel review. The total number of Comed employees at this time is about 19,400.

4

______m__-_ . _ .- - - _ _

points to be f.mphasized

  • nresden and Quad Cities Material Condition & >==n Performance

.mprovenants_Manded -

While steps have been taken at Dresden and Quad Cities to improve material condition over several years and management changes have been ande, Comed has a long way to go on thse plants. The Quad Cities.

management team has made good progress in resolution of major plant deficiencies while the Dresden management team has yet to prove itself.

Significant work remains to fully resolve equixaent, technical support and work control issues. While both stations save made some progress in improving human performance standards and accountability (e.g., recent sustained management attention steps to improve and stability control are critical room standards) to achieve nee ded station-wide, lasting change.

  • Zion proaress Slow While equipment and personnel perfonnance at Coned's other older station (Zion Citie),s in some respects progress has been slower.has Becausenot recently declined to the of concerns with the slow progress, we will be closely evaluating the effectiveness of the new management team.
  • Maintain Attention on LaSalle LaSalle has made slow but steady improvements over the last year.

However, equipment problems and poor original design issues continue to challenge the operators. It is important that Contd management ensures that this improving trend continues.

  • Arrest Material Condition Decline at Braidwood We are concerned that Comed has allowed material condif. ion to degrade at Braidwood, their newett plant. Weak engineering and corrective actions, high threshold for 16entifying problems, and lack of questioning attitude by most plant discip ines have led to a gradual decline in overall plant performance. Comed management needs to address this situation before it becomes a safety concern.
  • Many Mannaement Chanaes Could Affect Byron Performance Byron has had numerous management and staff personnel changes over the last couple of years. Many of these individuals have taken positions at the poorer performing plants. We will monitor Byron's performance in light of all these changes.

Attachment 5

2

  • M.intain Focus on Plant Perfonnance Comed needs to maintain a management focus on plant performance and ensure that resources are used to see improvement programs through to the end. Too often, the Itcensee has ' declared victory" too soon and abandoned programs prior to completion or changed the management team too quickly after improvements were noted (e.g., Zion).
  • Maintain Strona Manaca==gt Oversicht in Decentra11 ration While reducing resources to stay competitive, Comed should carefully evaluate the effect of planned reductions on all aspects of plant operation so that safe operation of the plants is not compromised.

Further, with Coned's large number of nuclear units and its efforts toward decentralization, strong cor> orate management oversight of the sites is important in maintaining tie Coned's authority and responsibility for its nuclear program.

Take a Leadina Role in Technical Issues Licensees must take t;1e lead in the resolution of technical issues that may arise. The staff believes, for example, that Comed has been unduly

, dependent on the staff to lead the resolution of the steam generator issues at Byron and Brai& rood. Our expectation is that the licensees conduct adequate research and evaluation up front such that the path leading to resolution and NRC approval is clear, direct and defensible without requiring an excessive commitment of NRC staff resources.

O

PRE-DSCISIOM&L SEMT nMUEL PL&MT PERPo*MnCE ASSESSMENT BRAIDWOOD UNITS 1 AMD 2 MERCE 1995 TO &UGUST 1995 .

FERFORMANCE OVERVIEW

  • Three new insi5 hts about deteriorating performance brou& h t Braidwood into clearer focus in this period. First, the uterial condition of the station has degraded significantly, with little attention by the licensee. This is evident primarily in the large number of unattended leaks on pumps and valves throughout the plant.

Second, the licensee's reluctance to identify and address problems was apparent in their limited problem identification and improper use of temporary alterations in lieu of modifications. Finally, significant performance mistakes in the last year by maintenance, engineering and operations came to light, and seemed to reflect low licenses standards.

The licensee has very recently started to recognize these shortcomings to a limited degree, and has begun to assess its performance more self-critically.

However, a prolonged legacy of complacency and the burden of some equipment neglect will not be rapidly reversed.

5 Braidwood operated throughout this period without a significant number of operational transients. Unit I completed a special steam generator inspection mid-cycle outage which found extensive steam geneaator degradation to be progressing somewhat more rapidly than predicted nine months ago, 1

SUMMARY

OF LICENSEE STRENGTES AND WEAINESSES IIISD&LhE

  • Station Dose
  • Plant Material Condition
  • Craft Capability of the Maintenar.co Department /Use of the Vroblem Identification System
  • Engineering Resolution of longstanding Problems
  • Procedure Adherence Problems
  • Knowledge of Design Basis e

Attachment 7

e Ineffective Self Assessments e Teamwork

  • Work Control '

FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSESSMDrFS

1. OPERATIONS Performance in this area was rated 1 in the last SALP but has declined during the current SALP period.

Operator actions in response to transients was go.- However, wealmesses in procedure adherence and crew teamwork identifiou in the previous 6 month period still occur. Weak teamwork, which was a principal contributor to a technical specification violation for failure to open reactor trip breakers, was also the principal contributor to two recent technical specification violations. Other weak areas were operability determinations and problem reporting. Operations failed to adequately address significant station material condition problems. No operability determination was made following the failure of a safety-related battery ventilation fan nor was the operability impact of a jacket water leak on a diesel properly evaluated.

Operations was aware of, but did not consistently document equipment problems, such as two nonsafety related pumps that were not used because of excessive oil leakage.

2. MAINTENANCE Performance in this area was rated 1 in the last SALP but has declined during the current SALP period.

Significant problems have been identified in the use of the problem identification process, performance of self-assessments, and maintenance department craft capability (skill of the craft). Maintenance personnel failed to identify significant deterioration of the hypochlorite syeten, missing expansion joint tie rods on diesel generator lube oil systems, and improper installation of Posi-seal trunnion valves in the circulating water vacuum priming system. The maintenance department has not used the problem identification form (PIF) system effectively. Personnel are hesitant to write personnel error PIFs to avoid perceived potential retribution. Craft skill capability problems have contributed to a 25 gallen reactor coolant system leak, an inadvertent power operated relief valve actuation, improper installation of 2A RHR cooler tube sheet Sasket which rendered the cooler inoperable, and improper installation of an emergency service water pump oil cooler gasket. Craft skill testing revealed inabilities to perform fundamental operations such as repacking valves, assembling gasketed flanges, and safely installing grounding devices on electrical equipment.

2

As a result of the problems identified above, the overall material condition of the plant has slowly declined over the years and is poor. Numerous flange, valve packing, and valve body to bonnet leaks, as well as numerous .

pump water and oil seal leaks exist in both safety- and nonsafety related systems. -

3. EBCNEERIEG Performance in this area was rated 2 in the last SALP but has declined during the current SALP period, h licensee has failed to adequately address numerous longstanding material condition problems. The most s.*gnificant examples include:
  • Magterm problems with auxiliary building ventilation fan failures and flow balancing.

Inability to isolate the essential service water system for routine maintenance.

Poor performance of the chemical feed, condensate / condensate booster, and heater drain systems.

Boric acid buildup on numerous carbon steel components.

h licenses has taken recent actions to address these issues.

A majority of system engineers have failed to adequately identify material condition problems associated with their astigned systear. In addition, it was a common practice to work around problems through installation of temporary alterations once system operation was affected.

However, notable progress was made in the implementation of the MOV program following the part 1 inspection, particularly with respect to completion of gate and globe valve testing. The MOV program was well supported by management. Overall, the MOV staff members were highly competent. This can be attributed to the retention of experienced individuals.

4. P1 ANT SUPPORT Performance in this area was rated 2 in the last SALP but has improved during the current SALP period.

Licensee efforts at identifying contaminated items both inside and outside the RFA were good. Recent actions to limit the likelihood of unmonitored items leaving the RFA (e.g., using tool monitors, stationing RP technicians at the RFA access, and limiting the influx of tools and equipment into the RFA) appeared adequate. Control of station dose remained a strength.

Overall results of routine region-based inspections of radiation protection, chemistry, REMP, and solid radwaste and transportation indicated that the licensee had effectively managed these programs.

3

SUPPIJMENTAL DATA

5. SALP RATINGS AIb TREEDS FUNCTIONAL AREA SALP RATING FOR SALP PR(MECTION OR TREND NUMBER 12 TO DATE PLANT OPERATIONS 1 2 MAINTENANCE 1 2 ENGINEERINC 2 2 P1 ANT SUPPORT 2 1
6. MAJOR FIANNED ACTIVITIES AFFECTING the UTILITY or SITE Next refueling outage:

Unit 1 September 30, 1995 Unit 2 March 2, 1996 Major management changes:

  • Tim Tulon replaced Kurt Kofron as Station Manager.
  • Al Haeger replaced Eileen Roche as Health Physics Services Supervisor.
  • Eileen Roche replaced Al Haager as Executive Assistant to the Site Vice President.
  • Jim Meister has replaced Bob Kerr (on loan from Westinghouse) as Engineering Manager in November 1995, t

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PRE-DECISIONAL grumnrUAL PIANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT BYROM GENERATING STATION MARCE 1995 TO AUGUST 1995 PERFORM &BCE OVERVIEW -

The rtatien centinues to be an above average performer, operating conservatively. The number of significant problems has been small. No reactor trips or major ESF failures occurred during this period. Teamwork among the plant departments continued to be excellent. The licensee continued to be self-critical by identifying and resolving performance problems. Plant support continued to be an area of excellent performarme.

Although the licensee's overall performance was considered to be good, personnel performance errors were common early in the period. Recently, performance errors have not been as frequent. Management attention relating to performance errors now appears to be satisfactory.

SUlel&RY OF LICENSEE STR.ENGTBS AND WEAENESSES Strenrths

  • Teamwork and Interdepartmental Communications
  • Conservative Pro 5rammatic Approaches
  • Radiation Protection Program / low C>11 active Dose
  • System Engineering - Self Assessment EtakDransa
  • Performance Errors (most significant earlier in the period, primarily Operations and Maintenance)

FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSESSMENTS

1. OPERATIONS Previous SALP rating in Operations was a 1. Operations performance appeared to have declined, due to personnel errors, during the previous semi-annual period. Several performance errors continued early on the assessment period, but few mistakes were made later in the period, and operations were uneventful. Management attention to improve human performance and reduce personnel errors appeared satisfactory; however, it is too early to determine whether this improvement can be sustained.

Wstkarounds do cxist; htwsysr. thio has not become o major issue. The

. . licensee is adequately addressing the workarounds. Overall, performance this period was considered satisfactory.

2. MADrTENANCE Previous SALP rating in Maintenance was a 1. Maintenance performance -

declined, mostly due to personnel errors, during the previous semi.

annual period. In this period, performance was generally good, with minor exceptions. Maintent.nce displayed good work control, planning, and team effort with other departments. A procedural adherence violation on scaffolding issue was identified; however, it appeared to be isolated. Currently, procedure adherence problems in maintenance are not a significant concern.

3. ENCIurrargo Previous SALP rating in Engineering was a 1. Engineering performance was good during the previous semi annual period and remained good this period. System Engineering in particular was noted to be good.

Conscientious and knowledgeable system engineers continue to trend and work to improve their systems. Presently, some developing issues associated with equipment qualification and shutdown margin calculation are being reviewed.

  • The licensee has submitted a request for approval of a 3 volt repair criteria for steam generator tubes. Coned's technical oversight and management in support of the request has been mediocre. Consequently additional staff review time and additional licensee submittals have been required.
4. PLANT SUPPORT Previous SAI.P ratin- in Plant Support was a 1. Plant Support performance was gooo during the previous semi-annual period and remained good overall this period. Fire Protection worked to improve the fire door impairment program late in the period. The AIARA organization was strong. Material condition was good, with minor exceptions. In general, housekeeping was satisfactory; however, a slight decline appeared to be occurring. The licensee was addressing the issue to further enhance station housekeeping.

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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

5. SALP RATINCE AMD TREEDS Functional Area SALP Rating for Projection or Trend to Date SALP Number 12 ,

Plant Operations 1 1, declining early, then steady Maintenance 1 1, slightly declining Engineering 1 1 Plant Support 1 1

6. MAJOR PLANNED ACTIVITIES AFPECTING the UTILITT or SITE Next refueling outage: Unit 1: 3/29/96 - 5/13/96 Unit 2: 9/6/96 - 11/9/96 Other Planned outages: Unit 1: Mid cycle, 10/20/95-- 11/20/95 Unit 2: None Major Management changes: .

Yurt Kofron, Station Manager, effective April 25, 1995 Dave Vorniak, Engineering Manager, effective June 12, 1995.

7. OTHER Mid. cycle outage work: The Unit 1 eid-cycle outage is required for D4 SG inspections. Slesving will be included in the repair options. In addition to the SG inspection, several components will be repaired. All s!;,nificant degraded safety related equipment appeared to be included in the outage worklist.

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PRE-DBCISIO311L '

SEMTmU1L PLANT PERPORMANCS ESSESSISNT DRESDEN NUMTB1B PLENT MARCE 1955 TO SEPTEMBER 1995 ,

PERFORMASCE OFERVIEW Significant efforts have been initiated to reinvigorate the Dresden improvement initiatives. Most notable are the recent management changes throushout the organization. Manalament response to events has been much improved including the critical questioning of performance and immediate action to prevent recurrence. The scope for the current plant outages is q appropriate and included plans for significant meterial condition improvements. Continued progress in engineering is in the right direction with significant changes being made at all levels. Performance in the radiation protection area has been poor; however, strong management response to events is continuing.

SUIntARY OF LICENSEE STRENGTRS AND WEAKNESSES Strengths

  • Improvements in response to events.
  • Nonradiological laboratory analysis, yo e Very good plant water chemistry. .

a Weaknesses

  • Material condition.
  • Personnel errors: procedural adherence, independent verification.
  • Configuration control / management
  • Migh worker dose, poor radworker practices and contamination controls.
  • Procedure quality.
  • Craft skill level.
  • Work Control Process.

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FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSESSMENTS

1. OPERATIONS over the last 6 months, operations performance has been adequate and shown improvement. However, this assessment is being made with both units in -

shutdown. Unit 3 was returned to service in late september after a 4 month forced outage for a main turbine blade failure. A period of operation will be needed to fully assess the changes implemented within operations. The improved performance in operations was a result of management initiatives chat included reenforcing standards and expectations to the operations staff and making some personnel changes. Management's response to events is much improved including the critical questioning of performance and immediate response to events to prevent recurrence.

Safety equipment availability is improving but even future goals lag behind current industry averages Configuration control remains a problem, with continuing out of-service personnel errors Verification of actions (self-checking) remains weak, but panel attentiveness and supervisory review standards have been put in place Initial licensed operater training remains weak

2. MAINTENANCE ,

Maintenance remained constant at a 2 rating during the latest SALP period.

The scope for the current Unit 2 refuel outage and the Unit 3 forced outage were reviewed. Significant material condition improvements were planned.

The inspectors could not identify any additional safety significant work not already in the scope. The control room work request backlog has been reduced and the operator work around backlog has been reduced but the remaining backlog was still substantial.

Poor material condition and rework contributed to numerous equipment failures Rework was frequent and the licensee only recently started a trending program Work scheduling and execution have exhibited problems and errors of several kinds, resulting in no progress in reducing backlogs Numerous examples of poor maintenance personriel performance occurred (errors, FME problems, OOS

  • glitches * )

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3. ENGINEERING In the last SALP period the licenses was rated as a Category 3. Continued progress in engineering is encouraging. Significant changes occurred at .

all levels of the engineering organization over the last six months.

Although the changes made in engineering over the last six months are -

encouraging, time is needed to assess the full effectiveness of those changes.

  • Cood engineering response to amargent equipment failures
  • Licensee self-identified configuration control problems related to modifications Improved interactions with and operations confidence in system engineers a positive, but individual system engineers vary widely in knowledge, skill and involvement
4. PLANT SUPPORT Performance in Plant Support was rated Category 2 during the last SALP, overall performance during this last six month period has been consistent with the SALP 2 level although if Radiation Protection was on its own it would be probably be rated a 3.

Radiation protection technician skill levels and overall performance remain low, with numerous RPT errors s

Contamination control, dose control and radworker practices remain weak, contributing to high cumulative statior dose

  • Overall E-P exercise performance was good but several minor deficiencies were noted
  • Chemistry, REMP and security areas have not been recently evaluated, but prior performance was at an adequate to good level e

Examples of fire protection program implementation weaknesses suggest management's expectations have not been communicated well 3

SUFFLEMENTAL DATA

5. SALF RATIBGS AND TEENDS SALF 13: 8/93 3/95 SALF 14: 3/95 - 10/96 MMICTICMAL AREA SALP RATING FOR SALP FROJECTION OR TREND NUMBER 11 TO DATE PLAFF OPERATIONS 3 improving MAINTENANCE 2 steady ENGINEERING 3 igroving FIANT SUFFORT 2 _

steady

6. NMOR FIANNED ACTIVITIES AFFECTING the UTILITT or SITE Next refueling outage:

Unit 2 - February 2,1997, possible mid cycle maintenance outage in 1996.

Current refuel outage is scheduled to end mid October.

Unit 3 - March 16, 1996 (68 days). Most recent forced outage was completed on November 8,1995. ,

Major management changes:

John M. Heffley (Mike) took over as Station Manager. He has had a significant impact on accountability at all levels of the organizatton. He has demonstrated high expectations for maintensece and operations and a low tolerance for people not meeting expectations.

Tim O'Connor is now the Operations Manager for Entta 2 and 3. He has initiated higher standards for panel attentiveness, procedure adherence, and three way communications.

L one shift manager is now responsible for both units. The persons selected to remain as shift managers were viewed as the batter performers in the simulator and those who had fewer crew performance errors on shift. One of the weaker performers was reassigned to traintag.

All management positions within RP have recently been changed. The RPM has been at the station for aboe~ 10 months and this management position has the most tenure in the department. Recently the first line supervisors were replaced because of continuing events in radiation protection.

4

4 Significant changes have occurred at all levels of the engineering organization. New senior level managers have been brought in from outside the licensee organization and a significant number of new, outside engineers have also been hired. Current changes include rebidding all -

first level supervisor positions within system engineering and transferring '

the construction group to the maintenance department. 'though changes are substantial, time is still needed to assess the effectiveness of those i changes.

Within the maintenance organization, the licensee plans to implement full unitization. Previously, only management and select groups were unitized.

l rne goal is to have all maintenance personnel assigned to work on Unit 2 or

! Unit 3.

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PRE-DECISIONAL SEMrtuuGAL PLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT QUAD CITIES MUCLEAR POWER STATION ukacB 1995 To SEPTEMEER 1995 ,

PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW Overell perfermance showed improvement, especially during the last 6 months.

The new senior management team has established a clear course of action and increased accountability to improve performance. Notable examples include the strong oversight provided in the area of control room operations; the increased outage scope e,n Unit 2 to fix major equipment deficiencies such as feed ro5 valves, turbine DIC, and CRD system; improved A1 ARA planning and implementation; and the aggressive management response to plant events.

Significant challenges still exist regarding work control processes, skill level of craft personnel, engineering evaluations, personnel errors, effective corrective actions, and long-tern equipment problems. The licensee is experiencing several personnel errors at the working level particularly outside the control room.

SUMMARY

OF LICENSEE STRENGTHS AND VEAENESSES Strenrthm

  • Strong management team
  • Management oversight and safety focus in control room o AIARA planning and implementation
  • Source term reduction
  • Non-radiological analytical chemistry
  • Management support and improving trend in EP program Weaknesses
  • Work Control Process
  • Maintenance (skill of craft, quality of work, training, supervisory oversight, and rolling work schedule)
  • Material condition, but improving
  • Out-of-service and configuration control problems Corrective actions effectiveness (SALP theme)
  • High collective dose (poor work practices / dose control)

Other

  • Efforts to improve reliability of systems
  • Poor operation of hydrogen water chemistry ,

FUNCTIONAL ARIA ASSESSMENTS

1. OPERATIONS The licensee was recently assessed a SALP Category 2 based on the improvements made in the conduct of operations. Management efforts to improve control room communications and panel monitoring have been successful in creating a more formal and attentive control room environment. Operations implemented improved standards for procedural adherence, self check, and communications with mixed results from operators outside the control room. Out-of service tagging errors and other problems involving configuration of plant equipment continue to be a problem.

Operator work-around lists and control room corrective maintenance are receiving adequate management attention.

  • The ability of the operations departasnt to identify and resolve equipment problems is mixed.
  • Control room operators failed to trip the reactor after a pre-established test parameter was exceeded.
  • Personnel errors continue in the conduct of routine operations.
2. MAINTENANCE Maintenance performance continues to be adequate. Management response to specific plant problems such as foreign material control and the high number of equipment vibration problems has been good. However, continued weaknesses in work control, personnel performance, and lingering material condition issues remain major impediments to performance improvement.

Improvement was noted in safety focus and metagement involvement.

  • Overall plant material condition remained poor, however steady progress has been made over the last 6 montha.
  • Programs and procedures for the conduct of maintenance and the control of work activities are ineffective.
  • Significant performance weaknesses exist in the quality of work.

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3. ENGIntamT3G Overall, performance in engineering improved over the last 6 months. A ,

strong engineering management team with a commitment to sustain long term improvement is in place. Positive trends in management oversight were ,

exhibited late in the assessment period, including the restructuring of tho' engineering organisation to clarify eng'r.aering roles and responsibilities and establishing clear expectations of g e lity. Significant improvements remain to be mada in system engineering effectiveness, design change backlog reduction, plant system and equipment material condition improvements, engineering work quality, and self assessment effectiveness.

Rngineering identification and resolution of equipment problems is improving.

1he integration of engineering activities at Quad is still being defined by the new management team.

Some engineering personnel errors have occurred over the last 6 months; however, the licensee has responded aggressively.

  • Veak engineering design knowledge has been observed.
4. PIANT SUPPORT Overall, plant support continues to be good. Radiation protection performance has improved over the last 6 months, particularly with regard to A1 ARA planning and implementation. Recent outage dose performance was good, but long term collective dose remained high. Some weaknesses were noted in both individual radworker and RP departmental performance.

Performance in the chemistry area and radiological environmental monitoring program (RENP) continued to be very good with some exceptions in chemistry.

The Security program was fundamentally sound and equipment performance was good; however, some weaknesses were seen in daily security requirements.

Overall, the fire protection program was acceptable.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

5. SALP RATINGS AND Turuna PUNCTIONAL AREA SALP RATING FOR SALP PROJECTION OR TREND NUMBER 11 TO DATE PIANT OPERATIONS 2 CONSTANT MAINTENANCE 3 CONSTANT ENGINEERING 2 CONSTANT PIANT SUPPORT 2 CONSTANT 3

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6. MAJOR FIANND ACTIVITIES AFFECTING the !!TILITT cr SITE Next refueltag outage:

Unit 1 February 3 until April 3,199f, Unit 2 January 6 until March 30, 1997 INFO Visits:

Simulator Inspection Sept. 11 - 15, 1995 INPO Assessment Visit Oct. 2.- 13, 1995 Major Management Changes: None Major Management Neetings: SALP meeting: September 13, 1995 Major NRC Inspections: None planned I

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PRE-DECISIOM&L SIEMrmuwCAL PLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER $TATION MARCE 1995 TO AUGUST 1995 PERF0aMAmf2 OVERVIEW Notable performance improvements due to intense management focus have been made in several narrow areas such as source term reduction, A1 ARA planning, and emergency preparedness. However, more widespread, general improvement remains slow and difficult. Poor material condition remains the largest problem facing LaSalle. Causes include poor original design, weak engineering, low maintenance work rates, and a high tolerance / low recognition of workarounds. Efforts in the last six months have resulted in a marked increase in planning, management involvement, and accountability. However, difficulties persisted in the recent Unit 2 refueling outage resulting in 113 days actual vs. 62 days planned and contributed to a low rate of fixing problems. Changes to the management team are still occurring and the new individuals are raising standards and expectations. While improvements have been seen in engineering, they are still in a reactive environment and are just beginning to systematically attack major longstanding problems.

SUMMARY

OF LICENSEE STRENGTES AND VEAENESSES Strenrths ,

  • Source term reduction efforts
  • AIARA planning improvements
  • Chemistry self assessment and analytical skills Weaknesses
  • Equipment material condition
  • Maintenance work process and packages, although improving
  • Engineering remains largely reactive
  • Operator standards and expectations, although improving
  • Operating p~ocedures and the procedure change process
  • Self-assessment capability (corrective actions)
  • Radworkar practices and dose ownership, although improving

FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSgSSMENTS

1. OPERATIONS Overall operator performance remains average. Imprcvement is slow due to low standards and expectations and operator's disinclined to change.
  • Strengths continue to include the operators' response to transients. The new operations manager has provided strong leadership, raised standards and expectations, and challenged supervisors to improve or move out. Crew acceptance is slow. Some shift engineers and most other operations management have been replaced. These organizational changes are more extensive and run to a lower level than previous personnel changes implemented in attempts to address the problems.

The overall quality of procedures continues to be weak; procedures are inefficient and confusing, h e procedure change process is ineffective; consequently, workers are disinclined to identify problems. Current estimates are that 20 man years of work are necessary to improve the identified problems.

Decisions on plant eperations are becoming more conservative, but this is mainly being led from the top down. Operations is trying to take the role of holding other organizations accountable for meeting schedules and returning fixed components on time. The operation's culture still does not recognize some issues are workarounds, because they have "always" operated that way. The total number of workarounds also remains high.

Equipment proble.as continue to present operational challenges:

n e large number of operator workarounds f.s being reduced very slowly.

2. MAINTENANCE Material condition continued to present the biggest challenge to LaSalle.

Equipment problems occasionally hampered the operators' rasponse to plant events. Good progress has been made in performing system walkdowns, identifying material condition problems, and s.cheduling the corrective maintenance backlog. However, continuing problems with the out-of-service process, incomplete work packages, low wrench time, and emergent work activities have hampered Comed's ability to complete work and improve material condition. Deficiencies in the surveillance program were evident as surveillances continued to be missed. This is an example of weak self-assessment capabilities, as the licensee had indicatiens that this was a serious problem six months ago and adequate corrective actions have net been taken.

3. ENGINazarug Performance is average with a slight upward trend. Management changes have

' improved engineering performance. The site and system engineering managers have increased standards and expectations on the quality of work as well aa 2

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s early engineering involvement in problem Ec 21ution. Design engineer!.ng has recently gotten much more involve (. in the problem resciution procose at asn earlier stage than they did previously. However, system engineering is struggling to get out of the reactive mode and t ransition into a pron:tive '

mode to identify and correct equipment probinas before they present operational difficultses. Wile resolution of routine issues is slow, engineering continues to do a very good job at addressing problems ones the incuen are identified and raised to a significant attention level. Overall engineering effectiveness to improving material condition is stial weak, as demonstrated by slow progress on resolving workarounds and top technical issus.

4. P1 ANT SUPPOET
  • Performance in Radiological Controls was good and improving. LaSalle was successful in improving collective dose from the fourth to the third quartile for BWRs; this trend appeared to be continuing.
  • Performance in chemistry was good, but weaknesses continued in control of water quality.
  • Performance in emergency preparedness (EP) was considered good as substantial improvements have been maue in the last year,
  • Performance in Security remained unchanged from the previous period and is good,
  • The fire prctection program was adequate with significant weaknesses noted in inspection and testing of emergency lighting units, initiation and performance of hourly fire watch tours as compensatory measures for fire protection impairments, and one case involving the control of combustible materials.

SUPP12 MENTAL DATA

5. SALP RATINGS AND TRENDS FUNCTIONAL AREA I SALP RATING POR SALP PROJECTION OR TREND NUMBER _ 12 . To DATE PIANT OPERATIONS 2 Steady MAINTENAP9E 3 Slight Improvement ENGINEERINC 2 Steady PIANT SUPPORT 3 Improving 6

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6. MAJ01 FIA4WED ACTIVITIES AFFECTING the UTILITY or SITE Next refueling outage (for each unit):

Unit 1 1/26-3/10/f5 Unit 2 9/07-11/5/96 Major management changes:

las Guthrie - Operaticas Manager (6/95)

Paul Smith - Maintenance Superintendent (6/95)

Doug Brown - Acting SQV Dirsetor (7/95)

' Petros Antonoupolis - Site Engineering Manager (6/95)

Rich Jacobs (1 year INFO loanee) - Syctem Engineering Supervf sor (3/95)

JoEllen Burns - Regulatory Assurance Supervisor (6/95)

Al Magnafici - Shift Operations Supervisor (8/95)

Other: None 4

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O PRE-DBCISIONAL

g e rmuug&L yLANT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT IION STATION
MARCE 1995 TO &UGUST 1995 t

PERFORMANCE OVERVIEN i

i Zion's performance in the last six months has been poor. A large number of i

' personnel errors, violations, and deteriorating plant material condition have been observed. Theme have occurred against a background of mainly uneventful power operations and significant changes in plant management. It appears that Zion is suffering from a long legacy of ineffective corrective action for l equipment problems, low standards for task performance, and management complacency. Senior management recognizes that this is an unacceptable I foundation for safe operations. In the last six months, they have made

changes in plant management in an attempt to begin to reverse these root l causes. With the exception of the new Engineering Manager, the new managers i have yet to make a noticeable impact on performance or personnel attitudes.

) No major efforts to correct the fundamental problems are apparent. It remains to be seen whether Zion can correct thest underlying problems before an incident occurs which further illuminates Zion's weaknesses.

SUMMARY

OF LICENSEE STRENGTES AND VEAENESSES Strenrthm

!

  • Senior management recognition of problems Frequent senior management prasence in plant l

Cood initial implementation of dose reduction plan

Eta} messes

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  • Mediocre material sendition with frequent workarounds 1
  • Ineffective work. planning, scheduling and prioritizing
  • Hi 5h total dose; poor contamination control l

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  • Frequent performance errors while changing plant lineups I '* Poor trending and root cause development by engineering i
  • Poor followup on planned corrective actions

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  • Limited interdepartmental teamwork to solve problems e Limited value added by quality control

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  • O FUNCTIORAL AREA ASSESSMEETS

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1. OPERATIONS Zion received a SALP rating of 2 for 3 ALP 12. Performance during the period of this semiannual assessment has been poor. Based on current performance, a SALP rating of 3 for SALP 13 would be appropriate. Specifically, mistakes by operators with plant lineups and a lack of awareness of plant conditions are of concern. Examples include the failure to control equipment return to-service which resulted in the loss of 500 gallons of reactor coolant <

inventory and the failure to prevent the rolling of the Unit 2 MP turbine while in cold shutdown. Other examples included taking both Unit 2 DGs out of service inadvertently and improperly adjusting a turbine cooling water valve setpoint (to prevent its actuation).

During the Unit 2 startup in February, operators' inattention to detail and lack of a questioning attitude resulted in lifting of a main steam line code safety valve and a turbine trip. The absence of the Shift Engineer and Unit 2 Supervisor from the control room during the final phases of the Unit 2 heatup demonstrated low operations standards.

l-Other significant personnel errors include: valving in the wrong cation bed, dead heading of the reactor cavity sump pump, taking both HVAC instrument air compressors out of-service, and mistakenly opening an ESF bus breaker during DC ground troubleshooting.

Compounding these performance errors is the large number of workarounds faced by operators due to the marginal material condition of the plant. For example, following a reactor trip or during normal shutdowns, operators must manually isolate both the Unit 1 main feedwater pumps due to excessive leakby of the stop/ governor valve to preclude the pumps from continuing to roll.

Senior management recognises these issues in their discussions with the NRC, and maintains good visibility in the plant discussing their higher performance expectations with personnel and supervisors, but, to date, the performance and material condition issues remain to be resolved.

2. MAINTER&BCE Zion received a SALP rating of 2 for SALP 12. Performance during this semiannual assessment has been marginal to poor. Based on current performance, a SALP rating of 3 for SALP 13 would be appropriate.

Specifically, the licensee has not improved the plant's poor material condition. The licensee's backlog of non outage work (approxiastely 1900 items) remains high with a work *down rate that is essentially zero. The licensee has completed work items which immediately threaten plant operation.

However, the inability to work more chan the immediate needs of the plant means plant deficiencies do not get fixed, and the plant is deteriorating.

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l In its current state, Zion does not effectively or consistently ensure work is identified, planned, scheduled, and completed. In general, work schedules are finalized only 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in advance of the job. This, and a lack of teamwork betwee. the departments, reduces the amount of work performed.

  • Also, work par,tages are often in error due to work planner inexperience, ,

leading to ortors.

Finally, altaough many jobs are completed safely and professionally, several mistakes have occurred which indicate an inability by some maintenance g personnel to do their work right the first time.

3. ENGrunta m Zion received a SALP rating of 2 fo. SALP 12. Performance during this semiannual assessment hae been adequate. Conservative decision making to complete equipment repairs was observed early in the assessment period.

Additionally, the service water system (SWS) self-assessment was considered a good effort.

s system engineer performance is mixed. While most are knowledgeable, competent and dedicated, there are some that are mediocre and complacent.

There appears to be a general 1s.~.k of knowledge relative to systems design bases. Knowledge and interest in trends on their assigned systems is limited. Some system engineers have multiple systems assigned and do not cover all of them adequately. System engineers spend a great deal of their time dealing with reactive circumstances, and trending of their systems' performance is haphazard.

Design engineering performance is acceptable; however, Engineering as a group lacks clear priorities. Although Engineering has established a top 20 modification list, it does not appear to be the 20 most important engineering problems. Engineering performance of operability and root cause assessments is mixed. The threshold for root cause investigation appears to be too high and the whole program lacks a formal structure. Operability assessments are often done too quickly and have led to questions by the NRC. Weaknesses in the temporary alteration program and thermographic monitoring program demonstrate an inability of the engineering organization to meet some commitments.

Engineering involvement in the plant's material condition problem may be increasing. The new Engineering Manager was recently assigned to develop a plan to arrest the deteriorating condition of the plant. Preliminary review of the plan shows it to be very general with no specifics. Some specific material condition problems are being dealt with such as the replacement of the instrument air compressors. Other issues, equally as important, are not getting sufficient management attention, for example, rod position indication system modifications.

The new Engineering Manager puts safety first and does not appear to allow his ataff to settle for average perforrance.

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  • 4. PLANT SUPPORT Performance - in Plant Support was rated Category 2 during the last SALP.

Overall performance during this last six-month period has been at the SALP 2 level. .

a. Radiological Controls Zion continues to be in the industry's -fourth quartile in collective radiation exposure. The station has developed a dose reduction plan with many good initiatives. Initial implementation appears good. Progress has #

not been strog in elimit.ating the hot spots and the source of high general area radiation levels.

Although the 1994 Unit 2 refueling outage had a few problems surrounding cavity work, the overall radiological performance was very good. However, inadequate evaluation of work led to two events that resulted in unanticipated internal contaminations of workers in the cavity.

The licensee has made improvements in addressing weaknesses in the control of contamination. Some significant areas have been decontaminated, but major sections of the auxiliary building remain contaminated, with no plans to decontaminate them. Extensive minor valve leakage in these rooms would make their decontamination more difficult.

The licensee has frequent failures of both area and process radiation monitors; in addition, some required samples have been missed because monitors were out of service. The licenses has developed a number of evaluations and action plans, but progress has been limited,

b. Chemistry and REKP Performance in the chemistry program continued to be very good.

Radiological confirmatory measurements indicated strong analytical ability and very good laboratory qualit- assurance programs. The chemistry technicians demonstrate good analytical technique and radiation protection practices.

Plant water chemistry parameters have been controlled near industry averages. Secondary water chemistry has been degraded by condenser in-leakage (Unit 2). The licensee has reduced Unit 1 blowdown to provide 4

additional blowdown capacity on Unit 2 to compensate for the ialSakage of oxygen and sulfates. Additionally, feedwater iron levels ten.'.ad to be above the industry guidelines.

The radiological environmental monitoring program (RENP) has been effectively implemented. Good oversight of contractors was observed.

Material condition of sampling equipment was very good.

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  • SUPPLEMENTAL DATA i

l 5. SALP BATIBCs AND TREEDS 1

4 FUNCTIONAL AREA SALP RA"'ING FOR SALP FROJECTION OR TREND

NUMBER 12 TO DATE j FiANT OPERATIONS 2 DECLINING
MAINTENANCE 2 DECLINING j BtGINEERING 2 00NSTANT

! FIANT SUPPORT 2 CONSTANT i

6. MAJOR FIANNED ACTIVITIES AFFECTING the UTILITT or SITE I

Next refueling outage: Unit 1 - September 7, 1995 Unit 2 - September 5, 1996 Major management changes:

Manes New Position Old Position i

Keith Schwartz Station Manager Byron Station Manaher

! Bill Fitzpatrick Operations Manager U.S. Navy Commands Dale St. Clair Work Control Byron Engineering Superintendant Manager i Other: Senior management visits - September 15, 1995 (Deputy RA, DRS)

November II, 1995 (EDO, DEDR) i i

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