ML20217D426
| ML20217D426 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Byron, Braidwood, Quad Cities, Zion, LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1997 |
| From: | Charemagne Grimes NRC |
| To: | Mccree V NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D413 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-178 NUDOCS 9710030179 | |
| Download: ML20217D426 (33) | |
Text
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I From:
To:
Cathy Grimes VMM,JLB,BBG Wor hb@ j MO f b d j3 /!
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Subject:
Visits to Cmr. McGaffigan I've scheduled the following visits and would like to receive any information that you
.;ggy have.
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Nov. idh - Gary Broughton, President & CEO, & Dr. Robert Long, VP & Director of Nuclea Services at GPU Dec. 3rd - Mike Wallace, Sr. VP, & Jim O'Connor, CEO at Commor wealth Edison Thanks.
! Cathy
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JAMES J. O'CONNOR Chairman and Chief Executive Officer EXPERIENCE
- Unicom/ Commonwealth Edison Company
' Present - 1980 Chairman rad Chief Executive Officer 1980 - 1978 Member of Board of Directors 1978 - 1977 President l
1977 - 1973 Executive Vice President 1973 - 1970 Vice President -
1970 - 1967 Assistant Vice President 1967 - 1966 Division Commercial Manager at Chicago North 1966 - 1963 Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committec l
- United States Air Force .
1963 - 1960 Three years of active duty EDUCATION e JD - Georgetown Law School,1%3 MBA - Harvard University,1960 BS - Holy Cross College, major in economics,1958 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS a-
- Dirror of Nuclear Energy Institute, Chairman of the Advance Reactor Corporation Dhector of Edison Electric Institute, past Chairman Board of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, past Chairman Member of Board of Directors of American Nuclear Energy Council
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- '. Michael J. Wcilace Senior Vice President Chief Nuclear Officer EXPERIENCE Commonwealth Edison Company Present 1993 Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Omcer 1993 1993 Vice President, Chief Nuclear Officer 1993 1992 Vice President, Chief Nuclear Operating Omcer 1992 1990 Vice President, Nuclear PWR Operations 1990 1989 Manager of Engineering and Construction 1989 1987 Manager of Projects and Construction Services l
1987 1982 Assistant Manager of Projects, and Braidwood Project Manager 1982 1981 Superintendent, Waukegan Station -
1981 1979 Assistant Superintendent, State Line Station 1979 1978 Project Coordinator, Byron Project 1978 1977 Field Cost Engineer, LaSalle, Byron, and Drsidwood Projects 1977 1974 Quality Assurance Engineer, NSSS Programs United States Navy .
1974 1969 Line Officer, Nuclear Submarine Force U.S. Navy EDUCATION MBA University of Chicago,1978 I
BS Marquette University in Electrical Engineering,1969 OTHER OUA'LIFICATIONS Registered Professional Engineer PROFESSIONAL AFFIIJATIONS
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Advanced Reactor Corporation, Vice President Commonwealth Research Corporation, Vice President and Director NPOC Ad Hoc Committee for New Nuclear Power Plant Deployment Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee Nuclear Strategic Issues Steering Group Utility Management Board for the Advanced Light Water Reactor First of a Kind Engineering Program American Nuclear Society kttesumel.vpr/1
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AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 11,1995 COMED DROP IN VISIT WITil NRC CHAIRMAN SHIRIIY JACKSON _
- 1. Introductory Remarks J. J. O'Connor
- 11. Comed Nuclear Division Performance -
M. J. Wallace III. Discussion of Key Strategy Issues M. J. Wallace L4adership
. Standards and Accountability Matedel Condition Competition
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON COMED plants has been The perfomance inconsistent of Commonwealth and a concern Edison to the NRC. Comed hasCompany trad (Comed)itionally promoted within and as a result benefitted little from outside experience. During its ambitious plant construction program during the 1970's and early 1980's, many of the company's more talented managers were moved from site to site to complete construction and get the units licensed and started up. Likewise, corporate attention and resources were focused on the newer units while they were in the latter stages of construction and licensing. As a result, the '
older plants generally got fewer resources and less quality management attention. Plant material condition and operating standards and practices declined.
SECY-92-228, ' Performance r,f Comonwealth Edison Company Plants," dated . -
June 25, 1992, described r,omEd's major weaknesses. These weaknesses were: .
(1) lack of effective manaaement attention and aonlication of resources; (2) wea k corpoiate oversight of nucinar anaratinae* (3) naar irahlam recoanit<.nn '
anc re to ensure lasting carractiva =cU nat; (4) lace of adequate aaainaar aa maaart.; and (5) an inability or reluctance to learn frna
, experiences _at Comed and other utilities.
In recent years, the cyclical performance of Comed plants has concerned the Comission and NRC staff. gr_e_sd_en was on the Watch List from June 1987 until December 1988 and was returned t6 the Watch List in January 1992. ZinD was on the Watch List from January 1991 until January 1993; however, the cata_.cf performance imorov===at was not sustained. Declining perfomance at Quad.
G.it.tes was discussed at the June 1991 and June 1993 SMis; a Diagnostic Evaluatian Team (DET) assessment was performed there in the fall of 1993.
Both Quad Cities and LaSalle were issued Trending Letters in January 1994 and '
again in June 1994. Significant problems were even noted at Dresden. Unit 1, which was permanent 1v thut down in 1978. In' January 1994, a slgnificant freezing event on Unit 1 identified a number of management oversight weaknesses. In January 1995, Quad Cities received a third Trer.::ing Letter and LaSalle was removed from the Trending Category. Braw.w:! 'nas been an average perfomer; however personnel and equipment problems indicate that performance may be declining.- Byron's perfomance has been excellent and it was identifled as a Good Perfomer at the January 1994, June 1994 and January 1995 SMMs. Presently Dresden is the only one of the Comed plants on the Watch List. However, the performance at Lahlle. Quad Cities. Zion, and Braidwood renint a staff concern.
Only within the last several years has Comed begun to take significant sseps to improve performance. These steps included reorganizing to clearly establish responsibilities for plant operation and oversight; increasing the company's engineering capability; improving craft skills; benchmarking their perfomance against other utilities; and (maybe most importantly) hiring management individuals from outside the company. These individuals included several corporate vice presidents, site vice presidents, plant managers, and various senior and mid-level plant management individuals. A number of the .
managers hired early in this process-had no experience in improving the Attachment 4
. (
- performance of problem plants and were not effective in doing so at Comed.
This resulted in numerous senior management changes at the poorer performing 1 plants. More recently, managers with proven track records have been hired and some improvements in expectations and performance have been noted, particularly at Quad Cities.
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Current Issues and Concerns l
Plant Performance l Comed still faces significant operational challerges. During the last 3 years, the licensee has implemented both corporate and site reorganizations and has brought in considerable management talent from
- outside Comed. However, the older stations (Dresden, Quad Cities and Zion) continue to be challenged by longstandtng material condition and human performance problems.
Quad Cities has had an effective management team in place for almost a .
l year and appears to be making progress in raising standards and i accountability, most notably in conduct of operations in the control _
room. The most recent Unit 2 outage significantly im> roved some major !
equipment deficiencies. However, the maintenance hac(log remains high l
- - and the work control process has been ineffective.
l Dresden management has been changed frequently and has continued to struggle with power operation and outage >erformance. While there has been some improvement at Dresden, it has )een sporadic. The Site Vice President, Mr. Tom Joyce, is a long-tem Comed employee and just recently was assigned to INPO for a 6-month developmental assignment.
Mr. Stephen [ Steve) Perry, BWR Vice President,'is actively filling the position durtng Mr. Joyce's absence. Some progress has been made, particularly with large rotating equipment, the maintenance backlog, and conduct of operations. Operations improved significantly from the Senior Vice President'-s initiative to require all licensed operators to attend conservative decisionmaking training.
Comed has tried to address problems at Zion with a unproven management team consisting largely of individuals from within the company. While performance is now improved from that in the 1990 time frame (when the NRC perfomed a DET assessment), it has stagnated for the last few years. Zion has a very high corrective maintenance work backlog, and has not taken effective corrective action to reduce it.
Lasalle has brought in several capable managers from outside Comed and there has been slow, but steady improvement in material condition and human perfomance.
Braidwood, long considered a good perfonser, has had recent equipment problems due to a high threshold for identifying problems, and weak engineering and corrective actions. As such, laterial condition has declined.
Byron is a good performer, but has lost several key management individuals to other Comed stLions. It will be a challenge for the new managers to maintain the current level of performance.
Attachment 5
1 l
- Steam Generators The Byron 1 and Braidwood I steam generator tubes are subject to outside diameter stress corrosion cracking (ODSCC) at the tube support plates (TSPs). As a consequence, both plants are operating with approximately 10% of their tubes plugged. It is believed that the ODSCC at the TSPs ,
is attributable to the use of carbon iteel TSPs, the type of glyice. I b_etween the tube and TSP, and prior secondary side chemistry control.
The licensee's long-tei~m solution is to replace the steam generators; Braidwood is scheduled to be done in the fall of 1998 and Byron in the spring of 1999.
In the short term, the licensee is taking steps to safely maintain as.
high a power output as possible with the degraded steam generators. At present the licensee is required-to repair or remove from service those tubes that have edd) current voltages greater than 1 volt. The licensee I has requested staff approval by November 7,1995, to use a voltage-based repair criterion of 3.0 volts to be applied to the Braidwood I refueling i outage and the Byron 1 mid-cycle outage, both occurring this fall, This l
pending request deviates from the 1 volt authorized by the staff in GL 95-05 thereby involving technical questions not previously reviewed by the staff. The licensee estimates that if it can not implement the 3.0 volts criteria it will lose between $50M and $60M in power revenue over the remaining life of these steam generators.
The major premise of the licensee's basis for its request of the 3.0 volts criteria is that in the event of a main steamline break (MSLB degraded tubes would be prevented from rupturing because they would)be constrained by the TSPs. The licensee proposes to ensure limited movement of the TSPs following a MSLB by expanding selected tubes immediately aboyc and below the TSPs on the hot leg side of the SGs to provide additional rigidity to the TSPs. The three major technical issues to be addressed are: (1) actual leakage from___a tube at theJP dur.ing-a-MSLE; (2) incteasina the suteentibility of the expanded ~ tubes to circumfetentsal cemeHan in the arma of the_ernansion; and (3) preTicting the tran11*nt diffrential-pr4ssur4-acenst~a TSP during a MSLB.which is-thea usado predict TSP deflectio(
The first issue _nas resolved through an experimental program that measured leak rates of degradad tuben when subjected to MSLB differential pressures. The inennd < true was resolved by the licensee committing to an enhanced inspection orogram that would detect further degradation in the tube expansion area. The r_ammining issue is that of predicting the differenH=1 presser =e nernet the TSPt. To date, predictions haveTeeiimade from a number of different models, none of which was developed for this a,nplication. Because it is not clear how closely the models predict actual pressures, the staff has proposed to .
conservatively estimate the TSP loads. At this time there is disagreement between the licensee and the staff about the magnitude of the appropriate loads. The magnitude of the loads affects the number of u
tubes which must be expanded in order to minimize movement of the TSPs.
- Technical Specification Unaredes All of the Comed sites are upgrading their Technical Specifications (TS). Dresden and Quad Cities which have custom TS are converting to the old version of the Standard Technical 5)ecifications.
Implementation is scheduled for completion )y the end of the year for Dresden and June 1996 for Duad Cities. Zion is converting to the with full Improved Standard implementation Technical scheduled for June Specifications 1996. Applicat(iSTS) ions from Byron, Braidwood, and LaSalle for conversion to iSTS are expected in June 1996.
- tmeroency Operations facility (EOF) .
In March 1993, Comed requested, that in the event that EOF activation is required for a site, the corporate EOF in Downers Grove be used as an interim EOF until the nearsite EOF is activated. The submittal was made following concerns identified by Region III inspectors regarding Comed's ability to staff its EOFs within the I hour goal specified in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. Because the corporate E0F'is more than 20 miles from any of the Comed sites, Commission approval is required for the change. The technical issues have been resolved; the staff is preparing a Commission Paper recommending approval.
In anticipation of receipt of Commission approval for the interim EOF, the licensee has requested approval for the consolidation of the near site EOFs in one single central EOF located at Downers Grove. To date, no review has been initiated pending resolution of the interim EOF.
- Comoany Restructured in June 1994 the company was restructured. Comed became wholly owned subsidiary of Unicom, the stated purpose being to permit the company to compete in an unregulated environment. The stockholders of Comed became the. common stockholders of Unicos in the same proportion as they previously held Comed stock. NRC staff review of the restructuring concluded that there was no detrimental effect on the operation of the nuclear units.
- Eglential Staff Reductions Several of Comed's corporate offices are undergoing a detailed function and personnel review with the ex>ected elimination of a significant number of positions. Although tiere has been no official information regarding similar efforts at the plants, the staff believes that reductions may be forthcoming.
Points to be Emphssized
. Dresden and Quad Cities Material Condition & Human Performance l Imorovements Needed While steps have been taken at Dresden and Quad Cities to improve material condition over several years and management thanges have been made, Comed has a long way to go on these plants. ...e Quad Cities management team has made good progress in resolution of major plant deficiencies while the Dresden management team has yet to prove itself.
Significant work remains to fully resolve equi) ment, technical support and work control issues. While both stations inve made some progress in improving human performance standards and accountability (e.g., recent steps to improve control room standards) sustained management attention l and stability are critical to achieve needed station-wide, lasting change.
. 71on Proaress Slow While equipment and personnel performance at Comed's other older station l-(Zion) has not recently declined to the level of Dresden and Quad Cities, in some respects progress has been slower. Because of concerns with the slow progress, we will be closely evaluating the effectiveness of the new management team.
. Maintain Attention on laSalle LaSalle has made slow but steady improvements over the last year.
However, equipment problems and poor original design issues continue to challenge the operators. It is important that Comed management ensures this improving trend continues.
. Arrest Material Condition Decline at Braidwood We are concerned that Comed has allowed material condition to degrade at Braidwood, their newest plant. Weak engineering and corrective actions, '
high threshold for identifying problems, and lack of questioning attitude by most plant disciplines have led to a gradual dec.line in overall plant performance. Comed management needs to address this situation before it becomes a safety concern.
. Many Manaaement Chanaes Could Affect Byron Performance Byron has had numerous management and staff personnel changes over the last couple of years. Many of these individuals have taken positions at the poorer perfoming plants. We will monitor Byron's perfomance in light of all these changes.
- Maintain Focus on Plant Performance Comed needs to maintain a management focus on plant performance and Attachment 6
I ensure that resources are used to see improvement programs through to the end. Too often, the licensee has " declared victory" too soon and abandoned programs prior to completion or changed the management team too quickly after improvements were noted (e.g., Zion).
Take a leadina Role in Technical Issues Licensees must take the lead in the resolution of technical issues that may arise. The staff believes, for example, that the licensee has been unduly dependent on the staff to lead the resolution of the steam generator issues at Byron and Braidwood. Our expectation is that the licensees conduct adequate research and evaluation up front such that the path leading to resolution and NRC approval is clear, direct and defensible without requiring an excessive commitment of staff resources.
Maintain Strona Manaaement Oversiaht in Decentralization While reducing resources to stay competitive, licensees should carefully evaluate the effect of planned reductions on all aspects of plant operation so that safe operation of the plants is not compromised.
l Further, with Comed's large number of nuclear Onits and itc efforts toward decentralization, strong cor) orate management oversight of the sites is important in mainttining tie Comed's authority and responsibility for its nuclear program.
4 BRAIDWOOD STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2-Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Reactor Type: PWR (Westinghouse) 4 Loops Unit 1 Unit 2 Power Level: 3411 MWt 3411 MWt CP Issuance Date: December 31, 1975 December 31, 1975 OL !ssuance Date: May 21, 1987 December 18, 1987 !
OL Expiration Date: October 17, 2026 December 18, 2027 OL Recapture Date: N/A N/A
- CURRENT OPERATING STATUS Unit 1: The unit shutdown on 09/30/95 to start a 50 day refueling outage.
Unit 2: Operating at power.- Restarted on 05/07/95, after recovering from a forced outage due to RCS leak from loop stop by) ass valves packing. Next refueling outage is scleduled for 03/02/96.
CURRENT TECHN' CAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Unit I steam generators (SG) are-Westinghouse "D4" models. These generators have displayed tube degradation (ODSCC) at tube sup M t
_ plate (T5P) crevices. On 05/07/94 the staff approved a request for application of a 1 volt IPC for repair of tubes with this particular tube degradation mechanism. Unit 1 is now operating-with approximately 10 percent of the steam generator tubes plugged. Because there were several instances of voltage growths in excess of 2.7 volts (the value below which there is a high level of confidence of maintaining complete structural integrity of the tubes), the staff required that the licensee conduct a mid-cycle inspection which was done in 02/95. Unit 2 steam generators are Westinghouse "D5" models which have not shown the accelerated tube degradations.
Unit I was shut-down on 02/19/95 for a mid-cycle outage to inspect steam generator tubes; the inspection revealed that the tube degradation continued at the previously observed rate. Following the outage, the unit was restarted on 03/14/95.
On 02/13/95, the licensee initially submitted a request for a license amendment to implement a 3 volt IPC repair limit for hot leg TSP intersections with tubes expanded into the TSPs and a 1 volt limit for TSP cold leg intersections which do not have expanded tubes. Several revisions have been made to the request, the most recent one being on 09/01/95. The submittal is under review by the staff.
Attachment 7
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Braidwood. Units 1 and 2 . -
The licensee has informed the staff that the Unit 1 steam generators will be replaced during the September 1998 refueling outage.
In 05/95, Tim Tulon was selected as the plant manager. Before j becoming plant manager, Mr. Tulon was a technical assistant to the i
~ Executive Vice President for PWRs and prior to that he was the ;
operations manager at-Byron Station.
RECENT LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Braidwood has been considervd to be an average operating facility.
Recently, significant maintenance and operational errors have occurred. Material conditier., self assessment, and craft skills are developing problem are.5. Problems with engineering '
performance have also been observed, notably poor engineering evaluations and weak test controls.
The most recent SALP period ended on 09/30/95. The previous SALP ,
report. included Category I ratings in maintenance and operations and Category 2 ratings in engineering and plant support for the period ending 02/19/f?
On 05/30/95, a Severity Level III violation with $100,000 civil penalty was issued for operating Unit 2 with the hydrogen monitoring system disconnected for two months, potentially defeating containment integrity during a severe accident.
On 09/21/95, NRC held a pre-decisional enforcement conference with the licensee to discuss Braidwood's failure to properly identify the safety significance of the failure of a 125-volt de battery
-room exhaust fan.
Comm'onwealth Edison intends to convert the Braidwood 1/2 Technical Specifications to the Improved Standard Technical Specification.
Comed is planning to submit the amendment package by 06/96.
4
Contact:
Ramin R.-Assa, 415-1391 10/95
-. - - - - . . - ._- - _ . _- -~ . - - . . . ._
BYRON STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Reactor Type: PWR (Westinghouse) 4 Loops Unit 1 Unit 2
- Power Level
- 3411 MWt 3411 MWt CP Issuance Date: December 31, 1975 December 31, 1975 OL Issuance Date: October 31, 1984 November 6, 1986 OL Expiration Date: October 31, 2024 November 6, 2026 OL Recapture Date: N/A N/A
- CURRENT OPERA 11NG STATUS Unit 1: Operating at Power. Restarted from last outage on 4 12/10/94. Hid cycle outage scheduled to begin on 10/20/95. Next refueling outage scheduled for 03/96.
Unit 2: Operating at Power. Restarted from last refueling outage on 03/26/95. Next refueling outage scheduled for 09/96.
- CURRENT TECHNICAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Unit I steam generators (SG) are Westinghouse "D4" models. These generators have displayed tube degradation (0DSCC) at tube support plate (TSP) crevices. On 10/24/94, the staff approved a request for application of a 1 volt IPC for repair of tubes with this particular tube degradation mechanism. Unit I now has a total of 9.6 percent of the steam generator tubes plugged. The percentage of plugged tubes for specific steam generators varies from 4.8 percent to 12.3 percent. Because there were several instances of voltage growths in excess of 2.7 volts (the value below which there is a high level of confidence of maintaining complete structural integrity of the tubes), the staff required that the licensee conduct a mid-cycle inspection which is scheduled to begin on 10/20/95. Unit 2 steam generators are Westinghouse "D5" models which have not shown the accelerated tube degradations.
The licensee has informed the staff that the Unit I steam generators will be replaced during the 1999 refueling outage. The new steam generators will be manufactured by Babcock and Wilcox.
On 02/13/95, the licensee initially submitted a request for a license amendment to implement a 3 volt IPC repair limit for hot leg TSP intersections with tubes expanded into the TSPs and a 1 volt limit for TSP cold leg intersections which do not have expanded tubes. Several revisions have been made to the request, the most recent one being on 09/01/95. The submittal is under review by the staff.
l
1 Byron, Units 1 and 2 There have been several recent management changes. In 05/95, Kurt Kofron became the new Plant Manager. Mr. Kofron was previously the Plant Manager at Braidwood. In 06/95, Dave Wozniak, formerly the 'sperations Manager at Zion, was assigned as the Site Engineering Manager.
Commonwealth Edison intends to convert the Byron Technical 4 Specifications to the Improved Technical Specifications. Comed is planning to submit the amendment package by 06/96.
RECENT LICENSEE PERFORMANCE Byron is considered to be an above average performer, operating conservatively. The NRC placed Byron Station on the good performance list in 01/94. It remained on the good performer list following the 06/94 and 01/95 Senior Management Meetings. The licensee is self-critical by identifying and resolving performance problems. The most recent SALP results for the period ending 08/20/94 were a rating of "1" in all four functional areas. Byron is on a 24 month SALP cycle.
Although the licensee's overall performance is considered good, a recurring problem has been personnel errors; including improperl performed maintenance, tagout errors, return to service errors. y During a recent requalification exam (06/95) 6 of 23 crews failed the annual dynamic simulator requalification examination. Failure i
rates would not have been as high under NRC criteria. However, personnel error were the major contributor to the failures.
Contact:
George F. Dick, 415-3019 10/95
9 4 DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 Licensee: -Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
Reactor Type: (GE) BWR-3, Mark 1 Containment Unit 2 Unit 3 Power Level: 2527 Mwt 2527 Mwt l
CP Issuance Date: January 10, 1966 October 14, 1966 OL Issuance Date: February 20, 1991* January 11, 1971 OL Expiration Date: January 10, 2006 October 14, 2006 l OL Recapture Date: Have not applied January 12, 2011 j
- POL Date: -December 22, 1969 CURRENT OPERATING STATUS Unit 2: Is currently in a refueling outage which began on -
06/02/95. The unit is scheduled to restart in early 11/95.
Unit 3: The unit restarted on 09/22/95 from a forced outage due to a turbine blade failure. On 09/28/95, the unit tripped due to an apparent failure of the main generator exciter.
CURRENT TECHNICAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Turbine Failure On 05/28/95, the Unit 3 reactor tripped from full power due to a main turbine trip. The turbine tripped on high vibration due to a failed blade in the last stage of the "C" low pressure turbine. One of the blades on the last stage of the turbine fractured about 8 inches from the blade's tip and two additional blades were bent, as a result of the fractured blade impacting the casing and blades.
The licensee's investigation indicated that the blade failure mechanism was fatigue cracking initiated in the stellite surfaced wear material on the leading edge of the turbine blade. The cracking propagated transversely through the stellite-to-base metal weld-joint and then through the base metal.
The subject turbine blading was " reverse engineered" by ABB from original GE blades and manufactured for ABB in the UK by Turbine Blading Ltd. in the old 1980s. Dresden Units 2 & 3 utilize the reverse engineered blades in combination with the original GE supplied blades. No other nuclear plants are known to utilize the AB8 reverse engineered blades with the stellite wear material on the
-leaf.ng edge. Quad Cities, Unit I will be inspected during the next outage.
Liquid penetrant examinations of the Dresden Unit 3 "C" low pressure turbine blading identified numerous indications in the leading stellite edge. . A total of 47 blades of the 208 examined exhibited indications. Routine Dresden inspections of the turbine blading did N
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Dresden, Units 2 and 3 not include a penetrant examination of the stellite edge. A mag-particle inspection of the entire blade was done; however, the non-magnetic stellite would not reveal indications using that method.
The licensee replaced all the defective ABB manufactured turbine blades with turbine blades manufactured by GE in both the Unit 2 and '
Unit 3 low pressure turbines.
Technical Specification Upgrade Program In 1991, a Diagnostic Evaluation Team at Dresden concluded that the custom TS at Dresden required numerous interpretations that could result in operational difficulties. In response, Commonwealth Edison initiated a TS upgrade program (TSUP) to upgrade the custom TS at Dresden and at its sister site Quad Cities to the BWR Standard Technical Specifications.- Initial amendment requests were submitted in 1992 and 1993 followed by supplements in 1995. Technical review is being conducted by NRR Projects with concurrence by the applicable technical review branches. Of the 17 TS sections to be upgraded, amendments have been issued for 11 sections and 6 sections are under review or in concurrence. The Ticensee is preparing clean-up packages to address issues which have been left as open items in the issued amendments. The entire program is ex>ected to be completed in the fall of 1995 with implementation by tie end of the year.
Core Shroud Status During the Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit I refueling outages in the spring of 1994 Comed discovered significant cracking in the circumferential welds in the core shrouds at both units. The ,
licensee submitted analyses showing that the cracked core shrouds could maintain margins against failure as specified in Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code). The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's analyses 'and concluded that the cracked shrouds would satisfy ASME Code margins against weld failure for 15 months of operation. These units are shutting down for refueling in the early spring of 1996 at which time the licensee will effect permanent repairs to the core shrouds in each unit. Dresden Unit 2 and Quad Cities Unit 2 have completed permanent repairs to the core shrouds in both units. The shroud repair plans were submitted to the staff for review and approval. The staff issued the Quad Cities Safety Evaluation approving the shroud repair on 06/08/95 prior to the unit restart.
The staff plans to issue the Dresden Safety Evaluation prior to the Unit 2 restart from the current refueling outage which is scheduled for early 11/95.
The licensee had conaitted to install-two (2) additional diesel generators to meet the requirements of the Station Blackout; (S80)
- l.
- 4 0
Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Rule, 10CFR50.63. Diesel installation as well as the interconnecting cabling is nearing completion and operation was scheduled for 12/30/95. This is being delayed due to the reschedule to 03/96 of the next Unit 3 refueling outage where the final SB0 modification work for the station would be completed. A schedular exemption has been requested by the licensee.
RECENT_ LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
- Dresden remains on the watch list. The units were put on the watch ,
list in January 1992.
- The SALP report for the period ending 03/95 was issued on 04/27/95.
Dresden received Category 3 ratings in Plant Operations and '
Engineering. Maintenance and Plant Support received a Category 2 rating. Weaknesses were observed in routine plant operations, lack of a strong safety focus in engineering and work control problems in Maintenance.
- The NRC's inspections and overview activities have confirmed that the performance of Dresden Station is improving, although very slowly. In order to bring additional management focus to the Dresden Station, the positions of Station Manager, Operations Manager and Maintenance Superintendent were unitized in the Fall of 1994. In 06/95 Comed announced that the positions of Station Manager and Operations Manager will no longer be unitized. Mr. John Michael (Mike) Heffley was selected as the new single Station Manager at the Dresden Station. Mr. Heffley was serving as the Dresden Unit 3 Station Manager. Mr. Tim O'Connor, the Unit 2 Operations Manager, was named as the new Operations Manager for the entire station. Mr.
Richard (Dick) Bax, the previous Unit 2 Station Manager, and Mr.
Gerry Tietz, the previous Unit 3 Operations Manager, remain at Dresden to provide management oversight for the current Unit 2 refueling outage. The Maintenance Department management will remain unitized. Improvement in the condition of the units' large rotating equipment have been made. Progress in the areas of self-assessment, engineering, and operations has been slow, and much remains to be done. Attention is still needed in the areas of personnel errors, radiological protection, and engineering work. Mr. Tom Joyce the current site Vice President at the Dresden Station has been temporarily reassigned. Mr. Joyce will be going to INP0 where he will be assessing other plants which have had a decline in performance and have established a successful plan to reestablish acceptable performance. He will be at INPO for approximately six months. During i
LASALLE COUNTY STATION. UNITS : AND 2 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Reactor Type: (GE) BWR-5, Mark 2 Containment Unit 1 Unit 2
. Power Level: 3323 MWt 3323 MWt CP Issuance Date: September 10, 1973 September 10, 1973 OL Issuance Date: April 17, 1982 December 16, 1983 OL Expiration Date: April 17, 2022 December 16, 2023 OL Recapture Date: N/A N/A
=
CURRENT OPERATING STATUS Unit 1: Currently operating at power. Unit trip >ed on 09/24/95 during a surveillance test of tie overspeed -
trip function of a turbine driven main feedwater pump and was returned to service on 09/28/95. Next refueling outage scheduled for 01/96.
Unit 2: Started up on 09/23/95 following a forced outage to 4
, trouble shoot and repair ' oscillations of 2A reactor u recirculation flow control valve. Next refueling
! outage scheduled for-09/96. ,
CURRENT TECHNICAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT-EVENTS The station is implementing various organizational and programmatic improvement efforts. Near-term attention has been '
focused on material condition / equipment availability radiation protection, issues management, and management and leadership controls.
Plant events, including scrams, and equipment failures have demonstrated that material condition-remains an issue at LaSalle.
Contributing to the material condition problems are historical
-weaknesses in preventive maintenance, corrective action programs, and a lack of emphasis on equipment and system reliability.
Dealing with emergent work has hindered progress on resolving long.
standing equipment problems.
The recent Unit 2 refueling outage was extended' by approximately
- 50. days; as a result of. equipment-problems discovered during the outage or experienced during the restart. These problems included leakage past the RHR shutdown cooling isolation valves, main condenser inleakage due to a breach of a condenser hood boot seal, and leakage from the RCIC inboard steam isolation valve.
RECENT LICENSEE PERFORMANCE During the most recent SALP period (06/93-11/94), Category 2 ,
ratings were. assigned in the functional areas of plant operations and engineering and Category 3 ratings were given in the areas of maintenance and plant support. The report stated that some
LaSalle, Units 1 and 2 l l
improvement-in the identification of problems had been observed; however, resolution of 1:. sues and the improvement of the plant's material condition had not yet occurred. ;
Recent audits and inspections noted some improvement in radiological controls, issues management, work control and housekeeping. Improvements have also been noted in corrective action programs.
Problems in the area of equipment reliability and availability have continued to be an issue. There has been a decrease in the frequency of unplanned scrams and several modifications to improve l plant material condition have been implemented. Licensee efforts to further improve the plant's material condition include increasing the roles and responsibilities of system engineers and plant operators. The system engineering program is improving but
- has been slow in accomplishing the goals related to improving system and component performance. The licensee assigned a focus team to review and recommend priorities for the improvement of material condition. Staff assessments of these initiatives have been positive and recent inspections have observed slow progress in improving the plant material condition. The recently completed Unit 2 outage is thought to have diverted attention from the improvement programs.
During the recently completed Unit 2 outage, a rumber of personnel errors and equipment problems led licensee management to invoke two stand-downs of outage activities while investigations and corrective actions were performed. The licensee developed improved expectations for- personnel and performed training for the licensed operators to reinforce those expectations.
On 08/16/95 an output breaker on the IB RPS motor generator set ~
opened causing the reactor building ventilation system to trip.
An independent failure of a containment isolation relay to reset after operators installed jumpers resulted in'an MSIV isolation-and reactor scram. Seven channels of nuclear instruments (SRMs &
IRMs) were unavailable or failed during the event. The overall shift crew performance during the scram was good. However, the station's tolerance of a design condition that requires operators to install jumpers within just a few minutes to prevent a dual unit MSIV closure after the loss of ventilation, indicates that the acceptance of workarounds is -still a problem.
Contact:
Robert Latta, 415-1314 10/95
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)
Reactor Type: (GE) BWR-3, Mark 1 Containment Unit 1 Unit 2 Power Level: 2511 Mwt 2511 Mwt CP Issuance Date: February 15, 1967 February 15, 1967 OL Issuance Date: December 14, 1972 December 14, 1972 OL Original Expiration Date: February 15, 2007 February 15, 2007 OL Recapture Date: December 14, 2012 December 14, 2012 CURRENT OPERATING STATUS Unit 1 is operating at power with a continuous run of over 250 days.
Unit 2 is operating at power. After shutting down for a refueling outage on 03/05/95, startup activities were begun in 07/95 and completed in late 09/95. The licensee encountered several problems during startup including equipment leaks, recirculation pump speed increase due to data acquisition equipment, oscillating turbine bypass valves, EHC fluid leaks, leaking PORVs, and CRD's that would not move during CRD exercising. The plant shut down four times since 07/20/95 due to these problems.
CURRENT TECHNICAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Inspection of the Unit 1 core shroud has identified significant cracking. On 07/21/94, the staff issued a safety evaluation concluding that Unit I can safely operate for 15 months above cold shutdown without making any repair. During the Unit 2 outage, the licensee had repaired that unit's shroud.- However, during the reassembly of the vessel internals two support legs of the shroud head / steam separator assembly interfered with the. shroud repair hardware. Two support legs of the shroud head / steam dryer assembly had to be removed. During the Dresden 2 shroud work evaluation, the licensee discovered that a single mass point discrepancy which has been in both Dresden and Quad Cities seismic analyses since 1968 perpetuated through the most recent shroud reanalysis. The licensee has stated that the plants remain operable and they submitted their operability determination on the docket. The licensee will also submit a corrected seismic analysis.
The plant specific Technical Specification Upgrade Program (TSUP) is ongoing to implement the old Standard Technical Specifications at Dresden and Quad Cities. A total of 12 packages have been submitted. Technical review is being conducted by NRR Projects l with concurrence by the applicable technical review branches. The entire program is expected to be completed in 1995 with implementation at Quad Cities by June 30, 1996.
- e. .
Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 -
In order to eliminate a single failure vulnerability, the staff approved an amendment request regarding a modification of the reactor vessel level indication system. The initial modification was performed in response to Bulletin 93-03. The permanent modifications were completed for Unit I and have just been completed during the recent refueling outage for Unit 2.
The licensee had committed to install two (2) additional diesel generators to meet the requirements of the Station Blackout (SBO)
Rule, 10CFR50.63. Diesel installation as well as the interconnecting cabling is nearing completion and operation was scheduled for 12/30/95. This is being delayed due to the reschedule to 02/96 of the next Unit I refueling outage where the final SB0 modifk: tion work for the station would be completed. A schedular exemption has been requested by the licensee.
RECENT LICENSEE PERFORMANCE As of 06/95, the Quad Cities units were removed from the list for the plants with declining trends. ,
The last SALP evaluation ending in 7/95, resulted in a Category 2 rating in Operations, Engineering, and Plant Support and a Category 3 rating for maintenance.
The senior management team has clearly demonstrated an improved-safety focus and a conservative operating philosophy. Senior management has established a clear course of action for the station and is effectively communicating performance expectations, setting standards, and accountability. Notable examples include significant improvement in the conduct of control room operations, the increased scope of outages to fix major equipment deficiencies and improve material condition, and the aggressive management response to plant events. ALARA planning and implementation, the identification and reporting of problems, and engineering evaluatioris have also improved. The site quality verification organization's performance improved.
Current issues with licensee performance include personnel performance, corrective action program, out of service control, work scheduling, quality of work and supervisory oversight in maintenance, material condition, and high collective dose.
Contact:
Robert M. Pulsifer, 415-3016 10/95
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 Licensee: Commonwealth Eoison Company (Comed)
Reactor Type: PWR (Westinghouse) 4 Loops lin1L1 Unit 2 Power Level: 325L MWt 3250 MWt CP-Issuance Date: Deceder 26, 1968 December 26, 1968 OL Issuance Date: Aprii 6, 1973 November 14, 1973 OL Expiration Date: April 6, 2013 November 14, 2013 OL Recapture Date: N/A N/A CURRENT OPERATING STATUS Unit I shutdown for a refueling outage on 09/09/95, which is currently scheduled for 64 days. Scheduled restart date is 11/11/95. Prior to shutdown, Unit 1 operated for 306 days since early 11/94, with the exception of a 3 day outage to repair a leaking SG manway.
The Unit 2 return to service date from its refueling outage was 04/18/95. As of 09/30/95, it had operated for 165 days. Next refueling outage is in 09/96.
CURRENT TECHNICAL ISSUES AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS -
A license amendinent with new acceptance criteria (F-Star) for steam generator tubes with degradation in the tubesheet roll expansion-region was issued. It may also allow the licensee to return some tubes to service that have been plugged.
RECENT LICENSEE PERFORMANCE The licensee received a Category 2 rating in each of the functional areas in the most recent SALP, which covered the period from 12/01/92 through 05/28/94. Its current SALP period ends on 12/23/95.
The licensee is in the process of converting to the standardized TS, with full implementation scheduled for June 1996.
The licensee's performance is characterized by below average material condition, recurring poor work performance, ineffective work planning and coordination, and high total dose.
The licensee was granted five Notices of Enforcement Discretion between 03/23/95 and 06/13/95 for Technical Specifications compliance issues associated with safeguards testing that was not being performed, steam generator operability and incorrectly sequenced emergency diesel generator testing._ The Notice of Violation 1:: sued on 09/22/95 classified the violations as Severity Level III, ha did not levy a Civil Penalty.
Contact:
Clyde Y. Shiraki, 415-3101 10/95 o
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PREDICICICNAL
- DRE8 DEN 2 PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 SSF 01/07/95 LERf 23795001 50.728: 28220 PWR stST: CONDITION OtiSTED IN ALL MODES UP 10 1001 POWER Sl#CE INITIAL DPERAfl0N BROUP : CONTROL E:NM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM GROUP SYSTWI : CONTROL SulLDING/ CONTROL COMPLEX ENVIRouMEPTAL CONTROL SYSTEM OTN Mulia TNIS EVENT W S AS$1GNED TO UNITS 2 Am 3.
DESC DOTN TRAINS Of THE CokTROL ROOM NEATING Ale VENTILATION AIR FILTRATION Wif 300 STER FANS WERE DECLARED IIIOPERABLE BECAUSE THEIR TIIERMAL OVERLOADS WERE SET Too LOW.
PI EVENTS FOR 95-2 l
NONE PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 NONE PI EVENTS FOR 95-4 88F 10/20/95 LER# 23795019 50.Tu 294a5 PWR NISTs CON 0! TION EXISTED IN ALL MODES UP TO 1001 POWER SINCE 1983 BROUP a REACTOR TRIP INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEgi PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM DESC : Tile CONTROL ROD DRIVE SCRAM DISCMARGE VOLUME'S RPS CONTROL LOGIC O!D IIOT SATISFY SINGLE FAILURE CRITERIA. TMIS COULD RESVLT IN A NALF SCRAM WHEN A FULL SCRAM 18 REQUIRED. A DESIGN ERROR WAS INTRODUCED IN A 1983 MODIFICATION.
4
PREDECISIONAL o
DRF8 DEN 3 ,
PI EVENTS FOR 95-1 i 88F 01/07/95 . is 25795001 50.72s: 2 220 PW NIST CoelTION EXISTG IN ALL MODES UP TO 1001 POWER SINCE INITIAL OPERATION GCOUP CONTROL ROON EMERENCY VENTILATION SYSim GROUP SYSTEM CONT 90L BUILDING /CINITROL COWLEX ENVIRGINENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM OTN Willf: TNIS EVENT m3 AmsteED To UNITS 2 Am 3.
MSC BOTN TRAINS OF TIE CONTROL Rotal NEATING As VENTILATION AIR FILTRAfl0N UNIT B00tTER FANS WRE DECLARED 1110PERAALE BECAUSE TIIEIR TNERMAL OWERLOADS WRE SET 700 LOW.
SCSAM 01/09/95 Leks M 995001 50.728: 2 226 PWR HIST: POWER OPERAfi m S AT SPE DESC WillLE CMANGING TIE LINEUP OF THE NIaN *RESSURE FEEDWTER DRAIN SYSTEM. A PIGN 810!STURE SEPARATOR LEVEL INITIATO A flestIE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP. THE EMERGENCY DRAIN WALVES FAILED TO OPEN BECAUSE THEIR CCNTROLLERS IM OUT OF CALIBRATION.
S8F e5/09/95 LER# m ep5006 50.72#: Ia507 PWR MIST: EVENT DISCOVERED 312111G OPERATION AT 97X POWR GROUP EleaWNCY CORE C00LilIG SYSTEMS MOUP SYSTM NIGli PRES $URE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTM MSC THE RIGN PRESSURE C00LAlli INJECTION SYSTEM WS DECLARD INOPERABLE Ale THE INLET STEAllLINE WS ISOLATED, AS Tile RESULT OF A STEAM DRAIN VALVE FAILING CLOSG DUE TO A LEAKING VALVE OPERATOR DIAPRAWI.
58F 03/27/95 Leks s of5006 50.728: 2s596 PW NIST: EVENT SiSODWERED DURluG CPERATION AT 983 POWR GROUP ISOLAT10N CONDENSER STSTEM GROUP SYSTEM ISOLATION COSENSER SYSTEM MSC THE ISOLATION COWENSER WAS DECLARED Il10PERABLE WNEN TIIE NIGN PRESSURE SIDE VENT PATP WAS MAIIUALLY ISOLATE DUE TO DIE VENT VALVE EXCEEDING ITS STROKE TIME REQUIRDENTS.
PI EVENTS FOR 95-2 58F 06/ w/95 LERs m eF5009 50.72#: 2e696 PWR NIST EVENT DISCOVERED SWING OPERATicel AT 97X POWER SRCUP EMERGEIICT CORE COOLING SYSTEMS moup SYSTEM NIGN PRESSURE COOLANT INJECT 10ll SYSTEM DESC THE BIGE PRESSURE EBOLANT INJECT 10It SYSTEM uns DECLARED lil0PERABLE AS TIIE RESULT OF A BROKEli SELT ON TE SYSTEM ROOM EIELER Fall.
8 CRAM 05/as/95 Leas 36ep500s 50.72s: 2se59 PWR NIST: power OPERATIONS AT 100E DESC AN AUTOMATIC REACTta SCRAM CCCURAG AS A RESULT OF A MAlW TW811E TRIP CAUSED OT lilGN VISRATical. A BLADE FAILD ON TIE LOW PRESastt TURSINE ROTOR.
I S8F 05/2a/95 LERs mop 500s 50.72s: toast PWR NIST EVENT OCCURRO IN WT SNUTDetal ERCUP : EMERMIICT CORE COOLIE SYSTWIS GROUP SYSim a IllGN PRESSURE rnns mT 3saECT10N SYSTB DESC IIPCI BECApE Ill0PERABLE f0LLOWilfG A SCRAM WIWI N18N RX VESSEL LEVEL FLotBED Tile IIPCI STEAM SUPPLY LIM.1E CAUSE OF TE PEEDWTER CONTROL SYSTM FAILURE 10 Plt 0PERLY IthlNTAIN RX VESSEL LEVEL WS A DES!W DEFICIENCT OF TE CostTROL LOGIC.
SSF 05/2a/95 LERs M 995010 50.72#: 28862 PW NIST: EVENT SISCOVERED 15 EDT SETTDOWN GRinJP ISOLAf ten COSENSER SYSTM MIRJP SYSTS ISCLATION CONDEllER STSTM ,
3 ESC : Tile ISOLATloti r"m8A SYSTM WS NOT AVAILABLE FOR OPERAtl0N AS REGUIRED WilEN PLANT PRESSURE INCREASED ABOWE 150 PSIG (FOR FIVE MINUTES) DURING A PLAllT $NUTDela.
38F 06/30/95 (Eas 34995007 50.72s:
PWR NIST: EVENT DISCOVERED 1s COLD SNUTDOWN MOUP CollTAIINtEllT Ale EXRITAllNENT ISOLAT10lt GROLP SYSTEM : PRl81ARY CONTAllNWIT DESC TOTAL CoelTAllNIENT LEAKAGE FCUS DURING LLRT TESTING COULD NAVE EXCEGG SC 19 AND 10 CFR 100 LIMITS DURING A DEllet SASIS ACCIDENT. TNIS EVENT WS CAUSED BT IWROPER VALVE FIT UP DUE TO A LACK OF EXPERIEllCE WITN A NEW TYPE OF VALVE.
. PREDECISIg30LL DRE8 DEN 3 i
PI EVENTS FOR 95-3 J 38F 09/11/95 Lams 24995016 50.72#: 29sts !
PWR RIST: EVENT ocomkB DURING STARTUP AT 61 POWER Soup : EDERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS GROUP sitTEM NIGel PREsastE COOLANT INJECTION ST8 TEM DESC TIE NPCI SYSTER WS DECLARED INOPERABLE IMilNG SURVEILLANCE WNEN AN EXNAUST DRAIN POT MIGN LEVEL ALAd WS RECElWD AND WOULD 180T CLEAR. A MALFUNCTION OF THE ALAftM RELAY Ale LEVEL SWITCM F0lt THE TURSINE ENNAUST DRAlu POT CAUSED TNIS EVENT.
SCRAN 09/38/95 Laas 24995017 50.72s: 29390 PWR NisT POWER OPERATIONS AT 771 DESC A RCff0It SCIM OCCURRED ON A SENERATOR TRIP FOLLOWING A LOSS OF GEllERATOR FIELD OURRENT. A REsi3 TOR Is TE WOLTAGE REalLATOR CIRCulf FAILED. l PI EVENTS FOR 95-4 58F 10/12/95 Leas 2499501s 50.72s: 29451 Met RIST: EVENT OCCtsHts DURING OPERATION AT 20E POWR OROUP DIERGENCY CORE COOLING ST8TEMS GROUP SYSTEM IllGN PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DESC IIPCI WS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUlt!NG A MONTNLT TEST WNEN A NPCI EXNAUST DRAIN POT MIGN LEVEL ALAftM WA5 RECElWED As WOULD as0T CLEAR. THE PROCEDURE SNOULD NAVE REQUIRED DRAINING TIE EXNAUST DRAIN PCT PRIOR TO TN TEST.
i 4
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