ML20212N476

Safety Evaluation Approving Licensee 850401 Exemption Request from Requirements in 10CFR50,App R,Section Iii.J Re Emergency Lighting

ML20212N476
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	08/26/1986
From:	NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20212N474	List: ML20212N471 ML20212N476
References
TAC-54373, NUDOCS 8608280247
Download: ML20212N476 (3)

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j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e

0 Enclosure SAFETY EVALUATION CONCERNING APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REQUESTS PLANT ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL SYSTEMS BRANCH FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET N0. 50-267 l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 1, 1985, the licensee submitted Appendix R Evaluation Report No. 4, which contained exemption requests and proposed fire protection and systems-related modifications. Eleven exemptions from the technical requirements of Section III.G. and one exemption from Section III.J. of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 were requested. This evaluation only discusses one of those requests concerning emergency lighting.

2.0 EXEMPTION REQUESTED l

The licensee requested an exemption from the technical requirements of Section III.J of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to the extent that it requires emergency lights to be powered by individual 8-hour battery

l packs.

3.0 DISCUSSION The plant is presently equipped with hard-wired, essential / emergency back-up lighting systems powered from the standby diesel generators and the plant DC system. However, these systems are not sufficiently independent such that they would be available in the event of fire.

In Appendix R Evaluation Report No. 4, the licensee committed to install a new system for the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. Outlying structures requiring access for safe shutdown functions that are not l

covered by ACM powered light will be covered by 8-hour battery lights. The new emergency lighting system will have the following attributes:

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Wiring and lights ecnfigured such that multiple physically separate systems would result with each e 4cem covering a zone or qua hant. Lighting equipment in each zone will be separated by a minimum of 30 feet from that of another zone. Loss of any one zone due to a postulated fire would be compensated for by the lights in the adjacent zones, including permanently installed but movable " extension lights" where necessary; 8608280247 860826 PDR ADOCK 05000267 F

PDR

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Separate and independent power feeds for each zone covered; 3.

Electrical power supplied from the ACM diescl; 4.

Breaker coordination such that only one circuit would fail given the loss of any one individual light unit, or a single fault such as due to a fire; 5.

A minimal number of lights per circuit so that the lighting availability loss would be minimized given a circuit loss; 6.

A mix of local area lights and spot flood beams plus extension lights where necessary; 7.

Receive a field check /walkdown to confirm adequate numbers, locations, and positioning of lights.

Essential valves or equipment components requiring manual operator i

action (s) would be covered by local zone lighting plus spot beams from l

adjacent zones. Therefore, if a fire failed the lectl circuit, the spot beams from a distance greater than 30 feet would still be functional.

In addition, extension lights will be available in selected areas where valves are located in upper galleries.

l The licensee justifies this exemption on the bases that the proposed new lighting system provides an equivalent level of emergency lighting 4

as individual 8-hour battery packs.

4.0 EVALUATION The technical requirements of Section III.J are not met in the Reactor and Turbine Buildings because the new emergency lights are not powered by individual 8-hour batteries.

We had two concerns with the proposed emergency lighting system in these buildings. The first was that a sufficient number of lights would not be installed so as provide an adequate level of illumination. However, all essential valves and equipment components requiring manual operator actions, and access and egress routes thereto, will be covered by the local zone lighting plus spot beams from adjacent zones.

In addition, at our request, the licensee in kepcrt No. 4, comitted to verify the adequacy of the illumination by conducting a field walkdown with plant operators to confirm the adequacy of the numbers, locations and positioning of the lights.

The second concern was that a fire could damage the power supply to the emergency lighting. However, the new system is designed in such a manner that a fire in any one zone would not affect the emergency lighting in adjacent zones. Therefore, individual 8-hour batteries for each emergency light are not necessary to provide us with reasonable assurance that sufficient emergency lighting would be available to complete safe shutdown functions.

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5.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our evaluation, we concludd that the licensee's alternate configuration will achieve an acceptable level of safety, equivalent to that achieved by compliance with Section III.J. Therefore, the licensee's request for exemption for individual 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting in the Reactor and Turbine Buildings should be granted.

Principal Contributor:

D. Kubicki, DPWRL-8/PEICSB Dated: August 26, 1986 e

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