ML20211F708
| ML20211F708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1987 |
| From: | Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211F695 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-87-08, 50-461-87-8, NUDOCS 8702250181 | |
| Download: ML20211F708 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1987008
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-461/87008(DRSS)
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Docket No. 50-461
License No. NPF-55
Licensee:
Illinois Power Company
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500 South 27th Street
Decatur, IL 62525
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Inspection At: NRC Region III Office
Inspection Conducted:
February 5-11, 1987
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Date of Previous Physical Protection Inspection:
December 1-15, 1986
Type of Inspection: Announced Physical Protection Inspection
Inspector:
P!/8[#7
G('L. Pirtle
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ysical Security Inspector
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Approved By: Okat
N/8/#7
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p. R. Creed, Chief
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5afeguards Section
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on February 5-11, 1987 (Report No. 50-461/87008(DRSS))
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Areas Inspected:
Included a review and analysis of five potential equipment
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tampering investigation reports provided by the licensee. The inspection was
conducted by on NRC inspector.
The inspection / review of the investigation
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reports was conducted in the NRC Region III Office.
Results: No licensee violations of NRC requirements were noted during the
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review of the investigation reports. The investigations were thorough and
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conducted by an independent offsite agency and licensee management personnel
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had reviewed the investigation results. A modification pertaining to covering
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accessible buttons / switches on area radiation monitors still needs to be
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completed.
The licensee also needs to complete testing to determine if radio
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transmissions in close proximity of area radiation monitors can cause source
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check activation.
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DETAILS
1.
Key Persons Contacted
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The following key personnel of the licensee's management staff were
contacted during the review of the investigation reports of potential
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equipment tampering incidents.
The asterisk (*) denotes those present
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during the telephone Exit Interview conducted on February 11, 1987.
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- J. Wilson, Manager, Clinton Power Station, Illinois Power (IP)
- J. Weaver, Licensing and Safety (IP)
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- J. Brownell, Licensing /NRC Interface (IP)
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- J. Palchak, Supervisor, Plant Support Services (IP)
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During the onsite review of the investigation progress and subsequent
weekly contacts, senior licensee management personnel to include the
Plant Manager and senior licensing and security managers were contacted.
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2.
Exit Interview (MC 30703)
A telephone exit interview was conducted on February 11, 1987, with the
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licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 above. The personnel were
advised that NRC Region III had completed the review of the investigation
reports pertaining to five potential equipment tampering incidents whi:h
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occurred between June 17 and September 3,1986. The Region III staff
determined that the investigations were adequate and well documented.
Region III will monitor licensee corrective action pertaining to covering
accessible switches / buttons on area radiation monitors until the remaining
31 monitors have been modified (refer to Section 3.c. for related
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information). Additionally, testing needs to be completed to determine
if portable radio transmissions in close proximity to area radiation
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monitors can cause source check activation (refer to Section 3.a.(5) for
related information). No written material pertaining to the inspection
findings was left with the licensee's contractor personnel.
3.
Independent Inspection (MC 927068)
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Between June 17 and September 3, 1986, five potential equipment
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tampering events were reported by the licensee to NRC Region III.
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None of the events impacted on plant safety system operability due
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to the construction status of the plant at the time of the cccurrences.
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A summary of the incidents are addressed below:
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(1) June 17, 1986:
Short circuiting of heater / fan units of an
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Electric Hydraulic Control Skid (EHC Skid) occurred. The EHC
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skid was located on the 737 elevation of the turbine building
along a high personnel access route. An aluminum cable
identification tag was found jammed into a connection on a
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terminal board for the EHC Fan unit. The investigation
concluded that vibration of the skid probably contributed
to a cable identifier tag (aluminum) coming loose and
working its way down the cable until it made contact with
the terminals. Equipment tampering was not considered a
probable cause for the event.
(2) July 2, 1986: Six switches on the control panel for the
Division 1 Diesei Ganarator were found in an improper
position. The six awitches should have been in an "off"
position but were found in the "on" or " auto" position.
The Diesel Generator local control panel was located on
the 737 elevation. The investigation did not identify
any conceivable authorized reason for the switches to be
in the improper position. Therefore, deliberate equipment
tampering could not be ruled out as a potential cause for
the incident.
(3) July 15, 1986: Two bolts on the Division 1 Shutdown Water
Pump Backwash Stainer Inspection Port and one bolt in the
Division 2 Strainer Inspection Port were believed to have
been deliberately loosened without proper authorization.
The strainer is located within the lake screenhouse. The
investigation could not determine conclusively if the three
bolts in question were in fact loosened. Although one
individual's statement indicated he thought the bolts were
loose " based on the feel of the wrench on the nut," the
bolts were not torqued and they were not observed by anyone
other than the person that originally found them loose and
then tightened the bolts. The bolts in question were
observed by two persons as being properly tightened on
July 14, 1986 (the day before the alleged loose bolts were
detected). Deliberate equipment tampering was not suspected.
(4) August 28, 1986: The chemistry ventilation exhaust fans
were found tripped. The fan control switches (OLV 11.SA
and OVL 11.SB) were found in the " closed" position rather
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than the required "open" position. These switches are
interlocked with the exhaust fans and trip the fans when
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placed in the " closed" position. No indication of a power
supply overload was found.
The panel with the control
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switches is located at the 737 elevation along a high
personnel traffic route. The investigation could determine
no legitimate reason for the mispositioned switches.
Therefore, equipment tampering could not be ruled out as
a possible cause for the incident.
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(5) September 3, 1986:
Two Area Radiation Monitors (Unit 205
and 207) were activated for no apparent cause. The radiation
monitors were located on the 781 elevation of the auxiliary
building. The investigation did not identify the cause for
the activation of the area radiation monitors (check source
button depressed). And therefore, deliberate equipment
tampering could not be ruled out.
Radio transmissions in the
vicinity of the monitors were identified as a possible cause.
The licensee has not completed testing to determine if
portable radio transmissions could in fact cause activation
of the source checks. The licensee was requested to complete
testing with 60 days after receipt of this inspection report.
This item will remain open until the testing has been completed
(461/87008-01).
b.
The licensee advised NRC Region III of each of the above cited
incidents at the time of their occurrence.
Investigative progress
was reviewed during onsite visits by the physical security
inspectors between June and September 1986. Onsite discussions
with the investigators and licensee management personnel were also
conducted during the onsite inspections.
Corrective actions
implemented as a result of the events were discussed with the NRC
Region III staff and at least weekly contact was maintained with
licensee representatives by a regional security inspector or the
resident inspectors until the corrective actions had been fully
implemented. No further potential equipment tampering events have
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occurred since September 3, 1986.
c.
The licensee's immediate corrective actions pertaining to the
incidents consisted of:
(1) hiring an offsite professional
investigative agency to perform indepth investigations of each
event; (2) significantly increasing the number of security force
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patrols; (3) providing plant technical support for the onsite
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investigations; (4) briefing department heads on the events to
increase awareness for detecting further potential equipment
tampering events; (5) checking related equipment where tampering
was suspected to assure further equipment tampering did not occur,
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and (6) modifying 29 area radiation monitors with plexiglass covers
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over accessible switches / buttons to prevent inadvertent activation.
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Thirty-one additional radiation monitors are pending a similar
modification. This modification (AR-29) will be monitored until
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completed.
The licensee was requested to complete the modification
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within 60 days af ter receipt of this inspection report (461/87008-02).
d.
The written investigation reports were sent to NRC Region III as
requested.
Review of the reports showed that the investigative
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actions consisted of:
(1) interviews of personnel; (2) review
of maintenance and surveillance activity and documentation for
the equipment involved, and (3) review of security computer
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printouts for personnel location purposes. The investigation
methodology appeared appropriate, thorough, well documented,
and the conclusions were conservative and supported by the
investigative findings.
e.
NRC Region III's staff concluded that the licensee had conducted
an indepth investigation to determine the cause(s) and identity
of person (s) involved in the possible equipment tampering incidents
which occurred between June 17 and September 3, 1986. Although the
probably cause(s) for all of the incidents had not been identified,
the Region III staff concluded that the licensae's actions
demonstrated to employees the management's willingness to commit
substantial resources and time to investigate such incidents.
Their investigative actions appears to have instilled a high sense
of awareness toward penalties associated with equipment tampering
incidents which should help deter future incidents of equipment
tampering.
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