ML20211F708

Physical Protection Insp Rept 50-461/87-08 on 870205-11.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review & Analysis of Five Potential Equipment Tampering Investigative Repts. Licensee Needs to Complete Testing Re Radio Transmissions

ML20211F708
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	02/18/1987
From:	Creed J, Pirtle G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F695	List: ML20211F689 ML20211F708
References
50-461-87-08, 50-461-87-8, NUDOCS 8702250181
Download: ML20211F708 (5)

See also: IR 05000461/1987008

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/87008(DRSS)

i Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-55

Licensee: Illinois Power Company

i 500 South 27th Street

Decatur, IL 62525

{ Inspection At: NRC Region III Office

Inspection Conducted: February 5-11, 1987

j Date of Previous Physical Protection Inspection: December 1-15, 1986

Type of Inspection: Announced Physical Protection Inspection

Inspector: P!/8[#7

G('L. Pirtle Date

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ysical Security Inspector

Approved By

Okat N/8/#7

1 p. R. Creed, Chief Date

5afeguards Section

l Inspection Summary

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Inspection on February 5-11, 1987 (Report No. 50-461/87008(DRSS))

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Areas Inspected: Included a review and analysis of five potential equipment

tampering investigation reports provided by the licensee. The inspection was

conducted by on NRC inspector. The inspection / review of the investigation

I reports was conducted in the NRC Region III Office.

Results: No licensee violations of NRC requirements were noted during the

! review of the investigation reports. The investigations were thorough and

! conducted by an independent offsite agency and licensee management personnel

i had reviewed the investigation results. A modification pertaining to covering

l accessible buttons / switches on area radiation monitors still needs to be

l completed. The licensee also needs to complete testing to determine if radio

! transmissions in close proximity of area radiation monitors can cause source

l check activation.

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DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

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The following key personnel of the licensee's management staff were

contacted during the review of the investigation reports of potential

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equipment tampering incidents. The asterisk (*) denotes those present

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during the telephone Exit Interview conducted on February 11, 1987.

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• J. Wilson, Manager, Clinton Power Station, Illinois Power (IP)

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• J. Weaver, Licensing and Safety (IP)

• J. Brownell, Licensing /NRC Interface (IP)

j *J. Palchak, Supervisor, Plant Support Services (IP)

l During the onsite review of the investigation progress and subsequent

weekly contacts, senior licensee management personnel to include the

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Plant Manager and senior licensing and security managers were contacted.

2. Exit Interview (MC 30703)

A telephone exit interview was conducted on February 11, 1987, with the

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licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 above. The personnel were

advised that NRC Region III had completed the review of the investigation

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reports pertaining to five potential equipment tampering incidents whi:h

l occurred between June 17 and September 3,1986. The Region III staff

determined that the investigations were adequate and well documented.

Region III will monitor licensee corrective action pertaining to covering

accessible switches / buttons on area radiation monitors until the remaining

' 31 monitors have been modified (refer to Section 3.c. for related

information). Additionally, testing needs to be completed to determine

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if portable radio transmissions in close proximity to area radiation

monitors can cause source check activation (refer to Section 3.a.(5) for

related information). No written material pertaining to the inspection

findings was left with the licensee's contractor personnel.

3. Independent Inspection (MC 927068)

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! a. Between June 17 and September 3, 1986, five potential equipment

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tampering events were reported by the licensee to NRC Region III.

i None of the events impacted on plant safety system operability due

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i to the construction status of the plant at the time of the cccurrences.

A summary of the incidents are addressed below:

! (1) June 17, 1986: Short circuiting of heater / fan units of an

! Electric Hydraulic Control Skid (EHC Skid) occurred. The EHC

! skid was located on the 737 elevation of the turbine building

along a high personnel access route. An aluminum cable

identification tag was found jammed into a connection on a

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terminal board for the EHC Fan unit. The investigation

concluded that vibration of the skid probably contributed

to a cable identifier tag (aluminum) coming loose and

working its way down the cable until it made contact with

the terminals. Equipment tampering was not considered a

probable cause for the event.

(2) July 2, 1986: Six switches on the control panel for the

Division 1 Diesei Ganarator were found in an improper

position. The six awitches should have been in an "off"

position but were found in the "on" or " auto" position.

The Diesel Generator local control panel was located on

the 737 elevation. The investigation did not identify

any conceivable authorized reason for the switches to be

in the improper position. Therefore, deliberate equipment

tampering could not be ruled out as a potential cause for

the incident.

(3) July 15, 1986: Two bolts on the Division 1 Shutdown Water

Pump Backwash Stainer Inspection Port and one bolt in the

Division 2 Strainer Inspection Port were believed to have

been deliberately loosened without proper authorization.

The strainer is located within the lake screenhouse. The

investigation could not determine conclusively if the three

bolts in question were in fact loosened. Although one

individual's statement indicated he thought the bolts were

loose " based on the feel of the wrench on the nut," the

bolts were not torqued and they were not observed by anyone

other than the person that originally found them loose and

then tightened the bolts. The bolts in question were

observed by two persons as being properly tightened on

July 14, 1986 (the day before the alleged loose bolts were

detected). Deliberate equipment tampering was not suspected.

(4) August 28, 1986: The chemistry ventilation exhaust fans

were found tripped. The fan control switches (OLV 11.SA

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and OVL 11.SB) were found in the " closed" position rather

than the required "open" position. These switches are

interlocked with the exhaust fans and trip the fans when

placed in the " closed" position. No indication of a power

supply overload was found. The panel with the control

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switches is located at the 737 elevation along a high

personnel traffic route. The investigation could determine

no legitimate reason for the mispositioned switches.

Therefore, equipment tampering could not be ruled out as

a possible cause for the incident.

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(5) September 3, 1986: Two Area Radiation Monitors (Unit 205

and 207) were activated for no apparent cause. The radiation

monitors were located on the 781 elevation of the auxiliary

building. The investigation did not identify the cause for

the activation of the area radiation monitors (check source

button depressed). And therefore, deliberate equipment

tampering could not be ruled out. Radio transmissions in the

vicinity of the monitors were identified as a possible cause.

The licensee has not completed testing to determine if

portable radio transmissions could in fact cause activation

of the source checks. The licensee was requested to complete

testing with 60 days after receipt of this inspection report.

This item will remain open until the testing has been completed

(461/87008-01).

b. The licensee advised NRC Region III of each of the above cited

incidents at the time of their occurrence. Investigative progress

was reviewed during onsite visits by the physical security

inspectors between June and September 1986. Onsite discussions

with the investigators and licensee management personnel were also

conducted during the onsite inspections. Corrective actions

implemented as a result of the events were discussed with the NRC

Region III staff and at least weekly contact was maintained with

licensee representatives by a regional security inspector or the

resident inspectors until the corrective actions had been fully

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implemented. No further potential equipment tampering events have

occurred since September 3, 1986.

c. The licensee's immediate corrective actions pertaining to the

incidents consisted of: (1) hiring an offsite professional

investigative agency to perform indepth investigations of each

event; (2) significantly increasing the number of security force

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patrols; (3) providing plant technical support for the onsite

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investigations; (4) briefing department heads on the events to

increase awareness for detecting further potential equipment

tampering events; (5) checking related equipment where tampering

was suspected to assure further equipment tampering did not occur,

j and (6) modifying 29 area radiation monitors with plexiglass covers

l over accessible switches / buttons to prevent inadvertent activation.

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Thirty-one additional radiation monitors are pending a similar

modification. This modification (AR-29) will be monitored until ,

completed. The licensee was requested to complete the modification

within 60 days af ter receipt of this inspection report (461/87008-02).

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d. The written investigation reports were sent to NRC Region III as

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requested. Review of the reports showed that the investigative

actions consisted of: (1) interviews of personnel; (2) review

of maintenance and surveillance activity and documentation for

the equipment involved, and (3) review of security computer

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printouts for personnel location purposes. The investigation

methodology appeared appropriate, thorough, well documented,

and the conclusions were conservative and supported by the

investigative findings.

e. NRC Region III's staff concluded that the licensee had conducted

an indepth investigation to determine the cause(s) and identity

of person (s) involved in the possible equipment tampering incidents

which occurred between June 17 and September 3, 1986. Although the

probably cause(s) for all of the incidents had not been identified,

the Region III staff concluded that the licensae's actions

demonstrated to employees the management's willingness to commit

substantial resources and time to investigate such incidents.

Their investigative actions appears to have instilled a high sense

of awareness toward penalties associated with equipment tampering

incidents which should help deter future incidents of equipment

tampering.

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