Text

Insp Rept 50-267/86-22 on 860804-08.Violation Noted: Failure to Correct Previously Identified Emergency Preparedness Deficiencies
	ML20210J009
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	09/17/1986
From:	Baird J, Yandell L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20210J003	List: ML20210H997; ML20210J005; ML20210J009;
References
	50-267-86-22, NUDOCS 8609260390
	Download: ML20210J009 (13)
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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/86-22 License: DPR-34

Docket: 50-267

Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

P. O. Box 840

Denver, Colorado 80201-0840

Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)

Inspection At: Fort Lupton and Fort St. Vrain, Colorado

Inspection Conducted: August 4-R, 1986

Inspector: O /d MM

J/'B. Baird, NRC Team Leader

T//7/f4

Dat( '

Other Inspectors: C. Hackney, RIV, NRC

W. Bennett, RIV, NRC

D. Perrotti, OIE, NRC

E. Hickey, Pacific Northwest Laboratories

G. Bryan, Comex Corporation

Approved: , ,

'7// 7/86

I L. A. Yandell, Chief, Emergency. Preparedness Date'

and Safeguards Programs Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted August 4-8, 1986 (Report 50-267/86-22)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency

response capabilities during the annual exercise.of the emergency plan and

procedures.

Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, one apparent violation

was identified (paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9 - failure to correct deficiencies).

Three emergency preparedness deficiencies were ident,ified by NRC inspectors.

B609260390 86c?24

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

F. Borst, Support Services Manager

H. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Fuels

0. Clayton, Technical Services Engineer

K. Collins, Quality Assurance Technician

R. Cook, Quality Assurance Technician

R. Doyle, Quality Assurance Engineer

D. Evans, Superintendent of Operations

M. Ferris, Quality Assurance Operations Manager

M. Fisher, Engineer, Special Projects

J. Fuller, Vice President, Engineering and Planning

C. Fuller, Station Manager

J. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear Production

A. Greenwood, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Auditing

J. Hak, Shift Supervisor

M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager

A. Horsechief, Health Physics Technician

R. Husted, Supervisor, Nuclear Fuels

M. Joseph, Technical Advisor

B. Langsteiner, Quality Assurance Engineer

0. Lee, III, Quality Assurance Technician

W. Ledford, Quality Assurance Engineer

H. Olson, Member, Nuclear Facility Safety Committee

D. McCue, Technical Services Engineer

R. Millison, Technical Services Technician

F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager

L. Pierce, Manager, Media Relations

J. Sills, Technical Services Supervisor

L. Singleton, Manager, Quality Assurance

G. Toner, Quality Assurance Technician

R. Walker, Chairman

D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

R. Williams, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations

State of Colorado

J. Everitt, Division of Disaster Emergency Services

M. Hanrahan, Department of Health

NRC

P. Michaud, Resident Inspector

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Other Personnel

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H. Bluder, Stone and Webster

B. Matheney, Member, Nuclear Facility Safety Committee, NUS

J. Rodell, Stone and Webster

Denotes thase present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(0 pen) Deficiency (267/8518-01): The NdC inspector noted internal

inconsistencies in the scenario impacted the demonstration of some

exercise objectives (see paragraph 3). This item remains open.

(0 pen) Deficiency (267/8518-02): The NRC inspector noted that controller

weakness in the control room impacted the demonstration of some exercise

objectives (see paragraph 4). This item remains open.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-03): The NRC inspector determined that

adequate habitability checks were made in the control room. This item is

closed.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-04): The NRC inspector determined that

adequate habitability checks were made in the technical support center.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-05): The NRC inspector determined that

licensee training on information flow had addressed the problems

identified in this deficiency; however, see related deficiency in

paragraph 6. This item is closed.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-06): The NRC inspector noted that exercise

observers did not identify any field monitoring team data record

weaknesses. This item is closed.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-07): The NRC inspector observed

radiological precautions by health physics technician and repair team

members to be adeo,uate. This item is closed.

(Closed) Deficiency (267/8510-08): The NRC' inspector did not observe any

prepositioning of station personnel for accountability. The licensee

created a printout list of personnel inside the protected area and station

personnel were accounted for against the station list. This item is

closed.

(0 pen) Deficiency (267/8518-09): The NRC inspector observed similar

weaknesses in first aid and decontamination during the exercise (see l

paragraph 9). This item is open. '

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(0 pen) Deficiency (267/8518-10): The NRC inspector observed similar

weaknesses in command and control of the forward command post during this

exercise (see paragraph 8). This item is open.

3. Exercise Scenario

The PSC exercise scenario was reviewed prior to the exercise to determine

that provisions had been made for the required level of participation by

state and local agencies, and that all major elements of emergency

response would be exercised by PSC in accordance with the requirements of

10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and the

guidance criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

Comments from this review were transmitted to the scenario coordinator

prior to the inspection date and satisfactory resolution was obtained

prior to the exercise. In general, the scenario was found to be

significantly improved over the previous exercise in internal consistency

and completeness of scenario data and instructions for players and

controllers. However, the NRC inspectors determined during the exercise

that weaknesses in the scenario were still present and impacted the

demonstration of some exercise objectives. Examples of these weaknesses

were as follows:

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Scenario data indicated higher fuel damage initially than planned for

in the exercise timeline. This caused the control room to initially

select the Alert classification instead of Notice of Unusual

Event (NOVE) as planned. Later, scenario data inadequacies

contributed to a delay in making the Alert classification.

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No thermal data were provided to permit prestressed concrete reactor

vessel (PCRV) failure risk.

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Reactor building louvers were opened although peak pressure data was

insufficient to cause opening.

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Scenario dose assessment data was based upon release option 4

although release option 1 (via the louvers) was appropriate. This

resulted in the re-boot of the dose assessment program and reentry of

data, causing a significant delay in producing dose assessment

projections.

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The method of providing data-logger information to players was new

and the scenario did not make adequate provisions for training

players to use this data in the same way as they would the

data-logger.

The exercise scenario weakness observed appears to constitute the same

general deficiency in this area that was identified during the last annual

exercise (267/8515-01). The failure to correct this deficiency is

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an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), which requires the correction

of exercise deficiencies (267/8622-01). The licensee also identified this

deficiency in the post-exercise critique.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

4. Contr a Room

Initial plant conditions and events of the scenario were provided to

the control room staff at about 7:00 p.m. by the exercise controllers.

The initial event was decreasing core outlet temperatures which could not

be corrected by adjusting the flow orifice control valves, followed by

erratic thermocouple readings. At about 7:30 p.m., a rise in primary

coolant activity was shown and a NOUE was declared at approximately

7:52 p.m. A spurious reactor scram, rise in primary coolant moisture, and

a main steamline rupture with the reactor building louvers open resulted

in the declaration of an Alert at about 8:47 p.m. and a Site Area Emergency

at about 9:05 p.m. A rise in primary coolant radioactivity and the

assessment of offsite dose consequences resulted in the declaration of a

General Emergency at about 12:06 a.m.

During the initial part of the exercise, the NRC inspector noted that

scenario problems (see paragraph 3) were impacting the demonstration

of emergency classification. The controllers in the control room did

not maintain contact with the players and make the necessary

scenario / player action corrections to get the exercise back on the

time line and permit adequate evaluation of control room response.

After a delay of about 30 minutes, one of the lead controllers

informed the control room staff that the scenario required

declaration of a NOVE. The classification problera persisted for the

Alert also. The shift supervisor (SS) consulted with the operations

superintendent by telephone and questions about whether or not the

data given required the declaration of Alert caused this

classification to be delayed until the operations superintendent

arrived at the plant.

The NRC inspector in the control room observed the appropriate use of

emergency implementing procedures (EIPs) for classifying events and

noted that initial notifications to state and local agencies were

made promptly by the SS. No notification was made'for Alert because

a Site Area Emergency was declared about 15 minutes later, preempting

the Alert notification. The subsequent notifications were timely.

It was noted that the SS had to leave the control room often to make

calls and notifications. During the times the SS was out of the

control room it was not clear who was in charge of operations.

In addition, the NRC inspector observed that there was good

communication and interaction in the control room during the

exercise, that the SS was properly relieved by the control raom

director (CRD), and that control room personnel were kept well

informed of events by the CRD as the information became available.

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However, it was noted that communications outside the control room

were weak in that the control room did not know the status of

accountability, if the personnel control center was staffed, or if

the onsite radiation monitoring team had been dispatched.

The control room controller weakness observed appears to constitute

the same general deficiency in this area that was identified during

the last annual exercise (267/8515-02). The failure to correct this

deficiency is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), which requires

the correction of exercise deficiencies (267/8622-01). The licensee also

identified this deficiency in the post-exercise critique.

Based on the above, the following additional item is considered to be

an emergency preparedness deficiency:

Information flow to the control room was deficient in that the

SS was not informed of the status of accountability, staffing of

the Personnel Control Center (PCC), or dispatch of the onsite

monitoring team in a timely manner. (267/8622-02)

The following are observations for the licensee's attention. These

observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items are

recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no

specific regulatory requirement.

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Provisions should be made for making notifications from the control

room and consideration given to delegation of the calls to a person

other than the SS.

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Consideration should be given to providing a status board to display

plant conditions and system status for the control room staff.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

5. Personnel Accountability

The NRC inspector noted that personnel were requested to report directly

to their emergency response facilities by the control room following the '

declaration of an Alert class. According to administrative Procedure G-5,

titled " Personnel Emergency Response," Section 4.1, "In the event that an

Alert or higher level classification event occurs, the Technical Support

Center (TSC), Personnel Control Center (PCC) . . . . will be activated

immediately after initial accountability is completed." In addition,

Section 4.4 of Procedure G-5 states that personnel other than operations

and health physics shall report to the lunchroom for initial

accountability. This caused some initial confusion. During the

accountability process all but two persons were accounted for in

approximately 30 minutes; however, two persons could not be accounted for

in the assembly area. It was subsequently determined by the licensee that

the two persons had left the area and were not key carded out of the

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protected area. The NRC inspector noted that Section 4.'4 of the

accountability procedure did not address what to do on backshifts or

weekends if personnel were missing, who to report missing persons to, or

who would and how to initiate search and rescue. These deficiencies were

also identified by the licensee during the post-exercise critique.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Technical Support Center

The NRC inspector observed that the technical support center activation

was not timely. The Alert was declared about 8:47 p.m. and the TSC

activation was accomplished at about 10:56 p.m. The NRC inspector noted

that this was in excess of the general goal of 60 minutes stated in

Section 8.2.1 j. of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 and the specific goal of

90 minutes authorized for Fort St. Vrain. The deficiency in demonstration

of timely staff augmentation and TSC activation was also identified in the

licensee's post-exercise critique.

After the TSC was activated, the NRC inspector noted that command, control

and communications in the TSC were deficient at times. For example, the

TSC director did not announce taking charge of the TSC when he arrived,

and briefings of TSC staff were infrequent, often incomplete (missing key

players and important information), and hampered by high noise levels

which included that of the TSC air sampler. These deficiencies were also

identified in the licensee's post-exercise critique.

In addition, the initial status board entries were not timely and dose

assessment information flow to the TSC director was slow. No running

accounts of limiting conditions for operations (LCOs) or inoperative

equipment were made. The NRC inspector also noted that, for approximately

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , information unavailability apparently led the TSC staff to

incorrectly believe the release rate had been decreased significantly by.

venting primary coolant to the bottle farm. Additionally, no provisions

were made for displaying the protective action recommendations implemented

by state and local agencies.

The NRC inspector noted that the TSC formulated the General Emergency

classification and directed the control room to announce a General

Emergency at approximately 12:05 a.m., and informed the forward command

post (FCP) of that declaration and protective action recommendations at

about 12:08 a.m. At this time the FCP had been activated and the

corporate emergency director (CED) had been responsible for classification

and protective action decisionmaking for about an hour.

The decisionmaking weakness observed appears to constitute the same

general deficiency in this area identified during the licensee's critique

of the last annual exercise and documented in paragraph 5 of NRC Report

No. 50-267/85-15. The failure to correct this deficiency is an apparent

violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), which requires the correction of

exercise deficiencies (267/8622-01). The licensee also identified this

deficiency in the post exercise critique.

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The following are observations for the licensee's attention. These

observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items are

recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but they have no

specific regulatory requirement.

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The Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), Section 6, indicates

the emargency alarm is to be sounded at Alert and all higher

classifications. Procedure RERP-CR stated the alarm is sounded at

Alert, Site Area, and General Emergencies unless previously sounded.

This should be made consistent.

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RERP-CR and RERP-PHONE lists only one of the four alternate telephone

numbers for the NRC operations center. The additional numbers should

be provided.

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RERP-TSC, 2.4.2, requires the control room director's concurrence

prior to commanding a data-logger printout of " Alarm Types." This

should be reviewed to determine if concurrence is necessary.

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Emergency response personnel coming into the plant were delayed at

security awaiting telephone authorization for entry. This practice

should be reviewed to determine if a more efficient procedure can be

provided.

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A display of protective action recommendations made by the licensee

and actually implemented by offsite authorities should be provided.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

7. Personnel Control Center

The Alert classification was declared at about 8:51 p.m. and the first

person arrived at the PCC at approximately 9:37 p.m. The PCC director

arrived at the PCC at about 9:44 p.m. and most of the other PCC personnel

arrived at approximately 10:06 p.m. The PCC director began conducting a

radiological survey to determine facility habitability and requested that

the emergency implementing procedures be removed from the library and used-

by PCC personnel. The NRC inspector noted that the PCC director did not

announce when the PCC was activated and did not conduct any PCC staff

briefings during the exercise. The emergency director in the control room

made emergency class declarations over the paging system from the control'

room; however, there were areas in the PCC where one could not hear the

announcements. The NRC inspector heard the emergency class announcements

but did not hear the reasons announced for the change in emergency

classes.

The NRC inspector noted that personnel arriving at the PCC assisted in

setting up a system for personnel monitoring and decontamination, and

checked themselves for contamination prior to entering the main PCC work

area. The NRC inspector also noted, however, that two persons went from

the PCC to the TSC without the PCC director checking with the control room

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for onsite radiological conditions. At this time, the station emergency

director had previously declared an Alert and there had been a

radiological release.

Telephone and radio communications were established with the TSC and both

were maintained throughout the exercise. The NRC inspector noted that the

offsite radiological monitoring personnel rectived the keys to the offsite

monitoring vehicles and were prepared to depart shortly after PCC

activation; however, the teams were not dispatched in a timely manner.

The exclusion area boundary monitoring (EAB) team was dispatched in

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 38 minutes and the emergency planning zone (EPZ) monitoring team

was dispatched in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months 25 minutes after the declaration of an Alert.

In addition to the slow dispatch, the failure to restart and stalling of

the vehicle for the EPZ team contributed to this problem. This deficiency

was also identified by the licensee during the post exercise critique.

The following are observations for the licensee's attention. These ,

observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These items are 1

recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but have no

specific regulatory requirement.

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Control room, TSC and PCC personnel should be notified when the PCC

is activated.

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The PCC and alternate PCC should have emergency lighting in the event

of a power failure.

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Personnel should sign in at the PCC under their functional areas so

that the PCC director is aware of personnel that have arrived. -

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All personnel should be made aware of plant radiological conditions

prior to departing for the TSC or control room.

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The public address system in the PCC should be upgraded so that all

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PCC personnel can hear accident related messages.

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PCC personnel should receive periodic emergedcy related information

from the PCC director.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8. Forward Command Post l

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The licensee's forward command post, which is the emer9ency operations I

facility, is located in the licensee's Fort Lupton service center '

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building. The NRC inspector noted that the facility was laid out per

Procedure RERP-FCP, Issu'e 13, as amended by PDR 86-895. The NRC inspector

noted that the FCP was not activated within the 90 minutes time from the

declaration of an Alert (synonymous with the start of the fan-out

notification) as committed to by the licensee. The NRC inspector noted

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that the CED arrived approximately 90 minutes after the fan-out (AF+90).

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However, at this time no plant status was available from the TSC, so the

FCP remained staffed, but essentially unable to perform its primary

function of command and control of the licensee's emergency response. It

was observed by the NRC inspector that a FCP communicator passed

information on to the TSC that the FCP was fully manned at AF+97.

However, the CED had made no decision on activation at this point. At

AF+120 the TSC and FCP still had not been declared fully operational.

The NRC inspector also noted that Procedure RERP-FCP provides no detailed

instructions for the CED as to when or how the responsibility for command

and control of the emergency response should be transferred from the TSC to

FCP. The initial plant status briefing for the PSC FCP staff was

conducted by the CED. However, from that point on the licensee

demonstrated weaknesses in the command and controi of emergency response

activities, as evidenced by the following examples:

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The CED attempted a premature activation and announcement of PSC FCP

operability before the condition of the plant was fully known.

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There was nc, announcement made by the CED to the PSC FCP staff that

the FCP was considered to be activated and fully operational, that

the CED was in charge, and that the responsibility for notifying and

making protective action recommendations (PARS) to offsite

authorities had been transferred from the TSC to FCP.

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For the most part the station technical liaison (STL) briefed the

staff and appeared to be the decisionmaker for PSC.

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When asked for a protective action recommendation by the state, the

CED was indecisive as to what to recommend. Scenario events finally

overtook this situation when the emergency escalated from a Site Area

Emergency to a General Emergency.

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Press releases were not reviewed and concurred in by the~CED, and

made available to the NRC for review prior to issuance.

During the exercise the NRC inspector noted several instances where

approved procedures were not followed:

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RERP-PAG, Issue 4, specifies that the decision for PARS is.to be-

based, in part, upon plant system parameters. However, at the Site

Area Emergency level no consideration was given to protective actions

based on deteriorating plant conditions (even though an uncontrolled

release was in propress).

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RERP-PAG states that this procedure is to be implemented (i.e.,

protective actions are to be developed) whenever there is an Alert or

higher emergency class event in progress. Howev'er, when the state

requested a PAR (during the Site Area Emergency class) the licensee

failed to provide a PAR.

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RERP-FCP, Issue 13, specifies that data for radiological updates is

to be obtained from, and reviewed by, the radiological assessment

coordinator (RAC) prior to posting. However, the status board keeper

repeatedly posted data announced over the TSC speaker without a prior

review and concurrence by the RAC. At one point this resulted in

confusion as to the status of offsite doses (measured vs. projected).

RERP-FCP states that media relations will provide assistance to the

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FCP public information team in the preparation of news and related

i media releases. However, the media relations personnel informed the

inspector that they had not provided assistance in the preparation of

news releases, but had distributed the releases as they were issued.

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The process used in this exercise precluded concurrence in the

technical content of the news releases by the CED as discussed above.

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Although certain aspects of the physical capability of the FCP appeared to

be substandard and detracted from the exercise, this matter will be

deferred until the review of the Fort St. Vrain facilities under the NRC's

l program of post-implementation review of the emergency response facilities

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is conducted as discussed in a letter from G. L. Madsen, RIV to 0. R. Lee,

Vice President, Electrical Production, Public Service Company of Colorado

dated August 16, 1983.

The FCP command and control weakness observed appears to constitute the

same general deficiency in this area that was identified during the last

annual exercise (267/8515-10). The failure to correct this deficiency is

an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), which requires the correction

of exercise deficiencies (267/8622-01). The licensee also identified this

,

deficiency in the post-exercise critique.

Based on the observations above, the following additional items are

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considered to be emergency preparedness deficiencies:

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The FCP was not activated and operational in 90 minutes after

declaration of an Alert emergency classification. (267/8622-03)

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Certain provisions of RERP implementing procedures controlling

emergency response activities at the FCP were not followed.

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(267/8622-04)

The following are observations for the licensee's attention. These

observations are neither violations nor unresolved items. These. items are

recommended for licensee consideration for improvement, but have no

specific regulatory requirement.

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RERP-FCP needs revision to provide clear instructions on the transfer

of command / control from TSC to FCP. ;

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RERP-FCP and RERP-PAG need clarification with regard to the

difference in meaning of protective action recommendations and

protective action guides (PAGs).

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The functions of dose assessment (primary responsibility), control of

field monitoring tean.s and associated activities should be

transferred to the FCP when that facility is declared operational.

The TSC should continue to perform dose assessment as backup-

capability.

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Responsibility for event classification and determination of PARS

should be clarified as to when transfer of these functions is to take

place along with the transfer of the responsibility for notification

of offsite authorities.

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RERP-PAG should be revised to fully conform to IE Information

Notice 83-28 regarding PARS based on plant status.

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Status boards should be reviewed to provide capability for trending,

site evacuation status, to tell new data from old since all

information on the board is not updated at the same time, and posting

protective actions implemented by the state / local agencies.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

9. First Aid and Inplant Radiation Protection

The inplant monitoring and first aid portion of the exercise began at

approximately 9:20 p.m. with a team preparing to enter the reactor

building for valve lineup to depressurize the PCRV. The team was

subsequently dispatched at about 9:40 p.m., followed by one of the

operators falling and simulating the breaking of his leg and becoming

contaminated. The NRC inspector noted that the scenario for the medical

emergency was expected to require search and rescue, but was timed such

that the individual injured was never alone, and therefore never missing.

During this part of the exercise scenario, it was also noted that there

were many uses of the radios without stating that the activity was a

drill.

The NRC inspector noted that the team providing first aid made

radiological surveys, but did not keep a written record of the surveys.

In addition, the injured person was asked to " hop" out without benefit of

a splint being applied to his broken leg. A trauma kit containing a

splint was available, but since the individuals responding were not

qualified emergency medical technicians (EMT's), they did not use the kit.

The NRC inspector also noted that after the injured person was removed to

the health physics control point, his protective clothing was not cut off

to remove the majority of contamination, and to give him relief from the

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The NRC inspector noted that the radiological protection by health physics !

technicians and repair team personnel appeared to be adequate.

Anticontamination clothes and respirators were properly used and dosimetry

was checked after leaving the radiation area. l

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The first aid and decontamination weakness observed appears to constitute

the same general deficiency in this area identified during the licensee's

last annual exercise (267/8515-09). The failure to correct this

deficiency is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), which

requires the correction of exercise deficiencies (267/8622-01). The

licensee also identified this deficiency in the post-exercise critique.

No other violations or deviations were identified.

10. Exercise Critique

The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques by the licensee's

staff on February 26 and 27, 1986, to evaluate the licensee's

identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E of Part 50, paragraph IV.F.5. The

first critique was conducted immediately following the exercise and

included observations from players, controllers, and observers. The

second critique was a debriefing of exercise audit findings by the quality

assurance audit team under the cognizance of the Nuclear Facility Safety

Committee. It was noted that most of the observations by the NRC

inspectors during the exercise were also independe'ntly made and reported

during these critiques. Deficiencies which were identified by both

licensee personnel and NRC inspectors are described in the preceding

sections of this report. Corrective action for identified deficiencies

and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Meeting

The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection'on June 27, 1986. The

NRC inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and {

the findings. The NRC inspection team leader stated that although a

number of deficiencies were identified during the exercise,' implementation

of the Plan and procedures in many of the areas observed was improved over

the previous annual exercise, as was the exercise-scenario? The NRC

inspector also stated that the failure to correct deficiencies from the

previous exercise was an apparent violation of NRC requirements and the

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deficiencies identified during this exercise. indicated a lack of effective

demonstration of some of the major exercise objectives. ~~

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ML20210J009

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