ML20198G815

Summary of 740920 Meeting w/WPPSS,C-E & Ebasco to Discuss first-round Questions Re QA Mechanical Engineering & Effluent Auxiliary Power & Conversion & Containment Sys

ML20198G815
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	09/30/1974
From:	Oreilly P US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
CON-WNP-1336 NUDOCS 8605290776
Download: ML20198G815 (44)

Text

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pr . q - p4 DOCKET NOS: STN 50-508 AEL 50-509 FACILITY: WFPSS MUCLEAR FROJECTS NO. 3 AMD WD. 5 APPLICAM uamETON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (WPPSS)

SO M OF SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 NEETIBC WITE WFPSS TO DL9 CUSS DEAFT FIRST 30ERS (JUESTIONE Ce September 20, 1974, representatives of WFPSS, Ebasco, and combustien Engineering met with the Nagulatory staff to discuss draf t first round questiene regarding quality assurance, machanical engineering. effluent  ;

treatment systees, m.miliary and peeper conversion systems, ar.d contairaent systems. A list of attendees and ma agenda are attached.

.The schedule for the radiological safety review acd the contents a:ut tfane of submittal of the first amenlment to the PSAA vere also discuesed.  ;

WPPSS stated that the safety review scheduls transmitted with the staff's '

letter of September 1, 1974 was acceptable. The scope of tha first FEAR amendment was adjusted to allow submittal in a timely manner during  ;

October. As a result, this amendment will r.ot include responses to the staff's raquests for additional information. However, incorporation of the most recent CESSAR amendments and the contaf anent anabetapartasent i analysis results will be included.

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1 Patrick D. O'Reilly Light Water Reactors Project Branch 1-3 Directorate of Licensing Incleeures:

1. At w - List >

2. Meeting Agenda act Mr. J. J. Stein . l l Joseph B. Emetta, Jr., Esq.  !

Rf M Q. Quigley, Esq.

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S ENCLOSURE NO, 1 ATTENDANCE LIST SEPTMBER 20. 1974 MEETING WITH WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYST M WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM G. Sorensen C. Fies R. Johnsor.

G. Dyekman R. Nicklas ERASCO T. Raney P. Rangarajan R. Vickers P. Hannaway W. Rezak J. Killian W. Moritz J. Heifetz

0. Block COMBUSTION ENGINEERING. INC.

E. Guenther R. Rutkowski USAEC - REGULATORY STAFF

• J. Costello

• F. Cherney

• P. Chen

• F. Stoddart

• C. Liang P. O'Reilly

• Denotes part time attendance 1

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e, x ENCLOSURE NO. 2 AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 20. 1974 MEETING WITH WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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m' $. e 411-1 411.0 QUALITY ASSimANC.E What is ccant by a QA Program responsiole to the requirenmats of 411.1 (17.0) AEC Regulations ss s'tated in Section 17.0?

411.2 In Section 17.1.1 it states: " Inherent in the hPPSS Manager of (17.1.1) QA activities is the authority to ' accept or reject any or all work, n.atterials , or equipment associated . . . " Tell who dele-gates this authority to QA and how other non-QA organizations are -

instructe:d that QA has this authority.

411.3 Organizational charts for hPPSS 3 and 5 differ from hPPSS 1 and (17.1.1) 4. hhich organization will be used for hPPSS 3 and 5?

411.4 Section 17.1.16 states that the Regulatory Programs organization (17.1.1c) perfoms audits of hPPSS QA department activitics, thy is this organizntion used and what expertise do they possess to perfom this activity?

411.5 Describe the Quality Assurance participation in revict and approval

-(17.1..la) of drmeings and specifications to assure that appropriate quality control provisions are included. See Section 17.1.1(a) .

411.6 Describe in more detail the QA relatel activities perfomed by *

(17.1.1) engineering, project manager and procurement with a cicar delineation y of their responsibility and authority.

411.7 List who has stop-work authority.

(17.1.1) '

411.8 Describe those provisions which require top management to regularly (17.1.1) assess the scope, implementation and effectiveness of the QA Program.

411.9 In Section 17.1.2, page 17.1-8, the description of Design Control (17.1.2) QAP-4) does not ment-ion checking for adequacy of design. Does WPPSS check for design adequacy?

411.10 Identify the nanagement level responsible for the final review (17.1.2) and approval of the QA Program.

411.11 Describe those provisions which comunicate to all responsibic (17.1.2) organizations and individuals that quality policies, manuals and procedures.are mandatory requirements.

411.12 Need to how if hPPSS commits to comply with the requirements of (17.1.2) the " Green Book" and the revised " Gray Book".

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411-2 411.13 Identify the highest level of management, corporate or othenvise, (17.1.2) responsibic for establishing Quality Assurance Company policies, goals and objectives.

411.14 In those areas in the QA Program description where an activity is described, include a description of QA/QC involvement in these (17.1.1) areas. If QA/QC has no involvement in these areas, then so state.

As a minimum, QA/QC involvement should be described for each of the 18 criteria.

411.15 Describe how disputes are resolved when there is a difference of decisions between QA/QC personnel and other departments such as (17.1.2) engineering, procurement, or construction regarding design centent, purchase requisitions and orders, instruction or procedures, design review board decisions, manufacturing and inspection planning, further processing of stmetures, systems and components, disposition of nonconformances, corrective action, audit results, stop-work actions or material review board decisions.

411.16 Describe in more detail the indoctrination and training program used (17.1.2) by h?PSS.

411.17 Describe those provisions that h?PSS uses to assure that quality related activitics such as inspection and test will be done with (17.1.2) appropriate equipment and under suitable environmental conditions.

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411.18 hhere are the stmetures, systems and components listed which are (17.1'.2) covered by the QA Program?

411.19 How does h?PSS assure that their principal contractors perform an (17.1.3) independent design review?

411.20 Who approves vendor and contractor QA programs?

(17.1.4) 411.21 Describe in more detail the measures used by WPPSS to control documents and prevent the use of obsolete or superseded documents.

(17.1.6) 411.22 What involvement does h?PSS have ih' the review and approval of (17.1.7) vendors inspections plans?

411.23 In Section 17.1.8 describe the criteria used by h?PSS to assure that identification and control measures establish a means by which (17.1.8) items can 71 e traced to, and confomance verified with, their appli-cabic documentation.

411.24 Describe the measures used by h?PSS to assure an active file is kept (17.1.e) current on qualification records of all special processes, procedures equipment and personnel performing special processes.

l 411-3 411.25 What criteria does ITPSS impose.ppon the contractors or sub-(17.1.10) contractors to assure independence of inspection personnel?

411.26 How does hTPSS assure that its contractors or subcontractors meet (17.1.10) the physical or perfonnance requirements of drmeings or specifi-cations specified i:i the contracts?

411.27 How does h?PSS assure itself that a test has adequate and appropriate (17.1.11) equipment and there is calibrated instrumentation?

411.28 Ikw can hTPSS detennine the complete status of all items under the (17.1.12) calibration system of their principal contractors?

411.29 How does hPPSS assure that qualified individuals will specify (17.1.13) cleaning preservation, handling, shipping and storage requirements?

411.30 hhat criteria does hPPSS use to control the application and removal (17.1.14) of tags, marking labels and stamps?

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EBASCO 411.1 What tyoe of surveillance does the Project Quality Aseurance (17.2.1) Engineer perform on Vendors and Contractors? p. 17.2-2(d) 411.2 Explain what is meant by the Project QA Engineer reviewing Vendors (17.2.1) Quality Asaurance procedures to assure implementation.

411.3 In Figure 17.2-1 the QA Supervisor reports to the Resident Engineer.

(17.2.1) Explain how QC will have the necessary stature, authority, organization freedom and independence to effectively do their jch.

411.4 Explatn how the Director-Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance (17.2.1) can direct and control the QA related activities of organizations controls outside of the Nuclear Vice-President's domain.

411.5 Tha Project QA Engine? r can reject unsatisfactory work when it is (17.2.1) indicated by an audit. Who conducts this audit and how frequent are they?

411.6 Explain the relationship of the Site QC (Quality Compliance) Supervisor (17.2.1) and the Project QA Engineer.

411.7 Who prepares and who reviews and approves the detailed inspection plans (17.2.1) or instructions used by the QC personnel?

411.8 Explain in more detail the functions of the Resident Engineer.

(17.2.1) 411.9 Does the Quality Compliance Engineering Department approve Construction (17.2.1) Contractor QA Programs? If not, why not?

411.10 P. 17.2-3 last paragraph. Who directs and manages the Ebasco Quality (17.2.1) Assurance Program?

411.11 Why are Materials Engineering uad Quality Compliance combined in l (17.2.1) one organization?

411.12 P. 17.2-1 3rd paragraph. What is meant by corporate management? Who (17.2.1) has actually delegated the power to the Director of Materials Engineering '

and Quality Compliance to enforce the QA Program requirements? What is meant,by unqualified support of corporate management?

, . 411.13 Describe in more detail how the management Quality Assurance Audit l

(17.2.2) Committee assess the implementation and effectiveness of the Quality Assurance Program.

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411.14 Do the Quality Control representatives have accept-reject and stop (17.2.1) work authority?

411.15 Describe in more detail the quality related activities performed by (17.2.1) Engineering, Construction Purchasing and Projects.

411.16 Does Ebasco commit to comply with the requirements of the revised (17.2.2) " Gray Book" and the " Green Book" ?

411.17 Describe the indoctrination and training program that will be in-(17.2.2) corporated in the Ebasco Quality Assurance Manual. See last paragraph

p. 17.2-4.

411.18 Why don't Materials Engineering and Quality .Compl.iance approve (17.2.2) Construction Quality Control Procedures? p. 17.2-5 2nd paragraph.

411.19 What is the correct title Quality Compliance or Quality Assurance 17.2.1) Engineering in Figure 17.2-17 See p. 17.2-15 last paragraph.

411.20 What happens if QA Engineering Department finds Vendors inspection (17.2.10) procedures, instructions or check lists inadequate?

411.21 Do Ebasco Vendor Quality Compliance Representatives evcr do any (17.2.10) physical reinspection on a sampling basis?

411.22 P. 17.2-17, second paragraph. Describe the requirements for in-(17.2.10) spection activities at the construction sites.

411.23 Does Ebasco's Quality Compliance Plan require Ebasco's approval of (17.2.7) a, vendor's processing and inspection requirements?

411.24 Does Ebasco perform any physical inspections of materials, components (12.2.7) or systems on the site?

411.25 Describe the measures used by Ebasco to assure that organizational (17.2.7) elements of their suppliers who perform acceptance inspections have the authority organizational freedom and independence to assure adequate quality.

411.25 P. 17.2-13, paragraph 3. Explain randon approach to a check point (17.2.7) system.

411.25 Ebasco covers measures for identification of purchased items. Discuss (17.2.8) Ebasco fabricated items.

411.26 F. 17.2-7, paragraphs 1 and 2. Ebasco discusses checkers doing (17.2.3) design review. How complete is the review, is it a check for errors or is it a design challenge?

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411.27 Describe the criteria used by Ebasco to qualify new suppiters.

(17.2.7) 411.28 What criteria does Ebasco use regarding the type of personnel who have authority for the removal of tags, markings, labels and stamps?

(17.2.14) 411.29 P. 17.2-20 2nd paragraph. What does Ebasco consider to be conditions (17.2.15) adverse to quality?

411.29 Describe those measures which assure followup on corrective actions (17.2.16) to verify reoper implementation and to close out corrective action documentations.

411.30 Describe Ebasco's program for obtaining timely corrective action on (17.2.18) unfavorable audit results.

411.31 Describe the different types of audits that Ebasco performs.

(17.2.18) 411.32 Describe in more detail the activities performed by Ebasco when they (17.2.18) conduct an audit to evaluate work areas, activities, processes or items.

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WPPSS 411.31 What criteria does WPPSS use for defining authority and responsibility (17.1.15) for determining and approving disposition of nonconforming items?

411.31 Does WPPSS require its contractors to report nonconformances "use-as-is" (17.1.15) and " repair" to be reported to them?

411.32 What are WPPSS criteria for a nonconformance?

(17.1.15) 411.33 What are WPPSS's criteria or definitions for conditions adverse to (17.1.16) quality? See p.17.1-29 second paragraph.

- 411.34 What action does WPPSS take when its contractors do not take prompt (17.1.16) corrective action?

411.35 Describe in more detail the activities performed by WPPSS when they (17.1.18) conduct an audit and evaluate work areas, activities, processes or items.

411.36 11ow does WPPSS assure timely corrective action on unfavorable audit (17.1.18) results?

411.37 Does WPSS analyze and summarize their audit data to top management?

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'011.0 't:FrLUE*U %LA MXT Provide .bacriptions ot tabular nc::mries of the liquid Dil.) 11.2-3, 4, 5, 6,

.(9.3.2 and r,amplin; poinu ..huun un P6ID rigt.rc s.

11.4) and 7.

011.2 You state that non-condensible gases from the main condenser evacuation systim will be continuously (10.4.2)' dischargtd through charcoal bcd adaorbers and uenitored continuously for radioactivity prior to discharge.

Figure 10.4-2 contains a notation to the ef fect that discharge vill be through liVAC charcoal adsorber.

Identify the HVAC system and effluent discharge point to which this source is discharged. Describe how the effluent radiation monitor for the main condenser evacuation system discharge will provide automatic termination of discharge when effluent concentrations exceed a predetermined limit, in accordance with General Design Criterion 60. Provide P&ID's which show the charcoal bcd adsorbers, the effluent discharge point, and your provisions for automatic termination of discharge.

011.3 We do not find the inventory of radioactive contami-(10.4.2.3) nants in the effluent from the mechanical vacuum pumps which you state is evaluated in Section 11.3.

Ilouever, in Table 11.1-16, we find such an inventory under.the heading " Steam Jet Air Ejector." Clarify.

011.4 Discuss blowdown system parameters which ensure that

)\(10.4.8) the blowdown stream will not flash downstream of the

' regenerative bic. dcrn heat exchanger. Indicate hew

' the pressure indicator controller prevents flashing.

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isolation valves and all piping from the isolation valves to the steam generator.

011.5 You indicate the presence of a flash tank in the = team (10.4.8 and generator blowdown letdcun line. The description 11.4.2.1.3) and P&ID's of the steam generator blowdown systen in Section 10.4-8 do not show a flash tank. Clarify.

011.6 In your enalysis of the releases of radioactive catcrir.:s (11.1 and in liquid effluents, you did not consider releaser from the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) cnd 11.2) the s team generator blowdown system (SGES). Reactor operating experience does not justify this assumpticn.

You should provide justification that:

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011-2 01).6 a. The plant voter inventories can be neintaine ? xcr (11.1 and the plant lifetine uithstat discharges frem t hc sc 11.2) systems;

b. The tritium Icvcis in'the plant can be controlled to maintain radiation exposures to opcrating personnel as low as practicable without discharge from this system; and

. c. There is sufficient capacity and f1'exibility or redundancy in the systems that discharge from these systems will not be necessary as the result of anticipated operational occurrences and equip-ment downtime.

011.7 You propose to design the liquid and solid waste systc=s (11.2, 11.5) to Quality Group D classification. We do not consider this classification adequate because the design guidance should provide reasonabic assurance that equipment and components used in the radioactive waste nanagement systems are designed, constructed, installed, and tested on a level commensurate with other plant systers and structures to protect the health and safety of the public and plant operating personnel. You should design the systems handling liquid waste including components in the solid waste system which contain radioactive liquids, to Quality Group D (Augmented)

.h classification as described in the attached Branch

'\ ' Technical Position - F.TSO 1:o. 1, " Design Guidance fc.

' Radioactive Waste Management Systems Installed in

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011.8 Describe the function of the 4,000 gpm Floor Drain (11.2, Circulation Pump and the 6,000 gpm ICW Circulation Tabic 11.2-22) Purp.

011.9 You have not described your provisions for contro11 ire (11.2) overflows from tanks containing potentially radioacti.c materials. Provide curbings or dikes around all tan'as having the potential to overflow to the floor (insifc the plant) or to the ground (outside the plant). For all tanks containing potentially radioactive material.:

both inside and outside the plant including the conde.-

sate storage tank, indicate the provisions incorrerc:cd for cach to monitor liquid levels, alarm potential overflow conditions, and collect and sample liquid overflows.

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. t 011-3 011.10 Section 9.3.3.2.6 ttates that Turbine Building eqcip-(11.2.2) ment drains and f1cer drains vill be routed to either the water reuse tank or the liquid radwaste system for processing. Section 11.2.2.7 states that Turbine Building drains will normally be sent to the secondcry particulate waste tank for processing in the Second.ry Particulate Waste System. Section 11.2.2 states that the Turbine Building drains will be processed in the Secondary liigh Purity Haste System. Describe the Turbine

- Building equipment and floor drain system and your provisions for sampling or monitoring of sumps to determine uhether the sump discharge will be routed to cither the water reuse tank or the liquid radwaste system as stated in Section 9.3.3.2.6. Clarify the discrepancy between Section 11.2.2 and Section 11.2.2.7 or describe your procedure for determining the treat-ment system to be used.

011.11 You state that you assume that the annual average CVCS (11.2.2) purification flow rate is 84 gpm with continuous ges stripping. Flow diagrams and P&ID's for the CVCS show the gas stripper to be in the shim biced section of the CVCS which you show to have an annual average operating flow rate of approximately I gpm. Describe your provisions or procedures for achieving gas stripping at an 84 gpm annual average flow rate.

\ 011.12 You state that the radioactive gaseous usste syster. will

((11.3.3.1.3) have 112 and 02 analyzers to indicate char.ges in hycrogcn and oxygen concentrations: however, it ic specified Laat Laese anatyter, w.ti ve opcio6eu pe t oo.ca. y .

Provide a system capable of continuously monitorin; oxygen and hydrogen concentrations in your gaseous rc '-

waste system, with provisions to alarm and automatically isolate the systcm in the event that exyger. couccatrc-tions in the decay tank inlet lines exceed 2*/.. In c '. ed e an analysis of your system showing the effects of instrument malfunctions.

011.13 Liquid radwaste system P&ID's in Section 11.2 shou (11.4) provisions for process radiation monitors for the Ficar Drain Treatment System (Fig.11.2-3), Detergent Wes:e Treatment System (Fig. 11.2-4), Secondary High rurier Waste System (Fig.11.2-6), and Secondary Particuir.:o Waste System (Fig.11.2-7); however, these monitars are not listed or der.crilcd under Section 11.2 or 11.4.

Provide descriptions of these monitors in the apprn ric:t

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' I 011-4 Provide a description of the instrenentation to be used 01).14 to monitor radie:ica 1cvels inprocees and cffluent strevc (11.4) during postulated accidents, in confermance with General

Des'ign Criterion 64.

011.15 Provide a more complete description of your solid waste system, including:

(11.5)

(1) The description of the proposed system operation, and indicating your provisions for controlling process flows, chemical and waste additions, and how a solid matrix in the waste container vill be obtained. Explain your method for assuring that all liquids have been combined into the solid matrix af ter the process is completed i.e. , free liquids are not present. Indicate the steps to be taken if solidification is not canplete.

(2) The provisions for capping and decontaminating waste containers and for handling waste spillage in the process areas.

(3) The description of the Volume Reduction Package (page 11.5-1).

011.16 Provide the results of an analysis showing the radio-nuclide concentrations which could occur in both (1)

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g (15.24) , the nearest potabic uater supply and (2) the nearest gs suriccc USLer in an unrestricted area as a result of

' leakage based on singic failures of components located

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liquids. Assume 17. of the operating fission procuct inventory is released to the primary coolant, failed tanks release 807. of their design capacity, and all

- - liquids from fciled ccmponente- enter-the groundunter, i.e., do not assume liquids are retained by building foundations. Credit for radionuclide removal by the plant process systems, consistant with the decontamina-tion factors in WASH-1258 should be ascumed. List all parameters and provide-justification for the values assumed in your calculations, including liquid dis-persion and transit time based on distance, the hydraulic gradient, permeability and effective porosi:y of the soil, and the assumed decontamination due to ion exchange by the soil.

• I 11_1 11.0 'fECHANICAL ENGIMEEP.ING 110.1 Under 3.6.2.1.4(a) piping systems having an internal pressure of (3.6.2.1) up to 275 psia and fluid tenperatures not in excess of 200*F are excluded fron pipe break criteria. This is not consistent with Regulatory Gulde 1.46 nor the present ME3 position. The present MEB position is that through wall leakage cracks should be postulated for such piping as delineated in Attachment A which is' generally applicable for piping outside the containment.

110.2 PSAR states that criteri: for postulating pipe breaks for (3.6.2.2) piping outside the containnent will be per AEC letter from J. O' Leary of 7/12/73. This is acceptable, however, imple-mentation of this criteria should be as contained in Attachment A.  ;

110.3 (1) Provide loading combinations and stress criteria for (3.6.3.1) normal, upset, and emergency conditions for Class 1, 2 and 3 piping in the A/,E - BOP. scope.

(2) Provide more specific criteria than "per code" for faulted condition stress criteria for Class 1 piping. For example, ASME Section III permits the use of Appendix F of the code for faulted conditions; but, does not require it. state specifically what is to be used.

(3) Provide specific design details for the three types of piping penetration guard pipes. Also discuss the access provisions to carry out inservice inspection of the flued head to process pipe welds for the Type I and III penetrations.

110.4 (1) Identify the computer program to be used for the calculation (3.6.4.1) of postulated pipe break and if the program is not widely used ir. the nuclear industry, provide justification for its applicability and validity for this type of analysis.

(2) In the computation of the thrust force using the' simplified forcing function, justify the use of Psat in lieu of Po for compressed (flashing) or saturated water.

110.5 (1) For unchoked flow, the Regulatory staf f will accept use of (3.6.4.2) a model with a uniform half angle of dispersion not exceeding 10*.

(2) In calculating jet impingement force as described in Eq. (1),

the definition of the velocity ratio Um is not clear. Current MEB position requires that the steady state forcing function for jet impingement should have a magnitude (T) not less than 9

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11-2 110.5 T = KPA (3.6.4.2) Where P = system pressure prior to pipe break A = pipe break area, and K = thrust coefficient.

(3) For choked flow, provide justification for the following assuned angles of dispersion for the jets:

Flashing water - 45*

Steam - 22' Non- Flashing water - 25*

and clarify the pressure that is going to be used for .

calculating jet force.

(4) Define the symbols for calculating the jet Inimpingement those formulas, forces as given in cases A, B, C and D.

explain the missing pressure. force component.

(5) For the calculation of.the Drag Force (Case C) expand the discussion to include a broader range of5 Reynolds numbers other than the range of R ,= 103 to 10 given.

110.6 (1) The information presented in this section of the PSAR does not satisfy the requirements concerning " Seismic Category I (3.9.1.1) Mechanical Equipment Testing and Analysis - C.E. 'Scope Provideof Supply" for plants currently undergoing review.

the appropriate commitnents from CESSAR.

(2) Clarify type of operating experience to be used to verify

- that equipment will operate under SSE conditions, (3) Provide commitme'nt that all Category I mechanical equipment f and supports will be qualified to requirements of specifi-

• cations 7-74 in Appendix 3.9.A. '

(4) In paragraph 3.02 d of Appendix 3.9.A, when using the i

l Response Spectrun Modal Analysis nethod, provide criteria for determining closely space modes.

(5) In Appendix 3.9.A. paragraph 3.02.e permits an allowable stress of 0.9 of the material yield stress for faulted conditions. This is not consistent with limits stated per Table 3.9.3 of the PSAR. Revise the Appendix to conform l with Table 3.9.3.

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11-3 110.7 The seismic qualification program described in this section is (3.9.1.2) not totally acceptable. Revise the program to be in accordance (3.10) with criteria provided in Attachnent B " Electrical and Seisnic Qualification Program."

110.8 (1) In the last sentence of Part I of Appendix 3.9.B change "will" to "may".

(3.9.2.4)

(2) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B expand,the valve operability testing criteria to include the valve design pressure.

(3) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B under criterion d state the Qualification Standards to be employed.

(4) In Appendix 3.9.B define the horizontal and vertical accelerations to be used for static valve qualification.

(5) In Appendix 3.9.B,Section II, your position that for valves with natural frequencies less than 33 Hz operability can be verified without performing valve exercising per step C requires justification.

110.0 Provide note specific equations of notion and discuss methods (3.9.2.5) of solution for the dynanic analysis for open and closed systems.

110.10 The information provided in this section is not adequate. In (3.9.2.7) addition to the nominal pipe size which determine whether ASME (5.2.19) Class 2 and 3 piping vill be field run, identify in the PSAR those Category I piping systems which will be field run. Include any special or simplified procedures which will be used for designing and installing this piping.

110.11 Provide the specific' criteria that will be used to guarantee (3.10.2) operability of instrumentation and electrical equipment, not furnished by C.E., under faulted conditions when a dynamic analysis without performance testing is employed in the design of this equipment.

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. J 7/1/74 Attacitacnt A BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION-SIEB NO. 1

!!ECIt\ :ICAL E::GINEERING ETJ.NCH DIRECYdMTE OF LICENSING CRITERIA F01 POSTl' LATE 3 FAILU2E A:43 LEAnCE LCCATIONS IN FLUID SYSTCt PIPI::G OL:TSIDE C0:. 7A1:::!ENT The following criteria are within the review responsibility of the

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Mechanical Engineering Branch with the exceptica of~ I.A.. II.A., II.D.,

II.E and 1.a. ,1.b. ,1.c. , 2.a and 2.c. (3) of Appendix A.

I. Righ-Energu Fluid SystshPiotng

• A. Fluid Systens Separated from Essential Structures, Systems &

Components .

For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.a.

of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrangesent drawings should clearly show that-the effcces of postulated piping

• breaks at any location are isolated or physically remote from essential struct:c'es, syscEns, and coqonents. At the designer's option, break locations as detdrmined from I.C., I.D. , and I.E below may be selected for this purpose.

B. Fluid Systen Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping l

identified in 2.C. (1) and 2.C.(2) of Appendix A provided they I

meet the requirenents of AS:1E Code,Section III - Subarticle NE-ll10 and are designed to neet the following additional requirements: .

M See Clossary for definitions of italicized phrases.

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1. The following design stress and f atigue limits should not be exceeded; For ASME Code,Section III. Class 1 Piping

-(a) Maximum stress ranges should not exceed the following limits:

Ferritic steel j:,2.0S Austenitic steel ;L 2.4S .

(b) The maximum stress range between any two load sets  ;

(including the zero load set) should be calculated by Eq. (10) in Far. NB-3653, .ASME Code,Section III, for upset pZant conditions and an OBE event transient.

If the calculated maximum-stress range of Eq. (10) exceeds the limits of I.B.l(a) but is not greater than 3S , the limit of I.B.l(c) should be met.

m If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq.3(10) exceeds 35,, the stress ranges calculated by both Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) should meet the limits of I.S.l(a) and the limit of I.B.l(c).

(c) Cumulative usage factor 1 0.1, as required by I.B.1(b). .

For ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 Piping Maximum stress range as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10) in Par. NC-3652, ASME Code,Section III, considering ypset plgnr conditions (i.e., sustained loads, occasional loads, and ther=al L

expansion) and an OBE event should not exceed (S + Sh )~2/ *

2. Welded attachments, for pipe supports or other purposes, to these portions of piping should be avoided except where detailed

' stress analyses, or tests, are performed to demonstrate complianc.e with the limits of I.B.1. .

3. The number of piping circunferential and longitudinal welds and branch connections should be minimized.

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4. The length of the piping run should be reduced to the minimum length practical.

5. The design at points of pipe f,ixity (e.g., pipe anchors or welded connections at containment penetrations) should not require welding directly to the outer surf ace of the piping (e.g., fluid integral forged pipe fittings may be used) except

'where detailed stress analyses are performed to demonstrate compliance with the limits of I.B.l.

Geometric discontinuities, such as at pipe-to-valve section 6.

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'- transitions, at branch connections, and at changes in pipe

- wall thickness should be designed to minimize the discontinuity strasses.

l C. Fluid Systems Enclosed Within Protective Structures l

l 1. Breake in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping should I

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The limit of 0.8(1.2 Sh*S) A ay be used in lieu of (S, + Sh)*

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be postulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those portions of fluid system piping identified in I.B.) within a protective structure containing essenticI systems and components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b. or 1.c. of Appendix A:

a. At terminal ends of the. pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure.

b. At intermediate locations selected by either of the followingcrikeria: ,

(1) At each pipe fitting (e.g. , elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting) or, if the run contains no fittings, at one loc'ation at each extreme of the run (a terminal end, if located within the protective structure nay substitute for one intermediate break).

E (ii) At each location where the stresses  ! exceedn (S.a+ S )2/

but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest stress 4/ . In the case of a straight pipe run without any pipe fittings or welded attach-a "i"i="" "*

ments and stresses below (Sh+3}'# c location chosen on the basis of highest stress.

! St resses associated with normal and upset plant conditiv:c, and an 03E event as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10), Par. NC-3652 of the ASSE Code,Section III, for Class 2 and 3 piping

-4/Two highest stress points; select second point at least 107. below the highest stress.

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2. Breaks in non-nu. clear class piping should be postulated at the fol' lowing locations in each piping or branch run:

a. At ten 7inal ends of the pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure.

b. At each intercediate' pipe fitting and welded attachment.

D. Flu.id Systeca Not Enclosed Within Protective Structures ,

1. Breaks in ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping, should

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be po'stulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those portions of f7 aid system piping identified in I.B) outside but routed alongside, above, or below a protective structure tontaining essential systsms and components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b, or 1.c of Appendix A. .

a. At terminal ends of pressurized portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure,

b. At internediate locations selected by either of the following criteria:

(i) At each pipe fitting (e.g. , elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting).

(ii) At each location where the stresses 3/ exceed (Sf+Sy)2/

but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest stress4 / . In the case of a 6

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straight pipe run without any pipe fittings or

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welded attachments and stresses below (S + S ), a minimum of one location chosen on the basis of highest stress.-

2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each piping or branch run:

a. At te minal ends of pressurized portions of the run if lo.cated adjacent to the protective structure.

b. At ,each intermediate pipe fitting and welded attachment.

11. Moderate-Enerpu Fluid Sustem Pioing ,

A. Fluid Systa-'s Separated froa Essentici Structures, Systems & .

Components .

For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.a. of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrange =ent drawings should clearly show that the effects of through-wall leakage cracks et any location are isolated or physically ramote froa essential structures, systems, and components.

B. Fluid System Piping Between Containnent Isolation Valves

- Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping identified in 2.c. of Appendix A provided they meet the requirements of ASME -

Code,Section III - Subarticle NE-ll10, and are designed such that the stresses do not exceed 0.5(Sh

• Sc )5/ f r ASME Code,Section III, l

Class 2 piping. .

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- I C. Fluid JP .=te s Within or Outside and Adjacent to Protective Structur es khroughwil leakage cracks should be postulated in flu-!d syste"n Mping located within or outside and adjacent to Protectitee structurges containing essential systems and componsnr.s and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b.

or 1.c. d." Appendix A, except where exempted by II.B, II.D, or in tbbse partions of ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 or 3 ,

piping er non-nuclear piping where the stresses are less than 0.5(Sh + S The cracks.should be postulated to occur c )S_/.

individually at locations that result in the maximum effects from fluid sp aying and flooding, and the consequent hazards or environmental conditions develzped.

D. Moderata4nsegy Fluid Systems in Proximity to High-Energy Fluid Systems .

Cracks need not be postulated in moderate-energy fluid systen piping 1Nated in an area in which a break in high-energy fluid system piping is postulated, provided such cracks would not result in more limiting environ = ental conditions than the high-energy piping break. Ynere a postulated leakage crack in the moderate-energy ff..id systen piping results in more limiting environ = ental condition than the break in proxicate high-energy fluid system Piping, :he provisions of II.C should be applied.

E. Fluid S;.nc~s Qus1ttying as High-Energy or Moderata-Energy Syste~s Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks eay be postulated

in the piping of those fluid systens that qualify as high energy 6

f7 aid s.ys: ens for only short operational periods / but qualify

as moderate-energy f7uid systems for the major operational period.

III. Type of Breaks and Leakage Cracks in Fluid System Piping A. Circumferential Pipe Breaks .

The following circumferential breaks should be postulated in high-energy fluid system piping at the locations specified in Section I above: .

1. Cir.cu'mferential breaks should be postulated in fluid system piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch, except that, if the maximum stress range in the circumferential direction is at least twice Ehat in the axial direction, only a longitudinal break need be postulated. Instrument lines, one inch and less r.ominal pipe size for tubing should meet the provisions of negulatory, Guide 1.11.

! 2. Where break locations are selected at pipe fittings without -

the benefit of stress calculations, breaks should be postulated at each pipe-to-fitting weld. If detailed stress analyses

-6/An operational period is considered "short" if the fraction of time that the system operates within the pressure-temperature conditions specified for high-energy fluid systens is less than 2 percent of the time that the system operates as a nodcrate energy f7 aid systen (e.g., systems such as the reactor decay heat removal systems qualify as codcrate-l energy fluid cystems; however, systems 'such as auxiliary feedwater l systems operated during PWR reactor startup, hot standby, or shutdown i qualify as high-energy fluid systems).

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i (e.g., finite element analyses) or tests are perfor=ed, the maxihum stressed iocation in the fitting may be selected .

instead of the pipe-to-fitting veld.

3.. Circu=ferential breaks should be assumed to result in pipe ,

severance and separation amounting to a one-diameter lateral displacement of the ruptueed piping sections unless physically limited by piping restraints, structural members, or piping i

stiffness as may.be de=onstrated by inelastic limit analysis

• (e.g.i a plastic hinge in the piping is not developed under P loading).

4. The dynamic force of the jet discharge at the break location should be based on the ef fective cross-sectional flow area .

of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure as modified

• by an analytically or experim$entally determined thrust coefficient. Limited pipe displacement at the break location, line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled .

flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

5. Pipe whipping should be assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and configuration, and to cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction.

B. ' Longitudinal Pipe Breaks The following longitudinal breaks should be postulated in high-energy fluid system piping at the locations of each circumferential 7

break specified in,III.A.:

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1. Longitudinal break in f7 aid sys:en piping and branch runs should be postulated La nominal pipe sizes 4-inch and larger, except that, if the maximus stress range in the axial direction

, is at least twice that in the circunferential direction, only a circumferential break need be postulated.

2. Longitudinal breaks need not be postulated at terminal ends if the piping at the terninal ends contains .no longitudinal pipe welds and major geometric discontinuities at the circumferential .

weld j.oints of the terninal ends are designed to minimize dis-continuity stresses.

3. Longitudinal breaks should be assu=ed to result in an axial split without pipe severance. Splits should be located (but not concurrently) at two diametrically-opposed points on the piping circu=ierence such that a jet reaction causing out-of-f plane bending of the piping configuration results.

4. The dynamic force of the fluid jet discharge should be based on a circular or elliptical (2D x 1/2D) break area equal to the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe at the 4

break location and on a calculated fluid pressure modified by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust coefficient as determined for a circumferential break at the same location.

Line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

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5. Piping covenent sh.'old be assumed to occur in the direction cf the jet reaction taless limited by structcral me: bars, piping ,

restrainte, or P ping i stiffness as denonstrated, by inelastic -

limit analysis. ,

C. Through-Wall Leakage cr.teks The following through-v.111 leakage cracks should be postulated in modemte-energy fluid system piping at the lecstions specified in Section II above:

1. Cracks should be postulzetd in e.odsmta-en8PJy fIuid syste piping.and branch runs exceeding a noctinal pipe siz'e of 1 inch.

2. Fluid flow from a crack should be based on a circular opening

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of area equal to t h.st of a rectangle one-half pipe-dia=eter in length and one-half pipe vall thickness in vidth.

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3. The flow from the crack,,should be assumed to resu'l'c in an environment that ucts all unprotected components within the compartnent, with consequent flooding in the compartment and co==unicating corapartments. Flooding effec:s may be determined on the b.inis of a conservatively-estimated tica ,

period required to ef fect corrective actions.

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APPENDIX A PLANT ARECGDLEhi CRITIRIA AND SEI.ECTED PIPING DESIGN FEATURES

1. Plant Arrantement Trotection of essential s:ructures, systems, and components against postulated piping failures in high or modente energy fluid systems that operate duef ng normal plant conditions and that are located out-side of containment should be provided by one of the following plant arrangement consideraticas:

a. Plant arrangements should separate fluid system piping from essential structures, cystems, and components. Separation should be achieved by plant physical layouts that provide sufficient distances betueen essantial atructures, systems, and components and fluid system piping such that the effects of any postulated piping failure therein (i.e., pipe uhip, jet i=pingement, and the l-environmental conditions resulting from the escape of contained

. fluids as appropriate te high nr modemte-energy fluid system piping) cannot impair the integrity or operability of essential structures, systems, and co~ponents.

b. Fluid system piping or portions thereof not satisfying the previsions of 1.a. above should be enclosed within. structures or coupartments designed to protect nearby essential structures, eystens, and c: panents. Alternattvely, essential syste-:s and

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.., --- . enclosed within structures or conpartnents gyp r.sr.... -.

desLgned o vit stand the off acts of postulated pipir.3 faggung, in nearby ;3* Aid s?sta=3.

c. F1'anc s.rrange=ents or systes features that do not satisfy the provisions of either 1.a. or 1.b. above should be limited to those for which the above provisions are impractical. Such cases may arise, for example, ~ (1) at interconnections between fluid systens and essential systems and components > or (2) in fluid systems having dual. functions (i.e., required to operate during normal Pl ant conditions s's well as to shut doun the reactor).

In such cases, redundant design features, separated or otherwise protected frca effects of postulated piping failures, or additional

' protection should be provided so that reactor shutdown is assured in the event of a failure in the neerconnecting piping of (1),

or in the dual function pipi,ng of (2). Additional protection may be provided by restraints and barriers or by designing or l testing essential systems and components to withstand the effects associated uith postulated piping failures.

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2. Desien Features l

a. Essencial systens and co-:ponents should be designed to eeet the seismic design requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29.

b. Protective structures or conpartments, fluid system piping restraints, and other protective neasures should be designed in accordanc'e with the following:

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I (1) Protective structures or compartments needed to implement 1.b, or 1.c. above should be designed to Seismic Category I requirements. The effects of a postulated piping failure (i.e., pipe whip, jet impinge =ent, prersurization of co:part-ment, water spray, and flooding, as appropriate) in combination with loadings associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and normal operation should be used for the design of required protective structures. Piping re:straints, if used, may be taken into account to limit effects of the postulcted piping failun. ~

(2) Righ-energy fluid system piping restraints and protective measures should be designed such that the effects of a postulated break in one pipe'cannot, in turn, rupture  ;

other nearby pipes or components which could result in unacceptable offsite consequences or in loss of capability of essential systems ar$ components tc initiate, actuate, and complete actions required for reactor shutdown. ,

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c. Fluid system piping between containment isolation valves should l meet the following design provisions: ,

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-1/In the design of piping restraint, an unrestrained whipping pipe should be considered capable of (a) rupturing impacted pipes of snaller ,

nominci pipe siacs and (b) developing a through-wall leakage crack in larger nominal pipe sizes with thinner wall thicknesses except where experimental or analytical data for specific impact energies demonstrate the capability to withstand the impact without failure.

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(1) Portions of f7uid sys:c7 piping between isolation valves sf single barrier containc.ent structures (including any rigid connection ce the containment penetration) that connect, on a continuous or intermittent basis to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the stean and feedwater systens of PWR plants shoald be designed to the stress limits specified in I.B. or II.B. of this document.

These portions of high-ennpy fluid system piping shoulk be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional nonents) located reasodably close to the containment isolation valves. The rcitraints should be designed to withstaad the loadings resulting from a postulated piping

. failurs beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valva operability nor the leaktight integrity of the containment will be inpsired.

Termir=Z sede of the pipihg runs outside containcent should be-considered to criginate at the pipe whip restraint locations cutside containcant. ,

Where contain ent isolation valves are not required inside containcent, those portions of the fluid system piping extending from the outside i>clation valve te eithat the rigid pipe connection to the containment penetratien or the first pipe

whip restraint inside containment should be considered as the boundary of the system piping required to meet the above design limits and restraint provisions.

(2) Portions of fluid system piping between isolation valves of dual barrier containment structures should not exceed the stress limits in I.B. or II.B. of this document. These portions of high-energy fluid system piping that pass through the annulus, and whose failure could affect the leaktight integrity of the containment structure or re,sult in pressur-ization of the annulus beyond design limits, should be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional moments) located reasonably close to the containment isolation valves and should be provided with an enclosing structure or guard pipe. Restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a postalcted piping failure beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the associated containment penetration will be impaired.

Terminal ends of the piping runs outside containment should be considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations outside containment. -

For the purpose of establishing the design para =eters (e.g.,

pressure, temperature, axial loads) only of the enclosing e

structure or guard pipe, a full flow area break should be assumed in that portion of piping within the enclosing structure or guard pipe.

(3) For those portions of fluid system piping identified in 2.c. (1) and 2.c.(2) above, the extent of inservice examination conducted as specified in Division 1 of Section XI of the ASME Code during each inspection interval should be increased to provide volumetric examination of 100 percent of the circum-ferential and longitudinal weld joints in piping identified in Sec, tion III.A.l. and Section III.B.l. of this document. The areas subject to examination should comply with the require-ments of the following categories as specified in Section XI I ,

of the ASSIE' Code:

(a) ASME Class 1 piping welds, Examination Category B-J in Table IUB-2500.

(b) ASitE Class 2 piping welds, Examination Category C-F and C-G in Table IWC-2500.

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. I GLOSSARY l

Essential Stru:t:c'es, Sustt s, c>.d Cc-: cunts. Structures, systems, and components required for reactor shutdown without of f-site power or to mitigate the consequences of a postuZated piping failure in fluid system piping that results in trip of the turbine-generator or the reactor protection system.

Fluid Systens. High and moderate energy fluid systems that are subject to the postulation of piping failures against which protection of essenticZ structurea, systems, and components is needed. ._

High-Enerou FZuid Systems. Fluid systems that, during nornul plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of the foLlowing are cet:

a. maximum operating temperature exceeds 200*F, or

b. ' maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig.

Moderats-Iners i Phid Systems. Fluid. systems that, during nor.cl plcn?

conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above i

( atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are f

l met:

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a. maximum operatit.g temperature is 200*F or less, and I b. maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less.

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_ Nor -s! Plcnt Cor.litiens. Plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power,* hot standby, or reactor cooldown to cold shutdown condition.

Upset Plcne Ccnditions. Plant operating conditions during system r

E- transients that :ay occur with moderate frequency during plant, service life and are anticipated operational occurrences, but not during system testing. ,,

_ Postulated Pirina Failures Longitudinal and circumferv.ial breaks r

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in high-energy flsid system piping and through-wall leak' age cracks in

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moderats-energy fluid system piping postulated according to the provisions of chis docu=ent.

D Sp Sg. and Sj . Allowable stresses at maximum (hot) temperature, at ,

minimum (cold) temperature, and allowable stress range for thermal expansion respectively, as defined in Article NC-3600 of the ASSE Code,Section III. '

. Design stress intensity as defined -in Article NB-3600 of the AS'E Code,Section III.

Sinale Act{*>e Cercnent Fcilure. Malfunction or loss of function of a component of electrical or fluid systems. The failure of an active component of a fluid system is considered to be a loss of component function as a result of mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical

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malfunction, but not the loss of component structural integrity. The direct consequences of a single cetive cot T 'nJ':r failure are considered to be part of the single failure.

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l Temiral Ends. Extreneties of piping runs that connect to structures, co:nponents (e.g. , vessels, pu=ps, valves), or pipe anchors that act as rigid constraints to piping thermal expansion. A branch connection to a main piping run is a terminal end of the branch run.

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. . . 12/5/73 Attachment B

.E._gnICE AND MECED: ICE EQUI".ENT SE!e:IC QUEIFICATION PROC?_*.M I* ismic Test for Zuuip..ec.c Operability

- A test program is required to confirm the functional operability of all Seismic Cate ory I electrical'and nechanical equipment and instrumen:ation during and af ter an earthquake of magnitude up to and including the SSI. Analysis without testing =ay be acceptable only if structural integrity alone can assure the design intended function, n en a complete seismic testing is impracticable, a combination of test and analysis may be accept-able.

. The characteristics of the required input motion shoold be specified by one of the following:

(a) response spectrum  ;

(b) power spectral density function (c) time history Such characteristics, as derived from the structures or systems seismic analysis, should be representative of the input motion at the equipment mounting locations.

A. Equipment should be tested in the operational condition. Oper-ability should be verified during and af ter the testing.

4 The actual input motion should be characterized in the same ~

manner as the required input motion, and the conservatism in amplitude and frequency content should be demonstrated.

% Seismic excication generally have a broad frequency content.

Random vibration input motion should be used. However, single frequency input, such as sine beats, may be. applicable provided one of'the following conditions are met:

(a) The characteristics of the required input motion indicate that the motion is dominated by one fraquency (i.e., by structural filtering effects).

(b) The ant'icipated response of the equipment is adequately represented by one mode.

(c) The input has sufficient intensity and duration to excite all modes to the required magnitude, such that the testing response spectra vill envelope the corresponding response spectra of the individual modes.

I AUXILIARY POWER AND CONVERSION SYSTEMS l l

1. Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping Discuss the means by which protection is afforded for each high and moderate energy system as outlined in Mr. J. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973.

2. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup System Discuss the interfaces between the shutdown heat exchangers and' the spent fuel pool cooling system (to insure that the shutdown heat exchangers will not be connected to the fuel pool cooling system unless the reactor is shut down and in a refueling mode).

3. Tuel Handling Discuss the consequences of dropping and possible tipping of the cask into the spent fuel pool.

4. Essential Cooling Water System Discuss the measures taken to protect dry and wet cooling towers from external missiles.

5. Ultimate Heat Sink Provide the results of an analysis of the 30-day period that determines (1) the total heat load (2) sensible heat load (3) decay heat from i

radioactive material (4) station auxiliary system heat rejected.

6. Control Room HVAC Provide P&ID's of the control room HVAC system for review.

! 7. Diesel Generator Air Starting System Revise the system design to meet the Staff's position (capable of l

5 cold starts by each sub-air starting system. Two sub-systems for each diesel).

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8. Turbine Generator Expand the discussions of the turbine overspeed protection including the redundant trip mechanisms and the trip set points.

9. Circulatina Water System Discuss provisions which will be made in the design to protect safety related equipment from performing its design function in the event of flooding due to failure of:

(a) condenser expansion point (b) circulating water system (c) condenser hot well (d) other non-seismic Category I system failure.

10. Auxiliary Feedwater System Discuss the system design relative to the single failure criteria and diversity for power supply to AFW pumps and values.

11. Condensate StoraRe Facilities Discuss the provisions made to prevent water in the condensate storage tank from freezing.

12. Diesel Generator Room HVAC Describe the design criteria of the outside air intake system for diesel room ventilation and combustion air supply in light of the single failure and missile protection considerations.

Provide the design criteria for the diesel fuel oil storage room ventilation system.

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l REQUEST POR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION i WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM I DOCKET NOS. 50-508. 50-509_

03.0 Containment Systems Branch 03.1 Table 5.3-2 gives the pressure of the secondary side of the steam (6.2.1) generators as 1070 psig for full power and 1170 psig for zero power.

These pressures are higher than those used in the steam line break analysis. Justify the pressures used in the steam line break analysis l

or redo the analysis using the higher pressure values.

03.2 In the analysis of steam line breaks you analyzed a spectrum of (6.2.1) double-ended breaks at various power levels. For breaks smaller than the full double-ended break, the assumption of slot breaks would appear to be more appropriate. Discuss the effect on your calculations if slot breaks were assumed.

03.3 Provide the following information regarding the steam line break )

(6.2.1) analysis:

(1) Discuss possible single failures in the main and auxiliary feed-water systems by which additional fluid could be added to the steam generator following a steam line break. The failure of j an isolation valve in the main or auxiliary feedwater lines and the addition of fluid stored in the lines and injected by the feedwater pumps should be considered.

(2) If the above single failure analysis indicates that additional l fluid mass and energy should be included in the steam line break '

analysis, redo the analysis and provide the revised mass and energy release data.

l 03.4 Provide a comparison of the mass and energy release data calculated '

(6.2.1) using the CEFLASH - 4A code and the CEFLASH - 4 code.

03.5 Provide the results of the subcompartment pressure response analyses, (6.2.1) 1.e., the calculated pressure differentials as a function of time for the most severe pipe break in each compartment.

03.6 Provide analyses of spray line and surge line ruptures in the pressurizer (6.2.1) compartment. (

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6. The input =otion should be applied to one vertical and one principal (or two orthogonal) horizontal axes simultaneously unless it can be demonstra:ed that the equipment response along the vertical direction is r.)c sensitive to the vibratory motion aleng the horizontal direction, and vice versa. The time phatin; of the inputs in the vertical and horizontal direc-tions must be such that a purely rectilinear resultant input is avoided. The acceptable alternative.is to have vertical and horizontal inputs in-phase, and then repeated with inputs 180 degrees out-of-phase. In addition, the test must be repeete:

with the equipment rotated 90 degrees horizontally.

7. The fixture design should meet the following requirements:

(a) Simulate the actual service mounting (b) Cause no dynamic coupling to the test item.

8. The in-situ application of vibratory devices to superimpose the seismic vibratory' loadings on the complex active device for operability testing is acceptable when application is justifiable.

9. The test program may be based upon selectively testing a repre-sentative number of mechanical components according to type, load level, size, etc. on a prototype basis.

II. Seismic Design Adequacy of Supports

1. Analyses or tests should be performed for all supports of electrical and mechanical equipment and instrumentation to ensure their structural capability to withstand seismic excitation.

2. The analytical results must include the following:

(a) The required input motions to the mounted equipment should be obtained and characterized in the manner ao stated in

' , Section I.2.

(b) The combined stresses of the support structures should be within the limits of ASME Section III, Subsection NF -

Component Support Structures" (draft version) or other comparable stress limits.

3. Supports should be tested with equipment installed. If the equipment is inoperative during the support test, the response at the equipment mounting locations should be monitored and characterized in the manner as stated in Section 1.2. In such a case, equipment should be tested separately and the actual input to the equipment should be more conservative in amplitude and frequency content than the monitored response.

4. The requirements of Sections I.2. I.4, I.5, I.6 and I.7 are applicable when tests are conducted on the equipment supports.

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03.17 Specify and discuss the basis for establishing the design inward leak (6.2.3) rate of the shield building.

03.18 Identify all high energy lines within the annulus, and those which will (6.2.3) be provided with guard pipes. Provide drawings of the mechanical penetrations showing the guard pipes.

03.19 The statement is made on page 6.2-165 of the PSAR that containment (6.2.3) isolation will be initiated by means of a containment Isolation Signal (CIAS), which occurs on containment high pressure. Discuss the adequacy of this approach, where there is no diversity in the contain-ment isolations signals. Discuss and justify your reasons for not including the safety injection and main steam isolation signals as containment isolation signals. Discuss and justify your reasons for not wanting the main steam lines to be isolated upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. Discuss and justify your reasons for not wanting the main feedwater lines to be isolated upon receipt of a containment isolation signal.

03.20 Discuss when, during normal plant operation, purging of the containment (6.2.4) would be required, including the frequency and duration of purge operations. Provide an analysis of the volume of containment atmosphere that would be released to the environment if the purge system valves were open at the time of loss-of-coolant accident or steam or feed-water line break accident occurred. The analysis should be done for a spectrum of pipe break sizes. Identify the instrumentation and set-points that will initiate containment isolation, including purge valve closure. Provide assurance that containment isolation will occur.

03.21 Describe the analyses or tests that have been or vill be conducted to (6.2.4) demonstrate the capability of the containment isolation valves, in particular, valves whose lines are open to the containment atmosphere such as the containment purge system valves, to function under the dynamic loading conditions'resulting from high air and steam flow rates and high differential pressures following a pipe break accident. Justify that test conditions are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail following a pipe break accident. Provide the analytical and test results.

03.22 Identify and justify the proposed locations of the suction points (6.2.5) inside containment for the hydrogen recombiners of the combustible gas control system. Show the locations of the auction points and routing of piping on plan and elevation drawings of the containment. Discuss the design provisions to protect the piping against loss of function.

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03.23 Provide a piping and instrumentation drawing of the hydrogen recombiner (6.2.5) system.

03.24 Specify the mass and area of aluminum and zine in the containment and (6.2.5) the mass of airconum cladding in the core.

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