ML20210T343

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Summary of 740920 Meeting W/Util,Ebasco & C-E to Discuss Draft First Round Questions Re QA Mechanical Engineering & Effluent,Auxiliary & Power Conversion & Containment Sys. Attendance List & Agenda Encl
ML20210T343
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 09/30/1974
From: Oreilly P
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
CON-WNP-1807 NUDOCS 8605300075
Download: ML20210T343 (44)
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{{#Wiki_filter:~ - - -.. A n,, h. m w L i. g. g J y o. p n :.. m% c.r m 8 s vewnww A.. e.n 59 s &g swnwv.;,at.3D _*c..my.w,9 g:.,bt.ye:1pr,<,p_ g; y:y e m -m a SEP 3 01974 c DOCKET NOS: 50-504 A B STN 50-509 e-e y a 1 -. 3.g j j- ..7, A F ,ACILITY: WPSS,< EUCLEAR FE0JECTS 30,.' 3. AB ED. 5 A.. .~.=..'... - l , p.. ew. s , ;e.. ;,): 3.. ^ ".g., ;.. x. 3 n ~ n ?...AFFLICANY: (MaEENTON FUELIC POWER SOFFLY SYSTEM (WFFSS) u 1,7: ~ t 9 ~ :,y :p Q:b <t: > .,,. 2 JM,.,' 3... 2.y:WjS,n L 3. ;-M - .%.s".' sumasamy Oy SIFTEMBER 20* 1974 NEITIES WITE WFPSS TO DISCUSS DRAFT FIRST ~ t I M % 1033 ,f c./. V.Q*[$a y <pp * '.4 ~', - ~~ .j; t .s C %*,* t, ; -p. a . On September..20,1974 ' representatives of WFFSS, Ibasco, and Combustion i 4 ' Engineering met with the Regulatory staff to discuss draft first round l" questions ressrding quality assursace, mechanical assineering, effluent l treatment systems, auxiliary and power conversion systems, and contaionant systees. A list of attendees and an agenda are attached. j l The schedule for the radioloSical safety review and the contents and i time of amhaittal of the first amendment to the PSAR were also discussed. ~, WPSS stated that the'mafety review schedule transmitted with the sesff's - letter of September 6, 1974 uns aseeptable.' The scope of the first FSAR We was adjusted to allow submittal in a timely manner during October. As a result, this amendment will not include responses to the staff's requests for addittomal information. However, incorporation of the mest recent CESSAE amendments and the eestainment subcampartment analysis results will be included. 5, ll... Original Signed by l Patrick D. O'Reilly 2,. i M Fatrick D. O'Reilly .+

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p i l ENCLOSURE NO. 1 i ~I ATTENDANCE LIST I l SEPTEMBER 20. 1974 MEETING WITH WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM i WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM G. Sorensen C. Fies R. Johnson G. Dyekman R. Nicklas ERASCO T. Raney P. Rangarajan R. Vickers P. Hannaway W. Rezak J. Killian W. Moritz J. Heifetz

0. Block COMBUSTION EtiGINEERING. INC.

E. Guenther R. Rutkowski USAEC - REGULATORY STAFP

  • J. Costello
  • F. Cherney
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  • P. Stoddart
  • C.

Liang P. O'Reilly l

  • Denotes part time attendance 4

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em k, mew - 4 4 4h-# .W e l r ~ ) I ENCLOSURE NO. 2 AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 20, 1974 MEETING WITH WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM i L A

p 3 411-1 411.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE What is meant by a QA Program responsioie to the requirements of ~ 411.1 (17.0) AEC Regulations'as s'tated in Section 17.0? 411.2 In Section 17.1.1 it states: " Inherent in the hPPSS Manager of (17.1.1) QA activities is the authority to ' accept or reject any or all' work, matbrials, or equipment associated.~.. " Tell who dele-gates this authority to QA and how other non-QA organizations are instructed that QA has this authority. 411.3 Organizational charts for hPPSS 3 and 5 differ from hPPSS 1 and (17.1.1) 4. hhich organization will be used for hPPSS 3 and 5? 411.4 Section 17.1.16 states that the Regulatory Programs organization (17.1.1c) performs audits of hPPSS QA department activities. hhy i~s this organization used and what expertise do they possess to perform this activity? 411.5 Describe the Quality Assurance participation in revicu and apprcval (17.1.la) of drawings and specifications to assure that appropriate quality control provisions are included. See Section 17.1.1(a). 411.6 Describe in more detail the QA related activities performed by * (17.1.1) engineering, project manager and procurement with a cicar delineation g of their responsibility and authority. 411 l List who has stop-work authority. (17.1.1) 411.8 Describe those provisions which require top management to regularly (17.1.1) assess the scope, impicmentation and effectiveness of the QA Program. 411.9 In Section 17.1.2, page 17.1-8, the description of Design Cor. trol (17.1.2) QAP-4) does not mention checking for adequacy of design. Does WPPSS check for design adequacy? 411.10 Identify the n,anagekont level responsibic for the final review (17.1.2) and approval cf the QA Program. 411.11 Describe those provisions which communicate to all responsible (17.1.2) organizations and individuals that quality policies, manuals and procedures.are mandatory requirements. 411.12 Need to know if kPPSS commits to comply with the requirements of (17.1.2) the " Green Book" and the revised " Gray Book". A

.m I .m q 1' 411-2 f 411.13 Identify the highest level of management, corporate or otherwise, I (17.1.2) responsibic for establishing Quality. Assurance Company policies, goals and objectives. t 411.14 In those areas in the QA Progrant description where an activity (17.1.1) is described, include a description of QA/QC involvement in these 3* If QA/QC has no involvement in these areas, then so state. areas. As a minimum, QA/QC involvement should be described for each of the 18 criteria. t .411.15 Describe how disputes are resolved when there is a difference of (17.1.2) decisions between QA/0C personnel and other departments such as engineering, procurement, or construction regarding design content, purchase requisitions and orders, instruction or procedures, design review board decisions, manufacturing and inspection planning, further processing of structures, systems and components, disposition of nonconfomances, corrective action, audit results, stop-work actions or material review board decisions. 411.16 Describe in more detail the indoctrination and training program used (17.1.2) by hPPSS. 411.17 Describe those provisions that hPPSS uses to assure that quality (17.1.2) related activities such as inspection and test will be done with apptrpriate equipment and under suitable environmental ccnditions. \\ 411.18 Where are the structures, systems and components listed which are (17.1.2) covered by the QA Program? 411.19 How does hPPSS assure that their principal contractors perfom an (17.1.3) independent design review? 411.20 Who approves vendor and contractor QA programs? l (17.1.4) 411.21 Describe in more detail the measures used by WPPSS to control (17.1.6) documents and prevent the use of obsolete or superseded documents. ~ 411.22 Nhat involvement does h?PSS have ih' the review and approval of (17.1.7) vendors inspections plans? 411.23 In Section 17.1.8 describe the criteria used by hPPSS to assure (17.1.8) that identification and control measures establish a means by which items can be traced to, and confomance verified with, their appli-cable documentation. 411.24 Describe the measures used by hPPSS to assure an active file is kept (17.1.9) current on qualification records of all special processes, procedures, equipment and personnel perfoming special processes.

c. i 411-3 ~l 411.25 What criteria does h?PSS impose,.ppo.1 the contractors or sub-(17.1.10) contractors to assure independence of inspection personnel? 411.26 How does WPPSS assure that its contractors or subcontractors meet (17.1.10) the physical or performance requirements of drawings or specifi-cations specified in the contracts? 411.27 How does hPPSS assure itself that a test has adequate and appropriate (17.1.11) equipment and there is calibrated instrumentation? 411.28 How can WPPSS detemine the complete status of all items under the (17.1.12) calibration system cf their principal contractors? 411.29 How does hPPSS assure that qualified individuals will specify (17.1.13) cleaning preservation, handling, shipping and storage requirements? 411.30 What criteria does hPPSS use to control the application and removal (17.1.14) of tags, marking labels and stamps? e L I I

i = p i t EBASCO l l 411.1 What type of surveillance does the Project Quality Assurance (17.2.1) Engineer perform on Vendors and Contractors?

p. 17.2-2(d) l 411.2 Explain what is meant by the Project QA Engineer reviewing Vendors 4

(17.2.1) Quality Assurance procedures to assure implementation. 3 411.3 In Figure 17.2-1 the QA Supervisor reports to the Resident Engineer. (17.2.1) Explain how QC will h' ave the necessary stature, authority, organization freedom and independence to effectively do their job. 411.4 Explain how the Director-Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance (17.2.1) can direct and control the QA related activities of organizations controls outside of the Nuclear Vice-President's domain. 411.5 The Project QA Engineer can reject unsatisfactory work when it is (17.2.1) indicated by an audit. Who conducts this audit and how frequent are they? 411.6 Explain the relationship of the Site QC (Quality Compliance) Supervisor (17.2.1) and the Project QA Engineer. 411.7 Who prepares and who reviews and approves the detailed inspection plans (17.2.1) or instructions used by the QC personnel? 411.8 Explain in more detail the functions of the Resident Engineer. (17.2.1) i 411.9 Does the Quality Compliance Engineering Department approve Construction (17.2.1) Contractor QA Programs? If not, why not? l 411.10 P. 17.2-3 last paragraph. Who directs and manages the Ebasco Quality l (17.2.1) Assurance Program? ~ 411.11 Why are Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance combined in l (17.2.1) one organization? ~ I l 411.12 P. 17.2-l'3rd paragraph. What is meant by corporate management? Who (17.2.1) has actually delegated the power to the Director of Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance to enforce the QA Program requirements? What is meant,by unqualified support of corporate management? i 411.13 Describe in more detail how the management Quality Assurance Audit i (17.2.2) Committee assess the implementation and eff"ectiveness of the Quality Assurance Program. I f i .__..___,-___,,..-_____...._._._..,.___m

...~. _. m...-... b t_ i j . 9 8 411.14 Do the Quality Control representatives have accept-reject and stop (17.2.1) work authority? 411.15 Describe in more detail the quality related activities performed by (17.2.1) Engineering, Construction Purchasing and Projects. 411.16 Does Ebasco commit to comply with the requirements of the revised (17.2.2) " Gray Book" and the " Green Book" ? e 411.17 Describe the indoctrination and training program that will be in-(17.2.2) corporated in the Ebasco Quality Assurance Manual. See last paragraph

p. 17.2-4.

411.18 Why don't Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance approve (17.2.2) Construction Quality Control Procedures?

p. 17.2-5 2nd paragraph.

1 411.19 What is the correct title Quality Compliance or Quality Assurance 17.2.1) Engineering in Figure 17.2-17 See p. 17.2-15 last paragraph. 411.20 What happens if QA Engineering Department finds Vendors inspection (17.2.10) procedures, instructions or check lists inadequate? 411.21 Do Ebasco Vendor Quality Compliance Representatives ever do any (17.2.10) physical reinspection on a sampling basis? 411.22 P. 17.2-17, second paragraph. Describe the requirements for in-(17.2.10) spection activities at the construction sites. 411.23 Does Ebasco's Quality Compliance Plan require Ebasco's approval of (17.2.7) a, vendor's processing and inspection requirements? l 411.24 Does Ebasco perform any physical inspections of materials, components (12.2.7) or systems on the site? 411.25 Describe the measures used by Ebasco to assure that organizational (17.2.7) elements of their suppliers who perform ace.eptance inspections have the authority organizational freedom and independence to assure adequate i quality. 411.25 P. 17.2-13, paragraph 3. Explain random approach to a check point (17.2.7) system. [ 411.25 Ebasco covers measures for identification of purchased items. Discuss (17.2.8) Ebasco fabricated items. 411.26 P. 17.2-7, paraFraphs 1 and 2. Ebasco discusses checkcrs doing (17.2.3) design review. How complete is the review, is it a check for errors or is it a design challenge?

-(l \\ Describe the criteria used by Ebasco to qualify new suppiiers. 411.27 (17.2.7) What criteria does Ebasco use regarding the type of personnel who 411.28 (17.2.14) have authority for the removal of tags, markings, labels and stamps? 411.29 P. 17.2-20 2nd paragraph. What does Ebasco consider to be conditions (17.2.15) adverse to quality? Describe those measures which assure followup on corrective actions 411.29 (17.2.16) to verify proper implementation and to close out corrective action documentations. 411.30 Describe Ebasco's program for obtaining timely corrective action on (17.2.18) unf avorable audit results. 411.31 Describe the different types of audits that Ebasco performs. (17.2.18) Describe in more detail the activities performed by Ebasco when they 411.32 (17.2.18) conduct an audit to evaluate work areas, activities, processes or items. l l l

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...;..... -... ~., p. m ,1 WPPSS 411.31 What criteria does WPPSS use for defining authority and responsibility (17.1.15) for determining and approving disposition of nonconforming items? 411.31 Does WPPSS require its contractors to report nonconformances "use-as-is" (17.1.15) and " repair" to be reported to them? 411.32 What are WPPSS criteria for a nonconformance? (17.1.15) 411.33 What are WPPSS's criteria or definitions for conditions adverse to (17.1.16) quality? See p. 17.1-29 second paragraph. 411.34 What action does WPPSS take when its contractors do not take prompt (17.1.16) corrective action? 411.35 Describe in more detail the activities performed by WPPSS when they (17.1.18) conduct an audit and evaluate work areas, activities, processes or items. 411.36 How does WPPSS assure timely corrective action on unfavorable audit (17.1.18) results? 411.37 Does WPPSS analyze and sununarize their audit data to top management? (17.1.18) E, 5

l _s ) ( '011.0 rTFLUEN T *1BLViUFEl* 1 011,1 Provide du.cri;>tions or tabular ur.m ries of the liquid (9.3.2 and samplin; poinu..huun va P61D Figurer. 11.2-3, 4, 5, 6, 11.4) and 7. 011.2 You state that non-condensible gases from the main (10.4.2) condenser evacuation systim will be continuously discharged through charcoal bcd adcorbers and i.mnitored continuously for radioactivity prior to discharge. Figure 10.4-2 eentains a notation to the effect that discharge vill be through IIVAC charcoal aosorber. Identify the HVAC system and effluent discharge point to which this source is discharged. Describe how the effluent radiation monitor for the main condenser evacuation system discharge will provide automatic termination of discharge when effluent concentrations exceed a predetermined ibnit, in accordar.cc with General Design Criterion 60. Provids P!,ID's which show the charcoal bed adsorbers, the effluent discharge point, and your provisions for automatic termination of discharge. 011.3 We do not find the inventory of radioactive contami-(10.4.2.3) nants in the e.ffluent from the mechanical vacuum pumps which you state is evaluated in Section 11.3, Houever, in Table 11.1-16, we find such an inventory under..the heading " Steam Jct Air Ejector." Clarify.. 011.4 Discuss blowdown system parameters which ensure that l\\(10.4.8) the bloudown stream will not flash downstream of the '\\ ' regenerative bic. deva heat exchanger. Indicate hew the pressure indicator controller prevents flashing.. n.,.4a .qn.... > < *.. c y c,,,, r i,,.. < f < r, < w n e epo isolation valves and all. piping from the isolation valves to the steam generator. 011.5 You indicate the presance of a flash tank in the ateam - (10.4.8 and generator blowdown letdown line. The description 11.4.2.1.3) and P&ID's of the steam generator blowdown system in Section 10.4-8 do not show a flash tank. Clarify. 011.6 In your analysis of the releases of radioactive r.ateric's (11.1 and in liquid effluents, you did not consider reicamer. 11.2) from the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) and the steam generator bloudoun system (SGus). Reactor operating experieneo does not justify'this assumptien. You should provide justification that: ' t e O e a

? . _ _ _ ~... _.. ~ 2 a ..-~.w. .O' ~ 011-2 The plant water inventories can be meintainc C eder 011.6 s. 9 (11.1 and the plant lifetime uithout discharges frem these 11.2) systems; b. The tritium icvels in the plant can be controlled to maintain radiation exposures to opcrating personnel as low as practicable without discharge from this system; and ,l c. There is sufficient capacity and flexibility or t redundancy in the systems that discharge from these systems will not be necessary as the result of anticipated operational occurrences and equip-ment downtime. 011.7 You propose to design the liquid and solid waste syste=s (11.2, 11.5) to Quality Group D classification. We do not consider this classification adequate because the design guidance should provide reasonabic assurance that equipment and components used in the radioactive waste management systems are designed, constructed, installed, and tested on a level ccmmensurate with other plant systers and structures to protect the health and safety of the public and plant operating personnel. You should design the systems handling liquid waste including components in the solid waste system which contain radioactive liquids, to Quality Group D (Augmented) b classification as described in the attached Branch ' Technical Pusition - ETS3 No. 1, " Design Guldance far Radioactive Waste Management Systems Installed in 1 4 i... n o r. c,. i... i,... n.. .....,,...i...e 011.8 Describe the function of the 4,000 gpm Floor Drain (11.2, Circulation Pump and the 6,000 gpm ICW Circulation Table 11.2-22) Pump. 011.9 You have not described your provisions for controlling (11.2) overflows from tanks containing potentially radioactire materials. Provide curbings or dikes around all can5s having the potential to overflow to the floor (insidc the plant) or to the ground (outside the plant). For all tanks containing potentia 11y radioactive materials + both inside and outside the plant including the cendc.- sate storage tank, indicate the provisions incorpore:cd for cach to monitor liquid levels, alarm potential overflow conditions, and collect and sampic liquid overflous. i e + I

m e 1 011-3 Section 9.3.3.2.6 etates that Turbine Building equip-011.10 ment drains and ficor drains vill be routed to cither i (11.2.2) the water reuse tank or the liquid radwaste system for processing. Section 11.2.2.7 states that Turbine Building drains will normally be sent to the secondcry particulate waste tank for processing in the Secondnry Particulate Waste System. Section 11.2.2 states that the Turbine Luilding drains will be processed in the Secondary liigh Purity Uaste System. Describe the Turbine Building equipment and floor drain system and your provisions for sampling or monitoring of sumps to determine whether the sump discharge will be routed to either the water reuse tank or the liquid radwaste l system as stated in Section 9.3.3.2.6. Clarify the discrepancy between Section 11.2.2 and Section 11.2.2.7 or describe your procedure for determining the treat-ment system to be used. 011.11 You state that you assume that the annual average CVCS (11.2.2) purification flow rate is 84 gpm with continuous g:s stripping. Flow diagrams and P&ID's for the CVCS show the gas stripper to be in the shim bleed section of the CVCS which you show to have an annual average operating flow rate of approximately 1 gpm. Describe your provisions or procedures for achieving gas stripping at au 84 gpm annual average flow rate. 'k011.12 You state that the radioactive gaseous unste systen will ((11.3.3.1.3) have H2 and 02 analyzers to indicate changes in hydrogcn and oxygen concentrations: however, it is specified - ce opeto6eu peu vu.ca.9 cuac tuese anatyters ..tt Provide a system capable of continuously monitoring f oxygen and hydrogen concentrations in your gaseous rcl-waste system, with provisions to alarm and automatically isolate the system in the event that oxygea conccntra-tions in the decay tank inlet lines exceed 27.. Inc'.u de an analysis of your system showing the effects of f instrument malfunctions. 011.13 Liquid radwaste system P&ID's in Section 11.2 shou (11.4) provisions for process radiation monitors for the Floor Drain Treatment System (Fig.11.2-3), Detergent Wes:e Treatment System (Fig.11.2-4), Secondary High ruri::- Waste System (Fig. 11.2-6), and Secondary Particult.tc Waste Syston (Fig. 11.2-7); however, these monitors listed or der.cribed under Section 11.2 or 11.4. aru not Provide descriptions of these monitors in the appropric:e -..i,,.....-4, ,q.....;,,it,- f

7 .. ~ _ _ _ _..., _, --- -~_ _. e r)s > T 011-4 Provide a description of the instrumentation to be used 011.14 to monitur radiction icycts in process and effluent streme.4 (11.4) during postulated accidents,.in conformance with General Des'ign Criterion 64. s Provide a more complete description of your solid 011.15 (11.5) waste system, including: (1) The description of the proposed system operation, l and indicating your provisions for controlling process flows, chemical and waste additions, and how a solid matrix in the waste container vill i I be obtained. Explain your method for assuring that all liquids have been combined into the solid matrix after the process is completed i.e., free liquids are not present. Indicate the steps to be taken if solidification is not canplete. (2) The provisions for capping and decontaminating waste containers and for handling waste spillage in the process areas. (3) The description of the Volume Reduction Package (page 11.5-1). ' Provide the results of an analysis showing the radio-011.16 nuclide concentrations which could occur in both (1) g (15.24) . the nearest potabic unter supply and (2) the nearest gg surface unter in an unrustricted area as a result of leakage based on single failures of components located .... a s.,..,............,...tz.,,, .. a t.,.. <... liquids. Assume 1% of the operating fission procuct inventory is released to the primary coolant, failed tanks release 807. of their design capacity, and all - liquids from failed ccaponents cnter-the groundvater, i.e.,'do not assume liquids are retained by building foundations. Credit for radionuclide removal by the plant process systems, consistant with the decontamina-tion factors in WASH-1258 should be assumed. List all parameters and provide justification for the values assumed in your calculations, including liquid dis-persion and transit time based on distance, the hydraulic gradient, permeability and effective porosity of the soil, and the assumed decontamination due to ion exchange by the soil. l l l i ~_ ~

__u T 11-1 ) 11.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEEP.ING 4 110.1 Under 3.6.2.1.4(a) piping' systems having an internal pressure of (3.6.2.1) up to 275 psia and fluid temperatures not in excess of 200'F are excluded from pipe break criteria. This is not consistent with Regulatory Culde 1.46 nor the present ME3 position. The present MEB position is that through wall leakage cracks should be postulated for such piping as delineated in Attachment A which is' generally applicable for piping outside the containment. j 110.2 PSAP. states that criteri: for postulating pipe breaks for (3.6.2.2) piping outside the containnent will be per AEC letter from J. O' Leary of 7/12/73. This is acceptable, however, imple-mentation of this criteria should be as contained in Attachment A. 110.3_ (1) Provide loading combinations and stress criteria for (3.6.3.1) normal, upset, and emergency conditions for Class 1, 2 and 3 piping in the A/E - BOP scope. (2) Provide more specific criteria than "per code" for faulted condition stress criteria for Class 1 piping. For example, ASME Section III permits the use of Appendix F of the code for faulted conditions; but, does not require it. State specificall'y what is to be used. (3) Provide specific design details for the three types of piping penetration guard pipes. Also discuss the access provisions to carry out inservice inspection of the flued head to process pipe welds for the Type I and III penetrations. 110.4 (1) Identify the computer program to be used for the calculation (3.6.4.1) of postulated pipe break and if the program is not widely used in the nuclear industry, provide justification for its applicability and validity for this type of analysis. (2) In the computation of the thrust force using the sinplified in lieu of P forcing function, justify the use of Psat o for compressed (flashing) or saturated water. 110.5 (1) For unchoked flow, the Regulatory staff will accept use of (3.6.4.2) a model with a uniform half angle of dispersion not exceeding 10*. l (2) In calculating jet. impingement force as described in Eq. (1), the definition of the velocity ratio Um is not clear. Current MEB position requires that the steady state forcing function for jet impingement should have a magnitude (T) not less than 1

. ~. -. _ _ l-j{.' -) ,s 11-2 .) m ? I 110.5 T = KPA (3.6.4.2) i Wher.e P = system pressure prior to pipe break i A = pipe becak area, and ] K = thrust coefficient. i (3) For choked flow, provide justification for the following assumed angles of dispersion for the jets:

l Flashing vater - 45*

j Steam - 22' Non-Flashing Uater - 25' and clarify the pressure that is going to be used for j calculating jet force. (4) Define the symbols for calculating tha jet i=pingement forces as given in cases A, B, C and D. In those formulas, explain the missing pressure. force component. l (5) 3or the calculation of. the Drag Force (Case C) expand the [ discussion to include a broader range of Reynolds numbers 3 to 105 given. other than the range of R, = 10 (1) The information presented in this section of the PSAR does L 110.6 not satisfy the requirements concerning " Seismic Category I I (3.9.1.1) Mechanical Equipment Testing and Analysis - C.E. Scope of l Supply" for plants currently undergoing review. Provide the appropriate commitments from CESSAR. (2) Clarify type of operating experience to be used to verify that equipnent will operate under SSE' conditions. (3) Provide commitme'nt that all Category I mechanical equipment and supports will be qualified to requirements of specifi-cations 7-74 in Appendix 3.9.A. f: (4) In paragraph 3.02 d of Appendix 3.9.A, when using the Response Spectrun Modal Analysis method, provide criteria for determining closely space modes. (5) In Appendix 3.9.A, paragraph 3.02.e permits an allowable t l stress of 0.9 of the material yield stress for faulted j This is not consistent with limits stated per conditions. Table 3.9.3 of the PSAR. Revise the Appendix to conform with Table 3.9.3. i l

7.,....... 3., i .S ,1 m 11-3 a b The seismic qualification progran described in this section is 110.7 not totally acceptable. Revise the program to be in accordance (3.9.1.2) with criteria provided in Attachment B " Electrical and Seisnic (3.10) j Qualification Prograc." (1) In the last sentence of Part I of Appendix 3.9.B change 110.8 (3.9.2.4) "will" to "nay". (2) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B expand,the valve operability 1 testing criteria to include the valve design pressure. (3) In Section II of Appendix 3.9.B under criterion d state the Qualification Standards to be employed.

  • "A vartical (4) In Appendix 3.9.B defins the her " *al accelerations to be used for static valve qualification.

(5) In. Appendix 3.9.B, Section II, your position that for valves with natural frequencies less than 33 Hz operability can be verified without performing valve exercising per + step C requires justification. Provide more specific equations of notion and discuss methods 110.0 of solution for the dynamic analysis for open and closed systems. (3.9.2.5) In 110.10 The information provided in this section is not adequate. addition to the nominal pipe size which determine whether ASME (3.9.2.7) Class 2 and 3 piping will be field run, identify in the PSAR (5.2.19) Include those Category I piping systems which will be field run. any special or simplified procedures which will be used for designing and installing this piping. 110.11 Provide the specific' criteria that will be used to guarantee operability of instrumentation and electrical equipment, not (3.10.2) furnished by C.E., under faulted conditions when a dynamic analysis without performance testing is employed in the design of this equipment, t e

4 1 i n .m - ) 7/1/74 i

1 Attact:.cnt A BRANCH TECIC;ICAL POSITION 'tEB NO. I j

MECli\\ ICAL E:'GINEERING ER.:.5CH q ,I DIRECT 02 ATE OF LICENSING CRITERIA F02 i POSTUI. ATE 3 FAILU2E A53 LEAKAGE LCCATIONS IN FLUID SYSTCI PI?IUG OUTSIDE C0 TA13:!E';T -I ij The following criteria are within the review respon'sibility of the - : q Mechanical Engineering Branch with the exception of I.A., II.A., II.D., ~1 4 II.E and 1.a.,1.b.,1.c., 2.a and 2.c. (3) of Appendix A. ' l HigbEnerguFluidSusteblPiotng I. r.

  • A.

Fluid Systems Separated from Essential Structures, Systems & Components For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.a. l of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrange ent drawings should clearly show that-the effects of postulated piping " breaks at any locatica are isolated or physically remote from essent'ial structures,. systems, anl cat =onents. Av. the designer's option, break locations as detdrained from I.C., I.D., and I.E below may be selected for this purpose. B. Fluid System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping -t i identified in 2.C. (1) and 2.C.(2) of Appendix A provided they meet the requirenents of AS !E Code, Section III - Subarticle . 1 NE-1110 and are designed to meet the following additional requirements: 1 1/ - See Glossary for definitions of italicized phrases.

t. ~ f, ) The following design stre.ss and fatigue limits should not be 1 1. exceeded; 1 For ASME Code, Section III, Class 1 Pioing 7.; -(a) Maximum stress ranges should not exceed the following limits: 4 'I Ferritic steel < 2.0Sm J 1 Austenitic steel < 2.4S. m i '4 (b) The maximum stress range between any two load sets (including the zero load set) should be calculated by i Eq. (10) in Par. NB-3653,.ASME Code, Section III, for upset plant conditions and an OBE event transient. 3 If the calculated maximum etress rhnge of Eq. (10) exceeds the limits of I.B.l(a) but is not greater than i 3S,, the limit of I.B.1(c) should be met. i If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq.g(10) exceeds 3S,, the stress ranges calculated by both I Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) should meet the limits of I.S.1(a) and the limit of I.B.l(c). (c) Cumulative usage factor < 0.1, as required by I.B.l(S). For ASME Code, Section III. Class 2 Piping Maximum stress range as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10) in Par. NC-3652, ASME Code, Section III, considering upset plgnt conditions (i.e., sustained loads, occasional loads, and ther=al r O G

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1 1 expansion) and an OBE event should not exceed (S + S )2/ h i [I 2. Welded attachments, for pipe supports or other purposes, to ~ these portions of piping should be avoided except where detailed ' stress analyses, or tests, are performed to demoastrate compliance with the limits of I.B.l. a 3. The number of piping circumferential and longitudinal welds and branch connections should be minimized. ~ 4. The. length of the piping run should be reduced to the minimum length practical. t .i 5. The design at points of pipe f,ixity (e.g., pipe anchors or welded connections at containment penetrations) should not require welding directly to the outer surf ace of the piping l (e.g., fluid integral forged pipe fittings may be used) except l lihere detailed stress analyses are performed to demonstrate l compliance with the limits of I.B.l. l 6. Geometric discontinuities, such as at pipe-to-valve section j transitions, at branch connections, and at changes in pipe 1 wall thickness sheuld be designed to minimize the discontinuity i l l stresses. t i C. Fluid Systems Enclosed Within Protective Structures 1. Breaks in ASME Code, Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping should 2/ l - The limit of 0.S(1.2 S. + S ) may be used in lieu of (S + 5.). 4 j C 4 ^

j. q 3, / l be postulated at the following locations in each piping ahd i -branch run (except those portions of fluid system piping 'I identified in I.B.) within a prot'ective structure containing .( ~] assential systems and cenpanents and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b. or 1.c. of Appendix A: .i At terninct ends of the. pressurized portions of the run a. 1 i if located within the protective structure. b. At' intermediate locations selected by either of the following crit,eria: (i) At each pipe fitting (e.g., elbow, tee, cross, and i non-standard fitting) or, if the run contains no fittings, at one loc'ation at each extreme of the run (a terminal end, if located within the protective structure cay substitute for one inter =ediate break). At each location where the stresser exceed (5. + S )2/ 3/ (ii) n but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of highest stress !. In the case of a straight b pipe run without any pipe fittings or welded attach-8 ments and stresses below (S.

  • 5 ), a sinimu= of one n

c l location chosen on the basis of highest stress. l 4 E! resses associated with normal and upset plant conditi":J, and an 03E St l cvent as calculated by Eq. (9) and (10), Par. NC-3652 of the ASSE Code, Section III, for Class 2 and 3 piping 4/ -- Two highest stress points; select second point at least 10% below the highest stress. 9

._..-.-a y m 2. Breaks in non-nu, clear class piping should be postulated at the following locations in each piping or branch run: i a. At ten 7inal ends of the pressurized portions of the run if located within the protective structure. b. At each inter =ediate' pipe fitting and welded attachnent. l D. Flu.id Systems Not Enclosed Within Protective Structures 1. Breaks in ASME Code, Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping, should be po'stulated at the following locations in each piping and branch run (except those portions of f2 aid system piping identified in I.B) outside but routed alongside, above, or below a protective structure tontaining essential systa=s cr.d components and designed to satisfy the provisions of 1.b, or 1.c of Appendix A. a. At tenninal ends of pressurized. portions of the run if located adjacent to the protective structure. b. At internediate locations selected by either of the following criteria: (i) At each pipe fitting (e.g., elbow, tee, cross, and non-standard fitting). E (ii) At each location where the stresses - exceed '(S. + S )S-n c . but at not less than two separated locations chosen on the basis of hig' est stress / In the case of a 4 h 9 m. .--rrr

.m s straight pipe run without any pipe fittings or i welded attach =ents and stresses below (S. + S ), a n a minimum of one location chosen on the basis of j highest stress.- F l 2. Breaks in non-nuclear class piping should be postulated at l ~ the following locations in each piping or branch run: a. At ter f aal ands of pressurized portions of the run if lo,cated adjacent to the protective structure. b. At,each ititermediate pipe fitting and welded attr.chment.

11. Moderate-Enercu Fluid Sustem Picing A.

Fluid Systems Separated from Essentici Structures, Systems & Components For the purpose of satisfying the separation provisions of 1.a. of Appendix A, a review of the piping layout and plant arrange =ent [' drawings should clearly show tha't the effects of through-wall leakage cracks at any location are isolated or physically remote 'from essentici structures, systems, and components. I B. Fluid System Piping Between Containment Isolation Valves Breaks need not be postulated in those portions of piping identified in 2.c. of Appendix A provided they meet the requirements of ASME - l Code, Section III - Subarticle NE-ll10, and are designed such that h+S;)S/ the stresses do not exceed 0.5(S f r ASME Code, Section III, j Class 2 piping. %l

_._.m e C. Fluid.fy. ace s Within or Outside and Adjacent to Protective S tructu,:vs f Throughm11 leakage cracks should be postulated in fluid j system Mping located within or outside and adjacent to i i Protectice structurps containing essential systens and caponen?s and designed to satisfy the pravisions of 1.b. l or 1.c.,ht Appendix A, except where exempted by II.B, II.D. i or in thN-e partions of ASME Code, Section III, Class 2 or 3 P P ng er non-nuclear piping where the stresses are less c.un ii h +. S )S_/.The cracks should be postulated to occur 0.5(S c individually at locations that result in the maximum effects from fluid sp aying and flooding, and the consequent hazards or environmental conditions developed. D. ModeratMnargy Fluid Systems'in Proximity to High-Energy Fluid

  • Systems Cracks need. net be postulated in moderate-energy flui.j systes P ping 1Nated in an area in which a break in high-anergy fluid l

i l l system Piping is postulated, provided such cracks would not result in more 'initing environ = ental conditions than the high-energy P Ping break. Where a postulated leakage crack in the moderate-i energy 71.id system piping results in = ore limiting environ = ental ( conditiona than the break in proxi= ate high-energy fluid systs P ping, :he provisions of II.C should be applied. i E. Fluid Syne =s Qualifying as High-Energy or Moderate-Energy Syste s Through-wall leakage cracks instead of breaks may be postulated l

,.7 s in the piping of these fluid syster s that qualify as high energy f i fluid systens for only short operational periods 6/ but qualify as moderate-energy fluid systems for the major operational period. III. Type of Breaks and Leakage Cracks in Fluid Systsm Pioing A. Circumferential Pipe Breaks The following circumferential breaks should be postulated in high-energy fluid system piping at the locations specified in Section I above: 1. Cir.cumferential byeaks shoul,d be postulated in fluid systerrr piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of 1 inch, except that, if the maximum stress range in the circumferential direction is at least twice clat in the axial direction, only a longitud 2n.a. break need be postulated. Instrument lines, one inch and less nominal pipe size for c2bing should meet the provisio:.s of Regulatory, Guide 1.11. 2. Where break locations are selected at pipe fittings without the benefit of s*.ress calculations, breaks should be postulated at each pipe-to-fitting weld. If detailed stress analyses 6/ - An operational period is considered "short" if the fraction of time that the system operates within the pressure-ta=perature conditions specitied for high-energy fluid systens is less than 2 percent of the time that the system operates as a : aderate energy fluid system (e.g., systems such as the reactor decay heat removal systems qualify as r Oderate-energy fluid systas; however, systems such as auxiliary feedwater ( systens operated during PE reactor startup, hot standby, or shutdown qualify as high-energy fluid systems).

-~-u- ~ ._.m. _. .n (e.g., finite element analyses) or tests are performed, the ~ I mvGum stressed location in the fitting may be selected t instead of the pipe-to-fitting weld. 3.. Circumferential breaks should be assumed to result in pipe l severance and separation amounting to a one-diameter lateral displacement of the ruptured piping sections unless physically limited by piping restraints, structural members, or piping ~ stiffness as may,be demonstrated by inelastic limit analysis (e.g.,' a plastic hinge in the piping is not developed under j loading). ' t, .i 4. The dynamic force of the jet discharge at the break location should be based on the ef fective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure as modified ~ by an analytically or experimentally determined thrust l coefficient. Limited pipe displacement at the break location, line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge. ~ 5. Pipe whipping should be assumed to occur in the plane defined by the piping geometry and configuration, and co cause pipe movement in the direction of the jet reaction. B. ' Longitudinal Pipe Breaks The following longitudinal breaks should be postulated in high-I energy f7,uid system piping at the locations of each circumferential break specified in,III.A.: ~~..._ _ _ r- =; 1. Longitudinal break in fTuid syste:n piping and branch runs should be postulated in nominal pipe sizes 4-inch and larger, j except that, if the maximum stress range in the axial direction 1 , is at least twice that in the circunferential direction, caly i a circumferential break need be postulated. 2. Longitudinal breaks need not be postulated at terminal ends if the piping at the terininal ends contains.no longitudinal pipe welds and major geometric discontinuities at the circunferential. weld j.oints of the tenninal ends are designed to minimize dis- ~ continuity stresses. 3. Longitudinal breaks should be assumed to result in an axial . split without pipe severance. Splits should be located (but not concurrently) at two dissetrically-opposed points on the ~ piping circumference such that a jet reaction causing out-of-f plana bending of the piping configuration results. 4. The dynamic force of the fluid jet discharge should be based on a circular or elliptical (2D x 1/2D) break area equal to the effective cross-sectional flow area of the pipe at the break location and on a calculated fluid pressure codified by an analytidally or experieentally determined thrust coefficient as determined for a circumferential break at the same location. Line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump-controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoirs may be taken into account, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge.

t 5. Piping covement sh.'uld be assumed to occur in the direction of l the jet reaction ualess limited by structural members, piping 1 I restraints, or Pi?ing stiffness as denonstrated by inelastic i limit analysis. i C. Through-Wall Leakage Cracks The following through-wall leakage cracks should be postulated in modemta-energy fh.id opstem piping at the locations specified in ~ Section II'abova: 1. cracks should be postulated in moderate-energy f2uid system piping:and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe siz'e of 1 inch. 2. Fluid flow from a crack should be based on a circular opening i of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe-diaceter in length and one-half pipe wall thickness in width. 3. The flow from the crack,,should be assuced to result in an environment that vets all unprotected components within the compartment, with consequent flooding in the compartment and coccunicating compartments. Flooding effe.ts may be determined en the ti.inis of a conservatively-esti=ated tir e period required to. f geet corrective actions.

~ APPENDIX A PLANT ARR.CGD1EhT CRITERIA AND SELECTED PIPING DESIGN FE. CURES 1. Plant Arrante=ent Protection of essentici structures, systems, and components against p08tulched piping failures in high or m0derCte energy fluid systems i that operate during nomal plant conditions and that are located out-side of containment should be provided by one of the following plant arrangenent considerations: s. Plant arrangements should separate fluid system piping from essentici structures, systems, and components. Separatton should be achieved by plant physical layouts that provide sufficient distances between essential structu es, systems, and components and fluid system piping such that the effects of any postulcted piping failure therein (i.e., pipe whip, jet i=pingement, and the environmental conditions restilting from the' escape of contained fluids as appropriate to high or moder=ce-energy fluid system piping) cannot impair the integrity or operability of essential structures, systens, and components. t b. Flu **d system piping or portions thereof not satisfying the provisions of 1.a. above should be enclosed within. structures or compartments designed to. protect nearby essential str:4 cures, systems, and c =ponents. Alternatively, essentici systems and l l l -=

m egr7;ngr.- .:7 he enclosed within structures or compart=ents desLgced :o.:ithstand the effects of postulated piping fail:a,eg in nearby.~hid cys ems. P1'snt arrange =ents or systes features that do not satisfy the c. provisions of cither 1.a. or 1.b. above should be limited to those for unich the above provisions are impractical. Such cases r.sy arisa, for example, (1) at interconnections between flyid mystems and assenticL systems and components, or (2) th fluid systems having dual. functions (i.e., required to operate P cac conditions a's well as to shut dava the reactor). during 1:omal l In such cases, redundant design features, separated or otherwise protected from effects of postulated piping fcitures, or additional protection should be provided so that reactor shutdown is assured ..in the event of a failure in the interconnecting piping of (1), or in the dual function pipi,ng of (2). Additional protection may be provided by restraints and barriers or by deeigning or testing asaantial systems and cogonents to withstand the effects associated uith postulated piping failures. 2. De-sien Features EJaanticl systems and cog onents should be designed to ceet the a. seismic design requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29. b. Protective structures or cc part=ents, fluid system piping restraints, and other protective measures should be. designed in accordanc'o with the following:

  • * - * ? '* *M pewm. __ _.

i i m (1) Protective structures or cospartments needed to implement - 1.b. or 1.c. above should be designed to Seismic Category I requirements. The effects of a postulcted pipir.; failura (i.e., pipe whip, jet i=pingement, pressurization of co=; art-ment, water spray, and flooding, as appropriate) in combination with loadings associated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and normal operation shculd be used for the design of required ~! protective structures. Piping restraints, if used, may be taken into account to limit effects of the postulcted piping

failure, (2) Righ-energy fluid system piping restraints and protective measures.should be designed such rhat the effects of a b in one pipe'cannot, in turn, rupture postulated break other nearby pipes or components which could result in unacceptable offsite consequences or in loss of capability of essential systECJ Cnd compCndn0s to initiate, actuate, and complete actions required for reactor s,hutdown.

l Fluid systcn piping between containment isolation valves should c. meet the following design provisions: II/ n the design of piping restraint, an unrestrained whipping pipe -- I ~ ~ should be considered cap.ble cf (a) rupturing i=pacted pipes of smaller rominal pipe si:en and (b) developing a through-wall leakage crack in larger nominal pipe sizes with thinner wall thicknesses except where l experimentsi or analytical data for specific. impact energies de=onstrate the capability to withstand the i= pact without failure. l S

e i (1) Portions of fluid s3 scen piping between isolation valves of single barrier containment structures (including any rigid connection to the contsinment penetration) that connect, on a continuous or intermittett basis to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the stea: and feed' water systens of PWR l plants should be designed to the stress limits specified in I.B. or II.B. of this document. i These portions of high-energy fluid system piping shoulk be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., dapable of resisting bending and torsional moments) located reasoriably close to the containment isolation valves. The rcitraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a postulated piping failurs beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the containment will be impaired. l l Tennin Z ends of the pipihg runs outside containment should be-considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations l outside containment. Where contain=ent isolation valves are not required inside containment, those portions of the fluid system piping extending from the outside isolation valve to either the rigid pipe i connection to the containnent penetration or the first pipe

7 m whip restraint inside contain=ent should be considered as the boundary of"the systen piping required to meet the above design limits and restraint provisions. (2) Portions of f?uid system piping between isolation valves of dual barrier containment structures should not exceed the stress limits in I.B. or II.B. of this document. These i i portions of high-energy fluid system piping that pass through the annulus, and whose failure could affect the leaktight integrity of the contain=ent structure or re,sult in pressur-ization of the annulus beyond design limits, should be provided with pipe whip restraints (i.e., capable of resisting bending and torsional moments) located reasonably close to the containment isolation valves and should be provided with an enclosing structure or guard p$pe. Restraints should be designed to withstand the loadings resulting from a postulcted piping failure beyond these portions of piping so that neither isolation valve operability nor the leaktight integrity of the associated containment penetration will be impaired. Tenninal ends of the piping runs outside contain=ent should be considered to originate at the pipe whip restraint locations outside containnent. For the purpose of establishing the design para =eters (e.g., pressure, temperature, axial loads) only of the enclosing 4 4

.. ~. - p .s structure or guard pipe, a full flow area break should be assumed in that portion of piping within the enclosing structure or guard pipe. (3) For those portions of fluid system piping identified in i 2.c. (1) and 2.c. (2) above, the extent of inservice examination j conducted as specified in Division 1 of Section XI of the ASME f Code during each inspection interval should be increased to provide volumetric exanination of 100 percen,t of the ci,rcum-farential and longitudinal weld joints in piping identified in Sec, tion III.A.1. and Section III.B.l. of this document. The areas subject to examination should comply with the require-ments of the following categories as specified in Section XI I of the ASME Code: j (a) ASME Class 1 piping welds,. Examination Category B-J in Table IWB-2500. (b) ASME Class 2 piping welds, Examination Category C-F and C-G in Table IWC-2500. 6 o S

r-GLOSSARY i'ssenti.cl Str*etu"cs, Svstt s, cr.d Cc rencnts. Structures, systess, and components required for reactor shutdown without off-site power or , to nitigate the cor. sequences of a postulated piping fciture in fluid system piping that results in trip of the turbine-generator or the reactor protection system. Fluid Systems. Righ and moderate energy fluid systens that are subject to the postulation of piping failures against which protection of essential structures, systams, and components is needed. Righ-Energu Fluid Sustems. Fluid systems that, during normt plant conditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of the foLlowing are cet: maximam operating temperature exceeds 200*F, or a. ~ b. maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig. Moderate-Inerru ?Iuid Systems. Fluid. systems that, during norn21 pZcnt cor.ditions, are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are met: a. maximum operating temperature is 200*F or less, and b. maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less. O

/ Nor-ral ?!cnt Conditiens. Plant operating conditions during reactor startup, operation at power,* hot standby, or reactor cooldown to cold. shutdown condition. Uoset PZcnt Cc".ditions. Plant operating conditions during systes transients that =sy occur with coderate frequency during plant service l life and are anticipated operational occurrences, but not during systes testing. Postulated Pisino Failures. Longitudinal and circumferential breaks in high-energy fluid system piping and through-wall leak' ge cracks in a moderate-energy fluid system piping postulated according to the provisions of this document. L S S cnd S. Allowable stresses at maxi =um (hot) te perature, at p f g minimum,(cold) temperature, and allowable stress range for thermal expansion respectively, as defined in Article NC-3600 of the ASE Code, Section III. t S,. Design stress intensity as defined in Article NB-3600 of t.he ASE i Code, Section III. i i Sinals.4ctb s Ce c onant FciEurs. Malfunction or loss of function of a component of electrical or fluid systems. The failure of an active component of a fluid system is considered to be a loss of component function as a result of mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, or electrical malfunction, but not the loss of component structural integrity. "rae direct consequences of a single accive ec.:7' nan; failure are considered to be part of the single failure. e - -. -. - - - ~. - - -.. -,, -.. -

Ta n:ral, Er.ds. Extremeties of piping runs that connect to structures, components (e.g., vessels, pu=ps, valves), or pipe anchors that act as rigid constraints to piping thermal expansion. A branch connection to a main piping rur. is a terminal end of the branch run. O e e e 3 6 9 9 4 6 6 l I 0' e O O p 9 S 9 0 e e L

.~ '~s 12/5/73 p Attachasnt B 5:.2TRICAL AND MECPJ.NICAL EQUIPMENT SEIS?!IC QUAI.IFICATION PROC?f.M I* ot* sic Test foe Euuipcaent Operability A test program is required to confirm the functional operability of all Seis=ic Category I electrical and mechanical equipment and instrumentation during and af ter an earthquake of magnitude up to and including the SSI. Analysis without testing may be acceptable only if structural integrity alone can assure the design intanded funcrion. k' hen a complete seismic testing is impracticable, a combination of test and analysis may be accept-able. The characteristics of the required input motion should be specified by one of the following: (a) response spectrum (b) powar spectral density function (c) time history Such. characteristics, as derived from the structures or systems seismic analysis, should be representative of ths input motion at the equipment mounting locations. A. Equipment skauld be tested in.the operational condition. Oper-ability should be verified during and after the testing. 4 The actual input motion should be characterized in the same manner as the required input motion, and the conservatism in amplitude and frequency cont'ent should be demonstrated. 4 Seismic excitation generally have a broad frequency content. Random vibration irsut motion should be used. However, single frequency input, such as sine beats, may be applicable provided one ofN he following conditions are met: t ~ (a) The characteristics of the required input motion indicate that the motion is dominated by one frequency (i.e., by structural filtering effects). (b) The ant'ibpated response of the equipment is adequately represented by one mode. (c) The input has suf ficient intensity and duration to excite all modes to the required magnitude, such that the testing response spectra vill envelope the corresponding response spectra of the individual modes. I u 6 Y

_--s.. ~. u AUXILIARY POWER AND CONVERSION SYSTEMS 1. Protection Against Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping I Discuss the means by which protection is afforded for each high and moderate energy system as-outlined in Mr. J. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973. t 2. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup System Discuss the interfaces between the shutdown heat exchangers and the spent fuel pool cooling system (to insure that the shutdown heat exchangers will not be connected to the tuel pool cooling system unless the reactor is shut down and in a refueling mode). 3. Fuel Handling Discuss the consequences of dropping and possible tipping of the cask into the spent fuel pool. 4. EssentiaI Cooling Water System Discuss the measures taken to protect dry and wet cooling towers from external missiles. 5. Ultimate Heat Sink Provide the results of an analysis of the 30-day period that determines l (1) the total heat load (2) sensible heat load (3) de. cay heat from radioactive material (4). station auxiliary system heat rejected. 6. Control Room HVAC Provide P&ID's of the control room HVAC system for review. 7. Diesel Generator Air Starting System I Revise the system design to meet the Staff's position (capable of l 5 cold starts by each sub-air starting system. Two sub-systems for each diesel). i 1

,n i o 2-8. Turbine Generator Expand the. discussions of the turbine overspeed protection including the redundant trip mechanisms and the trip set points. 9. Circul'ating Water System Discuss provisions which will be made in the design to protect safety related equipment from performing its design function in the event of flooding due to failure of: (a) condenser expansion point (b) circulating water system (c) condenser hot well (d) other non-seismic Category I system failure. 10. Auxiliary Feedwater System Discuss the system design relative to the single failure criteria and diversity for power supply to AFW pumps and values. 11. Condensate Storage Facilities Discuss the provisions made to prevent water in the condensate storage tank from freezing. 12. Diesel Generator Room HVAC Describe the design criteria of the outside air intake system for diesel room ventilation and combustion air supply in light of the single failure and missile protection considerations. Provide the design criteria for the diesel fuel oil storage room ventilation system.

1 a REQUEST FOR ADD TIONAL INFORMATION WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ~ . DOCitET NOS. 50-508, 50-509_ 03.0 Containment Systems Branch 03.1 Table 5.3-2 gives the pressure of the secondary side of,the sterm (6.2.1) generators as 1070 psig for full power and 1170 psig for ero power. These pressures are higher than those used in the stead line break analysis. Justify the pressures used in the steam line break analysis or redo the analysis using the higher pressure values. l l 03.2 In the analysis of steam line breaks you analyzed a spectrum of (6.2.1) double-ended breaks at various power levels. For breaks smaller than the full _ double-ended break, the assumption of slot breaks would appear to b'e more appropriate. Discuss the effect on your calculations if slot . breaks were assumed. 03.3 Provide the following information regar, ding the steam line break (6.2.1) analysis: (1) Discuss possible single failures in the ma'in an auxiliary feed-water systems by which additional fluid could be ad,ded to the steam generator following a steam line break. The failure of an isolation valve in the main or auxiliary feedwater lines and the addition of fluid stored ip the lines and injected by the feedwater pumps should be considered. (2) If the above single failure analysis indicaties that additional fluid mass and energy should be included.in the steam line break analysis, redo the analysis and provide the revised mass and energy release data. ' 03$4 Provide a comparison of the mass and energy release data calculated (6.2.1) using the CEFLASH - 4A code and the CEFLASH - 4 code. 03.5 Provide the results of the subcompartment pressure response analyses, (6.2.1) 1.e., the calculated pressure differentials as a function of time for the most severe pipe break in each compartment. 03.6 Provide analyses of spray line and surge line ruptures in the pressurizer (6.2.1) compartment. n 4 m W e f -{-.- --- ~ -

,.~ p r j i* 6. The input =otion should be applied to one vertical and one principal (or two orthogonal) horizontal axes si=ultaneously unless it can be de=onstrated thac the equipment response along the vertical direction is not sensitive to the vibratory motion along the horizontal direction, and vice versa. The 2 time pha31a; of the inputs in the vertical and horizontal direc-tions must he such that a purely rectilinear resultant input is ) avoided. The acceptable alternative.is to have vertical and horizontal inputs in-phase, and then repeated with inputs 180 degrees out-of-phase. In addition, the test must be repeated with the equipment rotated 90 degrees horizontally. i 7. The fixture design should meet the following requirements: I (a) Sinalate the actual service mounting (b) Cause no dynamic coupling to the test item. 8. The in-situ application of vibratory devices to superimpose the seismic vibratory' loadings on the complex active device for operability testing is acceptable when application is justifiable. 9. The test program may be based upon selectively testing a repre-sentative number of mechanical components according to type, load level, size, etc. on a prototype basis. II. Seismic Design Adequacy of Supports 1. Analyses or tests should be performed for all supports of electrical and =echanical equipment and instrumentation to ensure their structural capability to withstand seismic excitation. 2. The analytical results must include the following: (a) The required input motions to the mounted equipment should be obtained and characterized in the manner as stated in Section I.2. (b) The combined stresses of the support structures should be within the limits of ASME Section III, Subsection NF - " Component Support Structures" (draf t version) or other comparable stress limits. 4 ) 3. Supports should be tested with cquipment installed. If the equipment is inoperative during the support test, the response at the equipment mounting locations should be monitored and characterized in the manner as stated in Section I.2. In such a case, equipment should be tested separately and the actual input to the equipment should be more conservative in amplitude and frequency content than the monitored response. 4. The requirements of Sections I.2 I.4, I.5, I.6 and I.7 are applicable when tests are conducted on the equipment supports. emapw .--,.,_y--

7 L p 4 03.17 Specify and discuss the basis for establishing the design inward leak (6.2.3) rate of the shield building. 03.18 Identify all high energy lines within the annulus, and those which will (6.2.3) be provided with guard pipes. Provide drawings of the mechanical penetrations showing the guard pipes. t 03.19 The statement is made on page 6.2-165 of the PSAR that containment (6.2.3) isolation will be initiated by means of a Containment Isolation Signal (CIAS), which occurs on containment high pressure. Discuss the i adequacy of this approach, where there is no diversity in the contain-ment isolations signals. Discuss and justify your reasons for not including the safety injection and main steam isolation signals as containment isolation signals.. Discuss and justify your reasons for not wanting the main steam lines to be isolated upon receipt of a containment isolation signal. Discuss and justify your reasons for not wanting the main feedwater lines to be isolated upon receipt of a contain==nt isolation signal. 03.20 Discuss when, during normal plant operation, purging of the containment (6.2.4) would be required, including the frequency and duration of purge operations. Provide an analysis of the volume of containment atmosphere that would be released to the environment if the purge system valves were open at the time of loss-of-coolant accident or steam or feed-i water line break accident occurred. The analysis should be done for a spectrum of pipe break sizes. Identify the instrumentation and set-points that will initiate containment isolation, including purge valve closure. Provide assurance that containment isolation will occur. 03.21 Describe the analyses or tests that have been or will be conducted to (6.2.4) demonstrate the capability of the containment isolation valves, in particular, valves whose lines are open to the containment atmosphere such as the containment purge system valves, to function under the dynamic loading conditions resulting from high air and steam flow rates and high differential pressures following a pipe break accident. Justify that test conditions are representative of conditions that would be expected to prevail following a pipe break accident. Provide the analytical and test results. 03.22 Identify and justify the proposed locations of the auction points (6.2.5) inside containment for the hydrogen recombiners of the combustible gas control system. Show the locations of the suction points and routing of piping on plan and elevation drawings of the containment. Discuss the design provisions to protect the piping against loss of function. i i l -~.. ---, __,_.-m_. ,, _ _ _ _ -. -,., - -, _. ~ ~ _ _ - _

l (~ ', - ") ~ ,..a 03.23 Provide a piping and instrumentation drawing of the hydrogen recombiner (6.2.5) system. 03.24 Specify the mass and area of altaninum and zine in the containment and (6.2.5) the mass of zirconum cladding in the core. I i o ,f + e O s M4,w,g --w}}

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