ML20198G562
| ML20198G562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1975 |
| From: | Oreilly P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-1318 NUDOCS 8605290669 | |
| Download: ML20198G562 (17) | |
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i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON, D.
C.
20555 JAN. 2 41975 D00TT NOS. :
STN 51-508 A SL-509 APPLICANT:
WASHING lDN PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTDi (WPPSS)
FACILITY:
WPPSS NUUIAR PPNECTS NO. 3 AND NO. 5
SUMMARY
OF JANUARY 9,1975 M.1 TING WI'IH APPLICANT TO DISCUSS RESPONSES
'ID STAFF'S REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION On January 9,1975, representatives of WPPSS and Etasco mt with the Regulatory staff in Bethesda. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the responses to the staff's requests for additional infonration. A list of attendees and an agenda are attached as Enclosures No.1 ard No. 2 respectively.
We asked WPPSS for a clarification of the respmse to Item 110.7 regarding mecMnical engineering. We questioned the use of Psat instead of the P for compressed or saturuted water. In their o
explanation, Ebasco pointed out that the KPA analysis was not used to verify the adequacy of the design. We requested that the response to Item 110.7 be revised to clear up any possible misinterpretation of the analytical technique. WPPSS replied tMt the response would be revised accordingly.
In a discussion about the response to Iten 110.9, we inquired about the equation for m1 minting jet impingement force. We renarked tMt the definition given for the velocity rutio used in this section m s not clear. WPPSS infonned us that the response would be revised to reflect the discussion.
We requested clarification of the calculations in the msponse to Item 110.11, WPPSS stated that all of the results presented in this response would be converted to the KPA fonut.
In a discussion about the respmse to Item 110.5, we asked whether the guard pipes treated in this response would be subjected to pressure testing. Ebasco replied tMt the guard pipes will be pressure tested.
WPPSS stated tMt the response to Item 110.5 will be mvised to provide a reference to the proper section in the PSAR where the pressure testing is discussed.
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, We comented that the response to Item 110.13 in Section 3.9 contains material which apparently conflicts with the yield stress discussion in Appendix 3.9.A.
WPPSS stated that the conflict would be removed with a revision of Table 3.9-3.
We expressed confusion over the response to Item 110.17 in Appendix 3.9.B on page 3.9-2.
We stated that it is necessary to clarify which criterion is actually being used. WPPSS infomed us that the requested clarification will be provided.
In a discussicn about the post-IDCA mdiologim1 dose mienlations, we infomed WPPSS that our preliminary calculations resulted in unacceptably high doses under 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. In a comparison of the values of the input pammeters, a discrepancy as noted between the bypass leakage assumptions used by Ebasco and the assumptions that we had used. Ibrther comparison yielded significant differences in the two sets of input X/Q values. Our X/Q values were nuch higher than those used by Ebasco. WPPSS and Ebasco agreed to review the meteorological data used to mlonlate the X/Q values. Further discussions will be held after this review of the meteorological data is completed.
We inquired about the distance between the exhaust headers of the Shield Building Ventilation System. WPPSS provided the requested inforation and agreed to either indicate the locations m an appropriate figure in the PSAR or to provide a reference to a figure already containing the infomation.
The respmses to Items 331.1,14,16,.9,.11,.12,.14,.15, and.18 regartling mdiological assessment were discussed. WPPSS stated that the necessary clarification or additional information would be provided.
We presented our cerments on the Ivsponses to the requests for additional information regartling effluent treatment systems. Continuous nonitoring of hydrogen in the gaseous radwaste system, monitoring of radiation levels in process and effluent streams during postulated accidents, and the combining of liquid wastes into a solid matrix were discussed.
We informed WPPSS that Section 13.2.2 contained material regartling the operator retraining program and requalification progmm that is more suitable for an operating license application. WPPSS replied that this material would be deleted from the PSAR.
The responses to requests for additional information regartling containment systems were discussed. We stated that the response to Item 042.15 as given in CESSAR is considered unacceptable. In addition, we discussed the staff's position on purge valve opemtion. We infomed WPPSS that the requested information conceming aluminum items inside containment had not been provided.
JAN 2 41975
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- We asked WPPSS about the status of the dose analysis requested by Item 422.1 regarding emergency planning. WPPSS stated that the requested information was scheduled for subnittal in early Felruary,1975.
In reply to our question about their consultant's report on industrial security, WPPSS stated that this report was scheduled for subnittal in Marr.h, 1975. We informed WPPSS that our safety evaluation in these two areas could not be prepared without the requested information.
We expressed our concem that the recent reorganization of WPPSS could cause difficulty in preparing staff positions on quality assurance.
Finally, draft positions concerning naterials engineering and reactor systems were discussed.
{L li Patrick D. O'Reilly Light Water Reactors Project Branch 1-3
Enclosures:
No.1, List of Attendees No. 2, Agenda ces: Mr. J. J. Stein Joseph B. Knotts, Jr., Esq.
Richard Q. Quigley, Esq.
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ENCLOSURE 1 MEETING WT1H WPPSS WNP-3 AND WNP-5 ATIINDANCE IJST NRC P. D. O'Reilly P. Stoddart Pei-Ying Chen L. Phillips I' rank C. Chemy M. Bolotsky V. Goel Eba* " Re daes Russell T. Vickers
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W. Moritz R. C. Iotti D. H. Vories A. W. Barr.has T. Donohue WPPSS Don lagrou G. C. Sorensen.
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9 ENCWSURE 2 AGENDA JANUARY 9, 1975 MEETING WI'ni WPPSS I.
Discussion of Responses to Staff's First Round of Requests for Information A.
Mechanical Engineering 1.
Item 110.7 2.
Item 110.9 3.
Item 110.11 4.
Item 110.15 5.
Item 110.13 6.
Item 110.17 B.
Padiological Assessment 1.
Item 331.1 2.
Item 331.4 3.
Item 331.6 4.
Item 331.9 5.
Item 331.11 6.
Item 331.12 7.
Iten 331.14 8.
Item 331.15 9.
Item 331.18 C.
Effluent Tmatment Systems D. - Opemtor Licensing E.
Dnergency Planning F.
Industrial Security G.
Quality Assurance II.
Discuscion of Post-IDCA Dose Calculations III. Discussicn of Dmft Positions A.
Materials Engineering (See Attachment A)
B.
Reactor Systems k_-
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Attachnent A 120-1 120.0 MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH, APPLICATIONS SECTION 120.24 (RSP)
The response to Item 120.6 in Amendment 5 regarding avoiding (10.3) significant sensitizatian of austenitic stainless steel com-(10.4) ponents refers only to the ESF components,whereas Item 120.6 pertains to the steam and feedwater materials also. The response is acceptable for the ESF components. Confirm that similar steps, in accordance with the recommendations of Regu-latory Guide 144, will be taken to avoid significant sensi-tization of pressure-retaining austenitic stainless steel components of the steam and feedwater systems.
120.25 (RSP)
The response to Item 120.10 in Amendment 5 regarding confor-(6.1) mance to the interin Regulatory position on Regulatory Guide (10.3) 1.31 is acceptable except for paragraphs 4)b) and 4)c) des-(10.4) cribing a test sample to represent the production weld when a production weld must be evaluated for acceptability. This test sample is not permitted. The interim alternate Regu-latory position 4.b. states: "When the production weld is below the minimum acceptable level of delta ferrite, a sample of the weld shall be removed, and a metallographic examination or a bend test shall be made on a transverse section to determine the presence or absence of excessive fissures....." Confirm that if Regulatory position 4.b. is J
followed as an alternate, the testing will be of the pro-duction welds.
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120.26 (RSP)
The response to Item 120.14 in Amendment 5 is unacceptable.
(6.1)
The Regulatory position is that the fracture toughness pro-(9.0) perties of the ferritic materials of all Class 2 and 3 com-(10.3) ponents in WPPSS Nuclear Projects No. 3 and 5 must meet the (10.4) requirements of subsubarticles NC-2310 and ND-2310 of the Summer 1972 Addenda to Section III of the ASME Code. The Regulatory position requirements for fracture toughness pro-perties of Class 2 and 3 ferritic material components are intended to supplement those of the 1974 Edition of Section III of the ASME Code. Confirm that you will comply with this Regulatory position.
120-27 (RSP)
The response to Item 120.15 in Amendment 5 is not clear.
(9.0)
The Regulatory position is that the mechanical properties (10. 3) of materials specified for use in all Class 2 and Class 3 (10.4) components of WPPSS Muclear Projects No. 3 and 5 must be either as stated in Appendix I to Section III of the Code, or alternately, as indicated in Parts A, B, and C of Section II of the Code. Confirm that you will comply vith this Regulatory position.
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121.0 MATERIALS PERFORMANCE SECTION, MATERIALS EFiGINEERING BRANCH 121.1 (RSP)
Confirm that the design cnd layaot of t'ne hCah energy fluid (5.2.8) system piping between (a) the first figid pipe connection to (6.0) the containmen't penetration, or (b) the first pipe whip (9.0) restraint inside containment,'and the first isolation valve (10.0) outside containment will. allow sufficient access to perform adequate augmented ' inservice inspection. Acceptable augmented service inspection rec;uirements for these portions of piping are attached.
121.2 (RSP)
'Ibe response to Item 12.13 (10.2.3) has not been received.
(3.5)
We will require the following informatica in detail to complete (10.2) our evaluation of the int'agrity of the turbine disks.
(1) The specific ASME or ASTN naterial cpecifications for the turbine disk and rotor forgings.
(2) The preservice inspcetien procedurc: n.d creeptance criteria used to verify the initial Integrity of the disk and rotor forgings.
(3) The maximum tangential bore stress (including centrifugal loads, interference fit and thermal gradients) in the low pressure disks at normal speed and design overspeed.
The corresponding minimum bore temperature at which the maximos bore stress occurs.
(4) The stress-rupture properties of the high pressure rotor materials and the method used to obtain these properties.
(5) The maximum steady state tangential and radial stress in the high pressure rotor assembly and the corresponding maximum steady state temperature.
(6) The inservice inspection program and associated acceptance criteria planned for the turbine rotors and disks.
(7) The fracture toughness (Kg) of the high pressure rotor and low pressure rotor and disk,, materials.
The attached Eranch Technical Position for turbine integrity describes acceptable criteria for these requirements.
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121.3 (RSP)
Acceptance standards should be in accordance with Section (5.2.8.5)
XI, 1974 edition instead of Summer 1973 Addenda to
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Section XI.
121.4 (RSP)
-Line 9 should be changed to read, " Pressure Vessel Code, (5.2.8.6)
Section XI, 1974 edition." Also line 2b should be changed to read, " requirements as'specified in the ASME Section XI.
1974 edition and in Regulatory Guide 1.51.
121.5 (RSP)
Lines 4, 5, 6 should be changed to read, " Comply with re-(5.2.8.7) quirements of ASME Section XI,1974 edition."
121.6 (RSP)
Requirements of Regulatory Cuide 1.45 will be strictly (5.2.7) followed.
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AUCMENTED IliSERVICE INSPECIIO! OF FLUID SYSIE!! PIPIEC 1.
Protective neasures, structures and guard pipes should not prevent the access required to conduct.the inservice examinations specified in the ASHE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Division 1,
" Rules.for Inspection and Testing of Components in Light-Water Cooled
'P1nnts."
For those portions of fluid systen / piping between containment 1
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isolation valves, or, where no isolation valve is used insida containment, between the first' rigid pipe connection to the contain-ment penetration or the first pipe chip restraint inside containmer.t and the outside isolation valve, the entent of inservice exaninations completed during each inspection interval (I!!A-2100, ASME Code, i
Section XI) should provide 100 percent volumetric examination of circ oferential aAd longitudinal pipe velds within the boundary' o5 '
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these portions of piping.
For those portions of fluid systems / piping enclosed in guard pipes, 1
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inspection ports should be provided in guard pipes to pernit the required exae.ination of circumferent.ial pipa velds.. Inspections ports should not be located in that portion of the guard pipe passing through the annulus of dual barrier containnent structures.
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- Fluid Systems. High energy fluid systens that nrc'hubject to the postulation of pipinc, failurcs outside containment against which protection of essential systens and components is needed.
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BRt.NCll TEcl::iICAL POSITION - !TIEB TURSI!!E DISK INTEGRITY 1.
Materials Selection The applicant's selectica of a disk or rotor material is acceptable
=1f in accord:nce with the folloreing:
The turbine disk or rotor should be made from a material and by a process that tends to riinimize finu occurrence and mar.inize fracture toughness properties, such as a NicrMov alloy processed by vacuum melting and degassing. The material should be examined s.nd tested to seet the following criteria:
a.
Chemical analyses sliould te made for each forging. Phosphorus and sulfur each should not exceed 0.015 we,I for low pressure disks and 0.02 we.% for high pressure roters.
b.
The fracture appearance transition ta=perature (50% FATT) as obtained from Charpy tests performed in accordance with specific-ation t.SIX /.-370 should be no higher than O'F for low pressure disks and 50'r for high pressure rotors. Nil-ductility transition (NDI) terrperatura obtained in cccordance with specification ASTM C-203 may be used in lieu of EATT. EDT temperatures should be no higher than -30 and 20*F, respectively.
The Chsrpy V-notch (C ) energy at tha minimum operating temperature c.
y of each los pressure disk in the tangential direction shocid bc W
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> 1 I
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At 1 cast 60 ft-lba.; The C enc'rgy of high pressure rotor y
mterinis at nininun operating toeparature should be at least 60 fc-)bs. A minicun of thrce C specimens should be tested in v
accordance uith specification AST1 A-370.
2.
Tracture Tounimass The lou pressure turbine disk and high pressure rotor' fracture tough-ness properties are acceptable if in co:rpliance with the follouing criteria:
The ratio of~the fracture toughness (K7c) of the M and rotor.
riaterials to the maximu:2 tangential strocs at speeds frorn normal to design overspeed should be at least two 6., and the fracture tough-ness of the low pressure dish natcrial should.,be at least 150 ksi M. at ninitum operating temperature. tore stress calculations r
should include corponents due to centrifugal loads, interference fit, and charnal gradients. Sufficient warmup tine should be specified in the turbine operating instructions to assure that toughness will be adequate to prevent brittle. fracture during startup. Fracture l
toughness properties can be obtained by any of..the following stethods:
Testing of the, actual caterial of the Lt:rbine dish to establis.h a.
j the K value et nor=al operating ter:porature, yc b.
Tecting of the actual esterial of the turbine disk with an l
instrumented Ctntpy eachine and a fatigue precracked specimen to l
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establish the K (dynanic) valuo at nornal operating tc=peraturc.
y If this nothod is used, K, (dynamic) shall ha used in lieu cf y
K (static) in mccting the toughness criteria above.
y c.
Estimating of K valu s at various temperatures fron conventional Ic Charpy and tensile data on the disk naterial using r.ethods presented by J. A. Eegley and W. A. Logsdon in Westi'nghouse Scientific Paper 71-1E7-MSLRF-P1 (Ref. 5). This method of e used only on materials which exhibit a obtaining K s u Ic well-defined Charpy energy and fracture appearance transition curve and are strain-rate insensitive. The test data and the calculated toughness curve should be submitted to the staff for review.
8t vari us temperatures d.
Estimating " lower bound" values of KIc using the equivalent energy concept of F. J. Witt and T. R. Mager, ORNL-TM-3894 (Ref. 6). Load-displacement data from the compact tension specimens and the calculated toughness data should be submitted to the staff for revice.
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3.
High Temperature Properties The stress-rupture properties of the high pressure rotor material are acceptablo if they provide sufficient assurance of rotor integrity for the lifetino of the turbina. The applicant can demonstrate compliance by submitting stress-rupture data of an equivalent material with similar proporties to the staff for evaluation.,
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4.
Preservice Inspe'etion The applicant's preservice inspection progran is acceptable if in compliance with the follouing criteria:
a.
Disk forgings should be rough machined with mininum stock allou-ance prior to heat treatment.-
b.
Each $1nished dish should be subjected to 100% volumetric (ultrasonic), surface, and vienal examinations using procedures and acceptance criteria equivalent to those specified for Class 1 components in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
. Sections III and V.
c.
Finish machined bores, keyuays, and drilled holcs should be subjected to magnetic particle or liquid penetrant examination.
No flaw indication in keyvay or hole regions is allowable.
d.
Each fully bladed turbine rotor assembly should be spin tested at the maximun speed anticipated during a turbine trip following loss of full load.
5.
Turbine Design The applicant's design is acceptabic if in acompliance with the following:
Tha turbina assembly should be designed to withstand normal conditions, anticipated transients, and accidents resulting in a turbine trip
d without loss of structur:1 integrity. The design of the turbine assenbly should meet the follo,'ing critoria:
a.
The design overspeed of the turbice should be 130% of rated speed or 57, above the highest anticipcted speed resulting froa a loss of load, whichever is greater. The basis for the assuecd design overspeed should be submitted to the staff for review, b.
The tangential stress in lov pressure disks or high pressure rotors at design overspeed due to centrifugal forces, interference fit, and thermal gradients shculd not exceed C.75 of the minican specified yield strength of the caterial.
-c.
The turbine shaf t becrings should be abic to withstand any i
combination of the nornal operating loads, anticipated transiento, and accidents resulting in turbine trip.
d.
The turbine should be designed so that thern are no critical frequencies betecon zero and design spcod. If such critical speeds exist, assurance should be provided that they are not within 20% of norcal operating speed and that the turbine vill not dwell at then.
6.
Inservice inspection The applicant's inservice inspection program is acceptable if in compliance with the folloulng criteria O
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The inservice inupection progran for tha stcan turbine asscably and for valves associated with the overspaed protection nyctem should provide assurance that disk flaws that night Iced to brittic failure of a disk at speedo up to desiga speed uill be detected and that valves importent to the overspeed protection systen vill be operable when needed so the probability of disk rupture at destructive overspeed'will be reduced.
The inservice inspection progran for the turbine assenbiy chould include the following:
Disassembly of the turbine at approxitiately 10-year intervals, a.
duringplantshutdowncoincidingwiththainseviceins[ action c
schedule as required by AS:!C Boiler and Pressuro Vessel Code,
- Section XI, and complete inspection of all norcally inaccessibic parts, such as couplings, coupling bolts, turbine shafts, low pressure turbine blades, lou pressure disks, and high pressure rotors. This inspection should consist of visual, surface, and volumetric examinations, as required.
The applicant should keep abreast of technological advances in volumetric examination techniques so that tihen improved cethods for inspection of turbine disks are developed they can be incorporated into the inservice inspection progran.
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L b.
Conduct an in-placa vit uni cxanination of.the turbine asschltj at necessibic location <!uring refueling shutdo;:ns at intervals not exceeding two yects.
The inservice inspection of main steam and rehest valves should
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include the following:
c.
Dismantle at 1 cast one e.ain steam stor valvo, one main steam control valve, ona reheat stop valve, and one rcheat intercept valve, at appror.instely 3-1/3 year intervals during refueling or maintenance shutdowns coinciding with the inservice inspection e
schedule required by ASME Code Section XI, and conduct a visual l
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end surface exauination of valve coats, dicks, and stems. If unacceptabic flaws or exessive corrosion p,rc found in a valve,
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all valves of its typt shall be inspe.cted. Valve bushings should g
be inspected and clesecd, and bore dicceter should be checked for proper. clearance.
.h d.
Main steam stop and control and reheat stop and intercept valves should be exercised at 1 cast once a week by' closing each valve and observing by the valve position indicator that it movcs scoothly to a fully closed position. At least once a conth this observation should be naJe by actually s.utchir.g the valve t
motion.
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I Distributicru Docket Fil R. Tariaam NRC PDR V. Stello local PDR R. Maccary NRR Reading (M. Groff)
H. Dmten R. DeYoung V. Benaroya V. More C. Icng D. Skxwholt J. Kastner D. & ller G. Iainas R. Denise D. Ross K. Goller T. Ippolito G. Imar J. Ynight W. Butler S. Pawlicki J. Stolz L. Shao R. Clark B. Grimes T. Spies W. n==411 D. Vassallo R. h11mrti K. Kniel P. Fine O. Parr T. Novak A. ScNencer M. Spangler R. Schenel EP Project Mamyger - J. Norris D. Ziemam Attomey, EID P. Collins IE (3)
R. Purple V. Wilson G. Knighton ACRS (12)
G. Dicker Project Mana6er -
P. D. O'Reilly B. J. Youngblood INR l-3 Reading W. H. Pegan, Jr.
IWR l-3 File R. Vollmer F. Kantor W. Houston V. Goel S. Varga T. Johnson R. W. Klecker C. Stepp F. Schroeder J. Greeves D. Budge T. Murphy R. Fornasiewicz C. Liang P. Stoddart J. Costello P. Chen T. Cherney E. Boccks R. Satterfield G. Minz F. Ashe M. Bolotsky I. Silseeil L. Phillips R. Culp Pei-Ying Chen