ML20151L068

Summary of 880127 CRGR Meeting 128 Re Listed Items,Including Review of Proposed Generic Ltr to Inform Licensees of New NRC Position on Guidelines for Determining Whether Operating Basis Earthquake Limits Exceeded

ML20151L068
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	04/04/1988
From:	Jordan E Committee To Review Generic Requirements
To:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20151L073	List: ML20151L068 ML20154E459 ML20154E498 ML20154E533 ML20154E822 ML20195G946 ML20195J296 ML20196E010
References
RTR-REGGD-01.100 NUDOCS 8804210482
Download: ML20151L068 (38)

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April 4, 1933 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements

SUBJECT:

NINUTEi, OF CRGR MEETING NUMBER 128 The Comittee to Review Generic Requirements (CPGR) met on Wednesday, January 27, 1988, from 1-5 p.m.

A list of attendees for this meeting is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The following it. ems were addressed at the meeting:

1.

L. Shao (NRR) and L. Rotter (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed Generic Letter to inform Ilcensees regarding a new NRC staff position on guidelines for determining whether the Operating Basis Earthquake (08E) limits have been exceeded if their sites are affected by a seismic event.

The Comittee recommended in favor of issuing the proposed Generic Letter, subject to a number of minor wording revisions to be coordinated with the CROR staff.

This matter is discuoied in Enclosure 2.

2.

The Comittee reviewed a propored NRC Bulletin on $*.eam Generator Tubt Rupture requesting that PWR licensees take certain actions to assure that their plants are not susceptible to the rapidly propagating fatigue reca.snisms that led to the SG tube rupture event at the North Anna f acility on July 15, 1987.

The Committee recomended in f avor of issuing the proposed bulletin, subject to several minor wording changes tha?. are to be coordinated with the CRGR staff.

This r.atter is discus.*ed i,i.

3.

The briefing for CRGR by OGC on applicability of 10CFR50.54(f) to proposed 10CFR21 amendments that was schedu';ed earlier for this meet'ng was cancelled.

4.

The Committee reviewed a proposed NRC Bulletin requesting that licentees make a one-time inspection of Westinghouse Series 05 circuit breakers used in Class 1E applications at their facilities and take necessary corrective actions if those components do not, meet acceptance criteria included in the bulletin.

The Committee recossended in faver of issuin0 the proposed bulletin, subject to sinor changes to be coordinated with the CRGR staff. The Comittee also recoerended that the EDO direr.t the staff to reconsider a requirement for diverse (ATVS-related) scraw systems in Westinghouse FYRs in view of continuing adverse operating experience with the components that are the subject of this bulletin (and i

other previous generic comunications from the staff).

This matter is discussed in Enclosure 4.

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The Committee reviewed, and recommended in favor of forwarding to the Commission, a proposed final Amendment to 10CFR73, Appendix 8, that would eliminate the existing schedule link between the annual physical fitnest test ar1 the preceding medi:a1 examination now required for all armed security personnel at nuclear facilities.

The Committee also endorsed the CRGR Chairman's determination regarding the disposition of two other potential CRGR review items that had been identified by RES.

These matters are discussed in Enclosure 5.

In accordance with the E00's July 18, 1983 directive concerning "Feedback and Closure on CRGR Reviews," a written response is required from the cognizant l

office to report agreement or disagreement with CRGR recommendations in these minutes.

The response, which is required within five working days after 4

receipt of these meeting minutes, is to be forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recommendations, to the EDO for decisionmaking.

Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Jim Conran (492-9855),

j Orishi Sivand 4 LL W I

Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements

Enclosures:

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As stated t L se..

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Distribution: w/o ene).

Commission (5)

Central File SECY POR (NRC/CRGR)

Office Directors S. Treby Regional Administrators W. Little 1

CRGR Members M. Lesar i

V. Parler B. Doolittle (w/ enc.)

i L. Shao CRGR SF (w/ enc.)

i L. Reiter CRGR CF (w/ enc.)

i E. Rossi M. Taylor (w/ enc.)

1 J. Conran (w/cnc.)

J. Heltemes (w/ene.)

C. Sakenas (w/ enc.)

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY M

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e LIST OF ATTENDEES CRGR MEETING NO. 128 January 27, 1988 CRGR MEMBERS E. Jordan O. Ross J. Snferek R. Bernero J. Scinto T. Collins (for T. Martin)

OTHERS J. Heltemes J. Conran G. Bagchi L. Reiter L. Shao N. Anderson E. Doolittle C. McCracken E. Igne N. Chokshi R. Kenneally A. J. Murphy R. Rothman O

__ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. to the Minutes of Meeting No. 128 Review of Generic Letter on 08E Exceedance January 27, 1988 TOPIC L. Shao (NRR) and L. Reiter (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed Generic Letter to inform recipients about a new NRC staff position on guidelines to be used in determining whether the Operating Basis Earthquake (08E) limits have been exceeded in a seismic event that affects their sites and whether their facility is required to shutdown.

Copies of the briefing slides used in their presentations 4re attached to this Enclosure.

(See Attachment.)

BACKGROUND The package submitted by the staff for CRGR review in this matter was transmitted by memorandum dated December 31, 1987 T. E. Murley to E. L. Jordan; the package included the following documents:

1.

Ornft Generic Letter (undated), "Staff Position on Exceedance of the Operating Basis Earthquake" 2.

"CRGR Submittal Package for Approval of a Staff Position on Exceedance of the Operating Basis Earthquake" (as required by CR'R Charter Sec !V.B.)

s REC 0 MEN 0ATION3 As a result of their review of this matter, including the discussions with the I

staff at this meeting, the Committee recommended in favor of issuing the pro-posed Generic Letter and OBE exceedance positions, subject to the following caveats:

1.

The wording of the draft Generic Letter (at p. I and p. 6) should be revised to indicate that licensees are expected to be aware of the new 08E exceedance position and to modify plant procedures accordingly to l

guide plant personnel wi.en an earthquake occurs and the question of OBE l

exceedance is being evaluated.

2.

The wording in the first line on p. 2 of the draft Generic Letter should be revised to indicate that "... seismic instrumentation is expected to t e, available..."

L 3.

The first full sentence on p. 2 of the draft Generic Letter should be prefaced with the phrase "Although severe and damaging seismic events are unlikely, 4.

The detailed technical bases for the staff's conclusion at this time that OBE exceedances in that portion of the response spectrum above 10 Hz are

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of little or no safety significance (see draft Generic Letter at p. 3) should be cited explicitly somewhere in the final Generic Letter that is issued.

5.

With the concurrence of OGC, revise the wording of the STAFF POSITION in the draft Generic letter (at p. 4 and p. 5) to delete the references to

".. request for relief.." and the suggestion that licensees must seek an exemption in connection with application of the new staff position on OBE exceedance Instead, the wording of the final Generic Letter should indicate that the new OBE exceedance position reflects an approved interpretation of the Commission's regulations that can be applied by licensees without the need for evaluation or prior approval by the staff, (as would be the case if were it necessary to seek an exemption).

6.

The wording of the draft Generic Letter (at p. 6 and p. 7) that specifies the time limits for reporting and plant shutdown following an earthquake should be revised along the lines of the following:

a.

State clearly the prompt (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) and followup reporting require-ments of 10CFR50.72, as they apply to a seismic event situation; b.

State clearly that a plant that has experienced an earthquake need not shutdown unless at least one of the following conditions is met:

- There is evidenca from visual observaticn, plant instrumentation indication, or other reliable basis significant plant damage such that the plant cannot continue to operate safely;

- The licensee determines that the OBE exceedance criteria put forth in the Generic Letter are actually exceedad;

- The licensee is unable to determine within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the exceed-ance criteria set forth in this Generic Letter are met / exceeded.

7.

Revise the wording at p. 7 of the Draft Generic Letter to more clearly convey to licensees that the new position on OBE exceedance criteria promulgated by this Generic letter is a fully approved staff position although it may ba,ubject to further refinement when relevant ongoing studies are completed several years from now.

Alternatively, delete the last paragraph altogether.

Regulations which may be subject to further refinement when ongoing studies are completed.

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OPERAT!!.G BASIS EAPTfiCUAKE EXCEEDAliCE AliD PLAlli StiUTD0hfi PRESEllTAT10f4 TO CRGR LE0fi REITER, ESGB, DEST l

JAfiUARY 27, 1988 l

l Attachcent to Enclosure 2 I

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1 OBJECTIVE _OF_ STAFF POSIT 10f(j0ENERIC LETTER)

- TO PROVIDE GUIPAl:CE REGARD!t:0 OBE EXCEEDAftCE AllD Pl.AtlT SHUTDOWfi 50 AS TO AVOID CONFUSl0tl, ASSURE PLAf4T SHUT-D0Wfi kHEf1 WARI! ANTED AllD AVOID UNECESSARY PLAllT SliUTL0hN c

kHE!! il0T WARRAfiTED

- fl0 SPECIFIC RESP 0ll!E RE0 VESTED, HOWEVER IT IS EXPECTED THAT UTILif!ES WILL REVIEW lilFORMAT1011 FOR APPLICABILITY AhD REVIEW THEIR OWN PROCEDURES FOR CEE EXCEEDA!!CE l

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effPf@jiLLLO_10 CFR PART.100 OBE "THAT EARTHCUAKE WHICH.... COULD REASONAPLY BE EXPECTED TO AFFECT THE PLANT SITE DURING THE OPERATING LITE OF THE PLANT" (Ill, D)

"0SE SHALL PE CEFINED BY RESPONSF SPECTRA" (VI, A, 2)

...!F VIBRATORY GROUND MOTION EXCEEDING THAT OF THE OBE CCCURS, SHUTDOWN OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT WILL BE RL-

CUIRED, PRIOR TO RESUMING OPERATIONS, THE LICENSEE WILL l

BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE COMMISSION THAT NO FUNC-TIONAL DAMACE HAS OCCURRED TO THOSE FEATURES NECESSARY FOR CONTINUED OPERATION WITHOUT UNDUE RISK TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC" (V, A, 2)

"REQUIRED SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION.....

SHALL BE PROV!DED S0 THAT SEISMIC RESPONSE CAN BE DETER-MINED PROMPTLY,,,, A COMPARISON IS NEEult.....T0 PERMIT...

TIMELY ACTION AS PAY BE APPROPRIATE" (VI, A, 3) i I

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STAFF POSITI0t! ON EXCEEDANCE OF OBE Af!D SHUTDOWN APPEtiDIX A T010 CFR PART 100 - SHUTDOWil IF CDE IS EXCEEDED PROBLENS

- VARYlfiC LEVELS OF lilSTRUMEliTATION

- IN0PERABLE SEISMIC lllSTRUMEf1 TAT!0ft r

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- PEAK ACCELERATION AflD HIGH FREGUENCY RESP 0fiSE SPECTRA AL0f1E ARE POOP. IllDICATORS OF LIKELTH00D OF EARTHOUAKE DAMAGE PAST EXPERIENCE

- OBE SPECTRA EXCEEDED AT PLAliTS fiOT YET OPERATING OR SHUT 00Kil (PERRY, SUMMER, HUMBOLDT BAY)

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- JUNE 10,1987 ILLIN0IS EARTHOUAKE PROBABLE HIGli FREQUENCY EXCEEDAfCE AT CLINTON (OPERATING PLANT),"-

SIX SITES IN REGION !!! WERE AFFECTED d~

GUIDAliCE NF.EDED

- TO AVOID C0hFUSION

- AV0!D UtiNECESSARY SHUTCOWfi 1

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BASIC POSITION

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- OBE IS EXCEEDED IF AflY PORTION OF OBE RESP 0flSE SPECTRA OR PEAL; ACCELERAT10ll IS EXCEEDED s~

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-; REQUEST FOR_RELIF,F FROM SHUTDOWN WILL BE CONSIDERED IF EXCEEDAllCE IS CONFlilED TO HIGH FRE0VENCIES (>10HZ) AND EARTHQUAKE IS LESS THAN CERTAIN SIZE

- LIMITATION IS PLACED Ofl TIME TO COLLECT AND PROCESS DATA H

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- LACK 0F INSTRUMENTAL DATA IllDICATES IllABILITY OF LICENSEE TO DEM0flSTRATE fl0ft-EXCEEDANCE I

- IF EARTHOUAKE IS FELT A PLAflT WALKDOWN IS ALWAYS tlEEDED TO ASSURE ABSEilCE OF DAMAGE fy ;_,,,;,.. f [ " '-

- APPLICABLE TO POST-APPEllDIX A PLANTS AllD THOSE EARLItR 3

PLAtlTS TilAT REFER TO APPEllDIX A CRITERIA Ill THElR SERS

- FOR OTHER OLDER PLANTS TilESE GUIDELIllES WILL BE THE STARTlflG P0 lilt TO DETERMINE WHETHER SHUTDOWi! IS WARRANTED 2

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Ecrthquake Cenditions Warranting Shutdown (OBE Exceedance)

I OBE exceeded at frequencies I 10 Hz A. Response Sp ctra Available OBE exceeded only at frequencies.> 10 Hz and at the Plant and OBE MMI > VII Magnitude > S.O Magnitude > 3.75 Response Spectrum is within 5 km within 25 km within S 65 Exceeded as,.* <

B. Only PGA Mil > VI 'fh h Mag. > 6.0 Mag. > S.0 Magnitude > 3.75 Available and OBE within 5 km 8 anywhere within 200 km within 5 kE is Exceeded at the Plant C. No Instrumental MMI > VI Mag. > 6.0 Mag. > S.0 Magnitude > 3.79 Data and Earthquake within S km anywhere within 200 km within 5 km Felt Within the Plant Note 1 MMI = Modified Mercalli Intensity.

Epicentral and MMI distances are to plant.

Note 2 The conditions in any box above warrants shutdown. If an earthquake occurs that is felt at a nuclear power plant, it is the licensee's responsibility to show that the OBE has not been exceeded cr, if it has, that the exceedance does not meet the shutdown conditions shown in the above table.

If the earth-quake is felt and shutdown is not warranted under A, B, or C, a walkdown should be conducted within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

If non-trivial damage or pervasive effects related to the earthquake are discovered, plant shutdown is warranted.

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WHAT D0 WE NEED FROM CRQPJ CONDITI0flAL APPROVAL OF GENERIC LETTER (OGC HAS (13T YET CONCURRED Of! PACKAGE) e

--CONDITIONS CLEARLY DOCUMENTED Ill CRGR MINUTES

- FINAL CRGR APPROVAL WITHOUT Tile flEED FOR ADDITIONAL MEETINGS IF THE REVISED PACKAGE MEETS CRGR CONDITIONS L

s 4

. to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 128 Review of Propor,ed Belletin on Steam Generator Tube Rupture January 27, 1988

-TOPIC L. Shao (NRR) and E. Murphy (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed NRC Bulletin regarding rapidly propagating fatigue cracks in PWR steam generator tubes.

The proposed action is a followup action related to the SG tube rupture event at the North Anna facility on July 15, 1987.

Copies of the briefing slides used by the staff to guide their presentation and discussions with the Committee at this meeting are attached to this Enclosure (see Attach-ment).

BACKGROUND The package of documents submitted by the staff for review by CRGR in this matter was transmitted by memorandum dated January 20, 1988, T. E. Murley to E. L. Jordan; that package included the following documents:

1.

Proposed N3C Bulletin 88-XX, dated January XX, 1988, "Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes" 2.

"Nonproprietary Safoty Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-338" 3.

Summary of Item to be Reviewed by CRGR (as required by CRGR Charter,Section IV.B.)

RECOMMENDATIONS As a rcsult of their review of this matter, including their discussions with the staff at this meeting, the Committee recommended in favor of issuing the proposed bulletin, subject to the following agreed upon changes:

1.

Draft Bu11ttin, page 2, middle paragraph:

r. Change ".,.and/or.." in the first sentence to

"..and.."

b. Delete the words "In either case..'! at the beginning of the second sentence.

2.

Draft Bulletin, page 3, paragraph B:

Revise wording to indicate that licensees should make provisions to ensure that the results of future SG tube inspections will be reviewed for evidence of denting at the uppermost support plate,

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Draft Bulletin, page 3, paragraph C:

Change the word ".. recommends.. " to ".. requests.. " Also, review the rest of the Bulletin for consistency with approved boilerplate usage of terms such as "should" and "shall," "recommend" and "request," etc.

Check revised wording with OGC and against the wording used in previous Bulletins.

4.

Draft Bulletin, page 3, last sentence:

Change the word ".. an.. " to ".. the..", and delete the words ".. such as.."

5.

Draft Bulletin, page 4, paragraph 2:

Change the wording of the second sentence to read "..(preventive plugging and stabilization of potentially susceptible tubes..)"

6.

Draft Bulletin, page 4, paragraph 2.(a):

At the initiative of the staff, the wording of this paragraph will be revised to reflect that a 3-dimensional thermal-hydraulic model will not be required in the analysis specified in that paragraph, and that the pr.incipal thrust of that paragraph is the need for assessment of stability ratios (includina flow peaking effects).

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.1 JANUARY 27, 1988 PROPOSED BULLETIN - RAPIDLY PROPAGATING FATIGUE CRACKS IN STEAM GENERATOR TUBES Rg a

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NORTH ANNA UNIT ] SGTR EVENT OC, CURRED ON JULY 15, 1987 P-S LEAKAGE PRESENT 24 TO 36 IIRS PRIOR TO EVENT

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INCREASIllG TREND 1

LESS THAff TECH SPEC LIMITS DOUBLE ENDED, CIRCUMFEREtlTIAL RUPTURE TUBE R9C51 AT UPPER EDGE OF UPPER SUPPORT PLATE DEffTIllG AT UPPER SUPPORT TUBE UNSUPPORTED BY AV3 n-- _ _ _ _ _ -

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1 FAILURE MECllANISM CRACK INITIATED AND PROPAGATED BY FATIGut REQIIISITE CONDITIONS FOR RAPID FATIGUE F DENTING AT UPPER SUPPORT PLATE HIGH FLUIDELASTIC STABILITY RATIO ABSENCE EFFECTIVE AVB SUPPORT

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EXISTING REGULATORY RE0lilREMENTS FOR ENSURING SG TilBE INTEGRITY APPLICABLE REGULATIONS - GDC 14, APPENDIX B TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, TECH SPEC REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR:

PERIODIC INSERVICE TURE INSPECTIONS P-S LEAK RATE LIMITS THESE MEASURES HAVE GENERALLY PROVEN EFFECTIVE O

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BASIS FOR BULLETIN THE NA FAILURE MODE IS UNIOUE IN THAT TS. INSPFCTI0ff REQUIREMENTS AND LEAK RATE LIMITS MAY-NOT BE EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING FAILURES OF THIS TYPE DUE TO RAPID RATE OF CRACK PROPAGATION PRELIMINARY INFO AT H SUGGESTS FIVE PLANTS MAY BE SUSCEPTABLE TO FAILURES OF THIS TYPE THIS LIST OF FIVE PLANTS IS HIGHLY TENTATIVE THE PROPOSED BULLETIN REQUESTS THAT LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS TAKE ACTIONS TO:

DETERMINE WHETHER REQUISITE CONDITIONS FOR RAPID FATIGUE FA! LURE EXISTS IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE AND/OR COMPENSATORY ACTIONS AS NECESSARY THESE ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH GDC 14 AND APPENDIX B

l POTENTIAL SAFETY BENEFITS SGTRS CONSTITUTE A MAJOR DEGRADATION OF THE RCS BOUNDRY-ALTHOUGH WITHIN THE DESIGN BAS!S, SUCH EVENTS CONSTITUTE A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE DEGREE OF n-PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY SUCH EVENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO CONGRESS AS ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES THE PROPOSED BULLETIN IS INTENDED TO IDENTIFY A.SMALL NUMBER OF PLANTS BELIEVED TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO RAPIDLY PROPAGATING FATIGUE CRACK FAILURES CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE BULLETIN WILL ENSURE THAT RAPIDLY PROPAGATING FATIGUE CRACKS ARE NOT A SIGNIFICANT RISK CONTRIBUTOR l

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ACTIONS REQUESTED BY BULLETIN A.

REVIEW INSPECTION RECORDS FOR DENTING AT UPPER SUPPORT B.

IF NO DENTING, PROCEDURES SHOULD BE REVISED TO ENSURE THAT:

1.

RESULTS OF FUTURE INSPECTIONS WILL BE REVIEWED FOR DENTING 2.

IF DENTING IS FOUND, ITEM C BELOW WILL BE j

IMPLEMENTED,

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FOR PLANTS WITH DENTING 1.

IMPLEMENT ENHANCED P-S LEAK RATE MONITORING PROGRAM AS A SHORT TERM COMPENSATORY MEASURE 2.

IMPLEMENT LONGER TERM PROGRAM TO MINIMIZE FROBABILITY OF RAPIDLY PROPAGATING FATIGUE FAILURES ASSESS NEEDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND/OR COMPENSATORY MEASURES AND IMPl.EMENT IF D S R PT PN AND RESULTS OF PROGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED EARLY ENOUGH TO PERMIT STAFF REVIEW AND APPROVAL PRIOR TO STARTUP FROM NEXT REFUELING (AFTER 90 DAYS)

D.

45 DAY REPORT

' Enclosure 4 to the Minutes of_Meetino No. 128 Proposed NRC Bulletin on RTB Mechanical Failures January 27, 1988 TOPIC C. E. Rossi (NRR) and C. H. Berlinger (NRR) presented for CRGR review a proposed NRC Bulletin (1) to provide information to licensees on problems with Westing-house Series DS circuit breakers, and sa'ety concerns associated with use of these brehkers in Class 1E applications; and (2) to request that licensees perform and document inspection of welds and mechanical alignments in Series DS circuit breakers in their facilities.

Copies of the briefing slides used in their presentations are attached to this Enclosure (see Attachment),

EACXGROUND The package of documents submitted by the staff for CRGR review in this matts e was transmitted by memorandum dated January 20, 1988; the package included the following documents:

1.

Draft NRC Compliance Bulletin No. 88-XX, dated January XX, 1988, "Defects in Westinghouse Circuit Breakers" 2.

NRC Information Notice No. 87-35, dated July 30, 1987 (and Supplement I dated December 16, 1987), "Reactor Trip Breaker, Westinghouse Model 05-416, Failed to Open on Manual Initiation from the Control Room" 3.

NRC Inspection Reports 50-369/87-22 and 50-370/87-22, dated August 31, 1987 (Augmented Inspection Team Report on McGuire 2 Event) 4.

Licensee Event Report (on McGuire 2 event) 50-370-009, dated August 3, 1987, "Reactor Trip Breaker Failure Due To Mechanical Failure" 5.

Notice, dated September 21, 1987, of Meeting with Westinghouse regarding Class IE Switchgear Models05-416, DSL-416, DSL-420, D5-206, and DSL-206 (Calvert Cliffs report) 6.

Summary, dated October 2, 1987, of September 23, 1987 Meeting on Westinghouse Switchgear Failures (Sequoyah report)

DISCUSSION / RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of their review of this matter, including the discussions at this meeting with the staff, the Committee recommended in favor of issuing the proposed bulletin, subject to the following changes to be coordinated with the CRGR staff:

1.

The staff should modify the "Reporting Requirements" section of the bulletin to add (a) a requirement for licensees who do not have circuit breakers subject to this bulletin in their plants to inform NRC of this

fact and, (b) a requirement that licensees who do have circuit breakers subject to this bulletin in their plants to report the total number of each type inspected, the number of breakers of each type requiring corrective action due to pole shaft welds not meeting acceptance criteria i

of the bulletin, and the number of breakers of each type requiring corrective action due to mechariism alignments not meeting the acceptance criteria of the bulletin.

2.

The staff should remove the term "Compliance" from the title of the bulletin.

3.

As a collateral recommendation (i.e., not affecting the bulletin itself, or the schedule for issuing the bulletin), in view of the overall poor reliability performance of scram system components seen in the cumulative operating experience of the Westinghouse plants, the Committee recommended that the EDO direct the staff to reexamine the rationale for not adopting the "alternative" ATWS rule once proposed that we'ild have required diverse scram mechanisms in the Westinghouse plants.

F. G Q DEFECTS IN WESTINGHOUSE CIRCllIT BREAKERS MAIN SLIDES Attachment to Enclosure 4

PROBLEM EVENT AT MCGUIRE 2 - RTB FAULTY WELDS JOINING LEVERS TO POLE SHAFT EXCESSIVE WEAR LEADING TO MISALIGNFENT CATAWBA 1, 2 CRACKED WELDS, LACK OF PENETRATION SEQUOYAH 2 CRACKED WELD, POROSITY CALVERT CLIFFS 1 CRACKED WELD, LACK OF FUSION WESTINGHOUSE INSPECTION AND TESTING MEETING WITH NRC (9/23/87)

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ISSUED TECHNICAL BULLETIN (12/1/87)

AFFECTED BREAKERS (!E APPLICATIONS)

MODELS DS-206/ -416/ -420 MODELS DSL-206/ -416

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS BASED ON STAFF ASSESSMENT OF WESTINGHOUSE RECOMMENDATIONS WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

SHORT-TERM INSPECTIONS 0.F 3 CENTRAL POLE LEVER WELDS TO 4 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA LONG-TERM INSPECTIONS OF REMAINING 4 LEVER WELDS AND OF ALIGNMENT OF CLOSING MFrWANISM i

1 REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT OF POLE SHAFTS WITH ACCEPTABLY WELDED l

LEVERS l

t LETTER CONFIRMING COMPLETION OF INSPECTIONS l

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T DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NRC BULLETIN A,ND WESTINGHOUSE TECHNICAL BULLETIN NRC RECOMMENDS THAT SHORT TERM INSPECTIONS OF RTBs BE COMPLETED IN 30 DAYS AND CONFIRMED BY LETTER IN THE NEXT 30 DAYS NRC PR0HIBITS USE OF CRACKED WELDS IN RTB BYPASS APPLICATIONS NRC ASKS FOR VERIFICATION THAT WELD POROSITY MEETS WESTINGHOUSE CRITERIA NRC PROVIDES INSPECTION AND REPORTING SCHEDULES FOR CP PLANTS l

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LIMITED USE r0t;D2 TION IF WELDS DON'T MEET THE ACCEPTA'!E CRITERi A, THiY MAY BE USED.

UNTIL THE BREAKER REACHES 4000 CYCLES OF UPERATf6N, PRnVIDED THAT:

THEY MEET.CERTAIN LESSER CRITERIA L

THEY ARE INSPECTED EVERY 200 CYCLES THEY ARE INSPECTED AFTER THE BREAKER HAS RECEIVED HIGH CURRENT l

SPECIFIC ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO CRACKS OR SEPARATION AT THESE INSPECf!ONS l

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LETTER CONFIRMING COMPLETION OF INSPECTIONS, INCLUDING DESCR!PTIONS OF POLE SHAFT WELDS OR MECHANISM ALIGNMENTS FAILING THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ANY NEEDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS OF COMPLETING A)

SHORT-TERM INSPECTIONS B)

LONG-TERM INSPECTIONS

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BENEFITS OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS ENSURE THAT MINIMUM STANDARDS SET BY VENDOR ARE MET l

PROTECT AGAINST SIMULTANEOUS FAILURE OF 2 RTBs, VHICH COULD RESULT IN AN ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)

ACCIDENT l

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f ENSURE OPERABILITY OF OTHER SAFETY SYSTEMS DEPENDENT ON CLASS IE CIRCUIT BPEAKERS t

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DEFECTS IN WESTINGHOUSE CIRCUIT BREAKERS BACKUP SLIDES I

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., a SHORT-TERM INSPECTIONS OF 3 CENTRAL POLE LEVER WELDS TO 4 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA:

WELD DIMENSIONS t

A)

LENGTH - 180* AROUND POLE SHAFT B)

LEG - 3/1618!CH i

WELD FUSION - TO BOTH LEVtR AND POLE SHAFT FOR FULL LENGTH OF WELD

~

NO CRACKS IN WELD l

FELD POROSITY - 1/16 INCH ACCUMULATED DIAMETER / INCH OF WELD l

t l

i l

l

,4

---

- - -r-r----v-

LIMITED USE CONDITIONS IF WELDS DON'T MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA, THEY MAY BE USED UNTil THE BREAKER REACHES 4000 CYCLES OF OPERATION, PROVIDED THAT:

THEY MEET CERTAIN LESSER CRITERIA 3/16 INCH FILLET FOR 90*

j 1/8 INCH Fillet FOR 120' i

NO CRACKS FUSICN FOR FULL LENGTH OF WELD THEY ARE INSPECTED EVERY 200 CYCLES THEY ARE INSPECTED AFTER THE BREAKER HAS RECEIVED HIGH I

CURRENT (SHORT CIRCUIT) i SPECIFIC ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO CRACKS OR SEPARAT!ON AT THESE l

INSPECTIONS - REPLACE IF CRACKED j

i i

f l

l 1

\\

3 ESTIMATES OF TIME REQUIRED FOR INSPECTIONS SHORT-TERM INSPECTIONS VISUAL INSPECTION WITH NO PROBLEMS NOTED - 6 HRS VISUAL INSPECTION WITH SUSPECTED PROBLEMS - 8 TO 12 HRS LONG-TERM INSPECTIONS VISUAL INSPECTION WITH NO PROBLEMS NOTED - 7 HRS VISUAL INSPECTION WITH SUSPECTED PROBLEMS - 8 TO 12 HRS

["

ESTIMATES OF COST FOR INSPECTIONS ASSUME LABOR COSTS $100/HP

.t INSPECTION TAKES 6 HRS / BREAKER THUS INSPECTION COSTS $600/ BREAKER COSTS FOR TOTAL INDUSTRY - $2,292K COSTS FOR VARIOUS PLANTS WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS (50 BRKRS/ PLANT, 54 Pl. ANTS) - $1,620K SEQUOYAH PLANTS (150 BRKRS/ PLANT, 2 PLANTS) - $180K CALVERT CLIFFS PLANTS (200 BRKRS/ PLANT, 2 PLANTS) - $240K OTHER PLANTS (10 BRKRS/ PLANT, 42 PLANTS) - $252K

v 8

Centar F la Lever

@ 1-F,roken Weld @@ @ @

1%

A 9

9 O

O n

Q

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c[4 d.

8*3 l

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1. SHUNTTRIP DEVICE

10. RATCHETWHEEL

19. RESETSPRING

2. TRIP SHAFT

11. HOLD PAWt.

20. CLOSING SPRING ANCHOR

3. ROLLER CONSTRAINING' LINK

12. DRIVE PLATE

21. POLE SHAFT

4. TRIP LATCH

13. EMERGENCICHARGE PAWL

- 22. MOTOR

5. CLOSE CAM

14. OSCILLATOR

23. EMERGENCY CHARGE HANDLE

5. STOP MOLLER

15. CRAN *C SHAFT

24. MOTOR CRANK AND HANDLE

7. SPRING RELEASE LATCH

16. EMERGENCY CHARGE DEVICE

25. MOVING CONTACT ASSEMBLY S. SPRING RELEASE DEVICE

17. CRANK ARM

25. INSULATING LINK OSCILLATOR PAWL

18. CLOSING SPRING

27. MAIN DRIVE LINK g

h. k Figure 2-16. Power-Operated (Stored-Energy) Methanism Graphic Details 3

^-

(Close Spring Shown in the Charged Position) g{

Broken weld from center pole lever to pole shaft (21). Another lever not shown in diagram

" f, had an intact weld. The combination of broken weld, manufacturing to?crunce, and high cyclt wear are considered to be factors in the mechanical binding of the bre.aker.

n (Figure f rom Maintenance Program Manual MPM-WOCRTSDS 416-d1 for U type DS-416 reactor trip c* rcuit breakers.)

A t techmen t 3 Left Side Trame Plate (When Viewed from Rear of RTB)

. Roller Right Side Trame Plate (When Viewed from Rear of RTB)

/

s

/

Roller Axis

/

/

d

/

l

/

/

/

Point of Wedging Between Side Trame j[

and Raised Edge of Closd Cam q

/

/l

/

/

l

/

/

/

l

/

l

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f Cam Segments r

l l

l l

/

/

l l

/

r

/

Spacers

/

j l

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7

/

Cranhhaft j

/

/

/

s I

rankshaft Axis

?

(

i u

_A Figure 3.

Roller Wedged Between Left Cam Segment and Right Side Trame Plate (Conceptual Drawing. Not-Fully to Scale; Source: Franklin Research Center. Interim Report. Septeeber 30, 1987) i 1

4

i to the Minutes of CRGR Meetina No. 128 Proposed Final Amendment to 10CFR73, Appendix B, Requirements for Physical Fitness Testing and Medical Examination of Armed Security Personnel January 27, 1988 TOPIC The Committee discussed the proposed disposition of several potential CRGR review items that had been identified / questioned by RES in a letter to the Chairman (see Background Items 1-3 below).

There were no presentations by the NRC staff on any of the potential review items at this meeting.

BACKGROUND The potential review items were identified, and related review documents transmitted (as appropriate), in a memorandum, dated October 28, 1987, from E. S. Beckjord to E. L. Jordan.

RES requested a determination regarding 1

whether the items identified required formal CRGR review.

The potential l

review items included:

1.

A proposed (final) Amendment to 10CFR73, Appendix B, "General Criteria for Security Personnei," that would delete an existing 30-day scheduling link between the annual physical fitness test and the preceding medical examination currently required for all armed security personnel at nuclear facilities; 2.

A proposed Amendment to 10CFR71. "Fackaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material" to achieve maximum compatibility between NRC and IAEA regulations; i

3.

A proposed Policy Statement on Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization, reviewed carlier by the Committee at Meeting No. 106.

The material provided by RES was reviewed preliminarily by the CRGR staff, and ar. appropriate disposition for each item was proposed by the Chairman in a r.emorandum, dated Janaary 19, 1988, to all CRGR members (see Attachment to this Enclosure).

In accordance with that memorandum, the Committee discussed I

the above items and their proposed dispositions at Meeting No. 128.

DISCUSSION / RECOMMENDATIONS l

As a result of their consideration of these matters at this meeting, the 1

Committee (1) recommended that the proposed Amendment to 10CFR73, Appendix B

(

(Background Item 1) be sent forward without change for Conimission

[

consideration; and (2) approved for transmittal to RES (in firal form) the l

draft response included in the Attachment to this Enclosure, as proposed by E

the Chairman, j

f 1

.