ML18153D012
| ML18153D012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry, North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1992 |
| From: | Buckley B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9205260259 | |
| Download: ML18153D012 (33) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281 and 50-33ij, 50-339
- May 12, 1992 LICENSEE:
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
FACILITIES: Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 (Surry 1&2) and North Anna Power Station, Units 1&2 (NA-1&2)
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
OF MARCH 30, 1992 On March 30, 1992 VEPCO met with the NRC staff in Rockville, Maryland to discuss significant licensing issues for Surry 1&2 and NA-1&2.
An attendance list is provided in Enclosure 1.
VEPCO handouts are provided in Enclosure 2.
VEPCO indicated that NA-1&2 will meet the station blackout (SBO) rule by installing a fifth diesel generator as an auxilary alternating current (AAC) power source.
The diesel will be non-safety grade and will be capable of powering required loads associated with one safety division of either unit in the event of a loss of offsite power.
NA-1&2 implementation of the SBO rule is scheduled to be completed by April 1995. Surry 1&2 will meet the SBO rule by installing two additional non-safety grade diesels as AAC sources. The two diesels will be capable of powering required loads associated with one safety division of either unit on loss of offsite power.
Surry 1&2 implementation is scheduled to be complete by February 1996.
The staff indicated that NA-1&2 implementation falls within the time frame specified by the SBO rule.
For Surry 1&2, implementation would not be enveloped by the SBO rule. The staff indicated to VEPCO that they would be advised in the near future as to the acceptability of Surry 1&2 implementation schedules.
VEPCO indicated that upper management would be making a final decision in approximately 3 weeks whether to terminate NA-1&2 as the lead plant in the Westinghouse Owners Group Standard Technical Specification Upgrade Program.
Should the licensee terminate NA-1&2 as the lead plant, the staff requested
- that VEPCO so notify the NRC by forma 1 1 etter.
VEPCO stated that the ongoing refurbishment of the NA-1&2 service water (SW) system would be accelerated during the forthcoming steam generator replacement project commencing in January 1993.
The current SW chemical treatment program will be enhanced by controlling sulfate producing bacteria to eliminate microbiological influenced corrosion.
SW lines will be replaced to the NA-2 control room chiller units. A buried piping cathodic protection system will be added to the 36-inch headers. Also, main SW pumps will be upgraded.
SW lines to and from the NA-1&2 containment recirculation spray heat exchangers will be repaired or replaced.
Likewise, SW lines to and from the NA-1&2 9205260259 920512 PDR ADOCK 05000280 P
PDR May 12, 1992 component cooling water heat exchangers will be repaired or replaced.
Finally, new permanent access points will be added to encased headers and piping for future inspections, maintenance and testing.
VEPCO further stated that temporary time extensions of TS LCO action statements may be required for certain in-place repairs and coating.
The staff indicated that this will require an amendment to the NA-1&2 TS and, therefore, the licensee should submit a request as soon as possible.
VEPCO indicated that the internal flooding analysis for the NA-1&2 individual plant examination (IPE) is nearly complete.
The impact on NA-1&2 to internal flooding is significantly lower than for Surry 1&2.
Several modifications may be warranted but implementation would have minimum impact on plant operations.
Combinations of proposed modifications could further reduce the estimated core damage frequency to a value as low as 8.4E-6/year.
Of the 39 Surry 1&2 internal flooding modifications and activities, 29 have been completed.
Two are ongoing and four will be completed in the 1992 and 1993 outages for Surry 1&2, respectively.
An additional two items would be completed by December 1992 and the final two by December 1993.
By letter dated March 26, 1992, VEPCO submitted an evaluation of the radiological consequences of a main steam line break (MSLB) at NA-1.
The licensee's evaluation assumed different levels of primary-to-secondary leakage for an integrated end-of-cycle crack growth rate in the NA-1 steam generators (SGs).
The staff stated that it could not agree with the licensee's basis for assuming a 9.5 gpm primary-to-secondary leak rate. However, the licensee's assumed value of 24 gpm represented a conservative envelope for MSLB primary-to-secondary leakage for the NA-1 end-of-cycle degraded SG tube condition.
Finally, the staff indicated that its independent evaluation of the licensee's evaluation would assume the 24 gpm leak rate.
VE~CO prese~ted ';ts Performance Based Assessment Integration Plan and a Nuclear Commitments Management Status Report for staff information.
- Finally, a quality ~ontrol (QC) assessment of operator independent verification of procedures was presented for staff information.
The staff indicated that QC of operator independent verification of maintenance activities and associated
. work procedures was an exce 11 ent effort.
(Original Signed By)
Leon B. Engle, Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 (Original Signed By)
Bart C. Buckley, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
- 1.
Attendance List
- 2.
Handouts cc w/enclosures:
See next page DISTRIBUTION See next page PM:~
LEngle:kdj S /J\\ /92 Document.~e - MTS.NAS PM:PD?f-2 D:f~f2?
BBuckley Hffe~~~
.s-- //2-/92 tslr~/92
Virginia Electric & Power Company cc:
Mr. William C. Porter, Jr.
County Administrator Louisa County P.O. Box 160 Louisa, Virginia 23093 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.
Hunton and Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Dr. W. T. Lough Virginia State Corporation Commission Division of Energy Regulation P.O. Box 1197 Richmond, Virginia 23209 Old Dominion Electric Cooperative 4201 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Mr. E. Wayne Harrell Vice President - Nuclear Services Virginia Electric and Power Co.
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Office of the Attorney General Supreme Court Building 101 North 8th Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2, Box 78 Mineral, Virginia 23117 North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 C.M.G. Buttery, M.D., M.P.H.
State Health Commissioner Office of the Commissioner Virginia Department of Health P.O. Box 2448 Richmond, Virginia 23218 Regional Administrator, RII U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. G. E. Kane, Manager North Anna Power Station P.O. Box 402 Mineral, Virginia 23117 Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon Vice President - Nuclear Operations Virginia Electric and Power Company 5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Mr. Martin Bowling Manager - Nuclear Licensing Virginia Electric and Power Co.
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Mr. W. [. Stewart Senior Vice President - Nuclear Virginia Electric and Power Co.
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 Attendance List Meeting With Virginia Electric and Power Company March 30. 1992 W. Beckner H. Berkow B. Buckley K. Eccelston L. Engle E. Flack C. Grimes G. Holahan G. Lainas J. Partlow C. Rossi J. Schiffgens N. Stinson J. Tatum S. Varga Surry 1&2 and North Anna 1&2 M. Bowling H. Fontecil la E. Harrell L. Hartz
e Meeting Summary Dated May 12, 1992 Docket File NRC & Local PDRs PDII-2 RF I
T. Murley/F. Miraglia J. Partlow G. Lainas S. Varga H. Berkow L. Engle B. Buckley D. Mi 11 er OGC E. Jordan, MNBB 3701 W. Beckner, 10/E/4 K. Eccelston, 10/D/4 E. Flack, 6/H/3 C. Grimes, ll/E/22 G. Holahan, 8/E/3 C. Rossi, 11/E/4 J. Schiffgens, 10/E/4 N. Stinson J. Tatum, 8/D/l ACRS (10)
J. Wechselberger, 17/G/21 M. Sinkule, RII e
North Anna Pow-er Station Quality Monthly Report February 1992 Suni,nary VIRGl/t/lA POWER CB2216.1
- Post Maintenance Testing Conducted By Engineering
- Procedure Control
- Documentation Of Personnel Certification
- Modification Package Implementation Process
- Work Plan Contains Procedural Attributes
- No Controlling Procedure CB2216.2
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I
- Fitness For Duty Audit
- 6 Strengths, No Findings Or Observations
. - Overall, Program Effectively Implemented CB2216.3
- Maintenance Procedure Write-In Step Assessment
- Significant Improvement In The Quality And Detail Of Write-In Steps
- Increased Personnel Awareness Of The Need For Quality Write-In Steps CB2216.4
- Post Maintenance Testing Assessment
- Overall Concept Of A Computerized PMT Program Is Good
- Lack Of User confidence In The Program
- Changes To The PMT Matrices Are Not Being Formally Reviewed And Approved In A Timely Manner
- Inconsistencies Between The PMT Matrices And Maintenance Procedures
- Additional Training Needs Have Been Identified
- Resource, Allocation May Not Be Adequate Cll2216.5
~- --
- Completed Oversight Of The Westinghouse Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Eddy Current Inspection Activities
- Quality Assurance Personnel Continue To Witness Operations Department Independent Verifications (Witnessed* 17,036 As Of February 29)
- Quality Assurance Personnel Verified Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Plugging
- Quality Assurance Personnel Assigned As Outage Shift And Containment Coordinators CB2218.8
- Adverse
- Adherence To Administrative Procedural Requirements CB2216.7
Quality Monthly Report February 1992 Su,n,nary VIRGl/t/lA POWER Cll2290.I
e
- Concerns With DCP Work Procedures C82280.2
- Successful Bus 5 Outage
- Chemistry Department Back-Shift Assessment
-Chemistry Personnel Are Knowledgeable And Professional
- Some Procedures Are Too Restrictive, Resulting In Procedural Adherence Concerns
-The Secondary Lab Is Crowded
- Performed Two Operations Surveillances Cll2280.3
- Fitness For Duty Audit 92-04
- 6 Strengths, And 1 Observation
- Overall, Program Effectively Implemented
- No Significant Issues Identified C82280A
- One Member Of The Audit Group Continues A Temporary Assignment In Maintenance
- One Member Of The Performance Group Continues To Prepare For SRO Class Cll2280.5 e
e
- Operations Surveillances Initiated
-Two Completed In February - Minor Administrative Concerns Identified With Logs, No Concerns Identified With PTs C82280JI
e
- Inspection Staff Augmented With 11 Contractors e
CBZ!II0.7
- Increased Senior Management Visibility At Surry
- The New Administration Building
- Improved Interdepartmental Communications
- Improved Efficiency
- Improved Teamwork Cll2280.I
- Positive
- Surry Security Continues It's Positive Trend
- Adverse
- No Adverse Trends Were Identified In February C82280JI
e STATION BLACKOUT NORTH ANNA AND SURRY POWER STATIONS L STATION BLACKOUT REQUIREMENTS 1 OCFRS0.63, Loss of All Alternating Current Power, requires that each nuclear power plant be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from a complete loss of AC electric power (station blackout) to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses.
The specified blackout duration is based on i) redundancy of the onsite emergency AC power sources, ii) reliability of the onsite _emergency AC power sources, iii) expectancy of loss of offsite power (i.e., probability of severe and extremely severe weather to affect the offsite power source), and iv) probable time required to restore offsite power.
Station specific evaluation of these four criteria determines coping time and the need for the installation of alternate AC (AAC) power sources.
- 11. VIRGINIA POWER'S RESOLUTION A. NORTH ANNA - North Anna Power Station (NAPS) will meet the station blackout (SBO) rule by the installation of a fifth diesel generator as an AAC power source.
This diesel will be installed in a new building to be constructed at the station and will be independent of the existing emergency diesel generators ~nd their support equipment and cables.
The diesel will be non-safety related and will be capable of powering the required loads *associated with one safety division, of either unit, in the event of a loss of offsite power.
The AAC source may be manually aligned to-- any of the three transfer buses that feed the four emergency buses.
B. SURRY - Surry Power Station (SPS) will meet the SBO rule by installing two additional diesel generators as AAC sources.
As at North Anna, they will be located in a new building to be constructed at the station and will be independent of the existing emergency diesel generators and their support equipment and cables.
The two new diesels will be non-safety related and each diesel will be capable of powering the required loads associated with one safety division, of either unit, in the event of a station blackout.
Each AAC source is capable of powering any one of the three transfer buses that feed the four emergency buses.
However, they are not being designed for parallel operation.
One AAC diesel would normally align to transfer bus 'E' and the second to transfer bus 'F'.
Ill. SCHEDULE 1 OCFRS0.63 requires full compliance with the SBO rule within two years of the NRC's acceptance of the licensee's proposal, or justification must be provided for an extended schedule.
In the NRC's supplemental SER for each station, the NRC noted that an implementation schedule of three years after the SER approval date or the nearest,refueling outage to three years, which ever is later, should be achievable.
If this schedule could not be met, further justification would be required.
The scheduled date for completion of the SBO modifications at North Anna is the end of the April 1995 Unit 2 refueling outage which is within the NRC's acceptable schedule.
The Surry modifications will be completed by the end of the February 1996 Unit 2 refueling outage which is one outage* past the acceptable schedule provided in the NRC's supplemental SER.
Schedule relief has been requested from the NRC for Surry.
IV. PARTIAL COMPLIANCE A. NORTH ANNA - By the end of the October 1994 Unit 1 refueling outage, the AAC diesel will have been installed and the 'D' transfer bus tie-in completed. This enables the AAC diesel to energize the 1 J emergency bus and mitigate an SBO event on Unit 1.
The remaining major modifications to be completed during the following April 1994 Unit 2 refueling outage consist of the 'E' and 'F' transfer bus tie-ins to enable mitigation of either a Unit 1 or 2 SBO event.
- 8. SURRY - By the end of the September 1995 Unit 1 refueling outage, both of the AAC diesels will have been installed and will be able to power either the 1 J or 2H emergency bus.
This assures that an SBO event on either unit could be mitigated.
The remaining major modification to be completed during the following February 1996 Unit 2 refueling outage is the 'F' transfer bus tie-in.
This allows the four emergency buses to be powered by the two AAC diesels and enables mitigation of an SBO event on both Units 1 and 2.
V, UNRESOLVED I OPEN ITEMS (REQUIRE NRC CONCURRENCE)
A. COPING DURATION-The time period that a station must be able to cope with an SBO is either four or eight hours.
Both SPS and NAPS have been evaluated and submitted to the NRC as four hour coping plants. The NRC must approve our basis for this decision, however, as they have previously considered both stations as eight hour coping plants.
e B. EFFECTS OF LOSS OF VENTILATION - The effects of the loss of ventilation in various critical plant areas has been reviewed and resolved for both stations, however, NRC concurrence is pending.
Presently, NAPS has committed to implement procedures to require operators to open equipment doors in the Control Room and Emergency Switchgear Rooms should the ambient temperature exceed 90 degrees.
C. SCHEDULE - See discussion above.
D. QUALITY ASSURANCE AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS - The SBO modifications will be implemented under a QA program that meets NRC regulatory guidance.
No Technical Specifications are planned for SBO equipment, though they may be required by the NRC at a later date.
E. EOG RELIABILITY - The AAC diesels will be included in the existing station EOG reliability program or a similar program.
A Generic Safety Issue (B-56) concerning emergency diesel generator reliability is pending NRC resolution. The NRC believes a proposed change to the SBO rule is necessary to require licensees to maintain and monitor EOG reliability through presciptive targets (percentage of start failures vs. demands).
Failure to meet the set reliability targets would result in an NRC violation.
Provisions have also been proposed for Level Ill violations if so-called "double" targets are missed.
(Double targets would Qe 'x' start failures out of 50 demands and 'y' failures out of 100 denia:.nds.)
The ACRS is against this proposed rule.
F. COMPRESSED AIR - Station procedures will be prepared to power a normal bus feeding one of the two station air compressors (SPS only).
VI. DIESEL PROCUREMENT Virginia Power has submitted a bid on three surplus diesels available from the cancelled Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in an effort to expedite procurement.
The potential procurement of the diesels from other sources is proceeding in parallel.
VIRSINIA POWER NDRTHCAROUNAPDWER e
To Mr. D. L. Benson -
IN3NW From R. M. Berryman -
IN3SW Memorandunt, Innsbrook Technical center March 10, 1992 Internal Flooding Analysis Type 2 study of Potential Modifications North Anna Individual Plant Examination (IPE)
The internal flooding analysis for the North Anna IPE is nearly complete.
The task team has produced an interim report which documents the analysis and presents core damage frequency (CDF) estimates for the as-built plant and several potential modifications.
The purpose of this memo is to request a Type 2 study to evaluate each of the potential modifications for feasibility, impact on operations, and cost.
Fortunately, the impact of the vulnerability to internal flooding is much less than at Surry.
Implementation of several modifications may be warranted but the majority of the modifications are minimal in terms of impact on statio~pperations.
Each of the modifications are presented individual'ly on the attachment.
After a brief description of the modifica~ion the reduction in CDF is presented.
If any of the p~oposed modifications* are warranted they should be implemented a~both units.
Combinations of these modifications would further reduce the estimated CDF to as low as 8.4E-6/yr.
It is important that Va Power identify which modifications are cost beneficial early enough to seek management approval and implementation of the modifications prior to completing the final IPE report.
Therefore, I am requesting that the Type 2 study be completed by April 15, 1992.
This completion date will allow enough time for management review and detailed analysis of any approved modifications.
Please call if you have any questions or desire further information. Either Mr. Ron Thomas (2205), Mr. Dave Bucheit (2264) or I (2202) are available to discuss the flooding modifications.
~.v'-7~>"'1 R. M. Berryman Form No. 7l!0003{Feb 80)
(For!Mf1y 97024020)
e CC:
Mr. F. K. Moore - IN3SW Mr. G. E. Kane -
NAPS Mr. D. A. Heacock -
NAPS Mr. J. A. Stall -
NAPS Mr. M. L. Bowling -
IN2SE Mr. c. M. Robinson,*Jr. - IN1NW Mr. G. H. Flowers - IN2NW Mr. K. L. Basehore - IN3SW Mr. J. H. Graff -
IN3NW Mr. R. w. Riley - IN3NW Mr. R. s. Thomas - IN3SW Mr. D. M. Bucheit - IN3SW Mr. K. D. Tuley -
IN3SW Mr. R. M. Neil - IN2SE NAF File 2.5.1 - IN3SW NSA File 22.36 - IN3SW
Mod.
Number 1
2
)
4 5a3
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS Description Installation of backflow prevention devices in each of the charging pump cubicle drain lines and confirmation that the cubicles are sealed up to 44" above the floor.
Implement periodic testing of these devices to demonstrate their ability to prevent backflow.
Install a flood barrier at either end of the pipe tunnel connecting the QSPH and the Auxiliary Building (AB).
The barrier should seal the pipe tunnel to prevent flooding the AB.
Install flow shields2 around the nine SW expansion joints in the Air Conditioner Chiller Room (ACCR).
Modify the gastight door between the MCR/ESGR ACCR,and the air conditioning room {air handling units).
The door should be made to withstand 3' of water or a dike installed.
The door between the TB basement and the ACCR should be replaced by a door that is not restrained so floods in the ACCR flow into the TB basement.
Develop a program to maintain the sump pumps in the ACCR and instrument rack area.
Install flow shields2 around the SW expansion joints in the AB (2-24" and 4-20" on the SW supply and discharge headers -
12 total).
CDF1 Post-Mod.
9.0E-5
- 1. lE-4
- 1. 2E-4
- 1. 2E-4
__L e
Mod.*
Number 5b 5c 6
7 8
Notes:
SUMMARY
OF POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS (Continued)
Description Make the manual SW pump discharge isolation valves remotely controlled (i.e. from the MCR) MOVs (lSW-4,5, 11,13 and 2SW-4,5,11,13).
Determine the size of vacuum breaker required to stop flow in a service water header after the pump has been tripped.
Modify installed vacuum breakers as appropriate.
Determine if a deviation report is warranted.
Provide alarms in the MCR to indicate flooding in the QSPH.
Seal the pipe tunnel between the Unit 1 safeguards area and the QSPH.
(The equivalent Unit 2 pipe tunnel is already sealed with concrete.)
Modify the Instrument Rack Room sump pumps so discharg~ does not go to ACCR sump.
CDF1 Post-Mod.
- 1. 7E-44
- 1. 7E-44
- 1. BE-4 1.7E-4 1.BE-4 CDF Reduction 7.9E-6 7.9E-6 Smalls 1.0E-5 Smalls Cost
___L
- 1)
The core damage frequency and reduction in CDF were estimated based on the initial quantification of the North Anna model.
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)
- 5)
The dee ign of the flow shields should incorporate a gap no larger than O. l" for expansion joints in the ACCR and no larger than 0.25" for expansion joints in the Auxiliary Building.
Options Sa, Sb, Sc are mutually exclusive. Any one of the three options provides about the same reduction in CDF; therefore, only one of these modifications would be recommended based on the cost benefit analysis.
Options Sa, Sb, Sc, 6, and 7 have not been evaluated.
The CDF is an estimate based on the reaulta for option* one through four.
Therefore, we have not evaluated the increase in unavailability from inadvertent operation at this time. If the option(e)
. are attractive the final evaluation will include this contribution.
Impact on CDF is small but the change is considered good engineering practice.
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APPIIl°'4L eLANNEP MOPIFICAIIO' AND ACTl'llTIES ASSOCIATED WITH INTERNAL FLOODING VIRGINIA POWER LEITER SERIAL NO. 91-1340, NOVEMBER 26, 1991 MARCH 27, 1992 STATUS Modjficatjon or Activity Status or Schedule Procedure Revisions for Response to Flooding (i.e., abnormal annunciator and response procedures) in TB, MER 3, Safeguards Building, and Auxiliary Building During Power Operation Complete
/
Procedure Revisions for Isolation of CW and SW Piping for Maintenance During Outages Complete '
Implementation of EWA to Improve Flood Control Panel and Complete l Enhance Annunciation Installation of Backflow Prevention Devices in Charging Pump Cubicle Drain Lines Complete *~
Repair/Replacement of Certain Backflow Prevention Complete 4'
~
Devices Flow Shield Installation on Expansion Joints in Service Complete C,
Water Supply Lines for Bearing Cooling and Component Cooling Communication of Importance of Flood Protection Complete 7 Program to Station Personnel Procedure Revisions for CW Maintenance Complete 8'"
(i.e., double isolation, tagouts, flood watch during maintenance, slow refilling of CW lines prior to stop log removal)
Improved Sump Pump Reliability - Maintain at Least Ongoing ct 7 Pumps Operable at All Times Stop Log Staging, Procedures, and Assigned Personnel Ongoing /0 and Equipment in Place Internal and External Inspection of a 96" Expansion Joint, External Inspection of the Bearing Cooling Expansion Joints, Complete II and Evaluation of Inspection Results Restoration of Existing Expansion Joint Shields Complete /1' Development of Turbine Building Sump Pump Operation Complete/]
Rotational Schedule (within Existing Design)
Development 9rurbine Building Sump Pump Tesfj Procedure (including level switches, check valves pump flow testing)
Completion ~f Initial Performance of Turbine Building Sump Pumps Special Test to Establish Baseline for All Pumps Evaluation of Insertion of Stop Logs during CW/SW Maintenance Activities Reassessment of CW and SW Piping Inspection Schedules Performance of Heavy Load Evaluation Using NUREG-0612 as a Guideline Review of Annual PM Procedures for Flood Protection Devices and Schedule Modification of CW MOV Locking Pins Such That Full Engagement into Valve Stem is Easily Discernable Revision of Refueling Procedures for Testing Flood Protection and Alarm Systems Development/Documentation of Expansion Joint Inspection Program and Service Life Replacement Program Development/Documentation of Inspection Program for Valves (e.g., bolts, connecting pins, and manual operators)
Development/Documentation of TB Sump Pump Reliability Program (e.g., operability requirements, surveillance and PM programs)
Complete 11 Complete,,;
Complete,,
Complete IJ Complete l(r Complete
{'j Complete
~()
Complete \\I To Support 2/92 U1 and ~
2/93 U2 Outages To Support 2/92 U 1 and ~3 2/93 U2 Outages To Support 2/92 U1 and l~
2/93 U2 Outages Replacement of Certain Expansion Joints During m
Eight Intermediate Outlet EJs rescheduled 2/92 U1 and ~
as separate line item (Serial 91-134E) 2/93 U2 Outages SW EJs tied to outage: #42, 43, 46, 48, 50 & 52 for both units Assessment of the Need for a Flood Mitigation Equipment Reliability Program Complete*
~(.
It has been determined that to perform a Reliability Centered Maintenance (ACM) evaluation relative to the Surry !PE/internal flooding analysis is not appropriate.
- Instead, the appropriate approach, which will be undertaken, is to dev~lop a preventive maintenance plan for affected components that were not previously included in the ACM studies on the CW and SW systems.
Assessment o.e Need for Procedures Validation f Operator Actions for Flood Mitigation Assessment of Installation of Submersible Operators for BC/CC MOVs Relocation of Power Source for Existing TB Sump Pumps Complete "J.1 1 2/31 /9 2 'J... CW" 12/31/93 J...~
.(
VIRGlf-POWER LETTER SERIAL NO. 9.E. DECEMBER 19 1991 MARCH 27, 1992 STATUS Modification or Activity Evaluate Oconee modifications for internal flooding for applicability to Surry As an interim measure, inspect condenser intermediate outlet expansion joints (eight EJs) and install reduced gap flow shields Replace condenser intermediate outlet expansion joints on Units 1 and 2 Evaluate modifications to seal plates for insertion against flow Evaluate increasing the height of dikes at the auxiliary building pipe tunnel and the turbine building emergency switchgear room door Evaluate installation of a water tight door at the MER 3" -
emergency switchgear room opening Evaluate the installation of permanent reduced gap fiow shields on expansion joints Reassess the internal flooding design basis and update UFSAR, as necessary Status or Schedule Complete 3 a Complete 1/
Complete 1t Complete** lj Complete** 1~
Complete.. JS 5/4/92 7/1/92 37
i I
L e
e MLB White Paper on SW Activities Rev. O March 9, 1992 8:43 AM SERVICE WATER PRESERVATION
- PHASE 1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION Planned t Ongoing Activities 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Enhance the current service water chemical treatment program to reduce or eliminate microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) by controlling sulfate producing bacteria.
Replace Service Water lines to the Unit 2 Control Room Chiller Units.
Complete Buried Piping Cathodic Protection System to extend remaining life of buried and coated 36" headers.
Upgrade main Service Water Pumps Repair and replace Service Water lines to and from Unit 1 and Unit *2 Containment Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers.
Repair and replace Service Water lines to and from Unit 1 and Unit 2 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers.
Add new pe.rmanent access points for future inspection, maintenance and repairs or encased headers and piping.
Full scale mock-ups for testing and qualitication of pipe rehabilitation methodologies and, training of personnel for performance thereof.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for repair activities and to support licensing activities in Technical Specification Relief Requests.
0 0
0 Temporary relief from tornado missile protection of certain buried mechanical and electrical components in various yard areas. (needed by end Fourth Quarter 1992 to support 1993 activities)
Temporary time extensions of TS LCO Action Statements for certain in-place repairs and coating.
Possible request for Code relief for certain permanent repair methods that are currently n9t code acceptable.