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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20247M0861998-05-21021 May 1998 SER Accepting 1997 Rev to Catawba UFSAR Submitted on 970925. Rev Added Analysis for Postulated Accident Involving Dropping of Sf Pool Weir Gate Onto Sf Assemblies ML20216E1771998-04-13013 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Request 98-01 for Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 from Requirements of ASME Boiler & PV Code for Second 10-year Interval Program for Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves ML20217M4211998-04-0303 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Relief 97-04, non-code Repair Valves.Relief Granted Retroactively to Unit 1 & Expired Dec 1997.Relief for Unit 2 Will Expire at End of Cycle 9 Outage or Next Scheduled Outage Exceeding 30 Days ML20199A5521998-01-22022 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves, for Cns,Units 1 & 2 ML20199A6421998-01-22022 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed EALs Changes for Plant, Units 1 & 2.Concludes That Changes Consistent W/Guidance in NUMARC/NESP-007,w/variations as Identified & Accepted in Review & Meets Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) ML20198P9641998-01-15015 January 1998 SE Granting Relief Request 97-03 for Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program ML20198R9951997-10-30030 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Approval of Alternative to Exam Requirement of Reactor Vessel Shell Weld,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) ML20198J7651997-10-15015 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan Alternatives for Listed Plants Units ML20211F8801997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ML20149K8281997-07-29029 July 1997 SER Granting Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR70.24 for Units 1 & 2 ML20141E1121997-06-16016 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Licensee Position That UFSAR Table 6-77 Be Revised to Identify SA-1 & SA-4 Instead of SA-3 & SA-6 as Containment Isolation Valves ML20148H2501997-06-0505 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Restructuring of Util Through Acquisition Of,& Merger W/Panenergy Corp ML20141G6701997-05-20020 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Use of TS Requirement for Code Class Snubbers ML20135B3051997-02-27027 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Second 10 Yr ISI Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief ML20134P2421997-02-20020 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting TR BAW-10199P for Ref in Plants Licensing Documentation & Use in Licensing Applications ML20134L4081996-11-19019 November 1996 SER Accepting Performance of Plant Standby Nuclear Svc Water Pond ML20134G5551996-11-0707 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Application of BWU-Z CHF Correlation for Plants Mark-BW 17x17 Type Fuel ML20129E4851996-10-0101 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Recommending That Relief Request 96-02 Be Granted,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i),per Request ML20056D9611993-07-30030 July 1993 SER Accepting Licensee 930325-0429 Submittals of Technical Info to Support Continued Operation of Facility for Remainder of Fuel Cycle 7 ML20055H9151990-07-27027 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Actions Taken to Resolve NRC Bulletin 88-002, Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generators Tubes ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML20246L4221989-05-12012 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Revs 15 & 6 to Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program & Relief Requests ML20150C2651988-06-28028 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Assessment to Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events,Per 10CFR50.61 ML20150C2611988-06-28028 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Assessment to Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events,Per 10CFR50.61 ML20154H2171988-05-18018 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 880414 Submittal Re Reload Startup Physics Test Program ML20148H1001988-01-22022 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 871113 Proposed Tech Spec Changes Reflecting Unit 2 Cycle 2 Refueling & Addition of Boron Dilution Mitigation Sys for Unit 2 ML20236M9631987-11-0606 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry for Facilities,Per 10CFR50.62(c)(1) & Pending Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20236D4451987-09-30030 September 1987 SER Re Licensee 870814 & 21 Responses Re Single Failure Potential in Nuclear Svc Water Sys.Nuclear Svc Water Sys Meets Requirements of GDC 5 & 44 Re Sharing & Provisions for Suitable Redundancy in Cooling Water Sys ML20236F5881987-07-29029 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831104,841102,1231 & 851203 Responses to Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 ML20215D2701987-06-11011 June 1987 SER Accepting Rev 13 to Unit 1 & Rev 4 to Unit 2 Pump & Valve Inservice Testing,Per Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) ML20214T4061987-06-0202 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 860424 Submittal Re Turbine Sys Maint Program for Early Detection of Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Wheels ML20214M3361987-05-22022 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Rept Entitled, Rod Swap Methodology Rept for Startup Physics Testing ML20209B1511987-01-28028 January 1987 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys on-line Testing ML20207Q5851987-01-15015 January 1987 SER Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Concerning Vendor Interface Programs for Reactor Trip Sys Components.Util Response Acceptable.Item Closed ML20207N3011987-01-0808 January 1987 Safety Evaluation on Util 830309 & 851025 Requests for Relief from 10CFR50.55a Requirements Re Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program.Relief Granted W/Listed Exceptions ML20207P6341986-08-31031 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 851120 & 860324 Proposals to Eliminate Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks in Select List of High Energy Piping Sys ML20199L3941986-07-0202 July 1986 SER Providing Final Conclusions & Recommendations from Evaluation of Tdi Owners Group Program to Validate & Update Quality of Tdi Diesel Generators ML20211E4251986-06-10010 June 1986 Draft SER Re Util 850624 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.1,4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Preventive Maint Program for Reactor Trip Breakers/Maint & Trending.Position on Item 4.1 Acceptable.Position on Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Unacceptable ML20207T4241985-12-30030 December 1985 SER Re SPDS Based on Documentation & 850513-15 Audit.Spds Does Not Fully Meet Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737. Five Listed Variables Should Be Added to Spds.Interim Implementation Acceptable ML20138M9011985-12-17017 December 1985 Draft SER on Util 850329 Response to 841003 Request for Addl Info Re Hydrogen Control Measures for Plant.Addl Info & Analyses Required Re Effect of Upper Compartment Burns on Air Return Fan ML20128F9921985-06-21021 June 1985 SER Based on Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review Program Description & Procedures. Program & Procedures Acceptable 1999-08-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO RE0 VEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM 10 CFR 70.24 RE0VIREMENTS ,
I DUKE POWER COMPANY. ET AL. I
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CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 j DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414 ,
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
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{ -Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR) at subsection (a) of 10
- CFR 70.24, " Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee
- authorized to possess special nuclear material shall maintain in each area
, where such material is handled, used, or stored, a criticality accident
- monitoring system "using gamma- or neutron-sensitive radiation detectors which i
will energize clearly audible alarm signals if accidental criticality occurs."
- Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify the detection, t sensitivity, and coverage capabilities of the monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24(a). Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires that the licensee shall maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored and provides (1) that the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the
! sounding of a criticality monitor alarm, (2) that the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) that the .
i; . procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the H alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in accessible locations !
, for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) requires licensees to have a !
- means to quickly identify personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or q more. Subsection (b)(2) requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other
- i medical penonnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain !
arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment j
! facilities outside the site boundary. Subsection (c) exempts Part 50 '
- licensees (such as Catawba) from the requirements of paragraph (b).
! Subsection (d) states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause
- why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons j for the relief requested. -
j By letter dated February 4,1997, as supplemented March 19, 1997, Duke Power Company (the licensee) requested an exemption for all its nuclear plants from i the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. The staff has reviewed the licensee's i submittal and has determined that procedures and design features make an i inadvertent criticality in special nuclear materials handling or storage at
, ~ Catawba unlikely, in'accordance with General Design Criterion 62.
I Enclosure 9707300177 970729 PDR ADOCK 05000413 -
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l 2.0- EVALUATION i Special nuclear material, as nuclear fuel, is stored in the spent fuel pool
, and the new fuel storage vault. The spent fuel pool is used to store irradiated fuel under water after its discharge from the reactor, and raw fuel prior to loading into the reactor. New fuel is stored dry (in air) in che new fuel storage vault.
? Special nuclear material is also present in the form of fissile material incorporated into nuclear instrumentation. The small quantity of special nuclear material present in these items precludes an inadvertent criticality.
2.1 Requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1) and (2)
Each Catawba unit has its own spent fuel pool. The spent fuel pool is designed to store the fuel in a geometric array that precludes criticality. '
Section 5.6 of the unit's Technical Specifications requires that the spent
, fuel racks are designed and shall be maintained such that the effective i
+
neutron under allmultiplication factor, k,,ditions normal and accident con for fuel of maximum nominal, will remain less than or e j enrichment of 5.0 weight percent (wt%) U-235. The staff has previously found ;
! this design acceptable, meeting all applicable regulatory requirements and i guidance (Catawba Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0954, February 1983).
1
- Each Catawba unit has its own new fuel storage vault. The new fuel storage vault is used to receive and store new fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading in ths reactor or spent fuel pool. Although the new
~
i fuel storage area is prevented by design from flooding (there is no piping a
which could rupture and flood the area, there is a drainage system, and there e is no hydrogenous fire fighting equipment in the area), the spacing between i
new fuel assemblies in the vault is sufficient to maintain the array in a
- subcritical condition even under accident conditions assuming the presence of f neutron moderator. The marimum nominal enrichment of 5.0 wt% U-235 for the of less than 0.95 under i
conditions new of fuel assembliesaccidental flooding by unborate of low-densityresults in a maximum The st f ask,,,d water, and k less than 0.98 under conditions optimum moderation. previously !
found the design of the licensee's new fuel storage vault to be adequate to l store fuel enriched to 5.0 wt% U-235, meeting all applicable regulatory l requirements and guidance (Catawba Safety Evaluation Report, NVREG-0954, February 1983).
Nuclear fuel is moved between the shipping container (two assemblies in each container), the new fuel storage vault, the reactor vessel, and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling operations. In all cases, fuel movements are procedurally controlled and designed to preclude conditions involving
(
- criticality concerns. Only one new fuel assembly is handled at any one time 1
ir, any area of the fuel building. Upon removal from the shipping container, j the assembly is inspected and transferred by the crane to the new fuel storage i uabit or the spent fuel pool for storage. All valves that could allow water !'
i into the area of the spent fuel operating deck are administrative 1y a
controlled, and remain shut during fuel handling operations.
- The licensee's current procedures and controls prevent an inadvertent
' criticality during fuel handling; nevertheless, radiation monitoring, as required by General Design Criterion 63, are provided for handling new fuel prior f.o being placed into the spent fuel pool. In additlon, handling of fuel
. in the spent fuel pool is monitored by radiation monitors on the fuel handling
. bridges.(Section 3/4.3.3 of each unit's Technical Specifications). These required radiation monitors have associated alarm response procedures that
- provide instructions to the operators upon receipt of alarms, d
On the baris of the information provided, the licensee has met the intent of i
.' 10 CFR 70.24(d) by the existing facility design, extremely low probability of I criticality, and operating procedures. Literal Mmpliance with the I requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1) and (2) would not increase the margin of safety.
l 2.2 Requirennnts of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3) 4 l The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensure that if a criticality were to occur
- during the handling of special nuclear material, personnel would be alerted to l that fact and wculd take appropriate action. The staff has previously discussed that reasonable and satisfactory precautions exist to preclude a i
nuclear criticality accident, thereby meeting the requirements of General Design Criterion C2. In addition, the licensee has installed radiation
! monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions.
The licensee provides radiation alarm training in the general employee plant access training that each employee receives before being badged for unescorted access at the plant. This training identifies the types of alarms that are used, the types of alara signals emitted, and the expected employee response.
While literally the licensee does not meet the " emergency procedures for each area" requirement of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3), the licensee has met the intent by having general plant procedures. Existing radiation monitors installed to meet the requirements of another regulation (General Design Criterion 63) will continue'to be available te carry out the function required by 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3). Thus an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3) would not decrease personnel's ability to identify and respond to radiation alarms in areas involving fresh fuel as long as the licensee's general procedures described in its submittals are in effect.
2.3 Requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(b) and (c) l The requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(c) exempt holders of Part 50 operating licenses (e.g., Catawba) from th( requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(b)(1) and (2) regarding decontamination facilit5es, arrangements for physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and arrangements 4
l for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities ,
outside the site boundary. Thus there is no need for the staff to take any ;
action on 10 CFR 70.24(b) and (c) for Catawba. j 3.0 CQHELUSION j In accordance with 10 CFR 70.24(d), the' licensee has demonstrated that good- !
cause exists for an exemption: the existing facility design and operating l procedures ensure extremely low probability of criticality, and the existing l emergency procedure provides for notification and evacuation of personnel. l Literal compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1), (2), and ('3) '
would not increase the margin of safety, and therefore an exemption can ht:
granted.
Principal Contributor: Laurence Kopp J l Date: July 29, 1997 l
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