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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20247M0861998-05-21021 May 1998 SER Accepting 1997 Rev to Catawba UFSAR Submitted on 970925. Rev Added Analysis for Postulated Accident Involving Dropping of Sf Pool Weir Gate Onto Sf Assemblies ML20216E1771998-04-13013 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Request 98-01 for Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 from Requirements of ASME Boiler & PV Code for Second 10-year Interval Program for Inservice Testing of Pumps & Valves ML20217M4211998-04-0303 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving Request for Relief 97-04, non-code Repair Valves.Relief Granted Retroactively to Unit 1 & Expired Dec 1997.Relief for Unit 2 Will Expire at End of Cycle 9 Outage or Next Scheduled Outage Exceeding 30 Days ML20199A5521998-01-22022 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves, for Cns,Units 1 & 2 ML20199A6421998-01-22022 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed EALs Changes for Plant, Units 1 & 2.Concludes That Changes Consistent W/Guidance in NUMARC/NESP-007,w/variations as Identified & Accepted in Review & Meets Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) ML20198P9641998-01-15015 January 1998 SE Granting Relief Request 97-03 for Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program ML20198R9951997-10-30030 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Request for Approval of Alternative to Exam Requirement of Reactor Vessel Shell Weld,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) ML20198J7651997-10-15015 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting 10-yr Interval Insp Program Plan Alternatives for Listed Plants Units ML20211F8801997-09-22022 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Second ten-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 ML20149K8281997-07-29029 July 1997 SER Granting Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR70.24 for Units 1 & 2 ML20141E1121997-06-16016 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving Licensee Position That UFSAR Table 6-77 Be Revised to Identify SA-1 & SA-4 Instead of SA-3 & SA-6 as Containment Isolation Valves ML20148H2501997-06-0505 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Restructuring of Util Through Acquisition Of,& Merger W/Panenergy Corp ML20141G6701997-05-20020 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative Use of TS Requirement for Code Class Snubbers ML20135B3051997-02-27027 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Second 10 Yr ISI Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief ML20134P2421997-02-20020 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting TR BAW-10199P for Ref in Plants Licensing Documentation & Use in Licensing Applications ML20134L4081996-11-19019 November 1996 SER Accepting Performance of Plant Standby Nuclear Svc Water Pond ML20134G5551996-11-0707 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Application of BWU-Z CHF Correlation for Plants Mark-BW 17x17 Type Fuel ML20129E4851996-10-0101 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Recommending That Relief Request 96-02 Be Granted,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i),per Request ML20056D9611993-07-30030 July 1993 SER Accepting Licensee 930325-0429 Submittals of Technical Info to Support Continued Operation of Facility for Remainder of Fuel Cycle 7 ML20055H9151990-07-27027 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Actions Taken to Resolve NRC Bulletin 88-002, Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generators Tubes ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML20246L4221989-05-12012 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Revs 15 & 6 to Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program & Relief Requests ML20150C2651988-06-28028 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Assessment to Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events,Per 10CFR50.61 ML20150C2611988-06-28028 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Assessment to Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events,Per 10CFR50.61 ML20154H2171988-05-18018 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 880414 Submittal Re Reload Startup Physics Test Program ML20148H1001988-01-22022 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 871113 Proposed Tech Spec Changes Reflecting Unit 2 Cycle 2 Refueling & Addition of Boron Dilution Mitigation Sys for Unit 2 ML20236M9631987-11-0606 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry for Facilities,Per 10CFR50.62(c)(1) & Pending Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20236D4451987-09-30030 September 1987 SER Re Licensee 870814 & 21 Responses Re Single Failure Potential in Nuclear Svc Water Sys.Nuclear Svc Water Sys Meets Requirements of GDC 5 & 44 Re Sharing & Provisions for Suitable Redundancy in Cooling Water Sys ML20236F5881987-07-29029 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831104,841102,1231 & 851203 Responses to Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1,3.2.2 & 4.5.1 of Generic Ltr 83-28 ML20215D2701987-06-11011 June 1987 SER Accepting Rev 13 to Unit 1 & Rev 4 to Unit 2 Pump & Valve Inservice Testing,Per Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) ML20214T4061987-06-0202 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 860424 Submittal Re Turbine Sys Maint Program for Early Detection of Cracking in Low Pressure Turbine Wheels ML20214M3361987-05-22022 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Rept Entitled, Rod Swap Methodology Rept for Startup Physics Testing ML20209B1511987-01-28028 January 1987 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys on-line Testing ML20207Q5851987-01-15015 January 1987 SER Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Concerning Vendor Interface Programs for Reactor Trip Sys Components.Util Response Acceptable.Item Closed ML20207N3011987-01-0808 January 1987 Safety Evaluation on Util 830309 & 851025 Requests for Relief from 10CFR50.55a Requirements Re Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program.Relief Granted W/Listed Exceptions ML20207P6341986-08-31031 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 851120 & 860324 Proposals to Eliminate Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks in Select List of High Energy Piping Sys ML20199L3941986-07-0202 July 1986 SER Providing Final Conclusions & Recommendations from Evaluation of Tdi Owners Group Program to Validate & Update Quality of Tdi Diesel Generators ML20211E4251986-06-10010 June 1986 Draft SER Re Util 850624 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 4.1,4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Re Preventive Maint Program for Reactor Trip Breakers/Maint & Trending.Position on Item 4.1 Acceptable.Position on Items 4.2.1 & 4.2.2 Unacceptable ML20207T4241985-12-30030 December 1985 SER Re SPDS Based on Documentation & 850513-15 Audit.Spds Does Not Fully Meet Requirements of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737. Five Listed Variables Should Be Added to Spds.Interim Implementation Acceptable ML20138M9011985-12-17017 December 1985 Draft SER on Util 850329 Response to 841003 Request for Addl Info Re Hydrogen Control Measures for Plant.Addl Info & Analyses Required Re Effect of Upper Compartment Burns on Air Return Fan ML20128F9921985-06-21021 June 1985 SER Based on Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1 Re post-trip Review Program Description & Procedures. Program & Procedures Acceptable 1999-08-20
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217H0201999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216E5401999-09-0707 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990826,discovered That Meteorological Sys Upper Wind Speed Cup Set Broken,Causing Upper Wind Channel to Be Inoperable.Cup Set Replaced & Channel Restored to Operable Status on 990826 ML20212B4711999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217H0321999-08-31031 August 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211B1281999-08-31031 August 1999 Dynamic Rod Worth Measurement Using Casmo/Simulate ML20211A9791999-08-20020 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request for Approval of Proposed Relief from Volumetric Exam Requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section Xi,For Plant,Unit 2 ML20211F3441999-08-17017 August 1999 Updated non-proprietary Page 2-4 of TR DPC-NE-2009 ML20211C1291999-08-17017 August 1999 ISI Rept Unit 1 Catawba 1999 RFO 11 ML20210R1051999-08-0606 August 1999 Special Rept:On 990628,cathodic Protection Sys Was Declared Inoperable After Sys Did Not Pass Acceptance Criteria of Bimonthly Surveillance.Work Request 98085802 Was Initiated & Connections on Well Anode Were Cleaned or Replaced ML20210S2891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20212B4871999-07-31031 July 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209E4361999-07-0909 July 1999 SER Agreeing with Licensee General Interpretation of TS LCO 3.0.6,but Finds No Technical Basis or Guidance That Snubbers Could Be Treated as Exception to General Interpretation ML20196K6631999-07-0707 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee 990520 Position Re Inoperable Snubbers ML20210S2951999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20209H4561999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206T4771999-05-31031 May 1999 Rev 3 to UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology ML20196L1881999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to DPC-NE-3004, Mass & Energy Release & Containment Response Methodology ML20196A0001999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206P5201999-05-14014 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20206N8391999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr ML20206R1811999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196A0041999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20206N8261999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 15 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 12 Colr. Page 145 of 270 of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205S5551999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20205N3651999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting IPE of External Events Submittal ML18016A9011999-04-12012 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Component of DSRV-16-4,Enterprise DG Sys.Caused by Potential Problem with Connecting Rod Assemblies Built Since 1986,that Have Been Converted to Use Prestressed Fasteners.Affected Rods Should Be Inspected ML20206R1931999-03-31031 March 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9521999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20205P9561999-02-28028 February 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20204C9111999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20203A2581999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation of TR DPC-NE-3002-A,Rev 2, UFSAR Chapter 15 Sys Transient Analysis Methodology. Rept Acceptable. Staff Requests Duke Energy Corp to Publish Accepted Version of TR within 3 Months of Receipt of SE ML20204C9161999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K8711999-01-13013 January 1999 Inservice Insp Rept for Unit 2 Catawba 1998 Refueling Outage 9 ML20199E3071998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F9931998-12-31031 December 1998 Piedmont Municipal Power Agency 1998 Annual Rept ML20205E9441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 10CFR50.59 Rept for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2, Containing Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments,Including Summary of Ses.With ML20206P2081998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981218,inoperability of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Channels,Was Observed.Caused by Data Logger Overloading Circuit.Replaced & Repaired Temp Signal Processor ML20203A4101998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 16 to CNEI-0400-25, Catawba Unit 2 Cycle 10 Colr ML20203A4041998-12-22022 December 1998 Rev 14 to CNEI-0400-24, Catawba Unit 1 Cycle 11 Colr ML20198B1341998-12-14014 December 1998 Revised Special Rept:On 980505,discovered That Certain Fire Barriers Appeared to Be Degraded.Caused by Removal of Firestop Damming Boards.Hourly Fire Watches Established in Affected Areas ML20196J8351998-12-0808 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request Re Relief Valves in Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Sys ML20199E3221998-11-30030 November 1998 Revised MOR for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 Re Personnel Exposure ML20198E3151998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C0251998-11-27027 November 1998 SER Accepting Clarification on Calibration Tolerances on Trip Setpoints for Catawba Nuclear Station ML20196A6881998-11-25025 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request 98-02 Re Limited Exam for Three Welds ML20196D4041998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 1 to Special Rept:On 980618,determined That Method Used to Calibrate Wind Speed Instrumentation Loops of Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Sys Does Not Meet TS Definition for Channel Calibration.Procedure Revised ML20195E5521998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20198E3261998-10-31031 October 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20154M7661998-10-12012 October 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980913,terminated Vendor Employee Entered Protected Area.Caused by Computer Interface Malfunction. Security Retained Vendor Employee Badge to Prevent Further Access & Computer Malfunction Was Repaired.With 1999-09-07
[Table view] |
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4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OF THE SECOND 10-YEAR INTERVAL INSERVICE INSPECTION PLAN 4
REQUESTS FOR RELIEF NO. 97-01 AND NO. 97-02 DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 D.O 3KET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414
1.0 INTRODUCTION
4 The Technical Specifications for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, state that the inservice inspection and testing of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, and 3 components shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) and applicable Addenda as required by Title 10 of the Cgde of Federal Reaulations (10 CFR) Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written ,
relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).
Section 50.55a(a)(3) states that attematives to the requirements of paragraph (g) may be used, when authorized by the NRC, if (i) the proposed attematives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, or (ii) compliance with the specified requirements would result in hardship or unusual difficulties without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components (including supports) shall meet the requirements, except the design and access provisions and the preservice examination requirements, set forth in ASME Code,Section XI, " Rules for Inservice inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. The regulations require l that inservice examination of components and system pressure tests conducted during the first 10-year interval and subsequent intervals comply with the requirements in the latest edition and addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) on
, the date 12 months prior to the start of the 120-montn interval, subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein. The applicable edition of the ASME Code,Section XI, for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, during the second 10-year inservice inspection (ISI) interval, is the 1989 Edition. The components (including supports) may meet the requirements set forth in subsequent editions and addenda of the ASME Code incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a(b) subject to the limitations and modifications listed therein and subject to Commission approval.
- Enclosure 9711130415 971030 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P PDR
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l Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5), if the licensee determines that conformance with an
! examination requirement of Section XI of the ASME Code is not practical for its facility. '
! information shall be submitted to the Commission in support of that determination and a request i
made for relief from the ASME Code requirement.. After evaluation of the determination, j pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), the Commission may grant relief and 'may impose '
l altemative requirements that are determined to be authorized by law, will not endanger life,-
i - property, or the common defense and security, and are othenvise in the public interest, giving j- due consideration to the burden upon the licensee that could result if the requirements were
! - imposed on the facility. '
i i
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(li)(A), the Commission revoked all previous reliefs granted to
[ licensees for the extent of volumetric examinations of reactor vessel shell welds, as specified in e Section XI, Division 1, of the ASME Code'. The Commission further required that alllicensees e
augment their reactor vessel examination by implementing, as part of the ISI interval iri effect i i
on September 8,1992, the Item B1,10 requiremer:ts (examine essentially 100% of the volume -
of each shell weld) of the 1989 Edition of the ASME Code.
Under 10 CFR 50.53a(g)(6)(li)(A)(4), licensees may satisfy the augmented requirements by performing the ASME Section XI reactor vessel shell weld examinations scheduled for ,
implementation during ISI intowals in effect on September 8,1992.- As a result, the licensee is ,
required to submit both an altemative to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) and a request for relief '
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iii), or a proposed attemative pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(3), ,
for the same welds when the licensee obtains less than the required coverage (essentially 100%) during the examinations.
Additionally, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5), a licensee who makes a determination that it is unable to completely satisfy the requirements for the augmented reactor vessel shell -
weld examination specified in 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) shall submit information to the Commission to support the determination and shall propose an altamative to the examination requirements that would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety. The licensee may
. use the proposed attemative when authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor -
- Regulation.
In a letter dated February 18,1997, and a subsequent response on September 2,1997, to the staff's request for additional information, Duke Energy Corporation (DEC, the licensee) submitted to the NRC its attematives to the augmented examination of the reactor vessel shell welds to be conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) for Catawba, Units 1 and 2, during the second 10-ye_r interval. The licensee's attemative plan includes examination of all reactor vessel shell welds to the maximum extent practical. The staff has reviewed and evaluated the licensee's request for attemative, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) and the supporting information for Catawba, Units 1 and 2.
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i - 2.0 DISCUSSION i- - Examination Requirement:
Section 50.55t.(g)(6)(ii)(A)(2) states that 'all licensees shall augment their reactor vessel examinations by implementing the examination requirements for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) l '
shell welds specified in item B1.10 of Examination Category B-A, " Pressure Retaining Wolds in Reactor Vessel,"in Table IWB-2500-1 of Subsection lWB of the 1989 Edition of Section XI, l Division I, of the ASME Code, subject to the conditions specifM in 10 CFR -
i 50.55a(g)(6)(li)(A)(3) and (4). For the purpose of this augmented examination, essentially 100% as used in Table IWB-2500-1 means more than 90% of the examination volume for eacn i weld. Additionally,10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) requires licensees that are unable to i completely satisfy the augmented RPV shell weld examination requirement to submit 4 --information to the NRC to support the determination, and propose an altemative to the examination requirements that would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, i
! Licensee's Request For Relief:
f Reactor vessel shell welds specified in item B1.10 of Examination Category B-A of the
! ASME Code,Section XI,' 1989 Edition that did not receive " essentially 100%" examination.
Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head-to-Shell Circumferential Weld ID Number item Number 1RPV-WO3 B01.001.001 Shell-to-Nozzle Belt Circumferential Weld ID Number item Number 1RPV-WOG B01.001.004 Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Lower Head-to-Shell Circumferential Weld ID Number item Number 2RPV-101-141 B01.011.001 Lower Shell Longitudinal Seams ID.fstmket item Number 2RPV-101-142A B01.012.007 2RPV-101-142B B01.012.008 2RPV-101-142C B01.012/09
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4 Licensee's Basis For Requesting Alternative:
During the ultrasonic examination of the welds, the minimum 90% coverage requirement of ASME Section XI,1980 Edition through Winter 1981 Addenda, clarified by Code Case N-460, could not be obtained due to part geometry and physical barriers. A combination of multiple angles and UT techniques was used to obtain the maximum coverage possible. Nthough the coverage requirements of ASME Section XI could not be met, the amount of coverage obtained for these examinations provides an acceptable level of quality and integrity. Based on these evaluations, the limited coverage will in no way endanger the health and safety of the general public.
These welds were examined to the maximum extent practical in accordance with ASME Section V, Adicle 4,1980 Edition with Winter 1981 Addenda and the additional requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.150.
No additional examinations will be required.
Licensee's Attemate Examinations:
The licensee states that the use of radiography as an attemate volumetric examination method ,
is not practical due to component thickness and configurations. Other restrictions making radiography impractical, are physical barriers prohibiting access for placement of source, film, number bands, etc.
The licensee will contir.ue to use the most current ultrasonic techniques available for future examination of the welds for which relief is being requested. The licensee believes that the limited examination is the best available and will continue to perform an ultrasonic examiration of all reactor vessel welds to the maximum extent practical in accordanc with the requirements of ASME Section V, Article 4,198g Edition and Regulatory Guide 1.150, Revisien 1, Appendix A.
3.0 EVALUATION Then staff has avaluated the attematives proposed by the licensee for the volumetric examination of the above-mentioned reactor vessel shell welds in regard to the following
- factors, o Physical constraints at each weld that limits the examination coverage o- Maximum extent of volumetric coverage obtained with the existing constraints o Supplementing inner diameter examination with examination from outside o Results of previous vessel examinations o Detect presence of degradation mechanism, if any, from the examination o Effect of neutron irradiation on the subject welds as of the secor:d 10-year inspection interval
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The licensee performed a best-effort examination of the above welds in both reactor vessels 3
from the inside surface._ in the Unit i reactor vessel, a volumetric coverage of 44% and 48% for the lower head-to-shell weld and the shell-to-nozzle belt weld respectively, was obtained. . The -
limited scan was due to geometric configuration of the welds. All other welds specified in item B1.10 of Examination Category B A, of Unit 1 reactor vessel met the Code examination requirement. In the Unit 2 reactor vessel, the lower head-to-shell weld received a volumetric coverage of 57% and three lower shell longitudinal seams received volumetric coverage of 81%, each due to physical obstructions from the core guide lugs. All other welds specified in item 81.10 of Examination Category B-A, of Unit 2 reactor vessel met the Code examination requirement. In response to staffs request for additional information dated April 17,1997, the licensee stated that in both units there is insufficient clearance between the reactor vessel wall and concrete to perform an examination from the outside surface for the shell-to-nozzle belt weld in Unit 1 and three lower shell longitudinal seams in Unit 2. However, he volumetric examination coverage of the lower head-to-shell weld in both units can be li.c Nwd by an outer diameter examination with high man-rem penalty.
The licensee's response to the staffs request for additional information states that the preservice inspection of the welds for which an attemative is being requested did not indicate any recordable flaw in the unexamined volume of each weld. Furthermore, the shell-to-nozzle belt weld and the lower head to-shell weld, being located outside the vessel beltline region, have not experienced neutron embrittlement, which would have adversely affected the fracture toughness of the welds and the heat-affected zones. With the number of transients below the design basis, the probability of origination and growth of a flaw to unacceptable dimensions is extremely small within the second 10-year interval. Moreover, the extent of volumetric coverage should have detected the presence of such a flaw. The three lower shelllongitudinal welds of Unit 2, located within the vessel beltline region received volumetric examination coverage of 81%. The staff has determined that flaws of unacceptable dimensions caused due to any degradation mechanism, if present, would have been detected with reasonable confidence with such volumetric coverage. Therefore, the licensee's proposed attemative provides an acceptable level of quality and safety,
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and concludes that the licensee has maximized examination coverage for the reactor vessel welds and that service-induced degradation, if -
present, would have been detected. Compliance with the code results in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety in that the licensee's proposed alternative contained in Requests for Relief No. 97-01 and 97e? provides an acceptable level of quality and safety. Therefore, the licensee's proposed attemative is authorized pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) and 50.55a(3)(ii) for !
Catawba, Units 1 and 2, during the second 10-year interval. '
l Principal Contributor: Prakash Patnaik I
-- Date: October 30, 1997 I
l l