ML20136F520
| ML20136F520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1984 |
| From: | Lazevnick J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mark Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082840446 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-663 NUDOCS 8411260140 | |
| Download: ML20136F520 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
1 e E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
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November 9,1984 il 1M MEMORANDUM FOR:
M. Miller, Project Manager j
Licensing Branch No. 4, DL THRU:
J. E. Knight, Section Leader Q h " 1/
Power Systems Branch, DSI
/
A. R. Ungaro, Section Leader g [ hf/gy Power Systems Branch, DSI FROM:
J. Lazevnick Power Systems Branch, DSI E. Tomlinson Power Systems Branch, DSI j
SUBJECT:
DISCUSSION OF V0GTLE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS i
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Plant Name: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 I
Applicant: Georgia Power Company Docket Nos.: 50-424/425 Licensing Stage: OL Project Meanager M. Miller Systems Integration Branch: PSB PSB Reviewers:
J. Lazevnick/E. Tomlinson Review Status: Awaiting Information By memorandum dated August 27, 1984 PSB indicated that, in lieu of a draft SER, PSB will provide DL with a list of open issues which will be used in
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discussions with the Vogtle applicant for their resolution. Enclosed is the status of the applicant's response to PSB's electrical and mechanical questions. The responses which are missing or inadequate will be open issues in the PSB SER unless resolved by first week of March 1985. For-the
_i responses we have found inadequate, a discussion is provided of what' we j
require to find them acceptable or the additional information needed by us to complete our review of the item.
If~ clarification of any of the enclosed l
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Contact:
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. J. Lazevnick, x29413 E. Tomlinson, x29420 b.
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November 9,1984 i
l M. Miller l i.
55 information is necesary, the applicant should contact the electrical l
reviewer, J. Lazevnick, or the mechanical reviewer, E. Tomlinson.
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q J. Lazevnick
- j Power Systems Branch DSI c1 ff
-j E. Tomlinson 1
Power Systems Branch, DSI j
Enclosure:
As stated I
cc:
L. Rubenstein jl M. Srinivasan
' j J. E. Knight i
A. Ungaro j
J. Lazevnick E. Tomlinson 1
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i V0GTLE DISCUSSIONS OF QUESTION RESPONSES q
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430.1 Not acceptable - more infomation required.
Provide additional information with supporting details which 1
demonstrates that training for operations, maintenance, and supervisory personnel will be the equivalent of vendor training.
Supporting details include such things as course outlines, length of course, qualification of instructors, provisions for training t
replacement personnel, and refresher training for current personnel.
430.2 Not acceptable - clarification required The question refers to a condition where a diesel generator (dg) failed to start automatically, and a manual start was attempted at the conclusion of the auto start sequence, but prior to the engine Clarification is required to fully explain (gard to The response is not clear with re coming to a complete stop.
i 1)does this condition.
the fuel oil interlock function as described above, or (2) does the fuel interlock function only w) hen the engine control switch iswith the engin placed in stop and, if so, (3 stop position, how does it automatically revert to the run position on a LOCA or LOOP signal? Describe more fully the procedures being developed to preclude depletion of the air supply in light of the above, and verify that. admission of fuel and starting air to the diesel engine prior to it coming to a complete stop is compatible with the vendor's operating instructions.
430.3 Not acceptable - clarification is required Surveillance testing of diesel generators in accordance with R.G.
1.108 must be conducted at 1007, of dg continuous rating for a f
minimum of I hour every 31 days. The staff's concern with no load or light load operation is with regard.to operation of the diesel generators for purposes other than surveillance testing, such as post maintenance / repair testing, troubleshooting, or during a LOCA with offsite power available. The applicant's response should address these concerns, specifically. As presently worded, parts A and B of the response are contradictory. Part D of the response l
should be expanded to. discuss the specifics of administrative j
prifcedures; 1.e., use of a checklist, by whom, when, number of j
people involved _1f more than one, etc.
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~430.4 The response is acceptable with the following conditions:
The applicant must verify that (1) no instrumentation is engine mounted (except for sensors, etc) and (2) that the vibration
'j frequencies and amplitudes which will be experienced at Vogtle are no greater than those considered for IEEE-323 qualification.
430.5 Not acceptable.
i 1
The applicant must demonstrate that emergency lighting for the j
control room, remote shutdown panel, and access routes is Class IE or equivalent. The position stated in footnote (e) of Table 430.5 is not. acceptable.
430.6 The response is acceptable.
430.7 The response is acceptable.
430.8 The response will be acceptable provided that:
i (1) a minimum frequency for test and calibration of instrumentation and controls is established Note 'there is no annunciation of the fuel oil strainers high P
alarm.
430.9 Not acceptable.
The applicant must conform to the testing requirements of ANSI N-195, Appendix B, and R.G.1.137, or provide a justification for nonconformance.
l 430.10 The response will be acceptable provided that:
(1) the applicant provides adequate data on how crankcase explosions j
are precluded by " design" i
430.11 Not acceptable.
The applicant must provide:
l (1)detailsofthepumphouseandmanwaycover,orreferencesto j
where they may be found in the FSAR I
(2) assurance:that the aanway cover can be readily removed when
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required (3) emergency operating procedures to cover this contingency.
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1 430.12 The response will be acceptable provided that:
j (1) details of the vents are provided, or a reference to where the details of the vents may be found in the FSAR (2) details of the tornado missile protection for these vents is provided.
430.13 The response will be acceptable provided that:
(1) -the applicant demonstrates that adequate tornado missile protection is provided for the day tank vents 430.14 The respon,se is acceptable (see comments for Q 430.12) i 430.15 The response is acceptable.
430.16.
The response is acceptable.
430.17 The response will be acceptable provided that:
j (1) emergency operating procedures are developed with provisions for i
realignment of the fuel oil transfer piping prior to refilling a fuel oil storage tank, and to ensure that refilling will be completed while there is adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of operation for two diesel generators at post LOCA loads.
430.18 Not acceptable.
i The question has not been answered. The applicant should identify j
what constitutes extremely unfavorable environmental conditions, and j
then discuss how fuel oil could be delivered to the site when these conditions are present.
430.19 The response is acceptable.
430.20 Not acceptable.
You have not addressed the need for cathodic protection system in addition to tank and piping coatings and wrapping. Provide j
justification for the adequacy of the present design.
I 430.21 Not acceptable.
Sek comments for Q 430.11 regarding F.O. storage tank fill lines.
The storage tank vents are safety related. The applicant must 3
I demonstrate that failure of a vent line flame arrestor will in no i
way impair the safety function of the vent line.
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430.22 The response is acceptable.
. 430.23 The response is acceptable.
430.24 The response is acceptable.
430.25 The response is acceptable.
430.26 The response will be acceptable when:
(1) The applicant includes information which demonstrates that the vendor's testing is applicable to the diesel engines at Vogtle for the coldest ambient conditions expected at the Vogtle site.
i (2) Plant ' operating procedures include provisions for loading the diesels to near full load fcr a substantial period of time following prolonged light load operation as would occur following a LOCA with offsite power available, or a loss of one offsite power feeder.
430.27 The response is acceptable.
430.28 The response is acceptab11.
l 430.29 The response is acceptable
,l 430.30 The response is acceptable.
430.31 The response is acceptable.
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430.32 The response will be acceptable if:
ll (1) The ap licant.provides a diesel generator room low temperature alarm 50*F setpoint) which annunciates in the control room.
430.33 Not acceptable.
The applicant should provide:
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(1) a description of the pneumatic safety system including schematics, logic diagrams, and other information required for a i
complete description.
(2)seismicandqualitygroupclassificationofallcomponentsin 3
the pneumatic safety system
.(3IP&IDorvendor'sdrawingshow!ngtheenginelubeoilsystemand the interface with the pneumatic safety system
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5 430.34 Not acceptable.
The applicant has not shown how lube oil is prevented from reaching the diesel engine rocker arms during standby.
p The staff has accepted the vendor's recommendation for continuous drip lubrication to the turbocharger but augmented by full pressure lubrication to the turbocharger and rocker arms prior to starting O
for surveillance or other testing. The applicant should confom to this recommendation, or provide. justification for noncompliance.
430.35 Not acceptable.
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The applic. ant has not fully answered the question;-the applicant j
should provide the following:
b (1) a discussion of the effects on system operation of allowing lube oil level to drop to 14" above the bottom of the sump (pressure, temperature, NPSH to lube oil pump, etc.)
l (2) an explanation of how lube oil can be added via a 3"-150 lb flange without interrupting lube oil flow (3) a discussion of additional lube oil stored on site, including i
how much,' where stored, and accessibility during emergency conditions, including the seismic event
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430.'36 The response will be acceptable when complete procedures for adding lube oil have been developed.
i 430.37 Not acceptable.
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What is the manufacturer's schedule for checking lube oil, and what I
method is used to ensure confomance to manufacturer's specifications?
(i.e., spectrographic analysis, or some other method) 430.38 Not acceptable.
I The mechanical portion of the crankcase ventilation is acceptable.
However, since the crankcase vent fan (s) are not Class IE, they cannot be assumed to be available following any design basis' event requiring operation of the diesel generators. Consequently, combustible gasses will accumulate in the crankcase, and the probability of a crankcase explosion is increased significantly -
rather than precluded. There is also the possibility that codibustible gasses will leak into the diesel generator room. This is*not acceptable.
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(1) that operation of the diesel engine with crankcase pressures of 1" to 1" H O is in confomance with the vendor's recomendations 2
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(2) that the design of the diesel engine includes a built-in capability to preclude a crankcase explosion with crankcase
.]a pressures of 1" to I" H O 2
(3) that leakage of combustible gasses into the diesel generator room will not occur, or that your design will prevent Leildup of any explosive concentration of combustible gasses (4) that the design of the diesel engine included provisions to i
mitigate the consequences of a crankcase explosion with pressures up to 1" H 0 in the crankcase or provide mitigating t
featuressuchassei$micCategoryI, Class 1Eventfans i
430.39 Not acceptable.
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'"Ihe applicant should confirm that the specific recomendations of 1
the 10 CFR 21 notifications issued by the vendor regarding governor I
lube oil cooler mounting and turbocharger lubrication have been met.
l The latter subject involves 2 Part 21 notifications. (seeQ430.34) i
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430.40 The response is not comple'.e.
The applicant should also provide all other design parameters; i.e.,
i cooling water temperature in and out, flow rates, and lube oil temperature in and out, all at maximum conditions.
-l 430.41 Not acceptable.
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j The applicant should expand the responses to include the following:
(1) Classification for the design, fabrication, and inspection of the exhaust system; 1.e., ANSI B31.1 with ASME III stress allowables, or ASME.III with temperature exception (code case)
(2)Industrycodesandstandardsusedbythemanufacturerfor silencers (intake and exhaust) and intake filters and show they are seismic Category I and Quality Group C.
430.42 The response is acceptable from the power systems standpoint.
1 However, other portions of the' staff may have concerns regarding the
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,adeguacy of the tornado missile protection.
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Nof, acceptable - clarification required.
430.43 l
The missile protection described in the resaonse and shown on Figure i
410.07-1 do not agree with the exhaust stac( termination as shown on e
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Also, the response reads that exhaust stack missile protection will be similar" to that shown on Figure 410.07-1. The applicant should identify any design differences, or 4
provide specific details of the exhaust stack missile protection to
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be used.
e 430.44 flot acceptable.
j The applicant has not addressed the potential for clogging of the screened air intake opening as a consequence of abnomal climatic 1
conditions. Also, the description of the diesel engine exhaust at the roof of the diesel generator building does not agree with exhaust missile protection described in the response to Q 430.43.
The applicant should revise the response to reflect the actual exhaust termination, and then address the staff's concerns regarding the effects.of abnormal climatic conditions.
430.45 Not acceptable.
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In accorc3nce with the recommendations of NUREG-CR/0660, it is the staff position that diesel generator electrical and control panels should be dust tight, and that individual relays within the panels be fitted with dust covers. The applicant should revise its design accordingly, or provide justification for noncompliance.
430.46 Not acceptable - clarification required.
i Part C of the response is not clear. The applicant implies that the i.
diesel generator keep warm systems (jacket water and prelube) will only be used when diesel generator room temperature is below 50*F.
If this is the applicant's design it is not acceptable. It is the staff position that diesel engines should be maintained near nomal operating temperatures during standby in order to enhance first try starting reliability. Also.the applicant indicates that the jacket 4
water and lube oil keep wam systems are designed on the basis of 50'F. The applicant should explain what measures will be used to
-3 maintain diesel generator temperature and prevent freezing if the i
diesel generator room temperature falls below 50'F. The response snould include details of alams and/or other indications which will alert the operator to low tamperature in the diesel generator room.
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430.47 The response is acceptable.
430.48 The response is acceptable.
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The. response is. acceptable.
430.50 Not acceptable.
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.10.2, and should include steam extraction valves as well as turbine
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430.51 The response is acceptable.
430.52 Mot acceptable - clarification required.
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Paragraphs 10.4.4.1.2.C and 10.4.4.2.1 of the FSAR do not agree.
430.53 The response is acceptable.
-430.54 A.
The revision note on Figure 8.2.1-2 indicates that the Waynesboro line has been deleted; however FSAR Figure 8.1-1 still 'shows that line existing. FSAR Figures 8.1-1 and 8.2.1-2 also show the Scherer line emanating from the station in opposite directions. Please clarify these discrepancies.
I Provide a revised FSAR Figure. 1.2.2-1 which shows the current line arrangement on the rights-of-way as they approach the 500 1
kV and 230 kV switchyards.
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B.
Response is acceptable.
j 430.55 Response is acceptable.
430.56 Response is acceptable.
430.57 Response is acceptable.
430.58 Response is acceptable.
'l 430.59 Respose is acceptable provided the final resolution to question 430.25, regarding the light loading capability of the diesel generator, agrees that the diesel can run for the time the plant is allowed to operate by the Technical Specification for loss of one offsite source. This should be without the need for paralleling the
,3 diesel generator to the remaining offsite source. The staff will also require that the Vogtle Technical-Specifications prohibit operation of both Class IE trains from the same reserved auxiliary i~,
transformer during normal operation since one RAT does not have sufficient capacity to supply both Class IE buses simultaneously.
..j 430.60 Pesponse is acceptable.
430.61 A.: Response is acceptable.
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Response is acceptable.
C.
The response with regard to the use of regulating transformers as isolation devices states that a secondary hot short on the I
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.l transfomers would produce results similar to that identified ij for a secondary short circuit with no degrading effect on the primary side of the transfomers. Describe specifically what the effects are for a secondary hot short in terms of voltage, frequency, current and time on the primary side of the transfomer. The effects of a 120 V ac and 480 V ac hot short
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1 which may be out of phase and slightly different frequency from the voltage on the primary side should also be addressed.
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Provide analysis or test results which support your conclusions.
+f Also provide analysis or test results which support your conclusions that the transformer primary current reduces to 90%
upon application of a secondary short circuit. Also address the o
effects of high impedance faults and overloads on the regulating j
transf,ormers.
i 430.61 See question 430.61 c. for comments on regulating transfomers used as isolation devices.
With regard to motor space heaters in Class 3E inotors, what portion of the space heater circuit is non Class IE7 If the heaters themselves are not Class IE qualified, describe how physical separation and electrical isolation is.provided between the motor i
and the heater. The two circuit breakers which provide isolation
. I between the 480 V bus and the 120 V heater circuits should both be l'l qualified as Class IE, coordinated with the upstream 480 V bus main j
breaker, and periodically tested. Verify this is the case.
Regarding the non Class 1E monitor light boxes located on the main l ;
control boards, the circuit breakers and fuses located in the j ;
primary and secondary respectively of the 120/24 Y transfomers
- i should be qualified Class IE, coordinated with the upstream li protective device, and periodically tested. Verify that this is the case. Also describe how physical separation is provided between.the monitor light boxes and Class 1E components located an the main
.j control board.
f FSAR Table 3.2.2-1 (sheet 86 of 97) also identifies Tlass IE 320 V ac power system distribution panels as non IE and not safety N
related. Explain why they are not qualified and what isolation and j
separation is provided from Class IE qualified scaponents.
H 430.63 Response is acceptable.
430.64 A.
The response states that the smallest conductar size used for any power circuit is No.12 AWG and the: cables are protected by
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e the magnetic only-trip circuit breakers as indicated in Figure lj
~-8.3.1-7, sheet 1. ' Figurc 8.3.1-7 in fact shows that some of the l.i power feeders are not protected by the magnetic only circuit I
breakers for values of high impedance fault current below a certain level. However, the figure also shows there are I
redundant thermal magnetic circuit breakers in these circuits F
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which will protect the feeders over this range of fault currents. This is acceptable for protection of the power feeders. See question 430.74 for comments on the use of the magnetic only circuit breakers as backup overcurrent protection
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for the electrical penetrations.
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Response is acceptable.
i C.
Response is acceptable.
430.65
-Response is acceptable.
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430.66 A.
Response is acceptable.
B.
Respon'se is acceptable.
430.67 Response is acceptable.
430.68 A. Response is acceptable.
1 B.
Are the transient voltage values given in this response taken at i
the terminals of the equipment being started? If it is not the i
voltage at the terminals of the equipment being started, please provide this infomation.
The response indicates that the worst case steady state voltage at the 120 V level is 85.3% on space heaters. If there are any additional 120 V loads which have greater than this worst case value but lest than 90% voltage at their teminals, please identify them and provide justification for their continuous operation at less than 90% voltage.
The response states that because degraded voltage conditions are abnomal conditions, justifiable deviations from specified 1
operating conditions have been allowed. Are the deviations i
referred to limited to those specifically identified in this response or are there others? If there are others identify them j
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C.
Response is acceptable.
4 D.
Response is acceptable.
430.69 A.
Response is acceptable.
B.. Response is acceptable.
~C.' The response states 1: hat comprehensive functional tests were 9
_i performed on a test prototype of the sequencer and it operated successfully in accordance with design logic. Describe the 4
functional tests which were performed. Has this sequencer 1
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.j design been used in other nuclear power plants? If so, identify 4
the plants it has been used in.
11 Are the manual controls, fo. safety loads which are actuated by
~1 the sequencer, entirely independent of the sequencer, or are t:I portions of the sequencer circuits used in the manual actuation i1 circuitry (through such things as pemissives, blocks, or use of
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430.70 Response is acceptable.
430.71 Response is acceptable.
i 430.72 The response is unacceptable. It does not address the question.
'i The motor ' service factor and operation at 90% voltage cannot be applied simultaneously. NEMA MG 1 section MG 1-12.47A and MG 1-14.35A specify that the service. factor can be applied to the notor only when it is operated at its rated voltage and frequency. It does not allow use of the service factor when the motor is operated at less than rated voltage. Section MG 1-20.13 of the NEMA standard in fact specifies that the service factor for large apparatus
-i induction motors be 1.0 and recomends the use of a higher i
horsepower rating in those applications requiring an overload capacity.
Il Section 9 of ANSI C50.41-1977 (Polyphase Induction Motors for Power Generating Stations) also specifies that the service factor is to be used at rated voltage and frequency.
In light of the foregoing, justify the ability of the centrifugal charging pumps to operate into their service factor range under less than rated voltage.
430.73' A.. The staff is presently reviewing the list of valves which i
require power lockout to insure it is a complete list of all valves which require this feature.
If additional valves are identified, the means used to lockout power to them will also j
require review.
l The response states that redundant indication is provided at indicator light boxes ZLB6 and ZLB7. Identify which of the i
indication circuits shown'in Figures 437.73-1 through 8 are connected to these light boxes.
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Describe the means by which you will insure that the control
. power lockout contacts are in their correct position. Also
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. address ?.he acceptability of undetectable failures occurring in the lockcut circuitry which would render the lockout ineffective against certain types of failures.
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B.. The response indicates that the accumulator isolation valves i
circuit breakers will be disengaged from the bus during reactor i
power operations, but note 7 on Figures 430.73-9, 11, and 12 and
- i note 8 on Figure 430.73-10 seem to contradict thfe
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'j clarify.
- C.
From drawings 430.73-9 through 12, it appears t.t the
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handswitch indicator lights used for accumulator valve position indication will~be deenergized when the valve motor circuit breaker is removed as required during reactor power operation.
'If this is so, describe how position indication will be provided for the accumulator isolation valves in order to comply with
_ position B.2 of ICSB-4. Is the power supply to this position indication independent of that to the critical function alarm 1
for th'e accumulator isolation valves?
430.74 A.
Response is acceptable.
B.
Response is acceptable.
j C.
Response is acceptable.
. -ll D.
Response.is acceptable.
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,i E.
It is still not clear from the revised load center protection curves that the fuses will' clear a single phasing condition on the motors before penetration damage will occur. Since the single phasing condition can occur as a result of two ground faults or a single line-to-line fault, even on an ungrounded system this condition should be protected by two overcurrent r
devices if the resulting currents can damage penetration integrity. Please respond.
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F. Response is acceptable.
-G.
Response is acceptable.
i H.
The response indicates that redundant protection is not needed
,i below the minimum postulated fault current values. - Minimum postulated fault currents are generally calculated on the basis of a low impedance fault under conditions when operating from a limited fault current source and fault current contributions from other sources (such as motors) is minimal. The purpose is to assure that sufficient fault current is available to quickly and reliably operate overcurrent devices. This does not imply
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- .that overcurrents less than that value cannot exist (such as
. those.due to high' impedance faults and locked rotor conditions). Describe the basis on which your minimum fault current levels are calculated and how faults below that level
- L are eliminated. Your reply should address all the cases in the l!
revised protection curves where the magnetic only circuit
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-breakers do not provide protection over the entire range of the penetration thermal capability curve.
I With regard to the inverter shown in revised (Amendment 7)
Figure 8.3.1-1 (sheet 11), provide its rated output voltage and C
current. Also indicate the basis on which the maximum fault
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current was calculated. If the active current limiting capability of the inverter was used to limit the calculated arount of available fault current, provide the value of maximum fault current available if this feature is~ lost. If this value of. fault current exceeds the continuous rating of the penetration (to maintain mechanical integrity) two over-current devices should be used to protect the penetration.
I 430.75 A.
Respon'se is acceptable.
B.
The response is not acceptable. The staff has not endorsed the 1581 version of IEEE 384. The response also states that because the non Class 1E circuit is confined to metallic conduit or sheath any resultant cable damage to the non Class IE cables would be confined within the conduit and not affect any cables in any adjacent raceways. No analyses supported by tests, however, have been provided to support this conclusion. There is a potential that the heat rise of the conduit due to the faulted cable inside or due to a fault of the internal cable to i
the conduit could damage adjacent Class IE circuits. ~ This should be addressed by analysis supported by tests.
C.
Response is acceptable.
D.
Response is acceptable.
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E.
Response is acceptable.
l 430.76 Response is acceptable.
1 430.77 Response is acceptable, j
430.78 Response is ~ acceptable.
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430.79 Response is acceptable.
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430.80 Response is acceptable.
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430.81 I. Respon.se is' acceptable.
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Response ~ is acceptable, however, other portions of the st'aff are reviewing the acceptability of flooding the instrumentation dJ transmitters identified in revised (Amendment 9) FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.10.
Address whether flooding of the instrumentation j
will cause adverse effects on Class 1E power supplies.
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430.82 The response is not acceptable. It addresses the total qualified number of valve cycles over the 40 year life of the plant. ~The
. i staff is concerned with the short term duty cycle of the valve j
motors and whether that duty cycle is compatible with the way they i
actually may be operated during an event. That is, if a motor i
operated valve is potentially required to cycle a larger number of l
times during a specific event than the number of cycles for which it is designed, the motor may overheat and become inoperable.
t Therefore, provide the short tenn duty cycle (number of starts per minute, per half-hour,- per hour, etc) of the identified motor operated valves and compare this to the worst case number of times the valve may be required to cycle during a specific event.
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