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UNITED STATES
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OCT 18 1954
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MEMORANDUM FOR: N ' e % a m & T d = T M - W_ J for Licensing
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- Division of Licensing FROM:
William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Materials, Chemical & Environmental Technology Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT -
V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 & 2 DOCKET N05. 50-424/425 Plant Name:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2 Docket No.:
50-424/425 Milestone No.:
N/A Responsible Branch & Project Manager:
M. Miller CMEB Reviewer:
R. Eberly Requested Completion Date:
October 1, 1984 Review Status:
14 Open Items Enclosed is the fire protection safety evaluation report.
The Chemical
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Engineering Branch reviewed the Fire Protection Program through Amend-ment 10 for conformance with the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800)
Section 9.5.1, dated July 1981.
This document includes BTP ASB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
Because the licensee has compared his program to the latter guidelines, our report also references these guidelines.
We have not yet made a fire protection review site visit because the construction of the plant has not progressed to the level when such a visit would be meaningful. We expect to have our site visit in 1985.
The following are the remaining fire protection open items:
1.
Fire Hazards Analysis BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.1.b 2.
Fire Brigade BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.3 3.
Fire Doors BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a 4.
Fire Dampers BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a 5.
Soundproofing Materials BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a 6.
Safe Shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.b 7.
Alternate Shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.c 8.
' Power Supplies for Ventilation BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.f 9.
Fire Detection BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.a 10.
Valve Supervision BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 11s Automatic SprinR1er Systems BTP CHEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 12.
Standpipes BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 13.
Halon 1301 Systems BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.d 14.
Control Room Complex BTP CHEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b
Contact:
R. Eberly xt+
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OCT18 es4 Thomas Novak --
Several areas of the fire protection program are being reviewed by other branches and will be reported in other sections of the SER, as follows:
Branch Item Section EPLB Offsite Emergency Planning 13.3 LQB Fire Brigade Training Program 13.2.2 LQB Fire Protection Organization 13.1 LQB Fire Protection Plan Procedures 13.5 LQB Technical Specifications 16.0 QAB Fire Protection QA Program 17.0 Our SALP input is attached.
Yi[N YhAY William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Materials, Chemical & Environmental Technology Division of Engineering
Enclosures:
As stated
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Contact:
R. Eberly x24302 cc:
R. Vollmer D. Eisenhut D. Crutchfield F. Rosa
- 0. Parr M. Srinivasan E. Adensam M. Miller V. Benaroya R. Ferguson T. Sullivan S. Pawlicki l
J. Taylor R. Eberly AE00 S. Ebneter, Reg. I T. Conlon, Reg. II l
C. Norelius, Reg. III l
E. Johnson, Reg. IV D. Kirsch, Reg. V
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Chemical Engineering Branch / Fire Protection Section Draft Safety Evaluation Report Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Docket Nos. 50-424/425 9.5.1 Fire Protection We have reviewed the fire protection program, as described in the FSAR through Amendment 10 for conformance with SRP 9.5.1 (NUREG-0800) which contains in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, the technical requirements of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
Because the applicant has compared his program to the latter guidelines, this report also references these guidelines.
In response to our request for an evaluation of the fire protection program against the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, the applicant, transmitted his fire protection evaluation report.
At the same time,'the applicant also provided an evaluation against the p
requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 and BTP CMEB 9.5-1 (NUREG-0800, 7
July 1981).
As part of this review, we will visit the plant site to examine the relationship of safety-related components, systems, and structures in specific plant areas to both combustible materials and to associated fire detection and suppression systems.
The site visit has not yet been conducted because the construction has not progressed to a level where such a visit would be meaningful.
Our review included an evaluation of the automatic and manually operated water and gas suppression systems, the fire detection systems, fire barriers, fire doors and dampers, fire protection administrative con-trols, and the fire brigade size.
Theobjectiveofthereviewisto ensure that in the event of a fire, personnel and plant equipment would be adequate to safely shutdown the reactor, to maintain the plant in a
' safe shutdown condition, and to minimize the release of radioactive material to the environment.
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i Our consultant, Rolf Jensen and Associates, Inc., participated in the review of the fire protection program.
We will require that the fire protection program be operational before initial fuel loading.
C.1 Fire Protection Program Requirements a.
Fire Protection Program The applicant's fire protection program is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5-1 and the Fire Protection Evaluation Report.
Based on our review, we conclude that the applicant's program conforms to the technical requirements in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
b.
Fire Hazards Analysis
- p The applicant's fire hazard analysis specified the combustible materials present in fire areas, identified safety-related equipment, determined the consequences of a fire on safe shutdown capability, and summarized available fire protection in accordance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.1.b.
Our evaluation of the identified fire hazards is in the para-graphs below.
Alternative shutdown capability has been provided for the control room and cable spreading room.
The capability also is evaluated below.
GDC 3, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that " Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that rupture or in' advertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capabilty of those structures, systems and components." To satisfy this requirement, the applicant has designed the components required for hot shutdown so that the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems will not adversely affect the operability
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.s of these components. Where necessary, appropriate protection is provided to prevent impingement of water spray on components required for hot shutdown.
Redundant trains of components that are susceptible to damage from water spray are physically separated so that manual fire suppression activities will not adversely affect the operability of cceponents not involved in the postulated fire. However, we are concerned that the mechanism by which fire and fire fighting systems may cause the simultaneous failure of redundant or diverse trains has been adequately considered in the design. lie will require that the applicant identify such mechanisms that were considered in his fire hazards analysis and the measures taken to preclude the fire or fire suppressant induced failure of redundant or diverse safety trains.
C.2 Administrative Controls The administrative controls for fire protection consist of the fire I
protection program and organization, the fire brigade training, the
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controls over combustibles and ignition sources, the prefire plans and procedures for fighting fires, and quality assurance.
Based on our review, we find that the administrative controls confom to the guidelines in BTP CNEB 9.5-1, Item C.2, and are, therefore, acceptable.
C.3 Fire Brigade and Fire Brigade Training The applicant has comitted te provide a fire brigade which will be composed of five members per shift.
The applicant has provided a description of the plant fire brigade, including equipment and' training, to meet the guidelines contained in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.3.
The fire brigade leader is the only person identified as being knowledgeable in safety-related systems.
This does not meet our guidelines. We will require the applicant to provide training in accordance with Section C.3 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 which states that the fire brigade leader and at least two brigade members should have sufficient training in or knowledge of plant
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safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants en saf2 shutdown capability.
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C.5 General Plant Guidelines a.
Building Design.
Fire areas are defined by walls and floor / ceiling assemblies. Walls f
that separate buildings and walls between rooms containing safe shut-down systems are 3-hour fire-rated assemblies.
In cases where the fire rating is less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, we have evaluated each individual area with respect to its fuel load, fire suppression and detection systems, and proximity to safe shutdown equipment to detemine if the fire-rated assemblies provided are adequate for the areas affected and meet the guidelines in Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
Based on.this evaluation,
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we find that the protection provided meets our guidelines.
The applicant will provide penetration seals for all penetrations of fire rated walls or floor / ceiling assemblies.
The penetration seals have been subjected to qualification tests using the time-temperature h
curve specified by ASTM Standard E-119, " Fire Test of Building Con-Y-
struction and Materials." A maximum temperature rise of 325'F will be used as acceptance criteria in accordance with Section C.S.a of our guidelines.
The applicant will provide masonry 2-hour rated fire barriers for the plant enclosed stairwells.
This complies with Section C.S.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Door openings in fire barriers will be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames and hardware except for watertight doors (which are not fire rated by UL), pressure retaining doors (which will have a certificate of UL label construction applfed by the vendor), and security doors (which will have a certificate of UL label construction applied by the vendor).
The applicant also states that only those fire doors which serve a securf ty g
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.-.a function are electrically supervised and monitored in the main control Doors designed to remain open to maintain post-accident (pipe break) room.
pressures within design limits are nomally held open and released only upon detection of smoke. Other doors are kept closed. Based on our review, we will require the applicant to indicate the type of door and the method of supervision provided for each door opening in the plant that is not a labelled fire door assembly. The applicant should also justify the adequacy of the special purpose doors when used in rated fire barriers. This infomation is needed for us to independently detemine that door openings in fire barriers meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.a(5).
Ventilation ducts that penetrate fire barriers are provided with fire dampers.
The applicant states that 17 oversize fire dampers are used that do not bear a UL label. This does not comply with Section C.S.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
We will require the applicant to provide fire dampers that are tested and approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory for all HVAC penetrations of
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fire harriers.
All transfomers installed inside buildings are of the dry type. Oil-filled outdoor transfonners are located more than 50 feet away from buildings containing safety-related equipment, and confinement dikes are provided.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the installation of the transfomers meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Sections C.S.a(12) and (13) and is, l
therefore, acceptable, r
Interior wall and structural components, themal insulation and radiation shielding mater.ials are noncombustible.
The FSAR indicates that interior l
finish materials have flame spread, fuel contributed, and smoke developed ratings of 25 or less.
The applicant has not stated the qualifications of soundproofing materials. We will requiro the applicant to verify that soundproofing materials also meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section l
,C.5.a(9).
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c.
Metal roof deck construction is Rt listed Class 1.
We conclude this meets the guidelines in Section C.5.a(10) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
Floor drains are provided to renove fire protection water from all safety-related areas.
Drains in areas of conbustible liquids have provisions for preventing back flow of combustible liquids to safety-related areas through interconnecting drain piping. We conclude that the plant floor drain system meets the guidelines in Section C.S.a(14) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
b.
Sa fe Shutdown Capability Our review of safe shutdown capability is ongoing and will be addressed in a supplement to this SER.
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c.
Alternate or Dedicated Shutdown Capability s
y Our review of alternate or dedicated shutdown capability is ongoing and will be addressed in a supplement to this SER.
d.
Control of Combustibles The storage of flammable liquids complies with flFPA 30.
Compressed gases are stored either outdoors or in nonsafety-related structures, except for small quantities of canpressed gases used in the laboratory.
Hydrogen lines in sa'fety-related areas are designed to Seismic Class 1 requirements.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that control of combustibles is in accordance with the guidelines of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Section C.S.d and is, therefore, acceptable.
e.
Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays, and Cable Penetrations All cable trays are noncombustible.
All cables except some inside cabinets and thosa in tha turbine ganar-1 tor, are spacified to pass, as a ninimum, the IEEE 333 flama tast.
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Line-type detectors are provided in the containment, and other detector types are provided in other areas.
Automatic sprinkler protection is provided for areas containing concentrations of cable trays.
Based on our review, we conclude that electrical cable construction, cable trays and penetrations meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.e.
and are, therefore, acceptable.
f.
Ventilation Air conditioning, ventilation or exhaust systems which could be utilized for discharging smoke or gas directly to the atmosphere are provided.
Release paths 'for potentially contaminated smoke and gas are continuously moni tored.
Power supplies and controls for mechanical ventilation systems will be run outside the fire area served, where practical.
This does not meet the f '93 guidelines in Section C.5.f. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
We will require the applicant
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to demonstrate that a single fire will not disable both trains of ventila. tion needed for safety-related areas.
Air intake and exhaust ventilation dampers in areas protected by total flooding gas extinguishing systems are provided with mechanisms that will close them upon actuation of the suppression system.
Stairwells are provided with self-closing doors designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.
Charcoal filters are protected in acccrdance with Reg. Guide 1.52. We find this acceptable, g.
Lighting and Communication Fixed, self-contained lighting units with individual 8-hour battery power supplies are installed in all areas that will be manned for shutdown and for access and egress routes thereto.
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Fixed emergency comunications, independent of the nomal plant communications system, are installed at pre-selected stations.
If repeaters are necessary for operation of the portable radio system, they will be provided. We find this acceptable.
Based on our review, we conclude that lighting and communication systems are provided in accordance with the guidelines in Section C.S.g and are, therefore, acceptable.
VI. Fire Detection and Suppression a.
Fire Detection A fire detection system is provided for all areas containing safety-related equipment and for all areas that present a fire exposure to safety-related equipment.
The system complies with NFPA 720 for a Class A system, except for the circuits which actuate the pre-action sprinkler system valves.
These circuits are Class 8 circuits.
If a fault occurs in these circuits a
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trouble sfgnal occurs which automatically trips the pre-action valve.
We find this an acceptable level of protection in lieu of providing Class A Supervision, as it will pemit automatic operaton of the pre-action systems j
after a fault occurs.
A backup power supply exists for the fire detection system with access to the Class lE diesel, switching manually, and a 4-hour battery backup power supply for the suppression actuation system with no access to the. Class lE l
diesels.
The applicant did not provide enough infomation for us to verify that this is in accordance with our guidelines. We will require the applicant to
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confirm that primary and secondary power supplies for the fire detection f,
system and for electrically operated control valves for automatic suppression I
systems meet the guidelinis of 9TP C:!E3 9.5-1, Section C.6.a(S),
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The applicant states that NFPA 72E will be used for guidance for fire detectors selected and installed in the plant, but does not indicate how the detectors might vary from these requirements.
We will require the applicant to confirm that the fire detectors meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.6.a(3).
Fire Protection Water Supply System The fire protection water supply consists of two 100 percent capacity diesel-driven fire pumps in the north fire pump house, and one 100 percent capacity electrically-driven fire pump in the south fire pump house.
Each pump can satisfy 100% of the fire protection water demand.
The two diesel-driven pumps share a common discharge line.
The motor-driven pump utilizes 4160-V switchgear instead of an NFPA 20 pump controller.
The applicant provided a line-by-line comparison of the 4160 volt controller to the requirements of NFPA 20.
We have evaluated the comparison and conclude that the 4160 volt controller is an acceptable deviation from SectionC.6.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
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The diesel driven fire pumps and the electric pump are separately connected to buried water main loop around the plant, thereby providing two independent pumping sources.
Pressure on the fire protection water system is maintained byjockeypumps.
Each fire pump capacity is 2500 gpm.
The greatest water demand for the fixed fire suppression system is 2000 gpm.
Coupled with 500 gpm.for hose streams, this creates a total water demand of 2500 gpm. We find that the water supply system can deliver the required water demand with one pump out of service.
The source of water for the fire protection system is two 300,000 gallon capacity water tanks.
Yard hydrants are provided at intervals of less than 250 ft along the fire protection water supply loop.
The lateral to each yard hydrant
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is provided with a key operated isolation valve to facilitate hydrant maintenance and repairs without shutting down any part of the fire water supply system.
Standard hose houses are provided in accordance with NFPA Std. 24.
Approved post-indicator sectional control valves are provided to isolate portions of the underground main for maintenance or repair without shutting off the supply to primary and backup fire suppression systems that serve areas containing or exposing safety-related systems.
Supervision has not been provided for all valves in the fire protection water supply system in accordance with our guidelines and NFPA 26.
We will require the applicant to meet the guidelines in Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
c.
Sprinkler and Standpipe Systems
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The applicant states that NFPA Standards 13 and 15 have been used as' guidance in the design of wet pipe sprinkler systems, deluge systems, and pre-action systems, but has not indicated how these systems might vary from the applicable standards.
We will require that the applicant meet NFPA Standards 13 and 15 or identify and justify any deviations from Section C.6.c of our guidelines.
Each automatic sprinkler system and interior hose standpipe is supplied through separate connections from the yard main or from the internal cross connections through buildings to ensure that no single failure in the water supply system will impair both the primary and backup fire protection in building areas.
Each sprinkler and standpipe system connection to the distribution system is equipped with an indicating gate valve so that groups of sprinkler systems and/or manual hose stations can be isolated without interrupting the supply to other sprinkler systems and manual hose stations connected to the same header.
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-> The applicant states that manual hose stations are located throughout the plant using NFPA ?4 for guidance, but has not indicated how the standpipes and hose stations might vary from this standard. We will require the applicant to comply with NFPA 14 or identify and justify any deviations from Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
A Seismic Category, dry standpipe is provided for the control building, containment, auxiliary building and diesel generator buildings.
We find this acceptable.
D.
Halon Suppression Systems Total flooding Halon 1301 systems are provided for the two shutdown panel rooms, the computer room, the cable spreading room termination cabinets, and five non-sa'fety-related areas in the control building. '
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The applicant states that the use of Halon systems is guided by NFPA Standard 12A but has not indicated how they might vary from this standard.
We will require the applicant to comply with NFPA 12A or identify and justify any deviations from Section C.6.0 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
F.
Portable Extinguishers Portable fire extinguishers are provided to conform with the guidelines of NFPA 10.
We find this acceptable.
Based *on our review, we conclude that the extinguishers meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.6.f and are, therefore, acceptable.
2 VII. Fire Protection of Specific Plant Areas a.
Containment The reactor coolant pumps will be equipped with an oil collection system.
The oil collection system will be designed and installed so that failure
will not lead to fire during normal or design oasis accident conditions and so that there will be reasonable assurance that the system will withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.
The collection systems will be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems.
Fire detection is provided at major fire hazards, including the reactor coolant pumps, charcoal filters, and safety-related cable trays.
Hose stations are provided inside the containment.
Each hose station is equipped with 100 feet of 1-1/2-inch diameter hose.
During normal operation, the standpipe is dry. Autanatically actuated deluge systems are provided for charcoal filters.
Normally, dry pre-action sprinkler systems are.prnvided below the reactor coolant pumps and in areas of high cable tray concentrations.
b Based on our review, we conclude that the fire protection provided for containment meets the guidelines in Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
B.
Control Room Complex The control rocm canplex is separated from all other areas of the olant by 3-hour-rated assemblies.
Peripheral rocas are separated fran the main control room by 3-hour-rated barriers. Automatic suppression has not been provided in all peripheral rooms.
This does not comolv with our guidelines.
We will require these rooms to be provided with automatic suppression and detection in accordance with Section C.7.b of BTP CMEP 9.5-1.
All cables entering the control roan terminate there. tJo cables are routed through the control room from one area to another.
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The only cables in the ceiling area are needed for the control room lighting system.
Ionization smoke detectors have been installed in the control room but not inside the individual cabinets and consoles within the. control room.
This does not comply with our guidelines. We will require the applicant to provide smoke detectors in the control room cabinets and consoles in accordance with the guidelines in Section C.7.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The applicant has provided an alternate shutdown system for the control room.
The alternate shutdown system is reviewed in Section C.5.c of this report.
The outside air intakes for the control room ventilation system are equipped with smoke detectors that alarm in the control room.
In the event of a fire, the smoke venting systems can be manually initiated to purge smoke from the c-f cont'rol room, or isolated to preclude smoke from entering the control room.
c.
Cable Spreading Rooms The cable spreading rooms are separated from each other and the balance of the plant by 3-hour fire-rated walls and floor / ceiling assemblies.
All penetrations through fire-rated barriers are fitted with 3-hour fire-rated dampers and/or 3-hour fire-rated penetration seals.
Each cable spreading room contains only one division of safe shutdown cables.
Automatic pre-action sprinkler systems and smoke detection systems are the primary fire suppression system for each cable spreading room.
The primary fire suppression system for termination cabinets is an automatic Halon 1301 system actuated by smoke detectors in the cabinets.
Back-up fire suppression "is provided by water hose stations located in stairwells avjacent to the cable spreading room.
The ventilation system is designed to isolute the room upon actuation of the fire suppression system.
Smoke venting can be manually accccplished.
- - Based on our review, we conclude that the cable spreading rooms meet our guidelines in Section C.7.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, and are, therefore, acceptable.
e.
Switchgear Rooms The switchgear rooms are separated from each other and from other plant areas by 3-hour fire-rated walls and floor / ceiling assemblies.
Each switchgear room contains only one division of equipment and cables.
Automatic fire detection is provided.
Manual protection is provided by standpipe hose stations and portable extinguishers.
Floor drains have been provided in the switchgear rooms.
Based on our review, we conclude that the protection provided for the switchgear rooms is in accordance with our guidelines in Section C.7.e of.BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
f.
Remote Safety-Related Panels Redundant safety-related panels remote from the main control room are separated by barriers having a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Based on our review, we conclude that the protection provided for remote safety-related panels meets the guidelines in Section C.7.f of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
g.
Safety-Related Battery Rooms The safety-related battery rooms are separated from each other and from the balance of the plant by 3-hour fire-rated barriers.
A smoke detection system is provided in each battery room.
Hose stations and portable fireextinguishersareavailableinadjacentareas. The ventilation system, consisting of two 100 percent capacity exhaust fans, is designed to maintain the hydrogen concentration in each room below 2 percent by volume.
' Air flow monitors that alarm in the control room, annunciate the loss of fan operation.
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e Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the fire protection for the safety-related battery rooms meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.g and is, therefore, acceptable.
i.
Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms The emergency diesel generators are in individual rooms separated from each other.and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
The primary fire suppression systems for each diesel generator room is an automatic pre-action sprinkler system.
Detection is provided in each diesel generator enclosure.
A diesel fuel oil day tank of 1250 gallon capacity is located in a separately enclosed area of each diesel generator room, separated from the diesel generators by 3-hour rated walls.
Each enclosure has a capacity of 200 percent of tank volume to compensate for oil leakage and accumulated fire fighting water.
[j The, capacity of the day tank exceeds our guidelines' recommended capacity of 1100 gallons.
Because of the protection provided, we find this acceptable.
Based on our review, we conclude the protection provided for the diesel generator rooms, with the approved deviation, meets the guidelines in Section C.7.i of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Other Plant Areas The applicant's fire hazards analysis addressed other plant areas not specifically discussed in this report.
We find that the fire protec-tion for these areas is.in accordance with the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and is, therefore, acceptable.
. Conclusion l
The following are the open fire protection items:
1.
Fire Hazards Analysis BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.b 2.
Fire Brigade BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.3 3.
Fire Doors BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a 4.
Fire Dampers BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a 5.
Soundproofing Materials BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a 2
6.
Safe Shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.b 7.
Alternate Shutdown BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.c 8.
Power Supplies for Ventilation BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.f 9.
Fire Detection BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.a 10.
Valve Supervision BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 11.
Automatic Sprinkler Systems BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 12.
Standpipes BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c
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Halon 1301 Systems BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.d 14.
Control Room Complex BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.b Summary of Deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 1.
Fire Pump Controllers BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.c 2.
Diesel Generator Daytank Capacity BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.7.g 4
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