ML20134M771

Part 21 Rept Re Potential for Four Valves in HPI Lines to Become Inoperable If Postulated Single Failure Resulted in Total Loss of Cable Tray.Six Cables for Two Valves in HPI Line Removed from Tray & Routed Through Separate Conduits

ML20134M771
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/29/1985
From:	Sailer W GILBERT/COMMONWEALTH, INC. (FORMERLY GILBERT ASSOCIAT
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
REF-PT21-85-389-000 PT21-85-389, PT21-85-389-000, NUDOCS 8509040249
Download: ML20134M771 (2)

Text

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• Gil b e rt / C o m m o n w ea lt h engineers and consuitants GILBERT / COMMONWEALTH. INC.. P.O. Box 1498. Reading, PA 19603/Tel. 215 775-2600/ Cable GilasoclTelex 836-431 August 29, 1985 W.F. SAILER Vice President & General Manager Quality Assurance Division United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, DC 20555 Attention:

Mr. J. M. Taylor Re: Reportable Condition Makeup System (HPI Function)

Valve Circuits

Dear Mr. Taylor:

This documents my report by telephone under the provisions of 10CFR21, on August 29, 1985, at approx N tely 10:30 a.m. to Mr. R. Singh.

Individual Who Reported Mr. W. F. Sailer, Vice President and General Manager, Quality Assurance Division, Gilbert /Commmonwealth, Inc.

Facility Involved Crystal River Unit 3, operated by the Florida Power Corporation.

Activity / Component Involved Cable routing for High Pressure Injection (HPI) Valves.

Nature of the Defect The potential existed for all four valves in the HPI lines to become inoperable if a postulated single failure resulted in the total loss of a cable tray.

Power cupplies and circuits for HPI line valves were originally designed and routed to be in compliance with separation criteria for safety systems. A design modification was implemented in 1979 to reduce single failure vulnerability on B&W plants. The modification facilitated the connection of any of the four HPI valves to either of the engineered safeguards power supplies. Safety system separation was maintained for this unique modification by routing the circuits for each HPI valve in separate conduits.

During a recent modification (Outage V) for the addition of remote shutdown capability, a single cable tray was added and utilized to 8509040249 850829 iq PDR ADOCK 050 2

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Page 2 August 29, 1985 J

l replace the existing conduits' carrying the circuits for all four HPI valves.

The utilization of a single cable tray.for all four HPI valve circuits, which could have resulted in loss' of separation, was detected and corrected during the outage V modification.

This condition does not exist for other safety system circuits on the l

Crystal River Project, or other projects designed by Gilbert / Commonwealth, l

Inc.

Date Information Obtained The Quality Assurance Division General Manager was informed on August 29, 1985, that this condition is reportable.

i Corrective Action Six cables for two valves in High Pressure Injection Line A were removed from the tray and routed through separated conduits on August 3 and 4, 1985.

As this has been determined to be an isolated case, no further corrective action is required.

If you require any further information, please call me at (215)775-2600, Extension 7543.

i e

4 Vice President and General Manager l

l Quality Assurance Division I

WFS:kb cc:

H. Lorenz C. D. Williams 1

E. M. Good

- Florida Power Corp.

B. A. Taylor - Florida Power Corp.

l J. M. Taylor - (2) - USNRC -

1 G. G. Zech - Vendor Program Branch, ' NRC i

Document Management Branch, NRC l

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