ML20132E566
| ML20132E566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1985 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132E501 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-369-84-36, 50-370-84-34, NUDOCS 8507170742 | |
| Download: ML20132E566 (14) | |
Text
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f MAR 2 71985 ENCLOSURE 2 APPENDIX TO DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION ,
4 UNITS 1 AND 2 -
SALP BOARD REPORT (Dated December 31,1984)
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Enclosure 2 I. MEETING SL M ARY
- a. A meeting was held at 10:00 a.m. on January 8,1985, at Duke Power Company's Charlotte, North Carolina corporate affices to discuss the SALP Board Report for the McGuire facility,
- b. Licensee Attendees:
D. W. Booth, President and Chief Executive Officer W. H. Owen, Executive Vice President, Engineering Construction and Production R. B. Priority, Vice President Design Engineering H. Tucker, Vice President, Nuclear Production R. Dick, Vice President, Construction M. D. McIntosh, Manager, McGuire M. S. Tuckman, Manager, Oconee
- c. NRC Attendees J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
J. A. Olshinski, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII J. P. O'Reilly, Former Regional Administrator, RII V. L. Brownlee, Chief, Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII J. C. Bryant, Senior Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP, RII L. King, Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP, RII K. Sasser, Resident Inspector, Oconee, DRP, RII W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire, DRP, RII R. Pierson, Resident Inspector, McGuire, DRP, RII D. Hood, Project Manager, Licensing Branch 4, Division of Licensing (DL), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
H. Nicolaras, Project Manager, Operating Reactor Branch 4. DL, NRR I
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Enclosure 2 II. ERRATA SHEET Page Line Now Reads Should Read 7 16 Severity Level III Severity Level IV Basis for Change: This violation was issued as a Severity Level IV violation, not a Severity Level III violation, 8 27, 30, Severi+.y Level Proposed Severity Level 36, 39 Basis for Change: The violations identified were denied by the licensee.
NRC has rejected three of the denials and is evaluating the fourth. Because resolution of these items has not yet been reached, a more appropriate characterization of each item is that of a " Proposed" violation.
9 1 Deviation Proposed Deviation Basis for Change: The deviation identified was denied by the licensee.
Although NRC has rejected the denial, resolution of this item has not yet been reached. A more appropriate characterization of the item would be that of a " Proposed" Deviation.
15 1-5 ...use of an inadequate ...use of an inad-procedure and drawing equate drawing in with the following two that use of a mis-examples given: (1) fail- leading electrical ure to restore an auxiliary drawing contrib-containment spray system uted...
vent valve to its normally closed position following completion of an upstream check valve surveillance test; and (2) use of a mis-leading electrical drawing that contributed...
Basis for Change: The licensee denied and the NRC accepted one of the two examples previously denoted in this violation.
26- 4 1 3 7 3 1* 3** 8*** 2 Basis for Change: The changes to this sumary page reflect the individual changes Giscussed above. -
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- Thirteen violations and one deviation were identified during is evaluation period. The violations can be categorized in t ree general areas: failure to follow procedures, failure to use procedures, and inadequate procedures.
The identified violations and the deviation were:
- a. Severi ty Level III violation for
- execute failing procedural documentation requirements for the / removal from service of equipment which ultimately led to hoperability of both containment spray systems and one dies I generator on one unit,
- b. Severity Level III violation for fai re by a second qualified individual to make an approp iate second indepen-dent verification for correct position ng of the containment spray recirculation valee upon com etion of the monthly surveillance test,
- c. Severity Level III violation for ailure to follow procedure during the removal and restora ion of the 1-A centrifugal charging pump (CCP) breaker, ndependent verification was not performed. Subsequent t CCP breaker restoration, the licensee failed to perfo proper daily verification of breaker position. As a ult, the 1-A CCP was inoperable for seven days.
- c. Severity Level IV v ation for failure to adequately or maintain procedures for plant establish, operationsimplemen with t . following three examples given:
(1) failure to foll a procedure for the Unit 2 Solid State Protection System unctional test which resulted in a reactor trip; (2) failur to isolate and tag the Unit 1B boric acid transfer pump a required by the Station Directives which resulted in a -40 gallon radioactive spill; and (3) failure to abide by tation Directives when incomplete operations surveillance procedures were signed off as complete with no discrepanci s noted.
- e. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow the controlJing procedure for unit startup which resulted in a violatfon of withdrawal limits established to prevent a posi ve moderator temperature coefficient.
- f. Se rity Level IV violation for failure to follow, maintain, ad implement approved procedures with the following four xamples given: (1) failure to follow a procedural step during the performance of protective system channel 1 ,
functional test which resulted in a unit trip from full power; (2) failure to incorporate new setpoints for pres-surizer safety discharge high temperature alarms when they
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l Thirteen violations and one deviation were identified during this evaluation period. The violations can be categorized in three general areas: failure to follow procedures, failure to use procedures, and inadequate procedures.
The identified violations and the deviation were:
- a. Severity Level III violation for failing to execute pro-cedural documentation requirements for the removal from l
service of equipment which ultimately led to inoperability of l
both containment spray systems and one diesel generator on one unit.
- b. Severity Level III violation for failure by a second qual-ified individual to make an appropriate second independent verification for correct positioning of the containment spray
! recirculation valve upon completion of the monthly surveil-lance test.
- c. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow procedure during the removal and restoration of the 1-A centrifugal charging pump (CCP) breaker. Independent verification was not performed. Subsequent to CCP breaker restoration, the licensee failed to perform proper daily verification of breaker position. As a result, the 1-A CCP was inoperable for seven days,
- d. Severity Level IV violation for failure to adequately estab-lish, implement, or maintain procedures for plant operations I
with the following three examples given: (1) failure to l follow a procedure for the Unit 2 Solid State Protection l System functional test which resulted in a reactor trip; l
(2) failure to isolate and tag the Unit IB baric acid transfer pump as required by the Station Directives which l resulted in a 30-40 gallon radioactive spill; and (3) failure l
to abide by Station Directives when incomplete operations
! surveillance procedures were signed off as complete with no l discrepancies noted.
- e. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow the con-trolling procedure for unit startup which resulted in a violation of withdrawal limits established to prevent a positive moderator temperature coefficient,
- f. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow, maintain, and implement approved procedures with the following four examples given: (1) failure to follow a procedural step during the performance of protective system channel 1 l
functional test which resulted in a unit trip from full
! power; (2) failure to incorporate new setpoints for pres-
! surizer safety discharge high temperature alarms when they I
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- were changed; (3) improperly declaring the loose parts monitor channel operable in the daily surveillance rocedure when in fact it was inoperable; and (4) failure to tilize a procedure while working inside the Unit I so d state
' protection cabinets, i
i g. Severity Level IV violat19n for failure to foi ow a procedure which requires that during surveillance t ting of the Reactor Protection System, administrative c trol of affected
.! equipment be maintained by placement of re tags. Failure to do so in this case resulted in the loss o decay heat removal i capability.
l h. Severity Level IV violation for failur to abide by approved procedures with the following th e examples given:
l (1) f ailure to follow operating pr edure for operation of 1
the chemical and volume control s stem by not verifying the i suction header valve to be open p ior to pump start resulting in destruction of the 2-B c trifugal charging pump;
{ Directives governing the j Stati (2) conduct failure to abide byof operations in thatp18 high volume control ta l
1 (VCT) pressure and/or high g V8 level alarms were received over a 12 minute period ingg61stely preceding the destruction of the 2-B centrifugal c ging pump without the operators
- taking prompt correcti action; and (3) failure to follow surveillance procedur which resulted in an erroneous
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i tripping of the main { in B reactor trip breaker instead of thebypassbreakerapasubsequentunittripfrom895 power.
- 1. Severity Level IV v olation for reporting an event as a 30
! day report, rather than a prompt report requiring a written j followup within 1 days.
i j. Severity Level violation for failure to establish, imple-
' ment and main in procedures for NUREG-0737 requirements in such areas as administrative control of access to the control
- room surveip ance area, sign-off of an operating procedure indicating paview completion, and administrative control of overtime w6rk for key personnel,
- k. Severit Level V violation for failure to issue an annual managepent directive designating the individual responsible for co'ntrol room command functions.
- 1. Sev ity Level V violation for failure of the Nuclear Safety R 'iew Board to review revisions to required procedures, l
a j m. everity Level V violation for failure to prepare and submit
- a special re;; ort on inoperability of a loose part detection system channel.
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were changed; (3) improperly declaring the loose parts monitor channel operable in the daily surveillance procedure when in fact it was inoperable; and (4) failure to utilize a precedure while working inside the Unit I solid state pro-tection cabinets.
- g. Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow a procedure which requires that during surveillance testing of the Reactor Protection System, administrative control of affected ;
equipment be maintained by placement of red tags. Failure to do so in this case resulted in the loss of decay heat removal capability.
- h. Severity Level IV violation for failure to abide by approved procedures with the following three examples given: ;
(1) failure to follow operating procedure for operation of !
the chemical and volume control system by not verifying the !
suction header valve to be open prior to pump start resulting ;
in destruction of the 2-B centrifugal charging pump; (2) failure to abide by Station Directives governing the conduct of operations in that 18 high volume control tank !
(VCT) pressure and/or high VCT level alarms were received over a 12 minute period immediately preceding the destruction of the 2-8 centrifugal charging pump without the operators l taking prompt corrective action; and (3) failure to follow !
surveillance procedures which resulted in an erroneous tripping of the main Train B reactor trip breaker instead of the bypass breaker and a subsequent unit trip from 89% power.
- 1. proposed Severity Level IV violation for reporting an event as a 30 day report, rather than a prompt report requiring a written followup within 14 days.
. J. Proposed Severity Level IV violation for failure to estab-lish, implement and maintain procedures for NUREG-0737 requirements in such areas as administrative control of access to the control room surveillance area, sign-off of an
, operating procedure indicating review completion, and administrative control of overtime work for key personnel.
- k. Proposed Severity Level V violation for failure to issue an annual management directive designating the individual r responsible for control room command functions.
- l. Proposed Severity Level V violation for failure of the Nuclear Safety Review Board to review revisions to required procedures, i
- m. Severity Level V violation'for failure to prepare and submit a special report on inoperability of a loose part detection system channel.
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- n. Deviation for failure to maintain shift urnover checklists in the master file for a minimum of six ears.
- 2. Conclusion Category: 3 Trend: Same
- 3. Board Recommendations Licensee management involvement i this area was acceptable, however, weaknesses were evident. Increased licensee management attention should be directed to his area. No decrease in NRC attention is warranted.
B. Radiological Controls
- 1. Analysis During the evaluation p tod, inspections were conducted by regional and resident i ection staffs.
The licensee's healtW) hysics staffing level .was adequate and compared well to o utilities having a facility of similar size. An adequate ber of ANSI qualified licensee and contract health physics te icians were available to support routine and outageoperationg The performance the health physics staff in support of routine operation and tages was generally adequate. A method for evaluating bet. dose due to skin contamination, developed by the corporate sta , was implemented at the plant.
During the valuation period, the licensee disposed of 14,119 cubic feet f solid radioactive waste. The radioactive material shipping ea was generally well managed, although it accounted for a vi ation indicated below.
Exposu control was adequate. The licensee posted dose rate and conta nation information on maps outside individual rooms. The fact ty man-rem total for the evaluation period was 456 man-rem whi is comparable to other facilities of similar size and type.
Per onnel exposure record keeping accounted for two violations i icating the need for improvement in this area.
n the confirmatory measurements area, NRC identified the need to evaluate dead time effects on Ge(L1) detector efficiencies and the need for development of administrative control limits for the Interlaboratory Chemistry Cross Check Program. This area accounted for one violation when an inadequate review of gamma
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- n. Proposed deviation for failure to maintain shift turnover checklists in the master file for a minimum of six years.
- 2. Conclusion Category: 3 Trend: Same
- 3. Board Recommendations Licensee management involvement in this area was acceptable, however, weaknesses were evident. Increased licensee management attention should be directed to this area. No decrease in NRC attention is warranted.
B. Radiological Controls
- 1. Analysis During the evaluation period, inspections were conducted by regional and resident inspection staffs.
The licensee's health physics staffing level was adequate and compared well to other utilities having a facility of similar size. An adequate number of ANSI qualified licensee and contract health physics technicians were available to support routine and outage operations.
The performance of the health physics staff in support of routine operation and outages was generally adequate. A method for evaluating beta dose due to skin contamination, developed by the corporate staff, was implemented at the plant.
During the evaluation period, the licensee disposed of 14,119 cubic feet of solid radioactive waste. The radioactive material shipping area was generally well managed, although it accounted for a violation indicated below.
Exposure control was adequate. The licensee posted dose rate and contamination information on maps outside individual rooms. The facility man-rem total for the evaluation period was 456 man-rem which is comparable to other facilities of similar size and type.
Personnel exposure record keeping accounted for two violations indicating the need for improvement in this area.
In the confirmatory measurements area, NRC identified the need to evaluate dead time effects on Ge(L1) detector efficiencies and the need for development of administrative control limits for the Interlaboratory Chemistry Cross Check Program. This area accounted for one violation when an inadequate review of gamma L.__________
15 Severity level IV violation for use f an inadequate 4f.
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procedure and drawing with the followin two examples given:
(1) failure to restore an auxiliary con ainment spray system vent valve to its normally closed position following completion of an upstream check valve surveillance test; and (2) use of a misleading electrical rawing snat contributed to an erroneous lead lift while tr ubleshooting a circuit which resulted in main steam iso'ation valve closure and reactor trip.
- 2. Conclusion Category: 2 Trend: Improvec
- 3. Board Recommendations Performance in this area wa evaluated as C.tegory 2 due to improvements which occurred n the latter part of the assessment period. Had performance con inued at the level exhibited in the early part of the period, a Category 2 rating would not have been justified. The licensee,A ould continue a high level of attention to this area. C E. Fire Protection a
- 1. Analysis &
Limited inspection ere performed by region based and resident inspectors. One vi ation shown below in the fire protection area was identified, should be noted that immediately following this assessment eriod, the Standby Shutdown Facility was inspected on Sep ember 4-6, 1984 and a special team inspection of A::pendix R com iance was performed during the week of _
Septemoer 24, 84. The findings were significant, resulting in apparent viol ions that will be addressed in the next assessment period.
The violati n durir.g this assessment period was:
Seve ity Level IV violation for failure to perform surveil-Ian e on valve positioning of the annulus sprinkler system.
- 2. Conclu on Cate ry: Not Rateo Tre d: Not Determined 1
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s 15 EY. Severity Level IV violation for use of an inadequate drawing in that use of a misleading electrical drawing contributed to an erroneous lead lift while troubleshooting a circuit which resulted in main steam isolation valve closure and reactor trip.
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- 2. Conclusion Category: 2 Trend: Improved
- 3. Board Recommendations Performance in this area was evaluated as Category 2 due to improvements which occurred in the latter part of the assessment period. Had performance continued at the. level exhibited in the early part of the period, a Category 2 rating would not have been justified. The licensee should continue a high level of attention to this area.
E. Fire Protection
- 1. Analysis Limited inspections were performed by region based and resident inspectors. . One violation shown below in the fire protection area was identified. It should be noted that immediately following this assessment period, the Standby Shutdown Facility was inspected on September 4-6, 1984 and a special team inspection of Appendix R compliance was performed during the week of September 24, 1984. The findings were significant, resulting in j
apparent violations that will be addressed in the next assessment period, iheviolationduringthisassessmentperiodwas:
Severity Level IV violation for failure to perform surveil-lance on valve positioning of the annulus sprinkler system.
- 2. Conclusion Category: Not Rated l
Trend: Not Determined l
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26 TABLE 1 INSPECTION'ECTIVITYANDENFOCEMENT FUNCTIONAL' NO. OF VIOLATIONS IN EACH SEVERITY LEVEL AREA DEV V IV III II I 3 3 Operations' 1 -
f 5 r Radiological Controls 3 Mainte,ance 2 Surveillance 6 ,
~ ~
Fire Protection " . 1 Emergency Preparedness n.
Security anc Safeguards A 2
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Refueling a
Quality Assurance #1 .
Program $ -
% s ,
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~N TOTAL 1 7 23 > 3
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I -l 26 TABLE 1 INSPECTION ACTIVITY AND ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONAL NO. OF VIOLATIONS IN EACH SEVERITY LEVEL J AREA DEV V IV III II I Operations 1* 3** 8*** 2 Radiological 3 5 Maintenance 2 Surveillance 6 Fire Protection 1 Emergency Preparedness Security and Safeguards 2 Refueling Quality Assurance 1 TOTAL 1* 7** 24*** 2
- This represents a proposed deviation.
- .Two of these violations are proposed.
- Two of these violations are proposed.
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III. LICENSEE COMENTS Licensee comments submitted in response to the SALP Board Report follow.
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