IR 05000369/1988021
| ML20205G439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, 05000000, Mcguire |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205G413 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-88-21, 50-370-88-21, NUDOCS 8810280262 | |
| Download: ML20205G439 (36) | |
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,I ',r ENCLOSURE 1 '< . ~ > >
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SALP BOARD REPORT '
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 50-369/88-21 50-370/88-21 DUKE POWER COMPANY
, McGUIRE UNITS 1 & 2
AUGUST 1, 1987 THROUGH JULY 31, 1988 l
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS Overall Facility Evaluation'
During the SALP assessment period, the McGuire facility was effectively managed and achieved a satisfactory level of operational safety. Overall corporate leadership, direction and support are good. The McGuire staff is technically capable, well qualified and dedicate Management involvement in problem resolution and routine plant operations is apparent. However, in the plant manager's absence the lack of initia-tive on the rest of the staff is often apparent in that his conservative and thorough approach to problem resolution is not continue The plan',
manager is motivating his staff toward excellence, but the task is not complet The alignment of the functional areas for this SALP period reflects a new format. A comparison with the last rating period shows no change in ratings. The following observations in each area are presented for your action as appropriate:
OPERATIONS shows continued improvement. The period included improved capacf ty factors for both units, 73.2% for Unit I and 78.2% for Unit 2, with reduced forced outage rates. Total reactor trips for Units 1 and 2 remained the same as last . period, which was close to the national averag Procedural compliance errors were still occurring, but management is committed to improvement. A site event which required an enforcement conference occurred in this area. One emergency diesel generator was not properly returned to service and not identified for a considerable period of tim RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS is the weakest area. Site management involve-ment was evident and the results were adequat Significant accomplishments were: the continued success of the program for control of personnel exposure to "hot" particles; and a reduction in the number of contaminated area However, elevated attention does not always assure resolution of problems, such as: the accumulated radiation dose is above the industry average; aggressive participation in the ALARA programs is lacking; and the recurring elevated levels of noble gas in the auxiliary building continue *
MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE activities were good but procedural compliance problems persisted. A Unit 2 problem which required an enforcement conference occurred in this area. The missing missile shield bolts were found through an aggressive licensee program and corrective actions were excellent. The system expert program is beginning to be useful. The performance group has made improvements in trending of system and component performance, since the component cooling heat exchanger (KC) problem of a year ago. The on-line testing of the KC heat exchangers will greatly enhance the coordin-ation of cleaning maintenance activities. Better cooperation between performance testing and operations is being encouraged by managemen '
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS drill performance has continued at its high caliber of the last SALP period. The offsite personnel have improved through receipt of additional guidance and conducting additional practice session Management continues to be responsive to NRC concerns and observation '
The SECURITY area and the MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY area is well manage The contract security force is very professional and well trained. The multiple examples of security violations inoicate a need for significantly increased oversigh ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT is improving, especially with estab-lishment of the on-site Design Engineering organization. Utilization of this group should improve communications between operations and engineering and allow the staff to enhance operational evaluations and to find the root cause of plant events. Improvement in management of the modification process is required. Plant management should better coordinate the technical staff to assist operations. This area's performance is improving and can contribute to an improvement in overall plant performanc SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION can be improve Eetter communication between NRC, Duke corporate licensing and plant personne Weaknesses in QA Department overview functions were noted during the last SALP period and marked improvement has not yet been found. Event root cause analysis is not always complete and corrective actions can be event specific without programmatic application. Reduction of NRC outstanding items has occurred due to increased attention by the site compliance grou Facility Performance Functional Area March 1, 1986_- July 31, 1987 Plant Operations 2 Radiological Controls 2 Maintenance 2 Surveillance 2 Fire Protection 2 Emergency Preparedness 1 Security 2 Outages 2 Quality Programs & Administrative 2 i Contrcis Affecting Quality Licensing Activities 2 _
Training 2 Engineering Support 2
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Functional Arp August 1, 1987 - July 31, 1988 ,
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Plant'0perations . 2 Radiological Controls 2 Maintenance / Surveillance 2 Emergency Preparedness 1 Security 2 Engineering / Technical Support 2 Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 2 III. CRITERIA Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas, depending on whether the facility is in a construction or operational phas Functional areas normally represent areas significant to nuclear safety *
and the environment. Some functional areas may not be assessed because of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful observatiun Special areas may be added to highlight significant observation The following evaluation criteria were used, as applicable, to assess each functional area: Assurance of quality, including management involvement and control; Approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint;
! Responsiveness to NRC initiatives; Enforcement history; Operational and construction events (including response to, analyses of, reporting of, and corrective actions for); Staffing (including management); and Effectiveness of training and avalification program However, the NRC is not limited to these criteria and others may have been used where appropriat I On the basis of the NRC assessment, each functional area evaluated is rated according to three performance categories. The definitions of these
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performance categories are as follows: 1 Category Licensee aanagement attention and involvement are readily evident and place emphasis on superior performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities, with the resulting performance substantially exceeding regulatory requirements. Licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of plant and personnel performance is being achieve Reduced NRC attention may be appropriat ._ ._S.=-- -
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8 Category Licensee management attention to and involvement in the performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities is good. The Licensee has attained a level of performance above that needed to meet regulatory requirements. Licensee resources are adequate and reasonably allocated so that good plant and personnel performance is >
being achieve NRC attention may be maintained at normal level . Category Licensee management attention to and involvement in the performance of nuclear safety or safeguards activities are not sufficient. The licensee's performance does not significantly exceed that needed to meet minimal regulatory requirement Licensee resources appear to be stiained or not effectively use NRC attention should be increased above normal level The SALP Board may also include an appraisal of the performance trend of a functional area. This performance trend will only be used when both a definite trend of performance within the evaluation period is. discernable and the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a change of performance level. The trend, if used, is defined as:
Improving: Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the close of the assessment perio Declining: Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the close of the assessment period and the licensee had not taken meaningful steps to address this patter IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS Plant Operations Analysi s During this assessment period, both routine and and special inspections and evaluations of plant operations and fire protection were performed by the resident, regional and Headquarters inspection staff The qua'iity of operations at McGuire has been maintained at a good level of performance. The previous SALP report indicated that the quality of operations had improved over past assessment periods and this improved level of performance has been maintaire Automatic reactor trips remain at about the industry average and gains have been made at reducing the forced outage rat i However, procedural adherence and adequacy remains a problem at ,
i McGuire, i Licensee upper level management was extensively involved in the establishment of corrective actions for abnormal plant event ,
They have stressed the importance of following plant procedures
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and identifying deficiencies in those procedures; however, procedural deficiencies continue to be a problem. Overall, *
operating procedures were adequat Senior plant management is involved in the day-to-day operation of the plant and tracks the status of known equipment operability deficiencies in daily management meetings. Active management involvement in daily operations has had a positive effect on plant operations and personnel morale. The ability to operate the units for longer periods of time without significant problems or unplanned trips has similarly had a positive impact on personnel morale and self estee Facility operations reflected adequate planning and assignment of priorities. An assessment of reactor trips during the SALP period shows that approximately the same number of automatic trins occurred as the last SALP period. The number of automatic Unit 1 trips increased from four during the previous SALP period to five during the current period, while Unit 2's trips decreased from five to fou Average reactor trips above 15%
power per 1000 critical hours for the SALP period were 0.59 for Unit 1 and 0.56 for Unit The forced outage rate for both units during the period was approximately two percent as compared to a historical forced outage rate of approximately twelve percent for both Mcguire unit The licensee's approach to the resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint was generally sound. An understanding of the safety issues was apparent, and conservatism was routinely exhibited when responding to safety-significant concern Two notable examples of conservative operating decisions made during the rating period involved the actions taken to verify cleanli-ness of the containment sump lines and the actions taken to verify cleanliness of service water to auxiliary feedwater lines following these problems being experienced at another plan Corrective action was usually taken for deficiencies but !
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occasionally was not initially ef fective at correcting the root cause of the proble For example, Operations, in order to establish containment integrity during an outage, took credit for a valve being shut that was actually disassembled and j under00ing maintenanc The valve was deemed shut based on ,
computer indication. The corrective action was event specific: )
the licensee revised the procedure for containment inte:rity to require local position verification if the computer is the only ,
remote indication availabl The root cause of keeping inade- '
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quate system status during outages was not addresse Operational events are usually accurately identified, however, some analyses are margina One significant example of a failure of the operations staff to accurately identify an
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operational condition was inoperability of the Unit 1 train A Emergency Diesel Generator for an extended' period of time. This resulted in escalated enforcement. Despite multiple indications in the control room over multiple shift turnovers the condition was not identified. Nonconservative corrective action was taken when the problem was discovered. Another example took place when a portion of the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) system was inadvertently overpressurized during a valve stroke timing tes The test was conducted during an outage, but with inappropriate plant conditions in effec The licensee accurately identified the cause of the event, but failed to broaden their analysis to consider the possibility of other tests causing similar occurrences until the inspector identified another valve stroke timing test with similar errors. This event resulted in a violation subsequent to the end of the assessment period. The conservative judgments of the plant manager are apparent and appropriate; however, his approach to problem resolution needs to be more firmly used by his staf The operations staffing level during this assessment period continued to exceed the required shif t crew compositio Each operating shif t consists of 4 or 5 senior operators (TS requires only 2) and 5 or 6 reactor operators (TS requires only 3). A fourth Assistant Shift Supervisor (SS) has been added to four of the five operations shif ts and is planned for the other shif t when additional senior operators are licensed. This Assistant SS was added primarily to serve in an on-shift training capacity to implement the Employee Training and Qualification System (ETQS), which utilizes "qualification cards" to document and track operator trainin The plant operations staff consists of approximately 155 employees. The low operations staff turnover rate is indicative of high employee moral Operations staff training, level of facility knowledge and attitude was goo However, a weakness in training was identified which contributed to the escalated enforcement for the 1A diesel generator inoperability. Weaknesses were identi-fied in training in indenendent verification and removal and restoration procedures and training of operators in indication and correction of control power problem ]
Control room professionalism is adequate. The operators recently instituted their own Operators Code of Ethics. The control room has been and is being upgraded through standardization of 1 control room indications and extensive cosmetic improvement However, numerous uncorrected control room functional deficiencies exist in the form of malfunctioning indicators and annunciators (20-40 per unit). Management receives weekly status of the number of deficiencies, but the total remains fairly constant -
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new items k.eep pace with correcced items. Correction Ni some items is, by necessity, deferrad to outages, however, most are scheduled only on a routine basi The plant's material condition, preservation, and housekeeping status is adequate, but could be improve The' resident inspectors occasionally find maint) nance debris and other material / housekeeping deficiencies during routine tours through the auxiliary building and other plant space Auxiliary building lighting could also be improved to aid operator The last SALP noted that procedural compliance was a weakness in the McGuire Operations. Program. It is noted that licensee management has taken repeated action to in. prove performance in this are This included clarifying administrative procedures, training personnel on the clarifications, pursu',ng a procedure upgrade program, and emphasizing procedural adherence and procedural adequacy to personnel. Several violations in the operations area during this rating period im,olved failure to follow procedures or inadequate procedure This remains a plant wide problem and was identified as a weakness in report 88-14. The following are examples of everts and violations in this area:
An enginee.ed safety features actuation occurred on August 16, 1987 when the Unit 2 main feedwater pump (MFP) trip logic was reset then marivally tripped with the other MFP in a tripped condition. This caused an auxiliary feedwater system actuation on loss of both MFPs. The operations procedure was found to be deficien Unit 1 emergency diesel generator valves were found to be mislabeled and mispositioned on September 11, 1987, potentially rendering both Unit 1 diesels inoperable. Label plates for two valves were found to be interchanged due to an error in Operating Procedure OP/1/A/6350/02. The unit was in a condition which did not require diesel generator operability during the time both diesels were technically inoperabl On September 1,1987 valve 2CA-87, a 2A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump manual discharge valve was found open but not locked open as required. A Tagout/ Removal and Restoration (R&R)
had been cleared several days earlier on this system and the restoration position for the valve was erroneously merked "open" instead of being locked ope The R&R in this case was inadequat A violation occurred (Inspection Report 88-04) when operations perscnnel removed a cation bed demineralizer from service using a procedure that was inadequate resulting in: overpressurization i of portions of the chemical and volume control system; a diaphragm rupture; and a contaminated spil , .
An inadequate procedure was used to drain a steam generator which resulted in an ESF actuation and an inadequate R&R which .
resulted in'a loss of offsite powe On June 3, 1988, during perfcrmance of the Safety Injection System (NI) Check Valve Movement Test, the operating Residual Heat Removal (ND) pump was left in service and suction pressure fell to zero psi due to a decrease in loop water level when the other ND pump was started for the tes The cause was attributed to a test procedure which did not directly monitor reactor coolant level and ND suction pressure and the fact that two valves were left in positions not in compliance with the performance test (PT) due to an erroneous interpretatio t A violation occurred (Inspectien Report 88-09) when the travel stops on RN-1908, Nuclear Service Water (RN) to Component Cooling System (KC) heat exchanger IB, were discovered in an-unconservative position for unknown reason The licensee belieted the stops vibrated to the as found positio Six violations and one deviation, were identified in this area:
(a) A severity level III violation for operating with D/G-1A out of service for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> leaving the train A !
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emergency bus without an emergency power supply between 1 July 26 and July 30, 198 (87-26, unit 1 only)
(b) A severity level IV violation for failure to authorize and document overtime in advanc (87-26)
(c) A Severity Level IV Violation for operating Unit 1 in
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Mode 1 for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with KC loop B inoperabl (88-09, Unit 1 only)
(d) A Severity Level IV Violation for inadequate or not properly implemented procedures (3 examples). (88-20)
(e) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to follow procedures and failure to maintain a procedure (2 examples).
(88-04)
(f) A Severity Level IV Violation for fire doors found blocked open rendering them inoperable for an undetermined period )
of time without stationing a fire watch or verifying the operability of fire detector (88-12, Unit 2 only) , j
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(g) A Ceviation was identified in that only a staff SRO was involved with the ooerability determination associated with a Problem Investigation Repor This action was contrary l to a response to a violation requiring shif t SR0s to be )
i involved with operability determination (88-12) I r
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13 Performance Rating-Category 2
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None B. Radiological Controls Analysis
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During the assessment period, inspections were performed by the resident and regional inspection staff The inspections included three radiation protection inspections, and one radiological effluents inspectio ,
The licensee's health physics (HP) staffing level compared favorably with other utilities having r. facility of similar size. The licensee contracted sufficient contract HP techni-cians to provide adequate coverage for radiological controls for the refueling outages in.1988. Technical assistance from the corporate HP staff remained strong and effective during the 1988 refueling outage and during normal operation The licensee has an effective training and qualification program for health physics technicians. The formal, specialized training i program, Employee Training and Qualification Sy stem (ETQS), used to train and qualify health physics and radwaste/ transportation personnel was expanded during the assessment period to include ;
dosimetry clerks and t echn i c i a r,s . An excellent working i relationship has been established between the health physics training group and the plant health physics staf'. During the ;
j assessment period, the training staf f has continued to improve the health physics training program as evidenced by the imple-mentation of a new task analysis program for identifying training '
i deficiencies and the development of a case study training course .
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e based on health physics related problems identified at the licensee's facilitics as well as other facilities. The licensee i also has an effective qualification program for contract health ,
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physics personne The licensee's health physics training program received accreditation from the Institute for Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) in March 1987. The licensee had developed an Independent Radiation Worker (IRW) training program designed ts itarease the !
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However, this initiative has had very linited succes The l
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individual groups that have been trained and qualified as IRW's were found to be reluctant to volunteer for routine tasks where they assisted HP in providing Jcb coverage as planned. The licensee is continuing to evaluate this program in order to increase its effectivenes Licensee management's support and involvement in the radiation protection program remained strong as evidenced by their involvement in resolving health physics concerns of plant group For example, resolution of radiation protection concerns relating to maintenance on plant equipment by mechanical maintenance were openly discussed between senior managers during daily plant staf f meeting Another indication of management involvement in the health physics program includes the allocation of monies for upgrading the plant's in-vivo bioassay equipmen The licensee's approach to resolution of HP technical issues was goo In March 1988, the licensee initiated a program to identify and reduce the elevated noble gas levels in the
Auxiliary Buildin The source was determined to be from
untrapped open drains connected to the Waste Evaporator Feed Tank (WEFT). The licensee aggressively pursued corrective actions for this source. However, the problem of elevated noble gases in the Auxiliary Building is a recurring problem and the licensee needs to establish an ongoing program for identifica-tion and elimination of sources of noble gase The performance of the HP staff in support of routine and outage operations was good. HP controls established to cover refueling activities were well prepared and enforce The licensee's program for control of personnel exposure to "hot" particles has continued to be effectiv The licensee's radiation work permit and respiratory protection programs were found to be effectiv Liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents were within the Technical Specification limits of radioactivity concentration in
, effluents, and in complianca with 40 CFR 190 limits for radiation dose to the environment. Effluent releases are summarized in the Supporting Data and Summaries,Section V.I. The effluent summary data indicate an increase in liquid and gaseous ef fluents
, from 1985 to 1987. This increase can be attributed to failed fuel problems which were experienced in 1986 and 1937 Also an increase in the liquid effluents can further be attributed to ,
extensive facility decontamination activities conducted during 1986 and 198 The licensee reported one abnormal liquid release during 198 The release occurred on Unit I during a refueling outag The liquid frc the secondary side of the steam generator was
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released directly to a yard drai The total activity was 0.77 curies as determined by the licensee's evaluation of the abnormal releas As part of the NRC's ' confirmatory measurements program, a simulated liquid waste sample which contained selected beta-emitting radionuclides was provided during November 1987. The [
licensee successfully analyzed the liquid spike for Sr-90, H-3 i and Fe-5 The licensee's program for preparing and shipping radioactive ,
waste continues to be effectiv During 1987, the licensee shipped 24,489 ft3 of waste for disposal, containing 322 Curies of activit Although the volume shipped in 1987, exceeded the national average for a two unit PWR of 13,180 ft3 it was not considered excessive in light of the scope of work performed and plant decontamination effort The licensee has installed a state-of-the-art trash sorting and monitoring facility to reduce the amount of trash being shipped for buria The licensee has also begun shipping compatible contaminated waste offsite for supercompaction, and, in addition some non-compactible contaminated waste is being shipped offsite for decontamination. The licensee has taken action to reduce
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the volume of radioactive material shipped for burial . The actions taken should be effective in reducing the volume to within industry norm The licensee experienced 485 personnel contaminations in 1987, 274 of which were skin contaminations. The licensee initiated corrective action such as protective clothing improvements and increasing the number of individuals receiving more advanced r radiation worker trainin The number of personnel contamina-tions in 1997, was greater than most other Region II facilitie t Through July 1988, the licensee has experienced 265 personnel contamination During the assessment period, the licensee decreased the total area maintained as contaminated from 7*. to approximately 6% of the radiological controlled area (excluding containment building).
The licensee has implemented an aggressive decontamination program. A twelve person crew is dedicated to f acility decon- ,
taminatio The area contaminated is less than most other '
Region !! facilitie During 1987, the licensee's collective radiation dose was 521 '
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person-rem per unit as measured by thermoluminescent dosimeter This was above the national average of 368 person-rem per unit l observed at PWR facilities. Over 35% of the collective dose (373 person-rem) was accrued during the Unit 2 refueling and <
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maintenance outage. The major source of exposure was associated
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with the steam generator (S/G) work (e.g. , eddy current testing, U bend stress relief, tube plugging, shot peening, nozzle dams and staging installation).
The licensee establish;d a 1988 collective radiation dose goal of 521 person-rem per uni At the end of the assessment period, it appeared that the licensee wm;1d exceed this goa Even if the goal is reached, the collective dose will more than likely exceed the national average by a significant amount. As in 1987, S/G work in 1988 will contribute significantly to the station's collective dos Although the licensee has implemented the use of collective radiation dose goals as performance appraisal elements for individuals in all levels of management below the station manager, support for the licensee's dose reduction program by the station manager and supervisern was weak. When the ALARA staff requested station supervisors to submit their plan for reducing the collective dose of their section, many of the plans reviewed by the NRC were superficial and failed to give specific actions that would reduce the estimated dose of their section During February and March 1988, the licensee's Quality Assurance staff performed an audit and noted poor attendance at ALARA committee meetings by key plant groups (mechanical maintenance, operations, planning, production support and training). The licensee's ALARA Manual assigns to this committee the responsibility for conducting and appraising the effectiveness of the ALARA program at each station. The audit also identified a lack of unified effort on the part of the station's planning and ALARA staffs in addressing dose reduction issues and recommended that management evaluate the ALARA planning proces, and job planning interface between the two groups. At the end of the assessment period, licensee management had not effectively addressed the deficiencies in their program for keeping radiation doses ALARA, nor had they developed a plan for reducing station exposures to within the industry nor One violation was identified during this evaluation period:
Severity Level IV violation for failure to barricade and post a high radiation area and failure of an individual entering the area to have the proper radiation monitoring device (88-06).
2. Performance Rating
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Category 2 3, Recommendations ,
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C. MAINTENANCE /SURVEILLANC5 Analysis The quality of maintenance and surveillance at McGuire is good and above that needed to meet regulatory requirements. Licensee initiatives in the maintenance area include increasing the use of system experts, purchase of new vibration monitoring equipment for monitoring rotating equipment, and expansion of the oil
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analysis program. In the surveillance area, fewer instances of missed surveillances were noted. However, procedural compliance and adequacy remain a problem and several violations occurred in
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this are r During the evaluation period, routine inspections were performed by both the resident and regional inspection staff The maintenance staff consists of approximately 345 personnel assigned to the Nuclear Production Department, with an additional 210 maintenance personnel assigned to the Construction and Maintenance Division (CMD). Construction personnel are also available from CMD when require The maintenance staf f is generally well qualified and traine l However, training and qualification may be a contributing factor ,
to poor understanding of work practices, as indicated by numerous l procedure and policy violations. McGuire's maintenance training program achieved INPO accreditation in March 1987.
J The maintenance program is well organized with decisions being made at management levels to assure appropriate supervisory involvemen Licensee resolutions to maintenance related technical issues indicated an understanding of issues and conservatism is generally exhibited, however, some problems prior to recur before effectively being resolved. For example, the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System is subject to fouling prior ;
to and during the annual phenomenon of "lake turnover" each fall '
season when cooler surface water in the lake tuterchanges with subsurface water, stirring up sedimen The licensee has been
< aware of this phenomenon and accurately forecasts when lake turnover will occur and monitors components cooled by RN that
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can become clogged by sediment. Nonetheless, the Component Cooling Water (KC) heat exchangers became unknowingly inoperable due to fouling following lake turnover in 198 The KC heat exchangers had been fouled during previous lake turnover period Effective resolution in the form of on-line monitoring of the KC ,
heat exchangers to trend fouling was not developed until after the 1987 even :
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Maintenance tracking during outages is considered a weaknes The licensee has recognized this weakness and stated that steps are being taken to improv According to the licensee, the
"projects 2" computer program, when fully implemented, will provide a means by which outage maintenance items can be tracked to assess the status of the maintenance at any tim The licensee is also implementing a system performance moni-toring program to improve station reliability. The prograu, which is being implemented includes vibration monitoring, system and component parameter trending, energy balances, and performance walkdown A program to upgrade existing maintenance procedures was under-taken to INP0 standards in an effort to further reduce human performance error The program scope includes approximately 6000 procedures with an estimated expenditure of up to 40 man-hours per procedure. This is a long term program which will extend into the mid 1990' The licensee has a detailed program for completed maintenance record review, which is quite thorough and effective in identifying and correcting deficiencie Deficiencies in recording work performed, inadequately described testing and identification of personnel making entries on work records were identified during the assessment perio The use of procedures in accomplishing maintenance activities was adequat The licensee's program for removal and restoration of equipment was adequate, however, some problems in this area were note One noteable example of an inadequate removal and restoration procedure, which resulted in a viclation, contributed to a loss of all offsite power on Unit 2. The tagout involved an electrical alignment after a busline had been removed from servic The licensee's action with regard to NRC initiatives, was goo Two examoles of this were installation of an on line differen-tial pressure instrument for component cooling heat exchangers and a program to monitor pipe thinning. The resolution of technical issues was normally sound and usually characterized by viable and relatively thorough approache One significant example that resulted in a Severity III violation occurred on August 14, 199 Unit 2 was shut down when the missile shield was declared inoperable due to a missing ,
bolt. The bolt was not installed due to inadequate controls for installation of the missile shield block Implementation of the surveillance testing and calibratio '
control program was adequate and reflected an acceptable level of management overvie Surveillance activities reflected
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adequate planning and assignment of prioritie Surveillance procedures were generally adequate; however, weaknesses were apparent with respect to procedural adequacy and procedural complianc These weaknesses were exemplified by the significant number of violations in this area. Surveillance records were given thorough reviews following completio The computerized program employed to schedule surveillance testing is adequat Improvements have been made in the operating schedule to minimize opposite train component test schedule overlap. A senior reactor operator has been assigned to the Planning / Integrated Scheduling staff to assist in minimizing operability conflict Licensee resolution of surveillance related technical issues reflected a thorough understanding of the issues and was conservative and viable. A significant example occurred when a weakness in the surveillance program for the component cooling heat exchangers was observe Several tests had failed that indicated the surveillance program was not able to detect degraded conditions until the component had dagraded to the point af being inoperabl The performance group made improvements in trending system / component performance to improve detection of this and related problem Twelve violations were identified in this area as follows:
(a) A Severity Level III Violation for an inoperable reactor vessel missile shield / divider barrier resulting from a defective maintenance procedure which was used for instal-lation of the missile shield block (87-35, Unit 2 only)
(b) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to take corrective action to preclude the recurrence of a violation of TS 6.8.1 while performing slave relay testing. (87-36)
(c) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to follow a procedure and maintain a procedure for lift checking primary code safety valves and for slave relay testin (88-09. Unit 2 only)
(d) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to perform proper post-maintenance testing on a Nuclear Service Water valv (88-09, Unit 1 only)
(e) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to follow proce-dures and inadequate procedures (4 examples). (88-12)
(f) A Severity Level IV Violation for an inadequate turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump test progra (88-12)
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(g) A' Severity Level , IV violation' for failure to follow procedures and inadequate procedures (2 examples). (87-41, Unit 1 only)
(h) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to provide :
adequate drawings and failure to follow a procedure (2 examples). (87-43, Unit 1 only)
(i) A Severity Level IV Violation for failure to establish an adequate component cooling system test progra (87-46, Unit 2 only) <
(j) Severity Level IV violation for permitting motor generated
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l valve stroke timing to be performed in a manner that could result in excessive inaccuracies. (88-13) ;
(k) Severity Level IV violation for exceeding core thermal power limits on serveral occasions. (87-42, Unit 1 only)'
(1) Severity Level IV violation for adjusting the fuel racks ,
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on the 2A diesel generator without a work request or procedur (88-14)
t Performance Rating l
Category 2 Recommendations The areas of procedural adequacy and procedural compliance require additional management attentio Emergency Preparedness Analysis i During the assessnent period, inspections were performed by
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resident and regional inspector Regional inspection included ,
an evaluation of the 1987 Annual Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise, a routine emergency preparedness inspec-l tion, and two special announced inspections to review the
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licensee's actions in response to Emergency Response Facility (ERF) appraisal findings and preliminary assessment of the new (
Crisis Management Center; and status of the McGuire Station l Technical Support Center (TSC). One revision of the McGuire ,
Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) was reviewed by the Regional staff during this assessment perio l
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The routine emergency preparedness inspection disclosed that the l licensee continued to demonstrate the capability to implement i key elements of the REP and respective procedures in response to '
l 4 ;
___ ._ _ . .- _ _ . _ . - - -
_
_ . - - -
y
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21 ,
, a radiological emergency event. Walkthroughs of licensee shift supervisors performed during the referenced inspection disclosed that they promptly identified and correctly classified emergency events consistent with the Plan and implementing procedure The supervisors were fully cogairant of their authorities and
,
'
responsibilities regarding accident assessment. Additionally, the following key emergency planning elements were ef fectively
'
implemented and maintained by the licensee: emergency response organization training; dose calculation and assessment; perfor-mance of eme.rgency drills and communication checks consistent -
with REP and respective procedures; periodic review and audit of the emergency preparedness program; emergency response organization management and control; and offsite notification,
'
including the prompt notification system and the corrective actions implemented to mitigate failure of a routinely scheduled j system test to activate all sirens deployed as part of that system. The latter system is provided with a backup console to supplement the recently installed primary console in the event of its failur Previous failures were traceable to human
. error. Management controls were implemented to preclude such failures and provide for prompt use of the backup.
Evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise demonstrated that the following emergency response elements were
! successfully implemented: fulfilling the scope and objectives of the exercise and drill scenarios; effective assignment of emergency response organization responsibilities; effective use of offsite emergency response support and resources consistent with the scope of the exercise; emergency classification; notification and communications; accident assessment and protective action recommendations and decisionmaking; radio-logical exposure control; public information; and detailed and
! ef fective critique of the exercise and participants in the exercis Based uoon the emergency preparedness inspection and evaluation of the annual emergency exercise, licensee managment continued to demonstrete its dedication to development and maintenance of an effective emergency preparedness progra [
'
The special inspection addressing the status of the new Crisis Management Center (CMC), disclosed that the subject ERF was adequate to support the Emergency Response Organization's
,'
management and control of radiological emergency event l
!
Management continues to respond to NRC initiatives as indicated *
'
by prompt implementation of effective actions in response to items identified during inspections, exercise evaluations and l
!
Plan revision finding !
q No violations or deviations were icentified.
1 h
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22 l
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i
. l Performance Rating
Category 1 l Recommendations l l
None E. Security
'
a Analysis Durir,g this evaluation period, four routine and two special ;
1 inspections were conducted. Additionally one Material Control I and Accounting inspection was also conducte The security violations identified are not symptomatic of 'a program breakdown. However, the multiple examples of violations do indicate a need for significantly increased attentiveness on the part of security personnel assigned to access control duties t and better management oversight and control over the deletion i of compensatory posts and protection of Safeguards Informatio ;
) The security program continued to be adequately managed and
. security resources were being utilized in an ef ficient manne ,
i I Also the contract security force continued to be adequately l staffed to support the security plan requirement On duty i shift supervisors demonstrated during inspections the capability I to provide an acceptable level of protection for the facilities ;
vital resources. Changes submitted to the Physical Security, r and Training and Qualification Plans were clear and reflected !
appropriate coordination and review by the licensee. Changes [
i implemented under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54 (p) were !
properly documented and submitted within the required period of l
'
tim j
. I The licensee's internal audit program for the security program [
was adequate and the licensee was generally responsive to NRC l and internal audit concern l'
i
\ There has been a concern for some time with the adequacy of some l i
aspects of the closed-circuit television system used by tM licensee for Protected Area surveillance and alarm assessmen f
- This was also identified by the Regulatory Ef fectiveness Review ;
j team as a Safeguards Program Concern. Late in the evaluation ,
i i period, the licensee established and implenented a program to l l address this issu ;
-
t
, Ouring the essessment period one inspection was conducted iri l
! the area of Material Centrol and Accountability (MC&A). The !
'
inspection confirmed that thr licensee had established, main- ;
l tained and followed written MC&A procedures for controlling and a l
,
.
. .
accounting for fuel and non-fuel special nuclear materials (SNM). These procedures covered receipt, storage, shipment, internal transfers, inventory and inventory burn-up calculations, recordkeeping and reporting. The licensee had properly documented and reported required inventory change reports and material balance information, and has maintained an adequate staff well familiarized in their assigned function No violations or deviations were identified in the MC&A are Four security related violations were identified during this perio The violations identified were:
(a) Severity Level IV violation for inadequate control of access to Safeguards Informatio IB7-45)
(b) Severity level IV violation for improper transmission and storage of Safeguards Informatio (87-45)
(c) Severity Level IV violation for admitting a person to the
,
Protected Area without a securi+y cadge (two examples).
(88-11)
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(d) Severity level IV violation for failure to malatain required security compensatory measures in place (three examples). (88-11) Performance Rating Category 2 Recommendations "
None
.
l F. ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT Analysis The Engineering / Technical Support (E/TS) functional area ,
] addresses the adequacy of the technical and engineering support ,
l for all plant activities to determine the adequacy of the 4 support provide Specific attention was given to the I identification and resolution of technical issues, respon-siveness to NRC initiatives, enforcement history, staf fing, Jl effectiveness of training, qualifications and if assurance of i quality was provided by the support give It includes: all licensee activities associated with plant modifications; ,
technical support provided for operations. maintenance, testing, '
I and surveillance; training, and ccnfiguration management. This
, evaluation is based on NRR licensing reviews of station modifi-
, cations, a special diagnostic evalution of McGuire per for ed by i I
,
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1 the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) and routine inspections conducted by resident and regional I rsonnel in this area as well as related functional ,
'
area NRR licensing design reviews of two significant station
- modifications proposed during this assessment period (Mitigation ,
system for ATWS, and replacement of the RTD bypass manifold !
system with in-line RTDs) concluded thst these engineering l evaluations were technically adequat Additionally, the +
licensee's response to NRR staff requests for information <
pertaining to the subject modifications was genarally timely and a complete.
'
The diagnostic evaluation conducted by AEDD examined the i activities of both the Nuclear Production Department (NPD) i engineering organt:ation at the station and the Design [
Engineering Department (DED) located off-site at DPC's general ;
offices. This evaluation reached the following conclusions: ,
' The overall technical capabilities of the station and !
j corporate engineering staffs was good. The corporate !
- support staff and the nuclear station staff worked together v
- ef fectively to develop and apply new or improved technolo- !
gies, management systers and programs. The nuclear support staff was technically competent with significant operating ;
experience. The DED staff assigned to support the McGuire ;
- station was large (approximately 260 people), well qualified ;
with the average experience level being greater than 10 i i year All engineers had at least a four year science [
] degree, many had advanced degrees and professional ;
i registratio }
' This team found that the NPD 2ngineering personnel normally "
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evaluate and solve all station technical problems and
!
develop most technical programs themselves. The role of l Duke's DEO was to provide support when specifically tasked i J by NPD, '
l l !
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The licensee has instituted a number of imrrovements in the [
modification proces The licensee responded to NRO i findings regarding the need for more effective engineering !
l overview and support to the statio In May 1933, a five !
1 member team of engineers, reporting to Design Engineering, :
was established full time at the sit Indications are ,
i l that this is having a positive effect on interface cortnuni- l l cation and engineering support by providing engineerino i 1 decisions in a timely manner. This group has been of i benefit in evaluating issues, but needs more operations ;
j input to provide complete packages. NRC previousi-l raised !
concerns about determining equipment operability. The ;
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licensee has initiated improvement in this area, including ,
a new procedure for requesting written operability deter- ;
mination from DE The diagnostic team reviewed examples i
'
of written equipment operability determinations provided by DED in response to requests from McGuire. The team ;
concluded that good support was being ptovided to the -
operators in their efforts to maintain plant operations within the confines of plant T ,
The system engineer concept and the actions prescribed by
,
the OED program document TOPFORM (discussed in McGuire's previous SALP report) are now being implemented and the ;
'
effectiveness of these initiatives on the improvement of the modification process will be examined in the near future. The licensee has reduced considerably (From 471 to 380) the number of outstanding McGuire: modifications over i the preceeding yea This total which is considered a somewhat more than a 3 year backlog is considered i reasonabl (
l'
j Notwithstanding the above strengths, the following programmatic !
- weaknesses, technical problems and concerns were identified by
! the team in the E/TS area:
) The team found that poor technical reviews, resulting ,
"
from weak involvement by DED in the development of the !
J initial Inservice Testing Program and, subsequently, in the !
, development of a comprehensive action plan to address check valve failures and problems discussed in INP0 SOER 86-3, were a significant underlying caus for the identified 1
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deficiencie *
i The safety evaluation for a modification (NSM MG 20616)
j performed in accordance with the require ents of 10 CFR ,
4 50.59 was not checked at the completion of design wor '
i !
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Two examples were found where 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations that !
'
were recently performed on changes to procedures faiied to recognize that the subject changes affected the FSAR or the TS,
, Key documentation elements of modification package M3-22042 such l as the modification summary and the elementary diagram were in
! conflict with each othcr.
i I
Lack of adequate management review and weaknesses in the
- technical capabilities of the QA surveillance group were found to be important underlying causes for administrative coold
- wn
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rate limits of the reactor coolant system and pressuri:er being exceeded on a recurring basis. The licensee responded to these findings and issues in a positive constructive nanner which was
- considered indicative of a desire to improve station rerformance.
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4 The diagnostic team concluded that the operator training program at McGuire was well organized and comprehensive having strong management backing at every level. Some weaknesses were found
! concerning the quality of visual aids used and the number of i hours scheduled for simulator requalification trainin (20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> which is significantly below the industry average.)
'
l Additional simulator training is now being scheduled as the !
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Catawba personnel are now using their own simulato ; There were no enforcement items identified in the E/TS func- .
j tional area this SALP period. NDE activities received limited
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inspection during this assessment period and the licensee's i
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! performance in this area was adequat . Performance Rating L i
Category 2 i Recommendations f
None :
t I SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION i Analysis i 4 This section includes an assessment of licensee activities
associated with the implementation of licensee safety policies; l licensee activities related to amendment, exemption and relief !
i I requests; response to Generic Letters, Bulletins and Information !
j Notices, and resolution of TMI items and other NRC initiative !
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This section also includes licensee activitias related to the resolution of safety issues, and self assessment activitie l l
[
- The basis for this assessnent was based in part on the licensee's ~
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- performance in support of licensing actions that were either l completed ur had a /gnifica"_ level of activity during the }
rating period. These actions consisted of amendment requests, ;
- Code relief requests, responses to generic letters, bulletins, .
TMI items and other actions. Specific supporting data are t listed in Section V.F of this report. The number of licensing i actions completed during this SALP period was 53 for Unit 1 and !
33 for Unit 2. or 66 for the Station. These can be divided into
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i various categor e Four categories and the number of actions i completed for these ar I
"
Unit 1 Unit 2 l
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I License amendments 17 17 !
I NUREG-0737 actions 2 2 !
iMI actions 4 4 i Requests denied 13 13 l l
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a a
Overall . corporate management leadership, direction and support is good. Efhetive management involvement in site activities associated with licensing areas was evident through prior planning, assignment of priorities, and decision making processe Management is well aware of generic and plant-specific safety issues and the schedules for their resolution Although some indication of manpower limitations is exhibited during periods of peak licensing activities, the overall staffing to support licensing activities is adequate. The staff has good knowledge of the plant, of technical issues, and a good historical knowledge of plant systems and program integration. The licensee has'taken effective measures to mimimize dependency upon outside contractors, and this has increased the ability to provide more timely responses and reduced backlog Management needs to improve the quality of its rt ,ests for licensing amendments and other NRC approvals prior to submitta Requests have been denied because of inadequate No Significant Hazards consideration analyses, inadequate support, and mathe-matical error The licensee makes effecti a use of meetings with the NRC when appropriate to resolve licensing issue The licensee is generally well prepared and provides ample support for its positions during such meeting Duke is an active participant, and frequently assumes a leading role, in nuclear industry activities regarding matters of generic concer The licensee understands the technical issues and considers carefully the impact of various NRC requests and positions en the plant. Conservatism from a safety standpoint is generally exhibited in the licensees apprcach to tbs resolution cf tech-nical issues and the approaches are generally sound and thoroug Followup of events and generic issues is generally thoroug Some repetitive problems have occurred which were documented in an NRC vam evaluation during the assessment perio The problems found were: recurving common-cause failures for each of the six AFW pumps; significant IST program deficiencies involving check valves and some air-operated valves; and a slowness to resolve industry identified problems such as those of INp0's SOER 86- The licensee usually provides timely responses to NRC requests and positions, and cesponses are generally sound and thoroug However, examples of untimely responses followed the NRC s
,
ree:est (1) in Bulletin SS-02 for implementation of an enhanced l j
leak rate monitoring program because of safety concerns regarding rapidly propagating fatigue cracks in steam 92nerator
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tubes, and (2) fn Generic Latter 88-05 for prompt implementation of a program of systematic measures to ensure that boric acid corrosion does not significantly degrade the reactor ecolant pressure boundary. The licensee has also provided untimely support for its proposed TS change for groundwater monitoring and control, first requested in October 1984, and in support of :
two of its requests for relief from hydrostatic testin ,
requirements for welds in the nuclear service water syste '
With regard to reporting of operational events, the Licensee Event Report-(LER) program at McGuire is adequat The LERs I adequately described the major aspects of the event, including component or system failures that contributed to the event, and the significant corrective actions taken or planned to prevent ,
recurrence. The reports were thorough, detailed, well written i and easy to understan ,
!
In the area of quality programs McGuire has a comprehensive l Quality verification program that emphasizes achieving quality [
in the line organization. The QA organization does not provide l as strong a quality role as the line organization in verifying t plant safety performance. Also, an NRC team evaluation during L
!
the assessment period found the McGuire Safety Review Group (MSRG) was not perfor:ning all of the functions identified as 3 part of the McGuire licensing basis and, therefore, did not i appear to meet the full intent of McGuire Technical Specifi- [
crtions. This issue ,esulted in a violatio !
One violation in this area was identifie <
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A Severity Level IV Violation for failure of the McGuire !
Safety Review Group to perform routine independent [
surveillance of plant operations and maintenance activities to provide independent verification that these activities were performeo correctly. (88-20) l t Performance Rating l l
Category 2 j l Recommendations None l l
V. SUPPORTING ?ATA AND SUMMARIES , !
l Investications i
,
No major investigative activities occurred during this assessment i perio ,
I
, .
B. Escalated Enforcement Actions Violations ' Issued or Pending Emergency Diesel Generator - 1A Emergency Otesel Inoperable
[ Severity Level III violation, $100,000 Civil Penalty issued October 28,1987].
Missile Shield - Unit 2 Reactor Cavity Missile Shield Inoperable due to a failure to install required hold down bol (Severisy Level III violation, $25,000 Civil Penalty issued January 29, 1933.] Enforcement Conferences August 15, 1987 Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability November 6, 1987 Reactor Cavity Missile Shield Inoperability January 15, 1988 Control of Safeguards Materials C. Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period October 29, 1987 - SALP meeting with licensee at McGuire sit January 13, 1988 - Management coeting in Region 11 to discuss Component Coo'ing system issues January 22, 1988 - Management meeting at Duke Power Con + ay offices in Charlotte, NC to discuss Diagnostic Evaluation results January 28, 1988 - Technical meeting with Duke ?esign Engineering in Charlotte, NC to discuss current issues and concerns D. Confirmati:n of Action Letters None E. R_eview of Licensee Event Reports During the assessment period, there were a total of 49 LERs analyzed (33 for Unit 1 and 16 for Unit 2). The distribution of these events by causes as determined by the NRC staff, was as follows:
-
,
9 * O 30~
Unit 1 Unit 2-Causes #LERs #LERs Total Component failure a 0 4 Design 3 1 4 Construction / Installation /
Fabrication 0 1 1 Others 6 2 8 Personnel
-
operating activity 2 2 4
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maintenance activity 8 3 11
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test / calibration activity 7 4 11
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other 3 3 6 Total 33 16 49 Note 1: The "Other" category is comprised of LERs where there was a spurious signal or a totally unknown cause Note 2: With regard to the area of "personnel", the NRC considers lack of proceoures, inedequate procedures, and erroneous procedures to be classified as personnel error. The board recognizes that the licensee considers these management deficiencies F. Licensing Activities The assessment of licensing activities was based, in part, upon licensing actions successfully completed during this perio These included the following:
i o NUREG 0737 1.0,2 Safety Parameter Display System o NUREG 0737 11.B.1 RCS Vents o Item 2. Equipment Class Programs for Safety-Related Components o item 4.1 Reactor Trip System Reliability-Vendor Modifications o Items 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Preventive Maintenance for RTBs-Maintenance and Trending o ltem 4.3 Testing of RTB attachments and Bypass RTBs (GL 85-09)
o ATWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62 o R31.97 Position on SG Level Monitoring (Wice vs. Narrow Range)
o Relief from Hydro Testing for RN Modifications (4 separate requests)
o Licensee Follow-up on RTB Binding with Westinghouse ,
o Resubmitted Startup Physics Test Program o Response to Several Bulletins o Unit . Amendments 74 through 59 (identified by subjects below)
o Unit 2 Amendments 55 through 71 (identified by subjects below)'
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31 The asses ment also included numerous licensee requests during the period which were denied by the NRC for various reasons. These ;
requests included:
l o Increase Allowed Unidentified Leak Rate - Inadequate Technical Basis (flaw stability)
o RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits - No Owners Group Endorsement '
o Substitutions within Fuel Assemblies (Initial Request) - Request not Limited Consistent with Justification Provided 5 l o Reload Methodology using CASMO-2E - Gross Mathematical Errors
'
o Changes to Startup Physics Test Program (Initial Submittal) - 7 Inconsistent with Standard l o Four Administrative Control TS Changes - Inadequate 10 CFR 50.92 '
Analysis and Justification l o Use of Summarized Measurements in Environmental Annual Reports - i Actual Measurements Needed, Inadequate 50.92 Analysis o Deletion of non-Type A RG 1.97 Variables - Premature and 3 Inconsiste.nt with Staff Positions L o Reporting Schedule of F-Star Tube Inspection Results -
Inconsistent with Staff Need to be Promptly Informed of Adverse Findings I o Request for Exigency Treatment of Groundwater Monitoring TS - No i
-
Prerequisite Information Provided ;
,
Amendments issued during the assessment period addressed: ,
!
o Attachtcents to RT Breakers and Testing of Bypass RT Breakers I (! tem 4.3 GL 8S-09) l o Station Releases from Equipment Staging Building -
o RV Head Venting (GL 83-37)
o Inoperable but Tripable Control Rods o Shared Portions of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System ;
o Updated Physical Security Plan !
o Correction of Minimum Voluees in the Boric Acid Storage System -
o Deletion of Maximum Fuel Rod Weight Limit of Uranium (
o Obsolete Text on Upper Head Injection System o Surveillance' Interval for Ice Condenser Doors -
o Replacement of RTO Bypass System with In-line RTDs :
o Increased Substitutions within Reconstitutible Fuel Assemblies -
I o Removal of Snubber Lists o Clarifications to TSs 3.0 and 4.0 (GL 87-09)
o TS Index Update and Selected Acministrative Changes o Continuation of F-Star Tube Plugging Criterion !
o Deletion of Inappropriate Surveillance for DG Protective Trips >
(Issued on emergency basis) i i
'
As noted above, 4 relief requests and 1 emergency amendment were ,
issued during the perio No exemptions and no exigency amendments -
were issue [
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Completed licensing activities also included a backfit claim regarding Appendix J and a backitt appeal regarding the safety parameter display syste Significant interaction with the licensee occurred regarding a proposed TS change on groundwater monitoring and control and, although not concluded during the assessment period, is included in ,
'
this SAL Meetings with the licensee and/or site visits occurred during the- ,
assessment period to discuss and work toward the resolution of various technical issues and planned changes. These included the following:
o Metallurgical Examinatiei of Catawba RTB Pole Shaft Welds o Use of Narrow-Range SG Level Detectors o Integrated Safety Assessmer.t Program (GL 88-02)
o Substitutions within Fuel Assemblies o Piping Safeguards o Groundwater Monitoring and Control o Experience with ICCI o Station Safoty Review Group Functions ,
G. Enforcement Activity L
NO. OF VIOLATIONS IN SEVERITY LEVEL FUNCTIONAL AREA I Il III IV V i
Plant Operations 1 5 i Radiological Controls 1
'
Maintanance/ Surveillance 1 11 !
Emergency Prepardness I Security 4 Engineering / Technical Support Safety Assessment / Quality Verification 1 1 TOTAL !
0 0 2 22 0 H. Reactor Trips A total of nine automatic trips occurred during the rating period, five on Unit 1 and four on Unit 2. Nine total automatic trips also occurred during the previous rating period. Three manual trips were also experienced. The trips are described in more detail belo '
.
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1. Unit 1 (a) On August 16, 1987, automatic trip in startup at 6*; powe An anomoly in the digital electrohydraulic control system '
,
combined with operator actione cauced all turbine control valves to open causing rapid decrease in steam line pressure ,
and an SI signal was generated, this trip was caused by a i combination of a poor des (gn of the system and operator error in that operators had not been trained to expect the !
response obtaine l t
(b) On December 28, Unit 1 tripped from 97 percent' power on a i false low-low water level in the B steam generator during l
.
surveillance testin An error in a schematic diagram ;
4 combined with personnel error lead to this tri {
> !
~
1 (c) On January 7 the unit tripped when a main generator voltage !
regulator failed, i
(d) On March 23, 1988, the unit experienced a spurious safety i
- injection main steam isolation and reactor tri The e i spurious SI signal was generated in a Solid State Protection l 1 System (SSPS) cabinet containing the circuity for A train
- low steam line pressure SI and main steam isolation. The ;
'
licensee believes the spurious signal was caused by a small t piece of loose wire or other conductor which had shorted or i grounded the circuitry upon agitation of the cabinet !
, following maintenanc !
(e) On April 16, the unit was manually tripped from 100 percent power due to decreasing level in the C steam generator l
! caused by the C feedwater regulating valve failing shu >
-
i
(f) On June 20 the unit tr'.jped on high negative flux rate when t
- several rods dropped into the core. The t-ip was caused by ,
j failure of a rod control cabinet power suppl !
I l I 2. U. nit 2 [
! !
) (a) On September 6, 1987, unit tripped from 100 percent power l g
on high pressurizer pressure. An instrument air motor i
- which had a shorted lead caused a load center to trip ;
i resulting in turbine generator, governor valves going !
)
closed removing the secondary heat sinL *
(b) On September 16, 1987 ur.it tripped from 100 percent power i when a loss of instrument air pressure caused the main i feedwater regulating valves to close causing a low steam
] generator water level tri The loss of instru; ent air j occurred due to a loss of offsite power caused by , arson- d error.
i
,----ne-n-+-,- --r-, - - - - , - ~ ~ - -
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34 ,
(c). On November 5, 1987, Unit 2 tripped from 100 percent power due to low level in the B steam generator. Low feedwater pump turbine vacuum tripped the 28 feedwater pump and reduced the capacity of the 2A pump resulting in low steam generator leve (d) On November 30, 1987, an apparent momentary spike in the main generator stator cooling flow caused a reactor tri The generator protection circuity, did not operate correctl l A wiring error had cross connected the low and low-low flow l functions resulting in the reactor tri ,
(e) On January 12, 1988, the unit was manually tripped from full power when the feedwater control valve to the C steam !
generator failed shut. A filter cap became unscrewed from t the filter houseing in the air supply line to the feedwater control valve causing a loss of air and valve closur (f) July 31, 1988, the unit was manually tripped from 100 i percent power due to decreasing level in the 2A S A worker in the turbine building lost his footing while .
Climbing and placed a fan he was carrying on the cable l
'
to the solenoid valve controlling air to the feedwater control valve to A SG, causing the valve.to fail shut and [
isolate flo I. Effluent Summary t Actitity Released (curies) 1985 1986 1987 Gaseous Effluents Fission and Activation Products 3.86 E+3 2.10 E+3 4.08 E+3 :
'
Iodine and Particulate 2.58 E-2 7.18 E-2 1.22 E-1 - Liquid _ Effluents l Fission and Activation l Products 1.24 E0 1.56 EO 3 14 EO Tritium 8.04 E+2 9.16 E+2 9.84 E+2 i
i
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{
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