ML20129J377
| ML20129J377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129J360 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-96-09, 50-483-96-9, NUDOCS 9611060232 | |
| Download: ML20129J377 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000483/1996009
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
REGION IV i
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Docket No.: 50-483
License No.: NPF-30
Report No.: 50-483/96-09
Licensee: Union Electric Company
Facility: Cal laway Plant
Location: Junction Hwy. CC and Hwy. O
Fulton, Missouri
Dates: September 1 through October 12,1996
Inspectors: D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector
F. L. Brush, Resident inspector
Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Projects Branch B
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ATTACHMENT: Supplemental information
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9611060232 961031
gDR ADOCK 05000483
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Callaway Plant
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NRC Inspection Report 50-483/96-09
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Operations
- The licensee identified that an operator had inadvertently closed a nitrogen
accumulator outlet valve which rendered inoperable the power operated relief valve
for Steam Generator C and the auxiliary feedwater flow path from the turbine-driven
auxiliary feedwater pump to Steam Generator C. Plant operators did not adequately
review this activity prior to performance. The failure to utilize a procedure or
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guidance appropriate to the circumstances was identified as a noncited violation
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(Section 04.1).
e Plant operators responded well to an unplanned isolation of low pressure Heater
String C. The inspectors identified that there was no off-normal procedure to guide
operator actions in response to unplanned automatic isolation of low pressure
feedwater heater strings (Section 04.2).
- The inspectors found that the licensee's program for minimizing shutdown safety
risk was good. Use of the simulator to practice the heatup and cooldown indicated '
good preparation and planning (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
- The licensee met its goals on outstanding corrective maintenance work requests
prior to the start of Refueling Outage 8. The goal was to have less than
200 corrective maintenance work requests prior to the start of Refueling Outage 8.
There were 104 corrective maintenance work requests outstanding. Additionally,
there was a goal of no more than 30 corrective maintenance work requests greater
than six months old. There were 23 corrective maintenance work requests greater
i than six months old (Section M2.1).
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Enaineerina
- The inspectors identified a violation involving failure to maintain proper configuration
control during a modification to a hydrogen recombiner. The inspectors found that
the licensee's use of the " Request For Resolution" process to implement
modifications did not have a feedback loop to ensure that procedures, drawings, or
other documents affected by the modification were changed (Section E1.1).
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Report Details
Summarv of Plant Status -
The reactor began this inspection period at 100 percent power. The reactor remained at
fuil power for most of the inspection period. On October 6,1996, plant operators oegan a
gradual reduction of reactor power to support planned activities for Refueling Outage 8.
On October 12,1996, operators opened the main generator output breaker to commence ,
the refueling outage.
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1. ODerations
01 Conduct of Operations
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01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of l
ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional :
and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were )
appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant j
testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly I
controlled.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O 2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions
of the following Engineered Safety Feature systems:
- Auxiliary Feedwater Trains A and B;
- Essential Service Water Trains A and B;
- Residual Heat Removal Trains A and B;
- Component Cooling Water Train A; and
- Emergency Diesel Generator Train B.
Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and were
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corrected.
02.2 Review of Eauioment Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors walked down the following tagouts for the Residual Heat Removal j
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System Train B planned maintenance outage:
, Worker Protection Assurance 20312 Component Cooling Water to Residual
. Heat Removal Heat Exchanger B isolation
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Worker Protection Assurance 20357 Residual Heat Removal Pump B
Worker Protection Assurance 20358 Residual Heat Removal Pump B Suction
Valve From the Refueling Water Storage ,
Tank '
Worker Protection Assurance 20359 Residual Heat Removal Pump B Minimum -
Flow Control Valve
Worker Protection Assurance 20360 Residual Heat Removal Pump B Room
Cooler
The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. All tags were on the correct
devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags.
04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Inadvertent Closure of Nitroaen Accumulator Outlet Valve KAC0637
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a. Insoection Scoce (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an inadvertent closure of
nitrogen accumulator Outlet Valve KAV0637. Closure of this valve rendered the
main steam to atmosphere power operated relief valve for Steam Generator C and
the auxiliary feedwater flow path from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump
to Steam Generator C inoperable,
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 18,1996, the system engineer for the compressed air system
requested operations department personnel to close four nitrogen accumulator tank
valves to obtain leak rate data for trending. The accumulators serve as a backup
- gas system to supply compressed gas to the four steam generator main steam to
l atmosphere power operated relief valves and the four auxiliary feedwater flow
l control valves at the discharge of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
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The system engineer gave operations personnel a marked-up copy of the associated
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piping and instrument drawing with the valves to be closed. While intending to
mark Accumulator Tank TKA03 Inlet Valve KAV0636, the system engineer
mistakenly marked Accumulator Tank TKA03 Outlet Valve KAV0637. The shift and
control room supervisors reviewed the drawing and erroneously concurred on the
valves to be closed, f ailing to realize an incorrect valve was marked. The shift
supervisor assigned an equipment operator to close the valves indicated on the
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drawing. Closing Valve KAV0637 made two components inoperable: Steam
Generator C main steam to atmosphere power operated relief Valve ABPV0003, and
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to Steam Generator C discharge
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Valve ALHV0012. Because of persistent questioning by the equipment operator,
approximately 3.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> later, senior operators and the system engineer realized the
mistake and had Valve KAV0637 reopened.
The licensee convened an Event Review Team to investigate the facts and causes
surrounding this event. The shift supervisor realized he had misread the marked-up
l drawing. In addition, the licensee identified the folhwing:
l There was no procedural guidance or work request directing this activity. A
plant engineer voided a preventive maintenance task that performed this
activity in June 1995 because it was viewed as no longer needed. The basis
was that the preventive maintenance task was effectively accomplished in a
separate surveillance procedure. The surveillance procedure placed the
nitrogen accumulator system in the accident lineup and checked leakage
from each accumulator in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
Plant operators did not perform an adequate review of the drawing prior to
allowing the marked valves to be closed. One reason was that control room
l personnel were busy covering several different activities at the time. This
l included routine and nonroutine activities for the upcoming refueling outage.
The licensee lessened the amount of control room activity by rescheduling
l many activities for off-hours.
The inspectors found:
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- The licensee's basis for deleting the preventive maintenance task was
inaccurate. The established lineup for the preventive maintenance task
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- air from the nitrogen system during normal plant operations. The Technical
l Specification surveillance procedure established a different lineup that could
j not check for leakage past these check valves.
- The equipment operator performed the requested lineup and immediately
informed the control room supervisor that all requested valves were closed.
The equipment operator specifically pointed out to the control room
l supervisor that he had closed a nitrogen accumulator tank outlet valve while
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closing inlet valves for the other accumulator tanks. Still the control room
supervisor did not realize a problem existed.
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- The equipment operator showed a strong questioning attitude in following up
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his question with the system engineer.
- Use of a controlled drawing in lieu of a reviewed and approved work
document to reposition the accumulator valves was minimally acceptable.
The licensee agreed and stated that a reviewed and approved work
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document would be used if there is a future need to test the check valves for
leakage.
The licensee was still evaluating whether the preventive maintenance task for the
check valves would be re-established. This was because the check valves were
recently replaced with little evidence of leakage.
The Technical Specification Action Statement under 3.7.1.2.d allowed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for
Valve ALHV0012 to be inoperable since it disabled one of the flow paths from the
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to the steam generators. Valve ABPV0003
l being inoperable did not require entry into any Technical Specification Action
l Statement since the other three main steam to atmosphere power operated relief
l valves remained operable. The duration of Accumulator Tank TKA03 Outlet
Valve KAV0637 being closed did not exceed the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit.
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The failure to provide procedural guidance or work document to direct this activity,
and the subsequent use of a controlled drawing with the incorrect component
l identified for operation is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, in that
the guidance provided was inappropriate for the circumstances. Given that the
condition was licensee identified, :.c Tachnical Specification Action requirements
were exceeded, and the response to the v'ent was prompt and comprehensive, this
violation is being treated as a noncited vic.ation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of
the NRC Enforcement Policy (483/9609-0 ?).
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c. Conclusions
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l The inspectors found that the licensee did not utilize a procedure or guidance
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engineer. The need for a formal review was evident in that the consequence of the
error was inadvertent entry into a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for
! Operation. The lack of formal review was a weakness that contributed to the
I occurrence of this event.
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04.2 Unolanned Isolation of Condensate Flow to a low Pressure Feedwater Heater Strina
a. Inspection Scope (93702)
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The inspectors observed the licensee's response to an unplanned isolation of low
pressure Heater String C.
l b. Observations and Findinos
, On September 27,1996, an unplanned isolation of condensate flow to low pressure
Heater String C occurred. Plant operators responded appropriately per plant
procedures to minimize the effects of the transient on the primary and secondary
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systems. The licensee held an Event Review Team to investigate the causes and
develop an action plan for corrective and preventive actions.
l The licensee found the probable cause was inadvertent bumping of the hi-hilevel
switch for low pressure feedwater Heater 2C. Investigatiori showed that bumping
of this switch would have resulted in the transient by causing the inlet and outlet
condensate isolation valves for the low pressure Heater String C to close. At the
j time of the event, contractors were removing insulation in the vicinity of the hi-hi
i level switch and may have inadvertently bumped or otherwise contacted the switch.
The licensee identified a list of proposed corrective and preventive actions. This
included re-emphasizing good work practices with contract personnel and assigning
additionallicensee personnel to observe field activities. Also, the licensee was
investigating ways to identify sensitive balance-of-plant instrumentation which
might cause unplanned activation of plant equipment.
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The inspectors found that plant operators responded well to this event. The
operator immediately recognized the feedwater heater string had isolated by visual
l indication of a digital alarm on the main control board computer console. The alarm
f ailed to sound. The licensee later performed troubleshooting on the alarm and
could not identify a cause for the alarm not sounding since the alarm functioned
properly during troubleshooting.
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l The inspectors reviewed plant procedures and identified that there was no off-
normal procedure to guide operator actions in response to unplanned automatic ;
isolation of low pressure feedwater heater strings. The guidance was contained in l
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multiple places in existing procedures for normal planned removal of low pressure
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heater strings. The licensee also recognized this and began to evaluate issuing an
l off-normal procedure for this type of event.
Overall, the inspectors iound good teamwork by plant operations, maintenance, and
- engineering personnel in responding to this event. Licensee management
l appropnately monitored and assisted in the recovery effort.
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c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that licensee's overall response to this event was good.
05- Operator Training and Qualification
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05.1 Refuelino Outaae Trainina for Licensed Ooerators
The inspectors observed a refueling training seminar held for plant operators. The
seminar covered topics such as refueling outage work scope, schedule, lessons
learned from the previous refueling outage, safety, and testing. The licensee
required all licensed ope.ators attend one of two seminars.
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Licensee management presented a majority of the topics. In addition to technical
discussions, management presented their expectations for operator performance.
There were open discussions on the various topics. The inspectors found the
outage training to be beneficial for plant operators in understanding outage work
scope and potential problems and contingencies.
05.2 Fire Briaade Trainina
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's fire brigade training and qualification tracking
program. The inspectors did not discover any problems in this area. The details are
discussed in Section F5 of this report.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Refuelina Outaae Shutdown Safety
a. inspection Scone (71707) :
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for ensuring that the plant meets all
Technical Specification and Final Safety Analysis Report requirements during the f
upcoming refueling outage. This included discussions with licensee management, '
attending one of the operator refueling outage training seminars, and reviewing
Procedure PDP-ZZ-00015, " Shutdown Safety Management", Revision O.
b. Observations and Findinas
Prior to the refueling outage, the licensee's Independent Safety Evaluation Group
reviewed the outage schedule to determine if there were any shutdown safety
problems. The group compared the planned equipment out-of-service schedule with
Technical Specification and Final Safety Analysis Report requirements. To assist in
the review, the group used a software package prepared by the Electric Power
Research Institute. The package used probabilistic shutdown safety assessment
models and various shutdown safety function assessment trees. The group
identified no significant concerns in this area.
The inspectors noted that all operator crews practiced the plant heatup and
cooldown on the plant simulator. Operators recommended some enhancements to
the procedures that were appropriately evaluated and included into the procedures.
The inspectors found that no outstanding issues needed to be resolved as a result
l of the shutdown safety review or from use of the procedures on the plant simulator.
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The inspectors found that during the outage, the operations shift supervisor
performs a formal risk assessment during each shift. Any maintenance schedule
changes are compared to the equipment out-of-service list. The shift supervisor
then presents the results of the risk assessment during the twice daily outage
schedule meetings. Any actual or potential problems concerning shutdown risk are
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resolved during the meeting. The licensee displays the updated outage risk j
assessment to ensure personnel are aware of the plant status. l
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c. Conclusions j
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The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for minimizing shutdown
safety risk is good. In addition, use of the simulator to practice the heatup and j
cooldown indicated good preparation and planning. The inspectors did not identify
any concerns.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues
08.1 (Closed) Violations 50-483/9508 01 and 50-483/9518-02: Failure of the Control
Room Operators to Review Control Room Narrative Loas Prior to Assumina the
Watch
in several instances the operators failed to read completed control room logs prior to 1
assuming the watch, in addition, the inspectors noted problems in the quality of
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shift turnovers.
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Since March 1996, the inspectors have observed numerous shift turnovers. The
inspectors did not identify any instances of a control room operator failing to read
the control room logs prior to assuming the watch.
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Additionally, the quality of the shift turnovers has improved. Prior to assuming the
watch, the operators discuss the plant status with the offgoing reactor operators,
walk down the control boards, and review the status of plant equipment. The
operators also review the current night orders to determine if there are any issues
that could affect plant operations. The inspectors have no further concerns in this
area and these violations are closed.
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11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillance
M 1.1 General Comments - Maintenance ;
a. Insoection Scoce (62707)
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The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities: l
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- Work Document W180963, Repair seat leakage on essential service water l
Train A to turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump Valve ALHV0032;
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- Work Document C575003, install new molded case circuit breaker for
Emergency Diesel Generator A room Supply Fan CGM 01 A;
- Work Document P587582, Perform functional test of ultimate heat sink
sump heaters Train A;
- Work Document P587583, Perform functional test of ultimate heat sink ,
sump heaters Train B; and
- Work Document W179860, Rebuild nitrogen supply regulator for
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to Steam Generator C flow control
Valve ALHVOO12, and Steam Generator C ttmospheric relief
Valve ABPV0003.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found most work performed to be professional and thorough. All )
work observed was performed with the work packages present and in active use. :
The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job
progress, and quality control personno' were present when required. Housekeeping
and foreign material exclusien contro.s were satisfactory. Some minor weaknesses
were identified and discussed with appropriate licensee personnel.
M1.2 General Comments - Surveillance
a. Insoection Scope (61726)
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The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities: I
- Surveillance Procedure OSP-AL-P0002,"Section XI Turbine-Driven Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump Operability"; ;
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- Surveillance Procedure OSP-AL-P0018,"Section XI Motor-Driven Auxiliary
Feedwater Pump B Operability"; and
- Surveillance Procedure CTP4Z-01010," Sampling of Secondary Grab Sample
Points."
b. Observations and Findinas
Surveillance testing was performed satisfactorily.
- in addition, see the specific discussions under Section M1.3 below.
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M1.3 Section XI Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumo B Operability Test
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a. Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors observed the normally scheduled motor-driven auxiliary feedwater
Pump B pre-job briefing and operability test. In addition to the operability test,
mechanical maintenance personnel adjusted the pump's packing while the pump <
was running.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The control room supervisor conducted a thorough pre-job briefing. All personnel
involved in the effort were present. The briefing included an overview of the work
to be accomplished as well as potential problems and plant transients. The
communications between the control room operators and field personnel during the
test were good. Licensee management was also present for the briefing and pump ;
run and reinforced their expectations on coordination and communications. The l
inspectors did not note any problems. i
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment i
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M 2.1 Review of Plant Material Condition !
The inspectors reviewed licensee data on material condition of the plant. The
licensee's goal was to have less than 200 corrective maintenance work requests !
prior to the start of Refueling Outage 8. The licensee met the goal, with
104 corrective maintenance work requests. Additionally, a goal of no more than l
30 corrective maintenance work requests greater than six months old was
established. The licensee met the goal, with 23 corrective maintenance work
requests greater than 6 months old. In all, the licensee started the cycle with 985
plant work requests, and ended the cycle with 495 work requests. Plant work
requests included corrective maintenance work requests but did not include work
activities performed on spare parts or in buildings outside the power block.
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l M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues l
M 8.1 (Closed) Insnection Followup item 483/9518-01: Ultimate Heat Sink Train B Sumo
Blocked with ice
On January 3,1996, while performing his daily sump inspection, a plant equipment
! operator found the ultimate heat sink Train B sump blocked with several inches of
ice. Plant operators declared the ultimate heat sink Train B sump inoperable. I
Workers immediately broke up the ice, returning the sump to an operable status.
The licensee found the formation of ice to be due to the failure of both temperature
switches in the ultimate heat sink Train B sump. As an immediate corrective action,
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the licensee implemented a temporary modification to jumper around the
temperature switches so that the heaters remained energized. As a long term 1
corrective action, plant engineers developed a permanent modification to increase
the reliability of the system.
The licensee removed the temporary modification and installed the permanent
modification as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/95-18. The inspectors
reviewed the modification package, observed functional testing of the Train B
heaters, and reviewed documentation on testing of the Train A heaters. The test.
results were satisfactory. The licensee has included annual testing of the heaters in
the preventive maintenance program.
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111. Enaineerina
E1 Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 Installation of New Temperature indicator for Hvdroaen Recombiner Train B i
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a. Insoection Scope (37551)
l The inspectors reviewed a plant modification to install a like-kind replacement for an
l indicator to monitor containment hydrogen recombiner Train B temperature.
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b. Observations and Findinos
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l Instrument and control personnel replaced the old analog temperature indicator,
GSTl0029, for hydrogen recombiner Train B with a new digital indicator. The old
indicator was obsolete. The licensee termed the modification a " material
equivalency", and used the " Request For Resolution" process to approve and install
the replacement temperature indicator. The inspectors reviewed the modification
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package and saw no items of concern except that changes to operations
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department procedures affected by the modification were not made.
From September 17-18,1996, hydrogen recombiner Train B was inoperable for
installation of the new indicator. On September 19,1996, the inspectors found !
l that procedures for operating and testing the recombiner were not changed. I
Specifically, Procedure OTN-GS-00001," Containment Hydrogen Control System", l
Rev. 5, contained instructions at Step 4.4 for placing the hydrogen recombiner in
service during post LOCA conditions. Step 4.4.9.2 required the operator to check
that temperatures of the hydrogen recombiner were increasing by reading i
temperatures from selected thermocouples. Step 4.4.9.2 also contained a " note" !
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informing the operator to gently tap the " knurled setpoint ring" on Temperature
- Indicator GSTl0029 when changing selected thermocouples to ensure a true
reading. Installation of the new indicator invalidated the note since there was no
knurled setpoint ring on the new indicator. The same note appeared in
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Procedure OSP-GS-00001," Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Functional Test",
Rev. 6., Step 6.2.
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l The licensee explained that procedure notes are for information only and are used to
l provide information that can help the procedure user in performing the procedure.
Although the inspectors agreed, it was evident that the licensee did not review
! proceoures affected by the modification to determine whether any changes were
i needed. The licensee changed the procedures to remove the note. The f ailure to l
update the operations department procedures was a violation of Technical :
Specification 6.8.1(483/9609-02). -
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Upon further review, the inspectors found that the licensee's use of the " Request
For Resolution" process to implement modifications did not have a feedback loop to j
ensure that procedures, drawings, or other documents affected by the modification
were changed. The licensee agreed and issued a corrective action document to
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evaluate this concern. The inspectors will review of the results of the licensee's
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evaluation when the violation is closed.
The licensee supplied the inspectors with results of a recent audit by quality
assurance personnel. The audit sampled 16 modifications implemented using the
Request For Resolution process. The auditors identified no substantive concerns.
! c. Conclusions i
The licensee's overall configuration control process following plant modifications
was satisfactory. A violation was identified for one example of failing to maintain
proper configuration control.
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Review of Facility Conformance to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report i
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Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
Final Safety Analysis Report description highlighted the need for a special focused
review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the Final
Safety Analysis Report description. While performing the inspections discussed in
this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the Final Safety
Analysis Report that related to the areas inspected. No inconsistencies were noted
between the wording of the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the plant practices,
procedures, and/or parameters observed by the inspectors.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues
E8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort 50-483/96002: One train of essential service water
inocerable due to revised accuracy of the butterfiv valve analysis and review test
system
in April 1996, Innovative Technology Incorporated notified the licensee that an error
assumption in calculating the setpoints for certain butterfly valve torque switches
was nonconservative. The license performed a reanalysis with the correct error
assumption for all affected safety related butterfly valves.
Following the reanalysis, the licensee determined that service water to essential
service water Isolation Valve EFHVOO25 could not be proven to close under all
design basis scenarios. The licensee processed a temporary modification to jumper
out the torque switch when the valve closes. The torques switches were used for
testing purposes only. A limit switch controls the actuator during stroking of the
valve.
As a long term corrective action, the licensee planned to jumper out the closing
torque switch contacts for all safety related butterfly valves. This modification
would preclude the valves from failing to close due to errors in torque switch
settings. The modifications are scheduled to be completed during routine
i maintenance on the valve actuators. The inspectors have no further concerns with
! this item and consider it closed.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
R1.1 Radioloaical Protection Proaram Observations
The inspectors toured various areas of the radiologically controlled areas of the
plant. Health physics personnel were observed routinely touring the radiologically
controlled areas. Pre-job briefs for work in radiological controlled areas were
satisfactory, with open discussions on radiological and personal safety. Licensee
personnel observed performing work in radiological control areas exhibited good
radiation worker practices. Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were
properly posted. Area surveys posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were
current.
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F5 Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification
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a. Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the fire brigade training program and qualification tracking ;
system. The inspectors also reviewed the program to determine if it was in
! compliance with the Final Safety Analysis Report requirements,
b. Observations and Findinas
The initial fire brigade program training is performed for all operators during initial ;
licensed operator training and is described in the Final Safety Analysis Report site
addendum Section 9.5. The licensee's fire brigade training program is implemented
by Procedure FPP-ZZ-00009," Fire Protection Training Program," Revision O.
The training subject matter correlated to the requirements of the Final Safety j
Analysis Report. The fire brigade members attend on-going fire protection training.
The fire protection requalification classes were comprised of six modules that were
taught at least once every 2 years. These modules were taught as part of the
licensed operator requalification program. 3
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The fire brigade member qualification status was tracked using the licensee's
computerized training tracking program. This program lists each person's ;
qualification and medical certification expiration dates. The inspectors reviewed this !
status list and verified that all operators assigned to the fire brigade were qualified.
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c. Conclusions l
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The inspectors concluded that fire brigade training met the licensee's program 1
l requirements. The inspectors did not note any problems with the fire brigade
member qua!ification tracking program. The training program met the requirements
of the Final Safety Analysis Report. ;
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The exit meeting was conducted on October 11,1996. The licensee expressed a position
on some of the inspection findings documented in this report:
- During the discussion of the unplanned feedwater heater string isolation
i (Section 04.2), the licensee stated that an off-normal procedure would be developed 1
) to respond to an unplanned automatic isolation of a low pressure feedwater heater
l string.
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- During the discussion of the installation of the new temperature indicator for the
hydrogen recombiner (Section E1.1), the licensee stated that failure to delete a note
in the hydrogen recombiner procedure did not rise to the level of significance to
warrant a violation.
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I ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION '
l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
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R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant
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J. D. Blosser, Manager, Operations Support
L H. D. Bono, Supervi::ing Engineer, Licensing Fuels and Site Licensing i
- F. J. Forck, Quality Assurance, Scientist
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. J. M. Gloe, Superintendent, Maintenance
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G. A. Hughes, Supervising Engineer, independent Safety Engineering Group
K. W. Kuechenmeister, Superintendent, Design Engineering
C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering 3
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D. W. Neterer, Shift Supervisor
! J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness and
- Organizational Support
l G. L. Raedolph, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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L The above personnel attended the exit meeting. Ir. addition to these personnel, the
inspectors contacted other personnel during this inspection penod. l
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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lP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
! IP 71707: Plant Operations
l~ IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
l lP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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Opened
9609-02 VIO Failure to change operating procedures following a modification.
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Ooened and Closed
9609-01 NCV Failure to provide guidance opportunities to the circumstances to l
perform evaluations requested by the system engineer. j
Closed i
9508-01 VIO Failure of control room operators to review logs prior to assuming ,
watch, i
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9518-02 VIO Failure to control room oeprators to review logs prior to assuming l
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watch. I
9518-01 IFl Ultimate heat sink Train B sump blocked with ice.
96002 LER Essential service water valve inoperable due to revised accuracy of j
butterfly valve analysis.
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Discussed
None.
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