ML20129G933
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.,t.s aig UNITED STATES 4
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN "ll, REClON IV 7
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$11 RY AN PLAZA drive. SulTE 1000
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ARLINGTON, TEXAS 78012
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'< -' f June 9, 1980
. Y' p.*-)W MEMORANDUM FOR:
G. W. Reinmuth, AD, RCI~, Hqs
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FROM:
Uldis Potapovs, Chief. VIB, RIV i
SUBJECT:
RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WESTINGHOUSE CONCERNING POTENTIAL SAFETY PROBLEM RELATED TO REACTOR VESSEL SAFE ENDS On, June 6,1980, a telephone conference was held with R. A. Wiesemann who is the Secretary of Westinghouse Safety Review Comittee, and various members of Westinghouse technical staff to discuss the reactor pressure vessel safe end problem which was first reported on Comanche Pa k =' *noth Texas projects.
(Ref. Region IV daily reports of June 2 andhe 4,1980D The following infomation was obtained:,
1.
The safe end problen is generic to Westinghouse 4-loop plants manufactured l
after 1971/1972. A design change 'during that time period resulted in reducing the outlet nozzle safe end length to 1/2 inch minimum as measured at the nozzle 0.D. surface. According to Westinghouse the problem does not affect any plants which are currently operating but could be common to the pre-operational facilities listed below.
Included in this listing are the current status of the specific facilities as well as the status of. Westing-house's investigation of the problem.
Callaway-1 Vessel has been installed anc welded into the crimary loon.
Etching test before welding verifieo tnat safe end length exceeded the specified 1/2 inch minimum.
Comanene Peak-1 Vessel has been installed and welded into the crimary icop.
w /6 e ec co,11r,elda No etching done to verify safe end dimension, but satis-tha factory PT and RT after welding suggest that adeouate safe y
end length existed.
South Texas-1 Vessel has been installed and welded into the primary loop.
j No etchino done to verify safe end dimension but satisfactory PT and RT after welding suggests adeouate safe end length.
Sterlitig (SNUPPS)
Vessel in CE shop.
Etching disclosed insufficient safe end length (smallest recorded dimension was 1/16 inch).
Repair by weld overlay with stainless steel.
Wolf Creek Vessel on site but not installed.
Field etching indicated that the safe end dimensions are acceptable.
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8506070414 840620 PDR FOIA GLASSPIS4-393 PDR
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OFFICE MEMORANDUM
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To Mr. W N.
h 1 *ps June 6, 1980 ST-HS-00374 r,
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. L. D. Wilson SFN: A-0100
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' Subject 50UDI TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION 8W NOTIFICATION TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
' 0F A POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE ITEM-(10CFR50.55.e)
UNIT II REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET N0ZZLES k+C
- p' On Friday, May 30, 1980, Mr. G. A. Marshall, while performing After questioning this activity,- [ d'I, surveillance activities, observed the protective covers being removed from the Unit II reactor vessel no::les.
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Mr. Marshall was informed that Westinghouse had requested the covers to g pd 3 7
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be, removed such that an examination of the no::les could be ne-famed.
gjc Shortly thereafter, Mr. D. A. Gulling (Westinghouse) arrived at the area accompanied by both a Westinghouse Engineer and a Combustion Engineering (C.E.)
Engineer. These personnel infomed Mr. Marshall as to what their activities would consist of and why they were necessary. At that time, Mr. Marshall contacted the Brown & Root Lead Mechanical Inspector such that QC cover-age would be provided and left the area.
On Monday, June 2,1980, we received a preliminary report from the Westinghouse on-site representative. A copy of this memo is attached.
Subsequent to the evaluation of this report, the. decision was reached
- hat this office should document this incident and require more information from Westinghouse concerning the Unit II safe ends reported as nonconform-ing and any actions which might be required relative to the Unit I vessel e
presently installed.
On the morning of Tuesdayt M 198 h tr. J W. Soward met with the Resident Reactor Inspector and in:omes nim of the nature of the finding. Tne i
Resident Reactor Inspector expressed concern on the generic aspect of the finding and stated he would be contacting NRC Region IV personnel.
Shortly after noon of the same day, the decision was reached that this finding represented a potentially reportable item as defined by 100FR50.55.e.
I subsequently notified the Resident Reactor Inspector.
Presently, our corrective action has been the issuance of site discrepancy memorandums to Westinghouse and Brown & Root to ensure the proper corrective actions and recurrence control measures are taken by all uarties invc1ved.
- bks cc: Messrs.
E. A. Turner C. W. Vincent (B5R)
D. G. Barker R. W. Peverley (BSR)
R. A. Fra:ar D. W. Janecke (BSR)
H. G. Overstreet G. T. __WagicL43 S. S. Rodgers T M. Phiu ips
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G. B. Painter STP RMS s-L. K. English Attachment S
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HL&P x2219 ST-WY-HS-00199 ue June 2, 1980
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Acid Etch of R.V. Outlet Nozzles 1:
Logan Wilson Four safe ends were acid etched to determine the location of the
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j b' interface between the inconel weld and the stainless steel safe end forgings.
Representatives of Combustion Engineering and W go1 'ylp were on site to conduct the etching.
g Etchine of the safe ends was done in order to avoid violatino the I bu
~ interface when making the stainless steel v fd e
because of the close proximity of the interface to the weld prep.
gr AS9 After etching, location of the amount of stainless steel left on the end preps was noted as shown on the attached diagram.
Results of the etching show that Combustion Engineering is in
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violation of eouipment specification 952545 paragraph 5.2.6 which states "The reactor coolant nozzles shall-have austenitic stain-less steel type 304 or 316 (1/2" or 12.7 m) length minimum applied to tne ends to facilitate field welding" to reactor coolant piping. Outlet nozzle code R2012-3 shows only 1/16" stain-less steel remaining after machining.
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W Enoineerino and Combustion Encineering are evaluating the results
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To determine what actions are required.
D. A. Gulling DAG:ck cc:
Joe Soward Bill Leslie
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DRAFT' 0F WRITE UP FOR JUNE REPORT (0 pen) CDR (CDR-No. 35):
Reactor Vessel Outlet Nozzle Safe End Dimensional
.' Error.
The RRI reviewed licensee file H0. 47.
Additionally Westinghouse Memo
. ST-WY-HS-00199 from D. A. Gulling to HL&P which stated that four safe ends were acid etched to determine the location of the interface between the inconel weld and stainless steel safe end forgings manufactured by Combustion Engineering. Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse technical representatives found that combustion Engineering had violated equipment specification 952545 paragraph 5.2.6 which states "The reactor coolant nozzles shall have austenitic stainless steel type 304 or 316 (h" or 12.7mm) length minimum applied to the ends to facilitate field welding" to reactor. coolant piping. Outlet,( nozzle code R2012-3 showed only 1/16" stainless steel remaining after machining.
The RRI reported this matter to Region IV on June 3,1980 and inofrmed the several other Resident Inspectors that similar etching for errors had been done at their sites.
The Region IV Vendor Branch became involed and additional information was obtained as occumented in a Memorandum for Mr. G. W. Reinmuth of NRC Headquarters.
During this review, the RRI noted an inconsistency between information in the RIV Memo and information provided in the previously referenced Westinghouse (W) Memo. That is the memo stated that acid etching was performed but the Region IV Memo stated that no etching was done at the South Texas Project.
This matter was referred to the Region IV Vendor Branch.
un4s I This matter remains unresolved ;:ndin; the results of the Region IV inspection c# thi: = tter. ca.rt lo s.
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