ML20127C131
| ML20127C131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1984 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20125C450 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-927 NUDOCS 8410020704 | |
| Download: ML20127C131 (7) | |
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, o Septemb::r 21, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: T. M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM: R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
LICENSE CONDITIONS REGARDING HYDR 0 GEN CONTROL MEASURES FOR CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 Proposed License Condition ll, Hydrogen Control Measures II.B.7, which was attached to Facility Operating License NPF-24 for Catawba Unit 1, would require that (1) the distributed ignition system be installed and operable prior to initial criticality and activated upon a safety injection signal, and (2) upgraded analyses be submitted for staff review and approval prior to exceeding 5% power. By letter dated August 31, 1984, the applicant, Duke Power Company, confirmed that the Unit I distributed ignition system is installed and operable cnd that the system will be energized following verification of a valid sefety injection signal. On this basis, the Containment Systems Branch (CSS) concludes that the first element of License Cbndition 11 has been satisfactorily resolved and may be removed from the Unit 1 operating license. With regard to the second element of License Condition 11, the applicant submitted responses to all outstanding staff questions on hydrogen control measures on May 22, 1984. The CSB has reviewed the material provided in the applicant's submittal and concluded that the responses do not adequately resolve all the remaining staff concerns. To further clarify the specific information and analyses required to complete our review of the distributed ignition system, we are providing as Enclosure 1 a Request for Information which we request be forwarded to Duke Power Company. Accordingly, we recomend that the second element of License Condition 11 remain as proposed, with one modification. The proposed license condition specifies that upgraded analyses be submitted for staff review and approval prior to exceeding 5% power. We recommend that the target date for completion of the upgraded analyses be changed from " prior to exceeding 5% power" to "by December 1, 1984". The basis for pennitting full power operation prior to final resolution of these matters is our review of a virtually identical s o..zo 7 0 . 0[ n at .
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T. Novak l hydrogen mitigation system installed in McGuire Nuclear Station, and supplementary analyses submitted for Catawba, from which we conclude that t'iere is reasonable assurance that the hydrogen control measures installed in Catawba will satisfactorily mitigate the consequences of the hydrogen release generated during the more probable degraded core accident sequences. We believe that a date of December 1,1984, will provide adequate time for resolution of the remaining issues without undue risk to public health and safety. A marked-up License Condition reflecting the recommended changes is provided as Enclosure 2. origimi oggnad by
- s. W g, guyns Boaston R. ne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration cc: E. Adensam K. Jabbour T. Kenyon D. Wiggington C. Stable C. Tinkler .-
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ENCLOSURE 1 REQUEST TOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES AT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
- 1. Recent containment analysis for degraded core accident sequences perfonned as part of the NRC Severe Accident Sequence Analysis program suggests the need to further address the survival of certain essential equipment for an expanded set of degraded core accident sequences. Specifically, analyses using the MARCH and HECTR computer. codes indicate that for more-recent estimates of hydrogen and steam release rates for the 52 D sequence and certain other equally-probable degraded core accident sequences, the l
temperatures and differential pressures, to which certain essential equipment may be exposed, can exceed that calculated using the utility-developed release rates and combustion assumptions. The ,
difference in calculated temperatures and pressures is due to changes in the timing, location, and magnitude of hydrogen burns as
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- well as the mass and energy release rates for the blowdown.
Considering the above discussion, provide the results of analyses to determine the effectiveness of deliberate ignition for the ! Catawba plant. The analyses should address the effects of hydrogen combustion on containment integrity and equipment survivability, and should be based on accepted structural heat sink heat transfer models, as outlined in our May 8, 1984, Request for Information. l' Furthermore, the analyses should be performed to address a spectrum ) of appropriate degraded core accidents. Specific items that should be addressed include: l l
2- - a.. Model input and analytical assumptions; b.- Calculated compartment atmosphere pressure, temperature, and gas concentration transients;
- c. Equipment temperature response profiles; and
- d. Differential pressure transients between compartments which will allow for an evaluation of 41 P effects on interior structures and mechanical components (e.g., doors, fans).
- 2. Provide a complete evaluation of fan (both air return and hydrogen skinner) operability and survivability for degraded core accidents. An evaluation of fan operability and survivability was requested by the staff in Requests for Information dated May 8, 1984, and August 18, 1983, however, the utility responses are incomplete and do not provide an adequate basis for concluding on the matter. In this regard, discuss the following items:
- a. The identification of conditions which will cause fan
- overspeed, in terms of the magnitude and duration of differential pressures required to produce overspeeding and i hydrogen combustion events.
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g ., - o-b.. The consequences of fan operation at overspeed conditions. The response should include a discussion of thermal and overcurrent breakers in the power supply to the fans, the setpoints and physical locations of these devices, and the fan loading conditions required to trip the breakers.
- c. Indication to the operator of fan inoperability, corrective actions which may be possible, and the times required for operators to complete these actions.
- d. The capability of each of the key fan system components to withstand differential pressure transients (e.g., ducts,
- blades, thrust bearings, housing), in terms of limiting conditions and components.
, e. An assessment as to whether requisite conditions for overspeed, tripping, or failure of the fan systems, will occur for each of the spectrum of degraded core sequences, and the impact of anticipated fan behavior on the progression of the accident.
- 3. Utility responses to staff questions regarding reverse pressure differential loads on ice condenser doors indicates an apparent inconsistency in reported values for both reverse pressure capability for the doors, and the peak calculated differential pressures. For example, the reverse pressure capability for the intermediate deck doors was' reported to_be 6 psid for Catawba and 2.8 psid for D.C. Cook; the peak differential pressures across these doors resulting from an upper compartment burn was reported to be 1.2 psid for Catawba and 12 psid for D.C. Cook. Furthermore, the utility responses do not provide a quantitative assessment of the reverse-pressure differential loads across each of the doors resulting from an u'pper compartment burn. The door positions and
- pressure loads resulting from upper compartment burns needs to be further examined in light of the recent MARCH HECTR analyses which indicate a greater frequency for upper compartment burns than
, indicated in utility analyses.
-Considering the above discussion, provide a quantitative assessment of the pressure differential loading on each of the ice condenser doors created by hydrogen combustion in a) the upper plenum and b)
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. the upper compartment. Describe and justify the assumed or calculated door positions. Provide an evaluation of the ultimate capability of the ice condenser doors to withstand reverse differential pressures. Discuss the probable failure modes and the consequences of such failures; including the impact on a) adjacent equipment and structures, b) ice bed integrity, and c) flow maldistribution.
ENCLOSURE 2 3-
- 11. Hydrooen Control Measures, II.B.7 (Section 6.2.5, Appendix C, SER)
(e) Oefe.e initiel c. iticelity, the di:tribut:d igritier :y;ter f:r hydr:g:n centr:1 ;h ll b; #n:talled and Operable, 2nd ch:!' h:v: b::n d:m:n:tr:ted t: b; ::tiv:ted upc' : :fety inj::ti :ign:1 escenecAt t,1984 464 Prior to cx::: ding 5" p;a:r, upgraded analyses shall be provided on the following issues and submitted for staff review and approval: (1) thernal response of the containment atmosphere and essential equipment for a spectrum of accident sequences using revised heat transfer nodels. (2) effects of upper compartment burns on the operation and survival of air return fans and ice' condenser doors. (3) operability of the glow plug igniter in a spray environment ; typical of that expected in the upper compartment of the contain-ment.
- 12. Quality Assurance Issues (ASLB PID) -
a) Prior to exceeding 5% power, Duke Power Company shall:
- 1) upgrade its procedures for control of weld filler material to
. prevent the mix-up of carbon and stainless steel filler material.
- 2) confirm to the Staff whether or not socket welds made by a particular construction crew incorporated a required gap between components being welded and, if not, what the results were.
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- 3) modify its instructions and procedures for walk-down inspections to remove any indications that such inspections are only for the purpose of discovering construction damage, i
l b) Within six months, or prior to full power operation (whichever is later), Duke Power Company is to modify and clarify its written policy on
- harassment of emplo opportunity issues)yees to make(which it clearcurrently focusesactions that it precludes on equal rights / equal against QA/QC inspectors intended to impede the inspector's proper performance of his duties.
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+$t December 6, 1984 Note to:. Guy H. Cunningham, III Thru: Edward S. Christenbury JosephR.GraQ /
From: George E. Johnson
SUBJECT:
HISTORY OF HYDROGEN CONTENTION IN CATAWBA PROCEEDING The following is a concise history of the development of'the hydrogen control issue in the Catawba OL proceeding:
- 1. December 9, 1981 - Intervenors proffered Palmetto Alliance'(PA)
Contentions 5, 9, and 31 (the latter also being Carolina Environ-mental Study Group (CESG) 2) addressing serious accidents and hydrogen generation. CESG 2/PA 31 stated: The license should not issue until and unless the hydrogen release consequences from that range and variety'of LOCA's which the Applicant is required by the NRC to consider have been dealt with so'as
, to make impossible damage to public health and _.
safety. The igniter system cannot perform this ' function. PA Contention 9 was similar: Applicants have failed to demonstrate that during the time period following a postulated LOCA but - prior to effective operation of the combustible gas control _ system, either (i) an uncontrollable
. hydrogen-oxygen recombination would not take place inthecontainment,or(11)theplantcould withstand the consequences of that hydrogen-oxygen recombination without loss of safety function.
However, PA 5 was a more general contention addressing the RSS.
- 2. March 5, 1982 - The iicensing Board rejected PA 9, 31 (CESG 2),
based on the ground Bat "the issue [of an explosive hydrogen-oxygen reaction produced within the reactor containment following a loss-of-coolant accident] is being addressed in the rulemaking < process." 15 NRC at 584, relying on Rancho Seco,-ALAB-655, 14 NRC 799. The Board noted that no credible accident scenarios for a LOCA producing hydrogen had been offered. PA 5 was also rejected tased on lack of specificity, 15 NRC at 583-4. yum c o g m A ,hn / v vi y' Gf
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- 3. - March 31, 1983 - Intervenors PA and CESG object to March 5, 1982 order and proffer 4 " credible accident scenarios." .'-
- 4. July 8, 1982 (16 NRC 167, 169-170) -
reconsideration noted that PA 5, 9, 31 (CESG had 2 Licensing) Board,on been rejected for lack of specificity but the door was left ajar for possible consideration of site-specific credible accident scenarios. Noting March 31, 1982 scenarios could occur at any PWR, it asked for party comments. Party coments submitted 7/30/82. Applicants opposed, Staff said scenarios were sufficiently specific to . litigate their credibility.
- 5. December 1,1982(16NRC1791,1798,1807-1810)- Licensing Board. -
on reconsideration rejected these contentions, and particularly the 3 hydrogen generation contentions, noting again they were generic issues in an ongoing rulemaking and need not be litigated. ASLB, while noting that the Comission permitted litigation of hydrogen issues in TMI Restart despite ongoing rulemaking, ruled that there was no substantial safety reason for litigating the generic issue since the rulemaking would be completed well before licensing. 16 NRC at 1809. It found "the pertinent rulemaking directly addresses the intervenors' hydrogen concerns." The ASLB also ruled out an environmental contention, DES-22, based on similar reasoning, but also had a separate, independent basis, finding that the DES. with minor revision, adequately treated the - risk of severe accidents involving hydrogen explosion. 16 NRC at 1798. .
'6. April 12, 1984 - PA and CESG seek to have original hydrogen control scenario contentions admitted based on the ground that the premise for earlier dismissal, the completion of rulemaking prior to
' licensing, had not proven to be viable. Intervenors also noted that the Staff considered the matter still an unresolved safety issue.
- 7. May 2, 1984 - The Staff responded that since completion of the rulemaking was likely within a short time, the ASLB's reasons for dismissing the contentions were still sound.
- 8. . June 22, 1984 (19 NRC 1418, 1425) - In Parth1 Initial Decision, 19 NRC 1425, n.3, the ASLB rejected the hydrogen accident contentions essentially for the reasons advanced by the Staff. .See Staff Responses dated May 2, 1984. Briefly, the hydrogen accidents are rejected because final Comission action on a generic rule addressing the same concerns is expected before the anticipated date of full-power operation of Catawba.
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- 9. ~ November 1, 1984 - The Staff informed the Licensing Board that the .
Staff expected the rulemaking to be before the Comission within the - month of November, but could not predict the date for approval. a l i: L . l { l
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k 9g3 [ ih cesG As discussed abcve, CESG has not supported a charg'e
\ of changed circumstances suf ficient to warrant relitigation of the need for power and no possible public interest factor ,
has been advanced which would warrant relitigating this issue for a plant that is substantially complete. 15/ Applicants submit that the time to discuss the need for power issue was at th e time the construction permits were sought and not now when the plant is alr'no t complete. 6/ Inasmuch as these issues were previously consideged and resolved at th e construction permit stage, not once but several times (hnd in the other proceedings discussed in Part II, supra), the matter warrants no further attention by this Board. Thus for reasons set forth above,. CESG's I ( l proposed contentions 1 and 12 should be barred by applica-ti the doctrine o ateral estop"pel. B. HYDROGEN GENERATION C SG Proposed Contention 2) CESG's proposed tion 2 reads as follows:
- 2. The license should not issue until and unless the hydrogen release consequences from that range and variety of LOCA's which the Applicant is required by 1_5,/ As of Fall 1981, Catawba Unit 1 was 86.4% complete; Catawba Unit 2 was 35.5% complete.
16/ This is in accord with the Commission's proposal to ar5end 10 CFR Part 51 to eliminate in operating license proceed-ings, and in environmental reports submitted at the OL stage, an analysis of the need for power and of alternative energy issues. 46 Fed. Reg. 39440 (August 3, 1981) t e + e
r o s _ the !;RC to consider have been dealt with se as to make impossible damage to public health and safety. The igniter system cannot perform this function. Applicants submit that to the extent CESG's contention . questions Applicants' analysis of hydrogen generation consequences as set forth in Applicants' FSAR, CESG's contention lacks the requisite specificity and supporting , basis required by Commissio'n regulations, and thus, must be - denied. 17/ In addition, to the extent CESG seeks to challenge the design assumpt, ions set forth by Commission
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' regulations and used by Applicants in their design analyses regarding hydrogen generation (e.o., 10 CFR 550.44), CESG's contention 2 is not subject to resolution in this proceeding in that it constitutes an impermissible challenge to Commis-p I sion regulations, and is the subject of ongoing generic rulemaking. See Pa'rt IB, supra. .
With regard to hydrogen generation, current Commission '
- regulations require that Applicants only consider the i
release consequences of an amount of hydrogen as set forth h in 10 CFR $50.44. Applicants have set .forth such analy-ses in Sections 6.25 and 15.6.5 of the FSAR and thereby have demonstrated compliance with the Commission's regulations. To the extent that CESG contends otherwise, CESG must 17/ To the extent CESG seeks to raise a new standard of
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" impossibility of damage to public health and safety,"
CESG's efforts are clearly in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Commission regulations, and - f must fail.
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Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 8 must be denied. G. HYDROGEN GENERATION (Proposed Contentions 9 and 31) Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 31 is identi-cal to CESG's proposed contention 2. For the reasons set forth -in Applicants' response to CESG's proposed , contention 2., as contained in " Applicants' Response To CESG" incorporated herein"by reference, A'pplicants submit that Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 31 must be denied. , Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 9 reads as follows: ..
- 9. Applicants have failed to demonstrate that during
'. the time period folloking a postulated LOCA but prior
- to effective operation of the combustible gas control system, either (i) an uncontrollable hydrogen-oxygen recombination would not take place in the , containment, or (ii) the plant could withstand the consequences of ,
that hydrogen-oxygen recombination without loss of safety function. Applicants submit that to the extent Palmetto Allian e's proposed contention questions Applicants' analysis of hydrogen generation consequences as set forth in Applicants FSAR, Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention lacks the requisite
. specificity and supporting basis required by commission regulations, and thus, must be denied. See Part IA, supra.
In addition, to the extent Palmetto Alliance's proposed O s 5
7.. . g: .-
. D. RISK EVALUATION AND SEVERE ACCIDENTS (Proposed Con-
.tention 5 and 32) <
Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 32 is identi- . cal to CESG's proposed' contention 3. For the reasons set
' forth in Applicants ' response to CESG's proposed conten- ,
tion 3, as c.ontained in " Applicants' Response To CESG" incorporated.herein by. reference, Applicants submit that ' Palmetto Alliance's proposed contention 32 must be denied. Palmetto Alliance's , proposed contention 5 reads as follows: ' ,
- 5. No reasonable assurance can be had that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public through occurrence of a serious accident, beyond design basis. The probabalistic risk assessment which might serve as
(' ' a basis and standard for finding a reasonable assurance of an acceptable risk to the public cannot be carried out because human errors and common mode failures are not susceptible to that method of analysis and because the complexity an'd number of nuclear plant ' systems defies such analysis. Such serious issues have 'been raised and shown regarding the conceptual, , methodological, statistical, and data underpinnings
- of the RSS that its use in licensing proceedings for decisien-making is entirely inappropriate.
UUREG/CR 0400, the Lewis neport, supra: Union of 7 Concerned. Scientists, "The Risks of Nuclear Power ; Reactors: A Review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH 1400" (NUREG 75 014), pp. 113-130. Serious accidents with releases of radioactivity to the l environment inimical to the health and safety of the , public are now plainly credible after Three Mil'e Island.- , Commission regulations are based upon a statutory mandate to assure "the common defense and security" and O lr ' L(lv' i i _
Cete Os 15 NRC 566 k1982) 1.gp.82 14 get LES OF PRACTICE: CONTENTION; REQUIP.EM. . OF - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SPECIFICITY i NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Where, at the time of* the first prehear.ms conference, key documents I ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD such as the Commission Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, its-lasironmental Impact Statement, most of the off. site emergency plans and
- Before Administrative Judges
- gurtions of the Applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report had not yet been i
.ritten, the argument that intervenors must plead all contentions with 4
James L. Kelley, Chairman ,canonable specificity prior to the conference, and that further contentions i } Dr. A. Dixon CalNhan based on information disclosed in subsequently available documents must j l Dr. Richard F. Foster be subjected to the restrictive standards for admissibility of late-filed ' contentions, was unreasonable and not required by the Commission's Rules l in the Matter of Docket No. 50 413-OL. and 50 414 04, J Practice as written or by prior decisions. j j ASLBP Docket No. 81-463 01 OL - t RULES OF PRAGICE: CONTENTION; EMERCENCY PLANNING ! DUKE POWER COMPANY, of al } (Catawba Nuclear Station, The Commission's regulations plainly contemplate that the adequacy of , ! ] Units 1 and 2) March 5,1932 Jf. site emergency plans for counties and municipalitics near the facility l . . that is the subject of the proceeding can be contested in their specific , The Licensing Board rules on pending petitions for intervention and Jctails by intervenors.10 CFR 50.47(a). ' contentions filed in support of those petitions. i i. RULES OF PRAGICE: ADMISSIBILITY OF CONTENTION : RULES OF PRAGICE: CONTENTION; REQUIREMENT OF , SPECIFICITY Where the documents likely to provide'the necessary specifics for the ] formulation of contentions were not yet available, the Board would not i '
- The requirement of the Comm. .ission's Rules of Practice that the basis g,, allow proposed contentions for lack of specificity but would admit such [
j for each contention be set forth with reasonable specificity facilitates contentions conditionally, subject to the requirement that intervenors
- Board determinations whether contentions are litigable, and helps auuse aJsancing such contentions review the relevant documents promptly after j ihat other parties are suffico
- ntly put on notice that they will know at least they become available and, within 30 days thereafter, submit revised
- generally what they will have to defend against. These purposes do not contentions meeting the specificity requirements of the Rules of Practice, ,
j imply that a high standard of specificity for cententions is required at W or else abandon the contentions.
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. carly a stage of the proceeding as the initial prehearing conference. The . principal function of contentions at this juncture is to place some i l acawnable limits on discovery, and this may be accomplished with RULES OF PRAGICE: ADMISSIBILITY OF CONTENTION contentions more broad and general than the revised contentions that can ,l The adequacy of any revised contentions based upon documents filed be developed after discovery and that will, after the final prehearin8 conference. structure the hearing. .ubsequent to the initial preheari,ng conference would be judged by the i general principles applicable to contentions, including specificity. However.
. nce the " lateness" of such contentions would be entirely beyond the -
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.ontrol of the sponsoring intervenor, the additional criteria normally g applied to late contentions under the Rules of Practice would not bc applied. ,
J l 566 , 567
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y .; ( g l ' conte; tion (whiu .r: rejecting) does not ref r to the i tal impact s. .cnt's discussion of serious accidents. W3 do not, by this .J. tulnerabihties of small owners. I conditional admission, necessarily endorse the need to consider the entire ' This contention about costs of decommissioning is similar j spectrum of PWR accidents; the scope of the Staffs obligation is basically - sention; it is admitted subject to deletion of the last ; contained in the Commission's Policy Statement. The second sentence of
-bject to further specification following discovery. .
this contention is rejected. The abilities of local officials to cope with the -* It is tnclear to the Board whether or to what extent the l consequences of serious accidents w6uld be more appropriately explored in ' l
)epartment of Ilealth and Environmental Control will be the emergency planning context. New contentions concerning the functions , ,.
t , . unitoring the operational effects of Catawba, either as a , and capabilities of local officials can be submitted promptly after the local ;. , ; aion ufety regulations or as a factor in the environmen. area plans become available. j .o ~. il 0 4., ;. (f P analpis. Various aspects of monitoring activities are dig. CESG 13: This contention alleging irregularities in welding practices is in Cl,apw: 6 of the Environmental Report, including a similar to Palmetto Contentions 6,7 and 18. It is admitted conditionally, i ,( y . 3 . of a pre-operational monitoring program by the South subject to further specification, or withdrawal, following discovery. The t A.ph nent of ilcalih and Environmental Control. Because this conference transcript indicates that further specificity could be provided. ',' yf i tied in with this discussion and is objectionable on Tr.348-350. y 4 .p., ,6 ds, it is diallowed, with one possible exception. The CESG 16: This contention is similar to parts of Palmetto Contention .
- fcas to the St.ite agency's " responsibilities in the event of Sc=se the ot'f. site emergency plans are not yet available, ,
- 22. It is qu,ite vague as drafted. However, it is being admitted con-ditionally, subject to further specification or withdrawal after the Ap- j[o.;:J,p G 4 wf
[h] o what role the agency may plan in an emergency, plicants have supplied to CESG a copy of the control room design review l 0 g j,..e i
- limited aspect of the contention is admitted conditionally, promised in Section 1.91(3) of the FSAR.
ara available and pending its revision or withdrawal. p y,,,,.p %" ions 8. 9,13 and 16 and 17" are admitted. in whole or in CESG 17: This contention lacks specificity in that it fails to state how JQ:g,i? an infestation of the Asiatic clam Corbicula might affect the performance ?i e fo!!owing conditions: of the cooling tower system and why such an effect should be of health Y .WM, .'I. iett> 35c The first sentence of this emergency planning and safety concern or impact the environment. The potential for Corbicula s N mat re because the ten mile plume exposure pathway rg zone has not yet been drawn by State and local ; infestation was brought out in the FES (p. 2-36) at the construction permit stage. Ilowever, the Applicants do not refer in their' picading to any hlPG.D ,. M DO Y' tion of this contention is admitted, subjec. to the Inter. I discussion of Corbicula in their FSAR or ER. In these circumstances, we the State and hical plans when they are available as to as of that EPZ boundary. The second sentence alleges admit this contention conditionally, subject to clarification of the issue and much greater specificity following discovery.
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;4%.". V.hi W 30 miles should be the basis for emergency planning." , l. .
neaa that the plume exposure pathway EPZ prescribed in Palmetto Contentions Rejected. g$-@h,Q{N wut tea miles" should be expanded to 30 miles in the 'this case. This is an impermissible attack on the Commis.
;; g ' j'i p I'R 50.47(c)(2)). Should the Intervenors wish to pursue Palmetto 5: This diffuse contention expresses a generalized concern about serious accidents at Catawba. It questions the use of the Reactor dt if mper course would be to file appropriate papers seeking a cnile feature of the rule, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.758.
Safety Study in accident analyses, and contends that serious accidents (presumably at reactors generally) are " plainly credible" after Three Mile [U T: d t! h f} ; ghu,- 5/ '. h i first untence of this contention is similar to Palmetto l>1and. This proposed contention falls short of specificity requirements, h seel consideration of serious accidents in the Staff's whatever standard one applies. There is no nexus of any kind, direct or i"5 act statement. ~1 his contention is admitted conditionally, p reused or withdrawn in light of the draft environmen. indirect, between the very generalized concerns being expressed and the specific licensing actions we are considering. The possibility of accidents at %%M*
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a particul:.r reactor can only be meaningfully analyzed with reference to '
. ' [ 7h.: , .on. are al=> aJ6ansed b) Palmciio as their consentions numbered 33*
i ' p. to postulate s specific serious and credib!c accident scenario at Catawba, oc r.inmua c.msnima, are also .Jmiiied, subject, et course. to the ,P.i.
.,i',
we might accept a contention based upon it. Cf. Public Service Co. of w j 6
.s ,q 582 583 e
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- '_ _ ., .s .*-y e u t.. . . lit ck 1 os Namel.ml, (*t.lcal, il NHC 4.l.l (19tIO). In the checace s., pen.ture, wills the number of jobe Catawba creas... c tlier un a s.am=Iri us i . .evitet lc nertimlo, side coenscesikies unent he rejected. t,..a princct or as an operating fucility, anal, by comyisirsson, lusw sn.iny p
- l'aimesse as aml .51 (CD4 23: These contentions address an emplosive en.cilments in conservation might have created had Catawba not les huhoren ouren reaction primiuced within the reactor containment follow. 1,mit.
l eni. tow-ol<.=>laint acciolent. As hcid in .Wcrumenso Municipal Utsleir l'almette 19 and 45 (CI'SU 19p These contentions uddrena the Cata= ! sinees.s (H.im:Im Secu NueIcar Generating Station), Al.All.655,14 NHC I mergency Core Coding System.10 CI R Part 50. Appendia K. Palme i rs, these contenti.ms are denied because the inue in being addrcued in ' 19 hrst alleges that the capceted pctformance of the mysicm han not in ihc intemaLmg proecss. As recently as December 23,19st (46 l'cd. Reg. .orrectly predicted and in support cites what arc described 'as publisi ! s,Lhill, the Commission published a proposed rule for comment. It is criticisms of the methodology embodied in the analysis put forth in ' i accarnised. Imwever, that hydrogen issues may be litigated in individual ~ Commission's Reactor Safety Study (WASil-1400). Additionally, Palmc ; j heensmg proeecdings provided the challenger postulates a credible scenario . 19 together with Palmetto 45 and CESG 19 allude in an uncicar man
- for a loss.of-coolant accident producing hydrogen. Absent such a scenario so a part of the reactor and allege that part is so poorly supported as to,-
i and in view of the pending rulemaking, these contentions are rejected. the limit of complete support failure, result in blockage of ports provii r i Palmette 11: This contention seeks to inject increased costs of construc- for entrance of emergency cooling water for the reactor core. The cont ! tion into the environmental cost / benefit analysis at the operating license tion is so unclearly stated, even in the oral presentation (Tr.179 ff, 3t i j stare. The second sentence makes it clear that it is an attempt to reopen .is to preclude identification of the item of equipment under discuss j the cost / benefit analysis conducted at the construction permit stage. While Therefore, both as a challenge to Commission regulations for emerge r l construction costs can be significant at the construction permit stage when core cooling and as a collection of unclear statements lacking specifics s it comes to choosing among alternatives, they are usually irrelevant at the f equipment, these contentions are rejected. ' operating license stage. In the first place, costs of construction of all power ! Palmetto 20: This contention postulates that occupational radiat -
, plants have risen sharply in the past several years. The costs of the benefits ! caposures will not be as. low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) beca
] aweiaied with building a plant have also risen. No claim is made that the certain equipment (specifically the steam generator, the reactor vessel a l
- costs of construction of Catawba have risen any faster than those of other '
neutron shield bolting) will require extensive repairs and because i I nuelcar plants, or of other goods and services in the economy. More ! FSAR does not adequately consider occupational exposure from vari
- fundamentally, the attempt to inject increased costs into the cost / benefit I other occurrences that are not specifically described.
j equation at the operating license stage simply comes too late. Even assum- ' This contention is disallowed because it fails to provide any reasont j ing that the costs of construction of Catawba have gone up an inordinate I specific basis for the assertion that ALARA requirements of 10 CFR 2 l amount, the fact remains that those funds have already been spent or are will not be met. The Applicants have set forth in Section 12.1 of j committed at this late stage of construction. Thus there is no practical . FSAR their program for "(e)nsuring that occupational radiation expost su;nt in considering such " sunk" costs now. Cf. Public Service Co. of New are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)." The contention, howe Hampshire (Seabrook Station), CLI-77-g, 5 NRC 503, 530-536 (1977). does not question this program or any part of it. Speculation that la f Palmette 12: This contention states that capital-intensive forms of collective doses of radiation might be received by repairmen at some fu-energy Ipresumably including nuclear power plants) place added burdens i . time because of the premature failure of equipment is not grounds fc l on a tight capital market and increase interest rates in the economy as a . showing that ALARA principles were ignored. j whole. This may or may not be true. However, exploration of this broad The Commission has under di:velopment, but has not yet publishec j economic thesis is far beyond the relatively narrow scope of this proceed-l proposed rule concerned specifically with occupational ALARA. Shc i ing. The argument would be more appropria:cly put to an economic Palmetto Alliance wish to pursue the subject matter of this content j committee of the Congress. participation in the making of the proposed occupational ALARA Palmetto 13: This contention about the effect of Catawba on the area would be an appropriate avenue. ! labor market is also beyond the scope of this operating licensing proceed- Palmetto 28: This contention seeks to raise "ATWS" (Anticip, j ing. We are concerned with whether the Catawba nuclear power plants Transients Without Scram) issues into this individual licensing procecc j meet the safety rules of the NRC and whether their benefits will outweigh The thrust of the allegation is that the Applicants have failed to d ; the environmental costs of operation. We are not concerned, at least at this onstrate that the risk from an ATWS event is such that there i i . l 584 l 585 ? i ) ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _
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UNITED STATES OF A"EF.ICA ' CMM L ' NUCLEA.E REGULATORY CD.'NISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINS BCAP.D In the Matter of ) . DUKE POWER COMPANY,'et al.,
) Docket Nos. 50-413-OL (CatawbaNuclearStation ) and Units 1 and 2), '
) 50-414-OL
)
PALMETTO ALLIANCE, CAROLINA ) March 33, 1982 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP and ) CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG ENVIRONMENTAL % C*^ "'
- Intervenors,
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PALMETTO ALLIANCE AND CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO ORDER FOLLOWING PREHEARING CONFERENCE Jesse L. Riley Robert Guild, Esquire Carolina Environmental Study Group 314 Pall Hall - 854 Henley Place . Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Attorney for Palmetto Alliance ,
. g',jff ,c )Adn q wo lno-p y
't-I h Fr:uant te .10 CfR 2.753 a(d) and at the dire: tion of the 5:ard Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group hereby file their objections to the Board's Memorandum and Order (Re-flecting Decisions Made'Following Prehearing Conference), dated March 5,1982; seek revision of the order in light these objections or the certification of such matters to the Comission or Appeal Board for detemination as pemitted by 10 CFR 2.718(i); and further respond to the Board as directed.
Intervenors object to the Board's Memorandum and Order to the extent that it either rejects or accepts only conditionally contentions
, which these Intervenors have filed for litigation in this proceeding, and to the extent that it denies relief sought by them in their- plead-ings or on the record before the Board. In support of this Response and these Objections Intervenors reiterate those matters set forth .-
in' their Petitions, Supplements and their statements of record at the prehearing conference held January 12 and 13,1982 at York, South Carolina,' which are incorporated herain oy referance. Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group generally agree with the Board's view that its contentions can not properly be reje'cted for lack of specificity or basis where the subject matter of a contention is to be addressed only later in Applicant or Staff filings or other documents not yet produced. Intervenors ,' object, however, to the limited and conditional acceptance of their contentions at this time and the burden of further specifications 2
F j' ., L E re:uired of the. later. It is the ;,rerc;stive of 'de Fc.,er 2 . any, et al. , to choose the time for filing its application for operating licenses for - the facilities and the prerogative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff to schedule the environmental and safety analyses which it perfoms as a basis for the agency action sought by Duke and opposed by the In-tervenors. Intervenors control neither process, yet are required to assert their interest and plead their contentions for litigation years in advance of plant completion and long before agency environ;aental and safety reviews are perfomed. While the Board acknowledges the unreasonableness of the Applicants' and Staff's views that Intervenors must plead its contentions with full' ( specificity now on pain of sumounting the barriers to late filing later; it imposes the burdens of this analysis on Intervenors in refusing the unconditional admission of contentions now which are otherwise fully litigable. Intervenors object to the requirements that they make further revisions of contentions because of the present unavailability of materials not withir. Inter.enor 's ccr. trol, t.:h c :.tt.r.ti:ns sh:e M be admitted unconditionally now. Intervenors properly face the burden of withstanding discovery and sum,ary disposition in due course, but not the continued burden of establishing the threshold appropriateness of their contentions for litigation. With respect to contentions for which the Board e.xpressly requires l t revision after initial discovery Intervenors assert the adequacy of those contentions as plead and specifically object to the requirement f 3
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. revision.- .In the' event that the Comission adopts proposed limits on r
discovery. Intervenors request that this required round of discovery not b'e charged against: these parties; 4 6 4-D i t
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x - . - SEF.IOdi ACCILENTS, Tai .e:t; 5, 9, 32; CESG 2. Intervenors object to 'the Board's rejection of contenti[ns which , question the assurance that Catawba can be operated without endangering the public health and safety through the occurrence of' serious accidents. Intervenors believe that a variety of, plainly credible, Catawba specific, 9 accident scenarios are implicit in their contentions as originally filed but are herewith postulating exp1'icitly s9veral such scenarios in response to the Board's view that further conside' ration of these contentions
. requires such a showing at this time. KerequestthattheBoardeither revise its Order accordingly or certify the question of the litigation of these issues for determination by the Commission or Appeal Board.
/ Intervenors have been of the opinion that the Staff has regarded
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__- _ serious accidents as credible in view of NRC funded studies on the subject currently in progress at Brookhaven on LOCA's, at Battelle - ' Columbus on core melt / core slump and at Sandia National Labs on hydrogen release, combustion and detonation. We are providing scenarios with a variety of sequences. It is obvious that some eleuents in these sequences may be recombined to form many other credible _ accident
~
scenarios. Initiating events from outside the~ station in the form of loss of offsite power, or from within the station in such events as feedwater loss as at THI-2, steam generator tube rupture as at Ginna or electrical _' insulation combustion as at Brown's Ferry. These accidents have taught us that sequential events contribute to the deyelopment of serious 5
~ . . . -_ .
s a::icents such as sticking POU's and disabled electrical systems. Sub-sequent events can lead to reactor pressore vessel breach, hydrogen release and containnent breach.,
- 1. OFFSITE POWER FAILURE Stations main transfonner burns out as it did recently at Duke's Marshall Steam Plant or the transmission line is brought down by a tornado or a heayy lightening strike in the switchyard disables the switch sear. Both reactors are operating at full power. Half of the diesel electric generat-ing capacity fails to start. There is an insufficiency of on site power for safe shut down. Decay heat renoval is inadequate due to inoperable feed water and reactor coolout pumps. This results in excessive reactor
- f_ temperature and pressore. The reactor vents through the pressurizer spring ( loaded relief valves. The ECCS accumulator water is soon exhausted. The reactor coolout system continues to yent steam with the result of core y exposure and subsequent melt down and core slump. There is massive hydro-gen release, a metal-water reaction at least 80% complete. The' air recir-culation fan is inoperative. The i5 niters ao not reach ignition tc .gra-ture. Hydrogen accalates in the containment. Diffusive mixing of hydrogen and containment air results in a combustible mixture. The tem-perature of the reactor surface is increased by the melted fuel to a temperature sufficient to cause ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture. Containment is breached, the estimated failure pressure of 67.5 psi .
- being exceeded. The reactor vessel melts through and releases essentially the entire inyentory of radioactive yolatiles to the atmosphere as the 6
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msiten fuel drops inte tne s:c; water va;;r'.zin; expletively cr. ::n a:t and forming a substantial Enount of particulates carried outside by'the steam generated from the sump water. 'This scenario represents a Ph'R-3 as dencminated in the F.eactor Safety Study. II. ATRS Catawba has been operating for 30-35 years. The nil ductility temperature of the reactor presscre yessel has increased to greater than 200 degrees F as coanonly occurs with reactors of this age. The . turbine generator throws a blade, puncturing the turbine case and making the feed water system temporarily inoperative. The control system calls for reactor trip but the reactor does not SCRAM due to
~
common mode failure of SCRAM systems leaving cont'rol rod solenoids i activated. Pressure builds in the reactor coolant system due to decay heat, load loss and cessation of feedwater flow. The PORY opens, the pressure rises to the set points of relief valves which operate. The ECCS actuates. The accumulators and high pressure injection pumps perform according to design. Large quantities of cold water Entering the reactor pressure vessel chill parts'of it to below the high nil ductility tenperature. Temperature differentials in the pressure vessel induce higher levels of stress, the effluent from the core is still at a high temperature. 'The combination of h.igh internal pressure-high pressure injection' pumps still operating, spring loaded relief _ valves now bei.ng closed, and the PORY partially closed - cause brittle failure of the junction of the reactor vessel and cold leg nozzle, 9 7 L
- ne weld having developed cracks. Wi:n the rea: tor brea:hed ECCS flow no longer traverses the core. The core heats op, hydrogen evolves from the zirconium-steam reaction. Sterm-hydrogen release rates are so great that the air return fan does not appreciably dilute the lower containment
- steam-hydrogen atmosphere with air and flowing through the ice condensor the steam condenses. Almost pare hydrogen emerges from the condensor.
It is bouyant, having only 2/14' the density of the upper containment' atmosphere. The hydrogen rises to the dome. The dome igniters operate using up the oxygen in the ignition region. Hydrogen continues to accumulate in the upper containment. Hydrogen flow slows as zirconium is depleted. The hydrogen and oxygen in the upper containment inter-dif-fuse broadening the interface and increasing the volume of combustible gas mixture. When a portion of the combustible mixture reaches an igniter most of it will combust due to the turbulent mixing which will occur in the initially combustible region. The containment pressure exceeds the exoected average rupture pressure of 67.5 psi. Radioactive violatiles will be released to outside atmosphere from the burst containment. Sub-sequent core slump will release additional steam and radioactive parti-culates resulting in a PWR-3 release. III. FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL The steam generator tube problem encountered in Westinghouse's D ,
~
Series Steam Generators is not satisfactorily fixed. The reactor requires shutdown and restart on a cuch greater rate than designed for - namely greater than a rate of 200 cycles in 30 years. The resultant fatigue 8
4
- strier ar. even :nore rapid in:rease in nil du::ility te. perature than encountered in nomal operation. Cracks develop in the pressure vessel welds: a comon occurrence as in Oconee 1. The any problems with the aging Oconee reactors and the steam generator problems at F.:Guire result in low nuclear plant capacity factors for the Duke system. To 7::eet Winter peak Catawba is operated, although a shutdown to deal with nil ductility temperature well in excess of 200 degree T would be prudent.
The' turbine trip relieves an overload condition. The reactor SCpAMS and is directed toward a cold shutdown. After several hours the load problem is remedied, parts of the reactor have fallen below the nil ductility temperature. Restart is too rapid in the effort to get the unit back on
! line. The~ excessively rapid pressure escalation and the excessive - 0 1
- temperature gradients result in stresses in the vessel which are suffi-
' ~
ciently large enough to cause a crack to propogate in brittle failure. .. Reactor is breached. From this point the scenario is similar to the ATWS scenario - resulting in a PWR-l release. IV. STUD 50' T T/.! LURE , An AEC licensed plant' experienced corrosion induced stud bolt failures, "An Investigation of the Failures of LACBWR Pressure Vessel Closure Studs," SWRI-2154-20, December 1971. The fix was a change in stud bolt alloy composition. Catawba bolts are sensitive to corrosion - by borated water. The FSAR requires bolts to be moved to a dry area _ during refueli.ng and bolt holes in the pressure yessel flange to be plugged while irnersed in borated water. In this refueling the plugs 9 L
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4 1 . 4 used are defe:t'ive. The presen:e of borate-water in tne bol noles is , undetected. On resumed operation corrosion of the bolts takes place. The intrinsic strength of the bolting material vary appreciably. TSAR Table 5.3-22. About one year after refueling a turbine trip causes a pressure excorsion in the' reactor. The reactor SCRAMS. 'Although the PORV set ' point is not reached the increased load on bolts is sufficient to cause the weakest bolt to fail. Almost instantly the remainder of bolts fail due to load increase from decompression of the flange at a failed bolt and the initial load increase in the vicinal bolts. (.thecc:pressionof the flange under normal loadin5 is approximately 0.1 inches) As a result of.the unzippering of the lid closure, the lid becomes a projectile,
~ / reaching a velocity of several hundred sph. As a result of steam thrust greater than one million, pounds the lid is not deflected by the polar crane and strikes the containment dome, breaching it. Becuase the reactor lid 1, thrusts asside the pie shaped cement blocks which close off the lower containment from the upper containment there is negligible steam suppression in the ice condensor. If nc: E1 ready brttti.ad hy the reactor lid, steam pressure breaches'the cement outer containment which'is not designed to withstand appreciable internal pressure. The ECCS is defeated.
Water pumped in to the _ reactor yessel flows out over the flange, kept . ~ from entering the core by steam' blocking. The core melts dischargi.ng
- yolitales and particulates to the atmosphere. The release qualifies as _
a.PWR-1.
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[tf iers Pou er is grant. k. .e appe Iof Barbara se as 16 NRC 167 (1982) LBP-82-51 $
}>.,N,[.D$8IL.*'",,kj d*s Apnl 30,1982, memorandum and order is
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .j.dZ$;ff.4k#;,.'. ?f.$ ;# . FOR Tile APPEAL BOARD - 3 I UE [As$..a.:e'W6 t c ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Airps, U.; .~.gh;.G , .-;>.
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C. Jean Shoemaker I y 4 YV 4 4 Secretary to the Before Administrative Judges: . g 454cO. . p ,,a:q Appi sl Ho.trd
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James L Kelley, Chairman 9
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,1 f? - ~.>W a Docket Nos. 50-413 Glf l In the Matter of i U .p...k. I.hM... .>. e:*..'.']
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q,s,* ..g p.g "Ihe Licensing Board overrules various objections to its Order issued following a ., .. prehearing conference pursuant to 10 CFR 62.75ta. The Board also denies j ,,y,
;n. f,.g, ",gn , j requests for refcITal of certain issues to the Appeal Board. 7 ';
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j; *J' f' f.f.$.D " . ' I RULES OF PRACTICE: SECURITY PLANS ji.?; g,p.d.43f,p[r
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Where an Intervenor seeking to challenge an Applicant's security plan does not d. ,,9(7.J,',, y iq,p.p 4 e
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produce a qualified expert to review the plan and declines to submit to a protective order, its vague contentions must be dismissed for failure to meet conditions that
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could produce an acceptably specific contention. ((ig ;< /, '! 3} N f*t g,P t'at!1 0f'p4 spJ
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N 'I e,h f . NRC : I$9.stA We share inicevenor's inscress shar the
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Iane 7. lW2t lius she has bicJ to convince us that the ;.h.; vi,.fif,N g (N=:.(*[d,. .$;K;
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e uale in yoparJ3 no on to manant acceptance of her late n.ns' argal and bnef shoulJ aho be striken for failure to
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in Pnhearing Conference. Denying ocal Ituard, and Addressing Certain contention provided it was clarified and made much more specific following discovery. Applicants object, believing that the Board has placed a burden on them
' U"i""$3 M,2Y' ,Oxf1M to provide the necessary specificity. Applicants have misinterpreted the Board'st M.pIM( h.4 h'
ruling. The burden for clarification and specificity of this contention remains with
., . N. .
lOCTION Intervenors. it was evident to the Board from the pleadings, the CP-FES and the yy rp6 FSAR that: gg*,j'Qgj,9 'y.*j( . plicants, the NRC Staff and Intervenors (a) Corbicula is present and may infest the cooling tower system; , (.M l in.: 1:nvironmental Study Group (CESG) (b) fouling of the Nuclear Service Water System by Corbicula is of' suffi- g,'g}j$c,.g. .f.',]$ f.femor.mdum and Order of March 5,1982 l C'ent concern to require control measures; *"j.pl g,g.; o(*.fp}fy
- ernative, sought referrul of some of those (c) precisely where and to what extent fouling will occur is speculative. ,y If 7, jmorandum and Order of June 30,1982 the consequences of such fouling are safety related this issue should a , PIE: g '*Qp. 'jg -
. .j, y,hy) the Applicants' and the Staff's objections clearly be litigated. .M '
is and teferred those rulings to the Appeal f other objections, the objections of the Our March 5,1982 Order did not say that the lack of specificity in the contention was grounds for rejection under 10 CFR 2.714. Rather we have attempted to focus 1
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[.hj.j p)y g estions. discovery so that it would be clear as to whether the kind and magnitude ,i g .Qgg,. of the y
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;; . Q.j consequences of a clam infestation would justify litigation. We reaffirm our pg.j., g.,g,, p conditioned admission of this contention. Intervenors have ' the burden ofty{ip@'
g,g .. clarifica- N j' tion and greater specificity. gj,}gh.J;;.//h'{6 W ti -
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1 \ ask us to dismiss Palmetto Contentions B. Intervenors' Objections' -
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- 1. The Burden of Further Specifications ' H cations of small on ners and to costs of 3e contentions aie luired by new rules y
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) wh.s Oister.&v47 Fcd. Reg.13750.
The Intervenors object to the conditional acceptance of most of their contentions .I ja '- . I by the new nales they are dhmissed. and to the ** burden of further specification ** later when relevant information .,f,'
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becomes available, or, in some cases, when discovery is complete. We ;f reject this ,g 54 , 8 objection. Given the availability ofinformation, the Commission's requirementQ' of 3,r, specificity in contentions is certainly reasonable. Assuming as we do the
' y' serious- .: 9 ^ei:g}.c/;g,,M F- y i l y' e ness of the Intervenors' intentions, they will have to read and analyze '9 relevant ).
j our Order that requires service on all Y .f ffkp': @kgf,L +' t material as it becomes available. In that context, it is not unfairly burdensome I to ,
*,f. . ' d require them to add more specificity to their presently vague contentions. MM #
wrated by the Applicants or the Staff. t j adhere to our Onfer and reject the I h, Ek I!I Indeed, '$ ed by the Statt at pp.1719 of their ; the burdens involved in that task will be minor compared to those involved in/,hd eventuallitigation of this case.
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esson to refer this part of our Order to ii 1b Y,N@
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I Serious Accidents (Palmetro S, 9, 31; CESG 2) l ,I '.[ ^1-s,r,A
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Ahhough these contentions were rejected by the Board for lacki ;of y, specificity, &y ,y d'.ig. .M the door was leit ajar for possible consideration of a site-specific credible accident { cffeen of Corbicula on the perfonn. fer of Aluch 5,1982 admitted this ' i
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_m ineervenues Pat.nen_n end crso_nied n iinste_joiniure !l: i ' f
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se end objections so ihe Marcit S Onlet.
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_- ' ' ~^' ~ ~ l - j at C Intervenors now return with descriptions c f accidents which presumt 4 bly.' ccur at any pressurized water reactor. 'Ihe Applicants and the Staff are makes a persuasivnhowing that referral standa. . . ire not met. Staff Ri .{. - now asked to comment on whether any of these scenarios may form the basis foran April 28,1982 at 9-10. The Intervenors' request for teferral of the admi
- acceptable comention. Comments shall be filed by July 30,1982. these cost / benefit contentions is denied. Following this denial, the is may seek directed referral from the Appeal Board. Sec ruMicScrvice C 3 3. Operator Qualofications ffampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station), ALAD-271,1 NRC 478,482.
We admined conditionally Palmetto's Contention 8 on operator qualifications, "" subject to the responses we called forconcerning whether this contention might be the equivalent of an impermissible attack on a Commission rule. Palmetto and the *'**" ** # * . " * # '* * - Siaff urge the admission of this contention. The Applicants see it as an attack on the # rules. This is a rather close question because the Commission did not make its PmedunpdW M h h h h %n imentions clear in its most recent rulemaking on the subject. However, we find the Power stah m Gah in m W d M 5 % M i ' StatI's arguments persuasive and endorse the following summary of those argu-ments: AP li P cants and the Staff to address questims about Duke s plans to use facilities to store fuel from other stations and to comment on ourj,un,sdu 1 I IWlhile litigation of Palmetto Contention 8 might ordinarily be barred as a a y Pem M t t a challenge to the operator licensing requirements in 10 CFR Part 55, the Parties' submissions show, this Board sdictionlacks jun,%ac over shipmen Commission has, through its Revised Statement of Policy on TMI Action "*' "" *' **** " # # *"
- i *
- I Plan requirements, authorized the litigation of such a contention and that " ** E authorization is not affected by the fact that TMI Action Plan requirements * "#" * "
j are now the subject of rulemaking. Palmetto Contention 8 may rlybe , the environmental effects of the transport of spent fuel shipments to the admitted and litigated in this proceeding. Staff Response at 7. , Plant from wher Duke Power Company facilities and of the contributic Palmetto Contention 8 is now admitted unconditionally. cUects to tk environrnental costs of kendng Catawba . . . , au Summary Table S-4 does not apply because the desimation of the spe
#- transit would be the Catawba facility rather than a fuel reprocessing p C88' F8 8'a' fit 8
, Board, in its Order of March 5,1982, disallowed this contention because :
i
- has been advanced as to why Table S-4 values would not adequately de:
The Intervenors object to our disallowance of Palmetto's Contentions l l,' 12, environmental effects. j 13,30,33,34 and 39 and CESG's Contentions I,5,6 and 12 concerning need for Intervenors object (Response and Gojections to Order Following P.' pow er, certain broad economic issues and financial factors said to affect the NEPA j j Conference. March 31,1982) to this rejection, citing the wording associ cost /henefit balance struck at the construction permit stage. We have considered
- 51.20(g)(1) and Table S-4 which relates to the method of shipping. Inters their objections and adhere to our prior rulings. Most of the Intervenors' objections not assert that the method of transport will be different than that cc are, in substance, objections to the Commission's recently adopted ruleI barring S t .21(g)(2)(v) (truck, rail, or barge). No new information has been pres 4
hiiption of need for power and alternative power sources in operating license cases. ' g invalidates the kind or magnitude of effects presented in Summary Ts 6 Therefore, we reaffinn our rejection of this contention. l In the alternative, the Intervenors ask us to "cenify"(refer) to the Commission ' or Appeal lloard the cost /henefit contentions we do not admit. Referral is an Palmetto Contention 15 assens that ". . . the favorable cost-benefi
! struck at the construction permit phase . . ."is compromised by capa:
exception to the normal rule against interlocutory review of Licensing Board I Catawba fuel storage facilities to accommodate fuel from other Duke sta: orders. The burden is on the movant to demonstrate that an issue meets established by the transport of such fuel. We admitted this contention provided a st.andards for teferral (discussed briefly at 15 NRC 1754 of our Order of June 30, i "Away From Reactor" were stricken. We need also to confine this ist. 19N2). Ifere, the Intervenors simply ask for referral without any attempt to meet
- action now before us, which is a license to operate the constructed plant.
that butden. W see no obvious reasons for referral. The Staff opposes referral and Alliance may resubmit this contention based on the OL Environmental S i 170
- 171
1 i Cite as 16 NRC 1791 1982) LD 17A -
- 9. Whether and t,.' . . hat circumstances relianc2 on feed and bleed is necessary at TMI-l (from the licensee and the staff).
- 10. Results of the c(fort by EGAG to demonstrate the ability of the RELAP5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA computer code to predict the results of Semiscale test S-SR-2 (from the NUCLEAR REGUt.ATORY COMMISSION stait).
II . Results of a RELAP5. type analysistodetermine whether feed and bleed ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD will successfully provide core cooling at TMI-I (from the staff).
- hough we direct the presentation of testimony by only the licensee and the Before Administrative Judges:
l on selected issues as indicated above, any party may offer testimony on any of lnatiers listed. (UCS may file written testimony in accordance with the ' 'Jule below if it wishes to present its own witnesses rather than rely upon James L Kelley, Chairman examination.) Dr. A. Dixon Callthan Dr. Richard F. Foster
- Procedure' In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-413
'e intend ta proceed promptly to supplement the record and to complete the 50-414 -Ilate process in this phase of the case. Allsupplemental written testimony shall , our hands and in the hands oforherparties no later than the close ofbusiness. (ASLBP No. 81463-01-OL) nesday, January 26.1933, he evidentiary heanng will be held in the NRC Public Ilearing Room, Fifth DUKE POWER COMPANY, et al. .r, Easi-West Towers Building,4350 East West liighway, Bethesda, Mary- (Catawba Nuclear Station, December 1,1982 , or 9.tX) a.m. on Tuesday February 8,1983. We expect to complete the Units 1 and 2)
-ing within a day or two. Parties will be afforded an opportunity to file briefs, ah shall include any proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law that they i us to make. Briefs shall be in our hands by no later than the close ofbusiness RULES OF PRACTICE: DEFERRAL OF RULINGS ON sJay, February 23,1933- CONTENTIONS ' is w ORDERED. 4 A Licensing Board has broad discretion to defer rulings on contentions which may later be made more specific on the basis ofinformation not yet availabic, or to FOR Tile APPEAL BOARD proceed with rulings on such contentions without waiting for more information. Barbara A. Tompkins RULES OF PRACTICE: CONTENTIONS BASED ON NEW INFORMATION Secretary to the Where a contention is advanced on the basis of new information following the original deadline for filing contentions, its proponent has the burden of explaining
-in appropriate detail and separate from the contention's text - what is new about the contention and why it could not have been advanced previously.
1791 1790
r; maxy such contentions probably would be withdrawa later and never have to , than design basis. With two eaceptions noted below, the contentions cit: no I. onsidered. On the _ od, deferred contentions are relegited to a procedu- specific shortcomings of the methodology nor(f the details of th- alitions.
. timho and compik osture cI a case that is complicated enough without < such as the CRAC Code for describing meteorology, in this respect .tentions . n. Where, as here, we are dealing with only a handful of contentions, it is lack specificity. ,
i mer procedurally and therefore preferable not to defer-to rule the contention he apparent assumption underlying these contentions is that WASit 1400 , r out .o e have done. Of course, new information contained in documents should not be used at all in risk analysis for licensing; as DES-22 puts it, such use is pt available may later provide a basis for more specific contentions. " entirely inappropriate." Dis assumption is incorrect. De discriminating use of WASil-1400 is not contrary to Commission policy. In accepting the report of the Risk Assessment Review Group (NUREG/CR-0400), which concluded that - Cententions on the Draft Environmental Statement . WASit-1400 provides the best available method for determining accident , >ur Order of September I,1982 (unpublished), directed the Intervenors to file
, *f tt co epa sof theStudy theCommissionexpects revned or new contentions based on new information m the Staff's Draft the staff to make use of them as appropriate, that is, where the data base is nronmental Statement (DES) by September 22,1982. In aj,omt filing Palmett '
adequate and analytical techniques permit. Taking due account of the
! CESG filed 23 contentions concerning various aspects of the DES. CMEC
! reservations expressed in the Review Group Report and in its presentation
- d a revised version of its Contention 4. to the Commission, the Commission supports the entended use of probabi-jihe new and revised contentions on the DES were not accompanied by a listic risk assessment in regulatory decisionmaking. NRC Statement on j
- ussion of the five lateness factors m Section 2.714(a) and, under the circum- Risk Assessment dated January 18,1979,p.4.
j nces, we did not expect such a discussion. Neither, however, were these Shortcomings in the original WASil 1400 are taken into account in the Staff's iitentions accompanied by an explanation why they could not have been ad DES analysis in various ways, including updated ("rebaselined") results for j iced earlier, or, in the Appeal floard s words, how they are" wholly dependent g ,; j a previously unavailabic document. We believe that the proponent of a conten- DES-1 seeks to place in issue the characteristics of the accidents at Browns Feny Il at this or some later stage of the pr cceding should have the burden of and Fermi, contending that they were " serious." It is beyond the scope of this j slaining clearly, in appropriate detail, and separate from the rest of the conten- proceeding to explore in any detail the characteristics of those accidents, at least in
- 1. Just what is new about the contention and why it could not have been the absence of some showing that the Staff's analysis was dependent upon them.
ganced previously. It should not be the Board s or the other parties job ,n i the We find nothing in the DES to suggest that it was, and the Intervenors point to no
.: instance to sort through old documents and pleadings for that purpose. In tius g
,j .c w e did not call explicitly for such an explanation in our prehearing conference The reactor modeled in the analysis is similar to that under construction at j ler. Ilut henceforth all parties are on notice that such a statement is required and Catawba (DES at 5-36), except that it has an ice condenser containment. One pt, m its absence and also m the absence of a showing on the five lateness factors, specific shortcoming cited in Contention 22 is that the DES does not include a heional contentions will not be considered. separate analysis of the ice condenser feature for its possible contribution to ! accidents. The Staff's position on this point appears at DES E-I, third paragraph, j Imetto/CESG Contentions and is not clearly stated. Citing a Staff assessment of Sequoyah, also an ice l condenser containment, the Staff acknowledges that that design feature is signifi-In order to avoid confusion with the numbers of contentions previously sub- cant in relation to hydrogen control. The Staff goes on to say, however, that the
- tied separately by Palmetto and CESG, we will refer to theirjointly submitted Catawba applicant "has plans to satisfy the Commission's requirement on hyd-nientions on the Draft Environmental Statement as " DES-l, DES-2, etc." rogen control." We naturally assume the Applicants " plan" to meet present Commission requirements. The quoted language may be intended as an oblique reference i the pending rulemaking on hydrogen control measures, and the fact "S.I and DES ",,
that Catawba will be subject to its outcome. See Interim Requirements Related to Ilydmgen Contml,46 Fed. Reg. 62281. In any event," planned" compliance with !These two contentions fault the Reactor Safety Study (WASil-1400) and the iance placed by the Staff upon it in the DES analysis of accidents more severe } il 1796 1797 \ i
} ! mies is not a complete answer in this context, where accidents beyond design basis acid. Sulfuric acid has a low vapor pressure and, accordingly, that part rer are being considered. . from the coolant system in the drift settles out in the nearby soil or onto ot - 1 We do not believe, however, that any detailed accident analysis of the .ice Sulfuric acid is described as a corrodant of many things, including the I - condenser feature is necessary in this DES. A more meaningful accident analys,s i respiratory system. of ice condensers and hydrogen control than could possibly be done here is now De characteristics of the water in the cooling tower system are, in { being done in the pending miemaking; for that reason we are declmmg to litigate . measure, like those of the blowdown, which is a liquid efauent subject hydrogen accident scenarios as a safety issue in this individual case. See discussion National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit issued by the St -
- at i80710, below. Dere is an additional reason not to consider in any detail South Carolina. His permit establishes a pli for the ef0uent in the range 6.0 hydrogen. ice condenser accidents in the DES " severe accident" discuss,on, i name-l (DES Table 4.5 at 4-29; DES at 1-2).ne pit of the drift blown from the town ly, that the DES discussion necessarily treats accident mechanisms with a broad -
the atmosphere should be substantially the same. De State's determination i
- brush, it will sufGce if the Staff clariGes in the FES its vague and summary regard is binding on the Board. He Board must then factor the environn reference to the ice condenser feature and provides a brief description of the effects of the State's determination into its overall NEPA cost /beneGt ana
, pending miemaking. Dus, we view this part of Contention 22 as a valid comment PublicScrvice Company ofNewHampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Units ! on the DES, but it is not accepted as a contention. 2), CLI-77-8,5 NRC 503,543 (1977). Under this sci eme, it is theoret Even though the final emergency plans have not been issued, the Staff includes possible but unlikely as a practical matter that these ef0uents could signiGa l' some pessimistic assumptions in its analyses (DES F 1), including an exampic affect the environment and thus the cost / benefit balance. where no early evacuation occurs (DES F-3, Fig. F-l). This aspect of the DES Apart from these considerations, however, this contention is untimely contions to the Commission's requirements forenvironmentalimpact statements. cooling system and its operation were considered at the CP stage (CP FES, Sec Public Service Company of OUahoma, et al. (Black Fox Station, Units I and 5.5.2.3, at 5.40 and Sec. 3.6. Table 3.12; OL DES Sec. 4.2.3.4, at 4-3). C 2), ALAll 57310 NRC 775,779 (1979)). It is not necessary for purposes of the the current intervenors proposed litigation of the sulfuric acid discharge at t. DES analysis to consider accidents in the context of the details of emergency plans hearing. Duac Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), that will be adopted later. 74 5,7 AEC 82,93 (1974). Most signiGeantly, the subject is also discus:
't he only portion of these two proposed contentions in which we find a valid OL-ER Sec. 3.6.2. The ER and DES do not differ in material respects in contention is the third paragraph of DES-22,conceming the so-called" smoothing discussions of this topic, technique"in WASil-1400 and whether the Staff has compensated forits deficien- This contention is denied as untimely. The Intervenors may seek recons:
cies in the DES. The Staff's response to DES-22 does not melude any specific tion upon an appropriate showing under 2.714(a)(1), if they continue to tw response to this part of the contention.The Applicants ignore this post. Although that this contention has merit. it could be more specific, the paragraph does raise a criticism about analytical methodology which warrants response. We are admitting the third paragraph of 4 DES.22 as a contention, but we are staying any discovery on that contention until DESJ after the FES is available. We expect that the FES will contain discussion of this point which may satisfy the Intervenors. This contention asserts that the DES is deficient because it does not addre Encept as stated in the preceding paragraph, Contentions I and 22 are denied for impact that vapor state chlorine discharged from the cooling towers will ha l lack of specificity and bases. People or on the corrosion of metals. The proffered reason for considerir subject at this time is th9t the OL-DES differs from the CP-FES in the amous I manner of chlorine addition. 2 DESJ Applying the guidance given in ALAB-687, this contention is not "v - dependent" upon the content of the OL-DES; it could have been advanced p. , This proposed contention refers to an addition of sulfuric acid to the coolant the first prehearing conference. The use of chlorine in the cooling towe ~j stream in excess of the quantity necessary to react with a stated mass of sodium described at the CP stage and the modifications to the original method of ap h> pochlorite for the production of free chlorine intended as a biocide. Although the lion were explained in the Applicants' ER (53.6.2.3). Ahhough the quantitia r contention acknowledges the absence of a specified concentration of the sulfunc kind of reagents now proposed differ from the CP specincations, the concent i
; acid to be added, it proceeds to establish a firm rate of release of unreacted sulfunc of free availabic chlorine remains the same (DES at 4-3). The description J
(
' verg
*; ;.y i
~
' r. l ',.e' .
.t ,
. CMEt ~ - rtentions ~
f DliS.Its and -5, above. . (is P ' CMEC did not file any additional contentions 'on the Staffs DES. CMEC (..
- j. .# '
4
, Contentions I 3 were originally admitted subject only to the condition that CMEC l..,
would review the DES when it became available and make any appropriate . !, that the StatI has seriously underestimated the health effects revisions in light of that statement. That condition has been met and thoseh* ,
- tion becauw of reliance on 11EIR-1 and lit, and because the
- contentions are now admitted unconditionally. g ,,' :
'clides along fami chains may be greater than assumed. This
, The original version of CMEC-4 concerning long-term health effects ,')3(l., of radia tully a resubmiwion of Palmetto's original Contention No. I, tion was somewhat vague and was admitted subject to the condition that it be ma * , menikin ol' lililR.I and teference to some pages in the DES. ! ,h more specific or withdrawn in light of the Seafi's DES. A revised and more speci h 5 adoutted palmetto I on the condition that it be made more ; !. /T version of CMEC-4 has now been submitted. He Applicants have no ; IM object
- he asailahday of the DliS. Our implementation of ALAB-687
%Imetto I f or lad orspecificity. The complaints in DES-21 are its admission. The Staff had some initial reservations but worked out a stipulation with CMEC. Tr. ; h',l' abou 443-444.'Under that stipulation, ' eific than those in its rejected predecessor. Although DES 2 Revised CMEC-4, as submitted in their pleading dated September .'8; . 19W 198 . swipe at Appendiz C to the DES concerning uranium fueleycle admitted by the Board subject to the Staff CMEp stipulation that the secon 5 h " 5' follow up w ith any specific criticism. Similarly, the references jiesis" and " food chain analysis"are not tied to any discussions numbered paragraph on page 2 be deleted. iYY. g.ff , 'e DES. nis contention is rejected for lack of a specific basis. Summary ofAdmitted Contentions
} ;lM; I 2 The following contentions have been admitted to date:
i
- CMEC
- 1-4. -
Vff1 / DES-1, above. Palmetto: 6 (in part),7,8,16 (in part),27, 2ib %,N CESG: 8 (in part),18. Palmetto /CESG Joint DES Contentions: 17,22 (in part).
*j h.
l jp , s'
!!cges that the Staff can no longer rely on Table S-3 for its C. Serious' Accident Contentions
' itonmental impacts of the uranium fuel cycle (see DES 5-47, I ) n . ',j decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of t.
'.alidaiing that rule. Natural Resources Defcase Council, Inc Serious accident contentions were included in the .initial ' ., ,f ;)g Palm f~
contentions. Palmetto 5 questioned the use of the Reactor Safety Study " i (WAS W (D.C. Cir.1982). De mandate in that case has been stayed "ain in eIfeet at least until the Supreme Court acts on pending 1400) in the assessment of probabilistic risk and contended that serious $ y jh p acci are " plainly credible after Three Mile Island." Palmetto 9 and.31 (CESG 4 2) E in light of these developments, the Commission recently concerned the possibility of an explosive hydrogen-oxygen recombination, ' result-ll'olicy (Licensing andRegulatory Policy andProceduresfor ing m failure of the containment. ,:
'i wt,W yrion; Uranium Fuct CycIc Impacts, 47 Fed. Reg. 50593) loardsin - This Board's Memorandum and Order of March 5 rejected these contentions Pointing out that (1) the very generalized concems expressed in Palmetto : f,'i.h 5 wer ,
hiinued reliance on the Final S-3 rule until furtherorder not from specifically related to the current licensing actions for Catawba ands>(2) 'I the hW %n, provided that any license authorizations or other deci- t #'.R hydrogen issues postulated in Palmetto 9 amt 31 (CESG 2) are the $I subject o iweeding. reliance on the rule are conditioned on the fiinal outcome of ongoing rulemaking process (15 NRC 583,584). We recognized, however that M d itention is rejected. hydrogen issues might be litigated in this individual licensing proceeding
.i 8 fhy if i
.i . igm '.
hydrogen generation, hydrogen combustion, d-M con 1806 I i, 4 g, ,k
- s. .. .
!
- g j g i,% v;
.. _ _ - . - - . ~ . -- - .. -. - . - . - - - . - . - --
ene , of f>ite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 guideline values" were to be advanced. systems that comply with the rules, and that therefore they should be viewed as* Metrop diran Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), impermissible attacks on these rules.s The Staff takes the position that thesc . CLl4016,11 NRC 674, 675 (1980) (TMI Restarr). No such scenario was scenarios are sufficiently specific and should be admitted for the purpose of advanced with the subject contentions, but our March 5 Order left the door ajar litigating their credibility. should the Intersenors come forward with credible hydrogen or other serious De applicable law on this question is not entirely clear. As a general proposilloc accident scenarios. The Intervenors thereafter postulated several accident scenar- generic issues that are the subject of an ongoing rulemaking need not be litigated is im in their Responses and Objections to the March 5 Order. We then asked the individual cases. We relied on that proposition and the Appeal Board's Ranche Applicants and the Staff to comment on whether any of the Intervenors' scenarios Seco decision
- in dismissing the hydrogen control contentions on March 5. On the might form the basis for an acceptable contention. Both argue, although for other hand, the pendency of a generic rulemaking does not necessarily preclude ddferent reasons, that the Stud Bolt Failure scenario should be rejected. We agree litigation of related issues in individual cases. In the TM/ Restart case,' fos with the A pplicants' position that yet another relitigation of this particular scenario example, the Commission allowed certain hydrogen control issues to be litigatec' is barred by the doctrines of resjudicata and collarcral estoppet CESG has been when a broad rulemaking proceeding on hydrogen control was in the immediats
- un uccenfully attempting to challenge the safety of Duke PowerCo.'s reactorstud offing. The Commission can and sometimes does remove any doubt on this score bolts since the McGuire construction permit proceeding in 1972-73. The basic by specifically stating whether boards should continue to litigate generic issuer l scenario - a stud bolt failure, followed by an "unzippering" of the reactor head,
- while a rulemaking on them is pending. But since the Commission has provided rn I follow ed by the reactor head's penetrating containment as a speeding projectile - explicit guidance here, we must exercise an informed discretion in the circum-
- has teen the same since then. The McGuire Licensing Board heard evidence on -
stances of this case. l this scenario and rejected it. Duke Power Company (William B. McGuire Nuclear De basic criterion is safety-is there a substantial safety reason for litigating Station. Units I and 2), LilP-73-7,6 AEC 92,106-108 (1973). In the construction the generic issue as the rulemaking progresses? In some cases, such as TM. genuit proceeding for Catawba, the Licensing Board again considered the CESG . Restart, such litigation probably should be allowed if it appears that the facility i: taud holt scenario, limited, however, "to the extent that new information has question may be licensed to operate before the rulemaking can be completed. it become available since the McGuire decision." Duke Power Company (Catawba such a case, litigation may be necessary as a predicate for required safety findings Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), LDP-75-34,1 NRC 626,642-46 (1975). Once in other cases, however, it may become apparent that the rulemaking will be agam CESG's contention was rejected on the merits. We see nothing in the completed well before the facility can be licensed to operate. In that kind of case , present stud bolt scenario io differentiate it from its predecessors, and CESG points there would normally be no safetyjustification for litigating the generic issues, and to nothing new. Therefore the proffered contention - a matter already litigated strong resource management reasons not to litigate.
, txtw een the same parties at the construction permit stage- may not be relitigated he present case is clearly in the latter category. The pertinent rulemaking now. Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units I and 2), directly addresses the intervenors' hydrogen concerns. Among other things, the i ALAll-182. 7 AEC 210 (1974); Southern California Edison Company, er al. (San proposed rule would impose " improved hydrogen control systems for . . . pressu-i Onofre NucIcar Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LDP-82-3,15 NRC 61,78-82 rized water reactors with ice condenser-type containments"like Catawba. 46 Fed.
1 (1982). The fact that Palmetto is also sponsoring this scenario is irrelevant. The Reg. 62281. The technical review being conducted in the rulemaking features both .
, Iwo organizations are joint sponsors and their interests for present purposes are depth and breadth, including " review of the deliberate ignition systems installed at ,
indistinguishable. Sequoyah and McGuire . . ., a spectrum ofdegraded core accident scenarios . . . The remaining three accident scenarios concern hydrogen control and present a somewhat different problem.nc Applicants oppose admission of these scenarios es contentions P'imarily on the ground that they presuppose successive failures of S hw may bmme nerit in this argument. although is seems to be contradicted by the Commission's allowance of" credible scenario"consenssons in the Taft Aessart case. Similarly. one could atgue that the scenarios are an outgrowth a(Palmetto 9 and thesciore an isp,1cnnissible attack on to CFR 50.44 because Palmetto 9 is taken almost verbaissa from 150.44. Conversely, one can ergue that the hydsogen scenanos themselvcs should be read as contentions under Part 100. We do not scach these rather > I legahstic arguments. preferring to rest our decision on the more practical considerations discussed an the tent. ! y
- Sacramcaso afsnicipal f/tildry Diswict (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station). ALAB455.14 NRC 799. 816 (198I).
' aferrepolisen Edsson Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Stasion, Unit No.1), CtJ-80 16, t i NRC 674. 675 (1980).
eene seno
. -r
[
'8 .f .g.
8 and several hydrogen combination phenomena."/d. at 62282. It now appears that Cite as 16 NRC 1811 (1982) . L8P-( l a final rule will be adopted in the next several months.* Given the present status of ll . this proceeding, no operating licenses for Catawba are likely to issue before ,- sometime in 1984, a year or more after the final rule. Thus we see no safety UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION justification for litigating the Intervenors' hydrogen scenarios in this case, and we are rejecting them as proposed contentions. This does not mean that the Intervenors may not have their hydrogen scenarios ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
!I considered at all. They were free to submit those scenarios as timely comments in the rulemaking. If they did not choose to do so before the comment period expired, I Before Administrative Judges:
they can be submitted now and still be considered, if that is practical for the
, rulemaking staff. Id.
s Peter B. Bloch, Chairman
' Jerry R. Kilne D. Discovery Hugh C. Paxton ll Our Memorandum and Order of July 8,1982 (LBP-82-51,16 NRC 167)
I1 suspended all discovery pending further order of the Board, except with respect to in the Matter of Docket No. 50-2664 !! Palmetto Contentions 8,16 and 27. That suspension order is now lifted and
; discovery may be resumed on all but one of the admitted contentions, as listed on
- i. WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER
- p. ige 1807, above. Discovery on the admitted part of DES-22 is stayed until the COMPANY 1:liS is available. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, 3
Several discovery motions end related pleadings are pending before the Board. Unit 1) December 10 Rulings on these matters will be issued shortly. 1 I FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND The Licensing Board declares intervenor Wisconsin's En vironmental Dec 0
. LICENSING BOARD be m default of its hearing obligations and dismisses its petition to intervens
- l Board also considers intervenor's contentions and finds each to be irrelev a without basis.
!l ADMIN IVE DGE RULES OF PRACTICEt DEFAULT; PRINCIPLES AFFECTING , APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS n Dated at Bethesda, Maryland. this ist day of December,1982. When an intervenor failed to appear at a Special Prehearing' Board applied factors found in the Statement ofPolicy on Conduct ofLice Proceedings. 46 Fed. Reg. 28533 (May 27,1982), in order to determine sanction was appropriate. I
= A recent nusice in the ftelcraf Argiurr psuvided a limetable for ehe rulemaking. indicating that a final RULES OF PRACTICE: DEFAULT; ADEQUACY OF EXCUSE F
,uie wa, especied in ociober i9:2. 47 reil. Ken. 48968. De Chairman ut this Board sclephoned Counwt for the Statiabout the psenent timetable and was advised that a final rule is now anticipased by sha State an January or February.19sL NONATTENDANCE AT SPECIAL PREllEARING CONFERENCE we resect ihai me were not able to foresee all of these developments in March, when we suggessed
, the cre ble c Jent sc sos might be considered. In any event et makes no sense to consider them A party wishing to attend an alternate engagement instead of a Special Pre '
J 844549
, L UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d ^ [hc[urteo hray' BEFORE THE ATOMIC SATETY AND LICENSING BOARD ///
fchcIvep) f,/18'Y
)
In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-413 DUKE P0k'ER COMPANY, et al. 50-414
)
(Catawba Nuclear Station. ) April 12, 1984 Units 1 and 2) ) iR9 h..b. '.
~
((Q
- PALMETTO ALLIANCE AND CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP MOTION TO READMIT CONTENTIONS REGARDING SEVERE ACCIDENTS, CONTROL ROOM DESIGN DEFICIENCIES AND LACK OF FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Sections 2.714(a)(1), 2.718, and 2.730 Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group hereby move to I
readmit'and provide for the litigation of previously admitted contentions on the subjects of severe accidents, control room design deficiencies and lack of financial qualifications. Contentions on these subjects were S previously filed by Intervenors pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.714(a)(3)(b) andtheLicensingBoard'syrderofNovember5,1981providingforthetime-
-ly submission of the contentions which Intervenors sought to have litigated in this proceeding. In that same pleading Intervenors sought the oppor-i tunity to amend or expand that filing on the basis of information not then l- known to Intervenors. This motion-is advanced now on the basis, in part,
~
of such new infor=ation, as well as on the basis of subsequent changes in applicable law and regulation.
- 1. SEVERE ACCIDENTS In their Dece=ber,1981 filing Palmetto and CESG advanced four conten- ' -
' (- tions on the subject cf severe accidents at the Catawba Nuclear Station: I m),
,~
m ,\
. - - Y( -
~~
rr
l, . l 1 ..
, ] ,
Palmetto Alliance contentions No. 5, 9 and 31 (CESG 2). In the Board's March 5, 1982 Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference), pp. 27-28 the Board rejected the contentions on the basis of the failure of Intervenors to advance a site specific " serious and credible accident scenario " and the December 23, 1981 proposed Commission j_ rule, 46 F.R. 62281 on the subject of hydrogen control measures. In their March 31, 1982 Responses And Objections To Order Following Prehearing Con-ference, Palmetto and CESG advanced a series of " plainly credible. -Catawba specific. accident scenarios." pp. 5-10: 1. offsite power fa,ilure; 2. ATWS; i 3.. fatigue failure of the reactor pressure vessel; and 4. stud bolt failure. By Order of July 8, 1982 this Board sought comments by Applicants and NRC
-Staff with respect to Intervenors posited scenarios. Finally, the Board re-
/ viewed these scenarios and confirmed its rejection of these contentions in
+ l
~~
l its Memorandum and Order. (Reflecting Decisions.Made Following Second Prehear-i j ing Conferenc'e) of December 1, 1982 16 NRC 1791 at 1807 eti seq. The Board, ' i
- there, rejected the . capitalized stud bolt failure scenario on the grounds of f res judicata, as having been previously litigated by CESG. With respect to the other three scenarios, the Board noted that the NRC Staff supported ad-mission of these as sufficiently specific for litigation, but rejected their i
admission on the grounds of the pending rulemaking: The basic criterion is safety -- is there a substantial safety i reason for litigating the generic issue as the rulemaking progresses? In some cases, such as TMI Restart, such litigation probably should , be allowed if it appears that the facility in question may be li-
-censed to operate before the rulemaking can be completed. In such a case, litigation may be necessary as a predicate for acquired '
safety findings. In other cases, however, it may become apparent j that the rulemaking will be completed well before the facility can 4 be licensed to operate. In that kind of case there would normally be no safety justification for litiS ating the generic issues, and
- CN- strong resource management reasons not to litigate. . . . It now appears that a firsl rule would be adopted in the next several
1 months (fn 8: Januarv or February, 1983.) Given the present status of this proceeding, no operating licenses for Catawba
- are likely to issue before some time in 1984, a year or more after the final rule. Thus we see no safety justification for litigating the Intervenors' hydrogen scenarios in this case, and we are rejecting them as proposed contentions.
JJ!. 16 NRC at 1809-1810. Subsequent developments make clear that the premise underlying this Board's rejection of Intervenors' hydrogen control accident scenarios is no longer viable, and more recent infor=ation makes clear that the serious safety issues involved in the adequacy of hydrogen control measures and the effects of hydrogen burns on safety equipment must be resolved through litigation in this proceeding prior to licensing the Catawba' Station. The hydrogen control issue has been denominated unresolved safety issue A-48. Its status and application to Catawba as of February, 1983 is described at pages C-22 and 23 of the Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0954. The Staff, i there, reflects the unresolved character of the pending proposed rulemaking and its conclusion that' interim measures are satisfactory at Catawba in the y . meantime. Of course, Intervenors disagree and seek to litigate the adequacy of such measures through the vehicle of the contentions and accident scenar-
. ios submitted. In its Aqua Book, " Unresolved Safety Issues Summary " NUREG 4
0606, Vol. 5. No. 4 (November 18, 1983) the NRC Staff projects a scheduled completion for unresolved safety issue A-48 of June 30, 1985. There, the Staff described the problem as follows: postulated reactor accidents which result in a degraded or melted core can result in generation and release to the containment of large quantities of hydrogen. The hydrogen is formed from the reac-tion of the zirconium fuel cladding with steam at high temperature and/or by radiolysis of water. Experience gained from the ITE-2 accident indicates that we may want to require more specific desi nE I provisions for handling larger hydrogen releases than currently re-quired by the regulations, particularly for s= aller, low pressure containment designs.
- J,d . , at p . 3 8.
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- Finally, the most recent Board Notification No. 84-057 of April 2, 1984, reflects the potentially troubling results of ongoing technical studies by Sandia National Laboratory of likely excessive temperature effects on safety equipment under several postulated hydrogen ignition accident scenarios in ice condensor containments. Such an effect would likely exacerbate accident scenarios by degrading the operability of such engineered safety features as containment recirculation fans and spray 1
. systems as well as the other components.
In light of these regulatory developments including the matters in-cluded in the referenced Board Notification as further basis Palmetto and CESG seek readmission and an opportunity to litigate the plainly credible accident scenarios in order to establish our earlier claims that Applicants , have not established reasonable assurance that the Catawba Station can op-
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erste safely. T
- 2. CONTROL ROOM DESIGN DEFICIENCIES In its March 5, 1982 Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made To11owing Prehearing Conference), at pp. 23-24 this Board initially admitted a portion of Palmetto Alliance control room design contention No. 22 condi-tiened upon later detail af ter sub=ission of further licensing documents re-flecting Applicants' control roca design review. Subsequently, in light of the Appeal Board's rejection of the device of conditional' admission of con-tentions, this Board determined to reject, rather that defer rulings on these control room design issues observing that new information contained in docu-ments not yet available might-provide a later basis for more specific conten-tions. Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Second Pre-hearing Conference) 16 NRC at 1795-6. The basis for such specific contentions has recently been provided by Applicants and the NRC Staff.
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l By letter of March 9,1984. Thomas H. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, of the NRC Staff transmits for review and co= ment to Applicants P a Preliminary Draft Safety Evaluation Report for the detailed control room .I I design review at Catawba Unit 1. There the Staff expresses its conclusions as to Applicants' satisfaction of the nine requirements of Supplement I to NUREG 0727. While expressing general satisfaction with Applicants' efforts to meet the requirements of these standards for control room design, the Staff expresses questions regarding the scheduling of implementation and the verification of. corrective actions until the end of the first refueling outage after fuel load licensing. It is on the basis of this analysis that Intervenors seek the readmission of previously filed contentions challenging the adequacy of Applicants' control room design. Palmetto and CESG offer the following revised contention for litigation:
' Applicants have failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the Catawba Nuclear Station can operate safely since they have failed to adequately meet regulatory requiremen'ts for the correc-tion of Human Engineering Deficiencies (HED's) in the Catawba ~
control room design and instrumentation in the absence of suffi-cient attention to the interaction of human factors and efficiency of operation considerations. As reflected in the " Human Engineering Factors Engineering Branch - Detailed Control Room Design Review For Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1," transmitted by cover letter of March 9,1984, Applicants have failed to demonstrate the justifica-tion for delaying correction of identified human engineering de-ficiencies until the end of the first refueling outage, and have failed to provide adequate verification that the implemented cor-l rective actions in fact resolved identified identified hu=an en-gineering deficiencies. Id., pp. 14-15. Palmetto and CESG submit that this revised control room design deficien-cy contention should be admitted pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a)(1) on the grounds that the balancing of the five factors warrants its admission for litigation. First, good cause is established by the contention's depend-ence on a licensing analysis by the NRC Staff available to Intervenors for less than one month. It is this "Prelitinary Draft SER" which first iden-mm t
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, tifies the scheduling and corrective action deficiencies in Applicants' control room design review. Second and fourth, as is commonly the case, the interest of petitioners can only be adequately protected by their own _I representation in this proceeding in support of this issue. While the NRC Staff can cease to represent the public interest outside this proceeding, petitioners' interest is best protected by their own efforts. Third, petitioners identified this issue of inadequate control room design as one of concern to them at the very earliest. We stand ready, now, to assist this Board in developing a sound record for decision on this important safe-ty issue. Palmetto and CESG ask the Board to note the effectiveness of the participation by their representatives and counsel in this and other proceedings on the basis of which this Board should conclude that they may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record. Fifth, while y the introduction of a new issue, inevitably will expand the proceeding and 1
require time for resolution Palmetto and CESG submit that such a com=it-ment of time and resources is well founded to resolve such an important safety issue. Furthermore, the Staff itself observes that resolution of the scheduling and corrective action deficiencies in Applicants' control room design review program must precede licensing authorization. Thus, a co=mit-ment to litigation of this contention could not only be productive but a necessary predicate to reasonable assurance of safe operation. On the fore-going basis Palmetto and CESG ask that the revised control room design defi-ciency contention be admitted for litigation. Intervenors are prepared to commit their time and resources to the identification of expert technical assistance to support their litigation of this contention.
t
- 3. LACK OF FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS.
By its March 5, 1982 Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made .I Following Prehearing Conference) this Board conditionally admitted Palmetto Alliance contention No. 24 questioning the financial qualifications of the small municipal and cooperative owners of the Catawba facility. M. at p.
- 24. However 'upon reconsideration as sought by Applicants and the NRC Staff the Board determined to dismiss Palmetto contentions Nos. 24 and 25 relating to financial qualifications and decomissioning on the basis of the I '
subsequently adopted new Commission rule barring consideration of such con-tentions, 47 F.R. 13750. Memorandum and Order (overruling Objections Follow-ing Prehearing Conference, Denying Requests For Referral To The Appeal Board, In Addressing Certain Related Questions) at p. 2. July 8, 1982. j On February 7, 1984,'the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
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trict of Columbia Circuit struck down the Commission atte=pt to eliminate the financial qualifications requirements in licensing p'roceedings. New & England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. No. 82-1581 (February 7, 1984). It is the position of Palmetto and CESG that in the absence of a valid rule barring our previously filed financial qualifications contention these matters should be readmitted for litigation in this proceeding at this time. While we are aware of proposals by the Commission to reinstitute rulemaking in an effort to remedy the evidentiary deficiencies identified by the Court of Appeals, we urge that the, proper course for this Board is to admit and litigate issue of financial qualifi-cations in this proceeding at this time. Palmetto and CESG would be pre-pared to demonstrate that the lack of financial qualification of the s=all
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municipal systems which are co-owners of this facility will likely . dversely affect the safe operation and shutdown of the Catawba facility. l
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On the foregoing basis, Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental
, Study Group request that this Board admit the above contentions for liti- .I
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gation in this proceeding at the present time. l Robert Guild 2135 Devine Street lg Columbia, S.C. 29205 I (803)254-8132 ' Attorney for Palmetto Alliance Jesse Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group April 12, 1984
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- May 2, M 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r
t BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 7 In the Matter of ) .
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY,.ET AL. ) Docket Nos. 50-413
) 50-414 (Catawba Nuclear Station, )
Units 1 and 2) ) NRC STAFF REspnNSE TO INTERVENORS' MOTION TO READMIT CONTENTIONS ON HYDR 0 GEN GENERATION ACCIDENTS, CONTROL ROOM DESIGN DEFICIENCIES, AND LACK OF FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS I. INTRODUCTION f On April 12, 1984, Intervenors served " Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group Motion to Readmit Contentions Regarding Severe Accidents, Control Room Design Deficiencies and Lack of Financial Qualifications" (" Motion"). In their Motion, Intervenors seek to show that certain changed circumstances or new information warrants readmission of contentions on the referenced subjects which were previously rejected by the Licensing Board. The legal basis for admission of the severe accidents (hydrogen control) and financial qualifications contentions is not clearly stated; however Intervenors' objectives appear to be in tha nature of reconsideration of earlier Board rulings rejecting the contentions, based on changed regulatory circumstances, rather than consideration of the contentions under the late-filing criteria. Admission of the control room design deficiencies contention is sought based on asserted "new" information in an allegedly previously unavailable licensing document, under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1).
$N'{l A0yf
- a . As described below, the Staff opposes admission of the hydrogen control and control room design deficiencies contentions. In addition, the Staff P believes the Licensing Board should now rule on the admissibility of the .J, financial qualifications contentions, in light of ALAB-687 and CLI-83-19,
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with regard to the. specificity and basis standards of 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b), and reject these contentions as failing to mett those standards, c II. DISCUSSION A. . The Board Should Reaffirm its Rejection of the Severe Accidents / Hydrogen Control Contentions By its motion,' Intervenors seek to litigate the adequacy of hydrogen control measures base'd on their specification of severa,1
" plainly credible, Catawba specific, accident scenarios". Motion, at 2, 3-4. . As discussed by Intervenors .they offered four severe accident
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scenarios in an effort to obtain readmission of three of their original contentions (PalmettoContentions5,9and31(CESG2).1/- One such scenario, " stud bolt failure", did not involve hydrogen generation and combustion, and was rejected' by the Board on the basis of res judicata. Duke Power Company, et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-107A, 16 NRC 1791, 1808. (Intervenors do not. appear to seek
. readmission of this matter.) The other three scenarios, implicating the adequacy of hydrogen control measures, were rejected in the same ,
-1/ See, Palmetto-Alliance and Carolina Enviromental Study Group Responses and Objection to Order Following Prehearing Conference, March 31, 1982, pp. 5-10.
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e prehearing conference order. Applicants, on the one hand, had araued that the scenarios presupposed successive failures of systems which
-5 complied with the rules and were therefore an impermissible attack thereon. The Staff, on the other hand, had argued that since the Commission had permitted litination of " credible" accident scenarios in light of the TMI-2 accident, and that the proffered scenarios were sufficiently specific for purposes of litigating Intervenors' contentions on their credibility, they ought to be admitted. The Licensing Board, however, found that there was no safety justification for litigation since completion of rulemaking regarding hydrogen control was likely to come well before licensing of the Catawba plant. Catawba, LBP-82-107A, supra ,16 NRC at 1809-10. The Board particularly noted that the technical review being conducted was considering "the deliberate 4
.- ignition systems installed at Sequoyah and McGuire . . ., a spectrum of degraded core accident scenarios . . . and several hydrogen combustion phenomena [ citing the Federal Reporter notice]. Id.
As Intervenors note, the hydrogen control rulemaking has not been completed, and is still pending. However, the Staff anticipates that the matter will come before the Comission for final action within approximately the next month. As noted in the attached March 15, 1984 memorandum, the Commission had scheduled an affirmation / discussion and . vote on the final Hydrogen Control Rule (SECY-83-357) when the Staff, by memorandum from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to the Comissioners, informed the Conraission that the Staff was in the process of reviewing certain hydrogen combustion tests which reviews the Staff recommended be completed prior to the Comission's decision on
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4-SECY-83-357. Attachment 1. .The Staff now anticipates completing its s review of the test data and forwarding its recommendation for action on , S the Hydrogen Control Rule by the first week in June. Counsel will supplement this pleading with the pertinent correspondence when it becomes available.. As a result, the Staff. believes that the decision originally reached by the Licensing Board in December 1982 remains sound. Although the rulemaking at this point has not been completed as anticipated, it still L appears that the rule will be forthcoming well before a full power operating license would be needed for Catawba. There is no basis for disturbing the Board's December 1,1982 rejection of the hydrogen control contentions (and the supporting scenarios) and Intervenors' Motion to
- readmit their severe accident conten.tions should be rejected.2/
I , B. The Board Should Reject Intervenors' Revised Control Room Design Deficiencies Contention Based on the Five Factor Test in 10 C.F.R. " l E.714(a)(1). Intervenors also seek admission of the following contention on the adequacy of Applicants' implementation of its obligations to perform a
-2/
Intervenors' reference Board Notification No. 84-057, dated April 2,
.1984, relating to calculational simulations of the effects of hydrogen generation and ignition accident scenarios on equipment operability in ice condenser containments, performed by Sandia
< National Laboratory. As noted in the Board Notification, the
- Sandia study is the subject of further Staff. review based, in part, on questions raised concerning the accuracy of the calculations.
The Staff cannot state, at this time, what impact these findings, if validated, will have on Commission requirements. However, the Staff is of the view that they would be more likely to affect the scenarios which are used in implementing and complying with the rule, rather than the format and content of the rule.
'A..,
Len , i i
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- detailed control room design review (DCRDP.):M Applicants have failed to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the Catawba Nuclear Station can operate safely since they have '
failed to adequately meet regulatory requirements for the .f correction o_f Human Engineering Deficiencies (HED's) in the Catawba control . room design and instrumentation in the absence -
.of sufficient attention to the' interaction of human factors and efficiency of operation considerations. . As reflected in the
, -" Human Engineering Factors Engineering Branch - Detailed Control Room Design Review For Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1," transmitted by cover letter of March 9, 1984, Applicants have failed .to demonstrate the justification for delaying correction of identified human engineering deficiencies until the end of the first refueling outage, and have failed to provide adequate verification that the ' implemented corrective actions in. fact ', resolved identified identified (sic). human engineering deficiencies. Id., pp. 14-15.
. Motion,'at 5. A similar, though more general, contention was initially l admitted on a conditional basis (pending further specification after availability of Applicants' review),4I and subsequently rejected in Y light of the Appeal Board's directions on the subject of conditional admission of- contentions, lacking adequate specificity.E Applicants were directed to provide Intervenors with a copy of ~
7 their control room design review when it became available, which they q did. See, Letter to Licensing Board,- dated June 8, 1983 (also Attachment 3 to letter to Licensing Board, dated February 2, 1984). s -3/ As a follow-up to the NRC Action Plan developed as a result of the TMI-2 accident, each applicant is required to conc'uct such a review, pursuant to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, dated December 17, 1982.
-4/- Duke Power Company et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1.and 2),
LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, 581.(1982). i' 5/ Catawba, LBP-82-107A, supra, 16 NRC 1791, 1795 (1982), citing, Catawba, ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 467.(1982). v-1 7
s Intervenors' revised contention focuses on Applicants' failure "to demonstrate the justification for delaying correction of identified human engineering deficiencies until the end of the first refueling outage, . and . . . to-provide adequate verification that the supplemented corrective actions in fact resolved identified . . . human engineering deficiencies." Motion, at 5. These deficiencies were raised by the Staff in its Preliminary Draft Safety Evaluation Report for the Unit 1 , DCRDR, and Intervenors rely principally upon the recent availability (March 9,1984) of this licensing document as good cause for their late submittal, under 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714(a)(1).6_/ Intervenors also claim that the other late-filing criteria favor admission of this contention. On factors two and four, they assert that the Staff may " cease to represent the public interest outside this proceeding", and that only Intervenors can , truly represent their own interest. On factor three, Intervenors ask the Board to " note the effectiveness of the participation by their representatives and counsel in this and other proceedings, and, on factor five, note that while there may be broadening of the issues and delay, the Staff has stated that reso:ution of the asserted deficiencies must precede licensing. Motion at 6. 6/ The factors to be applied in considering late-filed contentions are: (i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time. (ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected. (iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may 1 reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record. (iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be j represented by existing parties. 1 (v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will l broaden the issues or delay the proceeding. ; 10 C.F.R. Q 2.714(a), i
The Staff is of the view, however, that, on balance, the five late-filing factors weigh heavily against admission. Good 'Cause. First. to the extent Intervenors may rely on the .- unavailability 'of a licensing document, without which a reasonably specific contention could not have been raised..and on the prompt submittal of their contention following availability of the Staff's Preliminary Draft Safety Evaluation Report'(draft SER),7.,/ their
. reliance on the Staff's draft SER is misplaced. While it is true that
- - - Intervenors' contention follows promptly on the Staff's evaluation, the information on which the Staff document is based is contained in the Duke Power Company Response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 for Catawba Nuclear Station, submitted June 1, 1983, and transmitted to Intervenors by letter of the same date.8_/ Specifically, in Appendix D, thereto, one finds the Implementation Priority Schedule criticized by the Staff, which Applicants submitted pursuant to 1 5.2.b. of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. (Generic Letter No. 82-33) of December 17, 1982. Similarly, it is the June 1,1983 Applicants' submittal which the Staff relied on in its draft SER to find the lack of adequate identification of the method to verify corrective actions, as required by 15.1.d. of the Generic Letter /NUREG-0737 Supplement. However, Intervenors waited until April 12, 1984, over then months from the time the pertinent 7/
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See, Catawba, ALAB-687, supra,16 NRC at 460, as modified, i CL1-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1083). 8_/ See, supra, at 5.
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.L-licensing document--Applicants' submittal--was circulated, to further k specify their concerns on the adequacy of Applicants' control room ,
design review. - These circumstances were addressed by the Comission in this proceeding when it stated that "the institutional unavailability of a licensing-related document does not establish good cause for filing a contention late if information was available early enough to provide the. basis for the timely filing of that contention." Catawba, CLI-83-19, supra, 17 NR'C at 1048. Under that ruling, incorporating the Appeal Board's' three-pronged test for good cause in cases involving institutional unavailability of license-related documents,U the Applicants' FSAR, rather than the Staff's SER "is the central document for formulation of safety contentions." Id., at 1048-49. An intervenor - cannot wait until issuance of the'SER before filing safety-related content'ons which could have been timely raised based on information contained in the FSAR. M. In these circumstances, Applicants first served a portion of their FSAR, their Response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, relating to DCRDR, on June 1, 1983. To meet the Appeal Board's good cause standard, the contention should have been filed "with the-requisite degree of promptness once the document [came] into
. existence and [was] accessible for public examination." M., at 1044.
--9/. The three prongs of the Appeal Board test are that the contention:
"(1) is wholl(2)y dependent upon the content of a particular licensing document; -could not therefore be advanced with any degree of specificity (if at all) in advance of public availability of that document; and (3) is tendered with the requisite degree of promptness once the document comes into existence and is accessible for public examination." Catawba, ALAB-687, supra,16 NRC at 469.
rc
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.g.
Ey wciting urtil April 12, 1984, Intervenors failed to satisfy the Catawba test for good cause. The good cause factor weighs heavily against admission of this contention in these circumstances. -} Availability of Other Means to Represent Intervenors' Interests. In view of the fact that the basis for Intervenors' contention is limited to the concerns expressed by the Staff, it is not at all clear that the resolution.of these matters cannot be adequately left to the Staff. Even if it is assumed that there is no other party in the proceeding or other adjudicatory proceeding through which Intervenors' interest can be represented (factors two and four), the licensing review of the Staff may in reality provide another, non-adjudicatory, means whereby Intervenors concerns will be represented. While the recent Appeal Board decision in Washington Public Power Supply System, et al.. (WPPSS Nuclear
. Project No. 3), ALAB-747,18 NRC 1167,1175-6 (1983), clearly holds that both an adjudicatory forum and individualized representation cannot be supplied through the Staff's non-adjudicatory review, the coincidence' of the Staff and Intervenor concerns in this instance serves to minimize whatever weight is to be given to these factors in favor of admission.
While these factors weigh in favor of admission of this contention, they should not be given much weight in the overall balance. E Contribution to a Sound Decord. O'n factor three, whether Intervenor can be expected to assist in developing a sound record, Intervenors have made a very weak showing, giving no indication that they have access to 16/ It should be noted, in any event, that factors two and four are normally of "relatively minor importance." The Detroit Edison Company, et al. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, ALAB-707,
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16 NRC 1760, 1767 (1982).
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expert witnesses, or that they have a case of their own to present. They certainly have not made a showing comparable to that required by this , Licensing Board on the Intervenors' now dismissed diesel generator con- .E tention. See, Memorandum and Order (Referring of Certain Diesel Cenerator Issues to the Appeal Board), dated February 23, 1984, containing transcript pages 17541-51; and Order, dated April 13, 1984,
. dismissing the contention for failure to make such a showing. At bottom, Intervenors' showing on this factor amounts to an assertion that Intervenors have, in the past, contributed to the development of a sound record. However, for admission of late-filed contentions, a substantially greater showing than mere past performance is required.
See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power _ Station, Unit 1), Memorandum anc Order (unpublished) (March 19,1984),_ Slip op. at.11. No such showing has been made here and this factor weighs against admission of the contention.
?
Delay of the Proceeding and Expansion of Issues. Finally, introduction of control room design issues into the proceeding at this late stage would certainly broaden the scope of the issues under consideration and occasion substantial delay. Intervenors' argument that resolution of the Staff concerns will be required prior to licensing, thus mitigating the impact o'f broadening the issues and delay to the proceeding, is not well-founded. On February 20, 1984 Applicants provided certain improvements to the original schedule for implementation of corrective actions, and, on April 9,1984, in response to'the draft SER, provided evidence that all required Human Engineering Deficiency (HED) corrective actions are verified and that functional
performance-of the control room is validated after the HED corrections have been made. See, Attachments 2 and 3. The Staff has reviewed the , most recent submittals, and will shortly issue its final SER resolv.ing .! ; concerns with scheduling and verification of corrective actions. Thus, there are no factors mitigating the delay to the proceeding and expansion of the issues resulting from Intervenors having waited for over ten months to raise their concerns about the Catawba DCRDR. This
' factor weighs against admission of the contention.
In sum, factors one, three and five weigh substantially against admission of the control room design review contention, and factors two
- and four, which normally are given less weight, weigh only weakly in favor of admission. On balance, then, the late-filing factors weigh heavily against admission, and the contention should be rejected, i
C. lhe Board Should No.w Rule, Upon Reconsideration, That Intervenors' Financial Qualifications Contentions Lack the ' Requisite Specificity In its March 5,1982 prehearing conference order, the Licensing Board conditionally admitted two contentions addressing the issue of financial qualifications. The first, submitted as Palmetto Contention 24, dealing with the financial resources of the local power authorities and electrical cooperative which purchased portions of Catawba, was conditionally' admitted as follows: The sale of major portions of Catawba to consortiums of municipal power authorities and rural electrical cooperatives places an unknown and potentially impossible burden on municipalities and other entities which lack the reasources and ability to raise the significant funds which will be required to safely operate, maintain, and decommission the plant in conformity with NRC rules and regulations. t r
o. As the experience of the Washington Public Power Supply System has shown, miniscule to modest size municipalities and rural electrical cooperatives cannot be re1ied upon as unlimited revenue sources for construction and operation of nuclear facilities. Moreover, local ' voters may at any time refuse authorization to their elected E representatives to expend funds on Catawba. The second contention, submitted as Palmetto Contention 25, dealt specifically with the costs of decommissioning, an'd, as conditionally admitted, read: Applicants have made no plans for ensuring that funds will be available to safely decommission Catawba in conformance with NRC rules and regulations. Duke Power Company utilizes an unfunded reserve for depreciation expense. Since Duke claims to have failed to match earnings to inflation, an unfunded reserve, which constitutes an investment in Duke plant, cannot be viewed as the safest investment which could be made to ensure the presence of adequate funds when needed. (William H. Grigg, Testimony for Duke Power Com Service Comission, Docket No. 80-378-E, p.14)pany,. SCa Public Further, planned unfunded reserve calculated upon present value assumptions
/ will not match future cash requirements.
Attempts to collect, decommissioning funds from a myriad municipalities and electrical cooperatives after Catawba has ceased generating revenues will prove fruitless in many cases, y See, Palmetto Alliance Supplement to Petition to Intervene, dated December 9, 1981; Catawba, LBP-82-16, supra, 15 NRC at 581-82. Both contentions were conditionally admitted subject to being further specified following discovery. Catawba, LBP-82-16, supra, 15 NRC at 576, 582. , However, upon reconsideration following a n by Applicants, supported by the Staff, the Licensing Board dismissed both contentions based on the new Commission rule barring litigation of such contentions. Catawba, LBP-82-51, supra, 16 NRC 167, 168 (1982), citing 47 Fed. M . 13750. Thus, when the Appeal Board, in ALAB-687, subsequently ruled i j
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av that the Licensing Board had no authority to conditionally admit conten-tions lacking the requisite specificity,E the Licensing Board had no , occasion, upon remand of its rulings, to reconsider its earlier ] conditional admission of the two contentions dealing with the financial qualifications of the small owners and the costs of decommissioning.El Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC. No. 82-1581 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 7, 1984), concluded that the rule was not 'I adequately supported by its accompanying statement of basis and purpose and remanded it.to the agency. Thus, the rule upon which the Licensing Board based its dismissal of Palmetto Contentions 24 and 25 has now been questioned and the possible need for some consideration of financial qualifications in operating license review arises. E I , The effect of this sequence of events concerning the Comission's financial qualification rules is to place the Board in the situation presented to it in the Fall of 1982, when it reconsidered its earlier H/ Catawba, ALAB-687, supra,16 NRC 460 (1982). R / See, Catawba, LBP-82-107A, supra, 16 NRC 1791 (1982). 13/ The Comission is currently preparing a policy statement to provide guidance on how financial qualification issues are to be treated and dealt with in licensing proceedings pending the completion of additional rulemaking on financial qualifications. In the event the Licensing Board herein determines to admit financial qualifications contentions, the forthcoming Comission policy statement will likely indicate the manner in which such issues are to be addressed. The Staff suggests that, should the Licensing Board admit financial qualifications contentions pursuant to Intervenors' motion, the parties should be given the opportunity to brief the question of how such contentions should be dealt with in light of the Comission's policy statement.
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corditional admission of a number of contentions in light of the Appeal Board's ruling in ALAB-687. As the Licensing Board stated in its , December 1, 1982 order: ]
. . . we did not make an unequivocal finding of a fatal lack of specificity on many of the contentions admitted conditionally by our March 5 Memorandum and Order. Moreover, when we made those findings we were operating on the assumption that we had the option of conditionally admitting vague contentions, subject to later specification, instead of rejecting them outright. The presence of that assumption in the contention-ruling calculus probably would incline a licensing board more toward findings of vagueness, and we cannot say that it did not have that effect on us.
Catawba, LBP-82-107A, supra, 18 NRC at 1794. The Staff is of the view that it is appropriate, now that the basis e for its original dismissal of the two financial qualifications contentions (the now invalidated financial qualifications rules) has been eliminated, for the Board to reconsider its initi.al conditional admission of these l . v contentions in the same manner it approached the contentions reconsidered in its December 1,1982 order.E/ In the Staff's initial statement of its views on the admissibility ofthesecontentions,EI the Staff opposed admission of Palmetto Contention 24, principally on the ground that it lacked specific factual basis describing the financial obligations of the unnamed power authorities and electrical cooperatives and why these applicants would be unable to 14/ Thus, the Board need not reconsider those aspects of the originally proffered contentions which were rejected outright in its March 5, 1982 Order.
--15/ NRC Staff Response to Supplemental Statements of Contentions by Petitioners to Intervene, dated December 30, 1981. For the convenience of the Board, the pertinent pages of this Staff pleading are attached hereto.
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. / r:ect their obligations. (The Staff also opposed, as an attack on Comission regulations, that part of the contention, which was excluded, ,
. dealing with the costs of accidents.) The Staff continues to believe b that Contention 24 lacks the requisite specific factual basis. This previously conditionally admitted contention should be rejected on that basis.
The Staff did not oppose admission of the first two paragraphs of Contention 25 as conditionally admitted by the Board. However, it did express the view that further " refinement" of the contention was needed. The remainder of that contention was viewed as speculation without basis or specificity. With respect to those portions of Contention 25 which the Staff did not initially cppose, the Staff views the Board's March 5,1982 order directing that further specificity be provided following discovery as a finding of lack of sufficient specificity in these contentions as submitted. In view of the Appeal Board's direction in ALAB-687, discussed above, the~ Board should reconsider its March 5, 1982 ruling and, based on its earlier finding of insufficient specifi-city, reject the contention on that ground. In sum, the Licensing Board should reconsider its initial conditional admission of Palmetto Contentions 24 and 25 and dismiss them based upon the lack of requisite basis and/or specificity. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Board should deny Intervenors' Motion with respect to its severe accidents contention, based on the expectation of a Commission final rule on the subject prior to licensing
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. 5, 9
l cf Catawba, and with respect to the contro,1 room design deficiencies contention, based on balancing of the five late-filing factors. Finally, the Board should reconsider Palmetto Contentions 24 and 25 on financial .- qualifications in light of ALAB-687 and the specificity requirements of 10 CFR 5 2.714(b) and reject Palmetto Contentions 24 and 25 as lacking the required basis and/or specificity. Resp ctfully submitted, A George . Johnson Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland - this 2nd day of May, 1984. f 3 b.
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- Cole as 19 NRC 1418 (1984) RULES OF PRACTICE: TIME LIMITS ON EXAMINATION 'i
% L8P-84-24 ~
OF WITNESSES UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ns g aMs are authodzd to estaM reasonaWe time Undts b - j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION the examinzaion of witnesses, including cross-examination, under 10 ' c .an . c),'W Gmdssbn3 hinent g NQ ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD on Conduct of Lkensing Proc'cedings, CLI-818,13 NRC 452 (1981) and relevant judicial decisions. Before Administrative Judges: RULES OF PRACTICE: DISCOVERY , James L. Kelley, Chairman Under 10 C.F.R. I 2.740(b)(1) discovery is available after a contention Dr. Richard F. Foster is admitted t.ad it may be terminated a reasonable time thereafter. Liti-Dr. Paul W. Purdom gants are not entitled to further discovery as a matter of right with re-spect to information relevant to a contention which first surfaces long aft r discovery on that contention has been terminated. in nus Mauer of Docket Nos. 50-413 50-414 APPEARANCES (ASLBP No. 81-463-06-OL) DitK 6 POWER COMPANY, et at J. Michael McGarry. III. Anne W. Cottingham, and Mark S. (C..t.swha Nucidar Station, .. Calvert, Wash at d Albert V. Carr, Jr., and Ronald un.s t and 2) b* , th Carolina, for the Applicants, Duke June 22,1984 j
) Power Company, er of, Robert Gu!!d. Columb S uth Carolina, and John ,Clewell.
Ihn operating license proceeding was contested with respect to a bio.id quahty assurance contention Washington, D.C., th Intervenor, Palmetto Alliance. twn relatively narrow technical comeniinns, and numerous emergen,cy planning contentions. The Li- Jesse L. Riley, Charlotte, North Carolina, for the Intervenor, Carolina cen4ng Itoard decides the quality assurance contention (with certain Environmental Study Group. ecsenasions) and the technical contention concerning embrittlement of the sex son pressure vessel in the Applicants' favor The nother cal tech i George E. Johnson and Bradley Jones for the Nuclear Regulatory Com-c..niennon, concerning meteorology and accident analyses, is decided mission Staff. agams: the hft and the Applicants and in favor of the Intervenors Not . . withstandmg the lindings adverse to the Staff and Applicants, the BoardRichard P. Wilson for the State of South Carolina. sm.h shas, suh.iect to the resolution of certain unresolved issues over who,li n setains jurisdiction, the reasonable assurances requisite u- to a ti..oitabon of a low-power operating license are present '
. Accordingly, ilus partial Initial Decision authorizes the Director of Nuclear Reactor n un ne11: to issue such a license, on condition that the I:qntanon ved unresol 51 resolved in favor of the Applicants. A separate Licensi L..u.I will decide the emergency planning contentions at a l tng a er date. M 1418 ing
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I q. Ch.ac..ne. %'ea" .olma city limits. The flicilitY contrins tw3 prrss . ' OES, their eff,ct being admission of three such c:ntinliorr and rejec . dered 868 4 o. e in..r. . . dors, designs-d m w gg sinn of twenty cthers. Th3 net result was that ths Boa h I "'dl '"$7awatts, wnh a net ciectrical m p t f 45
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seventy five contentions (exclusive of Cmcrgency plan..
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tions), rejecting sixty two and admitting thirteen, at least for discovery purposes.3 .. 31 'I he l'a s sic,, Toward the close of discovery, the Applicants and Staff filed motions ; for sanctions against Palmetto, seeking dismissal of several contentions '~ I,ca..ui . i., c,.nsunct the facility. were issued' fall "D. " for failure to meet discovery obligations. This motion was granted in 19b t. A. f.. c, Co. (Catawba Nuclear Srat' "* . i i d LBP-83 29A,17 NRC 1121
' part and two contentions were d sm sse .
Lill*-n41. I NRP t.2ti (1975). In June 1981 i '.'.and 2). (1983). In June 1983, CMEC and the Applicants submitted a stipulation nusa n pub-h.hcd n. it,c f,,fc,ul keriner (46 Fed. Reg.' 32'974 II P to settle CMEC's four contentions. The Board approved the stipulation "I an aishanon h,r operating licenses for the Catawb f " - and dismissed CMEC as a party to the proceeding. sporne t.. th.n nonce. petitions to intervene were filed I " ^Hi- After discovery on the remaining contentions was completed, the Ap-anee iPalmesiol. Carolina Environmental Stud G * ' . Plicants and Staff filed motions for summary disposition on all the re-losse steal nhurg linvironmental Coalition (CME * " 8Y ANI- maining contentions. The Board granted several of those motions in
*ce (SIMI. anit the State of South Carolina. The B ubsequently whole or in part, leaving parts of four contentions for hearing:
~
adannled Pahneno, cliSG, and CMEC as parties to th d 8. The - Palmetto Contention 6, relating to quality assurance (QA); peulion of the state of South Carolina 10 inter 8 " ' 'S d - Palmetto Contention 16, relating to the storage of spent fuel;
- state, punuani io 10 C.F.R. 5 2.715(c), was also granted' - CESG Contention 18 (also Palmetto Contention 44), relating to the embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels; and '
C. 'I he r..nrentiun, - Joint Contention 17, relating to assessment of adverse meteorology in accident analyses. Ihr seitenemng panies filed a total of fifi .: "I "I " I "8 The texts of these contentions are set forth in our discussion of ea pome of alu.h were sponsored by two partie The Applicants and NRC contention.
.ran sen.u.ncis e,pposed mm or % %yi ns. The Board initially aJnuued turney. live rmuim 4 I t H m specified conditions
'nd adnuited one content. " n D. The Ilearings
,[g naHy. LDP 82-16, .mpra 15 W C o > b.ti3. A: ine ,e ph ants and the Staff, we IIcarings were conducted in Rock liill, S.C., and Charlotte, N.C. for eIc88cd tu the Appe.d Hoard certain <p si ng to standards for forty-five days, running continuously from October 4,1983 to December 4fnues.m or c.nuentions. LBP-82-50' 15 NR 171 8 ). FoHowing 16,1983 (with a recess. week forThanksgiving) and resuming on January "tc Apreal isoardi decision (ALAll 687 16 NRC -
. We 30 and 31 198 Call parties were represented by counsel, presented
' count f sed ..ur inutial comditional-admissio" fuI.ings and admitted C os latu.nally, in whole or in part, eleven of the ri " "'
'/
/3 ta *dd"'*a. 'h* so.ro h.s considered severallate cenaenuens riled arter the evidenuary heari y em emnly admitted on a conditional hasis' -
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" ' ' ' "pa 8 la nt docu **"'S <=tal '*= **sa We mu'*d c5 ial one",nement us imp.t. si (. DES, . meludins he Stafrs Draft Environm*"-
) and Ihe orrsit balancias or ihe five -iaieness- f.eiers. Tr. 12.541 50. Order of April 13.19s4 tunpubhih
'8 "Cy Plans, first swd i.esed a diesci genemw mieneen sus weae, but shot munnon w.s rund by nw Conunima 8"*e.eenc .eiasfahre following the Board.s initial ruimgs on contentions' , "' ** '"'wmeniete for s vow uceunent. oNer d June a. ns4 tunpubhM As to the inurm nas* June 2i. i9:4 moudas on dwies seacemor aanmions. are now 50. below. Ali or he reni.ining Ihe Ifo.nd mued a series of rulings on contentions lodged against the imie conicnuons are now. for various reasons, rejected. The Commission's statement of Poh 7.1984 requwes rejection of the financial guehricapone consension. we reject the hyd mud mwn han mienens esu% b nw resem Aanced W the hee b ster aspe j dated heay 2.1944. BrieDy. the hydrogen accedents are rejected because Anel Commmeon acuen
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8 ... a,n.,:a g%,,,, $g.,A 88a8 aut Gle consensens in suppri g gu g 8 s.. w - a s ,,,, gg puhearing runtercare. sI A das indscHe the 88" **#id 4 \ genenc rule addsessing the sanu concerns is espected before
. .. e. % . e,,,m, y'**"d"* *nJ thelcr of bl4rth S.1982, Lgp.82-16. i$ C \ for their lateness or that they could make a subesentini contribution to reseaution of those nsue
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1424 1425
/ pue m UNITED STATES ! y , *. . f[ gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ;; L;'a/j ; wasmuoton, o. c. 2csss sA a y a...*'f s.
s November 1,1984 James L. Kelley,-Chairman Dr. Paul W. Purdom Administrative Judge Administrative Judge A:omic Safety and Licensing Board 235 Columbia Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Decatur, GA 30030 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. iichard F. Foster Administrative Judge P.O. Box 4263
-Sunriver, Oregon 97702 In the Matter of DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET AL.
(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414
Dear Administrative Judges:
c , 1 In i.ts Partial Initial Decision issued on June 22,1984,(LBP-84-24,19 . NRC 1418), the Licensing Board rejected a contention on hydrogen control for the Catawba facility on the ground that final Comission action on a generic rule addressing the same hydrogen control concerns was expected before the anticipated date of full power operation of Catawba. LBP-84-24, 19 NRC 1418, 1425 at n.3. The Board's ruling in this regard was based on the NRC Staff's expectation that a final hydrogen control rule would be submitted to, and acted upon by, the Commission well before a full power operating license would be needed for Catawba. This is to advise you of the current status of the hydrogen control rule-making. As of this date, the Staff expects to submit a final hydrogen control rule to the Commission in this month of November but cannot pre-dict a date for Commission action on the rule. It is the Staff's under-standing that Catawba Unit I will be ready for initial criticality by early December 1984, for exceeding 5% of full power by mid-December 1984, and for reaching full power several months later. Si rely, . v
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[ George.Jghnson/ hk-Counse for NRC Staff cc: Service List *
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