ML20126M514

Summary of 850621 Meeting W/Util in Beshesda,Md to Discuss Nonseismic Interaction Program.List of Attendees & Outline Encl

ML20126M514
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/23/1985
From:	Doolittle E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8508010386
Download: ML20126M514 (51)

Text

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/r/ JR. 2 81985 Following the applicants presentation, Mr. Peter Yanev, representing EQE presented information on the application of experience data to seismic inter-action at Millstone 3. An outline of Mr. Yanev's presentation is included as Enclosure 3. Mr. Yanev explained that the SQUG has demonstrated the feasibility of using data on the performance of equipment in past earthquakes to address effects of use of different standards in operating and new plants for the sefs-mic qualification of equipment. Mr. Yanev discussed the data base for damage caused by seismic interaction gathered from plants on the west coast and in Chile. Infomation was presented leading to the conclusions that:

out of 10 earthquakes, 60 facilities, and thousands of seismic interactions, there are 13 instances of seismic interaction leading to damage; a thorough seismic interaction study such as that being conducted for Millstone 3 would have found and corrected the 13 interactions.

Following the presentation by EQE the applicant continued with discussion of specific application of this program to Millstone 3. It was explained that a series of three walkdowns would be performed on Category I cubicle areas to determine potential seismic interactions. Documentation of walkdown results would include interaction review sheets which also address disposition. The data base would be used to determine if equipment upgrade was warranted for observed potential interactions. A completed report of the Seismic Inter-action Review Program for the Intake Structure was presented as an example.

This report is included as Enclosure 4.

The applicant also noted during the meeting that the program only addresses seismic interaction and not other affects such as HELB; and that Millstone 3 will only apply the program to structural integrity of Category 2 piping and equipment and not functional capability.

Upon completion of the applicants presentation, Mr. Ted Ankrum, representing NRC,18E, stated that this approach does not appear to conform to a comit-ment in the FSAR and that this matter had been referred by IE to NRR (DL) for resolution. Further, IE involvement would be limited to field confirmation, if required, of whatever decision NRR reaches. The applicant stated that this approach is not contrary to the FSAR commitment and it is a justifiable approach. Original signed by:

I,112abeth L. Doolittle E. L. Doolittle, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

As stated 8500010386 850723 A 00 DISTRIBUTION: A See attached page

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... '.l./ JUL % a be Docket No.: 50-423 APPLICANT: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company FACILITY: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3

SUMMARY

OF MILLSTONE 3 SEISMIC II/I MEETING On June 21, 1985, a meeting was held with Northeast Nuclear Energy Company in Bethesda, Maryland. The NRC staff was represented by members of the Division of Licensing; Division of Engineering, Equipment Qualification Branch, Mechanical Engineering Branch, Structural and Geotechnical Engi-neering Branch; Division of Systems Integration, Auxiliary Systems Branch and I&E Quality Assurance Branch. The applicant was represented by members of Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO), Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W) and EQE, Inc. A list of attendees is included as Enclo-sure 1.

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the non-seismic / seismic inter-action program for Millstone 3.

The applicant began by discussing the program development including back-ground, application and regulatory developments. A copy of the outline is included as Enclosure 2. The applicant explained that prior to 1979 its approach was to install seismic Category II equipment in Category I areas according to seismic Category I criteria. Most large equipment was installed to this criteria. Subsequently, for economic and manpower reasons, the appli-cant changed its approach to install Category II equipment in Category I areas according to nonseismic Category II criteria with the intention of walking down these areas and upgrading equipment to Category I standards as required.

This approach was applied to smaller equipment such as field run piping, con-duit, lighting fixtures and space heaters.

During the period from 1980 to 1981, the Seismic Qualification Utility Group l (SQUG) was established. Although this program was acceptable to NRC for seis- l mic qualification of equipment in operating plants, this approach was not i intended for application to piping in plants under construction.

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'd Mr. J. F. Opeka Millstone Nuclear Power Station i Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Uni; No. 3 cc:

Gerald Garfield, Esq.

Day, Berry & Howard City Place Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 Mr. Maurice R. Scully, Executive Director Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative 268 Thomas Road Groton, Connecticut 06340 1

Robert W. Bishop, Esq.

Corporate Secretary Northeast Utilities Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141 Mr. T. Rebelowski Senior Resident Inspector Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Millstone III P. O. Box 615

Waterford, Connecticut 06385 Mr. Michael L. Jones, Manager Project Management Department Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company Post Office Box 426 Ludlow, Massachusetts 01056 Regional Administrator U. S. NRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. Karl Abraham Public Affairs Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 1

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ENCLOSURE 1 MEETING ATTENDANCE' LIST JUNE 21, 1985 Name- Organization E. Doolittle NRR/LB#1 J. Youngblood NRR/LB#1 N. Romney NRR/EQB G. Lear NRR/SGEB P. Kuo NRR/SGEB E. Imbro IE/QAB G. Ankrum IE/QAB D. Terao NRR/MEB H. Brammer NRR/MEB R. Goel NRR/ASB J. Wenniel NRR/ASB P. Yanev EQE Inc.

P. Quinlan NUSCO R. Joshi NUSCO R. Laudenat NUSCO C. Gladding NUSCO G. Milley S&W L. Kelly S&W

3 ENCLOSURE 2 SEISMIC INTERACTION PROGRAM MILLSTONE UNIT 3 I. INTRODUCTION - R.G. JOSHI, NUSCO II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT - P.J. QUINLAN, NUSCO III. SEISMIC. INTERACTION DATABASE - P. YANEV, EQE INC.

IV. ' PROGRAM DESCRIPTION - P.J. QUINLAN V. PROGRAM VERIFICATION - P.J.-QUINLAN 4

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I. INTRODUCTION i o PURPOSE OF MEETING - PROVIDE THE STAFF A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEISMIC INTERACTION PROGRAM l

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.II. PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT o PROGRAM BACKGROUND o PROGRAM APPLICATION o REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 1

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PROGRAM BACKGROUND o ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS - PHYSICAL SEPARATION o AVAILABLE APPROACHES TO 2 OVER 1 ISSUE o NUSCO SEP PLANTS INVOLVED WITH SQUG l

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PROGRAM APPLICATION o EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE DATA REVIEWED FOR APPLICABILITY TO MILLSTONE 3 o SEISMIC INTERACTION WALKDOWN PROGRAM DEVELOPED TO RESOLVE 2 OVER 1 ISSUE o DISTINCTION BETWEEN SQUG AND MILLSTONE 3 SEISMIC INTER-ACTION PROGRAM o PRACTICAL APPROACH - LESS CONGESTION - BETTER PRODUCT 9

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1 REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS o HR DENTON. LETTER TO SQUG 4/20/84 o NUREG 1061 o ASME CODE CASE N-411

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III. SEISMIC INTERACTION DATABASE o HISTORY OF DATABASE o SQUG PROGRAM t o CONTENT OF DATABASE o APPLICABILITY TO MILLSTONE 3 0 SYNOPSIS OF EQE REPORT FOR MILLSTONE 3 N

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IV. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION o METHODOLOGY o CRITERIA

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CRITERIA o DISTINCTION BETWEEN TYPES OF SEISMIC INTERACTIONS GRAVITY HISSILES ZONE OF INFLUENCE o DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAILURE MODES ,

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e V. PROGRAli VERIFICATION o EQE INC. REVIEW o NUSCO PROGRAM REVIEW o NUSCO SELECTED WALKDOWNS

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1 ENCLOSURE 3 ,

THE APPLICATION OF EXPERIENCE DATA TO SEISMIC INTERACTION AT THE MILLSTONE Ill NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EQE Project No. 8421-01

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Presented at:

NRC Bethesda, MD June 21,1985 for Northeast Utilities Service Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06141-0270 Peter I. Yanev EQE incorporated 121 Second Street San Francisco, CA 94105

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THE SQUG PROGRAM ON EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION IS EXTRAORDINARILY SUCCESSFUL, COST-EFFECTIVE AND PRACTICAL t

e DIFFERENT STANDARDS ARE USED IN OPERATING AND NEW PLANTS FOR THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT e NRC lDENTIFIED UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) A-46 TO ASSESS ANY EFFECTS DUE TO THIS DIFFERENCE e THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION UTILITY GROUP (SQUG) IS THE FOCUS OF INDUSTRY EFFORTS ON USI A-46

- N. SMITH, CECO, CHAIRMAN e SQUG HAS DEMONSTRATED THE FEASIBILITY OF USING DATA ON THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT IN PAST EARTHQUAKES TO ADDRESS USl A-46, IN LIEU OF USING TESTING OR ANALYSIS

- ACCEPTED BY NRC e SQUG SUCCESS lS DUE TO:

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- A WILLINGNESS TO INVOLVE NRC OPENLY AND FROM A VERY EARLY STAGE, INCLUDING VISITS TO DATA BASE S1TES iN CALIFORNIA AND CHILE

- THE REAL EARTHQUAKE ISSUES HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED IN NUCLEAR DESIGN

- A WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE FEW REAL ISSUES FOUND (FOR EXAMPLE, RELAY CHATTER AND ANCHORAGE)

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e OUT OF 10 EARTHQUAKES,60 FACILITIES, AND .

THOUSANDS OF SEISMIC INTERACTIONS, THERE ARE 13 INSTANCES OF SEISMIC INTERACTION LEADING TO DAMAGE

e A THOROUGH SEISMIC INTERACTION STUDY SUCH AS THAT BEING CONDUCTED FOR MILLSTONE Ill WOULD HAVE FOUND AND CORRECTED THE 13 INTERACTIONS 1

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o THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE ARE:

1 e TO PROVIDE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EARTHQUAKE RISK TO POWER FACILITIES e TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPES OF SEISMIC DAMAGE TYPICALLY OCCUR IN POWER FACILITIES .

e TO DETERMINE TENDENCIES FOR SEISMIC DAMAGE TO VARIOUS TYPES OF FACILITIES AND THEIR STRUCTURES, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS i e TO DETERMINE WHAT IS TYPICALLY NOT DAMAGED I

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THE CURRENT SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE CONTAINS DATA FROM:

1 e TEN STRONG MOTION EARTHQUAKES l

e SIXTY FACILITIES

- 17 POWER PLANTS WITH 53 UNITS e HUNDREDS OF STRUCTURES e THOUSANDS OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLATIONS e THOUSANDS OF PIPES, CABLE TRAYS, ETC.

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THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING 63 FACILITIES:

FACILITIES RANGE OF PGA* (G)

EARTHOUAKE 0.20 - 0.50

1. SAN FERNANDO,1971, M=6.5 4 POWER PLANTS 4 SUBSTATIONS 1 HOSPITAL 0.10 - 0.20 i 2. POINT MUGU,1973. M=5.7 1 POWER PLANT 1 SUBSTATION 0.35

3. FERNDALE,1971. M=5.5 1 POWER PLANT 0.28 - 0.35

4. SANTA BARBARA,1978 M=5.7 1 POWER PLANT 1 SUBSTATION 0.25 - 0.50

5. IMPERIAL VALLEY,1979, M=6.6 3 POWER PLANTS 0.25

6. HUMBOLDT COUNTY,1980, M=7.0 1 POWER PLANT 0.25 - 0.60

7. COALINGA,1983 M=6.7 5 PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS 4 NATURAL GAS PLANTS 3 WATER PUMPlNG PLANTS 3 SUBSTATIONS 1 CHEMICAL PLAN.T, 0.10 - 0.50

8. MORGAN HILL,1984, M=6.2 .

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2 ELECTRONICS FACILITIES 2 WINERIES 1 PUMPING PLANT 3 COMMERCIAL FACILITIES

9. CHILE,1985, M=7.8 5 POWER PLANTS j

' 3 SUBSTATIONS 2 REFINERIES 1 CHEMICAL PLANT 3 WATER TREATMENT PLANTS i

5 COMMERCIAL FACILITIES 1

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10. CHILE 1985, M=7.2 1 POWER PLANT .

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• • Values not yet established; vary between 0.20 and 0.70 ,, ,

THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE INCLUDES 17 POWER PLANTS WITH 53 UNITS.

NO.OF PGA POWER PLANT UNITS _{.G1 EARTHOUAKE G

1. SAN FERNANDO,1971, M=6.5 VALLEY 4 0.40 BURBANK 7 0.35 GLENDALE 5 0.30 PASADENA 4 0.20

2. POINT MUGU,1973, M=5.7 ORMOND BEACH 2 0.20

3. FERNDALE,1975, M=5.5 HUMBOLDT BAY 3 0.35

4. SANTA BARBARA,1978, M=5.7 ELLWOOD 1 0.35

5. IMPERIAL VALLEY,1979, M=6.6 EL CENTRO 4 0.51 DROPIV 2 0.40 MAGMAMAX 1 0.25

6. HUMBOLDT CO.,1980, M=7.0 HUMBOLDT 3 0.27

7. CHILE,1985, M=7.8 LAS VENTANAS (LV) 2 LAGUNA VERDE 2 RAPEL 5 RENCA 2 LV COPPER 1

8. CHILE,1985, M=7.2 RAPEL 5 TOTALS: 17 ~y- 0 53

• Values not yet established; vary between 0.20 and 0.70 *n -

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THE TYPICAL CALIFORNIA DATA BASE FACILITY IS DESIGNED TO l COMPARATIVELY LOW EQUIVALENT STATIC LOAD CRITERIA f

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0.20g STATIC EQUIVALENT SHEAR LOAD AT BASE OF

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STRUCTURES; NO DYNAMIC ANALYSES CONDUCTED e CONCRETE STRUCTURES 0.13g, OR LESS, STATIC EQUIVALENT SHEAR LOAD AT BASE OF STRUCTURE: NO DYNAMIC ANALYSES CONDUCTED e EQUIPMENT AND ANCHORAGE i

0.20g STATIC FORCE APPLIED AT CENTER OF GRAVITY; NO SEISMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR - -

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND OPERABILITY; NO SEISMIC QUALFICATION CONSIDERATIONS .

e PIPING .

- GENERALLY NO SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA AT ALL; VERY FEW HIGH PRESSURE LINES WERE DESIGNED FOR 0.20g STATIC LATERAL LOADS APPLIED IN ONE ,

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SNUBBERS WERE OBSERVED

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THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE DATA BASE GENERATING UNIT IS IMPRESSIVE. ALL UNITS WITH PGAs TO 0.35g REMAINED i OPERATING 1

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Performance Durino Earthouake

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Power Peak Ground Off Line, Plant Lost Size Acceleration Remained But Still Station and Unit MW Vintace (a) on Line Ooeratino Power El Centro (Imoerial Valley. 1979)

Unit 1* 20 1948 0.50 Unit 2* 30 1952 0.50 Unit 3 44 1957 0.50 -

X Unit 4 80 1968 0.50 - -

X Valley (San Fernando. 1971)

Unit 1 100 1954 0.40 - -

X Unit 2* 100 1954 0.40 Unit 3 160 1955 0.40 X -

Unit 4 160 1956 0.40 - -

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Olive:

Unit 1 44 1958 0.35 -

X Unit 2 44 1961 0.35 -

X Magnolia: -

Unit 1* 10 1940s 0.35 Unit 2 10 1940s 0.35 X -

Unit 3 20 1950s 0.35 X -

Unit 4* 30 1950s 0.35 i

Unit 5* 20 1968 0.35 Humboldt Bay (Ferndale. 1975)

Unit 1 50 1956 0.30 -

X Unit 2 50 1958 0.30 -

X Unit 3 65 1963 0.30 l Slendale (San Fernando. 1971)

Unit 1* 20 1941 0.30 Unit 2* 20 1947 0.30 Unit 3 20 1953 0.30 X -

Unit 4 44 1959 0.30 f,1 . !X. -

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Unit 5 44 1964 0.30

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Unit 1 50 1956

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Unit 2 50 1958 0.27 U"i t 2 - X 10 P4 Unit 3 65 1963 0.27 "" " 3 'M PI I

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THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE DATA BASE GENERATING UNIT

- IS IMPRESSIVE. ALL UNITS WITH PGAs TO 0.35g REMAINED OPERATING Performance Durina Earthauake Tripped Power Peak Ground Off Line, Lost Plant Size Acceleration Remained But Still Station and Unit MW Vintaae (a) on Line Ooeratina Power Pasadena (San Fernando. 1971)

Unit 1 45 1955 0.20 X - -

Unit 2** 45 1957 0.20 Unit 3 71 1965 0.20 X - -

Unit 4** 45 1949 0.20

+ Excludes the Chile (1985) earthquake.

• Not operating at time of earthquake.

• • On hot standby at time of earthquake. ,

FOR THE MILLSTONE Ill SEISMIC INTERACTION STUDY WE REVIEWED:

e FACILITIES THAT WERE AFFECTED BY STRONGER I

EARTHQUAKES THAN THE MILLSTONE 111 SSE e FACILITIES DESIGNED UNDER SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA THAT ARE MUCH LOWER THAN THE

MILLSTONE 111 CRITERIA e FACILITIES AT WHICH MDST ASPECTS OF SEISMIC INTERACTION WERE NOT CONSIDERED, UNLIKE MILLSTONE 111

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THE FOLLOWING SEISMIC INTERACTION ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED IN THIS PROJECT:

e IMPACT OF ADJACENT PIPING, CONDUIT, CABLE TRAYS AND DUCTING e SLIDING OR OVERTURNING OF EQUIPMENT e FALLING OF WALL-MOUNTED AND CEILING-MOUNTED EQUIPMENT AND FIXTURES l

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THE FOLLOWING SEISMIC INTERACTION SCENARIOS WERE FOUND AT THE DATA BASE FACILITIES (EXCLUDING THE CHILE EVENTS)

Falling Ceiling Pipe /Yalve Unanchored Anchored or Wall Earthquake Facility Structure Equipment Equipment Fixtures San Fernando Burbank Power Plant Glendale Power Plant Olive View Sanatorium x x x Pasadena Power Plant Rinaldt Receiving Station x Saugus Substation Sylmar Converter Station x x x Valley Steam Plant x Vincent Substation x Point Mugu Ormond Beach Gen. Station x Santa Clara Substation Humboldt County Humboldt Bay Power Plant Santa Barbara Ellwood Peaker Power Plant Goleta Substation Ferndale Humboldt Bay Power Plant

!mperial Valley El Centro Steam Gen. Plant x x x Magnamax Geothermal Plant Coalinga Amador Gas Metering Station --

i Chevren Cleaning Plant x l Ccasinga Feed Yard x x 1 Coalinga Nose Dehydration Station x x Coalinga Substation 1 x Coalinga Substation 2 x Coalinga Water Filtration Piant x x Sates Substation x Kettleman Gas Compretsor Station x Main Oil Pumping Plant x x Pleasant Valley Pumping Plant x San Luis Canal Pumping Stations x Shell Dehydration Plant x '

l Shell Water Treatment Plant x x Union Oil Butane Plant x Morgan Hill Evergreen Community College i x--

IBM - Santa Teresa Laboratory

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l Los Sanos Substation -;- - -

l Metcalf Substation Mirassou Winery x 7]

San Martin Winery United Technologies Plant x '"". A Wfitron Electronics Facility x

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AS A MINIMUM 290 PIPING INTERACTIONS OCCURRED IN ONE PORTION OF THE EL CENTRO POWER PLANT IN 1979 .

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l TYPE OF INTERACTION NO. OF INTERACTIONS j INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE 77 INSULATED PIPE DIFFERENT SIZES 27 NON-INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE 32 NON-INSULATED PIPE DIFFERENT SIZES 20 INSULATED /NbN-INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE 31 INSULATED /NON-INSULATED PIPE DIFFERENT SIZES 31 INSULATED PIPE / STRUCTURE 44 NON-INSULATED PIPE / STRUCTURE 21 l

VALVE / STRUCTURE '4 l l

VALVE / PIPE . . _ _ . . _ , . . _1 TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERACTIONS IDENTIFIED: 290 < 1

• Includes one failure of a cast-iron valve operator yoke due lo impact with an adjacent steel column. r l

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l THE FOLLOWING INSTANCES OF DAMAGING INTERACTIONS WERE l FOUND IN THE DATA BASE FACILITIES (EXCLUDING THE CHILE i EVENTS): l i

l SEISMIC INTERACTION INSTANCES OF CATEGORY DAMAGING INTERACTION IMPACT OF ADJACENT PIPING, 4 CONDUIT, CABLE TRAYS, DUCTING SLIDING OR OVERTURNING EQUIPMENT 4 FALLING WALL- OR CEILING-MOUNTED 5 FIXTURES I

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OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELIMINATING DAMAGING INTERACTIONS FROM SLIDING OR OVERTURNING EQUIPMENT ARE:

LL.ciLcow a LGc>- fu NA -

e NON-CATEGORY 1 EQUIPMENT ADJACENT TO

CATEGORY 1 EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CHECKED TO INSURE THAT SOME ANCHORAGE IS PROVIDED e IF OVERTURNING IS NOT A CREDIBLE HAZARD, IMPACT FROM SLIDING EQUIPMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE IF THE SEPARATION. ._.._

BETWEEN THE EQUIPMENT AND THE TARGET EXCEEDS 121NCHES l

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OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELIMINATING DAMAGING INTERACTIONS FROM FALLING CEILING- AND WALL-MOUNTED EQUIPMENT ARE:

f e SEISMIC LOADS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE INSTALLATION OF SUSPENDED CEILING IN CATEGORY 1 AREAS e LIGHT FIXTURES SUSPENDED OVER IMPACT-SENSITIVE CATEGORY 1 EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH RESTRAINT AGAINST FALLING e CEILING- OR WALL-MOUNTED EQUIPMENT DOES

NOT PRESENT A CREDIBLE FALLING HAZARD IF IT CAN BE EXCITED MANUALLY TO SEISMIC RESPONSE LEVELS DURING THE PLANT WALKDOWN j l

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OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELIMINATING DAMAGING INTERACTION FROM PIPING IMPACT ARE:

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1 o THE IMPACT OF CATEGORY 1 PIPING ON ADJACENT STRUCTURES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE HAZARD WITH RESPECT TO LOSS OF FLUID CONTENTS OR

RESTRICTION OF FLOW AREA o THE IMPACT OF NON-CATEGORY 1 PIPING ON CATEGORY 1 PIPING SHOULD LLQT BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE HAZARD UNLESS BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS EXIST:

THE RATIO OF THE PIPE DIAMETERS IS GREATER THAN 3 TO 1 THE CATEGORY 1 PIPING HAS INSUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO ACCOMMODATE THE MAXIMUM" - --

DISPLACEMENT OF THE IMPACTING NON-j CATEGORY 1 PIPING

! o A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF THE MAXIMUM DISPLACEMENT j (SWAY) OF PIPING IN AN EARTHQUAKE IS SIX INCHES, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE I o PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ADEQUATE l CLEARANCE DETWEEN PIPING ATTACHMENTS SUCH AS VALVE OPERATORS, THERMO-COUPLES AND INSTRUMENT TUBING, 1 AND ADJACENT PIPING OR STRUCTURES o PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR PIPING WILL REMAIN INTACT IN AN EARTHQUAKE EVEN IF NOT ~

SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR SEISMIC LOADS .  : , "

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%ELDED STEEL PIPING EXHIBITS SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE IN EARTHQUAKES

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INSULATION AND BRACING DAMAGE AT LAS VENTANAS PCWER PLANT, CHILE PHOTOGRAPHED ON MARCH 8, 1985 NO DAMAGE TO PRESSURE BOUNDARY 1

POMER PIPING DURING & AFTER EARTHQUAKES (RP 2635-01) l i

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OUR PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS ARE:

e OUT OF 10 EARTHQUAKES,60 FACILITIES, AND THOUSANDS Of SEISMIC INTERACTIONS, THERE ARE 13 INSTANCES OF SEISMIC INTERACTION LEADING TO DAMAGE e A THOROUGH SEISMIC INTERACTION STUDY SUCH AS THAT BEING CONDUCTED FOR MILLSTONE lil WOULD HAVE FOUND AND CORRECTED THE_13 INTERACTIONS l

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ENCLOSURE 4 HAZARD PROGRAM REVIEW STATEMENT MS-3 INTAKE STRUCTURE The above portion of the Millstone Unit 3 plant design and all associated structures, systems and components has been reviewed to assure that the dynamic and environmental effects produced by seismic-induced interactions, high ene gy missiles, and pipe ruptures will not reduce the safety function of adjacent plant features to an unacceptable level.

The review concludes that the installation will be adequate upon completion of the fo!!owing activities:

1. Positive anchorage of all chain-hung lighting fixture S-hooks to preclude seismic-induced detachment. (ref. E&DCR F-E-38410)

2. Installation of metal hold-down straps on wall mounted emergency lighting units (battery operated),3CWlO-4-0-EZ and 3CW2P-4-0-EZ.

(ref. S&W Drawing No.12179-EE-72C-2, "1.ighting Fixture Support Details -

Circulation Water Pumphouse").

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L L. KELLY 10 8 4 . _ _ .

Hazard Review Coordinator Date

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SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION BUILDING: Circulating and Service Water Pumphouse DESCRIPTION:

The circulating and service water pumphouse operating floor (elev. + 14.5 feet) is divided by fire and missile protected watertight walls into two pump compartments: one for housing the nonsafety-related circulating water and screen wash pumps and associated equipment, and the other for housing the safety related service water pumps and strainers. The service water pump compartment is further divided by a fire and missile protected watertight wail into two cubicles, each cubicle containing two service water pumps and associated self-cleaning strainers. It is within these two QA Category I cubicles that the seismic interaction walkdowns were conducted.

Preliminary Walkdown Date: Week of April 16,1984 Final Walkdown Date: Week of November 26,1984 Walkdowns Performed By: Thomas K. Gillespie l

I 4

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s Circulation and Service Water Pumphouse -

Cubicle Elevation 14'-6" to 39'-0" Walkdown

. Notes Cubicles 201 & 202 1

In each service water pump cubicle there are two General Electric service water pump i

with drive motors and two connecting automatic water strainers. Both service water pump cubicles are essentially mirror-images to each other.

J Electrical cable trays are located along the entire south walls of both cubicles. The

! supports for these cable trays are Seismic Category I (CAT I). There are five cable trays

mounted on the cable tray supports

the top four contain safety-related cable, whereas the bottom (fifth) tray contains nonsafety-related cable No clearance concerns were observed between the cable trays and nearby components.

Piping and conduit density is minimal throughout both cubicles. Both safety and nonsafety I

related piping and conduit are present in the two pump cubicles. There were three piping interaction concerns identified. Their disposition is found on Seismic Review Worksheets. . . w. . .

5-003 thru S-005.

Both safety and nonsafety-related instrumentation are present in the two pump cubicles.

There was one instrumentation interaction concern identified. See Seismic Review Worksheet 5-024 for the disposition of this concern.

Located at the east end of cubicle 202 and the west end of cubicle 201 are CAT I and CAT II motor control centers. All four MCC's have adequate anchorage to preclude overturning or sliding during a seismic event. -

l At the upper elevations of each cubicle are HVAC duct which are supported by seismic duct supports. No clearance concerns were observed between the HVAC duct / supports and nonsafety-related components in both cubicles.

Additional seismic interaction concerns which were identified were : (1) open 5-hook ,

connections, (2) unit heaters, (3) fire extinguisher supports, (4). wall-mounted (battery) lighting units, (5) loudspeakers and, (6) clearance between motor-operated valve and .

. structural steel. See Seismic Review Worksheets S-001, S-002,.5-006,3-007, S-025, and, v.c.q.:.. .

S-026 for disposition of these items. ._

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET

, SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION B ilding:

2 Intake Structure Interaction No. S-001 4

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Cubicle: ,201 & 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie

Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution

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Description:

All chain-hung lighting units (6 observed) have open "S" hook @'

connections.

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Elevation: Historical seismic data has shown that chain-liung lighting fixtures have slipped out of open "S" hook connections during a seismic event thereby resulting in a complete loss of anchorage. Lighting units s then become gravity missiles targeting anything beneath them. ,

Resolution: As a result of this review, E&DCR F-E-38410 was written to provide details / direction for positive anchorage of "S" hook connections.

Subsequently, chain-hung lighting 'anits pose no seismic interaction Concern.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION i

Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-002 Cubicle: 201 & 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie i

Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Unit heaters 3HVY-UHEIA and 3HVY-UHElB are mounted directly above safety-related components (see Photo No.1 & 2). Loss of anchorage would result in the unit heaters becoming gravity missiles  ;

targeting the safety related components.  !

Evaluation: The unit heater's support has been seismically designed up to the interface with the nonsafety-related unit heater. The unit heater is attached to the seismic CAT II support using two bolts on each side of the mounting bracket (see Photo No. 3).

No credible singular failure mechanism is present in the support configuration. In the unlikely case of one of the bolts failing during a seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided by the i

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. SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-002 (Con't.)

remaining three bolts precludes a complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

The unit heater and its support accommodates a high amount of lateral excitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earthquake survival data has shown that ceiling-mounted equipment such as unit heaters have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: Unit heaters will net become detached during a seismic event since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional impairment of nearby safety-related components will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-003 Building: Intake Structure Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Cubicle: 202 Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Nonseismically supported 1 1/2" diameter domestic water pipe is unusually close to safety-related conduit 3CC3320G (see Photo No.1). The available clearance between the two components is ..

approximately 1/2"(w/ insulation).

Evaluation: The safety-related conduit is restricted from movement towards the nonseismically supported 11/2" water pipe by a seismic U-strap /

unistrut support located 7" from the potential point of interaction.

l The 11/2" water pipe is restricted from movement towards the safety-related conduit by U-bolts which secure the pipe to angle l

iron cantilever supports located on either side of the potential l point of interaction (see Photo No. 2).

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Due to the close proximity and adequacy of the supports, the relative seismic movement between the components will be very small and adequate clearance will prevail during a seismic event.

4 Resolution: Seismic interaction between the nonseismic pipe and the safety-related conduit is precluded since adequate clearance exists.

Subsequently, no impairment of the conduits safety function will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET l l

. SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-004 i

Cubicle: 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

The vertical riser portion of the nonseismically supported domestic water pipe is unusually close to safety-related conduit 3CLS33NG.

The available clearance between the components is approximately 3/4".

Evaluation: The 3" diameter safety-related conduit is well-supported against movement towards the 3/4" nonseismic pipe by seismic U-strap supports located on each side of the potential point of interaction (see Photo No.1). The 3/4" nonseismically supported pipe is restricted from movement towards the safety-related conduit by a U-bolt support located approximately 16" from the potential point of interaction (see Photo No. 2).

Due to the close proximity and adequacy of the supports near the Photo No.1 Photo No. 2

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET -

SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION '

l Interaction No. S-004 (Con't.) l 1

l point of concern, the relative seismic movement between the components will not exceed the 3/4" available clearance between them.

Resolution: A seismic interaction between the nonseismically supported pipe and the safety-related conduits is precluded since adequate clearance exists. Subsequently, no impairment of the conduits' safety function will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET

- SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION l

1 Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-005 Cubicle: 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Nonseismically supported 1 1/2" diameter domestic water pipe is unusually close to safety-related conduit 3CK880PG and 3CC331PM.

1 The available clearance between the components is approximately 1/2" (see Photo No.1).

Evaluation: The 1 1/2" diameter nonseismic water pipe is restricted from movement towards the safety-related conduits by a U-bolt support located 10" and 13" respectively from the potential point of inter-action. The conduits are well-supported against movement towards i the nonseismically supported pipe by a U-strap /unistrut support located 9" from the potential point of interaction. Due to the close ,

proximity and adequacy of the supports, the relative seismic  !

movement between the components will be very small and adequate Photo No.1 l

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SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-005 (Con't.)

clearance will prevail during a seismic event.

Resolution: A seismic interaction between the nonseismically supported pipe and the safety-related conduits is precluded since adequate clearance exists. Subsequently, no impairment of the conduit's safety function will occur. .

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-006 Cubicle: 201 and 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie 4

Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Portable fire extinguishers in both safety-related service water cubicles (one in each cubicle) are gravity hung onto supports mounted to the wall (see Photo No.1). Vertical excitation from a seismic event will cause the fire extinguishers to become completely detached from their supports.

Evaluation: A complete loss of anchorage is assumed since the fire extin-guishers are only held onto the support by gravity.

The fire extinguishers will not fall onto any safety-related components since all safety-related components susceptible to damage from the falling fire extinguishers are remotely located from the area (see Photos 2 and 3). In addition, the ability for Photo No.1 Photo No. 2

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i each fire extinguisher to roll and hit a safety-related component

after falling is restricted due to the presence of the protruding _

nozzle bracket around the circumference of the cylinder.

Resolution: The fire extinguishers are expected to lose their anchorage during a seismic event, however, no functional impairment of safety-related components will occur.

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SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-007 Cubicle: 201 & 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Descriotion/ Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Emergency lighting units are wall mounted in both safety-related service water cubicles (one in each cubicle). A loss of anchorage would result in the lighting units becoming gravity missiles -" ' ' ~" "' '"' "

• targeting safety-related components (see Photo No. 2).

l Evaluation: The mounting brackets upon which the battery-powered lighting l units rest are firmly attached to the wall using (4) - 3/4" diameter anchor bolts.

The lighting units are kept from overturn'ing/ sliding off the bracket l by metal hold-down straps (see Photo No. I and Figure No.1). i Additionally, the front edge of the mounting bracket is bent up to form a lip which stops the lighting units from sliding off the front j Photo No.1 Photo No. 2

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of the bracket.

The lighting unit and its support accomrnodates a high amount of lateral excitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earth-quake survival data has shown that wall-mounted equipment such as emergency lighting units have not lost tiielr anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: Emergency lighting units will not become detached during a seismic event since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional impairment of nearby safety-related components will occur. ,

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SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION i

Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-024 Cubicle: 201 & 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution: ~

Description:

Mercury vapor lighting units are wall-mounted in both safety-related service water cubicles (see Photo No.1). A loss of anchorage would result in the lighting units becoming gravity,nissiles "" --

! targeting safety-related tubing and other components located below (see Photo No. 2). The same hazard concern is in each cubicle.

Evaluation: The lighting units are firmly attached to the wall using (4)- 1/4"

, diameter anchor bolts (see Figure No.1).

i No credible singular failure mechanism is' present in the support configuration. In the unlikely case of one of the bolts falling during a seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided by the i

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. SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-02t+ (Con't.)

remaining three bolts precludes a complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

Past earthquake survival data has shown that wall-mounted equip-ment such as lighting units have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: Mercury vapor lighting units will not become detached during a seismic event since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functionalimpairment of nearby safety-related components will occur.

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- SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION l

Building: Intake Structure Interaction No. S-025 l

Cubicle: 202 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

At elevation 21'-9", the safety-related limitorque motor operated valve housing is unusually close to the edges of the raised platform.

The available clearances between the two components are as shown - - --- .

on Photo No.1.

Evaluation: The raised platform is adequately supported using robust structural j

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steel members with diagonal bracing (see Photo No. 2). The  !

I platform has been designed to withstand seismic loads. Likewise, l the safety-related motor operated valve is very securely mounted to j the 30" diameter service water pipe and has been designed and constructed to Seismic Category I standards. l l

t Nevertheless, the acceptability of this configuration cannot be determined by a visual /judgemental assessment because of the Photo No.1 ,

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. SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION l Interaction No. S-025 (Con't.)

tight clearances and the unpredictability of the relative seismic movement between the two components during a seismic event.

Upon further investigation, a comparison between the analyzed seismic displacements of the safety-related motor operated valve /30" diameter pipe and the raised platform reveals that adequate clearance exists between the two components during a seismic event.

Resolution A seismic interaction between the edge of the raised platform and the safety-related motor operated valve housing is precluded due to adequate clearance between the two components. Subsequently, no impairment of the motor operated valve's safety function will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET .

4 SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-026 Building: Intake Structure Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Cubicle: 201 & 202

! Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Nonseismically supported loudspeakers are mounted in both service water pump cubicles which contain safety-related components (see Photos 1 & 2). A loss of anchorage would allow the loud .., , ,, , - . .

speakers to fall and possibly impact safety-related components.

Evaluation: The nonsafety-related loudspeaker's support is mounted to the wall using (3)-1/4" diameter anchor bolts. The loudspeaker is attached I to the support using two bolts (see Photo No. 3).

' No credible singular f ailure mechanism is present in the support. If one of the bolts should fail during a seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided by the remaining bolts precludes a .

complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

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The loudspeaker and its support accommodates a high amount of lateral excitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earth-quake survival data has shown that wall-mounted equipment such as loudspeakers have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: Loudspeakers will not become detached during a seismic event _. ,_

since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional impairment of safety-related components will occur.

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- HAZARD PROGRAM REYlEW STATEMENT MILLSTONE 3 HYOROGEN RECOMBINER BUILDING The above portion of the Millstone Unit 3 plant design and all associated structures, systems, and components has been reviewed to assure that the dynamic and environmental effects produced by seismic-induced interactions, internally

-generated missiles, and postulated high energy pipe ruptures will not reduce the safety functions of adjacent . .. .. ... . . .

plant features to an unacceptable safety level.

The review concludes that the installation will be adequate upon completion of the following activities:

1. Closure of all chain-hung light fixture S-hooks to preclude seismic-induced detachment. See E&DCR e F-E-38410.

2. Completion of the installation of a emergency lighting battery pack. The hold-down strap is awaiting final attachment. An earthquake could cause damage to the building security system access control box which is located directly below.

NOTE: The current level of construction activity in the building suggests that a supplementary walkdown at a later date is prudent. There are no other current concerns, however. .

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Date: 01 May 85 . .; . . . '.. -<,- .

Lawrence J. Kelly Hazard Review Coordinator. ,.

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1 SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET

)

SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Hydrogen Recombiner Interaction No. S-008

! Cubicle: 183,184 and 186 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie Problem Descriotion/ Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

All chain-hung lighting units have open "S" hooks at their connections.

l Evaluation: Historical seismic data has shown that chain-hung lighting fixtures . . . . . ._

have slipped out of open "S" hook connections during a seismic event thereby resulting in a complete loss of anchorage. Lighting units then become gravity missiles targeting anything beneath them.

Resolution: E&DCR F-E-38410 now provides details / direction for positive anchorage of "S" hook connections. Therefore, chain-hung lighting units pose no seismic interaction concern,.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION l 1

Building: Hydrogen Recombiner Interaction No. S-009 Cubicle: 184 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie i Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

Nonseismically supported loudspeaker 3 COP-SPKR281 is mounted directly above safety-related conduit 3CC982PC6 (see Photo No.1).

A loss of anchorage would allow the loudspeaker to fall and impact . . _ . - . .

i the safety-related conduit.

Evaluation: The loudspeaker's support is mounted to the wall using (3)- 1/4" diameter anchor bolts. The loudspeaker itself is attached to the support using two bolts (see Photo No. 2).

No credible singular failure mechanism is present in the loudspeaker's I support configuration. If one of the bolts should fail during a I i

seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided by the re- l

! maining bolts precludes a complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET .

SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-009 (Cen't.)

The loudspeaker and it's support accommodates a high amount of lateral excitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earthquake survival data has shown that wall-mounted equipment such as loud-

- speakers have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: The loudspeaker will not become detached during a seismic event ----- - -

since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional impai ment of the safety-related conduit will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Hydrogen Recombiner Interaction No. S-010 Cubicle: 183-185 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie l

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Problem Descriotion/ Evaluation / Resolution:  !

Descriotion: A Chromolox unit heater is mounted in each of the above Hydrogen l Recombiner cubicles containing safety-related components. A loss l of anchorage would result in the unit heaters becoming gravity . ,. . ..

missiles possibly targeting safety-related components. l

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Evaluation: The unit heater's support has been designated seismic CAT II up to i interface with the nonsafety-related unit heater. The unit heater is suspended from the seismic CAT II support using (4)- 3/8" diameter bolts boited into the top of the unit heater.

No credible singular failure mechanism is present in the unit i

heater's support configuration. If one of the bolts should fail during a seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided by the i

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i r ,i. l SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET -

l SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM .I MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION i

Interaction No. S-010 (Con't.) l

complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

The unit heater and its support accommodates a high amount of

' lateral ecitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earthquake survival data has shown that ceiling-mounted equipment such as unit f

i heaters have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

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i Resolutiom The unit heaters will not become detached during a seismic event i

since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional i impairment of nearby safety-related components will occur.

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET

, SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Hydrogen Recombiner Interaction No. S-011 Cubicle: 182 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie l

Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Description:

A chromolox unit heater is mounted in the sample room which contains safety-related components (see Photo No.1). A loss of anchorage would cause the unit heater to become a gravity missile possibly targeting safety-related components.

l Evaluation: The unit heater's support has been designated seismic CAT II up to the interface with the nonseismic mounting bracket. The mounting bracket is attached to the seismic CAT II support with (4) - 3/8"

! diameter bolts. The unit heater itself is mounted onto the i mounting bracket using (4)- 3/16" diameter screws.

i No credible singular failure mechanism is present in the unit heater's support configuration. If one of the bolts or screws should I

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SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET -

g SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Interaction No. S-011 (Con't.)

fait during a seismic event, adequate load path redundancy provided ,

by the remaining three bolts and three screws precludes a complete loss of anchorage of the unit.

The unit heater and its support accommodates a high amount of lateral excitation when shaken by hand. In addition, past earthquake survival data has shown that ceiling-mounted equipment such as heaters have not lost their anchorage during seismic events.

Resolution: The unit heater will not become detached during a seismic event since adequate anchorage is provided. Subsequently, no functional impairment of nearby safety-related components will occur. . .

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• SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION Building: Hydrogen Recombiner Interaction No. S-012 Cubicle: 187 Reviewer: Thomas K. Gillespie l

Problem Description / Evaluation / Resolution:

Descriotion: Nonsafety-related conduit 3CK978NES is unusually close to a i safety-related duct. The available clearance is approximately 1-1/8" (see Photo No.1).

! Evaluation: Adequate anchorage for the conduit is provided at three locations:

the junction box, the U-strap support, and at the conduit wall i penetration (see Photo No. 2). The safety-related duct is seismic CAT I supported.

Due to the adequate anchorage and inherent stiffness character-1stics of both components, the relative seismic displacements -- -

between the two compcnents will not exceed the 1-1/8" available clearance between them.

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.a n SEISMIC REVIEW WORKSHEET

-o SEISMIC INTERACTION REVIEW PROGRAM MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 NUCLEAR POWER STATION r'

s Interaction No. S-012 (Con't.)

Resolution: A seismic interaction between the nonsafety-related conduit and the ,

. safety-related duct is precluded since adequate clearance is avall-able. Subsequently, no impairment of the duct's safety function will I

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f JUL 2 31985 MEETING

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION

• Dock 5t File

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7 NRC Participants

'NRC PDR L PDR E. Doolittle NSIC J. Youngblood PRC System N. Romney LB#1 Reading File G. Lear Project Manager E. Doolittle P. Kuo M. Rushbrook E. Imbro Attorney, OELD G. Ankrum R. Hartfield* D. Terao OPA* H. Branmer R. Goel J. Wermiel OTHERS R. Sununers, Region I bcc: Applicant & Service List

• Caseload Forecast Panel Visits