ML20102B669
| ML20102B669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1985 |
| From: | Hawkins T Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20102B650 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8503040258 | |
| Download: ML20102B669 (26) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'_BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ,
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In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) 50-401 OL
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
AFFIDAVIT OF THOML.i I. HAWKINS IN SUPPORT OF APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF CONTENTIONS EPJ-3, EPJ-4 (a) and EPJ-4(b)
County of Fulton )
) ss.
State of Georgia )
Thomas I. Hawkins, being duly sworn,' deposes and says:
- 1. My present position is Emergency Management Program Specialist for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Included among my responsibilities is the radiclogical emergency nlanning liaison function between FEMA Region IV and the States of North and South Carolina. In this position, I am responsible for the review of radiological plans and preparedness for the State of North Carolina and the State of South Carolina and for the local governments within those States.
I have held this position since December 1981. I have been employed by FEMA since July 1978. A current statement of my 8503040258 850227 PDR ADOCK 05000400 0 PDR
4 1
professional qualifications is attached hereto. My business address is 1371 Peachtree_ Street, NE - Suite 736 - Atlanta, Georgia, 30309.
I have personal knowledge of the matters discussed herein and _
? i believe Ehem to be true and correct. I make this affidavit in response to Contentions EPJ-3, EPJ-4(a) and EPJ-4(b).
- 2. Contention EPJ-3 contends:
The number of volunteer workers -- such as members of volunteer police, rescue, and fire departments --
who would respond to an alert is extremely ques-tionable; plans should be based on a response rate of no greater than 50% in organizations in which no i attention has been given to composition which would avoid conflict between organizational and family responsibilities.
j Similarly, present planning assumes that teachers will leave their cars and families in the area and supervise students on the bus and in the shelters.
This is an unreasonable and unrealistic demand on i teachers.
- 3. Contention EPJ-4 (a) contends:
Section E4d of State Procedures (p. 47) is deficient because --
~ Fifty percent of school bus drivers are high school juniors and seniors (as young as 16 years). They should not be expected to perform as emergency personnel without explicit and specific authoriza-tion from their parents. Even with such authoriza-tion they should not be trusted to perform in emergency situations.
- 4. Contention EPJ-4(b) contends:
Section E4d of State Procedures (p. 47) is deficient because --
f Adult bus drivers have minimal education and are paid very low wages. They.cannot be trusted to
- put their jobs above familf obligations or to perform adequately in emergency situations.
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Contention EPJ-3, EPJ-4 (a) , and EPJ-4 (b) all purport to raise as issues the fact that workers in an emergency will not perform their assigned tasks. The contentions include volunteer workers _
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such as police and rescue units and school bus drivers. -"
I have reviewed the Applicants' motions for summary disposition of these contentions and find that I am in close agreement with their position. FEMA Region IV has observed or participated in numerous disaster operations including two recently declared disasters in North Carolina. We have learned from these experiences that volunteer workers do show up and faithfully perform their desig-nated functions. The Affidavit dated Janaury ll, 1985 of Dennis S.
Mileti submitted by the Applicants in suoport of their motions for summary disposition agrees with our view. Literature by experts in the field agrees with our position. See, for example, Evacua-tion Risks - An Evaluation EPA-52016-74-002 (EPA 520) at pages 43-51 and the references cited on pages 55-59 which are attached.
I know of no special demographic characteristics of the population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the Harris site that would lead to the conclusion that these people would act differ-ently than those whom we have observed in disasters, or different
'than those characterized by Dr. Mileti or in EPA-520 . The FEMA and NRC regulations, and NUREG 0654 do not establish requirements in terms of numbers or qualifications for volunteers or school bus drivers. It is our view that the present N.C. Emergency Plan in regard to volunteer workers and school bus drivers is adequate and that Contentions EPJ-3, EPJ-4(a) and EPJ-4(b) do not raise issues or disputes.
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Thomds I. Rawkins Sworn to and subscribed before me l- this 2 M day of February, 1985. l l
De__ b*m s NOTARY'PUBLIC FOR STATE OF GEORGIA Notary Public. Georgia. State at Large My Commiseion Expires: t, v commissien E= ceres Nov 12.1985
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Thomas I. Hawkins Professional Qualifications
+ 1L My present position is Emergency Management Program Specialist for -r the. Federal Emergency Management Agency. I am assigned to the Radiological Emergency Planning liaison position between FEMA Region IV and the States of North and South Carolina. In this position, I am responsible for the review of radiological emergency plans and*
preparedness for the State of North Carolina and the State of South Carolina and for the local governments within these States.
I huv,e held the position of Emergency Management Program Specialist (or its equivalent) since December 1981. I have been employed by FEMA since July 1978.
From April 1964 to January 1977 I was employ'ed as Planning Director of Clayton County, Georgia.
My formal education is as follows:
- AB Degree, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 1958
- Master of City Planning Degree, Georgia Tech., Atlanta, GA, 1963
- Completed Radiological Emergency Response Course at the U.S.
Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site, April 1982
- Completed Radiological Defense Officer and Radiological Defense Instructor Course, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Atlanta, GA, March 1982 Completed Basic Management Seminar for Emergency Management Personnel, Valdosta State College, Thomasville, GA, Winter Quarter, 1980
- ' Completed Radiological Emergency Planning Seminar, National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, Maryland, October 1982 4
- Completed Radiological Accident Assessment Course, National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, Maryland, August 1984 O
ETMCUATION RISKS-AN ETMLUATION f
pso srary i #h j 4% metg t
Joseph M.Hans,Jr.
l Thomas C. Sell i
June 1974 1
I* U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Office of Radiation Programs National Environmental Research Center-Las Vegas Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 4:.
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Panicorhksteriaassociatedwithcatastrophes -,
It appears that to the unknowing, a catastrophe often con-jures a vision of mass confusion, panic, and a complete breakdown of private and public services. Normal processes are com-pletely disrupted to a point that the functioning and inter-relationships which exist between mankind, its society, and human values are disregarded and chaos exits. In this situ-ation, people are unable to rationalize, The image, follow by fostered directions, television, or relate to one another.
movies, and the press, is that people react to a calamity by panic and hysteria.
Numerous studies, both in other countries and in the United States (39,40), which have investigated the reactions of people in many types of emergency situations, have essen-tially dispelled the so-called " myths of panic." The Disaster Research Center of The Ohio State University, which is the
- only group in the United States now devoted solely to research I on disasters and associated problems, had carried out 202 different field studies as of July 1972. These have included i
many investigations of peoples ' reactions to various crises due to man-made or natural disasters .
In a recent publication entitled " Images of Disaster Behavior: Myths and Consequences " (40) the authors enumerate the following popular, but incorrect, images of disaster f behavior:
- 1. People when faced with great threat or danger will panic. This takes the form of either wild flight or hysterical breakdowns. Even if the response is not intrinsically self destructive, it will generally involve giving little consideration to the welfare and safety of others. Persons cannot be depended upon to react intelligently and non-selfishly in situations of great personal dancer, r
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2 Those who do not act irrationally are often Thus, disas-immobilized by major emergencies.
ter impacts leave large numbers of persons dazed, shocked and unable to ccpe with the new realities of the situation, the longer run personal effects are rather severe emotional scars and mental health disturbances. Para-lyzing shock is followed by numbing symptoms of personal trauma.
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3 Partly because of widespread individual patho-Jg. logical coactions and partly because of the 35; overwhelming damage to the resources of disaster-affected communities, the ability of local organ-J4 + ,
_Z. izations to perform effectively in handling i QQ emergency tasks is severely limited. Not only
>$ ' do such organizations have to cope with the irrationality of others, but their own personnel are so immobilized by threat and damage that y,,
s they cannot fulfill their necessary occupational tasks. Therefore, local organizations are inef-fective agents to handle local emergency problems.
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p 4 The social disorganization of the community
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which is a product of disaster impact provides
( the conditions for the surfacing of a.nti-social behavior. Since social control is weak or absent,
[5 deviant behavior emerges and the dazed victims
'44 l' in the disaster area become easy targets for loot-f?
ing and other forms of criminal activity. Crime rates rise and exploitative behavior spreads as
)(b. i" Mr. Hyde takes over from Dr. Jekyll.
.E 5 Community morale is ver'y low in disaster stricken areas. Since impact localities are filled with
,1 irrational, disorganized and helpless persons and
'g , immobilized groups, the future of such communities y[', '
appears bleak and problematical. Residents, even those not directly impacted, prepare to leave and there is a reluctance to reopen and rebuild shat-tered businesses and industries.
L 6 A descent into total personal and social chaos is possible in such stricken communities. Immediate and firm and unequivocal measures are necessary to prevent such a deterioration. But in general local and established community officials lack the resources s and are so shaken by the disaster that they cannot
?, take the drastic steps required.
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?' The paper then explains why these " truths" prevail and the
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negative impact and implications they may have on policy and emergency planning.
The greater portion of the paper is devoted, based on the extensive work done by the Disaster Research Center, to demon-strate that these popular images are, in fact, myths and v
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completely ungelated to actual fact. A generalization that 1.
can be made is that peoples' reactions and behavior under adverse; abn'oEmal situations are diametrically contrary to -, ,.
popular myths.
Based on the Disaster Research Center report,' " Images of Disaster Behavior," peoples' behavior during an emergency is ;
characterized by: ,
p.
- 1. The idea that people will pinic in the face of great threat or danger is very widespread.
However, it is not borne out in reality. Inso-far as wild flight is concerned, the opposite I behavioral pattern in most disaster is far more likelye People will often stay in a poten-tially threatening situation rather than move out of it. This really should be expected, r-Human beings have very strong tendencies to !
continue on-going lines of behavior in prefer-ence to initiating new courses of action.
- 2. Just as the panic image of disaster behavior is generally incorrect, so is the view that disas-ters leave victims dazed and disoriented both at time of impact and in the recovery period. ,
Those who experienced disasters are not immo- l' bilized by even the most catastrophic of events, They are neither devoid of initiative nor pas- n.
sively dependent or expectant that others, especially relief and welfare workers, will take care of then and their disaster created needs.
In fact, disaster victims sometimes insist,on acting on their own even contrary to the expressed advice of the public authorities and formal agencies. >
3 The assumption that local organizations are u:able to cope with disasters is based both on the cation that there organizations and the communities in
- which chey are located are overwhelmed by disaster impact, and also by the fear that the employees ,
b of these organizations are so affected by disaster impact that their efficiency is reduced. Neither j-of these notions stand up well under close observation, 4 The idea that disaster af termath creates the con-ditions for the development of anti-social behavior l-is widespread. In particular, there is the assump-tion that widespread looting takes place. The term looting has military roots, implying invading L.
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! I armies take property by force, generally when the rightful owner cannot protect it. During 2 disasters, according to common belief, invad-ing. armies of opportunists take property left 3 l
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unguarded when the rightful owner is forced out _~' !
by disaster. Because of the expectation that !
looting will occur, one does find that there is, l
within disaster-impacted communities, anxiety about the possibilities of looting and also reports of looting which confirm the initial expectation. On the other hand, those who have done disaster research have found it difficult l
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'to cite many authenticated cases of actual looting.
Contrary to popular image, morale in disaster-5 impacted communities is not destroyed. Partly as a result of the generation of altruism and the reaffirmation of equality . . . the result i over time is an increase in collective morale.
Such an increase may seem implausible since disasters create to a greater or lesser degree those who have immediate personal losses -
the death of a family member, injury to them-Victims, i selves or damage to their property. I however, are always outnumbered by non-victims. !
Even in a community with a large number of
" victims," their losses do not necessarily have a cumulative effect in lowering morale.
Individual suffering is always experienced in reference to the plight of others. Suffering
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in the disaster context is not an isolated t experience and, therefore, it does not become an isolating experience.
6 Patterns of leadership and of authority in disaster-impacted communities are very complex.
Their complexity, however, is usually misin-terpreted as confusion and the panacea of
" strong leadership" is frequently offered as a solution without understanding the nature of '
the problem. Perhaps the beginning of under-standing is to start with the observation.that communities are not organized to cope with disasters. This is true even in communtins with extensive pre-disaster planning since there is a considerable difference in antici-pating problems and facing them. What disasters 46 gyp.-
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do is to create a series of new problems for tha? community and in doing this, they necessitate _
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'ner relationships among its parts . Disasters --
force the development of a new structure which reflects the current involvemen? of various parts of the community which, in turn, can make decisions "for" the community.
Although the studies done by the Disaster Research Center and others (17,40) have dispelled the myths associated with peoples' behavior during a disaster, if the causative agent of the incident were radiation, would peoples ' reactionsisbe substantially different? The conclusica drawn by many imper-that because radiation is largely an unknown quantitv, ceptible to the ordinary senses, inherently, the fez r of the unknown and its consequences would cause a different This vauls, c;havior in pattern--perhaps similar to popular notions. telease turn, have a dramatic effect on evacuation involvinj o of radioactivity, i
- ster Dr. Russell R. Dynes (41) , Co-Director of the 6 react ,
Research Center, was asked if he thought people woul.Dr. Dynes' different.ly--panic -because of a radiation threat.
reply was that.there has been an overemphasis placed on the qualitative difference between radiation and other threats by"What was assumed both public officials and anti-nuclear groups, was that the nuclear advent represented some new juncture in human history and, therefore, it would Dr. evoke andcontinued, Dynes demand a "As quite different level of human behavior."
I read history, there is not reason to suggest that because of the presence of a new ' order' of threat that human behavic. j would disintegrate into ' uncivilized' behavior." t The summation of Dr. Dynes ' reply is that there is not reason to expect that people will react any differently because the disaster agent is radiation than they would Thisfor a flood,
" normal" fire, or any other type of causative agent.and does not include panic.
behavior is amply documented (37,39) .
Dr. Dynes further states:
' If your concern is primarily with evacuation, there is good reason to suggest that the problem in evacu-ation is not one of panic flight but The the question problem of the of getting people to move at all.
perception of threat is a very complicated one and
~3 not as obvious as many people assume it to be.
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4 Based upon Dr. Dynes' response to the specific question d ldf Ja of behavior to radiation versus other threats, corroboratethat b"y the research (40) ~ ed to the panic conception, there r_
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-- y is no reason to believe or assume that the risk of
,,- accident or injury rate.
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'Ls " one fact is borne out by various data of past disasters:
the freedom to escape from threat of (37) death or 9; in3ury has a calming effect on the population."
Motivation to evacuate _
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people refuse to evacuate (17,2 3) , and persons
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conducting some degree, it the evacuation as to this reluctance h to leave.is fficial tation of the seriousness of the situationAnbased individual on teo licited.
3 or unofficialisinformation evaluation made and ahe/shepositivereceives.
or negative action e
- It cannot be taken for granted that an official order to evacu-ate will be followed, even if it is a mandatory rather voluntary order. t tha mately six percent of the total population refused to evacua e.
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Other reports indicate this figure can run higher than 50 percent (23) .
There is no reason to believe that because that is, theindisaste Rather, agent is radiation rather than some other agent, itself, will provide sufficient motivation to leave. hesitant the opposite viewpoint should be taken--people to leave.
d will to this problem and appropriate thought given to its reme y.
Warning systems and communication systems between evacuee-s and evacuator-news media- /
evacuator, evacuator-evacuator, population play a signific evacuation process (17,42,43).
pretested, workable systems be available, but that an standing of peoples' be recognized and be advantageously used.
Emergency plans d There have been many documents published on emergency an dicaster planning (44-4 8) , some of which are listed in the bibliography.
It was not the intent of this report to go into b
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Based upon Dr. Dynes' response to the specific question of behavior to radiation versus other threats, corroborated by the research (40) that reveals the true behavior of people durigg a disaster as opposed to the panic conception, there -
is no. reason to believe or assume that the risk of injury or _;
death should be any higher due to an evacuation than the normal l accident or injury rate.
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. . . one fact is borne out by various data of past disasters: the freedom to escape from threat of death or injury has a calming effect on the pcpulation." (37)
Motivation-to evacuate In many cases, even when presented with a grave threat,
, people refuse to evacuate (16,23,28,40). Many reasons have been given both by persons who have not evacuated (17,23), and persons conducting the evacuation as to this reluctance to leave. To I some degree, it is the individual's impressions and interpre-tation of the seriousness of the situaticn based on the official or unofficial information he/she receives. An individual evaluation is made and a positive or negative action elicited.
It cannot be taken for granted that an official order to evacu-p ate will be followed, even if it is a mandatory rather than a voluntary order. Results of this study indicate that approxi-mately six percent of the total population refused to evacuate.
Other reports indicate this figure can run higher than 50 percent (23).
4 There is no reason to believe that because the disaster
( agent is radiation rather than some other agent, that is, in itself, will provide sufficient motivation to leave. Rather, the opposite viewpoint should be taken--people will be hesitant to leave. Cognizance should be given in the planning stage to this problem and appropriate thought given to its remedy.
Warning systems and communication systems between evacuee-evacuator, evacuator-evacuator, and evacuator-news media-
, population play a significant role in the emergency and/or evacuation process (17,42,43). It is not only important that pretested, workable systems be available, but that an under-standing of peoples' response and behavior to warning systems be recognized and be advantageously used.
Emergency plans There have been many documents published on emergency and disaster planning (44-4 8) , some of which are listed in the bibliography. It was not the intent of this report to go into E
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this aspect; towever, a number of thoughts and suggestions were 1.
expressed by; individuals contacted concerning emergency plans ,
that are most appropriate for. evacuations. .
Scme of these thoughts and suggestions follow:
- l. To keep it workable in practice, an emergency plan should be kept as simple as possible for the particular situation under atudy. The language should be kept on a level commensurate with
.the training and experience of those who must execute it. 4 3
Scheduled periodical reviews of the plan are needed in e 2
order to correct it for changing conditions, technology, and ig personnel.
Continual testing of the plan, as autl.entically as 3
possible, is needed to determine whether it will work practically 1 and to determine needed adjustments.
'n; 4 Many times emergency plans are written by individuals 4i who have no real experience in emergencies and littleConsequently, or no };
knowledge of how people behave during an emergency. -
plans are written that are contrary to peoples ' behavior patterns . f As an example, people will not evacuate an area, regardless of J.t the danger, if their family group in separated, unless they know ,7 l
that members of their family are safe, accounted for, and that *-
arrangements have been made for them to evacuate.
4,
- 5. Some plans are written delegating responsibilities to persons or organizations that have not been informed of these y*c-responsibilities. In some cases, responsibilities are not A transferred to new personnel involved in normal turnovers and b.
position changes, L
- 6. Two instances in the literature (16,22) are reported -
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where delegated responsibilities were given to personnel, who, ,
a-for various reasons, were not available during the disasters, !
Other studies do not cite this as a problem (39). Serious con- h-sideration, however, should be given to the selection of personnel b; who would be responsible for an evacuation. Pre-disaster arrange- L.
ments should be made for the families of those responsible for j-the evacuation such that they are assured that their families s are safe and they can devote full time to the emerg acy without concern for the safety of their families. Jo L
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1 7 It is important that all personnel who will be involved 1
in the evacuation have adequate training commensurate with their ,
i responsibilities during an incident. Training in radiological l j hea%th and protection is especially important for the ancillar9L '
i per-sonnel needed to help with the evacuation, but who will not--
be doing actual health physics work. Their familiarity with 4 the subject will assist them in their communications with ^.he -
e j evacuces and will help them understand the situation themselves.
rj Problems encountered in various evacuations L
! Some of the problems encountered in the evacuations which were inve'stigated, which may or may not be typical, are worthy i
of mention since they demonstrate situations that have occurred s
and will probably occur again, f
, It was mentioned by the Illinois Civil Defense (21) that one of the problems that they seem to routinely encounter in emergencies and subsequent evacuations is premature childbirth.
R In Illinois prior arrangements are made in evacur. tion plans for this problem.
F It was pointed out by a number of individuals contacted g and in literature reviewed, that problems occur in the pre- and post-evacuation (16,22,23). In a number of instances, where an
[ evacuation was imminent but not announced, traffic congestion and confusion existed as people rushed to gas-up.and stock-up on food. This, in turn, has interfered with movement of traf-
, fic such that emergency vehicles have been impeded. Inbound traffic moving towards the impact area was diverted to relieve y congestion in one situation (35,49).
I" Post-evacuations, depending upon location, pose problems of preventing unwanted people from coming into the impact area while permitting access to the inhabitants and emergency workers, g Some personnel control was exercised by the use of passes, s Residents, in some cases, became angry at roadblocks when denied access to their homes and businesses. Many persons have evacu-l ated some distances from the impact area and the local news media where they were sheltered did not broadcast information ,
concerning reentry advice. Therefore, the evacuees stayed -
away longer than necessary.
In many types of emergency situations, a convergence behav-ior has been amply demonstrated (41) . Peoples' curiosity over-rides tneir fear of danger. Consaquently, this results in the people not leaving the area promptly or in people outside the affected' area coming in to sightsee. This convergence on a U
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1 disaster interferes with the movement of people out of the area -'
(evacuees) and interrupts and interferes with the movement of official traffic -impeding evacuation. efforts.
Sightseeing from aircraft has also interfered In with several necessary aerial missions over an impact area.
instances, Federal Aviation Administration Regulations were invoked to limit the airspace to air traffic associated with the incident.Traffic In most evacuations, people use their private (50) moves vehicles. in an orderly fashion, and slower, due to crowded roads. Minor accidents, mechanical problems, and lack of gasoline may cause congestion and slow the evacuation.
In some of the evacuations, tcw trucks and gasoline trucks were spaced along the evacuation route, along with Cars with good police mechanical patrol, to keep traffic flowing smoothly.
breakdowns were pushed off the road and their occupants were absorbed in other evacuating vehicles.
i In one evacuation investigated, a problem was Notencountered only was time with a non-English-speaking population group.
lost in obtaining an interpreter, but the people would not evac-uate ferenttoethnic the shelter group;area because therefore, it was they hadestablished to be directed for to a dif-another location (51) .
The security of the area must be firmly established and if people living in that area must be positively aware Thisthat,an evacuatio fire, theft, and other hazards and wanton destruction.
I knowledge helps persuade people to evacuate when necessary.
Looting is frequently reported during disaster evensituations.
though In the cases that have been investigatedgener!Ily (16,40) , turned out extensive looting had been repcrted, itIn other than civil dis-that the reports were mainly rumors. (40,52) .
turbances, it has been difficult to verify casesIt of is looting conjectured
! In many events, crime rates actually decrease.the absence of looting is due to increased t that, to some degree,
! security of the area.
Frequently, there is an over-response of voluntary help in disaster assistance. Many volunteers from different organi-Judicious zations present themselves at scenes of incidents.
use of their talents and equipment may help relieve some of the evacuation problems. In one instance, so many volunteers presented themselves that they actually caused logistic problems.
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Shelters and evacuation centers are usually quickly estab-lished and manned; they are generally located in public build-ingt, especially schools. Although they are readily available e '
relatively few people use these centers, preferring to find _'
their own accomodations either commercially or with friends or relatives. In a California flood, only 9,260 out of 50,000 persons evacuated registered in the 38 Red Cross shelters; during Hurricane Carla, 75 percent of the evacuees went to other than public shelters; and during Hurricane Betsy,
" only 20 percent requested assistance (23,40). Generally, shelter centers are used only if nothing else is available or if one a cannot financially care for himself.
It is necessary, in an evacuation called due to a radiation threat, to be able to warn all citizens in the affected area and to account for them later. Accounting for people at a shelter may prove impractical since the probability is that Therefore, some F only a small percent will use public shelters.
b other accountability systems will need to be devised, b Aside from adequate, redundant communication systems, the h
helicopter was mentioned as a most valuable assest in disas-ter situations. Not only does it make quick movement available, f
t.
but, as a movable observation point, a helicopter is invaluable.
4 rj Special evacuations
$ In the event of a nuclear incident, some institutions, 4 public and privata, may have to be evacuated. Each institution will have its own particular characteristics and will require f
e different procedures for handling the evacuees.
e Schools In most of the evacuations observed, more than 99 percent s
of the evacuees utilized private vehicles for the evacuations and evacuated as family units. If schools are evacuated, it may result in the separation of families. Parents are reluctant t
to be separated from their children and may attempt to retrieve them, causing additional congestion and, subsequently, may slow down the evacuation process. In order to minimize the congestion,
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plans should be developed whereby school children would be returned to their respcctive residences or evacuated to a spe-cific location. The location could be schools located out of the impact area since they would present a somewhat familiar
' environment and generally have food service facilities and ade-
- q. quate supervision. The choice of either action would be dependent tw w
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l upon an appraital of the af fected araa . In either case, the 1 parents should- be advised of the type of action to be taken -,
in order that appropriate family plans can be made.
l Hospitals Five hospital evacuations were recorded on the question-l ncires with no injuries or deaths reported. One hospital under- '
want " vertical evacuation" where the patients were moved to higher floors because of a tsunami and four were evacuated to other areas. Specific data on numbers of patients moved ,
were available for only three hospitals and involved 550 j pntients. . t The general procedures used during the hospital evacuations ?
wsre to discharge the ambulatory patients and transport the nonambulatory patients by police-escorted ambulances to other (j receiving hospitals. In one case, nonambulatory patients were af moved to a 200-bed disaster hospital and those that were in ..
intensive care were moved to another regular hospital. ($
6, Two problems arose during one evacuation. These were: k, failure to send records with patients and failure to provide g at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of medication. It was strongly emphasized, jf by the respondees during telephone interviews, that the hospital ['
cvacuations could not have been accomplished smoothly without er injury or loss of life without detailed planning and coordination.
"~
Penal institutions Several penal institutions were evacuated in the incidents investigated and involved a state penitentiary, a county jail, x v.
cnd a city jail. The city jail underwent " vertical evacuation,"
while the county jail and state penitentiary inmates were ;;,
evacuated by buses, designed for prisoner transfer, to other 4 L
areas. The state penitentiary prisoners were evacuated to a football field, while the county prisoners were absorbed into other correctional institutions. --
It appears that jails and prisons may be effectively evac- ..
uated if adequate planning and reception centers are available.
If, however, evacuation is not feasible or desirable, the shielding effects provided by buildings of the institution should be determined. Dose equivalence may be set at higher levels for -
prisoners and guards than for the general public if the risk associated with evacuation is unacceptable. Ji. ,, ,,
1 i i
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(
5' I
5 2
nursing homes One nursing home evacuation was documented from the incidents. A special train was provided which moved and housed ,
the occupants 50 miles from the point where a possible chlorine ~-"
release could have occurred.
It appears that private and public institutions can be evacuated safely, with little risk, in the event of a nuclear l incident provided adequate planning has been made and a recep-1 d
tion or care center has been designated out of the impact area.
CONCLUSIONS
- Based on the study of individual evacuations and consul-tation with persons having experience in managing and studying various aspects of evacuations, some general conclusions can i be made
l
- 1. Advanced planning is essential to identify potential problems that may occur in an evacuation.
2 The risk of injury or death to evacuees does not change as a function of the numbers of persons evacuated.
3 The risk of injury or death to evacuees can be approxi-mated by the National Highway Safety Council statistics for motor vehicle accidents, although subjective information sug-gests that the risks will be lower.
4 Most of the evacuees utilize their own personal trans-portation during an evacuation.
5 Most of the evacuees assume the responsibility of i
acquiring food and shelter for themselves.
6 Evacuation costs are highly area-dependent and should I be computed based on local demographic, economic, and geographic conditions.
7 No panic or hysteria has been observed in evacuations.
In summary, large or small population groups can be effec-tively evacuated from impact areas with minimal death and injury risks and, in most cases, they can take care of themselves pro-vided adequate plans are developed and executed to minimize potential problems that may occur peculiar to the impact area, Costs would probably not be a deterrent in initiating an evacuation.
4
, 54 t.
$g ~~ ,,-c u M T 'r.'W"i G'l ' 3+ L % *.-lGTJP2 k' NY!5 5! *' ? "~* -
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_- } {
fh k, h <-
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5gw ,. \. - < n-Ly; pv.;21,yg.g vy -sp.3,.q m g~.y.y.y y g, y;.
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d d }dff;~s5- 5!
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j -h 7, N:(f;$ $.. N h h h- s. d. k h k (Mi M h ;, p p REFERENCES -_
(1) Rules and Regulations , U.S . Atomic Energy Commission ,
Title 1D-Atomic Energy, Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria.
(2) Responsibilities of Federal Agencies for Fixed Nuclear Facility Incident Planning, Office of Emergency Prepar-edness, November 14, 1972 (3) Federal Radiation Council Report #5 -Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection Standards, July 1964 (4) Federal Radiation Council Report #7 -Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection.
(5) Handling of Radiation Accidente, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna, May 19-23, 1969, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1969 (6) Smith, David S., Interim Protective Action Levels, Office of Radiation Programs, Environmental Protection Agency, September 1972.
(7) Disaster Preparedness Report, Report to the Congress, Office of Emergency Preparedness, January 1972 (8) Annual Report, American National Red Cross, 1970 (9) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Jerome Vallen, College of Hotel Administration, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, NV 89109, May 1973. Telephone: 702-739-3230 j (10) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
l Lambdin and Mrs. Gart, Cooperative Extension Service, U .S . Department of Agriculture, 300 Las Vegas Boulevard i South, Las Vegas, NV 89109, May 1973. Telephone:
702-385-6411 (11) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Mrs. Hall, Salvation Army, Los Angeles, CA, May 10, 1973.
7 55
4 4
If.
-t I
.d (12) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
^J
~~
Lamocin anc Lawara Russell, Director, Disaster Services ,
American Red Cross, Los Angeles Chapter, 1200 S. Vermont i%
I p Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90006, May 7, 1973. Telephone:_ i
. 213-384-5361 _; !
+
(13) Personal Communication, Letter to Thomas C. Sell from Meyer Mathis, Director, Office of Systems Analysis, Information and Statistics, American National Red Cross, Washington, DC 20006, May 2, 1973 (14) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and George F. Goehler, Southern California Rapid
- Transit District, 1060 South Broadway, Los Angeles, CA, May 8, 1973 Telephone: 213-749-6977 (15) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
-- Lambdin and Robert Nieman, Disaster Services, Los Angeler County, Los Angeles, CA, May 7, 1973 (16) Treadwell, Mattie E., Hurricane Carla, DOD, Office of g Civil Defense, Denton, TX, December 1961.
(17) Wilkinson, Kenneth P. and Peggy J. Ross, Citizens' Responses to Warnings of Hurricane Camille, Social Science Research Center, Mississippi State University, October 1970 (18) Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1972 Edition, Chicago, Illinois, J. L. Recht, Director, Statistics Division.
(19) Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Library of Congress.
(20) Bascom, Williard, Ooeration Go Home, Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, National Research Council, November 12, 1954 (unpublished).
(21) Personal Communication, Conversation between Thomas C. Sell and G. Day, Illinois State Civil Defense, March 21, 1973 (22) Moore, Harry E., et al., . . . . and the Winds Blew. The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, University of Texas, Austin, 1964 56
.[
~zk
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. - r _;
(23) Moore, -Marry E. , et al. , Before the Wind, National Acad-emy of Sciences, National Research Council Washington, DC, 1963.,
(24) Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Acci-dents in Large Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, March 1957 (25) Year of the Guard, The, A Report of Emergency Operations, -
North Dakota National Guard, Adjutant General, Bismarck, ND, March 20, 1970 (26) Baldwin Hills Reservoir Flood, (Rough Draf t) , Los Angeles
~~
Police Department, Technical Operations Division, 1963 (27) History of the Los Angeles Earthquake, February 9, 1971, Los Angeles Police Department, Tactical Operations Group, 1971.
(28) Critique of the chlorine Barge Incident, Louisville,
~~ Kentucky, Office of Emergency Preparedness, March-April 1972 l
. (19) Personal Communication, Conver.sation between Joseph M.
' Hans, Jr. and Civil Defense Director, Harrison County, j MS, June 11, 1973, -
i "
- (30) Personal Communication, Conversation between Joseph M.
Hans, Jr. and Civil Defense Director, Le Flore County, f MS, June 11, 1973 (31) Personal Communication, Conversation between Joseph M. p l
Hans, Jr. and Civil Defense Df. rector, Morgan City, LA, June 11, 1973, (32) World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1973 Edition, George F. f Delury, ed., Newspaper Enterprise Association, New York, '
NY.
(33) Personal Communication, Conversation between Joseph M.
~~ Hans, Jr. and Director, Radiological Health, Georgia Department of Public Health, Atlanta, June 23, 1973 ,
(34) Bio Med 05R Polynomial Regression -Version of August 16, 1965, Health Services Computing Facility, Univeristy of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA.
I e
I
/ f e
57 f
(15) Lowe, Jack, Operation Greenlight, Oregon State Civil Defense Agency, s&Aem, on, reoraary 16, 1956 (Test evacu-ation of Downtown Portland, September 27-29, 1955).
(36) 1urt, T.-Yale, Interim Survival __ Plan, Prepared for the 1
- - Los Angeles County and Civil Defense Planning Board, 1955;-
? (37) Ickle, Fred C. and Harry V. Kincaid, Social Aspects of
-- Martime Evacuation of American Cities with Particular Emohasis on Lonc-Term Housino and Re-Emoloyment, NAS, l
. Committee on Disaster Studies, 1956 (Unpublished).
(38) Bascom, Williard, Operation Drive Out, Advisory Committee
~~ on Civil Defense, National Research Council (Unpublished).
(39) Dynes, R. R. and G. A. Krops, A Persnective on Disaster r -- Planninq, DRC, Ohio State University, June 1972 (40) Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes, Images of Disaster
] Behavior: Myths and Consequences, DRC, Ohio State University, 1972 (41) Personal Communication, Letter to Thomas C. Sell from Mr. Russell R t Dynes , Co-Director, Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University, 127-129 West 10th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43201, June 14, 1973. Telephone : '614-422-5916 (42) McL'uckie, Benjamin F., The Warning System in Disaster
-- Situations: A Selective Analysis, Office of Civil Defense, DRC, Ohio Sta':e University, July 1970 (43) Stallings, Robert, A Description and Analysis of the Warn-
-- ing Systems in the Topeka, Kansas Tornado of June 8, 1966, DRC, Ohio Sta:e University, June 8, 1967 (44) Sachs, Abner and Janet D. Kiernan, Natural Disasters Oper- ,
~~ ations Planning for Slowly Developing Disasters, Vol. 1, '
Institute for Defense Analyses, Program Analysis Division, Arlington, VA, July 1972 (45) Rainey, Charles T., Natural Disaster Operations Planning, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, CA, March 1972 (46) Anderson, William A., Local Civil Defense in Natural Disaster: From Office to Organization, DRC. Ohio State University, December 1969 (47) Accidental-Episode Manual, EPA, RTP , North Carolina., April 1972 (Prepared by Resources Research, Inc., McLean, VA).
l l
58 9'i A~,. __
,, y,re;
~; 7.. ]. .; ; . " F.E - i,f [ . s ( , ...e
- ,[ *. I ' y..- ;y 4
- ir '
.a - m a m. ,
h.%T' .: ~ , ^
. - . ?.' s . .
~ :::# 11 y &-:~.;r.iu , a%
e 14 . ) 2,d.q.3'EP-#k.p 2Egy
- rye g @ gt ,
k~I'*8)l...~h'O.$QE{y,,.;;j?.h'Q@y.t([.h;tff.f[D}hi.,gyyyjQ EN- h,r
}3 '* t 4gg$j}yyff*f g yMGQ.
y (48) Rainef, Charles T. Nuclear Emergency Operations Planning -
- at the Operating Zone Level, Stanford Research Institute, .!
Menlo Park, CA, October 1970 (M) Personal Communication, Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Sergeant Dahlberg, Technical Operations, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles, CA, May 7, 1973 (50) Federal Aviation Agency Regulation 91.91 (51) Personal Communication, Conversation between Joseph M.
Hans, Jr. and Everett Blizzard, California Office of Emergency Service, March 30, 1973
( 5 2,) Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes, Property Norms and Lootino- Their Patterns in Community Crisis, 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, MA.
4 i
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59
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMilISSION
[ BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLIt!A P0l!ER AND LIGHT COMPANY AND )
NORTH CAROLIf!A EASTERfl MUNICIPAL ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL POUEP AGEf!CY ) 50-401 OL
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF /FEf?A RESP 0f1SE TO APPLICANTS' MOTI0f15 FOR SUf1 MARY DISPOSITION OF CONTEflTIONS EPJ-3, EPJ-4(a), AND EPJ-4(b)" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or deposit in the Nuclear Pegulatory Commission's internal mail system (*), this 77th day of February,1985:
James L. Kelley, Chairman
- Richard D. Wilson, M.D.
Administrative Judge 729 Hunter Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Apex, NC 27502 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Glenn 0. Bright
- Travis Payne, Esq.
Administrative Judge 723 W. Johnson Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P.O. Box 12643 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, NC 27605 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. James H. Carpenter
- Dr. Linda Little Administrative Judge Governor's Waste Ifanagement Building Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 513 Albermarle Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien 325 North Salisbury Street Washington, DC 20555 Raleigh, NC 27611 Daniel F. Read John Runkle, Esq. Executive Coordinator CHAflCE Conservation Counsel of North Carolina P.O. Box 2151 307 Granville Rd.
Raleigh, NC 27602 Chapel Hill, NC 27514 Steven Rochlis Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Regional Counsel Associate General Counsel FEffA Office of General Counsel 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E. FEMA Atlanta, GA 30309 500 C Street, SW Rm 840 Washington, DC 20472
.- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Bradley W. Jones, Esq.
Board Panel
- Regional Counsel, USNRC, Region II U.S. Nucigpr Regulatory Commission 101 ifarietta St. , N.W. Suite 2900 ,
~-
Washington, DC 20555 Atlanta, GA 30323 Robert P. Gruber George Trowbridge, Esq.
Executive Director Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.
Public Staff - NCUC John H. O'Neill, Jr., Esq.
P.O. Box 991 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Raleigh, NC P7602 1800 ft Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Wells Eddleman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 718-A Iredell Street Panel
- Durham, NC 27701 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Richard E. Jones, Esq. Dr. Harry Foreman, Alternate Associate General Counsel Administrative Judge Carolina Power & Light Company P.O. Box 395 flayo P.O. Box 1551 University of Minnesota Raleigh, NC P7602 flinneapolis, MN 55455 h N Janice E. floore Counsel for NRC Staff a
f