ML20095H979

HV-1005, 1013A-D, 1015, 1017A,B, 1018A,B, 1026, 1041A,B,C, 1042A,B,C, 1043A,B,C, 1065; SV-1017A,B, 1018A,C; LV-1039A,B The worst case failure would be to abort a startup; there would be no effects during norsaal operations.

2.

SV-7089 to

7096, 7099A-D, 7100A-D, 7101A-D, 7102A-D; PSLL-3588A,B, 3589A,B,C The failure effects of these components include:

inadvertent bypass valve opening, turbine trip, recirculation runback, and a startup abort.

B.

HV, SV-1355A,B,C, 1359A,B,C, 1365A,B,C, 1373A,B,C, 1377A,B,C, 1387A,B,C, 1388A,B,C; HV-1357A,B,C, 1358A,B,C; SV, XV-1369A,B,C, 1374A,B,C, 1375A,B,C A slight loss of feedwater heating could result from the failure of these components.

C.

Vents and Drains i

1.

HV, SV-1450A,B,C; HV, SV, ZS-1455A,B,C, 1459A,B,C, 1461A,B,C, l

1462A,B,C, 1477A,B,C, 1479A,B,C, 1480A,B,C; HV-1466A,B,C, 1469A,B,C, 1511A,B,C, 1520A,B,C, 1529A,B,C; LT-1451A,B,C, 1453A,B,C, 1457A,B,C, 1458A,B,C, 1464A,3,C, 1481A,B,C; LV, i

3V-1451A,B,C, 1505A,P,C, 1513A.B,C, 1521A,B,C, 1531A,B C, 1532A,B,C; LY-1451A,B,C, 1464A,B,C, 1505A,B,C, 1532A,B,C; LV-1464A,B,C The potential effects of failure include a loss of feedwater i

flow and a loss (<100*F) of feedwater beating.

D.

Condensate 1.

HV-1620A,B,C,

1625, 1692, 1746B,C; HCV-1692, 1695; FV, SV-1650A,B,C; FY-1650A2, A4, B2, B4, C2, C4; LT-1657B,C, 1658B,C; LV-1686, 1687 The potential effects of failure include a loss of feedwater flow, a loss (<100*F) of feedwater heating, and a startup abort.

4 2

12-1944 4 A - 11

~~

E.

FV, SV, FY, ZS-1783A,B,C Failure of these components, such that the recirculation flow control valves open, would result in a loss of feedwater flow.

F.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

HV-1959A,B, 1972A,B,C The worst case failure effects would result in a turbine trip.

G.

Circulating Water 1.

HV, SV, ZS-2138A1 to 4, B1 to 4, C1 to 4, 2139Al to 6, B1 to 6, C1 to 6; HV-2102A,B,C, 2103A,B,C, 2104A,B,C, 2105A,B,C A main turbine trip on low condenser vacuus or a startup abort could occur from the failure of these components.

H.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling 1.

FSL-2435; HS, HV, SV-2653A,B; HV, SV-2464A,B,C; HSS-2905, l

LSH-2400A,B; MSH-2429A,B, 2903; PDSH-2442A,B,C; TISH-2436A,B, i

2443, 2903A,C,F; TV, TY-2625; ZS-2907A,B There would be only long-term consequences from the failure of these components.

I.

Gene.rator Gas Centrol 1.

Pacel 10C120 i

Loss of this panel could result in a turbine trip.

J.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

LV-2004 If this valve were to close, a loss (<100'F) of feedwater l

heating would occur.

K.

Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Steam 1.

HV-1766A If this valve were to close, a loss of one of the three feed-water pumps would occur.

III. Combined Effects I

The bounding effects listed in Section I of this zone are of short dura-l

tion, i.e., they are over in seconds; the only exception is the loss of l

I 12-1944 4 A - 12 2

i 9

+

,m. _.-,

aw..9-

.yyy y

.--..7

_,,m.

--yy y_.,,.._-

3-,-,.-

y_,

feedwater heating event. For the " quick" transients, no control component failure or combination of failures could exacerbate the original event.

s An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in bounded events, as detailed in the respective FSAR sections.

The Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1), combined with the worst case control components failures in this zone, could result in a turbine trip at an elevated power level. The results of this event are described in Section 3.0 of this report.

1 4

i 4

i 12-1944 4 A - 13 2

Zone H I.

High Energy Systems A.

Condensate 1.

16"/24"/30" AD-107 a.

Function: Common header from secondary condensate pumps to feedwater heaters 1A,B,C.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in the condensate piping in this zone results in loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel.

The consequences of the transient are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

2.

24"/30" AD-061 a.

Function: Common hes. der line from feedwater heaters 2A,B,C to third feedwater heaters (3A,B,C).

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in the condensate piping in this zone results in loss of feedwater flow to the vessel. The consequences of the transient are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

B.

Turbine EHC (Fluid Actuator Supply Lines) 1.

1\\"/2" VCT-001,002,003,004,005 s.

Functiont Supply high pressure oil to maintain main turbine CIVs open and control the control and bypass valves.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of EHC pressure results in fassediate turbine tri, and scres on loss of EHC pressure and/or MSV l

closure.

The ccusequences of this bre.-k are bounded by a Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3).

C.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

4" GA-013 a.

Function:

Header from heating unit 1 AVE 104 to condensate return unit 10T114.

b.

Effect of Break:

The auxiliary boiler system must use desineralized water as makeup.

The auxiliary steam / plant heating steam could continue to function normally.

12-194424 A - 14 1

~.... -._

,7

'.~

r

~

D.

Auxiliary Steas

~~

.a 1.

6" FB-001?

/ '

~. ' Function:

Eiliary steam from auxiliary boiler units to a

startup sealing steam and RFPTs for startup testing, SJAEs for startup and condenscr deseration and heating for l

startup.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of auxiliary steam could abort a

startup; no effect during power operation.

II. Control Components A.

Turbins EHC

\\

~

1.

TSH-7071,7073,T074;HS-7073 Function [ ' Space heater and " fan for EHC power unit area.

a.

Turns fan on and off to maintain temperature below 85'F.

b.

Failure Effects:

No effect on EHC if fan controls fail.

B.

Vents and Drains j

1.

Feedwater Heater Control Panels 1AC102, 1BC102, ICC102 a.

Function:

Controls for 'dr'ain and dump valves, extraction steam supply valves, and various RFPT trip functions for each of the three feedwater heater strings A,B,C.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of a sin 61e feedwater heater conttol panel could result in the isolation of one train of feedwater heaters, and a reduction in feedwater flow due to the trip of one secondary coudecsate pump, the opening of one minimum flow recirculation valve for a secondary condensate pump, er the trip of one RFPT.

i C.

Condensate 3

l 1.

HV-1654 a.

Function: Controls bypass flow (16" line) around secondary condensate pumps directly to first feedwater heaters (IA,B,C).

b.

Failure Effects:

Valve is normally closed, could so open or remain closed.

2.

LV-1657-2; LY-1657-4 l;

a.

Function: ' Control condenser hotwell level - reject line (reject to CST), valve opens on high level in condensers.

i i

12-194424 A - 15. -

1 j

r' 1

.. ~. -

- J

= -_

1 b.

Failure Effects:

Normally closed globe valve, could open j

or remain closed.

3.

FE, FT, FV, FY-1677 s.

Function: Controls flow to CRD pump suction.

b.

Failure Effects:

I.ose manual control of control rods.

Scram would not be affected.

4.

HV-1651A,B,C a.

Function:

Secondary condensate pump discharge valves leading to common header.

b.

Failure Effects: Valves are normally open gate valves that could go closed or remain open.

D.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling i

1.

TE, TV, TY-2661 a.

Function:

Control cooling water for EHC fluid coolers.

t b.

Failure Effects: The worst case failure would be for the valve to close, resulting -in only.long term consequences.

I, III. Combined Effeets A.

The condensate line breaks are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primarf Containment event (ISAR 15 3.6).

This, event would be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

not An additional single active failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in ISAR 15.6.6.

B.

The Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3) would nei be exacerbated by the

{

control component failures in this zone. An additiosal ringle active i

failure in a mitigatin's safety system would also result in a bounded i

event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

C/D. Neither the Plant Heating Steam nor the Auxiliary Steam pipe break would result in a transient event in and of itself.

However, the effects on the control systems components are such that the follovice cases are possible:

1.

The loss of specific components within one feedwater heater control panel could result in, at worst, a loss of some (<100'F)

J feedwater heating, without affecting feedwater flow. This event is bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would i

also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

i 2.

The loss of specific componcats within two feedwater heater j

control panels could result in:

i i

12-194424 A - 16 l

___,_...._..._.,._,._-,_.__.._.,.._.,._,-__.,.,..,_,._.,_,___...,_.___..mm_.,,..

=

I*

4 s

~ a.

A loss of-feedwater flow due to the isolation of feedwater flow through two feedwater heater strings (resulting in a feedwater pump trip on low suction pressure), the trip of the ' RFPTs on false high-high condenser pressure signals, s e trip of the RFPTs on false high speed and low suction i

pressure to the feedwater pumps, or trip of two secondary condensate pumps on-false low flow or low suction pressure signals. In any of the cases noted above, the consequences i

are bounded by the Loss of; Feedwater Flow event (FSAR 15.2.7).

An additional single failure in a mitigat-ing safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.7.

b.

A loss of some feedwater heating.

In the worst case, this loss. of feedwater heating would not be coupled with lower feedwater. ficw (as discussed above).

This would require failure of oniy selective components in two control panels.

Such an event is described here only to present the worst case possibility, without evaluation of probability.

The consequences.of this event are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event' (FSAR 15.1.1).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

3.

Loss of specific components within three feedwater heater control panels could result in:

~

a.

A loss of feedwater flow analogous to those events dis-cussed in 2.a above, only with - the isolation of three feedwater heater trains rather than two.

Also, a loss of feedwater flow could be effected on the opening of the three secondary condensate pump minimum flow recirculation lines; this would.cause feedwater pump trips on low suction pressure.

In any of these cases, the consequences of the event are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Flow event (15.2.7).

An additional ~ single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.7.

>b.

A loss of three trains of feedwater heaters could be effected.

In the worst case, this loss of feedwater heating would not be coupled with lower feedwater flow (as discussed above).

This would require failure of only selective components in all three control panels. Such an event is described here only to present the worst case possibility, without evaluation of probability.

Such a loss of feedwater heating would be mitigated by a high neutron flux scram and/or a high Thermal Power Monitoring System scram,~ as in the event discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

i This loss of feedwater heating could result in more than a I

100*F loss of feedwater heating. Although this case is not j

specifically addressed in the FSAR, the effects of the event are boimded by the additional transient analysis performed and discussed in Section 3.0 of this report.

l 2

12-1944 4 A - 17

_ _. _i____,

i Zone J I.

High Energy Systems A.

3" AB-127 a.

Function: Main steam supply to SJAE train A.

j 1

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in the main steam supply to SJAE would cause a main turbine trip as a result of loss of condenser vacuum.

B.

Vents and Drains 1.

14" AF-090 a.

Function:

Dump line from feedwater heater SA to condenser 1AE108.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of some feedwater heating capability via loss of drain to heaters 4A, 3A, 2A, and drain cooler 2A.

Loss of some inventory through the break.

2.

16" AF-105 a.

Function: Dump line from feedwater heater 4A to condenser lAE108.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of some feedwater heating capability via loss of drain to heaters 3A, 2A, and drain cooler 2A.

Loss of some inventory through the break.

3.

16" AF-138 a.

Function: Dump line from feedwater heater 3A to condenser IAE108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory.

Loss of some feedwater heating capability via drains to heater 2A and drain cooler 2A.

C.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

8" CG-028 a.

Function:

Auxiliary steam (startup supply) to SJAE trains A and B.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of "startup" steam supply to SJAE.

No effect during normal operation but could abort a startup.

l 2

12-1944 4 A - 18

- -. ~ -

D.

Gaseous Radwaste j

1.

8"/12" HA-012 Same as Zone A (B.1).

II.

Control Components A.

Condensate 1.

HV-1659A a.

Function:

Controls condensate flow through the SJAE (A&B) inter-condenser and after-condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

2.

HV-1666A a.

Function:

Control discharge of condensate from SJAE A train inter-and after-condensers to condensate filter /

desineralizer system.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

B.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

HV-1955A a.

Function: Main steam supply to third stage SJAE.

b.

Failure Effects: Normally open gate valve.

If valve would close, loss of air removal through third stage SJAE would result.

2.

HV-1956A i

a.

Function: Control offgas flow from SJAE after condenser to third stage SJAE.

b.

Failure Effects:

Valve is normally open butterfly valve; could remain open or go closed.

3.

HV-1957A l

a.

Function:

Control offgas discharge from third stage SJAE to gaseous radwaste recombiner.

i b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open butterfly valve; could remain open or go closed.

2 12-1944 4 A - 19

~

4.

HV-1963A a.

Function:

Controls main steam supply to second stage SJAE j

^

train A.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

5.

HV-1964A l

a.

Function:

Controls flow -in bypass line around third stage SJAE A and dump to condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally closed gate valve; could remain closed or go open.

6.

HV-1967A a.

Function:

Controls main steam supply from main steam line to first stage SJAE.

b.

Failure Effects; Nortsally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

7.

HV-1968A1,A2,A3 a.

Function:

Control offgas flow from condensers to first stage SJAEs in train A.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open butterfly valves on line from each condenser; could remain open or go closed.

8.

HV-2016A a.

Function:

Controls main steam supply to SJAE train A.

b.

Failure Effects: Normally open valva; could remain open or go closed.

9.

PCV-2018A a.

Function: Controls / regulates pressure in main steam supply line to SJAE train A.

1 b.

Failure Effects: Valve could assume any position from open to closed upon failure.

10.

HV-2019 i

a.

Function: Controls auxiliary steam supply to SJAE trains A and B.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally closed gate valve; could remain closed go open.

2 12-1944 4 A - 20

.- ~.

11.

EV-2020A a.

Function:

Controls auxiliary steam supply to SJAE train A and is downstream of normally closed gate valve HV-2019.

b.

Failure Effects:

Valve failure open or closed is inconsequential.

III. Combined Effects A.

The main steam supply line break is bounded by the Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3).

This event would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

B.

All three vents and drains line breaks would cause a loss SJAE train A, which is normally in service.

This would resu in a turbine trip due to loss of condenser vacuum. The Turbine T event (FSAR 15.2.3) occurs because of the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

i The condenser air removal line break could result in a main turbine C.

t trip on loss of condenser vacuum due to the loss of normal SJAE A.

This Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3) occurs because of the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

D.

A break in SJAE A&B common discharge line to the offgas recombiners could result in a main turbine trip on loss of condenser vacuum.

This Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3) occurs because of the control component failures in this zone. An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

I i

12-194424 A - 21 1

I

... -...,. _ _. _..,.. ~ _. _...., _. _ _ _.....,.... _. _ _ _ _. _. _.

Zone K I.

High Energy Systems A.

Vents and Drains 1.

14" AF-092 a.

Function: Dump line from feedwater heater 5B to condenser IBE108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and some heating capability through drains system is lost.

2.

16" AF-107 a.

Function: Dump line from feedwater heater 4C to condenser ICE 108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and loss of some heating capability through the drains system.

3.

16" AF-140 a.

Function: Dump line from feedwater heater 3C to condenser ICE 108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and loss of some heating capability through the drains system.

~

4.

14" AF-091 a.

Function:

Dump line from feed heater 5B to condenser 1BE108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and loss of some feedwater heating capability through the drains system.

5.

16" AF-106 a.

Function:

Dump line from feed heater 4B to condenser IBE108.

l b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and loss of some f

feedwater heating capability through the drains system.

6.

16" AF-139 a.

Function:

Dump line from feed heater 3B to condenser IBE108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory and loss of sorae feedwater heating capability through the drains system.

12-194424 A - 22 l

l

~~

B.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

8" CG-028 Same as Zone J (C.1).

C.

Gaseous Radwaste 1.

8" HA-012 Same as Zone A (B.1).

II. Control Components The components in this zone are identical to the componenta in Zone J except they are the "B" side rather than the "A" side.

The "A" side is normally used; the "B" side is not used at the same time.

III. Combined Effects combined event for all six breaks is bounded by the A.

The worst case Loss of Feedwater Heating transient (FSAR 15.1.1).

This event would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

B.

The condenser air removal line break would not result in any tran-sient event, since the SJAE "B" components are not normally in service.

C.

The gaseous radwaste line break would not result in any transient event since the SJAE "B" components are not normally in service.

l I

l l

l f

12-194424 A - 23

~-

Zone L I.

High Energy' Systems A.

Vents and Drains J

1.

14" AF-092 Same as Zone K (A.1).

2.'

16" AF-107 Same as Zone K (A.2).

3.

16" AF-140 Same as Zone K (A.3).

II. Control Components A.

Condensate 1.

HV-1660 a.

Function: Controls coninsate flow from primary condensate pur.;ps through to steam packing exhauster condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

i.,

HV-1661 a.

Function:

Controls condensate discharge flow from steam packing exhauster condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open gate valve; could remain open or go closed.

3.

PDV, SV-1719 a.

Function:

Control bypass around steam packing exhauster condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally closed butterfly valve; could remain closed or go open.

B.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

HV-1990A,B a.

Function:

Control discharge of steam packing exhauster fans to turbine ventilation system.

12-1944 4 A - 24 2

b.

Failure Effects:

Normally open butterfly valves; could remain open or go closed.

III. Combined Effects A.

Due to the control component failures combined with the HELB, the worst case line break would result in a transient bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Flow event (FSAR 15.2.7).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.2.7.

l I

l l

12-194424 A - 25

Zone M I.

High Energy Systems

)

A.

Vents and Drains 1.

14" AF-092 Same as Zone K (A.1).

2.

16" AF-107 Same as Zone K (A.2).

3.

16" AK-140 Same as Zone K (A.3).

B.

Condensate 1.

24" AD-061 Same as Zone H (A.2).

II.

Control Components A.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

HV, SV-1979A,B a.

Function:

Inlet valves for mechanical vacuum pumps 1AP105 and IBP105.

Valves are norrally closed gate valves, downstream of normally closed HVs (1973A,B,C) in lines from condensers to mechanical vacuum pumps.

b.

Failure Effects:

No effect if valves are open or closed during normal operation.

May abort a startup if valve (s) close during mechanical vacuum operations.

2.

FSL-1984A,B s.

Function:

Trip mechanical vacuum pumps on low seal water

flow, b.

Failure Effects:

May abort a startup.

No effect during normal operation.

III. Combined Effects A.

The worst case combined effect for all three breaks is bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating transient (FSAR 15.1.1).

This event would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

12-1944 4 A - 26 2

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

~

During startup, a break in any one of these lines could cause a loss of the mechanical vacuum pumps which could abort a startup, but there would be no adverse effects on reactor parameters.

B.

The Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6) would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.6.6.

i

.I I

)

1 i

I I

12-194424 A - 27 l

l

~. - - -- -....---.-,, ---, -

4 Zone N

~

I.

High Energy Systems A.

Condensate 1.

8" AD-119 a.

Function:

Steam supply from auxiliary boiler to condenser I

heating and deseration for startup.

b.

Effect of Break:

Not used during normal operation.

Normally closed gate valve upstream, such that a break in this line would have no consequence. Could abort a startup if break were to occur during startup operations.

B.

Plant Heating Steam i

1.

3" GA-006 a.

Function: Provide steam to various unit heaters.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of steam supply to various unit heaters.

Auxiliary boiler requires additional makeup from desineralized water system.

2.

3" GA-060 I

1 a.

Function:

Steam supply to unit heaters on Elevation 120.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of steam supply to unit heaters.

l Auxiliary boiler requires additional makeup from desiner-alized water system.

i 3.

4" GA-012 a.

Function:

Steam supply return to condensate return units i

from various unit heaters.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some unit heating capability.

Auxiliary boiler requires additional makeup from desiner-alized water system.

l C.

RFP Turbine Steam i

i 1.

8" FW-029 l

a.

Function:

Startup testing steam supply from auxiliary boiler to RFPTs. Not used during normal operation.

b.

Effect of Break:

No effect during normal operations.

Could adversely affect startup testing.

12-1944 4 A - 28 2

,J,_

D.

Condenser Air Removal 1.

8" CG-028 Same as Zone J (C.1).

E.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

8" CA-012 a.

Function:

Auxiliary boiler steam supply to main turbines and RFPT steam seals for startup only.

b.

Effect of Break: No effect during normal operation. Could abort a startup.

2.

3" GA-006 a.

Function: Auxiliary steam to various unit heaters, b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of unit heating capability of some heaters.

Auxiliary boiler requires additional makeup from desineralized water system.

F.

Auxiliary Steam a.

Function:

Auxiliary steam supply for auxiliary boiler deaerator, b.

Effect of Break:

No effect on auxiliary steam's ability to perform its function (demineralized water makeup capable of providing adequate water supply to auxiliary boilers).

II.

Control Components A.

Lube Oil 1.

PSL-3118-1,2,3 a.

Function: Main turbine shaf t oil pump discharge pressure.

Main turbine trips on low pressure with 2/3 logic.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of 2/3 would result in main turbine trip.

2.

PSL-3132 a.

Function: Turbine turning gear oil pump pressure.

b.

Failure Effects:

No effect on turbine during normal power or startup operations.

2 12-1944 4 A - 29

3.

HS-3116-2; SV-3116 s.

Function: Motor suction pump 10P108 test controls.

b.

Failure Effects:

No effect during normal power or startup operations.

III. Combined Effects A. to F.

The worst case line break would result in a Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.3) due to loss of PSL-3118-1,2,3.

No other control component failures could exacerbate this event.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as dis-cussed in FSAR 15.2.3.

i d

l

{

I l

l 12-194424 A - 30 l

Zone P I.

High Energy Systems A.

Extraction Steam

-1.

8" AC-031,042 a.

Function: Moisture separator drain to feedwater heater 5A.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break would result in a loss of some inventory through the break and a loss (<100*F) of some feedwater heating.

2.

14" AC-012 a.

Function: Crossaround steam supply to feedwater heater SA.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as A.1.b above.

Il" AF-008 3.

t a.

Function:

Steam Seal Evaporator (SSE) steam supply to feedwater heater 3A.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as A.1.b above.

1 4.

26" AF-003 a.

Function:

Ninth stage turbine extraction steam to feed-i water heater 3A.

j b.

Effect of Break: Same as A.I.b above.

5.

16" AF-005 a.

Function:

Eighth stage turbine extraction steam to feed-water heater 4A.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as A.I.b above.

1 I

B.

Vents and Drains 4

1.

8" AF-075; 14" AF-093; 14" AF-108; 16" AF-141 a.

Function:

Drain from feedwater heater 6A, 5A, 4A, 3A, respectively, to heater 5A, 4A, 3A, 2A, respectively, b.

Effect of Break:

A break in any of the cascading drain lines would result in a loss of some inventory through the break and a loss of some feedwater heating capability j

(<100'F) through the drains system.

12,-1944 4 A - 31 2

l J

2.

2" AF-078; 3" AF-096, 4" AF-117

~~

a.

Function: Operating vents for feedwater heater 5A, 4A, 3A, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in any of the vent lines noted above could result in a loss of some inventory through the break (extraction steam) and a negligible loss of feedwater heating.

C.

Condensate 1.

16"/24" AD-020 a.

Function: Common header to feedwater pump suction.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in this line could result in a loss of condensate flow to the feedwater pumps, resulting in a loss of feedwater flow to the vessel.

2.

24" AD-021 a.

Function:

Condensate discharge from feedwater heater SA.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as C.I.b above.

3.

24" AD-028 a.

Function:

Condensate flow from feedwater heater 4A to heater SA.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as C.I.b above.

4.

24" AD-031 a.

Function:

Condensate flow from feedwater heater 3A to heater 4A.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as C.1.b above.

4 5.

24" AD-058 a.

Function: Condensate inlet to feedwater heater 3A.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as C.I.b above.

6.

24" AD-061 a.

Function:

Common header to feedwater heaters 3A,B,C.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as C.1.b above.

12-194424 A - 32

t II. Control Components A.

Extraction Steaa 1.

LV, SV-1356A,1363A,1364A; HV-1360A,1361A,1362A a.

Function:

SSE to feedwater heater 3A, moisture separator drain to heater 5A, crossaround steam to feedwater heater 5A.

b.

Failure Effects:

Closure of the valves will result in a slight loss (<100*F) of feedwater heating.

2.

HV-1367A,B,C a.

Function:

Extraction steam drain lines from extraction steam supply to feedwater heaters 6A,B,C.

L b.

Failure Effects: Same as A.1.b. above.

B.

Vents and Drains 1.

LV, SV-1506A,1514A,1523A; LT-1514A,1523A,1525A,1532A; HV-1538A; SV-1506A a.

Function:

These are the feedwater heater train A drain valves between heaters 6A and SA, 5A and 4A, 4A and 3A, 3A and 2A, and associated level control transmitters and switches.

4 b.

Failure Effects: Same as A.1.b above.

2.

LT-1513A,1521A,1531A,1544A,1559A,1560A,1561A s.

Function:

Level transmitters controlling feedwater heaters SA, 4A, and 3A dump valves to condensers.

b.

Failure Effects:

Opening of the valves would result in a slight loss (<100*F) of feedwater heating.

3.

HV, SV-1510A,1519A,1528A,1543A,1545A 1568A, LT-1543A a.

Function:

Valves on startup and operating vent lines for heaters 5A, 4A. and 3A.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would result in a slight loss (<100*F) of feedwater heating.

i C.

Condensate 1.

HV-1613A a.

Function:

Condensate inlet valve from common header to i

heater 3A.

i 12-194424 A - 33

,,.~,n,-

,,---_n-.

m_..---,,.nn,,,,.,,,--,-._,-.---n-,,-.v,

b.

Failure Effects: Same as A.I.b above.

2.

HV-1600A,1745A a.

Function: Condensate outlet valve from heater SA to common feed pump suction header and associated bypass.

b.

Failure Effects: Same as A.1.b above.

3.

HV-1623 a.

Function: Valve controlling condensate flow bypass around heaters 3, 4, and 5.

b.

Failure Effects: Same as B.2.b above.

III. Combined Effects A/B. A break in any of these lines could result in an isolation of feed-water heaters 3A, 4A, and 5A.

This flow would be diverted through the remaining two, 50% each, heater trains B and C.

Feedwater heaters 3, 4, and 5 bypass valve (HV-1623), that is normally closed, could go open, bypassing some feedwater flow.

Extraction steam to heater 3A, 4A, and 5A could also be isolated due to the effect of the break on the heater level control instrumentation.

The loss of feedwater heaters 3A, 4A, and 5A would result in a transient bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

C.

Any condensate line break in this zone is bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

This event would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.6.6.

l 12-1944 4 g. 34 2

Zones Q.R These zones contain feedwater heater trains "B" and "C," respectively, whereas Zone P contains train "A."

The analysis for th;se zones is the same as for Zone P (with different designations for corresponding high energy lines) except for the following:

1.

Valve HV-1623:

Condensate flow bypass around heaters 3,4,5 is unique to Zone P and shall not be considered a component subject to failure in Zone Q or Zone R.

2.

Valves MV-1367A,B,C are unique to Zone P.

No similar components exist in Zone Q or Zone R.

The " Combined Effects" section of Zone P (III) applies for these zones except as noted above.

I

.1 i

12-194424 A - 35

s l

.~

Zone S I.

High Energy Systems A.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

3" GA-005 a.

Function:

Provides plant heating steam to unit heaters at Elevation 102'.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of heating steam to various unit heaters.

2.

3" GA-010 l

a.

Function:

Provides plant heating steam to unit heaters at Elevations 153' and 171',

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of heating eteam to various unit heaters.

II. Control Components A.

Vents and Drains 1.

LY-1506A,B,C l

a.

Function: I/P converters control air operated drain valves i

LV-1506A,B,C between feedwater heaters 6 and 5 in each of the A,B,C trains of heaters.

b.

Failure Effects:

Closure would result in a loss of some

(<100*F) feedwater heating through the drains system.

1 j

2.

LY-1514A,B,C a.

Function:

Same as, above for LY-1514A,B,C drain valves between heaters 5 and 4.

b.

Failure Effects:

Closure would result in a loss of some i

(<100*F) feedwater heating through the drains system.

3.

LY-1523A,B,C a.

Function:

Same as above for LY-1523A,B,C drain valves between heaters 4 and 3.

b.

Failure Effects:

Closure would result in a loss of some

(<100*F) feedwater heating through the drains syrten.

I 12-194424 A. 36

/

III. Combined Effects A.

As a result of the control components failures, the worst case postulated transient is bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

i i

i I

4 12-194424 g. 37

l i

Zone U I.

High Energy Lines A.

28" AB-001,002,003,004 a.

Function: Carry main steam from reactor vessel to the main stop valves. These are the main steam lines.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of main steam.

Effects of this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

i 2.

14" t,B-005,006 i

s.

Function:

Provide bypass path from main steam lines (upstream of main stop valves) to the main steam bypass valves. Also provide steam to RFP turbines.

4 b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of main steam.

Effects of this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

3.

28" AB-138 J

a.

Function:

Connects four main steam lines upstream of main stop valves.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of main steam.

Effects of this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

B.

16" AF-004 a.

Function:

Common header carries steam from LP Turbines A, l

B, and C to feedwater heaters 4A,B,C.

Also carries steam l

to steam seal evaporator (SSE).

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in this line would result in a loss of inventory through the LP turbines, a loss of some feedwater heating, and a need for Sealing Steam to use the j

alternate hain Steam supply to the SSE.

Loss of steam i

seals has no effect on reactor operation. The consequences of this break are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

i 12-194484 A - 38

2.

2" AF-008 a.

Function:

Common header carries steam from SSE drain tank to feedwater heaters 3A,B,C.

^

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in this line would result in a slight loss (<100*F) of feedwater heating.

The conse-quences of this break are boinded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

3.

14" AF-051,055,059 a.

Function:

Three lines carry steam from HP turbine to feedwater heaters 6A, 6B, and 6C.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in this line would result in a loss of inventory through the HP turbine and a loss of some

(<100'F) feedwater heating. The consequences of this break are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

C.

Vents and Drains l

1.

8" AF-072,073,074 a.

Function: Dump lines from feedwater heaters 6A, 6B, and 6C to condensers AE108, BE108, and CE108, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a transient bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

2.

8" AF-075,076 l

a.

Function: Drain lines from feedwater heaters 6A and SB to feedwater heaters 5A and SB.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a loss of some (<100*F) feedwater heating.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

f I

D.

Condensate l

1.

20" AD-020 Same as Zone P (I.C.1).

E.

Feedwater i

1.

24" AE-013 Same as Zone W (I.A.1).

I 12-194424 A - 39 i

2.

12" AE-015 a.

Function:

Carries feedwater from RFF BP101 outlet to i

condenser BE108.

This is the minimum flow recirculation line.

b.

Effect of Break:

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Con-

~

tainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

F.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

8" CA-001 Same as Zone Z (I.B.1).

2.

4" CA-019 a.

Function:

Carries steam from SSE drain tank to feedwater heaters 3A,B,C.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a loss of some (<100*F) feedwater heating.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

3.

3"/6" CA-040 a.

Function:

Common header carries sealing steam from SSE to RFPTs A,B,C.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in leakage of some turbine steam into the atmosphere, but there would be no effect on the reactor parameters.

4.

3"/6" CA-041 Common header carries sealing s' team from a.

Function:

RFPTs A,B,C to steam packing exhauster condenser.

b. ' Same as F.3 above.

G.

Plant Heating 1.

6" GA-006 Same as Zone N (I.B.1).

12-194424 A - 40

II. Control Components A.

HV-1003 a.

Function:

Main Steam supply to steam seal evaporator HV-1003 is normally open, gate valve upstream of normally closed valves in line to SSE. Main Steam supply is alter-nate supply only.

b.

Failure Effects: The effects of failure of this device are inconsequential.

B.

NV-1370 a.

Function: Normally open motor operated globe valve in line from SSE drain tank to feedwater heaters 3A,B,C.

b.

Failure Effects:

If vilve goes closed, a loss of some

(<100*F) feedwater heating would occur.

C.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling 1.

HV, SV-2469A,B a.

Function:

Mezzanine pipe chase unit cooler cooling water inlet valves.

b.

Failure Effects: Valves could so closed, resulting in loss of area cooling only, i

l III. Combined Effects A.

The Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4) would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.6.4.

B.

The worst case failure combination would result in a turbine trip (due to power / load unbalance) at an elevated power level. This event is discussed in Section 3.0 of this report.

l C.

The Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1) would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

i l

D.

The Steam Systes Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4) would not be exacerbated by the control component l.

failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating l

12-194484 A - 41

safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in i

FSAR 15.6.4.

E.

The Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6) ' would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.6.6.

F/G. The Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1) would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

t 12-194424 A - 42

asf '

.Zo,ne V 9

I.

HighEnergySy5tems A.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

3" GA-005 Same as Zone S (A.1).

B.

Service Compressed Air--

e 1.

3" KA-003

~

a.

Function:

Blow off 1ine to atmosphere, from Service Air Compressor (SAC) outlet li'nes which run from service air compressors 00K107 and 10K107 to aftercooler and moisture separators.

,'b.

Effect of Break: A b'reak in this'line would have no effect on the compressed air system.

2.

4" KA-004 s

a.

Function:

Outlet line fros-SAC 00K107 and 10K107 to afcercooler and moisture sepaiator.

Effect of Break:

If a break were to occur, a check valve b.-

downstress would prevent scessive loss of air and the backup service air, compressor engages.

C.

Instrument Compress =J Air 1.

6" KC-003 a.

Function:

Outlet from emergency instrument air (EIA) compressor (10K100) to aftercooler and moisture separator, b.

Effect of,. Break This systert is not used during normal operation.

A break would have no effect on reactor parameters.

II. Control Components A.

Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling (RACS) 1.

TSH-7570,7572 a.

Function:

Senses high EIA compressor cooling water outlet temperature; high temperature activates a compressor trip.

b.

Failute Effects:

Since this system is normally inopera-tive,. failure of this device is inconsequential.

12-194484 A - 43

T T

1 2.

TSH-7622 a.

Function:

Senses EIA compressor 10K100 ' oil temperature.

~

Eigh temperature, activates alare, b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally inopera-tive, failure of this device is inconsequential.

3.

TCV-7625 a.

Function: Controls flow from RACS pumps to IIA. tercooler and moisture separator 10E100.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is norms 11y inopera-tive, failure of this device is inconsequential.

4 B.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling (TACS) 1.

TV, TY-2415A,B 1

l a.

Function:

Controls outlet flow from RFPT lube oil coolers CIE118 and C2E118 (two out of six coolers).

b.

Failure Effects:

If the valve closes, there will be a l,

slight loss of RTPT lube oil cooling.

This loss could result in a reactor feed pump turbine trip after a long delay.

7

}

2.

PSV-2434 i

a.

Function:

Pressure safety valve from inlet to SAC 00K107.

I J

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this device is inconsequential.

3.

PCV-2458 I

i a.

Function:

Pressure-reducing regulatory on inlet to SAC l

KA-10K107.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this component causes backup SAC loop to engage.

1 C.

Compressed Air / Breathing Air

{

i 1.

PSL-7567 l

a.

Function: Senses low RACS cooling water inlet pressure, on line from RACS pumps to EIA compressor 10K100; low pressure activates a compressor trip.

i l

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

a 12-1944" A - 44 4

i

I 4 g s,

+

t 2.

PSH-7586 a.

Function:

Senses high E.'A compressor air pressure. High t

pressure activates a compressor trip.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

s 3.

SV-7592

?

a.

Function:

Emergency air compressor unloader machine-mounted solenoid valve.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this' system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

4.

TSH-7593 a.

Function: ' Senses high EIA compressor air temperature; high temperature activates compressor trip.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this~ system is normally off, failure of this device is. inconsequential.

5.

PSH-7597A,B a.

Function: Senses low instrument air pressure on instrument

~

air supply header 3" JDD-002.

Low pressure closes valve HV-7596 on service air supply line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Tailure of this device would result in loss of control of. HV-7596; if the valve were to remain open, a loss of instrument air could result.

6.

ME, MSH-7604 a.

Function:

Senses high moisture on instrument air dryer outlet; high moisture trips dryers.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure could cause moisture to accumu-late in instrument air lines.

This would att adversely affect reactor parameters in the short term.

'7.

PSL-7606A,B a.

Function:

Senses instrument air dryer left (A) and right (B) chamber outlet pressures. Low pressure activates dryer trip.

b.

Failure Effects:

Due to redundant systems, failure of these devices is inconsequential.

l 9

12-194424 A - 45 i

8.

SV-7607 a.

Function:

Controls f' low on instrument air dryer regenera-tion bypass line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this device is inconsequen-tial.

9.

PDSH-7610 a.

Function:

Senses instrument air dryer inlet and outlet pressure differential.

b.

Failure Effects: Dae to redundant systems, failure of this device is inconsequential.

10.

PSDH-7611 f

a.

Function: Senses instrument air prefilter inlet and outlet l

pressure differential.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this device is inconsequen-tial.

11.

HV, SV-7612 a.

Function:

Senses instrument air afterfilter pressure differential.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of these devices is inconsequen-tial.

12. HV, SV-7614 a.

Function: Valves control flow through instrument air dryer right chamber purge line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of these devices is inconsequen-tial.

13.

HV, SV-7615 a.

Function:

Same as HV-7614 and SV-7614 above, except for left chamber purge line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of these devices is inconsequen-tial.

14.

HV, SV-7616 a.

Function: Normally cissed valve controls flow into instru-ment air dryer right. chamber.

12-1944 4 A - 46 2

~

b.

Failure Effects: Failure of these valves could result in a loss of regeneration ability for the instrument air dryer train.

Due to redundant

system, failure in inconsequential.

15. HV, SV-7617 a.

Function: Normally open valve on left dryer chamber inlet similar to HV-7616 and SV-7616 above.

b.

Failure Effects:

Due to redundant systems, failure is inconsequential.

16.

FE, FSH, FSL-7618 a.

Function:

Sense flow on instrument air dryer inlet. High flow activates an alarm and the standby dryer.

Low flow opens discharge valve.

l b.

Failure Effects: Failure of these devices are inconsequen-tial due to redundant systems.

I 17.

FSLL-7618 a.

Function:

Senses flow on instrument air dryer inlet. Low flow trips the dryer.

b.

Failure Effects: Due te redundant systems, failure of th.s device is inconsequential.

18. HV-7618 a.

Function:

Controls outlet flow from instrument air after-filter.

b.

Failure Effects: Due to redundant systems, failure of this device is inconsequential.

19.

PY-7618 a.

Function:

Four way-three position valve operator controls dryer outlet batterfly valve HV-7618.

This device allows the valve to fail as is.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this device is inconsequen-tial.

20.

SV-7618A,B a.

Function: Supplies air via four-way valve operator PY-7618 j

to control valve HV-7618.

~

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of the<n devices is inconsequen-l tial.

12-1944 4 A - 47 2

- -. ~ -.

21. HS-7619 a.

Function: Switch on control panel 0KB-0C192.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure could result in loss of entire panel 0KB-0C192, and a subsequent loss of regeneration ability for the air dryer train.

In the long term, this could result in accumulation of moisture in the instrument air lines. However, there would be no short term effect on reactor parameters.

22. PS-7669 a.

Function: Senses EIA compressor 10K100 pressure, transmits signals to control panel 10C189.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

23. XV-7674 a.

Function:

Emergency air compressor intercooler blowdown valve.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

24. HS-7766 a.

Function:

EIA compressor 10K100 load / unload switch on 10C189 panel.

b.

Failure Effects:

Since this system is normally off, failure of this device is inconsequential.

III. Combined Effects A/B/C. None of the line breaks would be of any consequence by themselves.

However, when combined with the failed control components, a possible loss of Compressed Air Service and Breathing Air Service may result.

The effects of this loss are bounded by the Loss of Instrument Air j

event (FSAR 15.9.6, Event 8).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.9.6.

2 12-1944 4 A - 48

~-.

Zone W I.

High Energy Systems A.

14" AF-055 a.

Function:

High pressure turbine extraction steam to feedwater heater 6B.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory through the break and loss of some (<100*F) feedwater heating capability.

B.

Vents and Drains 1.

8" AF-073 a.

Function:

Dump line from feedwater heater 6B to condenser IBE108.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory through the break and loss of some (<100'F) feedwater heating capability through the drains system.

2.

12" AF-076 a.

Function: Drain line from feedwater heater 6B to feedwater heater SB.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some inventory through the break and loss of some (<100*F) feedwater heating capability through the drains system.

C.

18" AE-001 a.

Function:

Common header supplying feedwater to feedwater heaters 6A,B,C.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of feedwater flow to vessel.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

1 2.

16"/18"/24" AE-013 a.

Function:

Common header from the discharge of the sixth feedwater heaters supplying feedwater to vessel.

b.

Effect of Break: Same as above (C.1).

12-1944 4 A - 49 2

3.

18"/24" AE-032 a.

Function:

Feedwater flow from common header AE-001 to feedwater heater 6B.

b.

Effect of Break: -Same as above (C.1).

II. Control Components A.

Vents and Drains 1.

HV, SV-1502B1 a.

Function:

Solenoid valve controls HV-1502B1 on startup vent from feedwater heater 6B to condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

No adverse effect if vent valve were to go open or cannot be opened during startup or normal power operation.

2.

HV, SV-1502B2 a.

Function:

Solenoid valve controls HV-1502B2 on operating vent bypass line (main line from feedwater heater 6B to condenser).

b.

Failure Effects:

No adverse effect if vent is in either the open or closed position.

3.

HV-1503B a.

Function: Motor-operated isolation valve on dump line from feedwater heater 6B to condenser. Upstream of closed valve LV-1505B.

b.

Failure Effects:

Valve is normally open.

No adverse effect if valve goes closed.

)

4.

LT-1505B a.

Function: Measures level in feedwater heater 6B. Provides signal which controls LV-1505B on dump line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Some loss (<100*F) in feedwater heating through the drains system if valve opens during power operations.

5.

LT-1506B a.

Function: Measures level in feedwater heater 6B.

Provides signal which controls LV-1506B on heater 6B drain line to heater 5B.

12-1944 4 A - 50 2

1 I

l b.

Failure Effects:

Some loss (<100*F) in feedwater heating through the drains system if valve closes during power J

operations.

l

}

6.

HV-1508B Motor operated isolation valve on FW heater 6B a.

Function:

drain line.

b.

Failure Effects:

Some loss (<100'F) in feedwater heating through the drains system if valve closes during normal power operations.

7.

LT-1542B,1558B a.

Function:

Control HP Extraction Steam to feedwater heater 6B and feedwater heater dump valve LV-1505B.

b.

Failure Effects:

Some loss (<100'F) in feedwater heating capability in heater train B if valve goes closed.

B.

IV, SV, 2S-1754,1785 a.

Function:

Startup reactor water level control valves.

from common feedwater header (downstream of sixth Bypass feed heaters) directly to vessel bypassing sixth feedwater heaters.

Both valves are normally closed globe valves.

b.

Failure Effects:

If the valves go open, a slight. loss

(<100'F) in feedwater heating would occur.

C.

Reactor Recirculation

~

1.

FE-N001A,B J

a.

Function:

Taps for PDT-N001A,B.

Provide feedwater flow measurement to feedwater control loop for three element control.

b.

Failure Effects:

Loss of flow signal (0% feedwater flow) would cause recirculation pump speed runback and maximum feedwater flow demand.

III. Combined Effects A/B. A break in high pressure turbine extraction to heater 6B could cause an extraction isolation of feedwater heater IBE106.

This transient This is bounded by a Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

break could also result in the turbine extraction valve failing as is l

The (open), resulting in a turbine trip froni power / load unbalance.

worst case combination would be a turbine trip at an elevated power i

l 12-194424 A - 51

level due to the loss of feedwater heating.

This transient is discussed in Section 3.0 of this report.

C.

The Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6) would not be exacerbated by the control system compon-ent failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a miti-gating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as dis-cussed.in FSAR 15.6.6.

l 5

l l

l 12-1944 4 A - 52 2

l i

.~

Zone X I.

Iligh Energy Systems A.

14" AF-059 Same as Zone W (I.A), except from heater 6C.

B.

Vents and Drains 1.

8" AF-074 Same as Zone W (I.B.1), except from heater 6C to condenser ICE 108.

2.

12" AF-077 Same as Zone W (I.B.2), except from heater 6C to heater SC.

C.

Condensate 1.

16" AD-020 a.

Function: Feedwater supply from common header to feedwater Pump C.

i b.

Effect of Break:

A feedwater line break would result in a loss of feedwater flow to the vessel. The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Cutside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

D.

18"/24" AE-033 a.

Function:

Feedwater flow from common header AE-001 to feedwater heater 6B.

i b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of feedwater flow to the vessel.

1 i

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

2.

16"/18"/24" AE-013 Same as Zone W (I.C.2).

l 3.

18" AE-001 Same as Zone W (I.C.1).

i i

12-1944 4 A - 53 2

E.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

3" GA-007 a.

Function:

Supply heating steam from discharge of unit heaters on Elevations 137' and 171' to other unit heaters.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of space heating capability in some areas.

II. Control Components A.

Vents and Drains 1.

MV, SV-1502C1 Same as Zone W (II.A.1), except heater 6C.

2.

HV, SV-1502C2 Same as Zone W (II.A.2), except heater 6C.

3.

HV-1503C Same as Zone W (II.A.3), except heater 6C.

4.

LT-1505C Same as Zone W (II.A.4), except heater 6C.

5.

LT-1506C Same as Zone W (II.A.5), except heater 6C.

6.

HV-1508C Same as Zone W (II.A.6), except heater 6C.

7.

LT-1542C,1558C Same as Zone W (II.A.7), except heater 6C.

III. Combined Effects A/B. Same as Zone W (III.A), except affecting the "C" feedwater heater train.

C/D. The Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6) would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in l

FSAR 15.6.6.

12-1944 4 A - 54 2

E.

The combined effects are bounded by the Loss of Feedwater Heating event (FSAR 15.1.1).

An additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.1.1.

1 2

12-1944 4 A - 55

.~

Zone Y l

I.

High Energy Systems A.

14" AF-051 1

Same as Zone W (I.A), except heater 6A.

B.

Vents and Drains 1.

8" AF-072 Same as Zone W (I.B.1), except heater 6A to condenser IAE108.

2.

12" AF-075 Same as Zone W (I.B.2), except heater 6A to heater SA.

C.

18" AE-001 Same as Zone W (I.C.1).

2.

18" AE-013 Same as Zone W (I.C.2).

3'.

18"/24" AE-031 a.

Function:

Feedwater flow from common header AE-001 to feedwater heater 6A.

a.

Effect of Break:

Loss of feedwater flow to the vessel.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

D.

Plant Heating Steau 1.

4" GA-006 a.

Function: Supply heating steam to various units heaters on Elevation 137.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of space heating capability in some areas.

2.

4" GA-007 Same as Zone X (E.1).

12-1944 4 A - 56 2

4 II. Control Components A.

Vents and Drains 1.

HV, SV-1502A1 Same as Zone W (II.A.1), except heater 6A.

1 2.

HV, XV-1502A2 Same as Zone W (II.A.2), except heater 6A.

3.

HV-1503A Same as Zone W (II.A.3), except heater 6A.

4.

LT-1505A Same as Zone W (II.A.4), except heater 6A.

5.

LT-1506A Same as Zone W (II.A.5), except heater 6A.

6.

HV-1508A Same as Zone W (II.A.6), except heater 6A.

7.

LT-1542A,1558A Same as Zone W (II.A.7), except heater 6A.

III. Combined Effects A/B. Same as Zone W (III.A), except affecting the "A" heater.

C/D. The Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment ever.t would not be exacerbated by the control component failures in this zone.

An

~

additional single failure in a mitigating safety system would also result in a bounded event, as discussed in FSAR 15.6.6.

E.

Same as Zone X (III.E).

4 12-1944 4 A - 57 2

Zone Z I.

High Energy Systems A.

8',' AF-017 a.

Function: Extraction steam supply to steam seal evaporator (SSE).

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of normal steam supply to SSE, backup main steam supply is automatically available.

B.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

8" CA-001 a.

Function: Main steam supply to SSE.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of main steam through the break.. No effect on SSE, extraction steam supply is normal supply.

2.

6"/8" CA-012 Same as Zone N (E.1).

3.

12" VAT-016 a.

Function: Main steam supply to SSE.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some main steam through the break.

No effect on SSE, extraction steam is normal steam supply.

4.

12" VBT-010 a.

Function: Sealing steam discharge from SSE.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of turbine steam seals, resulting in some steam leakage through the turbine seals.

Only long term consequences would result.

5.

12"/16" VBT-050 a.

Function: Sealing steam discharge from SSE.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of turbine steam seals, resulting in some steam leakage through the turbine seals.

Only long term consequences would result.

12-194424 A - 58

u h

II. Control Components A.

Turbine Sealing Steam i

1.

HV-1991 a.

Function: Motor operated gate valve on main steam line to steam seal evaporator (SSE).

b.

failure Effects:

No effect. if valve goes closed during normal operation.

Normal supply for steam seals is from Extraction Steam.

2.

PY-1992; PIC, PV-1992A,B a.

Function: High pressure selector PV-1992 receives pressure readings from SSE steam inlet and SSE.

Controls normally closed valves PV-1992A and PV-1992B in main steam supply to SSE.

b.

Failure Effects:

No adverse effects if these valves were to open during normal operation.

3.

LIC, LT, LV-2003 a.

Function:

Heasure level in SSE - controls normally open LV-2003 on line from secondary condensate pump discharge.

b.

Failure Effects:

Closure of valve results in loss of sealing steam to main turbine and RFPTs, long term conse-quences only.

4.

LIC, LT-2004 a.

Function:

Measure level in SSE drain tank to control LV-2004 on line from SSE drain tank to condenser. Used for drain tank level control, b.

Failure Effects:

No adverse consequences result if valve opens (negligible loss of feedwater heating) or remains closed during normal operation.

5.

LIC, LT-2005 a.

Fa2ction:

Controls LV-1356A,B,C on lines from SSE drain tank to FW heaters 3A,B,C.

Provides for drain tank level control.

b.

Failure Effects: Negligible loss in feedwater heating will occur if LV-1356's close during normal operation.

I t

I l-12-194424 A - 59

~

6.

PDISH, SV-2012; SV-2012A,B a.

Function:

Measure differential.between SSE inlets from

~

feedwater heater 4 extraction and main steam.

Controls solenoid operated valve for control of check valves XV-2012A,B in line from heater 4 extraction to SSE.

b.

Failure Effects: Failure of PDISH could close bleeder trip valves XV-2012A,B, upon which main steam supply to SSE might be initiated. No adverse consequences would result.

7.

HV-2013 s.

Function:

Motor operated valve on line from secondary condensate pump discharge to SSE.

b.

Failure Effects:

If valve closes, sealing steam will be lost, which will result in only long term consequences.

8.

PIC-2038 a.

Function:

Measures pressure on line from SSE to seal headers and controls PV-2038 on line from auxiliary steam to seal headers.

b.

Failure Effects:

Opening of valve during normal operation will have no adverse effects on sealing steam.

III. Combined Effects A/B. A Main Steam supply to the steam seal evaporator line break could result in 'a loss of steam seals to the main turbine shaft seals, control valve, bypass valve seals, and reactor feedwater turbine seals. This would result in steam leakage from the turbines into the Turbine Building. There would be no impact on the critical reactor parameters.

l I

12-1944 4 A - 60 2

l l

- -~

i l

Zone BB I.

High Energy Systems A.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

3"/6" GA-001 a

Function: Auxiliary Steam supply to unit heaters on Eleva-s tion 171'.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of plant heating capability through units heaters downstream of heaters on Elevation 171'.

2.

2" GA-007 a.

Function:

Exhaust steam from unit heaters on Eleva-tion 171' to unit heaters on Elevation 102'.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of some plant heating capability through unit heaters.

(

II. Control Components A.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling 1.

PDISL-2670A,B,C,D s.

Function:

Measure flow of TACS water to chiller conden-sers.

Trip water chiller compressor motors on low flow of TACS water, resulting in loss of chiller operation.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would result in a loss of chiller operation.

B.

Chilled Wster 1.

FT, FSHL-9487A,B,C; HS-9487A2,B2,C2 a.

Function:

Trip chilled water circulation water pumps IAP161, IBP161, ICP161 on high/ low flow conditions.

b.

Failure Effects:

Chilled water would be lost on trip of Pumps.

2.

HV, SV-9503A-D; HS-9503A2,B2,C2,D2 a.

Function:

Control discharge of chilled water from water chillers 1AK111, IBK111, ICK111, IDK111.

b.

Failure Effects:

If valves close, loss of chilled water would result.

12-194424 A - 61

III. Combined Effects

'A.

An Auxiliary Steam line break could result in loss of chilled water circulation pumps AP161, BP161, and CP161 and chillers AE111 through DK111 due to loss of control panel 10C152 and associated instrumenta-tion. This would result in a reactor scram in 30 minutes due to loss

.of drywell coolers and subsequent high drywell pressure. Additional reactor scrans are accommodated in the reactor duty cycles estima-tion.

No additional single failure in a mitigating safety system could exacerbate this event.

9 l

l l

12-1944 4 A - 62 2

Zone CC I.

High Energy Systems A.

8" AB-006 a.

Function:

Carries steam from 28" sain steam lines to bypass valves.

Also carries bypass steam to steam seal evaporator (SSE).

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of main steam. The consequences of this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

2.

42" AC-022,023,024 a.

Function:

Carry ster.m from moisture separator AT104 to LP Turbines A, B, and C, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break:

A break in one of these lines would result in a turbine trip on low condenser vacuum.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

B.

Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) Turbine Steam 1

2"/10" AC-057; 6"/10" W-005,006,007 a.

Function:

Common header carries low pressure steam from moisture separator BT-104 to RFPT AS105, BS105, and CS105 steam chests, b.

Effect of Break:

There would be no isusediate effect as a result of this break.

Switchover to the HP supply for the RFP turbines would make up for the loss of the LP supply, and the loss of inventory would result in only long term consequences.

2.

8" FW-001 a.

Function:

Common header carries high pressure steam from 14" sain turbine bypass to RFP turbines AS105, BS105, and CS105 steam chests.

b.

Effect of Break: Loss of main steam. The consequences of 4

this break are bounded by the Steam System Piping Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.4).

I i

I e

12-1944 4 A - 63 2

_ _ _ = _ _, _ _. _ _ _ _ _

3.

8" W-029 1

a.

Function:

Common heeder supplying startup testing steam from auxiliary boilers to RFPT AS105, BS105, and CS105 steam chests.

b.

Effect of Break: A line break could abort startup testing.

I After startup, removable spool pieces separate the steam supply from the steam chests; a line break would result in only long term consequences.

C.

Condensate 1.

16"/20" AD-020 a.

Function:

Common header from fifth feedwater heaters supplying condensate to RFP AP101, BP101, and CP101 suction and to startup bypass line.

Feedwater heaters 3, 4, and 5 bypass is provided through valve HV-1623.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a feedwater line break event.

The consequences of this break are j

bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Con-tainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

D.

4"/16"/18" AE-001-a.

Function: Common header carries feedwater from RFPs AP101, BP101, and CP101 to feedwater heaters 6A, 6B, and 6C.

Also bypasses sixth feedwater heaters through startup bypass valves LV-1785 and LV-1754.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a feedwater line break. The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Cont'ainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

i 2.

12"/18" AE-005,006,007 a.

Function: Carries RFP AP101, BP101, and CP101 discharge to common header leading into sixth feedwater heaters.

Also

)

carries feedwater through minimum flow recirculation lines to condensers AE108, BE108, and CE108, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break: The worst case line break would result in 4

a feedwater line break event.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Containment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

12-1944 4 A - 64 2

~.

\\

f 3.

16"/18"/24"/30" AE-013 s.

Function:

Common header from sixth feedwater heaters

. supplying feedwater to the vessel ~.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a feedwater line break event.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Con-tainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

4.

12" AE-014,015,016 I

a.

Function:

Carries RFP turbine exhaust from RFP AP101, BP101, and CP101 outlets to condensers AE108, BE108, and CD108, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break:

Failure of one of these lines would result in a reactor feed pump turbine trip on low exhaust vacuum and a main turbine trip on loss of condenser vacuum.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Turbine Trip event (FSAR 15.2.7).

5.

20" AE-017,018,019 a.

Function:

Carry feedwater from fifth feedwater heater header to RFPs AP101, BP101, and CP101, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break:

A line break would result in a feedwater line break event.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Con-tainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

6.

18"/24" AE-031,032,033 s.

Function:

Supply feedwater from 18" RFP header to feed-water heaters 6A, B, and C, respectively.

b.

Effect of Break: A line break would result in a feedwater line break event.

The consequences of this break are bounded by the Feedwater Line Break Outside Primary Con-tainment event (FSAR 15.6.6).

E.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

8" CA-012 a.

Function: Supplies sealing steam from auxiliary boilers to HP turbine and LP turbines A, B, and C for startup, r

b.

Effect of Break: A break in this line may abort a startup.

All other effects would be inconsequential.

\\

12-1944 4 A - 65 2

l

2.

12"/16" VBT-050; 8"/12" VBT-010 a.

Function: Carries sealing steam from SSE to HP turbir.e, LP i

turbines A, B,

and C, and RFPT AS105, BS105, and CS105.

b.

Effect of Break: A line break during startup could abort the startup.

During power operation, a line break would result in a steam leakage through the turbines to the atmosphere.

However, there would be no effect on the reactor parameters.

F.

Plant Heating Steam 1.

2"/3" GA-003 a.

Function:

Supplies steam to unit heaters on Eleva-tion 137'.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of plant heating ability of some unit heaters.

2.

1\\"/3"/4" GA-007 a.

Function:

Collects steam from unit heaters at Eleva-tions 137' and 171'.

b.

Effect of Break:

Loss of plant heating ability of some unit heaters.

II.

Control Systems A.

Main Generator 1.

RT-6311; VT-6312; AT-6313 l

a.

Function:

Provide a generator trip signal on generator field temperature, voltage, or current, respectively.

b.

Failure Effects: The worst case failure would be a trip of the main generator.

B.

Main Turbine i

1.

TT-1064A,B,C; TY-1064A,B a.

Function:

Control the discharge of the exhaust hood spray to the three LP turbines.

j b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be the absence of hood spray, resulting in a temperature increase of the exhaust hood.

This function is used during low loads, and could abort a startup if lost.

2 12-1944 4 A - 66

.~

2.

SV-7103A-F; 7104A-F; 7105A-C; 7106A-F; 7107A-C a.

Function: These are solenoid test valves for the intercept and intermediate stop valves to the three LP turbines.

b.

Failure Effects: Worst case failures involve closing from one up to all six combined intermediate valves, which would result in a turbine trip.

3.

LSHH-1027A,B; 1028A,B; 1029A,B a.

Function:

Three switches per moisture separator provide a turbine trip when two out of three level switches register high-high level in either moisture separator.

b.

Failure Effects: Failure of any two level switches on one moisture separator may result in a turbine trip.

These switches could also fail in a manner that would incapaci-tate a turbine trip.

4.

LIC, LT-1039A,B,1040A,B a.

Function:

Control a normally closed, fail open line from the moisture separators to the condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the open position, which would result in a slight decrease in feedwater temperature.

(Loss of heating <100*F.)

5.

TE-7011A1,A2,B1,B2,C1,C2; TSH-7012A-C,7013A-C,7014A-C a.

Function:

Three switches per LP turbine provide a turbine trip when two out of three temperature switches register high temperature in any LP turbine exhaust hood.

)

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of any two temperature switches on one LP turbine may result in a turbine trip.

These switches could also fail in a manner that would incapaci-tate a turbine trip.

6.

HV-1006 a.

Function:

This is a normally open, fail closed, motor operated valve on the high pressure steam supply to the RFP turbines.

b.

Failure Effects:

.During startup, closure of this valve would result in a loss of feedwater flow.

Following startup, up to about 40% turbine load, this HP steam supply is throttled such that the LP steam supply from the cross-around piping is the main steam supply to the RFP turbine.

Above 40% turbine load, the HP stop valve is closed and RFP turbine steam is supplied entirely from the crossaround 12-1944 4 A - 67 2

i-l

l line.

Failure of this valve would be inconsequential any time after startup.

C.

Vents and Drains 1.

LY, SV-1451A a.

Function:

Control a normally closed, fail open valve in the line between feedwater heater 2A and drain. cooler 2A to the "A" condenser.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of this valve to the open posi-tion would result in the loss of level control in the 2A heater which leads to a slight increase in feedwater temperature.

2.

LY-1505A a.

Function:

Controls a normally closed, fail open valve on the bypass line from feedwater heater 6A (shell side) to condenser A.

b.

Failure Effects: Worst case failure would be in the open position which would result in a slight loss (<100*F) in feedwater heating.

3.

LY-1532A a.

Function:

Controls a normally open, fail closed valve in the drain line between feedwater heaters 3A and 2A.

b.

Failure Effects: Worst case failure would be in the closed position which would result in a slight loss (<100*F) in feedwater heating.

D.

Condensate 1.

PSH-1056B,C a.

Function:

Provide a turbine trip signal on high condenser pressure.

b.

Failure Effects:

Failure of either pressure switch may result in a turbine trip.

These switches could also fail in a manner that would incapacitate a turbine trip.

2.

PT-1664A-C a.

Function:

Provide a signal to the recirculation system to initiate recirculation flow runback on low pressure, b.

Failure Effects: Failure of any one transmitter may result l

in recirculation runback.

These transmitters could also fail in a manner that would incapacitate a recire runback.

9 f

12-1944 4 A - 68 2

I E.

FE-1755A-C, 1770A-C; FT-N011A-C, 1755A-C, 1770A-C, 1800A-C, 1801A-C; FY-1783A; HV-1744A-C, 1753A-C, 1768A-C, 1769A-C, 1772B-C, 1781A-C, 1782A-C, 1797A-C; LY-1754, -1785; PSIDI-1788 1-3; PSLL-1777Al-3, B1-3, Cl-3; PSV-1758A; TE, TIC, TV-1780A-C, 1796A-C; ZE-1744A-C

~

a.

Function: Due to the number of feedwater system components

.affected by a high energy line break, only the overall failure effects will be detailed.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure effects of these components would be any combination of the following:

O to 100% loss of feedwater flow through valve closure or RFP turbine trip Initiation of recirculation flow runback Slight decrease in feedwater temperature (<100*F)

A rod block signal originating from the feedwater control system F.

Turbine Auxiliaries Cooling 1.

TIC-2415B,C a.

Function:

Control normally open, fail open valves in two of three RFP turbine lube oil cooler lines.

4 b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be the closure of the cooling water inlet valves that would lead to increased RFP turbine lube oil temperature and an 4

eventual RFP turbine trip.

2.

TIC-2423 a.

Function: Controls a normally open, fail open valve in the main turbine lube oil cooler line.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would lead to increased main turbine lube oil temperature.

This would have only long-term consequences.

l 3.

TIC, TT-2625 a.

Function:

Control a normally open, fail open valve in the generator hydrogen cooler line.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would lead to increased generator hydrogen temperature, resulting in only long-term consequences.

2 12-1944 4 A - 69

=.

4.

TIC, TT-2661-a.

Function:

Control a normally open, fail open valve in the turbine EHC hydraulic fluid cooler line.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would lead to increased EHC hydraulic fluid temperature, resulting in only -long-term conse-quences.

5.

HS-2662 a.

Function: Controls a normally open valve in a line supply-ing cooling water to the turbine EHC hydraulic fluid coolers, the main turbine lube oil coolers, the iso phase bus coolers, the generator stator coolers, the - generator hydrogen coolers, and the alterrex air cooler.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would lead to a main turbine trip on high generator stator temperature.

G.

Lube Oil 1.

HS-3076-10 to 14, 3082-1 to 7; HV-3076-8,9; PSL-3075-1 to 7, 3080-1 to 9; PSV-3077-1 to 9; SV-3076-1 to 7; TSH-7083 a.

Function:

These components provide control of the high pressure lift pumps which assist in rolling the turbine /

generator shaft assembly during startup.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be to abort startup.

During power operation, there would be no ccuse-quences in failing any combination of these components.

2.

PSL-7000A,B, 7002A-C, 7003A-C a.

Function:

These components provide a turbine trip signal on low thrust bearing pressure.

b.

Failure Effects: Failure of any pressure switch may result in a turbine trip.

These switches could also fail in a manner that would incapacitate a turbine trip.

3.

HS-3146A to C, 3172A to C, 3176A2, A3, B2, B3, C2, C3, 3177A2, A3, B2, B3, C2, C3, 3178A2, A3, B2, B3, C2, C3; PSL-3151A1 to 3, B1 to 3, C1 to 3, 3164A to C; PSLL-3162A1 to 3, B1 to 3, C1 to 3 i

a.

Function: These components provide control of the lube oil to the RFP turbines.

b.

Failure Effects: Failure of these components may result in trip of the RFP turbines.

These switches could also fail in a manner that would incapacitate au RFP turbine trip.

2 12-1944 4 A - 70

4 i

s r,

'4.

SV-3187A to C, 3188A to C, 3195A to C, 3196A to C, 3197A to C a.

Function:

These are test trip solenoid and control power failure trip solenoid valves on the RFP turbines.

. Failure Effects:

The worst case failure of these compon -

b.

eats would result in a trip of'the RFP turbines.

5.

TT-2415A to C a.

Function:. Control normally open, fail open valves on the RFP turbine lube. oil cooler lines.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would lead to increased RFP turbine lube oil temperature and eventual RFP turbine trip.

6.

TT-2423

a. - Function: Controls a normally open, fail open valve on the sain turbine shaft lube oil cooler line.

b~.'

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the j

^

closed direction that would lead to increased turbine shaft lube oil temperature, resulting in only long-term conse-

~

I quences...

. ~,

7.

PSL-3176B s.

Function: _A low RFP turbine lube oil pressure signal which i

controls start of the emergency lube oil pump.

'b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be to obviate the starting of the emergency pump, which would have only long-term consequences.

H.

Turbine Sealing Steam 1.

HV-1999, 2001; PCV-2000 l

/

a.

Function: Valves on line supplying sealing steam to the HP turbine and the three LP turbines. ;

b.

Failure Effects:

The worstc case f failure would be in the closed direction, ceasing sealing steam flow. Radioactive steam leakage from the Main steam systen through the turbine seals would alert the operator of this occurrence but would result in no adverse. effectsc on reactor para-meters.

2.

HV-2037; PIC, PV-2038 l

a.

Function:

Controls two "in-series" - valves supplying an l

alternate source of sealing steam for turbine steam seals

/

l

.=

l' 2

12-1944 4 A - 71

g

~>

u a

=

a a

u from Auxiliary Steam; one valve is normally closed, fail open, and the other is normally open.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the

' closed direction that would result in no adverse conse-quences.

Only the alternate steam supply is affected.

3.

PIC-1992A,B a.

Function:

Control two rormally closed, fail open "in parallel" valves supplying mit alternate source of sealing steam from main steam, b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in the closed direction that would result in no adverse consequences.

I..

RFP Turbine Steam 1.

MS-3721A to C, 3738A to C, 3739A2, 3740A to C, 3745A to C, 3746A i

to C, 3747A to C, 3748A to C, 3757A to C, 3770A to C, 3778A to C; HV-1751A to C,1752A to C,1760A to C, 1761A to C, 1762A to C,1767A to C,1772A to C, 3714A to C, 3719; PSH-3709A, 3715A1 to 3, B1 to 3, C1 to 3, 3773A to C; SE-3749A1, A2, C1, C2, 3755A1, A2, B1, B2, 3775A to C, 3776A to C; SITS-3775A to C; STS-3755A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2; SV-1762A to C, 3737A; SY-3775A to C, 3776A to C; TSH-3712A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3, 3759A to C; XSS-3775A to C; XZS-3754A to C; ZE-3754A to C; ZITS-3754A to C; ZS-1762A, 1794A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3, 3763B,C, 3764B,C; ZY-3749A to C, 3754A to C a.

Function:

Due to the number of RPF turbine steam system components affected by a high energy line break, only the overall failure effects will be detailed.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure effects of these components could be any combination of the following:

i O to 100% loss of feedwater flow through reduced RFP turbine steam flow, feedwater control system logic, and/or RFP turbine trip Initiation of recirculation flow runback A rod block signal originating from the feedwater control system J.

Nuclear Boiler 1.

PDT-N002A,B a.

Function:

Provide a differential pressure signal to the feedwater control system to indicate feedwater flow.

l i

12-1944" A - 72

- -. _ _,,, ~..,,

a. c

,m.,

l t

4 b.

' Failure Effects: The worst case failure effect would be to run back the recirculation flow based on low feedwater flow signal.

i K.

Reactor Recirculation 1.

HS-8283A,B; PSL-8298A,B, 8299A,Bv 8300A,B, 8301A,B a.

Function:

Provide the means to start the MG set emergency lube oil pumps A and B, respectively.

b.

Failure Effects:

The worst case failure would be in a manner that would incapacitate the emergency pump start.

However, the normal MG set lube oil pumps should be operating.

III. Combined Effects The following if a summary of the non-safety control component failure effects as detailed in II above:

Control System Worst Case Failure Effects A.

Main Generator hain generator trip B.

Main Turbine 1.

Main turbine trip /no turbine trip

2.

Feedwater temperature decrease 3.

Loss of feedwater flow during startup C.

Vents and Drains Feedwater temperature increase or decrease 1.

Main turbine trip /no' turbine trip

D.

Condensate' 2.

Recire runback /no recirc runback

E.