ML20094H048

CFR50.59 Annual Operating Rept to NRC 1991

ML20094H048
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/31/1991
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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ML20094H047	List: ML20094H041 ML20094H048
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Download: ML20094H048 (79)

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3 TENNESSEEVALLEYAUTHORITY NUCLEARGENERATION l

SEQU0YAHhT0LEARPLANI UNITS 1AND2 i

100FR50.59 ANALOPERATINGREPORT l

TOTHE hT0LEARREGULATORY00.91SSION JANUARY 1,1991-DECEEER31,1991 DOCKETNMER50-327AND50-328 LICENSENMERDPR-77ANDDPR-79:

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 10 CFR 50.59 NRC ANhUAL OPERATING REPORT 1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS Yage Preface Acronym List I.

Summary of Facility Changes Modifications 1

Temporary Alterations 49 II.

Summary of Procedure Changes 54 III.

Summary of Special Tests 61 IV.

Other Safety Evaluations 63 V.

Occupational Exposure Data 66 PL210201/829

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 10 CFR 50.59 NRC ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT 1991 4

The following criteria establish the bases for the items contained in this report.

I.

Facility Changes A.

Modifications During 1991, Sequoyah continued the process of reviewing ECNs/DCNs to verify field-complete status in the plant and make appropriate revisions to the SAR. A number of these ECNs/DCNs had been previously completed but are being reported in this annual report as a result of the ECN/DCN backlog closure activities associated with the unresolved Item 327, 328/89-18-02. A cross-check of these ECNs/DCNs and previous annual operating reports revealed that some of these ECNs/DCNs had been reported in the past. Only the ECNs/DCNs not previously reported are included in this report.

B.

Temporary Alterations Temporary alterations to the facility that required a safety evaluation are reported if they were written and approved in 1991. A temporary alteration is documented on a TACF. Previously reported alterations still in existence are listed by their TACF number only.

II.

Procedures Procedures that were revised have been included in this report based on the June 1989 revision of Standard Practice SQAL19.- This-revision instituted the use of a safety assessment concurrent with the screening review.

If the safety assessment on a procedure indicated the need for a safety evaluation, the procedure change is reported.

III. Specific Iodine Isotopic Activity Concentration and/or DEI-131 Determination During 1991 there were no specific activity results of Unit 1 or Unit 2 reactor coolant systems exceeding the limits of TS 3.4.8 (1.0 pCi/gm) during either power operation or reactor shutdown / start-up.

IV.

Other Safety Evaluations Following a 1991 QA audit of the 10 CFR 50.59 program at SQN, a few safety evaluations were determined to not have been properly distributed following PORC approval. As a result, four*een safety evaluations from the 1989 time frame were not included in the annual operating report.

These safety evaluations have been included in this report. Program changes which have occurred since this event should prevent recurrence of this event.

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The following is a list of abbreviations and acronyma common to this report.

Abbreviations / Acronyms Definition AARP Alternate Analysis Resiew Program 4

ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gac Treatment System ABSCE Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure ac Alternating Current ACA Auxiliary Control Air AERCW Auxiliary Essential Raw Cooling Water AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AFWPT Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine AHU Air-Handling Unit AI Administrative Int' 12ction ANSI Aruerican National Standards Institute AOI Abnormal Operating Instruction ARPI Analog Rod Position Indication ASCO Automatic Switch Company ASME American Sociecy Of Mechanical Engineers ASOS Assistant Shif t Operations Supervisor ASTM American Society For Testing And Materials ATC Automatic Time Control ATUS Anticipated Transient Without a scram AUO Assistant Unit Operator AUX Auxiliary A!!G American Wire Gauge AZ Azimuth I

A/C Air-Conditioning BAE Boric Acid Evaporator BAT Boric Acid Tank BATP Boric Acid Transfer Pump BISI Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication BIT Boron Injection Tank CAM Continuous Air-Monitor-CAQR Condition Adverse To Quality Report CATS Commitment ' Action Tracking System CBACS Control Bldg Air Cleanup System CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump CCPIT Centrifugal Charging Pump Injection Tank CCS Component Cooling System CCW Component Cooling Water CDCT Cask Decontamination Collector Tank CDWE Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator CE Combustion Engineering CEB Civil Engineering Branch cfm Cubic Feet Fer Minute CFR Code Of Federal Regulations CGCS Combustible Gas Control System CILRT Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test CIS Containment Isolation System CIV Containment Isolation Valve CLA Cold leg Accumulator-COPS Cold Overpressure Protection System

4 AbbrevialispalAcronyma Definitina CP Crankcase pressure CPAES Containment Purge Air Exhaust System cpm Counts Per Minute CRD Control Rod Drive CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CRI Control Room Isolat4on CRVI Control Room Ventilation Isolation CS Containment Spray CSP Containment Spray Pump CSS Containment Spray System CSSC Critical Systems, Structures, and Components CST Condensate Storage Tank CT Current Transformer CSST Common Station Service Transformer CV Check Valve CVC(F.

Chemical Volume Control (System)

CVE Condenser Vacuum Exhaust CVI Containment Vent Isolation CIT Cooling Tower Transformer DAW Dry Active Waste DBA Design Baseline' Accident DBE Design Baseline Event DBVP Design Baseline Verification Program dc Direct Current DCA Design Change Authorization DCN Design Change Notice DCR Design Change Request DEC Digital Equipment Corporation DPM Division Procedure Manuals DWCD Demineralized Water and Cask Decontamination DWST Demineralized Water Storage Tank D/G Diesel Generator EBR Electrical Board Room ECCS Emergency-Core-Cooling System ECN Engineering Change Notice EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EHC Electrohydraulic Controller el Elevation EMI Electromagnetic Interference EMSL Electrical Maintenance Section Letter ENS Emergency Notification System E0I Emergency Operating Instruction E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EQ Environmental Qualification EQIS Equipment Information System ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF Engineered Safety Fer are FCR Field Change Request FCV Flow Control Valve FE Flow Element

Ahbreviations/ Acronyms Definition FHSS Fuel Handling end Storage System FQE Field Quality Engineering FRG Function Restoration Guidelines FS Flow Switch FSV Flow Solenoid Valves FT Flow Transmitter ft-lb Foot-Pound FVB Fifth Vital Battery GBCS Generator Bus Cooling System GCS Gland Steam Condenser GCS General Construction S ecification r

GDC General Design Criteria GOI General Operating Instruction gph Gallons Per Hour gpm Gallons Per Minute HCI Hazard Control Instruction HELB High-Energy Line Break HEPA High-Efficiency Particulate Air HERCW Hanger - ERCW HJWT High-Jacket Water Temperature ho Horsepower HPFP High-Pressure Fire Protection HOT Holdup Tank HVAC Heating, Ventilation And Air-Conditioning-ILO Instrument & Control ICF lastruction Change Form IMI Instrument Maintenance Instruction I/P Current to Pneumatic JB Junction Box 4

kV Kilovolt kW Kilowatt LC Limit Control LCO Lower Compartment Cooler LC0 Limiting Cendition Of-Operation -

LCV Level Control Valve LED Light-Emitting Diode LER Licensee Event Report LLRW Low-Level-Radwaste LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOP Lube Oil Pressure LT Level Transmitter mA Milliampere MCC Motor-Control Center MCR Main Centrol Room MDAFWP Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump MEB Mechanical Engineering Branch MELB Moderate-Energy Line Break MFIV(s)-

Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (s)

MFLB Main Feedwater Line Break

I Abbreviat f oruilAcr.Rnyina Definition MFPTC Main Feedwater Pump Turbine. condenser MFW Main Feedwater MIC Microbiological 1y-Induced Corrosion MOP Main Oil Pump MOV Motor-Operated Valve MPC Maxf a um Permissible Concentration MR Man-Rem / Maintenance Request MS Main Steam.

MSDDT Main Steam Dump Drain Tank MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLB Main Steam Line Break MSV Main Steam Valve MSVV Malu Steam Valve Vault MIR Minimum Training Radius mV Millivolts MVAR Millivolt Amperes Reactive MWTP Makeup Water Treatment Plant MLAI Modifications and Additions Instruction M&TE Measuring and Test Equipment NBS National Bureau of Standards NCR Nonconformance Report NDE Mondestructive Examination NE Nuclear Engineering NEB Nuclear Engineering Branch NFPA National Fire Protection Association NPDES National Pollution Discharge Elimination System NIS L

Nuclear Instrumentation System NPC Nuclear Power Group NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NQAM Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System NUREG Nuclear Regulation 0.D.

Outer Diameter-OLPS Office and Power Stores OE-MEB Office of Engineering-Mechanical Engineering Branch OH&S Occupational Health and Safety PAES Purge Air Exhaust System PAM PostAccident Monitoring PAS PostAccident Sampling PCB Power Circuit Breaker PCF Prodecure Change.. Form PCU Pressure Control Valve PD Positive Displacement PI Pressure Indicators PI Periodic Instructions FM Preventive Maintenance PMP Preventive Maintenance Program PMT Post Maintenance Test

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Abbreviations / Acronyms Definition SI Surveillance Instruction SI(S)

Safety Injection (System)

SMS Status Monitoring System SNM Special Nuclear Material SOI Standard Operating Instruction SOS Shif t Operations Supervisor SP-Standard Pressure SPDS Safety Parameter Display System SPTS Sequoyah Procedures Tracking System SQA Sequoyah Administrative Instruction SQN Sequoyah Nuclear Plant SR Surveillance Requirement SR0 Senior Reactor Operator SSD Seismic Self-Drilling SSP Site Standard Practice SSPS Solid State Protection System SS Stainless Steel STI Special Test Instruction S/D Shutdown S/G Steam Generator TACF Temporary Alteration Control Form Tavg Average Temperature TDAFW Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater-TDPU Time-Delay Pickup-TEACP Temporary Exterior Access Control Portal TI Technical Instruction TS Technical Specification (s)

TS Technical Support TSC Technical Support Center.

TSCDS Technical Support Center Data System UF Underfrequency UHIH Upper-Head Injection Hanger UHI(S)

Upper-Head' Injection (System)

UO Unit-Operator USQ Unreviewed Safety Question USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination UV Undervoltage U.L.

Underwriters Labcratories V

Volt VCT Volume-Control Tank V0M Volt /0HM Meter WC Water Column WGC Waste Gas Compressor WGDT Waste Gas Decay Tank WOG-ERGS Westinghouse Owtars-Group-Emergency Response Guidelines WP Workplan

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Abbreviations /Acronyma Definitinn PORC Plant Operations Review Committee PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve ppm Parts Per Million PRO Potential Reportable Occurrence PRT Pressure-Relief Tank PRV Pressure-Relief Valve PS Pressure Switch psi Pounds Per Square Inch I

psia Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute psid Pounds Per Square Inch Differential psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge PS0 Power System Operations PT Pressure Transmitter /Preoperational Test QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QE&C Quality Engineering and Control QIR Quality Information Release / Request QMDS Qualification Maintenance Data Sheet R

Revision RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCH Reactor Coolant Hanger RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RCW Raw Cooling Water REX Radiation Exposure System l

RF(I)

Radio Frequency (Interference)

RHR(P)

Residual Heat Removal (Pump)

RHV Reactor Head Vent RIMS Retrievable Information Management System RM Radiation Monitor RPI Rod-Position Indicator / Indication rpm Revolutions Per Minute RES Reactor Protection System RSW Raw Service Water RID Resistive Thermal Detector RTV Room-Treated Vulcanization RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank RX Reactor R.G.

Regulatory Guide SAR Safety Analysis Report SCF Standard Cubic Feet SCFH Standard Cubic Feet Per Hour SCR Sig.,*ficant Condition Report SCV Steel Containment Vessel SDM Shutdown Margin SE Shift Engineer SER Safety Evaluation Report SFPC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling SGBD Steam Generator Blowdown SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture

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CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - H0DIFICATIONS ECN/DCN I

DESERIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

L5048 Nuisance alarms in the main control room were eliminated by An evaluation was performed by MEB on the elimination of all deleting the existing flow switches in the ERCW main flow the ERCW low-flow alarms. It was concluded that the problems

headers, that might cause a low-flow alarm would cause other detectable effects; therefore, the alarms could be eliminated. The removal of the low-flow alarms will not af fect the ERCW's ability to operate under Appendix R conditions. Removal of the low-flow alarm for both headers will not increase the probability of an accident occurring and does not impact the system's ability to perform its safety functions. The consequences of any accident were not increased, and no new accidents were created.

L5063 This ECN authorized the replacement of containment isolation This modification did not degrade the af fected system or Check Valves (both units) 26-1260,' 26-1296,59-633, and allow an increase in leakage. The new valves meet the same 81-502.

The new valves have the disc hinged from the valve.

qualification as the previous valves. The margin of safety body instead of the bonnet to facilitate maintenance by as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

allowing visual checks in the disc-to-seat alignment.

Revision 1 to the ECN noted that the Unit 1 Check Valves 1-26-1296, 1-81-502, 2-59-633, and 2-81-502 were not replaced. They were leak tested, and their performance was found to be satisfactory.

L5064 This ECN authorized the replacement of CIVs 31C-697, 31C-715 The replacement of the check valves was done to ensure 31C-734, 31C-752,70-679, 70-698,77-868. The existing check seating reliability and did not degrade the affected valves were Class B and were replaced with Class B soft seat systems.

.ne new valves met the same qualifications as the check valves. Also, the seal weld on the bonnet of Valves 1 existing valves. No new accident or malfunction and 2-77-868 was removed and replaced with a b;nnet gasket.

possibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was not This ECN was only partially implemented and the remaining reduced.

work tracked under WP-9972 and WP-9034.

L5096 This modification added a third CSST and revised the 6900V There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or Start Bus A and B by adding a new 6900V start board and consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment revising the 6900V Start Bus A and B.

important to safety previously evaluated in the SAR. No new accident or equipment malfunction possibilities were created. TS 3/4.8 addresses electrical power systems and was reviewed for this modification. No margin of safety was reduced.

L5101 Reservoir temperature monitoring equipment was added to This is not nuclear safety related. The SAR does not address determine compliance with reservoir temperature limitations reservoir temperature limitations as one of nuclear safety stipulated in the NPDES permit.

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The basis for any TS margin of safety was not reduced.

L5171 This modification provided the Unit I and Unit 2 interface The LLRW storage facility does not interface with any for the LLRW storage facility which is designed to receive, safety-related equipment. Based on NRC's issuance of license handle, store,. load, and retrieve packaged nonvolume-reduced ' : to TVA for this facility and their evaluation of the and volume-reduced L8RW generated at SQN. This ECN and USQD facility, the use of this facility will not create any new was for the interface connections only; it did not cover the types of accident or malfunction. This margin of safety as addition of the LLRW facility, defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

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_ CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - N00!f! CATIONS SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

EQupOf D[iGIPTION SuttMY L5322 This modification was written to install supplementary The existing PAX system supplies the needed comunications; battery-operated phone circuit in the MCR to serve Panels therefore, this ECN was downscoped to delete the requivement I

1-H-2, V-4, 1-H-6, 1-H-8, 1-H-15, and 0-H-27A.

The to install the phone circuit in the NCR. The installation of conduits and cables were installed, but the phor.e power conduits and cables did not degrade any safety-related supply was not installed in Panel 0-H-27A.

equipment or function. The margin of safety as defined in the basi; for any TS was not reduced.

L5323 This ECN was written to replace charcoal test canisters on lhere was no increase in the probability of occurrence Or the ABGTS, EGTS, PAES, and CBEACS with charcoal absorber test consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment trays. Because of manufacturer's material availability, the important to safety. No new accident or equipment test trays were not installed for Train A of the CBEACS.

malfunction possibilities were created. The TS margin of Instead, stainless steel pipe caps were installed. The safety was not reduced.

partial workplan for EGTS and CPAES was for removal of the charcoal test canisters, plugging the corresponding piping and using regular charcoal trays instead of charcoal test trays specified in the original ECN.

I' L5434 The ECN modified Door A-56 at el 690 between the service The replacement door mects or exceeds the specifications of building and auxiliary building. Its frame and hardware were the existing door. There was no increase in the probability replaced and an' electrical closure was added, of occurrence or consequences of an accident. No new accidents or malfunctions were eated. The margin of l

safety was not reduced.

Work performed under this ECN designed and constructed the The construction of the facility did not adversely impact any L5495

_ outage office and shop facility (Eield Services Building) at safety system or function. No features addressed in plant SQN.,It was built in two phases: Phase I was the TSs were affected by this ECN.

construction of the office building, Phase II was the construction of the shop facility.

L55^0 Valve locking devices were installed on specific Unit I and There was no change in the function of the ERCW or in the Unit ? valves to ensure proper system alignment between the function of equipment served by ERCW. This work enhances dev.ces installed alse ensure proper alignment of tb : uppl y _ nuclear safety by ensuring that the correct ERCW alignments ERCb.;amping station and the intake pumping station. The are maintained. The margin of safety as defined in the basis header isolation valves to the D/Gs and the MDAfWPs.

for any TS was not reduced.

L5552 The condensate demineralizer syem was modified to allow for This change was made to a nonsafety-related system and it had processing two polisher beds per day. The change required no impact on any safety-related system. The condensate replacing the high-crud filters, adding neutralized receiving demineralizer system is not addressed in the basis of the twnks and adding or replacing existing piping, valves, pumps plant TSs. Radioactive material allowed to be released to and instrumentation equipment as required.

unrestricted areas is addressed in TS 3/4.11.1, but this change improves system performance in that area.

L5586

.A 3-inch conduit NC2772 was installed from 1-R-137 to cable' The conduits installed by this ECN do not carry any i

tray XH. A 3-inch conduit MC2773 was installed from 2-R-137 cable related to this ECN. The holes cut en Panel H-4 to cable tray XW.

Holes were cut in Panels 1, 2-H-4 for have not been used for any hardware of this ECN. No Controllers 1, 2-FIC-1-213.

safety-related equipment was installed by this ECN.

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. t CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATI0HS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

1AFETY ANALYSTS

SUMMARY

L5611 A pressure-reducing valve was added to HSIVs on the Unit 1 This change was meant to enhance, not degrade, the main control air system to regulate control air pressure to the steamline isolation. There was no increase in the HSIVs. A pressure-rallef valLe and gauge were added probability for occurrence or consequences of an accident.

downstream of the regulator.

No new possibilities for an accident or malfunction were i

created. The margin of safety as defined in TS 4.7.I.5 was not reduced.

L5620 Under this ECN instrumentation was to be added to monitor the The abandoned cable is not terminated ct either end and the discharge pressure 6f TDAFWPs IA-S and 2A-S from the retagged conduits have no safety function. The modifications auxilia y instrument room. The only work completed was the made have no impact on ti.e SAR. The (hange does to affect partial pull of Cable IA1593 and changing the conduit numbers the ability of the TDAFWP to perform its safety function.

on conduits 2A1592 and 1A1592 to ZA1598 and.lA1598. ihe ECN The margin of safety was not reduced.

was downscoped for closure.

L5635 A permanent ladder was installed in the Unit I reactor The ladder is designed such that its failu during a building from the raceway (el 679.78, 270* azimuth) is seismic event will not jeopardire any safety-related accumulator room 4 at el 693.0.

equipment. No safety-related function or feature was adversely affected by this modification. The addition 1

of the ladder did not directly or indirectly af fect any safety-related system covered by the TSs.

L5653 Modifications were made to provide adequate freeze protection The installation of adequate freeze protection features did for sense lines and transmitters, as needed, for the RWST not degrade the function, logic, or controls of the af fected instrumentation. This included upgrading the hest trace or nearby features. No new accident possibilities were units, upgrading the insulation and providing adeyoate created. The margin of safety was not reduced. This (heated and insulated) enclosures for the transmitters.

modification was necessary to promote the availability and reliability of ESF actuation system instrumentation.

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L5671 Modifications were made to provide power to the field There was no. increase in the probability of occurrence or the Sr vices Building, the additional D/G Duilding, the Volume consequences of an accident or malfunct.on of equipment

, eduction / Solidification Building, and future buildings in important to safety. No new possibility for an accident or Lie-ins.

malfunction of equipme.t was created. The equipment affected the last area of the yard. Another ECN provides. final by this ECN is not addressed by the TS.

L5754 This ECN provided for. changing switch setpoints in order to Each setpoint change was evaluated and found to be clear various nuisance alarms on the annunciator panels acceptable. There was no increase in the probability for or 4

listed in the ECN document.

Consequences of an accident. No new accidents were created.

ihe TS margin of safety was not ecduced.

L5779 A bypass line was installed around UHI isolation valve

'Ihere was no increase in the probability of occurrence or FCV-87-22 with a differential pressure gauge.

consequences of an accioent or malfunction of equipment. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

4 L5330-.

.This modification replaced the seats on the containment This modification did not impact the safety functions of the building lower compartment normal range radiation monitor CIS, RMS, or any other system important to safety. There was RE-90-106A containment isolation valves 1-fCV-90-107,108, no increase in-the prcbability of occurrence or consequences 4

and 111. The existins seats were SA479 Type 316 stainless of an accident. The margin of. safety as defined in the basis steel. The new seats are SA479 Type 316 with ethylene for any TS was not reduced.

propylene terpolymer insert. The insert seats provide a tighter seal against-leakage for Kerotest 9957 model valves.

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{ CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - H00IFICATIONS SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

((N/DCN QESCRIPTI0tLSDMMARY LS838 Hodifications were made to upgrade the door interlock system This change was not safety-related. TF: new inter?sch system on Doors ASS, A60, A64, A65, A151 and A152.

is more reliable and should prevent inadvertent opening of the doors. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. No TS margin of safety was reduced.

L5855 Ar iliary Building Personnel Doors A56, A57 and A58 were There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or moutfied as required to withstand high frequency use.

consequences of an accident or malfunction of. equipment Originally, these doors were designed for occasional important-to safety. No new possibility of an accident or equipment access and minimal personnel access. They are now malfunction was treated. This change did not decrease the being utilized at a rate as high as 1800 people in an 8-hour margir. of saf6ty as described in the basis for the TS.

shift. Modifications were made to eliminate the positive pressure against the doors. Modifications were made to existing equipment and additional hardware was added.

L5858 This modification changed the NPSH alarm and trip setting for There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or Unit I condensate booster pumps from 85.3 psig to 60 psig for consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment. No the alarm and f rom 85.3 psig to 50 psig for the trip, new accident possibilities were created. The changes did not Instruments affected by this change were 1-PS-2-82A, 82B, affect any TS margin of safety.

88A, 883, 95A and 958. These-changes were made to reduce the number of nuisance trips that have occurred.

L5883 Existing MS, AfW, and Ventilation system flow and pressure There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or

. switches listed in the ECN were replaced / relocated to meet consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipmer.t the requirements of NUREG-0588. The function of I and important to safety. The margin of safety was not reduced.

2-PS-3-140A, 1408, 150A, 1508, 160A, 1608,'165A and 1658 was deleted 'under FCR 3262 as recommended by the AfW Reliability Task Team.

L5911 This ECH provided permanent TVA Class G piping which will The WDS piping modification was designed to appropriate codes allow operation at the mobile procescing equipment located in to maintain retention in the event of a seismic event.

the railroad bay. This modification allows removal of the Safety-related equipment was not adversely affected by the temporary hoses currently in place to allow movement of implementation of this ECN. There was no increase in the radioactive liquid waste froe.the Auxiliary Building to the probability Of occurrence or consequences of an accident railroad bay. ECN L5911 also removed from available service ~ previously evaluated in the SAR. The probability for an

-the 3-inch pipe that provides a fill path to the refueling accident of a different type or the probability for a canal from the CVCS holdup tank. The 3-inch pipe was capped malfunction of equipment of a dif ferent type than any at both ends. TI.is ECN also tied into the CDCT recirculation evaluated previously in the SAR was not created. The TS piping to allow the processed radioactive: liquid waste to be maa gin of safety was not reduced, returned to a convenient holdup tank before discharging to the anvironment via the dif fuser pond.

L5914 for Unit I and Unit 2 the main steam dump drain tank was lhese modific2tions did not degrade the logic -control, or modified by installing another FCV in parallel with FCV-1-171 function of any features required to perform c9 clear safety and providing manual isolation valves for both FCV-1-171 and functions. This modification provides redundancy and C

the newly added valve. Also, a sight glass and additional instrumentation to detect problems with the steam pressure-vacuum gauge were installed on the tank. fcr Unit I dump drain system These changes were not safety related and only, the existing 1-inch vacuum piping for the tank was

.did not impact the basis of any TS.

rerouted from its original location to a new location on the 14-inch condenser vacuum pump suction piping.

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i CHAM 6ES TN THE TACILITY - N001FICATIGM5

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EEN/DCN DE5ERipTION

SUMMARY

EAFETY ANALYSIS SDnq&E1 l

L59M-TACF 81-11-77 dated January B. 1981 sacressee the CDCT There was no increase in the probability of occurrence o.-

I Pumps A and 8 f rom a capacity of 10 gpa to 4C gpm.

The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

s larger pumps were mounted on wooden platforms and hence no The pectability of a malfunction of equipment impo: tant to seismic I(L). TACF 81-580-77, dated August 8, 1981, safety was not increased. The margin of safety as defined in increased CDCT pump A capacity from 40 gpm to 150 gpe.

ECN the basis for any TS was not reduced.

15916 covered the scope of both TACFs. TACF 81-890-77 removed the internals of Check Valve 0-77-687 to allow installation of a recirculation line (TACF 81-11-771 th-ough a bonnet adaptor. ECN L5916 allowed renoval of TACF 81-890-077 by restoring the temporaey change to its original plant configuration. by replacing the check valve internals and removing the temporary recirculation line. The total 1

i scope of ECH L5916 (under Revision 2) was to replace CDCT pumps I and B and associated Cartridge filters A and B with higher capacity (150 gpe) components. The scope also

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included a bypass line around the new CDCT' bag filters.

Revision 3 of this SE supported the request for removal of Check valve 0-77-687 to preclude flow restrictions placed on 3

the CDCT sy5 tem.

Af ter the CDC1 filter bypass line was installed, the temporary recirculation line installed by TACF i

81-890-077 was removed. It was not possible to fully restare

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the check valve to its pre-TACF configuration because of the 1

loss of the check valve internals. The valve was replaced i

with a similar size and type of valve. The check valve i

created a significant prer*ura drop within the system. TACF l

0-89-60-077 removed ti e :.ternals f rom the check valve on a

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temporary basis. DCN tjl984A was initiated to remove the j

check valve body from s te flow path and replace the valve i "

with a straight sectica of the piping, allowing the TACF to be removed.

I L5932 ECNs L5932. L5933. L5934. and L5935 provided for these modifications were made on the security system, which modifications to the existing security system as part of the does not involve any nuclear or support safety f unctions.

" Power Block" security concepi. The modifications outlined There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or the under ECN L5932 disabled the eussting system af ter the other consequence of an accident. No new accident possibilities ECNs enable the new security system.

a 'e created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

I L5938 This ECT provided for the replacement of FW Heaters 1 and 2

?ni-.n'ification did not adversely affect equipment with new heaters designed to match existing nozzle sizes-J reliabr*.ty materials compatibility, or system design locations and equipped with stainless steel tubes, and far (vedacters. No further equipment f ailure modes were created the replacement of FW Heaters 3 and 4 with Hartsville he+1ers sj f%is modification. These thanges did not af fect the that are also equipped with stainless steel tubing. Piping spa 3ng characteristics of any system from that described i

to TV Heaters 3 and 4 was redesigned and resupported to it ihc SAR. SAR Sections 10.4.7.1.2 and 10.4.9.1 and Tab' e

[

fac.sitate the new nozzle sizes and location. Also, each 10.1-1 (Sheet 4) were revised to reflect the new FW heater 30-inch extrar*.'on steam nozzle on the No. 4 FW heaters was manufacturer. tube matersal. and design temperatures and changed to 18 cl.es.

The modification required the pressures. There was no decrease in the margin of safety as relocation of various instrument and control panels, defined in the basis for any TS.

thermocouples, controllers, and level switches.

f I

t i

1 i f i

i j

CHANGES IN THC FACIt!TY - MODIFICATIONS i

)

ECN!DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMARf L5965 Hinge pin plugs were seal welded to repair leaks on AFW check The seal weld does not af fect the integrity the check valves 3-861. 862. 921. 922. J30. 831, 832, and 833.

valve or the seismic qut lification of the Af u system. There Drawings were revis s' to reflect this modification.

was no incmase in any accident or equipment malfunction possibilities or consequences. No TSs margin of safety was

[

impacted.

L5977 This modification provided dedicated blowdown desineralizers Based on the evaluation and discussion of the modification to the steam generator blowdown system.

checklist for this ECN and based on the special requirements l

identified in the SE. this design change satisfied the safety requirements of all systens impar;ted and did not introduce a t;5Q. As such, there was no impact on nuclear safety.

j

~ L6005 This ECN replaced the existing AFW turbine pump cast iron The new ejecter meets TVA Class C requirements; the existing ejector with a carbon steel ejector.

one did not. The replacwent ejector has the same (perating parameters as the existing one.

The new ejector and a

associated piping meet seismic Categorv I requireeent.

I L6064 A permanent access platform was added at el 700.5 in the tJntt There was no increase in the probability of accurrence or 1 reactor building. This platform extends from the existing consequences of an acc: dent or malfunct ion cf equipment steam generator psatform to the existing RCP 3 platform.

importan to safety.. There was no impact on any TS margin of safety.

2 L6095 A time-delay relay was added in the RM CVIs trip circuit for There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or i

RE-90-106. 112. 130 and 131 to prevent CVI on.purious high consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipoent rat *atica, signals. A time-delay relay was added on the MCR important to safety. Time-delay relays do not degrade the vent monitors RE-90-125 and 126 high radiation trip circuit function of the RMs. Ms new accident fossibilities were to prevent spurious high radiation signals from causing a created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any 1

i.

CRI. A time-delay relay was added on the auxiliary building TS was..c,t' reduced.

I vent monitor noble gas channel (0-R&90-101B) to prevent ABI from spurious high radiation spikes. A time-delay was added to the t rip function on the particular channel (0-R&90-101A) l and the iodir.e (0-R& 90-101C). A seal-in relay was added to the ausiliary building vent isolation signal from R&90-101.

FCR 7973 added one indicator light each for HS-9C-101G.

l HS-90-102 ar.d HS40-103.

L6137 A time-d& lay was Mded to high radiation trip circuit of the The time-delay relays and the seal-in relays do not alter the fuel pool RMs 0-RE-90-102 and 103. Also. a jumper was function of the RMs.

'he radiation levels are still i

installed to RP-1 module to allow fo: auto reset. FCR 2862 continuously monitored and automatic actic is still i

added seal-in relays to the auxiliary building vent isolation initiated upon high radiation as required by TS 3/4.3.3.1.

signal from 0-R &90-102 and 0-R &90-103.

4 t

L6148 This modification revised alarm logic on condensate storage This change was made to alert the operator to any low

[

tank header pressure to give annunciation when ant one of t' e pressure signal from the CST header. The change did act

~i three switches (of each set) in the 2/3 logic mak up impact any safety function of the system or any other safety indicates low pressure.

function of the plant. The margin of safety was not reduced.

I L6152 Modifications to the SFDS added 28 additional computer points The SPDS is a non-C..ss IC system designed to augment the 2

to the TSC data base and revised the MCR layout to include safety-related instrumentation in the MCR and to assist the the SPOS console and operMion desk. ' The modification also reactor operator in evaluating plant critical safety i

revised the TSC 12VAC power distribution panels I and 2 to functions during accident conditions. No safety-related 3

supply electrical power to the SPDS.

equipment was degrac'ed by this modification. Adequate design j

requirements and operating procedures were implemented to j

ensure that the margin cf safety was not reduced.

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t CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MCDIFICATIONS I

i i

ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION St'MMARY SAFETY 'MALYS15_SUMi'M I

L6156 Valves 1, 2-fCV-67-65, 66, 67 and 68 were replaced with The use of stainless stiel instead of carbon steel enhances f

valves that have stainless steel bodies. These valves are performance by eliminateg leakage as a result of corrosion.

i.

located in the DIG Building.

The new design meets or oceeds the original design i

eequirements. The margin of safety as defined in the basis r

ter TS 3/4.8.1 or any other TS was not reduced.

I L6170 This modification was written to install emergency descent There was no increase in the probability of eccurrence or the devices in the Unit I ant' Unit 2 east and west main steam consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment. The valve rooms.. The devices were installed in Unit 1.

No work possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different

[

i i

was done on Unit 2.

The ECN was downscoped to document type was not created. There are no TS covering th.s Unit 1 only.

equipment. No TS margin of safety was reduced.

L6181 Unit 2 RCS inboard and outboard cables 2PH910 and 2PH911 The old connection (230) had a high resistance which i

inside Penetration 22 were moved from Connection 230 to indicated failure. The new connection (251) performs the Connection 251.

same function as the old one and does not change any j

operational characteristics. There are no TSs governing the l

operation of this equipment.

1 1

L61%

The pressurizer safety valve loop seal piping was insulated There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or the L

to maintain the liquid loop seal temperature between 300*F consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment l

and 330*F. Revision 8 of the ECN addressed the Unit I and important to safety. No accident or malfunction of a I

i Unit 2 design changes from liquid loop seals to steam-filled dif ferent type was created. The margin of safety as defined l

safety valve loops. Revision 10 clarifiest e.he work done in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

under the ECr! as, " Reflective mirror insulation was installed

[

on Unit I only.

The Unit 2 insulation was installed by ECN

{

6221." The USQD on ECN L6196 also covered work on pipe and l

pipe supports modified on Units 1 and 2.

l f

L6205 This ECN cove 1 the reolaces,ent of fuses on the auxiliary The safety-related Class IE. seismic Category I instrument

[

instrument room and backun control panels to prevent a panels af fected by this ECM were not degraded, ar.d their norindicating fuse on the power supply from disabling function did not change.

There was no increase in the i

instrument loops before the indicating fuse blows.

probability for occurrence or consequences of an accident.

l and ne new accidert possibilities were created. The margin l

cf safety as defined in the basis for an TS was not reduced.

[

16206 This ECN authori ed the recoating of the interior of the CST fhe CST is a nonsafety class tank. The Level I coating i

wiih a Service Level I coating. Drawing notes were revisee-enhances the quality of the water supply by reducing the

[

I to reflett'this authorization.

g'otential for peeling, flacking, chipping, etc., of the t

coating. The margin of safety as described in TS 3/4.7.1 was not reduced.

[

a L6244 The VHF radio system used for alerting SQN and VSN of a This modification improved the communication link between SQN l

p flooding contingency from the location of Fontana hydro Plant and Fontana Dam. No safety-related function of feature was j

was reconfigured to utilize a new base-repeater station near degraded. Improved flood warning capability of the plant 1

j Fontana to replace Greentop in the overall channel routing.

ensures that protective actions will be taken and operations i

Under the new configuration. the microwave channel at terminated in the event of flood conditicas. The TS margin l

j-Greentop is not used and a radio station is required at SQN.

of safety was not reduced.

lhis station controls the base station at Lookout Mountain.

I providing a channel to Fcntana, as well as local area coverage. The existing base station at,SQN was retired.

4 4

I I

^ L i

i i

l CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS I

I t

ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION SLHMARY SAFETY ANALYSIS Stte1ARY

{

1-3 L6153 The No. 2 seal housing on the RCPs was modified to allor The probability of occurrence of an accident previousiy i

ad dition of replaceable wear surf ace. On the No. 2 RCP on evaluated in the SAR was not increased. The cr e vnces of 4

Unit 1. the seal housing was rotated 15 degrees so that a new an accident previously evaluated in the SAR wew r.cp antirotation einhole could be drilled. In addition, the increased. No accident of a dif ferent type wh m ted.

The j

holes for sin mounting bolts were redrilled.

margin of safety was not recuced.

[

'l L6311 All floor pipe and conduit penetration in the auxiliary None of tha changes degraded any plant safety functions or f

j-building el 690. 714. 734, 749 and 759 that were not already features. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

required to be sealed were sealed. A valve operater j

j handwheel entension was provided on I and 2-PCV-1-5 and 30.

Sprinklers were added in the ADO station el 669. Flow j

Drawing 47W851-1 was revised.

L6343 This ECN was written to replace or upgrade fire doors as All equipment added or modified meets U.L. requirements and necessary to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendin R requirements. Ten serves to meet the requirements of 10 Cfw 50 Appendia R.

The i

worliplans were written; nine workplans were ccepleted. WP installation of fire doors meets equivaleni seismic I(L) 3 11641 was written to install weatherstripping and automatic requirements. There was no impact on any safety-related i

door bottoms and has been determined to be. upgrade items only function or feature. Securety aspects of the plant were not and not required for Appendia R.

The ECN was downscoped, degraded. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for with WP 11648 to be implemented by visual inspection of TS any TS was not reduced.

fire doors on a periodic basis with hardware upgrades l

v provided by work requests.

L6351 This ECN was written to install damineralized water booster The CDWE does not perform any nuclear safety-related i

pumps to provide adequate pressure to the CDWE. Workplan function. All piping and components are TVA Class H,

(

e 11631 installed pump tie in points and isolation valves in nonseismic. The system fu.+ction was not altered, and no l

l the auxiliary building, but the ECN was downscoped because safety-related equipment was degraded. No safety-related l

the pumps were not installed.

function or feature covered by the plant TSs was directly or j

indirectly af fected by this ECN.

i L6352 The routing of Unit 2 AFW Cable 2PM4481 was changed be Neen The instrument loop af fecteo is non-Class IE ar.d does not i

2-FI-3-1708 on Panel 2-L-381 and 2-FPS-3-170B on Panel serve ar.y control function within the AFW system. The new i '

2-t-11A.

The original cable " shorted out" and a new cable cable meets the same design requirements as the one it i

could not be pulled in the original route because of replaced..arri the new routing did not result in any Appendim flamastic coatings.

R interactions. No safety-related system was adversely i

affected by this ECN. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS 3/4.7.3.2 or any other TS was not reduced.

I L6358 Barton transmitters 1-PDT-62-8. 21, 34, and 47 were replaced The new transmitters meet the same seismic and electrical 4:

with for.ctionally equivalent Rosemount transmitters.

requirements. The indication and alarm capability was not degraded. No safety-related function or feature of the plant was adversely affected by this modification. The probability j

of occurrence or the consequences of an accident were not increased. The margin of safety was not reduced.

L f

L6359 The Barton Model 288A level switches on the UHI tank were These modifications did not affect the function of the UHI replaced with more reliable switches that are less subject to system. No safety-related system was degraded and the new l

instrumsnt drif t.

switches meet all signal design requirements. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

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l 1:

l t L CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - tODIf! CATIONS

]

ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SLHMARY j

i 4

L6379 anstrument tabs were revised to identify all Appendia R This ECN wa, for documentation purposes only. No i

required equipment by adding an

• R" designation. This was a safety-related equipment was changed or affected.

documentation change only; no physical werk was involved.

1 L6406 lhis ECN ravised the SS0kV line pCBs reclosing scheme to This change was nonsafety-related and impacted only the power decrease the possibility of turbine shaft damage from shock.

transmission of the plant. No system safety function or e

as a result of,the unloading and loading of the generator.

existing plant function was affected. The 500kV PCBs are not addrestad in the basis of any TS.

[

L6417 An additional supply of cooling water to the CDWE There was no increase in the probebility of occurrence or recirculation pump seals other than the demineralized water consequence of an accident. No safety-related function or

'l system was provided by this modification.

feature covered by the TSs was adversely affected by this i

ECN. The margin of safety as defined in the basis f or any TS was not reduced.

3 L6437-This modification replaced FE-2-256 and FE-2-257 with fluid This modification did not adversely af fecit the function of Components Incorporatt d (FCI) model flow sensors and added a performance of the condenser vacuum exhaust system, and all narrow range FCI model sensor in the same area. The fCI equipment is in the turbine building, a nonseismic, model sensors have a slightly heated probe and are not nonsafety-related structure. The change required no IE power affected by condensation.

supply. and the sensors have no automatic control function.

No safety-related function covered by plst 15s was degraded i

by this modification.

tu439 This audification relccated I and 2-LT-68-320. I and The relocation of the transmitters cutside the craac wall t

2-PT-68-322. I and 2-PT-68-323 outside the crane wall. The allows maintenance to be performed in Modes 1 throtgh 3.

It j

sense line extensions were added for the transmitters, and also reduces the radiation exposure when w3rking on the the sense lines for additional required sense lines were transmitters ia. Mades 4 'hrough 6.

The modification did not j

changed from 3/8-inch compression tubing to 1/2-inch Schedule affect the functions of any components. All applicable 160 pipe.

safety requirements were met. No margin of safety was t

i redaced.

j L6444 This ECN was written to replace obsolete GEMAC transmitters The subject transmitters do not provide any automatic con'rol 5

with equivalent Rosemount transmitters. Workplan 11752 was function or serve any safety-related purpose. No written to replace only 2-PT-3-153 because it was safety-related equipment was indirectly affected. The TS inoperable. Replacement of the other transmitters margin of safety was not reduced.

i (2-PT-3-145. 161.'and 168) was not required at this time.

These were obsolete, not defective. When the need for replacement does arise, it will be nandled under a new DCN.

L6464 The PT-1-72 and 73 drain valve support was revised fres a This change did not adversely affect the function or typical wall mount to a bracket mount.

performance of the pressure transmitters. The new support reduces the stress in the sense line. No safety-related function covered by pl.nt T5s was directly or indirectly I

affected by this change.

r L6468' Insulation was installed behind the. upper deck went curtain There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or the are the upper deck vent curtain was sealed by the addition of consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment Ruc. stem or Armaflex insolation with a velcro-type fastener.

important to safety. The possibility for an accident or This vent curtain is part of the ice condenser system, and malfunction of a different type than any waluated previously the modification helps maintain the ice condenser ten *perature, in the SAR was not increased. No safety-related function or feature covered by the plant TS was degraded by the modification. The margin of safety as defined in any the basis for any TS was not reduced.

7 4

-ID-CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS f

ECN/DCH DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

i L6472 This ECN replaced defective 0-PCV-12-39 (a 5-inch The new valve did not change the function nor degrade the self-rontrolled pressure valve) with a 6-inch externally operation of the auxiliary boiler system. The new

(

l.

controlled pressure valve from Bellefonte (Masoneilan Model configuration was evaluated for seismic Category I 525).

requirements. The margin of safety as defined in the basis j

for any TS was not reduced.

t6489 The windsock for the heliport was relocated to a location 10 This modification was outside the security area, and the feet west of the fence and 24 feet 6 inches ecrth of the locatien is f ree of any ERCW piping or essential electrical

(

center line of the landing paa.

cables. This change was made to improve the pilot's i

l visibility of the windsock. No cafety-related function covered by the plant T5s was directly or indirectly af fected.

t6434 Several ERCW piping sections downstream of the CCW heat The new pipe sections are TVA Class C, which is compatible exchangers were replaced with carbon steel pipe coated with the existing system. The additional weight of the internally with Belzona Molecular Ceramic-5. These sections coating is insignificant and the seismic analysis was not l

had degraded'as a result of cavitation problems.

aifected. The possibility of the epoxy coating coming off 1

and becoming " mixed in" with the ERCW was evaluated. It was i

determined that this should not result in the possibility for any new accidents or malfunctions. The margin of safety as 7

defined in the basis for T5s 3/4.7.1.2 ( AFW) and 3/4.7.4 (ERCW) was not reduced.

f

?

L6545 Old pressure indicators PI-6-97. 100, and 103 were replaced The modification did not af fect the function or performance

[

with new indicators. Because of the actual operating design of any safety-related sytces, and all equipment is located in conditions at 100 percent power, the pressure on the No. 3

. the turbine building (a nonseismic, nonsaf ety-related HDT is 163 psia. The old indicators were scaled 0-100 psig.

st ructure). No IE power supplies were involved. There was The new indicators are 0-200 psig.

no reduction in any 15 margin of safety.

i L6572 The sof t iron gasket that was used between the flanges of the. The thickness of the flexitallic gasket is the same as the bonnet and body of each MfW isolation valve (1, 2-f CV-3-33 sof t iron gasket so that steam travel is not impacted. The 47, 87. and 100) was replaced with a flexitallic gasket.

new gasket is compatible with the materials ic the valve body and bonnet. The new gasket does not degrade the system in any way.

The valves in this modification are not addressed I

1 in the basis of the TSs.

I

?

L6596 This modification completed interface design and construction The DAW building is nonseismic and is not within the scope of t

j for DAW building and tied the building te the plant support the QA program. There is no safety-related equipment in the services.

building or in the near-by brea The probability of r

occurrence or tb-consequences of an accid-:t were not l-increases. The DAW is not addressed in TSs; therefore, the j

margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

L6604 Under this ECN warious changes and additions were made to These changes did not degrada the seismicity of the supports i

j the 47A050 mechanical hanger drawing series general notes.

or the af fected piping systems. No safety-related function or feature was adv?rsely affected. These changes to the i

j 47A050 notes did not invalidate any of the original design requirements for the supports or the af fected piping systems. No safety-related system covered by the 15s was

]

adversely af fected by this ECN. The margin of safety was not j.

reduced.

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4 CHANGES IN THf_ FACILITY - t00lfiCAfl0NS L

i ecd /QCH DESCRIPTION SUMMARI SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

l L6631 This modification provided for the review. resision, or This modification did not degrade any safety-related function addition of drawings as recess 3ry to incorporate updated or f eature. Any discrepancies between the litest thermal travel data (thermal movement) on all snubber support movement and installed snubber position setting that would be l

drawings, and snubber load tables. Also. resolutica was adverse to snubber operability was evaluated by the FCR provided for any discrepancies identified by the Office of process. Any snubber repla. eeents meet or exceed all Nuclear Power upon comparison of updated thermal movements in original design requirements. The margin of safety as j

actual snubber positica settings as authorized b the ICR defined in the basis for TS 3/4.7.9 or any other 15 basis was j

process including replacement of snubbers with e,s than not reduced.

1/16-incl. total movement..

~

j L6635 four embedded conduits beneath the caustic tank had been This madificaticn did not affect any safety-related conduits damaged as a result of corrosion. These conduits and cables or cables. All changes were made in the turbine building, a i

(located in the turbine building.nd serving nonseismic structure. There was no degradation to any plant nonsefety-related equipment) were rerouted as empesed rather safety system. No safety-related function covered by plant J

than sabedded and the four embidded conduits were sealed.

TSs was directly or indirectly af fected by this ECN.

Damaged conduit from the floor to the cable tray was removed.

j

. 16654 This modification removed the existing faulty magnetic oil The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an gage of th> sea'l oil drain regulator, closed the opening and accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety was t

replaced it with sight glass and necessary~ fittings.

not increased. No new accident or malfunction of a dif ferent Inspection had revealed that the Unit I gage actually type was creates. The margin of safety was not reduced.

I indicated a level greater than 1/4 full even though the tank was empty.

L j'

L6655 Permanently sostalled proximate / seismic vibration detection These test points were added to improve the plant's ability transducers (test points) were added for periodic monitoring to obtain accurate, two-plane shaft motion and vibration 1

and balancing of the turbogenerator shaf t (rotor).

data. There was no increase in the probability for or

}

consequences of an accident. The margin of safety as defined j

f. the basis of any TS was not reduced.

I L6666 This ECN'was written in 1986 to ecolace doors found damaged Fire rating compatibility between fire walls and associated l

4 or nonfunctional during the perform.3ce of SI-261. " visual doors and security requirements were not degraded by work i

Inspection of Technical Specification flee Doors on a originally planned under this ECN. There was no reduction in Periodic Basis - Unit 0, 1. and 2."

In the 1991 process of the TS margin of safety. Revision 2 of this ECN downscoped verifying field completion. it was found that doors and the requirement for the replacement of five fire-rated doors.

frames found nonfunctional by the SI had been found functional by later inspections and no longer required changeout. This ECN was downstoped and closed.

2-

' L6683 Snubber lo.-ds were calculated on rigorously aralyzed systems There were no functional changes involved. and no to verify oper snubber design; loads on TVA load tables safety-related equipment was degraded. The ana?ysis ensures j

were issuti and/or revised; snubber ca. :ulations were revised that the actual loads do not exceed the rated loads of the as required and snubbers were changed out where necessary.

snubber. The margin of safety was not reduced.

l The 1991 review for field completion and closure of this ECN foen; that work had been performed on Unit 2. but th.i no Unit I drawings were issued or revised and no field work was 4

required on Uni

• 1 under this ECN. A separate DCN can be written for the unimplemented work on Unit I and ECH L6683 was closed.

l I

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i I

i i

~ CHANGES IN Tite FACILITY - N00IFICATIONS t

i ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SUtMMY

?

i l'

There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or the

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L6689 This modification revised control of main steam system PORVs located in the east and west valve vaults to prevent consequences of an accident. No new accident possibilities I

f uncontrolled blowdown of two steam generators. Affected were created. No safety-related function covered by plant pilot solenoid valves and I/P converters were relocated from ISs was affected by this ECN.

i' the valve vaults to a less harsh environment. These in the east valve vault were moved to the reactor building annulus

[

and mounted on the outside of the shield wall. Those in the west valve vault were moved into the 480V shutdown board rooms at el 734. The valve positioners were replace ( Sy

[

those which have been qualified for operation to temperatures t

up to 180*F including addition of penetrd ions and tubing to facilitate installation.

L6696 The rubber and leather pe ts of the master and selector The material change did not functionally change cr adversely

[

valves in the Cardon Corporation supplied CO2 fire affect the system. The seismic requirements and design were I

extinguishing system were replaced with teflon parts.

not impacted. There was no increase in the probability of

' Manuf acturer drawings were updated accordingly.

occurrence or the consequences of an accident. No i

safety-related system covered by plant TSs was adversely I

affected by this ECN.

\\

L6719 ihis ICN provided a complete volumetric intrusion detection There were no in-plant changes made under this ECN. The

}

sjstem to supplement the existing FPS-2 system on the fence, changes did not af fect Category I structures, systems, or i

added a new nuisance fence, psovided grading and gravel equipment important to safety. The electrical changes were

{

between the nuisance fence and the existing fence, and made non-Class IE. No safety-related function covered by the TSs

]

fence lighting improvements for alarm assessment.

was directly or indirectly af fected by this ECH.

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L6758 HVAC seismic suppbris were added in the auxiliary building.

No existing duct support was modified under this ECN. CEB control building, and diesel generator buildings to account had performed an analysis to determine which duct sections i

for deficiencies as noted in SCR SQNCEB8602. There were required additional supports. The new supports were j

discrepancies between design assumptions and the HVAC duct evaluated to ensure that the addition did not degrade any test results aad/or design standards.

safety-related structure. There were no physical or j

functional changes to the HVAC system, equipment, or duct.

No safety-related system covered by plant TSs was degraded by j

l this FC"..

4 i

L6760 This ECN revised the labeling of 1-FCO-30-106 ans 107 and The systems were not functionally changed or adversely 2-fCO-30-108 and 109 and their associated equipment'from affected. This change brought consistency in design 3

purge air supply to auxiliary building ge eral supply in the documents. There was no increase in the probability of r

wiring diagrams and instrument tabs. The tai, numbers of the occurrence or consequences of an accident or ?quipment equipment were changed in the field. The wiring diagrams and malfunction previously evaluated it the SAR. No new accident i

i instrument tabs did not agree with other documents.

peasibilities were created. No safety-related system covered I

oy plant TSs was adversely affected. The 15 margin of safety 4

was not reduced.

]

L6761 Work performed under this ECN modified the east stam valve The modifications did not interface with any safety system.

room blowout panels to provide 64.6 square feat af permanent The modifications allow lower peak superheat temperatures.

ventilation area per unit to the outside and redesigned thus allowing the safety-related equipment in the valve missle protection because of the permanent opening of the vaults to be qualified ensuring proper mitigation of HSLSs blowout panels. Doors A103 and A107 were modified allowing f rom the valve vault equipment. There was no increase in the i

s i

for 22.7 square feet of ventilation area because TVA had probability of occurrence or the consequences of an i

based licensing (alculations on this door flow area for accident. No new accident possibilities were created. No TS 1

l postulated HSLDs with superheat in the valve vaults.

margin of safety was reduced.

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h i I CHANGES IN Tl!E FACILITY - MGDIFICATIONS 1

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I E

((N!DfH QL$CRIPTION St*; MARY SAfEQ ANALYSIS s? ttME L6768 This modification added supports to cable trays and/or This modific ation/ addition was performed to ensure that the modified existing cable tray supports in all areas emcept the cable tray supports can withstand all io4 wing conditions.

I annulus to confona to the requirements of design criteria.

Tha functions of the systems affected by these cables remained unaltered. TSs do not address cable tray supports.

l J

L6800 The setpoint for 1, 2-FS-72-13 and 1. 2-FS-72-34 was changed The change of the setpoint f r the 11(w switches was required from 500 gpm to 1650 gpm to ensure the calculated safety to ensure the safety limit will be met with instrument loop limit of 250 gpm will be met.

accuracy considered. This mooification was performed to prevent the potential camage to the containetnt spray pumps l

under low flow conditions due to overheating or ta.itation.

There was no increase in the probability of occurrence er the consequences of an accident. No new accident possibilities were created.

L6802 The EGTS filter housings and Units 1 and 2 containment purge The modification (following special requirements specified) i air cleanup filter housings. cre modified / qualified to use did not alter, modify, or af fect any engineered safety activated charcoal filter tr<sys between 26.75 inches and 30 feature function, reactor protective function, or safety

}

inches in nominil length. Ttis change also required seismic system. Implementation of this ECH did not degrade the qualification of the housings, radiation map revisions, margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.

,L environmental qualifications and possible equipment l

relocations.

3 L6809 This Unit 2 modification replaced missing and/or damaged The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an mirror insulation as requirec in the MSVVs. Other insulation accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety was

{

(other than mirror insulatic.n) was replaced as required.

not increased. The possibility for an accident or Wire meshing was installed around the piping and insulation malfunction of a different type was not created. The margin 1

to help shred any pieces of insulation that might f all of f so of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced.

drainage paths would not be clogged. The ECN also included provisions for running a temperature surveillance test program. This included installation of thermocouples.

L6813 During the baseline verification walkdown, it was noted that The design calculations as well as the TVA Bill of Haterial 1

PRVs 1. 2-72-512 and 513 were set at 120 psig while the flow 47BM436-4 R2 indicate a setpoint of 120 psig. MEB analysis diagram (Drawing 47W812-1 R12) b dicated the setpoint and CEB evaluation supported this change. There was no pressure to be at 100 psig. This ECN revised the associated increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences drawings to correct the setpoint of the relief valves in of an accident. No new accidents or malfunctions of 4

question.

equipment were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

L6815 A 500kV PCB and associated equipment were installed. The All changes were associated with nonsafety-related systems t

161kV PCB and its associated squipment were retired.

and did not impact nuclear safety. Since SAR Chapter 8

]

Transmission lines were reterminated; a power line carrier addresses the subject of electrical power systems that cover telephone. terminal was installed, and the security system 161kV and 500kV transmission lines and related equipment, the was modified by relocating the fence and associated equipment. SAR was updated. TSs do not address the 161kV switchyard.

the 500kV switchyard, or communications.

L6823 The work performed under this ECN rerouted Unit 2 conduit to This modification did not alter the logic, controls, or alleviate the ef fects of hot sp6ts on 10 (fR 50.49 cables in functions of any system required for nuclear safety. This the MSVVs. Cables and equipment (e.g., FCV's actuator, limit modification enhances the reliability and availability of the switches) that were identified as having experienced physical impacted features. There was ro increase in the probability degradation were replated. Design drawings were revised and of occurrence or consequences of an accident. The TS margin pipe rupture analysis on the rerouted conduit was performed.

of safety was not reduced.

s

f i i

i CH'NGES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

[

i

[CN/DCH DESCRIPTION SUttARv 5AFETY ANALYSIS SU E Rf i

i L6827 Modifications made under this ECN are intended to reduce t%difications to the tool sterage room drain system had no control building flooding from NELBs in the turbine adverse af fect on any plant safety featt,re.

These l

l building. Floor drains in the control building tool storage modifications enhance the n allability of the control l

room (el 669), which would receive water from turbine building af ter turbine building flooding as a result of a t

building via en open staircase at el 685. pre /de direct MELB. and no safety-related equip.nent was cegraded. No new l

access for flood waters into the control built.ng ths ough accident possibilities ere created. SQN TSs do not cover j

baserent floor de ains. Sealing off the tool 4 torage room the modifications made by the ECN.

drains blocks the passage of

• arbine imildint flood water I

i.

i.lto the control building. Tre first stage. 3r restart work.

involved the temporary capping of the tool s orage room

[

]

gutter draii.s.

t i

I L6830 Drawings'were revised to relocate the Class 4 to Class B These changes to reflect as constructed condition; are for l

boundary break in Unit 2 CVCS to reflect.s. constructed documentatien caly..The installation of the reducing i

I conditions. Crawings were revised to reloc te the Class A to. coupling did.,t degrade any system requirements. SAR Class B boundary break to reflect as-constracted conditions analyses and TS requireme*ts res:ain unchanged.

in Unit 1 2CS prassurizer spray lina to the blind flange 4

'j downstr m of valve 1-V62-593. A specially fabricated 3/4-inch by 1/2-inch 0.375 bore reducing coupling was installed downstream of Valve 1-V62-313A on Unit 1 CVCS seal

(

injection bypass line to No. I seal in RCP 2.

j i

L6832 A new DAW facility was required at Sequoyah. Work under this There was no increase in the probabiiity of occurrence er ECN verified the design, ' reviewed and accepted vendor consegnences of an accidert. The possibility for an acciden'.

' drawings and entered them into TVA's Drawing hanagement of a -Jif f erent ty;ie was s>ct created. The DAW is not covered System, reviewed vendor design cal ulations and issued them in TSs. There was no reductico in any margh of safe y.

s into TVA*s RIMS. Also, the finished facility was inspected i

and accepted, and the SAR was revised to reflect the changes 1

to the solid waste disposal system. The manis;om allowable 7

curie content and contact dose rate of waste stored in the

, building was detenrined, and radiation monitoring devices I

were provided.

l L6848 This ECN covered Unit 2 modifications'to end connections of This modif. cation.did not change the ability of the j

structural steel. members bearing piping and conduit supports structure, equipment. piping, tubing, or conduit supports to

?

for seismic Category I systems to compensate for their perforse their function. There was no increase in the thermal expansion and resultar.t reactions of interior walls probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident.

ar.d structural members located inside the reactor building.

TSs 3 not specifically address this change. No TS margin of safety was reduced.

j t

L6851 This ECN covered modificaticos in a har:,h environment to end This zodification allows thermal expaasier movement of the j

connections of structural members to' compensate for their member of the support system. thus prevecting excessive thermal expansion and resultant reactions of interior wall forces or movements that may create an overstress condition.

and structural members. The original design. construction.

The modification did not alter or change the functionality of 9

and installation of these supports did not make allowances the supports. The probability of occurrence or consequences l

. for temperature increases and ef fects on adjacent structures. of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety was not increased. Any new components ' supports) added by this modification were qualified to meet harsh 4.

environment conditions.

4.

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CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS

[

RCN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

I J

L6859 The low pressure alarm setpoint for UHI switches PIS-87-21 The increase of low pressure alana setpoint enables the

}

27, 23, and 24 was changed from 2800 psig to 2970 psig based isolation valves to have greater closing time tolerance and i

on the low limit used in Westinghouse analysis, 2875 psig and improves the operability limit. The modification did not the instrument loop accuracy calcelated by NE, 90.76 psig.

af fect the water volume delivery through the valves. There were no other changes involved--no wiring or cable changes were required. There was no increase in ihe probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. The possibility for an accident a malfunction of a dif ferent type than previously evaluated was not created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

z L6871 This modification added a note to conduit and grounding No physical modifications were made as a direct result of drawsngs and lighting drawings listed on the ECN data sheet this ECN. However, the presence of this note authorizes the to incorporate reg airements for conduit penetration fire sealing of any deficient penetration shown on any of the 5

barrier sealing in accorr'ar.ce with fire protection drawings af fected drawings. There were no adverse affects on any series 47W494 and fire -stop penetration detail drawing safety-related equipment. There was no reduction to any TS 4

45W880-26.

margin of safety.

L6874 The existing Chemeler 2-wire parallel aut9 heat trace was The operability and reliability of the subject heat trace was replaced with Thermon 3-wire parallel self-regulating heat improved and the maintenance required is minimized. There trace, &nd modifications were made to control / distribution was no increase in the probability of occurrence or panels. This was done on primary and secondary circuits of consequences of an accident. The margin of safety as defined

],

80, 83, 86, 87, 90, 101, 105, and 129.

in the basis for any T5 was not reduced.

L6877 Carbon steel fittings and a small piece of pipc on the Unit 2 This change involved a nonsafety-related portion of the NFW MrW load bypass between 2-T*V-3-70 and 84, 2-HCV-3-70 and 84, system. This portion is nonseismic and does not interface or i

and 2-VtV-3-580 and 581 wes replaced with s.ainless steel.

interact with rny safety-related system or function. T5s do l

i This was done to reduce erot m problems associated with this not address this portion of the NfW system.

3 line.

L6882 Existing Raychem splices km originally installed improperly This modification corrected the deficiencies on the Raychem

[

and had to be repaired or replaced in accordance with splices and improved the reliability of the af fected i

standard procedures.

circuits. There was no increase in the probability o.

L occurrence or consequences of an accident. The T5s do not address the issue of splices in the Unit 2 restart-required electrical equipment. However, this change increased dependability and the chance of failure is minimized.

Therefoce, the Ti margin of safety was increased.

i L6887 Unit 2 cable tray support NK-27 below 61 732 in the turbine No safety-related equipment was degraded. The redesigned

[

building was redesigned and replaced to clear existing pipes' supports meet all functional requirements of the original thermal movement.

supports. Turbine building supports are not addressed in TSs.

i 4

L7014 The cristing 6-ton waste packaging crane (0-CRN-303-225) was This modification enhanced the reliability and overall safety i

modified to include the following applicable safety of the crane and was performed in accordance with the crane features: (1) " Youngstown" type hoist block upper limit consistency program. The change did not involve a change in

[

travel switch, (2) hoist drum overspoolins/ overlapping the facility or plant operating characteristics from that protection, and (3) phase loss protection.

described in the SAR. There was no decrease in any T5 margin of safety.

4

i CHAN5ES IN THE FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS i

EQl/DQ1 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANAtYS11_$UMM M L7042 The existing 6-ton waste packaging crane (0-CRN-303-240) was This modification enhanced the reliability and overall safety modified to include the following applicable safety of the crane and was performed in accordance with the crane features: (1) " Youngstown" type hoist block upper limit consistency program. The change did not involve a change in travel switch, (2) hoist drum overspooling/ overlapping the facility or plant operating characteristics from that protection, and (3) phase loss protection.

described in the SAR. There was no decrease in any TS margin of safety.

-t7108 Hodifications were made to the pipirg from the starting air These changes improve the safety for persocoel performing i

tank to the pressure switch and oressure indicator on all dig maintenance on the pressure switches. There was no increase units to improve personnel safety, serviceability, and in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an reliability. An isolation valve and test tee were added, and accident. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for i

the piping to the pressure iraicator was replaced with any 15 remained unchanged.

L stainless steel tubing.

L7110 Unit 2 level modifiers LH-3-148A, 156A. 164A, and 171A were This change was made to reduce vibration-induced problems.

replaced and relocated. Conduit and grounding drawings were Class IE separation requirements were maintained.

revised to show the relocations. This also required Postmodification and surveillance testing ensures functional rerouting of air supply lines, conduit. and cables.

requirements are maintained. There was no increase in the a

probability for occurrence or consequences of an accident.

No new accidents or malfunctions possibilities were created.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis of TSs was not reduced.

4 i

L7117 Pulsation dampeners were added to Unit 1 TDAfW pump low This modification did not impact normal system operation.

j suction header pressure switches 1-PS-3-121A. 121B, 121D.

Operability / reliability of the system is improved by 139A. 1398, 1390. 144A, 1448, and 1440. This ECN made TACF protecting the switches from damage as a result of repetitive j

2-88-2008-03 permanent.

pressure spikes and causing wear f rom continuous operation.

• rc was no increase in the probability of occurrence or l

Teguences of an accident. TS 3.7.1.2 on cperability of s

=

Ark pumps a.ed 3.7.1.3 on CST were not violated by this 4

modification. There was no reduction in the TS margin of safety.

1 L7181 The Unit'2 lower compartment coolers were upgraded to safety. The probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident 1

grade and their fan motors were upgraded to Cla;s IE.

The were not inc eased. No new accident or malfunction of f an motors were e pgraded by a Buf f alo forge Rewind Program.

equipment was created. The TS margin of safety was not that ir.<olved changing the winding insulation from Class F tu reduced.

)

Class H.

The rewind program upgraded the notors to Class IE.

The motors were also refurbished restoring them to a like new condition. The electrical system associated with j

the lower; compartment coolers was upgraded by performa*.ce of the following calculations: cable ampacity, short circuit, l

penet ration protectioni degraded voltage,' and overload.

L7222 This ECN revised the D/G load sequencing relav time delay This change ensures the D/G reliability is maintained as i

setpoints for MGAfW pumps lA-A and IS-8, and CCS pumps 14-A, required. The new setpoints enable the D/G to properly 18-8, and C-S to agree with accuracy calculations and ensured accelerate the load to rated speed before the next load is the mininum interval between load steps is greatc-than or sequenced onto the D/G. The modification did not alter the equal to the minimum interval used.n the load analysis.

function of any component or system. The margin of safety as l

defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

1 4

m

t CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION SUPtMARY SAFETY ANALYSIS SU W RY L7283 This ECN authorized the performance of physical modificat uns The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an j

to various Unit 2 pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter i

4 required by all appl' cable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not

{

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

l seismic qualification of the affected supports.

L7290 This ECN authorized the performance cf physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an to various Unit 2 pipe supports to qualif y these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter 4

required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not i

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

L7299 This ECN authorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an to various Unit 1 pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

t seismic qualification of the affected supports.

[

L7312 This ECN authorizcd the performance of physical modifications TV probability of occurrence or the consequences of an k

to various Unit 2 pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The endifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin tf safety was not I

s calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

i L7332 The Unit 2 inboard hydrogen analyzer CIVs were changed from There was no ir~rease in the prob.

.y of occurrence or fail open electro-pneumatic valm to fail closed solenoid consequences of an accident or malfuaction of equipment valves (Target Rock 3/8-inch valves). The hydrogen analyzer important to safety. No new accidents or malfunctiun sample lines outside primary containment were capped or possibility was created. The TS margin of safety was not plugged. Existing centcel air lines inside containment were reduced.

4 capped. Theses lines wera no longer reqaired to provide air to the analyzer CIVs.

L 4

L7333 This ECN previded 15e second phase of pydrogen snalyzer This change was reouired to restore hydrogen analyzer system modifications to af fect complias ce with containment instrument operability (temporarily eliminated by ECN L7332) isolation and bypass leakage requirements. These and eliminate a potential post-LOCA secondary containment j

oodifications included actions such a* disconnecting reagent bypass leakage path to the end ronment, and establish a i

' gas line from auxiliary control air and replacing the air permanent containment isolation configuration. The changes supply with two air bottles, adding a failed-closed flow brought the system into compliance with SAR commitments and

. solenoid valve to each calibration i;as line addirg four test TS requirements. The changes'did not s Qnificantly degrade connections and two block valves 13 each train, removing or improve the operability of the system post-LOCA, The plugs or caps previously installed by ECN L7332, etc.

margin of safety in TSs was not reduced.

L7342 This ECN authorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an I

to various Unit 2 pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not insreased. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not

[

4 calculation and design drawings were issued to refisct the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

L7343 For 1-kE-90-106, 112, 130, and 131, seal-in contacts with This did not involve a change in the facility from that reset capability were added across the iodine and particulate descrioed in the SAR. There was no impact of system safety flow switches; the ground bus was relocated at the local functiens. The margin of safety was not reduced.

panel; and the l u al skid-mounted alarm was deleted.

I t

i

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i ;

i CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - HODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

.$AFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

l i

I L7356 Existing unqualified coating was removed from the exterior of There was no increase in the probability of or< _, rence or j-the Unit 1 PRI and repleted with System $NP-N-971 or consequences of an accident. No new accident r malfunction j

equivalent.- A revision to the SAR was also required.

of equipment possibility was created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

i L735E This ECN authorized the pertarmence af physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an to varicus Unit 1 pipe sup;9rts to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter

[

reqwired by all applicable design criteria. Additionally.

any function of any system. The mar 9in of safety was not f

caltu'ition and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

4 j '

L7359 This ECH authorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an i

to various Unit I pipe supports to qualify these supports is accident were not increase <. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally.

any function of any system. Tha sargin of safety was not

}

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the redeced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

3 L7362 This ECN authorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an

{-

to various Unit 1 pipe supports tc quality these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not

{

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

4 i

L7367 Security cages were added with exit doors" to the exterior of There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or the Unit I valve vaults. lhis allows unobstructed flood -

consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment. No

[

relief during MTLB and steam / pressure relief during MSLB.

new accident or malfunction possibilities were (reated

[

The doors function as emergency exits.

These doors are not covered by plant T5s.

I L7377 This ECN authorized the performance of physical actifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an to various Unit I pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not y

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

i seismic qualification of the affected supports.

L7385 This ECh suthorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an i

to various Unit I pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

1 L7392 This ECN authorized the performance of physical modifications The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an to various Unit 2 pipe supports to qualify these supports as accident were not increased. The modifications did not alter i

4 required by all applicable design criteria. Additionally, any function of any system. The margin of safety was not t

calculation and design drawings were issued to reflect the -

reduced.

seismic qualification of the affected supports.

2 P

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CHANGES IN FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS $@e @

N00231 This modification disconnected and relocated the hydrogen The four-phase modification of the hydrogen analyzer restores l

analyzer Train B calibration panels into the ABSCE. All system operability and containment integrity, and brings the

{

wiring and tubis connected to the calibration panel was system into compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendia A, SAR y.

'distonnected. Local cables conduits were removed. Wiring to commitments, and TS requirements. The change did not degrade

[

i the new calibration panel location was done under DCN M00232, or significantly improve the op -ability of the system post l

phase four of the hydrogen analyzer modifications.

LOCA. The changes to the hydrogen analyzer system do not l

contribute to the probability of an accident. DCN N00231 4

i reduces the consequences of an accident previously evaluated j

in the SAR.

This modification did not affect the existir.g margin of safety as defined in the basis for the TSs.

l l

l N00250 This DCN authorized the performance of physical modifications This modification did act increase the probability of

.te various Unit 1 pipe supports to qualify these supports as occurrence or consequences of an accident previously r

required by all applicable design criteria as denoted in the evaluated in the SAR, No new possibility for an accident or I

modification criteria. A 'itionally, calculations and design malfunction of equipment was created. The TS margin of

[

drawings were issued to *~ lect the seismic qualifications of safety was not reduced.

j the affr W d suppor*s.

1 k

N00260 Level switches for low wa;er level in the UHI accumulator This crdification did not af fect the function or performance were replaced; setpoints were revised in accordance with of the J11 system. The new switches were electrically Class l.

Westinghouse reevaluation of allowable UHI injection; SAR, IE 2

• e..:smic Category I, as were the switches replaced.

i f

TS, and design criteria were revised to reflect the new The samtmum and minimum amounts of water injected is within levels; and' instrument. calibration frequency was revised to the analyzed limits for safe operation. There was no 4

2 ensure-that the loops stay within apprcved tolerance.

increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. No (5 margin of safety was reduced.

i N00271 Physical modificatiens were performed to Unit I pipe supports These modifications did not involve a change in the facility l

such as adding stif feners, rolled steel plates, shapes, etc..

from tiet described in the SAR. They ensure that supports i

and replacing component parts.

eset. all requirements of the SAR. The modifications did not change any functional configuration.

a i

H00289 Condenser circulating water inlet and outlet expansion joints This did not involve a change in t!.e facility (or plant I

l were replaced with a modified design and superior material.

operating characteristics) f rom that described in the SAR.

This did not. af fect TSs or involve a USQ. The modification f

]

did not change system functional operability. TSs do not

[

address these expansion joints.

[

l M00302 Physical modifications, such as addicg stiffeners, rolled Modifications did not involve a change in the f acility from i

I steel plates, shapes, etc., and standard components, were that described in the SAR. There was no change in the

[

performsd to Unit I pipe supports.

reliability, maintainability, or performance f rom that i

assumed at initial installation of the piping with supports.

s

]

The margin of safety was not reduced.

i 4

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f CHANGES IN FACILITY - NODIFICATIONS f

1

[CN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

AFETY AMLYSl$ St.HMARY N00351 Unit 2 feedwater flow transeitters were rescaled to account The s. scaling ensures that the transmitters reflect actual f

)

for venturi fouling. The rescaling was detertir.ed by TI-2 plant coccitions. The rescaling ensures that NIS pwer I

l_

" Calorimetric Calculatten."

ree.ains within plus or minus 2 percent. of core power required I

by accident analysis. The rescaling ensures that plant I

j protection equipment responds as assumed in the SAR.

4 Rescaling of the feedwater flow transmitters ensures that the j

T5 margin of safety will Le maintained by causing the transmitters to acc arately reflect actual plant conditions.

I H00386 The valve packing on Valve 1-2984 was leakino steaci ir.to the The modification did not af fect T5s or involve a USQ. The i

Unit 2 east valve vault. The leaking salve was repaired modification did not change system functional operability.

4 l:

using furmanite.

This was processed as a minor modification. The margin of f

j safety was not reduced.

N00389 A flush and drain connection and flanges were installed in This modification had n: a ese impact on the safety

['

the vertical leg of circulation lines between the BAT and BIT function of the CtC5. T :=.nange reduces maintenance when in the CVC5.

boric acid in the vertical leg piping becomes stagnant and solidified. Ir.ere was no increase in the probability for f

occurrence or consequerres of an accident, and no new I

acrident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as described in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

-(

=

i N00421 Physical modi N;ations were performed to Unit I pipe ints' charge did not involve a change in the f acility (or j

supports.'succ. as adding stiffeners. rolled steel plates, plar.t operating characteristics) from that described in the j,

shapes, etc., and standard component parts.

SAR. The modification did not af fect T5s or involve a USQ.

There was no tapa t on system functional operability, and the l

T5 margin of safety was not reduced.

>-l' N00457 Chesterton live-load packing was used to replaca esisting This modificatior did not af fect T5s or involve a USQ. There packing on MfP Discharge Isolation Valves 1-FCV-3-67 and was no change in systes' functional operability. This upgrade 4

1-FCV-3-81.

eliminated the need for packing adjustment that helps prevent watcr from running down the valve s

M00547-Pipe Supports H20-352 and 1-H36-111 required expansion -

This modificatice did not af fect T5s or involve a USQ. Their

[

t-provisions and physical modifications as a result of thermal was no change is any system function. This was considered a j.

expansion.

ainor modification. The margic. of safety as defined in the t

}

basis for any TS was not reduced.

[

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N00595 Physical' modifications were performed to pipe Supports These modifications did not involve a change i the f acility H63-435 (IRHRH0417) ar.d H21-439 (IC5HG421) as a result cf from that described is. the SAR. The changes did not impact I-themal expansion.

T5s or Involve a USQ. The modification did not change system functional operability.

[

M00685 To' reduce the vibration problems in the condensate piping. NE. This modificatson did not affect plant configuration or designed dead-weight supports, sway strut restraints (fsr operating characteristics. The change did not impact T5s or i

vibration). and relocated existing supports. Calcu!ations involve a USQ. There was no change to system functional were performed to design for dead-weight loading and the operability

[

f vibration restraints were concurred with by CEB piping l

l vibration experts.

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CHANGES IN TACTi!TY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTIDN

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

N00693 Disk spring washers were added on I-LCV-c -118 between the The aedition of the washers prevents stem rotation of the valve actuator stem nut and the diaphragm washer to valve and alTows it to function as designed. The change did l

compensate for.any possible shrinkage of the diaphragm not affect the SAR or T5s in any way.

j thickness.

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MOO 710 Reinf orcement plates were welded over the excessively ground This is nonsafety-related piping. Tne SAR does tot describe areas of SFP cooling anJ cleaning system's refueling cavity-the physical ecnfiguration si piping. The weldir;g of the purified borated water supply pipe.

reinfcrcement plates was a repair modificatioc that did not alter the facility.

M00712 The setpoints related to the auxiliary oil pumps to This modification did not affect T5s or involve a USQ. There 4

condenzate booster pumps. No. 3 and No. 7 heater drain pumps was no change in system functional operability. The subject were revised. Pressure switch-settings were change to:

pressure switches are nonsafety-related, noncivisional oil pressure increasing 8.5 psig Aum Oil pump off switches in the turbine building.

Tl.e switches ind setpoints oil pressure decreasing 8.5 psig Aum Oil pump on are not mentioned in the SAR tent, but setroint values are oil pressure decreasing 5.0 psig Cond Bstr pump shown in SAR figures. These were changed to reflect this shutdown modification.

N00735 The drain line of the shutdown board room chiller There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or i

1-TCV-67-158 valve was rerouted and replaced.

consequences of an accident. This activity did not increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of a

[

malfunction of equipment important to safety. The TS margin i

i of safety was not reduced.

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j N00778 Modifications to support 47A435-17-2 required redesign of This modification did not af fect T5s or involve a USQ. There pipe clamps from existing P2558-10 pipe clamp to Pill 3 pipe was no change in system functional operability. The

[

i clamps because of space limitations.

modifications did not involve a change in the facility from l

that described in the SAR. but it does ensure that supports

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i '

meet all requirements of the SAR.

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M00779 Modifications to support 47A435-17-1 required redesign of This modification did not af fect 15s or involve a USQ. There pipe clamps f rom existing P2558-10 pipe clamp to Pill 3 pipe was no change in system functional operability. The clamps because of space limitations.

modifications did not involve a change in the facility f rom that described in the 5AR. but it does ensure that supports f

meet all requirements of the SAR.

t M00796 The entire defective valve ared actuator (1-FCV-74-?8) was There was no change in the facility fram that described in i

replaced by valve and actuator from Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

the SAR. Operating characteristics of the replacement valve i'

The new valve was installed in the same position as the old.

are the same as the original valve. There was no impact on Esisting limit switches, transducer, and pressure regulator any T5 margin of safety.

i were reused on tha new valve.

~

l M00858 Metal plates with a 5.5" x 5.5" srfuare opening were installed These changes had no adverse impact on safety. There was no j

over damper 1-FCD-30-203 and over damper 1-FCG-30-6.

This increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of was done to prevent the temperature in penetration room 669 an accident. This change did not create the possibility of a A7 from exceeding 130*F following a HELB in the pipe chase.

different accident. The margin cf safety was not reduced.

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I Cl%NGES IN FACILITY - NDDIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DJ.1CRJPTION SumARY JAFETY ANALYSIS SU mA_RJ 7

l M00926 The breaker long delay minimue pick up setting was changed The change did not alter the safety function of the equipment i

for Unit 2 electrical board room AC Compressor B-8 to meet and did not affect plant safety. The HVAC system involved is the requirements of Design Guide D.G.-E2-3-5 and prevent still able to perform its intended functier.. The margin of nuisance tripping during degraded voltage condition.

safety as defined in the basis for any TS was nct reduced.

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M00927 The breaker long-delay trip setting in compartments ID and 3D This change di1 not af fect TSs or involve a USQ. There was 480V S/D Board 182-8 was reset above the minimum setting no change to system functio.zal operability. There was no i

i required to prevent tripping during degraded voltage increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of i

conditions.

an accident. No TS margin of safety was affected.

I N00955 A permanent control air line was designed and installed to

'his modification did not af fect (directly er indirectly' any replace the temporary control air line installed under TACT

.1 formation presented in the SAR or deviate f rose the 80-152-79.

This TACF had installed rubber hose to supply description given in the SAR. This modification did not l

control air to the manipulator crane gripper. The design and affect ISs or involve a USQ. There was no change in system work under this DCN made the TACT a permanent part of the functional operability l

j crane design.

M00%2 Elapsed Time Meters 0-11-31A-8 G-11-31A-10, 0-11-65-23, and The elapsed time meters are not specifically discussed in the i

0-11-65-42 were replaced with seismic Category I qualified SAR.

This change did not af fect the facility or plant meters. The replacement meters were identical i.e.,

same operating characteristics. The change did not affect TSs or f

mounting with no wiring change.

involve a USQ.

N00966 This DCN changed the temporary power source from the hot shop The components involved in this change are all

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480V NCC 0-222-3 to a permanent installation for the 1-A/C nonsafety-related. The A/C unit is independent of any plant t

units'and lighting distribution panel No. LCA in the service system and does not af fect any safety system. This i

building. This resolved TACF 0-66-007-317.

modification did not af fect any component, equipment, or system whose breach or damage would increase the probability l

of or consequences of an accident. The cargin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

H00976 flow diagrams 47WB45-6, 47W859-2 and 47W859-4 and valve tab Implemer.tation of this modification did not alter the i

drawings 47A366-67-16 and 47A366-70-11 were revised to add control. logic er f unction of the af fected systems. There F

the newly identified vendor valves. The subject valves were was no degradation to any safety system. The margin of

(

tagged.

safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced.

4 H01020 A restraint bar was installed in front of each row of modules The panels and racks now meet their analyzed design in Racks 1-R-127, 128, 130 and 131 and Panels 1-L-11A and B.

conditions. The change did not involve a change in the f acility or the plant operating configuration. There was no i

3 change in system functional operability. The modification did not impact TSs or involve a USQ.

j N01021 A restraint bar was installed in front of each row of modules The panels and racks now meet their analyzed design j

in Racks 2-R-127, 128, 130 and 131 and panels 2-t-11A and B.

conditions. The change did not involve a change in the facility er the plant operating configuration. There was no change in system fuectional operability. The modification 4

j did not 'mpact TSs or involve a USQ.

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I CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

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ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION SLMMRY SAFETY ANALYSIS SLTf4 M

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H01100 Modifications were made to the Unit 2 fuel transfer cart.

This modification did not af fect T5s or involve a t'SQ.

There The bi-direction motion decoder / position counter circuit was was no change to the functional operation of plant systems.

removed and replaced with two limit switches (one limit The counter circuit that was removed had been unreliable in i.

switch on the STP side and one on the reactor cavity side) the past aad had resulted in a bent fuel assembly. Overall t

actuated by mechanical lever at the fuel transfer cart with reliability was improved by this modification. the margin of 4

j the limit switches'sounted above water level.

safety was not reduced.

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t NOI203

.This DCN involved the design and installation of Communications of voice and data were enhanced by the l

l -_

cocaunication cable raceways for non-Class 1 structures, replacement of the old telephone system. The addition of l

1.e.. facilities conduit and grounding. This DCN established communication cable raceways accommodated the cabling

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r cable raceways from the building entrance points to the required to interface the new system with all areas of the building distribution frames.

site. This DCN did not affect T5s or involve a USQ. There

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was no change in any system furctional operability

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- N01222 An internal rubber diaphragm located in the CST A was removed This modification required a revision to SAR Section 9.2.6.2 j

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(leaving the retaining hardware), thereby removing the to delete reference to the rubber diaphrage. The affected i

l possibility that the diaphragm could become over pressurized component is not safety related. There was no impact on

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to the point where is could damage the CST and render it safety system functions. No is margin of safety was reduced.

I inoperable. Nitrogen sparging will continue to be used as i

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the method to purge the tank of air. As a supplement to the j

-nitrogen sparging, a pressure / vacuum relief vent was instaMed to prevent a free flow of air into the tank. This 6

change also involved the revision of setpoints for 0-PS-77-428A'and 4288 (Tank A) and 0-PS-77-429A and 4298 (Tank 8).

The manway cover was sealed to prevent excess i

nitrogen leakage to the environment thus reducing operating i

cost.,

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4 M01278 A drain line was added to the waste gas header to allow The implementation of the DCN did not adversely af fect any draining of condensation from the header which collects in equipment cr plant system important to safety. The drain the horizontal rvo of pipe just upstream of the waste gas.

line is designed to sNpcpriate codes to maintain position

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compressor. The drain line was added between Check Valve 0-77-736 and PCV 0-77-789 shown on TVA Drawing 1, 2-47W830-4,.

and pressure boundary rdention. There ws no increase in r

the probability of any accident prevloesly evaluated in the just downstream of the CVCS VCI and the BAE vent line SAR, and the waste gas management system operation is not i

i

. connection to the header.

significantly changed to such an entent that any new accident i

scenarios would be created. There was no reduction to the i

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margin of safety defined in any TS basis.

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28, 1988, with NRC and Drilling and prouting did not af f eCt the safety or

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j N01312 As a result of a meeting held November TVA where the ERCW pumping station foundation and roadway operability s, the plant. The reduction of weak zores of i

cells were discussed, a. limited exploratory program for the concrete by grouting did not reduce the calculated stresses

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foundations was proposed by TVA to augment the available data in the sound concrete. The amount of concrete removed by the 1

used in the Bechtel evaluation. TVA Jrilled eight core holes 3-inch diameter holes did not degrade the structural capacity in the ERCW pumping station foundatica cells and six holes in of the mass concrete. Grout used to fill the cores had equal the access roadway cells.

or greater strength than the concrete removed. This activity i

did not increase the pro ~oability for or coesequences of g

accident or malfunction of equipment. The margin of safety I

j as defined in the basis for any T5 was not reduced.

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- i CHANGEi IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION Sul1 MARY 5Affff ANALYSTS SLSMARY v

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P01339-Leaking Main Steam Check Valve 1-VLV-1-623 was repaired using This change did not affect T5s er involve a USQ. The

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Fu rmani t e.

modification did net change system fur.ctional operability.

The valve still performs its design function.

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M01346 The leaking Main Steam Check Valve 2-001-624 was repaired This change did not af fect TSs or involve a USQ. The using furmanite.

modification did not change system f unctional oper.bility.

1 1

The valve still performs its design function.

i

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M01348 teakage from Valve 2-VLV-1-818 was eliminated by Furmanite.

This modification does not impact the ability of the system f

The yoke / valve interface was peened so that the valve could to perform its safety function. There was no increase in the be capped under the existing plant conditions of normal probability for or consequences of an accident. No new

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4 temperature and pressure. The manual valve operator (hand accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as wheel).was removed and a threaded cap was installed on the defined in applicable TSs was not reduced.

threaded Kerotest valve bonnet. The threaded cap was seal r

welded.

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M01349 During construction. CCS Test Valves 1-73-737 and 1-70-686A This activity had no adverse impact on safety. These are were installed in the reverse positions with respect to their test connection valves that. are used for performing leak locations on the design drawings. To document that the fests on a containment isolation valve. The size of these as-constructed condition is acceptable. Valve 1-70-737 (Mark valves only af fects the time required to perform the tests.

No. 47W464-104) was upgraded f rom TVA Class C to TVA Class B.

The valves do not perform any active function required to and the CCW flow diagram CCD No.1-47W859-2 ($AR Figure mitigate accidents. There was no increase in the probability 9.2.1-2) was revised to show the as-constructed positions and of occurrences or consequences of an accident. see new sizes of these valves.

accident possibilities were created. The T5 margin of safety

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was not reduced.

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M01356 During the DBVP, several manual valves were identified that This modification did not affect plant T5s or involve a USQ.

i did not have unique identification numbers' assigned. This There was no change in the functional operation of plant l

1 modification assigned unique identification numbers to the systess.

4 subject valves using the format detailed in Engineering

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Requirement Specification ER-SQN-EEB-001. Identification

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tags were fabricated and installed and drawings were revised to reflect vasve ID numbers.

N01378 This DCN changed TVA design drawings and plant configuration There was no increase in the probability of an accident t

by locking valses in their required design position. This previously evaluated in the SAR. The systems affected by I

DCN impacted 17 flow drawings and associated SAR figures as this activity perform their safety functions. All valves and i

listed in the DCN.

documentation reflect the required design basis position. No

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accident scenario was changed by this activity. TLe locked closed CIVs serve to prevent an increase in of fsite dose 4

i af ter an accident. No increased risk is placed upon equipment important to safety. This activity did not reduce

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any margin of safety as defined in the basi of any T$.

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M01395 The change involved the use of Furmanite to repair leaking This modification did not' af fect plant 15s or involve a USQ.

Valve 2-VLV-3-892, main steam supply to AFW turbine check There was no change in the functional operation of plant i

i val ve. -

systems.

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e CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION SUMKARY SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

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I H01414 This DCN added a redundant fire protection water source to The portion of the HPf P system that was changed serves no l

i the D/G building. This 6-inch line into the building safety function. The addition of the fire hose station does supplies one new fire hose rack located in the lebe oil not af fect the capacity of the HPFP system. The core storage room.

drilling and hanger installation necessary did not degrade

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the seismic qualification of the D/G building. lhis change had no direct impact on any safety function or safety-related system. ISs do list fire hose stations, and this new hose i

station nceessitated the update of TS Table 3.7-5.

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i N01435 This DCN tmplemented Stages 2 and 3 of the upgrade of Unit 1 This activity had no impact on safe shutdown of the plant, I

shield building vent stack effluent monitoring nor did it introduce any new radioactivity releases. The instrumentation. Actions taken included, but were not activity did not have any new failure modes. This activity 1

I limited to, relocating the 1-RE-90-100 flow splitter on had no impact on the performance of any system important to

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1-L-398 to a location on the 1-1/2 inch sample inlet tubing, safety.

t removing 1-fi-30-242 and 1-t-378, installing primary sample j,

dual pump skid Panel 1-L-707 and associated isolation valves, and rerouting sample lines. Also, 1-FE-90-242 tubing was disconnected and 3/8-inch return tubing routed through MK124 was disconnected. These tube ends were capped. The existing Ekerline RM equipment was disconnected and removed. Sorrento RM equipment and Kurz flow monitoring equipment was t

installed. A Nim Bin unit was installed in the control building ar.d 1-kM-90-450 was disconnected and removed from Panel 1-M-31.

A blank piate was installed on the panel with a cut out to mount the grab sample timer, and the sample

. timer was installed.

M01436 This DCN provided the design which upgraded the Unit 2 shield This activity in no way affects the safe shutdown of the building vent stack effluent monitoring instrumentation.

plant, nor did it introduce any new radioar.tivity releases.

i Implementation of Stage 1 installed all components at any This modification had no new failure modes that will affect time before Unit 2 Cycle 4 restart as constrained by TSs and equipment or systems important to safety.

SRs. This includad, but was not limited to, VFE-90-4004A, B, 4

C, and D, and their nounting assemblies (including guide l

cups), were installed; the existing primary sample line flow splitter was replaced with FE-90-452/ flow splitter assembly; and flow splitter replacement required minor sense line tubing rework to the flow splitter. Eberline RM equipment l

was disconnected and removed. Sorrento RM equipment and Kurz j

flow monitoring equipment was installed.

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N01437 This modification instaed a nonsafety-related temperature This activity did not change the function, the cintrol or the

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monitoring system in the east and west MSVVs.

logic of the af fected systems / components. The activity provides no controlling function to safety-related i

equipment. There was no increase in the probability for or consequences of an accident. There was no increase in the a

probability of equipment malfunction. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced.

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L l I 4

CPANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS

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i~

ECM/DQi DESCRIPTIDN SUMMAFJ SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

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N01451 This DCN involved performing a tempo *ary leak sealing This process did not increase the probability of an i

operation (Furmanite) on Unit 2 Valve 2-62-725.

The purpose accident. There was no increase in the consequences of an j

of this temporary change was the t?! W a' ion of identified acciuent previously evaluated in the SAR. The required CVCS leakage (reactor coolant le.*. e a the reactor function of the valve was not impaired based on its primary 6

building.

safety function. The probability of a malfunction of e guipment was not increased. This change did not affect safety nor did it impact or reduce the margin or saf ety for i

any TS.

THe Appendia R analysis was not affected.

N01501 DCN HMWA Nght the S/G Pressure iLoops 2-PT-1-2A, 28, 9A, The systems affected by this modification are not affected to f

98, 2L'i, FF

% and 278 Narrow Range Level toops the entent that operational characteristics or compliance 55, 94, 97, 107, and 110, and Wide-2ange methods described in the SAR are aff, d.

None cf the bases 2-LT-3-2

-r 3

level tooi 3, 56, 98, and til (w unjunction witn of the TSs reviewed are affected by this modification. This the Eagle L @de of the RPS isolatio tabinets) into modification was implemented within the constraints of the compliar ce with the guidelines specified in USNRC Regulatory design requirements specified, and no new failure modes were i

Guide 1.97 Revision 2 for Category I requirements.

introduced to systems and components affected by this

.;odification.

6 4

N01537 This DCN covers the SIS CLA work that was part of the Unit 1 This change did not alter the seismic Category I requirements j

UHI system being permanently removeo from service. DCN M01537 for any components associated with the CtAs. The new established higher and wider operating parameters for the setpoints for the CLAs ensure adequate core cooling is LLA. This involved the adjustment of operating pressures, provided in the early stages of a LOCA considering CHI has l

1evels, water volumes, and setpoints of the CtAs to that been removed. There is no increasa or expected change in the required by the new 10 CFR 50 Appendix K analysis for ECCS radiological consequences of any accident associated with without tNil.

these changes. The probability of system failure was not t

changed by this DCN. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any 15 was not reduced.

f 6

M01564 TVA design output documents were revised to tune the Unit 1 Actual flow to the steam generators was unchanged by the

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MfP speed control circuit. Westinghouse reviewed the FW tuning of the control system. The operability of the fW control system setpoints on Unit 2 and recommended changes to pumps was improved and the actual flow continued to be l

certain setpoints.

. regulated by the FW bypass regulator valves at the low power portion of the delta P program. The operation of these valves was unchanged by the tuning of the feedpump speed i

controls. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. The margin of i

)

safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

N01582 The Unit 2 containment air mass temperature instrument loops There was no adverse imoact on safety caused by this

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4 were modified so that 18 associated thermocouple signals are modification. This activity did not change the function.

l processed by the Prodac P250 pl#t computer (System 301) logic or control of the containment temperature loops. This rather than the Morgan Temperatwre Monitoring System (System modification resolved Human Engineering Deficiency 8138 that j

i 56). The P250 software was modified to monitor the 18 identified a problem with the operators being required to

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i

. containment temperatures and was also modified to compute manually calculate upper and lower containment temperatures.

average upper and lower containment temperatures and lower j

containment air. volum normalized to standard temperature.

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CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS I

1 i

ECN/DCN QCSCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFEif A~ALYSIS SUMMARI t

This DCN involved the performance of a temporary leak sealing This change had no adverse impact on safety. Furmaniting the H01645 operation (Furmanite) on Unit 1 MSV l-001-625.

This is a check valve shaf t seal does not prevent the valve f rom 32-inch TVA Class B check valve located immediately performing its design function and does not degrade its downstream of MSIV 1-FCV-1-22.

The packing gland that seals seismic qualification. There are no TSs applicable to the the valve shaft was Furmanited. A maximum of two holes per operatioe of this check valve.

j i

packing gland were drilled in the valve body and a 1/2-inch i

shutof f adaptor used to inject Furmanite materials into the l

valve packing area was installed. The adaptor remains 1

L permanently installed until the valve is repaired or replaced.

1 i

H01656 Thit DCN involved the performance of a temporary leak sealing This change had no adverse impact on safety. Furmaniting the

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F operation (Furmanite) on Unit 1 MSV l-001-624.

This is a check valve shaft seal does not prevent the valve from 3

32-inch TVA Class B check valve located immediately performing its design function and does not degrade its downstream of HSIV l-FCV-1-11.

The packing gland that seals seismic qualification. Thc.e are no TSs applicable to the the valve shaft was Furmanited. A manimum of twa Soles per operation of this check valve.

packing gland were drilled in the valve body and a 1/2-inch

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shutof f adaptor used to inject Furmanite materials into the e

valve packing area was installed. The adaptor remains permanently installed until the valve is repaired or replaced.

H01781 This DCN was written to document qualification of 132 support There was no adverse impact on plant safety. This activity calculations to the requirements of Design Criteria did not af fect (directly or indirectly) or deviate from any SQN-DC-V-24.2 and to apdate the analysis and support drawings. information presented in the SAR. There was no impact on as necessary. DCN N01781 was developed to complete the system operation, compliance to TS requirements, or on

+

design work begun under ECN t6767 and the corrective action procedures outlined in the SAR.

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required by SCR$QNCEB8619. Qualification of the design criteria resulted in the modification of ten supports.

s M01823 Corrective action for CAQR SQP871724 revised the affected These changes did not affect the original physical electrical

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47B601-43 series dra-i.igs to reflect the correct power train separation / isolation. There was no physical effect on the I

for the respect ~we hydrogen analyzer system instruments. In reliability of F*e equipment, and there was no impact on the i

. addition, physical modifications involved the local retagging single f ailure criteria.. This modification changed no SAR 4

of these instruments in accordance with applicable TVA system or functional requirement and did not change SAR tent, documentation, with the exception of indicators H2I-43-200 tables, graphs, ur figures. There are no 15 requirements for

[

and H21-43-210 lo: =ted in the MCR. All other affected labels on the hydrogen monitoring system.

t instruments are L sated in the auxiliary and reactor 4

buildings.

l H01835 fhis DCN provided for new eabeling of components located on This modification did not affect component or system

'JAf t I and common control boards located in the main and functions. There was no decrease to the margin of safety as

&Jxiliary control rooms. This DCN provided the design and defined in the basis for any TS.

design changes to fabricate new nameplates to resolve

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labeling related to Human Engineering Deficiencies 6001, I

6002. and 6003.

t M01855 A temporary leak sealing operation (Funnanite) was performed This repair was required to stop steam leakage and prevent a on Unit 2 M5V 2-001-623. This change repaired the valve by high temperature condition that could degrade the t

l Furmaniting the packing gland that seals the valve shaf t.

environmentally-qualified equipment in the MSIV vault. This change had no adverse impact on safety. This activity did not alter the control, logic or function of the MS system.

Implementation of this modificatico did not reduce the margin s

of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.

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I CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SU" MARY f

e N0186o This DCN involved the performance of a temporary leak sealing This repair was required to stop steam leakage and prevent a operation (Funnanite) on Unit 2 AfW ficw element 2-FE-3-163.

h 's temperature condition, which could degrade the This change repaired the flow element by installing a clamp environmentally-qualified equipment in the MSIV vault. There e

around the orifice flanges and Furmaniting *.he area between were no adverse impact on safety. There are no TSs the clamp and the orifice plate.

applicable to the operation of this flow element.

Implementing the DCN did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in any TS basis.

I M01899 Leaking Globe Valve 1-VtV-3-336A was repaired using This change had no adverse is; pact on nuclear safety. The Funnani t e.

Pipe rupture devise No. 95 was modified for application of Furmanite is a temporary solution until the

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access to the valve.

valve could be replaced during the next Unit I refueling

[

outage. Reliability of the valve was not affected by the i

modification.

I M01901 Valves 2-VtV-1-828 and 830 were leaking through packing There was no change in the functional operation of any plant j

glands. The leaking valve packing glands were repaired using system. The process is acceptable free a nuclear safety 1

Furmanite. Formanite procedures allowed the valves to be standpoint. There was no I pact on the information in the j

4 repaired while Unit 2 was in operation. Initial injec? ion of SAR or on any TS margin of safety.

Formanite did not totally correct the proble, so the valves were reinjected.

I A

i M01954 This DCN involvad the documentation and plant modifications This change did not adversely impact any design or functional i

to address S/G wet layup piping HELB. Auxiliary building requirements of any plant system. No method of TS compliance general supply intake Temperature Switches 1-TS-30-103 and was impacted by this change. There was no increase in the 103A and JB-2059 were relocated above 5-foot 9 inches, and probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident.

l

^

all 1E conduit fittings below this Sevel were sealed with RTV. The design change decreases the likelihood of a system / equipment failure by bringing the electrical design i

into compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 qualification requirements.

N01955 This DCN involved documentation and plant modifications to This change did not impact design or functional requirements address a S/G wet layup piping HELB. The auxiliary building of any plant system. This change indirectly impacted the SAR 9eneral supply intake Temperature Switches 2-IS-30-104, 104A. in that a previously unidentified HELB was introduced into and JB-2116 were relocated above 5 feet 9 inches and all IE the SQN pipe break and 10 CFR 50.49 design. En method of TS 1

conduit fittings below this level were sealed with RTV, in compliance was impacted by this change. The change did not i'

accordance with this DCN.

increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment.

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There is no potential for a new unanalyzed type of accident.

I N01978 This DCN involved physical modifications of supports, support No TS rhange was needed to implement these modifications.

l deletions, and reconfiguration of supports for MS piping.

Specifically, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS 3/4.7.9." Snubbers." was not reduced. The new designs meet er exceed SAR commitments and do not deviate f rom any description in the SAR.

4 i

I N01979 This DCN involved' physical modifications of supports, support No TS change was needed to implement these modifications.

I deletions, and reconfiguration of wpports for Unit 1 MS Specifically, the margin of safety as defined in the basis i

piping._ These changes resulted from a piping reanalysis for TS 3/4.7.9. " Snubbers." was not reduced. The new design which was done to qualify the MS lines f rom the top of all meets or exceeds SAR commitments and does not deviate from four steam generators through the SCV to a flued head anchor any description in the SAR. This activity did not involve on the valve room walls, and to the safety-relief valve USQ.

headers. This DCN covered only those MS pipe supports located inside the east and west valve rooms of Unit 1.

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l CHANGES IN FACILITY - N()DIFICATIONS t

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ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY AMAtYSIS

SUMMARY

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l' M01988 This DCN involved the design and installation of Implementation of this modification impacted only the

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communications equipment in the communications room located communicatiu system and did not impact the control, logic or j

in the control building el 669.

function of any safety-related system or component required to mitigate SAR Chapter 15 events.

[

H02064 MSIV bypass as-built piping did not agree with as-constructed This was a documentation caly change. There was no adverse piping drawing, analysis model or analysi; isometric impact on any safety-related function er feature. There was j

drawings. The installed configuration was avalified by no impact on the SAR or on plant TSs.

rigorous analysis; no field work was required. This was a

[

" documentation only" DCN.

t i

H02068 This DCN closed TACF 0-87-033-14 by 'rstalling a set of three The new bag ' ters do not change the function of the permanent bag filters upstream of and in series with the high-crud fi.

s as described in the SAR. This change did high-crud filter to reduce the frequent clogging of the not af fect the parameters such as design pressure / temperature high-crud filter.

of any of the affected systeme. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any TS was not reduced.

j N02107 Valve I-VtV-1-829 (Unit I west valve room) was leaking This modification did not af f ect (directly or indirectly) any

[

through the packing gland. teak sealing was performed using information presented in the SAR or deviate from the Furmanite.

description given in the SAR.

The application of a leak 3

i sealant is a temporary solution until the valve can be j

i repaired or replaced during the next refueling outage. There was no af fect on operability or ability to perform the i

valve's design function. There was no impact on any TS I

margin of safety.

i i

i M02109 Valve 2-Viv-3-508 (16-inch check valve) was leaking into the This did nct change the functional operation of any plant

[

l valve vault. The valve was temporarily repaired using system. The application of a leak sealant. is a temporary 4

Furmanite.

solution until the valve can be repaired or replaced during j-an outage. Furmaniting the valve did net. prevent the valve from performing its design function. ReliaMlity of the valve was not affected by the Furmanite. TM feedwater check i

valves aie not addressed in TSs.

t i

NO2140 This DCN involved the modification of the power supply for This change was part of the overall upgrade to the telephone

.c i

the teierommunications equipment in the control building system. the affected systems and components are not safety j

communications room and the addition of electrical service to related; therefore, there was no adverse impact on nuclear t

the Telecommunications Node Building.

safety. There was no impact on the TSs. The SAR was i

impacted because system design or functional requirements and

[

}-

test table, graphs or figures were changed. The activity did not alter the function of the telephone system and did not L

impact the control logic, or %nction of any nuclear safety-related systems, structures, or compcnents.

M02178 Based on CRDR recommendations, the lighting in the NCR was All work was performed in accordance with applicable changed. Thir change added state-of-the-art task lighting to procedures. All work performed a ound or above the control MCR Panels 1-M-7 through 1-M-II.

Changes made under this DCN panels in the MCR was coordinateo with Operations. There was l

improved lighting from a human enginecing standpoint and no impact on any components in the control room other than serve to enhance NCR operator responses and reaction.

lighting. 'There was no adverse impact on safety. Plant operations and other system functions as described in the Sequoyah TSs were not affected.

i

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' i CHANGES IN FACIcITY - MODIFICATIONS

{

f ECW/DCN DESCRIPf!ON

SUMMARY

SefETY AM' 15 SLHMARY I

H02192 This modification installed a double acting gripper (air The function of the manipulator crane was not altered by this i

cylinder modification) in the SQN Unit 1 manipulator crane.

change. The dual acting air cylinder modification improved This change provided compressed air for both the enoage and the operability. productivity, and reliability of the crane.

the disengage gripper actuation functions.

The manipulator crane pneumatics for the gripper are not

(

detailed in SAR test or figures. The load capacity for the crane as delineated in TS 3/4.9.6 was not affected by this modification.

P02225 The No. 3 HDI LCV-6-106A and B have had numerous incidents of This modification did not af fect any SAR figures or test, nor broken plug stems and/or pins. The valves were upgraded to did it affect any TSs. There was no impact on nuclear reduce f requent operational and maintenance outages; This safety. The function of the LCVs was not changed. This basically involved changes to valve components.

change was acceptable from a nuclear safety standpoint.

l i

N02251 Ihis package modified the existing laundry area (protective This modification did require changes in the SAR to remove I

clothing decontamination facility) in the service building to references to the laundry waste water system. And an j

have a place to set up computer terminals to allow for editorial change to the TS was required in Table 4.11-1 which installation of a controlled access point., RCA Access Control referred to the laundry tanks. The removal of the laundry l

Station, te provide Health Physics better control of facility and the addition of computer terminals and 4

personnel entering the RCA. Laundry eachines and associated associated support equipment created no new failure modes.

[

support systems were removed. Doct work to the washers and These changes did not directly or indirectly af fect any dryers has been blocked, the equipment drains were capped or esisting SAR safety function. There was no degradation of l

plugged at the floor. The service water to the laundry area any safety-related systee or compocent. There was no l

Was valved out at the washing machine Cutof f valves. The reduction in any TS margin of safety.

i power and control wiring were disconnected to the laundry 1

dryers'and washing machines at the disconnect switch. Then.

computer terminals and associated support systems were installed.

M02468 Physical modifications were required on Unit I pipe supports The support additions and scdifications were performed to in the ice condenser system. AFW, CVC3 ERCM and CCS. These bring the piping system and supports into compliance with the changes included adding or deleting some s pports and SAR and Design Criteria requirements. Equipment reliability l

u modifying existie.-

vaaorts.

was unaffected. The new designs meet or exceed $AR commitments and do not deviate from any SAR descriptions. No safety-related system covered by the TSs was adversely affected by this DCN. The margin of safety as described in the basis for TS 3/4.7.9 (Snubsers) was not reduced.

(

1 h02541 This modification involved upgrading the packing arrangement Equipment reliability was not affected by these* changes.

on Unit i MSV l-001-623. 624, 625, and 626 based o:' EPRI Evaluation determined that this modification has no impact on recommended design. This upgrade replaced the existing the ahility of the valve to clare or to maintain its 1

packing rings with an optimized f:ve ring set. To help integrity upon impact. there are no IS acceptance limits maintain a more uaiform packing pressure thraughout the associated..th this change and no impact on margin of safety.

service life of the packing. a live-loading system was utilized. Also. one of the counterweight. arms for Check i

Valve 1-001-625 was trimmed as part of this change to avoid a 4

I structeral interference. hinor dif ferences between the i

I as-built and as-designed counterweight arms on 1-001-624 and 625 were reconciled.

j 4

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CHANGES IN FACILITY - NODITICATIONS

(

i i

f1N/DCN DESCRIPTION Slit %RY SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

.M02965 Fire protection piping was replated for those portions of the This activity did not increase the probability for or l

auxiliary building and control tsuilding which were consequences of an accident. There was no increase in the i

bydraulically inadequate or were less than the 1-ir4h minimum consequences of a malfunction of equiement important to 3

diameter size required by NFPA 13 for ferrous spri.ik'.er safety. The activity did not reduce the TS margin of safety.

supply piping. Hydraulic calculations were also performed to q

verify the adequacy of fire protection piping in ite j

auxiliary building and control building.

l 1

3 i

NO3073 The manhole covers on D/G 7-day fuel oil tanks were modified This modification enhances the sampling process and did not

}

to provide a method of sampling without ramoving the manhole adversely affect the ability to meet TS require ents. There covers. This involved cutting a hole in the cover and was no change to any system design or functional requirements.

welding a 4-inch Schedule 40 pipe. The pipe is threaded on top to allow the use of a threaded cap to seal the tank. A l

1 3/4-inch heavy nut was welded on top of the cap to provide

]

for easy remraal and installation of the cap.

t 3-f M03281 This change involved upgrading of tinit.1 MSVs 1-001-623, 624 The system design and functional require w ts were not 1

1 625, and 626. This included such actions as building up and affected by this upgrace. The valve function to close resurf acing worn parts with harder materials to protect against reverse flow was not affecte;. The SAR does not i

against abnormal wear; adding set screws to the disc arms to describe the disc stud / nut cocnection, shaf t/ tee arm, nor the j

4 l

prevent shaft travel; and installing 't pin through the disc materials of construction for these valves.

stod and nut to prevent the disc nut from deser. gag mg.

t i

NO3707 Based on Control Race Design qeview recosamendations, the There were no ef fects on any components in the NCR other than I

. lighting in the NCR was changed. A transfer switch was lighting. Plant operations and other system functions as l

installed that allows the transfer of all standby lighting described in T5s were not'affected. This modification had no 4.

load above the NCR suspended ceiling frors one lighting safety analysis impact.

cabinet to the other (L52 and LS4). The feeder for standby lighting above'the suspended ceiling was changed to a dedicated circuit using an existing spare circuit in both LS2

'and LS4. The 20-amp spare breaLers were replaced with 30 amp circuit breakers in order to carry the entire standby lighting load in the NCR. The wiring from LS2 and LS4 was thanged to a larger size wire. A subpanei containing two 20-asp circuit breakers was added as estra protection in case of a fault in the standby. lighting load. This modification j.

also rewired 32 lighting fixtures (16 for Unit 1 ano 16 for Unit 2) located above the suspended ceiling.

I M03960 A bypass line was installed around 1-PCV-63-58, a nitrogen There were no credible Tailure modes associated with this I

pressure regulator which supplies the cover gas to the CLAs.

DCN. There is not interaction with safety-related equipment cr compone is which could impair or hinder their required function (s The change did not ime.act the CtA coeration.

)

7 There was pact on any TS margin of safety.

1 L

2 l

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l 4

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i CHANGES IN FACILITY - NODIFIrATIONS i

ECN/DCN DESCRIPITON SUte%RY SAFETY APMLLYSIS SLHMARY M040F' The Unit 2 MSV 2-001-623, 624, 625. and 626 were upgraded.

The reliability of the valve was not adversely affected by Warn parts were built up to their original dimensions and the material upgrade, packing upgrade, disc stud upgrade, j

resurfaced with harder materials to protect against abnormal addition of set screws and pins, addition of disc stops, o.

wear. Additionally, the.ashers and tee arm were trimmed to by the live-loading of the packing. These modifications will i

provide for proper disc seating if nee #d.

Set screws were decrease maintenance requirements for the valves and reduce

[

j added securing shaft to disc arm to prevent shaft travel. A the necessity for online leak sealing. The upgrade did act 1

pin was installed through the disc stud and out to preves.t change the performance of the valves since no change was made

}

the disc nut from disengagin9 The packing arrangement was to the flow characteristics of the valves. These valves are upgraded by replacing the existing packing rings with an not specifically addressed within the TSs; therefore, no TS

[

j optimized five ring set.

The following changes were al?o change was - ~ tred.

j

{

made: (1) the tr.ansition radius on the disc stud where. the

(

tee are meets the disc was increased. (2) two disc stops wers l

added to the valve body so that the disc backstop now j

consists of three stops; and (3) acoustic moniten and visual ind8 retors were installed to monitor the check valves.

{

i N04073 This change involved performing a temporary leak sealing This change had no adverse impact on safety. Furmanitieg the i

operatien (Furmanite) on Unit 2 SGBD Valves 2-V V-1-829 and leaking valve does not prevent the valve from performing its 831.

functien. These valves are not addressed in TS 3/4.6.3.

No F

margin of safety was reduced.

i i

N04113 This DCN was issued to provide detailed inforw tion to allow No safety-related system covered by the TSs was adversely modifications to Unit I cable tray supports. Mark Nos. 30, affected by this DCN. The new designs meet or er reed SAR i

15d and 59.. These modifications were necessary to bring the connitments and do not deviate from any descriptior,in the i

affected cable tray supports into long-term compliance with SAR.- There was no change in any method of ensuring TS i

Design Criteria and the SAR.

compliance.

t No safety-related system covered by TS was adN -sely affected l

t*04162' This DCN was issued to provide detailed information to allow modifications to cable tray supports Mark Nas. 3E, 4E, and by this modificaticn. The new design met or uteeded SAR i

5.

The modif kations added members to the existing support cosusitments and did not deviate im any description in the

(

1 structures to bring the cable tray supports into compliance

SAR, I

with Design Criteria SQN-DC V-1.3.4 and Section 3.10 of the SAR.

t i

M04507 This DCN involved changes to the drains from the Unit 1 MS System function was not affected by adding design conditions i

dump system. The change involved adding design conditions to the drawing, upgrading pipe flanges, or documenting the (pressure and temperature) to the drawings. Also, some as-installed configerstion. These changes only served to i

i 2-inch pipe flanges were upgraded to a higher pressure rating. restore the drain system into compliance with the 4de cf i

j record for this system. SAR figures 10.3.2-1,

,0.4.2-1, and 10.4.7-1 were updated.

i i

l' M04584 This DCN was issued to provide datailed information tc allo.4 No safety-related system covered by the TSs was adversely i

modifications to Unit 2 cable tray Mark Nos. 1, 2, and 4A.

affected by this DCN. The new designs meet or exceed SAR

[

The modifications required that additional members be added comunitments and do not deviate f rom.eny SAR description. The l

to the existing support structures. These swifications were TS margin of safety was no reduced.

)

required to br*ng ti.e cable tray supports into long-term

}

compliance with Design Criteria and the SAR.

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. i CHANGES IN FACILITY - H0DIFICATIONS ECN/DCN QL$(RIPTION SUMMARI SAf ETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

N04664 One-inch full bore gate valves were installed into the 8-inch SAR Figure 6.3.2-1 required a change to show the addition of Schedule 40 stainless steel line directly downstream of Valve the 1-inch gate valve directly below FCV-63-8 end cf the 1-FCV-63-8 and one on the horizontal run of 8-inch piping 1-inch gate valve in the 8-inch horizontal line below directly below FCV-72-40.

FCV-72-40.

This modification did not increase tne probability for or consequences of an acciaent. There was no l

increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. IS 3/4.5.2 was r.at affected a

by this &ctivity nor was any associated TS basis.

H04667 This modification installed valves, piping, and a vendor skid Sectioe. 3/4.4.7 of the TS concerning the chemistry of the RCS i,

to inject morpholine instead of ammonia downstream of the was reviewed, and no changes to this section were required.

condensate demineralizers in Unit 1.

Appendix B of SQN TSs for Unit I was not altered by this change. SAR Sections 5.5.2.3.3, 10.3.5.3 and Figure 10.3.5-1 required revision to allow the use of either morpholine or ammonia for pH contros of the seccadary side. The use of morpholine and boric acid in the secondary system has been I.

evaluated. The use of morpholine and/or boric acid is consistent with the intent of the Westinghouse Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines, 1985. This change did not adversely af fect the safe operation of the plant and did not represent a potential USQ as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 criteria.

?

N05282 This DCN w?? issued to provide detailed information to allow No safety-related system covered by TSs was adversely modificaticas to cable tray supports Mark No. OlP, 7, 8, 2:e affected by this modification. The modificatsin did not and 8J.

The modifications to these cable tray supports added deviate from any description in the SAR and meets or exceeds members to the existing support structures, and anchor bolts SAR commitments.

4 were replaced on existing baseplates, to bring the cable tray i

supports into long-term compliance with Design Criteria i

SQN-DE-V-!.3.4 and Section 3.10 of the SAR.

'N05420 This DCN fulfilled the commitment for Unit I to install check SAR revisions were required to add the new valves to Section valves ;n the RHR pump discharge lines downstream of the XI testing and to add the description of the. valves to the miniflow lines as the solution to the problem of deadheading SAR. There was no increase in the probabi'ity of occurrencs of the RHR pumps. Also, as part of this modification, a new or consequence of an accident. No new acs cent possibilities vent valve was added to the miniflow piping oc each train to were created The rurgin of safety was not reduced.

allow venting of the RHR heat exchanger when drais.ing.

M05612 This DCN was' issued to provide detailed information to allow No safety-related system covered by TSs was adversely mod fications to cable tray supports Mark No. IB. 12. and affected by this modification. The modification did not i

21e. The modifications to these cable tray supports added deviate from any description in the SAR and meets or exceeds members to the existing support structures to bring the cable SAR commitments.

tray supports into long-term compliance nith Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-1.3.4 and Section 3.10 of th? SAR.

1

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4 m

, CHANGES IN FACILITY - HODIFICATIONS EQf/]Di QESCRIPiION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSI$_

SUMMARY

H05639 The straightening vanes upstream of the Unit 2 MfW pump Th<

em, i

'obtening vanes were located in the turbine oischarge flow elements (2-fE-3-70 and 84) were removed, and bu 'L 4 *

. ?c structure. The change increases the i.

the holes in the pipe that were used for holding the vanes in

<f i c: Tit: 0 seedwater system and flow elements place were plugged.

"-ir D J r

t-

,84 by eliminating a failure mode.

If i

4c aw elements were recalibrated af ter the nr. c n -

stra.;raca.ag vanes were removed. This change did not 3ffect the operating characteristics of any system f rom that described in the SAR, and there was no impact on TS compliance. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS wa-not reduced.

H0SS62 This DCN is the change control document that controlled the This modification was performed to ensure compliance with installation of a new power source for specific Unit 1 IS.

SAR figure 8.3.1-32 and Taales 8.1-14 and 8.1-18 were Appendix R required instrument loops. These instruments are revised. There wis no increase in the probability of required for a fire in the control building, and the new occurrence or consequences of an accident or equipment power tource is outside the control building, malfunction. No new accident or equipment malfunction passibilities were created. The TS mareiri of safety was not reduced.

N05953 This modificatica replaced a 1-3/8 inch diameter bolt / stud in There was no impact on TSs. The change did reet directly or the manway cover flange to the high-p' essure HSR on Unit 2 indirectly affect any information presented in the SAR or with a 1-1/2 inch diameter bolt / stud.

deviata from any $Ak description. Systec desion or functional requirements were not changed by the bolt / stud size change. This char.ge was acceptable from a nuclear safety standpoint.

9 H06005 This modification installed valves, piping, and a vendor skid Section 3/4.4.7 of the TS concerning the chemistry of the RCS to inject morpholine instead of ammonia downstream of the was reviewed, and no changes to this section were required.

condensate demineralizers in Unit 2.

Appendix B of Sequoyah TSs for Unit 2 was not altered by this change. SAR Sections 5.5.2.3.3, 10.3.5.3 and figure 10.3.5-1 required revision to allow the use of either morpholine or

.mnonia for pH control of the secondary side. The use of morpholine and boric acid in the secondar-; system has been evaluated. The use of rorpholine and/or boric acid is consistent with the intent of the Westinghouse Secor.dary Water Chemistry Guidelines,1985. This change did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant and did not represent a potential USQ as defined in 10 CfR 50.59 criteria.

N06023 The HbAC supply duct serving the RCS pressurizer enclosure The overall design air flow for the pressurizer enclosure did for Unit I was modified by installing an 8-inch branch duct not change, only distributed differently. This was done in with balance damper of f of the existing 26-inch supply duct an attempt to improve cooling around Valve A (which has to provide cooling near Valve A.

experienced more leaks than B or C) to reduce valve body temperature and hence operability. SAR Section 9.4, figure 7-1 was changed to show the additional cooling outlet and damper. There was no adversa impact or any TS margin of safety.

)

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CilANGES IN FACILITY - HODIFICATIONS UNDW DESCRIEIION

SUMMARY

SATLTY ANALYSIS SUffMRY

'N06041 Three fire protection sprinkler heads (with associated The addition af these three sprinkler heads did not impact piping, fittings, and hangers) were added in the Unit 2 the ability of the plant or plant staf f to perform required l

mechanical equipment room, el 749.0-A9, in the auxiliary functions. These three additional sprinkler heads provides a building. To accomplish this, an existing branch containing higher level of cooling and fire suppression capability than l

1 three heads was resized and extended to add three new heads.

actually required. SAR Figure 9.5.1-6, 47W850-6, required i

revision to reflect the sprinkler addition as did other

{

appropriate drawings. There was no reduction in any margin y

of safety.

L M06043 Three fire protection sprinkler heads, with associated The addition of the piping, fittings, heads, and hangers had pipicg, fittings, and hangers, were added in the Unit I no direct impact on the function and operation of any mechanical equipment room, el 749.0-A8, in the auxiliary satety-related systems, structures, or. components. The building. One sprinkler is supplied o a short 4*9" run of modification enhances the capabilities of the SQN Fire new pipe, and the other two sprinklen are in an 8' 11" run protection System. There was no reduction in any TS margin 4

of new pipe.

of safety.

N06080 This modification, performed in 0-L-4, corrected wiring This modification did.not introduce any new hardware or alter errors-in the 6.9kV Shutdawn Board 18-B and 28-8 aux'eliary any existing operating procedural requirements. The i

control room ammeter indicator circuit.

equipment involved performs exactly at the originci design intended. Equipment reliability is enhanced due to the i

return to a permanent nameplate configuration which shotid be i

less prone to reading or interpretation errors. These

[

[

indipators are Non-lE, Non-Q-List, Non-TS, and.Non-TS crepitance.

~N06116 Level transmitters 1-Lf-77-125, 126, 410, and 411 were This modification replaced obsolete level transmitters with replaced with Rosecount Hoael 1153 Series 0 transmitters and new units. It was a like-for-like replacement. The involved Model.1159 remote diaphragm seals Alto, 1-LT-77-125, 126 equipment was non-Class 1E, non-appendix R. and nonsafety reference 'eg end standpipe were vented to the existing related The entire modification complied to Seismic 6-inch diamater vent, and 1-LT-77-410, 411 :aference leg and Categorv I(L)B requirements. There was no increase in the standpipe were vented to existing 2-inch dimeeter vent which probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident.or extends to 15.22 feet above the raceway floor.

malfunction of equipment. The margin of safety as defined in 4

the basis of ar.y TS was not reduced.

M06118 This modification eliminated the electrohydraulic fluid level This (Aange is acceptable from a nuclear safety standpoint.

low turbine trip switch (1-LS-47-78/A) and electrohydraulic This modification oid not change any information contained in i

. fluid pressure low turbine trip switch (1-PS-47-20) from the the SAR text; however, SAR figures required revision. No 2

turbine trip circuits shown in Figure 10.2.2-1.

MCR alarms procedures or instructions were created or revised that i

remain active and SOIs require that specific' actions be taken differ from tne SAR or TSs, and no conflicts were created by the' operator to resolve the alarm condition.

with respect to those documents. There was no inc ease in the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident.

L The TS margin'of safety was not reduced.

l

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M06133 This DCN revised flow Diagram 47W866-4 to show fire dampers' Implementation o+ this change did not impzct any system

.I i

XfD-31A-227, 228, 231, and 232 as normally closed and added a requirement or functional requirement described in the SAR.

note stating that the fire barrier function of-these dampers This change did not impact TS compliance. No TS margin of f

is ensured during normal operation (since they will be safety was reduced.

normally closed) and that they are required to be opened l

during flood mode operation. Additionally, this DCN allowed 1

permanent removal of the turning vanes in the duct immediately in front of the tire dampers on the' control j

building side to facilitate inspection of the fire dampers through access doors in the duct.

4.

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CHANGES IN FACIfITY - HODIFICATIONS DESCRIPff0N

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMAR

[CN/DCM

'H06173 This DCN was issued to replace 10 level switches mounted on There is no requirement in plant TSs for th MS traps. This the Unit I drain pots that are located on the MS piping. Ten modification did affect the system description of the MS HS traps were replaced / modified along with discharge supply system in that some of the components of the MS traps l

piping / components from the drain pots to the condenser.

are stainless steel and this infomation must be added to the SAR. The f unctional requirements for the MS raps did not change. The system functions exactly as before but with increased reliability. The margin of safety as descaibed in the basis for any TS was not s educed.

H06185 The recirculation flow rate for each HDAfWP 1A-A and IB-B was There was no TS' impact. The modiiication did not change the increased from 25 to 130 gpa by upsizing the existing system design or functional requirements as presented in the recirculation orifices from 25 to 30 gpm and installing a SAR.

There was no increase in the probability of occurrence.

4.

2-inch,135 gom recirculation line parallel to the existing or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the recirculation line.

SAR. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

N06194 DCN H06194A removed the nuisance alarms determined to be from The operability and reliability of the equipment from which abandoned equipment from the plant annunciator system. The the alarms were removed is unchanged by this modification.

j plant annunciator is made up of nonsafety-related display The change was designed such that it did not change or 1

alarms in the NCR, introduce any new failure modes. Ttie alarms removed have i

been determined to be of no useful purpose, and the lack of the alarms poses no hazard to the remainder of the system.

There was no increase in the probability for or consequences i

of an accident. These alarms and their associated equipment are not required for meeting TSs. and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

H06203 This modification applied to Unit I and common and was SQN TSs do not specifically address annunciators and their designed to eliminate those nuisance alarms that require associated alarm circuitry. There was no increase in the 4

" interlocks" (or were consequently deleted) in order to probability for or consequences of. an accident. No new accomplish the des hed results necessary to compliment the accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as.

j development of the tilack board" concept. The modification defined ir. the basis for any TS was not reduced.

involved the instal' cioc on =)ondivisional, non-1E,

)

s nonsafety-related interlocks that do not affect safety-related functions.

H06205 To correct a problem of.CC.S tubing being used as a step by The addition of the protective cover over the CCS tubh to personnel in the areas and $.o prevent damage to other RCPs, protect it from personnel stepping on it did no* have an a protective cover was designed for all four pumps in both adverse impact on safety. This change did not affect the units. This modification installed protective covers for operation or design requirements of the RCPs or the RCS; i

Unit 1, over the CCS tubing, at the point where the tubing therefore, there is no potential for impacting TSs. The passes through the RCPs' motor support (at the point where activity did not affect any information presented in the SAR the tubing is used as a step).

or deviate from the description given in the SAR.

H06219 This modification reconfigured the annucciator circuitry The rewiring of the annunciator input cables and the addition associated with RH-90-1-101, 102, 103 so as to disable the of two relays did not impact the TSs. The modification was a acknowledgement and resetting of the at:Luiator high human factors engineering enh?ncement. The TS margin of s

radiation alarms for each RH until the a N iated seal-in safety was not degraded. The modification did not affect any relays are reset. An additional relay cnil was placed in information presented in the SAR, nor did it deviate f rom the series with' the existing seal-in relay coils for R&90-102 description given in the SAR.

(Train A) and RH-90-103 (Train B).

The annunciater system 3

input wiring was moved to tne normally open contacts of the additional relays for RM-90-102 and RH 90-103 and to a spare normally open contact

'.4 ;*w seal-in relay on R S90-101.

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. _.. CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/D@

DESCRIPTIDfL

SUMMARY

SAFETY AEALYSIS_SuffM81 N06227 This DCN removed interferences to allow installation of There were no changes to any information presented in the r

component cooling Heat f= changers IA1/1A2 and associated SAR. No changes to system design or functional requirements

. piping in later DCNs. Conduit Hanger 47A056-DV0034-001 was were involved with this modificatica. There was no impact on made modified to remove the side brace. ERCW hanger T5s.

478450-568-22 had steel members added on it and then other

. steel members removed. Chi.lled water piping was rerouted and resupported in the vicinity of the open stairs on el 714.

Chilled water piping serving AHU 2A on el 714 was rerouted.

M06259 Pressure indicators were added to both sides of the station The addition of the pressure indicators did not impact any control and service air and the auxiliary control air control function. They are strictly for local monitoring of afterfilters.

the differential pressure across the afterfilters. The indicators do not perform any nuclear safety functions.

M06265 This modification affected various instruments in the NCR.

All equipment addid. modified, or replaced was done so on These changes included such actions as: Chessell recorders such a manner that all loop functions and qualifications were in Panels 1-M-3.-1-M-4 and 1-N-6 were replaced with Yokogawa maintained. The changes performed by this modification to recorders; two existing Westinghouse VX252 indicators on the various components do not change the functional or Panel 1-M-1 were replaced with digital indicators f or logical operations of any af the affscted systems. SAR 1-EI-57-39 and 66;- 129 various recorder and indicator scales figures 5.1-6, 6.3.2-3 and 7.1.4-1 were impacted by the were replaced; two square root extractors werr installed to addition of new instrucents. There was no increase in the provide linear signal to their respective indiustors.

probability for or consequences of an accident or malfunction i

of equipment important to safety. No new accident possibilities were created. The T5 margin of safety was not reduced.

+

l M06277 The existing fire-rated walls above Door C23 on el 685 and

. The modification improved the fire resistance of the walls I

above Door C53 on el 732 of the control building were such that they meet the existing fire protection modified to make these fire walls meet their initial design requirements. A fire watch was posted to provide required requirements.

fire protection up to the time this modification was completed. The walls meet all seismic design criteria requirements. This modification did not conflict with or require a change in the TS or the SAR. There was no decrease in nuclear safety, and there was no safety analysis impact.

1 MD6279 As a result o'f problems with spurious signals on 0-RM-90-125, This modification did not inpact TS operability and the an evaluation was made of other RMs that may experience.

reliability of the RMs was enhanced. This modification did i

spurious signals due to LMI..This evaluation identified all not af fect equipment failure modes or increase the i

l RMs which if affected by EMI could initiate an ESF probability of equipment failure. Nuclear safety was actuation. These RMs were wrapped with EMI tape to shield enhanced by reducing the potential for spurious EST cables from stray EMI fields. A note was added to the wiring actuations.

diagrams' to wrap the exposed signal cables from the point i

where the cable exits the field conduit to the radiation

+

detector termination. Tnis DCN covered Unit 2.

N06280 As a result of problems with spurious signals on 0-RM-90-125 This modification did not impact TS operability and the an evaluation was made of other RMs that may experience reliability of the RMs was enhanced. This modification did spurious signals due to EMI. This evaluation identified all not af fect equipment failure nodes or increase the RMs which if affected by EMI could initiate an ESF probability of equipment failure. Nuclear safety was actuation. These RMs were wrapped with EMI tape to shield enhanced by reducing the potential fc,r spurious ESF cables from stray EMI fields. A note was added to the wiring actuations.

diagrams to wrap the esposed signal cables from the point

+

where the cable exits the field conduit to the radiation detector termination. This DCN covered Unit 1 and common.

_ _ - CHANGES IN FACILITY - H0DIFICATIONS ECN/DC8 DESCR!PlION

SUMMARY

3AFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

N06292 The CCP 18 in the CVCS was overhauled (at power operation)

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the under LCO 3.5.2 because of high vibration and low flow SAR was not increased by this modification. There was no conditions indicative of rotating element damage. This SA/SE increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of evaluated the electro-mechanical effects of the installation equipment important to safety beyond that analyzed. The of a stock higher hea) rotating element supplied by the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not original pump manufacturer as an equivalent (equal or better) reduced.

replacement for the original lower-head rotating element.

The new. higher-head rotating element fit the existing pump casing without modification. An orifice was added to the discharge of CCP 18 to balance it with existing CCP 1A low-head rotating element.. Piping supports were modified to allow installation of the orifice.

M06298

-This modification to the Unit 1 ice condenser refrigeration This activity required the revision of SAR figure 6.5.6-2.

This modification did not differ with or affect system system installed 3-inch flet stainless steel hose from the operation characteristics from that described in the SAR text expansion tank vent to a vertical dr.in line located in the or figures, nor did it dif fer with or af fect compilance with crane wall and approximately at azimuth 311' and el 775' 1 2',

lo' f acilitate the tie-in in the metal flex hose to the TSs. There was no increase in the probability for or existing 2-inch ve't' 'al drain line, a temporary' rubber or consequences of an accident. The TS margin of safety was not equivalent flex hose was installed as a bypass drain line.

reduced.

M06301 New locksets were installed in three HCR doors (C37, C53, and The Overly locksets have becn UL qualified for use on l

C60). A note was added to Drawing Series 46W454 (non-SAR fire-rated doors. The Overly latch bolts installed in Russwin locksets maintains the doors' Ut fire rating. The figures) to allow the use of Overly brand latch in any new locksets and latches meet or exceed the requirements of Russwin 5000 series lockset.

the old items. The reliability and operability of the doors

-did not change. The SAR was not affected by this modification.

K06331 This DCN installed shieldinr around the Unit I reactor head lhe installation of removable shielding to the reactor head to reduce collective radiation doses during refueling lifting assembly significantly reduces the radiation exposure activities. I-beam trolley assemblies were permanently to personnel performing refuel activities. This modification installed on each of the three reactor-head-lift-rig was deemed acceptable from a seismic and dead-weight aspect columns. The trolley assemblies support removable lead with no decrease to nuclear safety. There is no threat to shields that will be installed during refueling activities safety-related equipment, and there is no TS impact.

and removed during plant operation.

N06340 This DCN implements the corrective action of CAQR SQP890583 This DCN corrects the deficiency documented in CAQR that identified that the accuracy calculation for instrument SQP890583, thus allowing the system to operate as required loops described in this DCN did not consider via properly scaled instrumentation. These changes put the temperature-induced dif ferences for the pressure gradients system back into its originally analyzed configuration.

inside and outside containment. DCN, H06340 provided for:

Consequently, there was no negative impact on safety. There (1) minor circuit rewiring with the replacing of instruments was no impact on the basis of any TS sections. This DCN within the control loop to improve loop accuracy, and (2) corrects the CAQR condition to ensure that the SAR routing the sense line for the high-pressure side of the description is satisfied. The SAR text was not impacted.

transmitter to the top of the reactor building before

. penetrating the sh' eld building roof. Additionally, a portion of the existing high-pressure sense lines to these Pdis was removed and the existing sense lines were capped where the lines tee into the sense lines for PdT-30-146.149 and PdS-30-148 and 149.

, CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS fCN/DCN QL$CRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

M06355 This DCN addressed various modifications to the Unit low The probability of accidents previously evaluated in the SAR pressure feedwater heater replacement project for interface was not increased by these changes. This activity affected items and implementing the removal and rerouting of equipment only nonsafety-related and nonseismic equipment in the and el 706 in the turbine building.

turbine building that is not included in any accident evaluation in the SAR.

There was on impact on TSs. There wc*e no TS bases affected by these changes. The margin of safety was not reduced.

t H06356 This DCN made TACF 0-88-01-12 permanent. The TACF modified System function was not adversely affected by this the SQN auxiliary boiler control system to ease the modification. These modifications made the auxiliary boiler I

transition from manual to auto operation during start-up of system more reliable as demonstrated through a special test.

the boiler and to allow the fuel / air ratio to be contrelled The nonsafety controllers have no impact on the in parallel. This consisted of disabling the fuel and fuel safety-related auxiliary boiler system equipment or any other

air flow from the. fuel valve control loop. Combustion safety-related equipment.

condition controls were enhanced by relocating the air / oil' a

l ratio' relay controller to the imput of the forced draf t damper manual / auto station.

M06368 This modification removed the rotameter of 1-FIT-62-142 from Instrument toop 1-F-62-142 does not perform any the primary water supply line to the boric acid blender and safety-related function, receives r.ondivisional power, and is 9

replaced it with a pipe segment containing an orifice plate, not IS equipment. Although the loop is listed as a 15 l-fE-62-142. A suitable new replacement 1-f1T-62-142 compliance loop in TI-54, " Compliance Instruments," an i

. transmitter and power supply 1-PX-62-142 were installed in evaluation determined that the loop is not used in the TI-7, i

Panel' l-t-538. - The instrument loop was modified by "Heasurement of the At-power Moderator Temperature replacement of existing test point resistor, dropping Coefficient," and is not required for TS Compliance resistor, and installation of a new I/I converter module, determination. This modification replaced the flow 1-fH-62-142B,.in Rack 1-R-15.

indicating transmitter and alters other instruments interr.al

]

to the control system, however, functionally the control system performs as before. There was no increase in the probability for or consequences of an accident. No new accident possibilities were crected. The margin of safety was not reduced.

H06408 This permanent modification replaced TACF I-90-45-241 and There was no impact on nuclear safety. There was no impact added relay circuitry to provide a 10 second time delay on on TSs. The change did not impact or change the test, the turbine trip function of the gas-operated relay.af ter the tables, graphs and figures as described in the SAR.

deenergizing of the cooling oil pumps on the Unit I main i

transformers A, 8 C, SP.

The 10 second time delay feature 4

of this modification provides an adequate margin to prevent i

inadvertent turbine trips.

N06419 This DCN replaced the CCP 1A-A casing. This work was This change did ent affect the plant's ability to comply with implemeeted during Unit 1 Cycle 5 refueling outage, any of the applicable ISs that were reviewed. The change did not change or af fect the pumps normal or safety-related function. The replacement of the casing and associated parts t

improves the overall reliability of these pumps. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. No new accident possibilities were created.

The margin of safety was not reduced.

CHANGES IN FACILITY - H0DIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETf ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

M06421 This DCN implemented Unit i TSC computer system upgrades to The TSC computer systen will functicn exactly as designed to increase reliability / availability. Actions taken included retrieve and display data, with the only apparent change replacing the PDP 11/44 CPU with an 11/84 CPU, replacing being f aster response and higher reliability. The system existing RM02 drives with DEC RA8I drives, installing a design requirements and the system functional requirements Hegatape subsystem for use in backup and software updates, are not charged f rom the SAR description. The system 4

removing the 1511 tape units, and modifying software to operational characteristics are unchanged. The margin of accommodate new hardware.

safety as described in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

r M06422 This DCN implemented Unit 2 TSC computer system upgrades to The TSC computer system will f unction exactly as designed to increase reliability / availability. Actions taken included retrieve and display data, with the enly apparent change replacing the PDP 11/44 CPU with an 11/84 CPU, replacing being faster response and higher reliability. The system existing RM02 drives with DEC RAB? drives, installing a design requirements and the system functional requirements Hegatape subsystem for use in backup and sof tware updates, are not charged from the SAR description. The system removing the TSil' tape units, and modifying software to operational characteristics are unchanged. lhe margin of accommodate new hardware.

safety as described in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

4 M06440 This DCN disconnected an optional feature of the annunciator The modification did not degrade nuclear safety. This change 9

circuity for the " Flash with Manual Reset" and the "Reflash" ensures that each alarm is addressed and also requires i

type of sequence which allows the audible portion of the additional steps on operations to obtain a quiet board daring alarm to automatically silence, except in the backup control a transient. The annunciator system is a nonsafety-related room, after a period of time. Removal of this feature system. It provides indication only and has r.o control requires operator action to clear an alarm. The operator function. It is not addressed in TSs. There was no_ impact must now acknowledge the sound and lamp flash rather than on any margin of safety.

allowing the audible alarm to "tunc out."

4 H06441 This DCN disconnected an optional feature of the annunciator The annunciator system is a nonsafety-related system. This circuity for " Flash with Manual Reset" and the "Reflash" type system provides indication only and has no control function.

of sequence that allows the audible portion of the alarm to It is electrically isolated from the system in which the automatically silence, except in the backup control room, alarm condition exists. The system is not specifically af ter a period of time. Removal of this feature requires addressed in TSs. There was no impact on any TS margin of operator action to clear the alarm.

safety and no challenge to any limits defined in TSs. The SAR was not affected, e

N06445 This modification made the changes made by TACF 0-88-17-43 a The modifications are Incated in the turbine building, which permaneat plant installation. The TACF was written to close is a nonseismic structure, and in the titration room, which 4

SQ-STEAR-INST-84-04. The plant'was altered to set up lon is a nonseismic area in the auxiliary building. Therefore, Chromatography system sample feeds.

nuclear safety was not degraded. The samples taken are of secondary water systems. The material used to route the a

samples is stainless steel and teflon tubing. The system is not used f or any TS function and does not degrade nuclear safety.

H06527 This DCN replaced the Bussman NOM-10 branch control power The reliability of the D/G air compressor air dryer and fuses in Compartment 3C of the Diesel Auxiliary Boards IAl-A,-

af tercooler circuits was enhanced by the fuse replacements.

4 181-8,- 2Al-A and 281-8 for all D/G air compressor and The replacement fuses were installed in the same fuse blocks af tercooler circuits with 10 amp Bussmann Fusetron FRN-R-10 as the fuses that were replaced. The D/G start air (250V) dual-element time-delay fuses. Also, to maintain compressor, air dryer, and af tercooler systems are not selective ccordination, the existing 30 amp upstream control specifically addressed in TSs. This modification toes not bus supply fuses (Bussmann LPN-30).were replaced with affect or deviate from the system design or functional FRN-R-30 dual-element time-delay fuses.

requirements as described in SAR for the involved systems.

a 4

m

s CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECMlQCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

r

.j i

i H06555 1his change added flow restriction orsfices in the operating This change was made to restrict the vee 6 flow to within l'

vents of each of the No. 3 and No. 4 feedwater heaters f or design values. This modification did i affect TSs. System Unit 1.

design or functional requirements were s.vt changed. There j

was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. No new accident possibilities l

4 were created. ihe TS margin of safety was not reduceo.

M06563 This DCN made a permanent change to the portion of There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or TACF-0-90-60-043 that provided setpoint and scaling documents consequences of an accident. There was no increase in the for instruments associated with HZ and 62 analyzers and probability of a malfunction of equipment important to revised the instruction. The jumper that was installed to safety. The TS margin of safety was not adversely affected, disconnect the h2 alarm was removed by this DCN. This DCN s

also altered the internal panel wiring in Panel 3-L-206 to change the existing "0R" gate logic to "AND" gate logic. The annunciator Window 1 on Panel 0-t-206 was changed to "H /02 2

HI", and Window 2 was left blank.

4 i.

- N06589 The manipulator crane was upgraded to improve reliability.

The upgrade was performed with 1(L)b qualified components.

safety, and operability of the fuel hardling equipment by Components upgraded are functionally and electrically installing a 2100 pound underload safety circuit and qualified to the original requirements for the crane. The light / heavy underload safety circuit (including pregrammable performance of the crane was not adversely affected. It is limit switches), and a Sensotec lead system with quick expected that this modification will improve fuel movement disconnect plugs.

reliability over the existing design. Thes e was no impact on any TS margin of safety.

t H06597 This modification changed the S/G low-low-level trip The setpoint valves are not documented in the SAR, and this setpoints from 19 percent to 15 percent for the adverse change had no impact in the SAR. There was no increase in containment value and from 13 percent to 10.7 percent for the the probability of occurrence or consequences of an 3

normal environment allowance modifier ccatainment value.

accident. No new accident possibilities were created. The TS margin of. safety was not reduced, however, a TS change was L

1 requested.

N06608 This modification relocated the neutral grounding register The CTT neutral grounding resistor is non-Class IE and does fcr CTT B.

This was done to avoid conflicts with fire not perform a nuclear safety function. The DCN required a j

i protection piping and a new fire wall.

change to figure 8.2.1-2.

CTT B neutral grounding resistor appears in the SAR drawing as' background information and does not af fect text, procedures, or other items found in the SAR. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences'of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. No new accident possibilities or probabilities of equipment malfunction were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

M06624 A portion of the condensate demineralizer system 3-inch Implementation of this change did not impact any system -

carbon steel neutralized waste to cooling tower blowdown requirement or functional requirement described in the SAR.

piping in the yard was replaced with No system functional or design requirement was impacted in Acrylonitrile-Butadiene-Styrene plastic pipe.

any way. This change was acceptable from a nuclear safety standpoint.

i CHANGES IN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS t

f,[y/Q[3 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

Mf ETY Af(ALYSIS SUMMAlY N06641 This modific. tion replaced the flow orifices (1-FE-67-61 and One header at a time was worked, and the proper LCOs were

62) used to measure Unit 1 ERCW Main Header A and B flows.

entered as required for the header under work. Table 7.5-2 1

The new orifice plates provide a better measurement at the of the SAR required revision to indicate that the variable lower flowrates required f or Section XI testing.

range for the ERCW header flaw changed to 0-8000 gpm for Unit I headers. There was no increase in the probability of an i

accident or the consequences of an accident. The EQCW is l

still able to perform its safety functions. No new accident 4

possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

M06646 This DCN modified the Unit I west MSVV blow-out roof. The There was no imoa(t on T5s. SAR text was affected in the existing roof at el 765 was removed and replaced with light description of the high roof. The modification made no roof on top of the concrete wall at el 778'-6".

The light change to system design, ftaction or operation as described roof is designed to blow off between 0.23 psid and 0.31 psid in the SAR. There was no increase in the probability for or 4

pressure without fail back.

consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR.

4 No new accident possibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

M06647 This DCN implemented required modificaitons to the Unit 1 The unit i TS 3/4 7.1.1 and 3/4 7.1.5 were reviewed ano the.re east NSVV blowout roof. The existing east MSVV high roof at is no impact because of this change. The modification did el 750 was removed and replaced with light roof on top of the not alter inforaation presented in the SAR. No SAR tab!es.

concrete wall at el 753.

graphs are involved. However. SAR text was affected in the Jescription of the high roof. There was no increase in the i

prtbability of an accident. The modification did not increase the prebability of occurrence of a m.insnction of equipment important to safety. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety as described i.. to, basis for any 15 was not reduced.

M06643 This DCP irplemented required modification to the Unit I west This change did not increase the probability of occurrence or I

HSVV rcan blowout plugs. The six concrete blowout plugs were consequences of any accident as defined in the SAR. Its replaced with steel hatches.

interaction with safety-related systems, con;ponents and other structures was unchanged before the modification. The modification did not increase the probability of occurrence of malfunction of equipment important to safety. No new accident possioilities were created. This modification did i

not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.

4 M06667 This modification' involved relocation of the Unit 1 MSVV roof The aodification did not alter information presented in the fans and their associated dampers following the replacement SAR. No SAR text, tables, or graphs were involv?d. however, i

of the east and west MSVV roo' with blow-off' roofs and the SAR figure 9.4.2-5 was affected in the elevation change shown raising of the roofs.

for the MSVV fans and associated dampers. Raising the fans

~

causes no real change to system design, function or operation as described in the SAR. This modification did not increase the probability of orcurrence or the consequences of an j -

accident. There was no impact on the possibility of 1 malfunction of equipment important to safety. The actie te did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the ba.es i

of any TS.

1

i, CHANGES IN FACILITY - M001FICAl f 0NS LQUDQi DfMRIPT10tLSW2iMY SAf ETY ANALYSI5 SM!giHY N06675 This DCN changed the valve component identifier names on 32 The change to the valves was in name only. There was no valves in the D15 starting air system from FCV or PRV to change to operability requirements of these valves. No PCV.

These valves were intdvertently named wrong; this physical work wLs done other.han retagging. The valves change corrected this error and made the valves name match continue to perform their des ign function.

their f unction.

I N06742 This DCN reviewed Unit I ventilating system, sampling system, This modification did not affect and/or impact the safety RCS, nuclear instrumentation, and incore instrumentation function of any equipment or system.

It. therefore, did not I-Tab drawinqs for the appropriate PAM/ Train designations.

decrease nuclear safety in the plant.

The applicable revision to the I-Tab drawir.gs, the Q-List and the EMS documents were made to show tne as-constructed identifications. The I-Tab drawing " Remarks / Power" columns were corrected to show the appropriate PAM/ Train designation 1

for the lE instruments and "ND" for the nondivisional instruments.

j M06743 This DCN reviewed Unit 2 ventilating system, sampling This modification did not af fect and/or impact the safety i

. system, RCS, nuclear instrumentation, and incore function of any equipment or system.

It, therefore, did not instrumentation I-Tab drawings for the appropriate PAM/ Train decrease nuclear safety in the plant.

2 designations. The applicable revision to the I-Tab drawings.

the Q-List and the EMS documents were made to show the I '

as-constructed identifications. The I-Tab drawing i

" Remarks / Power" columns were corrected to show the 1

appropriate PAM/ Train designation for the IE instruments and "ND" for the nondivisional instruments.

2 i

M06766 This DCN provided a qualified exnansion joint detail for two There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or i

auxiliary building shield walls (41N372-2) at their interface consequences of an accident. The modification did not with the reactor building exterior shield walls (41N112).

introduce any new failure modes. The change was not related The joint detail is shown on Drawing 46W466-3.

to any TSs. Therefore, no margin of safety as defined by any 1

TS was reduced.

3 H06775 This modification installed a high-head rotating element in All TSs directly or indirectly affected by this modification CCP 1A-A. ' The replacement element is equivalent to the were reviewed for potential impact as a result of the i

existing pump casing without casing modification. This DCN changes. No impact was determined to exist. SAR figure i

also removed the flow limiting orifice in CCP IB-B discharge 9.3.4-1 was impacted and required revision. The system line and replaced it with a spacer having an inside diameter design and functional requirements were unchanged. The equal to that of the discharge pipe, modification did not increase the probability of occurrence l

of an accident or malfunction of equipm3nt important to safety. The change diu not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

M06794 Cable 2PL6770 is a 480V supply to the Refueling Water TSs were not impacted by this cable modification. The j

Purification Pump Bl.

This modification replaced Mark No.

changeout of the power cable with another IE cable did not 1.

WD8-1 (approximately 30' feet) of this cable with a new cable dif fer with, or a adversely af fect, system operational 1

from Contract No. 825342-1. The existing cable was just

' characteristics from that described in the SAR.

.l I

short of making the connection af ter the pump motor's f rame was changed out.

4 m

i '

CHANGES JN FACILITY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTIQN

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

H06838 Supply air to the unloader valves on the nonsafety-related The station control and service air system af fected by this i

Control Air Compres ors A, 8, C, and D was rerouted activity does not perform a safety-related function. There downstream of the air dryers to provide a dried air source.

was no increase in the probability of occurrence or toad / unload setpoints f or Service Air Compressor E were consequences of an accident. The margin of safety as defined revised to allow Compresso-E to operate as the lead in the basis of any TS was not reduced.

compressor for the nonsafet -related station control and service air system.

M06850 As a solution to the problem of Operations personnel manually This modification was performed during Unit 1 Cyrle 5 venting the system to release trapped undissolved hydrogen refueling outage. SAR Figures 6.3.2-1 and 9.3.4-1 were 4

gas, valves were installed to evaluate the possibility of affected in the changing of the vent valve configuration. No venting the hydrogen from existing buildup areas to the VCT change to system design, func+ ion or operation as described l

outlet piping. '

in the SAR occurred. There was no increase in the j

probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of equipment. There was no increase in the consequences of an accident of malfunction of equipment. The margin of safety was not reduced.

l H06933 This modification changed the temperature / pressure setpoints The modification did not increase the probability of for the low tempe ature overpressure protection system. This occurrence or consequences of an accident previously change resulted from the Eagle 21 upgrade that occurred evaluated in the SAR. This modification did not alter the i

turing the Cycle 4 refueling outage, a recent change to SQN's hardware configuration of the plant nor invoke operation 1

• CS pressure-temperature limits, and the extended eifective requirements on the involved instrumentation outside the.

i full power years for 10 CFR 50 Appendix G from 9.2 to 16 scope of its design specifications. This modification did years.

not affect the ability of any safety-related system or component to mitigate any accident for which it was designed. There was no reduction in any TS margin of safety.

H064U6 This DCN installed an isolation valve in the Unit 1 bearing This change improves system reliability and maintenance.

j lube water supply line to CCW Pumps lA, IB,.and IC.

This change did not impact the TSs. The DCN did affect SAR Figure 9.5.1-12. Drawing 1, 2-47W832-1, " Flow Digram-Raw Service Water Cooling & Fire Protection," by adding an isolation valve to the bearing lobe water supply line to the i

Unit 1 CCW pumps. The modification did not change the design I

or function of the CCW system, nor that of either the RSW cooling system or the fire protection system. There was no 1

increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

1

- M07144 Bored-out orifice plates previously installec on the This activity did not increase the probability of occurrence discharge lines to the containment spray headers were removed or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the and new orifice plates were installed with a bore sufficient SAR. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence to limit total CSS flow to 9500 gpm from the RWsi. NE also or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to qualified the CSS pumps with the full-size impellers that safety. No new accident possibilities were created. The were purchased from Sulzer-Bruchsal in 1975 and the one activity did not reduce the margin of safety,as defined in installed in CSS Punp 18 in 1988.

the basis for any TS.

4 4

3

~

-4 5-I' l

l C:iANGES IN FACILITY - H0DIFICATIONS i

ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY AHALYSIS

SUMMARY

G06209 DCR 2634 and 3219 described problems associated with various All replacement valves and components were procured on an l

sampling system valves presently in use, obsolete replacement individual basis to meet or exceed the required parts, maintenance difficulties, and ALARA considerations specifications. The new devices did not change the contributed to a need for a suitable replacement. The f unctioral characteristics of their associated loops and will i

subject obsolete valves, which are all air-operated Hoke sperate within the parameter for which they were designed.

valves with bellows assembly, were replaced with Copes-Vulcsa There was no reduction in nuclear safety.

walves. This is a generic DCN that allowed the valves to be j

replaced upon f ailure or when the. benefit of improved plant operations became apparent.

E i

507327

.Since furmanited Valve 2-VLV-1-818 had been replaced by WR There were no TSs impacted by this activity. This did i

8795596 with a valve identical to the criginal valve, this involve deleting a note from Drawing No. CCD No.1 DCN was for documentation only to remove all reference to 2-47W801-2 <Fith is included in the SAR as figure No.

Furmaniting for documents issued by DCN N01007 and H01348, 10.4.B-1.

There was no increase in the pruoaaility of occurrence or consequences of an accident of malfunction of safety equipmant. No new accident of equipment malfunction possibilities were created. 'The margin of safety was not 4

reduced.

1 f

I 3 '

i

}

)

1 l

CHANGES IN THE FACILITY - HDDIFICATIONS i

LW/fW DESCRIPTION SUMtMY SMETY ANALYSIS SNtM 1

X00001 Leaks had occurred in some of the inlets and outlets This modification did r.ot af fect TSs or involve a USQ. This connected to the condenser water boxes. This modification modification did not change system functional operability.

consisted of removing an internal protective ring and then This modification has been successful for the same coating the inside of the joint bellows with Belzona.

application at other plants.

1 X00018 A micro-adjustable needle valve was installed in place of the This was a vendor recommended change. This modification did existing check / relief valve within the hydrogen analyzer.

not change system functicral operability. There was no impact on any TS margin of safety.

X00026 DCN X00026 separated powerhouse area sanitary water / sewage The yard sewage system does not intertie with or af fect the from all other sewage generated at the Sequoyah site. The safety function of any safety-related system essential to existing Design Services Complex package plant and the old safe operation of the plant. Operability of components 4

Of fice and Services Building sand filter treatment unit were important to safety have not been affected. There was no deactivated. Powerhouse sewage continues to'be treated by impact on any IS.

the esisting aerobic treatment system located northeast of the O&PS Building. Other sewage is routed to a common collective point and then pumped offsite to the Soddy-Daisy j

regional sewage system.

X00044 Vent holes were cut in dropping resistor box for Unit 2 TDAFW This modification did not affr-TSs or involve a USQ. The pump controls to dissipate heat buildup, which has caused modification did not change system functional operability.

component failure.

ISs do not address this level of detail.

- X00066 Internal wiring of Recorners 0-TR-82-5036/I, 5036/2, 5036/3, The modification did not involve a change in the facility or and 5036/4 was modified to permit proper annunciator response plant operating characteristics f rom that described in the from the recorders to existing Annunciator Window 30 on Panel SAR. There was no change to system functional operability.

M-26 in the HCR, and annunciator on Panel 0-L-4 in the The modification did not af fect TSs or involve a USO.

auxiliary control room.

X00070 A new I/4-inch check valve was added to the 1/4-inch tube The new check valves stabilize calibration and reagent gas immediately downstream of the. hydrogen analyzers iunit 2 flow to the analyzers allowing the analyzers to be within the Trains A and B) calibration panels to stabilize calibration i

1.5 percent accuracy requirement committed to in the SAR.

gas and reagent gas flLw rates in accordance with vendor This mcdification did no' af fect TSs or involve a USQ. The reconsendations, modification did not chat.ge system functional operability X00081 The setpoints for D/G day tank level Switches 0-LS-18-62A/D This modification did not involve a change in the facilit, or through 64A/B and 77A/B through 79A/B were changed to meet plant operating characteristics from that described in the the performance ' criteria of SHI-0-18-1, "Setpoint SAR and which could impact nuclear safety. The modification Verification of Diesel Generator Day Tank Level Switches."

did not change system functional operability. The change did The switches had been calibrated using floor elevation level not af fect TSs or involve a USQ.

as a basis even though several of the switches are moun*ed at.

different elevations because of the nonuniformity of the I

floor in all D/G building locations. The'setpoints to these 1

switches were changed using the top of each tank as a basis.

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, a CHANGES IN THE FACILTTY - HDDIFICATIONS LENIDCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

X00115 A 1/16-inch diameter hole was drilled in the spring rod to This was a minor mcdification to a handling toci to improve provide for cotter pin and a spacer was inserted between the operability of the tool. The change did not affect T5s i

cotter pin and lock arm to prevent the spring rod f rom or involve a USQ. The modification did not change system binding, which has interferred with proper operation of functional operability. and it did not require a change to 0-T00L-79.

This tool is used to handle fuel in the SFP.

the SAR or design criteria.

X00133 This DCN revised the logic of operation associated with the This change did not increase the probability of occurrence or Unit 2 CCps. A 10 second time delay was added to the CCPs' the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.

control circuitry, which allows the pumps to start 10 seconds The time delay installed ensures the availability of the CCPs af ter the manual initiation of a " START" signal. This was an during normal and abnormal conditions. There was no adverse input to an "0R" logic along with the lobe oil pressure impact on the operability, performance, or reliability of the setpoint input.

pumps. The modification did not af fect TSs or involve a U50 X00140 The instantaneous overcurrent trip setting for all motors Thi; change eliminated the possibility of inadvertent breaker listed in proposed disposition of CAQR SQP871238 powered by trips. This did not affect TSs cr involve a USQ. System 6.9kV ERCW shutdown boards and the 480V CCS pump motors were functional operability was unchanged.

i reset to a minimum of 200 percent of the motors' locked rotar current.

i X00155 CAQR SQP880101 identified a problem which causes a mild This DCN did not af fect TSs or involve a USQ. System environment to be reclassified as harsh as a result of a functional operability was not changed. The change did not postulated critical crack in the HS/fW lines. All 1E involve a change in the facility f rom that described in the equipment in Unit 2 714-A12 was reevaluated and upgraded as SAR.

required.

X00163 This DCN qualified Hangers 2-H3-295, 306, and 307 as existing This modification did not af fect TSs or involve a USQ. ' There in the field; qualified worn pipe near Hanger 2-H3-306 and was no change to system functional operability. There was no 2-H3-307; qualified pipe. weld ground flush at top and bottom changa to the facility as described in its SAR. The margin of pipe weld near Hanger 2-H3-295.

of safety was not reduced.

X0166 The Unit I normal feeder breaker on 480V S/D Board 1 Al-A Increasing the long delay trip setting improves operability.

(Compartment 10B) was reset from 392 amps to 500 amps.

reliability, and performance. Maintainability was not 4

impacted. The change did not af fect ISs or involve a USQ.

There was no adverse change to system functional operability.

)

X00188 for the Unit 2 CVCS Pipe Support 47A053-714 was modified to This change did not af fect TSs or involve a USQ. The j

allow spring to function.

modification did not change system functional operability.

l X00191 Valve 1-67-608B was replaced with a valve originally ordered The new valver meet all the safety requirements of the old for ECN L5009 (stainless steel changeout) to be used in this valves and pressure boundaries are maintained. There was na spot. Valve 1-70-743 was replaced with a valve transferred impact on neclear safety. The replacement valves ensure that i

f rom Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant.

current design specifications are satisfied.

2 4

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4 i CHANGES IN THE FACitIlY - MODIFICATIONS ECN/DCN DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

X00199 The damaged breaker in S/D Board 2B1-B Compartment 48 was This change did not involve a change in the f acility f rom replared with a spare breaker currently in $/D Board 282-B that described in the SAR. The change did not affect i$s or Coopartment 30.

The breaker was reset.

involve a USQ. The modification did not change system functional operability.

i X00216

- The loops with 10 ohm dropping resistors for TSC35 input were This modification did not affect TSs cr involve a U50 The

}

replaced by 100 ohm resistors. This changed the signals to a modificetion did not change system functional operability.

l-5 volt range since they are in current loops. This made There was no impact on safety.

j the input signals less susceptible to noise. In cases where both~ redundant SPDS points were assigned to the same multiplexor, one of the points was moved to another 4

multiplexor.

X00247 Unit 2 containment ' integrity was being degraded by using a This modification did not af fect TSs or involve.a USQ. The l

test tee with threaded cap in the sense line to PI-63-74 modification did not r.hange system functional operability, between the inboard and outboard CIV FCV-63-71 and The change brings the plant into compliance with 10 CFR 50 FCV-63-84. The threaded cap was replaced with a manual Appendix A.

The margin of safety es defined in the basis for valve, which meets the requirements for containment any T5 was not reduced.

isolation. The valve was tagged and locted closed.

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4 d

t 1 CHANGES IN THE FACILITY-fEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS IAC[

DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

0-91-008-039 This TACF installed a temporary differential pressure gauge This.TACF did not ir act the control. logic or fonction across level gauge (0-t!S-39-36) on 6-Ton Co2 storage tank in of any cther equipment. This modification was confined the D/G building.

in a room from ether safety-reTated equipment located in the D/G building. Implementation of this TACf was necessary to comply with TS 3/4.7.11.3.2 while 0-LIS-39-36 was ir. operable. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

i 0-91-009-028 This TACF removed Valves 0-28-505. 0-FCV-28-7. 0-28-647, and The turbide building MWIP flow diagram. SAR figure G-28-649 and capped each line to prevent future leakage to 9.2.3.1 was affected by this TACF. The text and tables the turbine building MWTP sump and potential deadheading of of the SAR were not affected. The affected equipment I

the new MWTP sump pumps.

is not addressed in T$. and this activity did not adversely affect any equipment addressed in 15s. The activity did not introduce any new failure codes. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

i 0-91-011-067 This TACF installed a temporary bull hose (2-inch diameter)

The bull hose to the MCR Chiller B dio rot af fect the on the discharge side of the MCR Chiller B.

This bull tose possibility of any accident previously evaluated in the was connected f rom the chiller condenser discharge to the SAR. A compensatory measure sas utilized to station an

(

s plug valve (0-TCV-67-201). The plug vaive was used for ADO at the chiller to isolate the ERCW ficw when i

j throttling condenser water flow (ERCW).

informed of the event initiation by the HCR. The ADO remained there as long as this TCf was in af fect.

j Additionally, if the hose developcd a leak, a second hose was available for installation. The TS margia of i

safety was not reduced.

j 0-91-016-027 This TACF installed temporary piping to reroute system supply This activity did not affect any safety-related I

j headers around the new cafeteria construction area until a eq:sipment. and the frequency of accidents or pe aent reroute design is implemented, operational transients referenced in the SAR was nnt increased. No new failure modes or accidents was 4

{-_

created by this TACF. Measures were established to monitor iake level for flood protection in accordance with TS 3/4 while the tie-ins were made. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

0-91-019-026 This TACF increased the fire protection header pressure by This activity ensured the operability of the fire permitting the back pressure control valve (0-fCV-26-15) protection system and did not adversely af fect any setpoint to vary from 135 to 150 psig.

safety-related system or equipment. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consecuences of an accident or malfunction of i

equi psent. No new accident possibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

0-91-022-077 This TACF provided a hookup for directing processed liquid This. activity did not increase the probability of any radwaste from the RAD dis to the CDWE distillate tanks in accident previously evaluated in the SAR. The TACF did additions to the monitor and cask decon collector tank.

not increase the probability of occurrence of a Transfer was through spent resin transfer and CDWE bottoms malfunction of equipment. The margin of safety was nc*

transfer. line to CDWE distillate tanks via a temporary bull reduced.

I hose.

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f' CHANGES IN THE FACILTTY-TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS TACF DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAEETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

0-91-037-317 Eleven (11) thermocouple probes were routed through existing The TACF provides a remote means of monitoring room penetrations to monitor the temperature of the " AREA 1" temperature without requiring a person to physically be locations. The thermocouple cables were connected to a data in the room. This eliminated the need for a continuous logger at a control location in the auxiliary building. The fire watch in these eleven high radiation area thermocouples were placed at a minimum of six feet above the locations. The margin of safety was not reduced.

floor. Cable trays were not used to route the cables.

0-91-050-400 This TACF was written to install a small office building on The approved TACF had no irpact on any Chapter 15 WR C053962 Unit 1 MSR floor turbine building. The building on the Unit accidents. The building was to be constructed outside 2 side was being utilized by DPSO and could not accommodate the Category I structure where no equipment important any additional personnel. The TACF was approved, but not to safety was located. No new failure modes would be installed.

created, lhe installation of the small office building would not impact the TS rargin of safety.

l 0-91-055-013 Fire detection system panels 0-L-616, 0-L-613. 0-L-008.

Jumpering the non-TS fire pump ruaning alarms is not of.

0-L-609, and 0-L-615 have been declared inoperable because concern since Operations has indication in tae MCR of alarms f rom'these non-TS zones were masking trcuble alarms fire pumps running via the hand switch lights and tne from TS zones. This TACF installed jumpers on the non-TS MCD window. The installation on the jumpers on the zone alarms to ensure operability of the fire detection non-TS header leaking alarms ensures TS operability of system panels.

the panels and fire zones until CAQR SQP870921 4

j corrective action is implemented. There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequeiccs of an acrident or equipment malfunction.

No new accidents or malfunct*on of equipment

)

possibilities were created. The.TS margin of safety was not reduced.

4 4

t l-91-021-041 Containment penetration X-118 was modified during the outage This configuration was installed af ter the unit entered to allow routing of temporary service air through existing Mode 5 and was removed and the blind flange reinstalled t

S/G layup piping. A temporary air compresscr was placed in and tested before reentry ints Mode 4.

This activity 1

the Unit I additional equipment building and was hooted up did not affect any system which could affect any of the via temporary flexible hose to the flange near Valve 1-503.

DBAs addressed in the SAR. Containment closure A Class B check valve and assembly were bolted to the requirements were met for this activity. No other existing inboard penetration flange. A Class B manual valve systems were affected by this change. There,was no was bolted to the outboard flange of the penetration. Air adverse impact on safety-related equipment. The margin hose was installed f ran the valves to the existing S/G layup of safety was nat reduced.

piping on both sides of the penetration.

1-91-035-068 The PRT is designed to operate at 120 F initial temperature.

The PRT is not safety-related equipment. The use of 0

2-91-036-068 The PRTs have been operating at elevated temperatures sbeve the PRT is not discussed in Chapter 15 accident 132 F.

This was contrary to the s equirement specified in the analysis of the SAR.

The failure.of the PRT will not 0

SAR, Westinghouse design criteria and 507-68.1, " Reactor impact any safety system. There was no increase in the 4

Coolant Systems-Units I and 2."

.This TACF allows operation probability of occurrence of consequences of an C

of the PRT between an approximate upper temperature of 150 T accident or malfunction of equipment important to to 160 F for the rest of the fuel cycle. The temperature safety. The PRT is not safety-related, therefore, TS 0

alarm and annunciation were set at 155 F by these TACFs.

bases were not affected, 0

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k 3-CHANGES IN THE FACILITY-TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

.TAEL DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

l 1-91-038-20) Additional cooling capacity was required during the UICS The systems affected by this activity are not required 1 41-042 088 refueling catage to reduce the temperature inside containment to be operable during Modes 5 and 6, e= cept for y

to allow outage work to be performed. Increased cooling containment isolation capabilities of penetrations capacity was accomplished by supplying chilled water to the X-108, ad X-109 during a flood warning, f uel handling ccoling coiis of the two permanent lower compartment coolers, activities, or midloop activities. Appropriate 4

LCC 1A and LCC 3C, using a temporary system of water chiller measures were established to enture containment packages, valves, and hoses connected to the LCC FRCW supply integrity and isolation were maintained during a flood and return piping and using the.LCC fans to circulate warning, core alterations, and mid'nop activities. The i

containment air as it passes over the coil structure.

ERCW system was realigned and reste-ed before entering Mode 4.

Appropriate special requ ements ensured equipment important to safety was not adversely affected. The margin of safety was not reduced.

1-91-039-030 These TACFs disconnected the feeder cables to CRDH Fans 1A-A CRDH fans are not covered by TSs. The CRDM fans are 1-91-040-030 and 1B-8 ar.d utilized these power circuits as a temporary needed to support normal plant operation only. The source of 480V, 3-pnase power inside Unit I primary TACfs were 'n place only in Modes 5 and 6.

There was 4

containment during the UICS refueling outage. The CRDH fans no increase in the probability of occurrence or were' restored to normal and the TACFs closed before Unit I consequences of an accident or malfunction of entered Mode 4 at the completion of the outage.

equipment. The margin of safety was not reduced. SAR j

Figure 8.3.1-13 and 8.3.1-15 were revised to reflect this plant configuration while the TACFs were in place.

4

[

i 1-91-057-20? During the performance of DCN E07713 on 480V S/D Board 102-B, The operating characteristics of the polar crane were I

a f ault was imposed on the main bus causing damage to the not affected by this TACF. The operation and i

board. This board was rendered inoperable, and power was-capabilities of the 480V $/D Board 181-8 were not lost to the polar crane during refuel operations. This TACF affected by this change. When 480V S/D Board 182-B was

. provided power te the polar crane. The required power was restored to operability, this TACF was closed. There i

provided from 480V S/D 181-B by installing a temporary cable was no increase in the probability of occurrence or f rom compartment 50 to a splice in Cable IPL4610.

consequences of a previously evaluateo accident or 1

malfunction of equipment. No new accident or equipment malfunction possibilities were created. The margin of safety as described in the basis for any 15 was not reduced.

}

1-91-058-201 During the performance of DCN E07713 on 480V S/D Board 182 P The operation and capabilities of the 480V S/D Board i

a fault was imposed on the main bus causing damage to the 181-B were not affected by this change. Then 480V S/D board. This board was rendered inoperable, and power was Board 182-8 was restored to operability. this TACF was 4i lost to the MCR Anu B-8.

This TACF provided power and closed. There was no increase in the probability of j

limited control functions to MCR AHU B-B.

The required power occurrence or consequences of a previously evaluated was provided from 480V S/D 1B1-B by installing a temporary accident or malfun(tion of equipsent. No new accident cable from Compartment IOC to a splice in Cable 1PL45108.

or equipment malfunction possibilities were created.

The margin of safety as described in the basis for any TS was not reduced.

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I

CHANGES IN THE FACILITY-TEMPORARY MDGIFICATIONS I

{

TACF DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

)

1-91-059-056 This TACF removed Morgan Temperature Monitoring Unit there was no adverse impact on any TS.

The temperature 1-1H-56-2 from Rack 112 in the auxiliary instrument room and monitoring system is not mention in the SAR, but the replaced it with a Fluke 2286 with an expansion chassis or TACF did change the pin and panel locations for the equivalent.

affected temperature elements. This did affect variou3 t

control drawings which af fected SAR figures. There was i

no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of '

j equipment. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

i 4

2-91-032-056 This TACF removed 2-TM-56-2 from Rack 112 in the auxiliary There are no design basis accidents affected by this h

F zi instrument room and replaced it with a Fluke 2240C. The MCR change. The temperature monitoring equipment reg. laced

~j '

annunciator on panel 2-H-6 is enabled f rom this system as by this TACF is not required for plant safety and is before, but because of compatibility problems, the data from not part of the engineered safety systems. No new the Fluke monitor is not available f rom the remote printer accidents or equipaent malfunctions were created. The located in the Control Panel 2-M-10.

The Fluke 2240C has a 15 margin of safety was not reduced.

I local printoet, which is available in the auxiliary instrument room.

1 l

2-91-051-026 This TACi allowed the HPFP system to be the source of TSs 3.7.11.1 and 3.7.11.4 were reviewed and no conflict suppression water for temporary trailers 5tationej on el 732 was found. There was no impact on TSs. There was no of the turbine building floor and on the Unit I side weather change in any functional requirements of system design 4

deck.

requirements presented in the SAR. However, since the TACF did change Several valve positions that are shown in SAR Figure 9.5.1-1. a change to the SAR was required

)

of the duration of the TACF. This activity did not t

j adversely af fect any safety-related equipment. The probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment imoortant to safety was not increased. No new credible' t

failure modes or accidents were created. The margin of i

safety was not reduced.

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Previously Reported TACFs Remaining Open December'31. 1991 1-85-0070-030 2-90-0034-062 0-87-0004-234-1-90-0035-0062 2-90-0049-241 0-88-0018-317 0-89-0032-062 0-90-0026-078 l

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i i P90CEDURE REVISIONS 2

PROCEDURE _30 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

0-SI-ICC-043-CHANNEL CALIBRATION OF WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM OXYGEN AND Superseding SI-243 with 0-ST-ICC-043-500.0 resolves the 0-0 5000 AND 0-H 5001 procedural issues identified in the tiR. This procedure 500.0 HYDROGEN ANALYZERS LOOPS 2

2 revision a,J the TACF ensure that the alarm function on ICF 91-0018 This ICF was written to revise the SI-243 (now Panel 0-L-2 provides indication of potentially explosive H -02 gas mixtures in the gas decay tanks. These 0-51-1CC-043-500.0) to include the 02 alarm setpoint at a 2

maximum allowable value of 2 percent by velume. It activities ensure the required 07 alarm function is not incorporated setpoints on the waste gas a"ilyzer and deleted masked by normally occurring H2 Tevels above 4 percent.

Hp alarm verification in accordance with *. ACF 0-90-60-043, There was no adverse impact on the control, logic, or LER 50-327/90025 corrective action, and issued setpoint and function of any component or system outside the scope of scaling documents. Detailed calibration instructions for the SA/SE. Tha TS margin of safety was not reduced.

all waste gas analyrer loops in accordance with vendor manual SQN-VTM-W120-3170 were incorporated.

0-50-62-4 HOLDUP TANK OPERATION This activity did not increase the probability of nccurrence or consequences of an accident previously Rev. O 0-50-62.4 describes operation of the HUTS including svaluated in the SAR. and the probability of occurrence or consequences of a malfun-tion of equipment important recirculation through the BAE feed ion exchangers via the gas stripper feed pumps; transfer between tanks; and to safety was not increased. No new unanalyzed accident recirculation thrcugh the HUT recirculation pump.

or equipment malfunction possibilities were created. TS 3/4.11.1.4 was reviewed and it was determined that the activity did not reduce the margin of safety or impact tid TS basis.

i 0-50 ?50-1 125 VOLT DC VITAL POWER SYSTEM-There was no increase in the probability of occurrence j

Rev. 1 or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in i

PCF91-0296 The normal power to the' Vital AC Power Transfer Switch II the SAR. The probability of occurrence or consequences was lost as a result of a f ailure of its 480V supply. ihe of a malfunction of equipment important to safety was FvB was proposed to be used to supplement the current to not affected. No new accident possibilities were 125V Vital Battery Board II.

0-50-250-1 provides created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis instructions for aligning the FVB charger to a selected for any TS was not reduced. This procedure did not battery board..The difference between this procedure and constitute a USQ.

the current procedure for placing the FVB in service fc r substituting for one of the primary vital batteries is that j

the tie breaker from the FVB board to the FVB is open and i

the tie breaker to the FVB charger is closed.

l-SI-SXH-068-HYDROSTATIC PRESSURE TEST OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM There was no increase in the probability of an accident 4

001.0 previously evaluated in the SAR.

This activity with its Rev. 1 This instruction provides detailed steps to perform a system administrative controls and no other deviation in normal hydraulic pressure test on the Unit 1 RCS piping and equipment operation did not create the potential t:-

components, as required by ASME Section XI.

During this equipment malfunction. No new accident or equipment test, ECCS systems {RHR SIS, CVCS) remain operable as do malfunction possibilities were created..By complying sampling and boration control. Revision 1 added with all applicable LCOs, the margin of safety was not instructions on notifying the ANI/ANII, and removed the reduced.

' testing of the piping between the secondary check valves and the cold leg accumulators, i

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l 1 PROCEDURE REVISIONS PROCEDURE NO.

QESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

$AffTY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

I 1-$0-63-5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM An SE was performed because SAR Subsection 6.3.2.17, Manual Acticos states:

"No manual actions are required Rev. 3

. EMERGENCY CORE C00 LING SYSTEM during the injection phase." This procedure change 2-50-63-5 Rev. 1 requires FCV-062-24 or FCV-062-174 to be closed upon This change added instructions to:

initiation of an SI or CIS. This manual action is in conflict with the SAR. This SE determined that there i

1.

Vent the CCPIT discharge piping between CCP outlet was no increase in the possibility of occu.rence or isolation valves (FCV-063-25 and FCV-063-26) and the consequences of an analyzed accident or malfunction of high-herd safety injection secondary check valve equipment. No new accident or equipment malfunction

-(VLV-063-581). The venting is to be performed by possibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was l

opening the test header isolation valve (FCV-063-174) not reduced. This change did not involve a 050 j

and the test heads containment isolation valves (FCV-063-71 and it. -063-84).

This will provide a flow 4

path to the HUT.

2.

Vent the CCPIT discharge piping between CCPIT cutlet i

isolation valves (FCV-063-25 and FCV-063-26) and the high-head safety injection primary check valves t

(VLV-063-586, VLV-063-587. VLV-063-588, and VLV-063-589). The venting is to be performed by opening the test header isolation valve (FCV-063-24) and the 4

test header containment irolation valves (FCV-063-71 and FCV-063-84). This will provide a flow path to the HUT.

2-SI-ICC-068-CHANNEL CALIBRATION Of DELTA T/Tavg CHAfJNEL IV, kACK 13, This ICT was reviewed against the SA/SC for DCN M02034, 067.4-LOOP 1-68-67 (T-441/442) upgrading the steam generator loops to meet PAM Category i

Rev. 0 -

I requirement - Unit 2.

There was no adverse impact on ICT 90-0627 This ICf updated the instruction to reflect latest delta T nuclear safety.

values recorded during the performance of TI-2,

" Calorimetric Calculation - Units 0, I and 2." on I

December 5,1990.

0-TI-SXXX-000 BREACHING THE SHIELD BUILDING, ABSCE. OR CONTROL ROOM These revisions did not increase the probability of i'

-016.0 BOUNDARIES occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction I

of equipment. The probability of an unanalyzed accident This instruction provided requirements for breaching the or couipment malfunction was not created. The margin of ABSCE, shield building, and the emergency control room safety as defined in the basis for any TS was not

. pressurization boundary. The breaching requirements only reduced.

address the integrity of the various ventilation boundaries; and do'not supplement any other procedures or requirements specified within those procedures.

Rev. 3 Revised to include results of the MCR pressurization tests 0-SI-Sfi-031-144.A and.144.B dated March 1991 to evaluate the acceptability of breaching the HCR pressurization boundary for temporary maintenance or modification activities.

4

, PROCEDURE REVISIONS PROCEDURE NQ.

DESCRIPTIDN

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

Rev. 4 Included the opening of process components or piping in the i

breach definitions. Revised Step 6.5 (28) to define immediately as 45 seconds. (Step 6.5 [28) is consistent e

with Step 6.5 [2C]). Added notes to all performance sections stating that SA/SE special requirements be addressed in work documents. Added SOS concurrence on PHYSI-13 steps and made minor editorial and reference

+

changes.

These changes did not irpact the requirements of TS AI-27 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR a

Rev. Il since the requirement of TS is for the STA to " serve in This was a general revision to delete all text that and advisory capacity to the SOS on matters pertaining implemented STD-7.1.9.. "Shif t Technical Advisor Training,"

to the engineering aspects of assuring safe operation of which is directly implemented in SSP-4.51, "Shif t Technical the unit.-

This requirement is unchanged. The change Advisor (STA) Training." The source and interface was not a change to plant systems and did not affect any documentation section was updated to reflect current of the procedural requirements stated in TS. An SE was references. The instruction was revised to include the use performed because this does deviate from NUREG 0011, 3

of.a degreed SRO that has completed the STA training to I.A.I.l.

The SE determined that this change did not perform the function of the on-shift STA.

The requirement involve a USQ.

for the STA to complete a dedicated STA daily journal was 4

deleted, and Attachment I was deleted which outlined the duties of the STA following a reactor trip. The revision also included an annotation for NUREG 0737 in accordance with AI-4, " Preparation, Review, Approval and Use of Site Procedures / Instructions."

AI-30 NUCLEAR PLANT CONDUCT Of OPERATION Changing the title of the operator responsible did not-Rev. 33 increase the probability of the design basis accidents General revision to this AI updated references, deleted occurring. This procedural change did not modify redundant information; added the Operations Manager to the equipment important to safety. The revision enhanced list of individuals who may relieve the 505, enhanced the the control room operator's ability to monitor description of the duties of the A505, etc. These geaeral equipmeni. There were no new accident possibilities changes were addressed in the safety assessment. The created. TS 6.2.2 defines the number of operetors that revision addressed by the SE included changing the title of must be present in the NCR. This procedure change did

{

the operator responsible for the "at the controls area" of no af fect this or any other TS.

l the PTR and extending Zone 1 and the impact of this change on safety and on SAR Section 13.5.1.1 and Figures 13.4.1-2 and 13.5.1-3.

A01-15 LOSS Of COMPONENT COOLING WATER - UNITS 1 AND 2 This revision was made in conjunction with DCN N06225.

Revising the procedure did not impact nuclear safety.

Rev. 16 There was no increase in the probability of occurrence L

This revision was prepared then reviewed by the on-shift Operations personnel before Heat Exchanger A was removed or consequences of an accident. The TS margin of safety i

from service by DCN N06225. This instruction provided the. was not reduced.

prerequisites, precautions, instructions, and realignment of the CCS and ERCW systems to allow for removal of the CCS Heat Exchanger A f rom service and its replacement with CCS Heat Exchanger lAl/lA2.

[

d

l,

PROCfDURE REVISIONS PROCEDURE NO.

DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

ES-1.2 TRANSFER TO RMR CONTAINMENT SUMP, UNIIS I AND 2 There was no increase in the probability of occurrence i

Rev. 11 or consequences of an accident or equipment This revision reinstated a previously cancelled procedure.

malfunction. No unanalyzed accident or equipment Deleted Step 6 which was applicable to U-2 due to BIT malfunctio.. possibilities were created. The TS margin i

inleakage. Revised Step 6 of Appendix A to include actions of safety was not reduced.

of Step 7 in ES-1.2, Revision 9.

Deleted r.ote following 3

Step 6 Appendix A.

Renumbered subsequent steps. Revised Step 13 of Appendix A to its original format in ES-1.2, Revision 8I this change is needed since ECN L6474 on "Cd CCS heat euchanger is complete. Revised Appendix B to incorporate changes due to DCNs MI533 and MI541 for Unit 1 and DCNS 2644 and 2645 for Unit 2 and TS change 89-26 (BIT renamed CCPIT). Updated instruction numbers to those presently in effect. This instruction replaces 1-ES-1.2 for Uni t' I and 2-ES-1.2 for Ucit 2.

IMI-85-RSL ROD CONTROL SYSTEH - AUTOMATIC ' PEED PROGRAM K1TS 1 AND 2 The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an Rev. 4 accident or malfunction of safety equipment was not PCF 91-0106 The procedure was changed'to include online removal and increased. No safety-related equipment was affected by replacement of rod speed module. The rod trip function and this change. The possibility of a new, u1 analyzed RPI will still be operable during this time. Testing of the accident was not created. The TS margin of safety was

-replacement module to ensure operability can be accomplished not reduced.

online. Westinghouse concurs that online replacement does not degrade plant safety.

j Revision of the procedure did not impact nuclear SI-40.1

' CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP CASING AND DISCHARGE PIPING VENTING - UNITS l'AND 2 safety. No TS margin of safety was adversely affected.

SI-40.1 was revised to reflect the impact of TACF

' 90-034-062 which connected a vent hose to allow venting 4

suction piping to the CCPs into the HUT. Without venting to the HUT. the auxiliary building can become airborne as a i

result of gases released.

4 SI-166

$UMMARY Of VALVE TESTS FOR ASME SECTION XI - UNITS 0, 1 AND 2 This activity affected PORV bloc 6 valve wrich is not addressed directly pertaining to a design basis accident SI-166.1.1 FULL STR0 KING OF CATEGORY "A" AND "B" VALVES REQUIRED IN ALL or transient. The activity did not affect any j

H0 DES - UNITS 1, 2, AND COMMON components that could result in increasing the l

probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment This revision to SI-166 and SI-166.1.1 was cade to backseat 'important to safety. The operability of tne PORVs and 6

PORV block valves to reduce or eliminate packing leaking their block valves was not adversely affected.

through the valve stem leakoff of the FRT.51-166 was NE/ Westinghouse calculation verified that the valve revised to allow 2-FCV-068-332 to be backseated (torqued to would close from the backseated position, and the a maximum of 225 in-lbs at the nandwheel nut), stroke time performance of SI-166 verified that the backseating had tested, and then placed back on the backseat.

no adverse affect on the valve's operability. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

1 i

. - _ _ PROCEDUPE REVISIONS PROCEDURE NO.

DESCRIPTION SUMMAE1 SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

SI-180 FIRE PUNP START TEST The procedure change reflected the new pressure setpoint incorporated by the TACF, but it did not affect the This 51 was revised to document the 0-PCV-26-15 setpoint acceptance criteria of the SI or the applicable TSs.

change from 135 to 150 psig in 9njunction with TACF There was no adverse impact on any safety-related system 0-91-0019-026.

or component. The probabi'ity of occurrence or the consequences of an accident did not increase. No new accident possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.51-180 FIRE PUNP START TEST This revision reflected the setpoint incorporated by this TACF but did not af fect the acceptance criteria of Rev. 2 this procedure or TS Section 3/4.7.11.

This activity This revision changed 5.he procedure to reflect the new setpoint established for 0-PCV-26-15 by TACF 0-91-019-026.

did not adversely af fect safety-related equipment and did not impact or create any DBAs or anticipated operational transients. The margin of safety as defined in TS was not reduced.

50I-62.4 CVCS PURIFICATION SYSTEM This change did not violate any 15 constraints, limits, Rev. 27 or assumptions. The change did provide guidance for This change added Sections J and K for placinq mixed bed Operations personnel for reactivity contrci, which will Demineralizers A and B in service for RCS deboration.

provide for more accurate reactivity changes. The SAR Before this change, RCS deboration by a mixed bed had been contains a detailed procedure for boron dilution accomplished by this instruction. This change enhances the utilizing addition of primary makeup water while j

instruction by adding specific sections for this activity.

diverting letdown to the HUT. The change to 50I-02.4 Sections D and C for placing mixed bed demineralizer in offers an alternative method not presently described in service previously contained a note stating "at EOL the the SAR. There was no increase in the probability of mixed bed may be placed in service to deborate the RCS."

occurrence or consequences of an accident previously Sections B.1 and C.I. borating the mixed beds for standby, analyzed in the SAR. This change did not impact 1

previously contained a note stating, "Instead of diluting to operating characteristics of safety equipment, ncr maintain power, tne inlet valve will be throttled open and result in equipment design specifications being closed to maintain power at desired level until bed is af fected; therefore, the probability of occurrence of a finished.being borated." This change created separate malfunction of equipment was not increased. No new Sections J and K, to eliminate confusion in how and when the accident possibilities or equipment malfunctions were mixed beds are to be placed in service for deboration of the created. TS bases da not address RCS dilution except in RCS as well as established guidelines for reduction of RCS the refueling mode of operation. Additionally, the bcron concentration and flow through the beJ.

reactivity control systems required to be opesable by tne TS are not affected. Therefore, margin of safety was nct reduced.

~

501-68.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM STI-86 proved that the RCDT pump will not cavitate if it Rev. 64 is started before the Suction Valve FCV-68-310 is This revision added a RCDT pump manual start method to indicating fully open position. The performance of this a

i Section D, Presserizer Relief Tank..This method was SOI, or any malfur.ction of the RCDT pump that might i

validated during the performance of STI-86, "fCV-68-310 occur as a result of this 501, cannot increase the i

FUNCTIONAL TEST." Revision 64 incorporated a change to the probability of an accident previuv51y evaluated in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PRT high temperature operating limit. The SAR. The RCDT pumps do not perform a safety function.

i' i

limit was 132*F but TACF 1-91-35-068 and 2-91-36-063 raised The bases for SQN TSs were reviewed, particularly those the annunciator setpoint to 155'F.

associated with Section 3/4.11, and no margin of safetf of any TS was reduced or compromised by the performance of this SOI.

?

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4

- i PROCEDURE REVISIONS PROCEDLSE NO.

DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

$AFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

SOI-70.2 COMPONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER CHANGEDUT9 This revision was made in conjunction with DCN M06225.

Revising the procedure did not impact nuclear saf ety.

50I-70.2 was revised then reviewed by the on-shift There was no increase in the probability of occurrence Operations personnel before Heat Exchanger A was removed or consequences of an accident. T5e TS margin of safety from service by DCN M06225. This instruction provided the was not reduced.

prerequisites, precautions, instructions, and realignment of the CCS and ERCW systems to allow for removal of the CCS Heat Exchanger A from service and its replacement with CCS Heat Exchanger lAl/l A2.

SQA-134 CRITICAL STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS (CSSC) LIST This revision required that SAR Chapter 17 be resised to Rev. 29 dalete portions of the CSSC list as they were replaced r

SQA-134 was revised to delete certain systems based on with the Q-list. No TSs were impacted by this procedure approved Q-lists for esch of these systems. This revision revision. The implementation of the Q-list for these also fully replaced the CSSC list with the Q-list.

systems did not change the operational use or qualification level of any equipment utilized in accident analyses.

SQE-22 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT CHEMISTRY PROGRAM TSs do not address the changes to the pH control i

Bew. 73 measures and the additional sampling analyses to the This revision upgraded the pH control methodology for BAE CCS, and heater drains. Changes involving RWST and 7

reactor coolant, included TS Change 89-25 and 89-26, and CLA boron and deleting LHI and BIT comply with the s

included additional parameter measurements in plant systems. ' approved TS changes. lhere was no increase probability

,l of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment. No new accident or equipment failure possibilities were created. The margin of safety was not reduced.

SSP-8.2 SURVEILLANCE TEST PROGRAM This was an administrative change and did not affect the performance of any test. Both Pls and sis are scheduled Rev. 0 and tracked in the SI data base. Changing the SI-l SURVE LLANCE PROGRAM UNITS 0, 1 AND 2 (CANCELLATION) 4 i

Rev. 28 definition in the SAR would clarify the types of tests Chapter 13.0 of the FSAR describes.the types of written and therefore did not increase the probability of an instructions that SQN uses. Section 13.5.1.4, " Surveillance accident previously evaluated in the SAR. There was no Instructions," (SAR Update 7) described all tests defined by increase in the probability of occurrence of a i

L the surveillance test program as outlined in SI-1, Rev. 27.

malfunction of equipment important to safety previously At that time, no conflict existed between the SAR and SI-l evaluated in the SAR.

Sections 6.5.lA and 6.8.1 of the or SSP-2.3 since the SAR did not. distinguish sis from pIs.

TSs require all written procedures to be reviewed by However, Update 8 of the SAR added Section 13.5.1.16, qualified reviewers, evaluated for 10 CtR 50.59

" Periodic Instructions " and did not define PIs'or sis as consequences, and approved by PORC/ responsible manager.

already described in SSP-2.3 and SI-l..Therefore, a change Changing the SAR description of PIs and sis clarified I

to the SAR descriptions in Sections 13.5.1.4 and 13.5.1.16 the requirements such that only sis may be tsed to was required for consister.cy.

satisfy TS SRs and PIs used for all other requirements I

(e.g.. SAR, NPDES permit NFPA Code). Therefore, this change did not decrease the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.

D e

9

-t')-

PROCEDURE REVISIONS

' PROCEDURE NO.

DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

TI-54 COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENTS There was no increase in the probability of occurrence Rev. 17 or consequences of,an accident. No new accident or TNis instruction defines a list of process instruments and equipment malfunction possibilities were created. The P-25b computer points C.I that are used to obtain data or TS margin of safety was not reduced.

used to sa isfy standard TS requirements. This instruction is for Units 0 and I ano is required by the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan. TVA NQA-PL89-A.

This revision incorporated the list of P-250 computer points used by the plant to

[

satisfy or verify TS compliance. This is a corrective action for LER 328/91004, Commitment NC0910077004. Char.ged j

corrective action plan reference from CAQR to PER and referenced AI-4 to SSP 2.3.

Also, in conjunction with DCN H06368, an evaluation was perfarmed to determine if F-62-142 (nonsafety related) needed a demonstrated and required accuracy calculation. The evaluation indicated F-62-142 was not required for use in TI-7 as indicated in TI-54 and 54.2.

This posit.on further substantiated via a memorandum from Technical Support. Therefore, this SA/SE deleted TI-7 as a procedure requiring the use of F-62-142.

This procedure change was necessary to preclude confusion in the future with regards to determ*ning if demonstrated and required accuracy calculations are required for this instrument loop. SSP 9.1, Section 3.1 requires a demonstrated and accuract calculation for all instrument loops used for TS compliance.

a TI-54.2 COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENTS '

There was no increase in the probability of occurrence Rev. 12 er consequences of.a accident. No new accident or This instruction defines a list;of process instruments and equipment malfunction possibilities were created. The P-250 computer points that are used to obtain data or used TS margin of safety was not reduced.

to satisfy standard TS~ requirements. This instruction is for Unit 2 and is required by Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, TVA.NQA-PLN 89-A.

This revision incorporates the list of P-250 computer points used by the plant to satisfy or verify TS compliance. This is a corrective action for LER328/91004, Commitment NCO 910077004.. Changed corrective action plan reference from CAQR to PER and referenced AI-4 to $$P-2.3. - Also, in conjunction with DCN N06610 and DCN M06368, an evaluation was performed to determine if i-62-142 (nonsafety related) needed a demonstrated and required accuracy calculation. The evaluation indicated F-62-142 was not required for use in TI-7 as indicated in TI-54 and 54.2. ifhis pesition further substantiated via a memorandum 3

from Technical Support. Therefore, this SA/SE deleted TI-7 4

as a procedure requiring the use of F-62-142.

This procedure change was necessary to preclude confusion in the future with regards to determining if denc< strated and required accuracy calculations are requi-for this instrument loop. SSP 9.1. Section 3.1 requires a oemonstrated and accuracy calculation-for all instrument loops used for.TS compliance.

f 4

l 7 SUMMAt-OF SPECIAL TESTS i

$11 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

$AFETY ANAtYSIS

SUMMARY

L i

STI-84 D/G 28-B AMBIENT STARY WITH DEGRADED AIR START PRESSURE During the performance of this STI. the D/G =as declared I

inoperable and appropriate LCDs were entered. Also, f

This STI reestablished "as found" conditions for 2B-8 D/G which opposite train equipment was verified OPERA 8tE bef ore j'

were identifiec when an ADO f ound 28-8 D/G low air peessure beginning the STI and appropriate PMT was perfor.med

(

j alarm in and air pressure in engine No. I air tank at 140 psig before the 0/G was returned to service. This was all L

L 4

(alarm setpoint is 200 psig). The STI also initiated a D/G within the boundaries of TSt.

There was no increase in start signal and varified diesel start time; established 140 the probability of occurrence or consequences of an i

psig air pressure in one of the normally aligned D/G air start accident or equipment malfunction. No eew accident l

tanks. started its air compressor and timed the tank recovery to possibilities were created. lhe TS margin of safety was j

1 180 psig; and established the air receiver bleed down rate.

not reduced.

STI FCV-68-310 FUNCTIONAL TEST performance of this special test, or any malf unstion of

(

the RCDT pu p tnat might oc e' as a result of this test.

m This STI was performed to prove that the PRT Drain Valve could not increase the pro ub. lity e'l en accident l

1 FCV-68-310 is not required to be in the fully indicated open previously evaluated in the %R. Th RCDT pumps are net positiun bef ore the RCDT pump can be started. This STI remotely considered important to safety in that they do not obtained the data which was necessary to diagnose the problem perfs.a a safety fenction. The performance of this STI l

and confirm there is no detrimental effect upon the system did not create an interaction with any system important

[

performance. Data was also taken which could be used to help to safety previously evaluated in the SAR. The TS k

determine movement is linear in relationship to the "inditated" margin of saf ety was not reduced.

j response of the valve from the full close to the full open position.

STI-135 STEAM VALVE VAULT TEMPERATURE SURVEY There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accidett or malfunction of f

This test measuret! hot spot and ambient temperatures throughout equipment inportant to safety. No new accideat i

the vault to verify the ef fectiveness of the upgraded insulation possibilities or malfunctions of equipment were I

system in reducing temperatures to acceptable levels. The test created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

)

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also provided interim monitoring of the emhaust air temperatures

[

4 f rom all four valve vault f ans as part of the corrective action for CAQF SQp 880390 RO.

This was a long-term test and continued until notified by NE that sufficient test data had been 3-collected.

STI-142' HIGH VOLTAGE DC TEST FOR SELECTED LDW VOLTAGE CSSC CABLES The performance of STI-142 was within the existing l

limits and restrictions provided in the TSs. No

)

j This STI performed high-voltage DC tests e' low voltage cables permanent system modification was involved. The rt= was j.

installed in conduits identified by NE.

M.e STI is generic and no increase in the probability of occurrence or i

was implement *d by a Wk.

NE provided the specified nominal test consequences of an accioent or equipment malf unction.

J' J

voltage and identified if the cables must be submersed in water No nce scenarios for accidents or equipment malfunction during the test. IEEE 383-1974 was used by NE as a guideline fer were created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

s determining the required nominal test woltage.

l i

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SUMMARY

OF SFECIAL TESTS ill QL$CRIPTION SUMMARJ SAFETY AWE.IS Sd9%R1 STI-143 CHEMICAL INXCTION AND Pt ANT PROCESS SAMPLING FOR USE IN MAIN There was no increase in the probability of occurreme l

FEEDWATER FLOW AND STEAM GENERATOR MOISTURE CARRYOVER of any previcusly evaluated accident. The probability DETERMINATION of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously eval uted in the 5AR was not i

i This STI provided documentation on the connectien of CC supplied inc reased. No new accidents or malfunctions were chemical injection and sample carts to the condensate and MFW created. The IS margin af safety was not reduced.

piping and the collection of M W, MS, and SGBD samples which i

were analyzed by CE for determination of MfW flow and S/ e

).

. moisture carryover via the CE Chestrac process.

i STI-144 CCS TRAIN 8 TLOk BALANCE VERIFICATIQN WITH ONE CCS HX ISOLATED There was no incre se in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malf unction of This STI was performed to determine that the required flow rates equipment. No unanalyzed accident er equipment to the safety-related components in the Train B CCS system can malf unctions were created. The 15 margin of safety was

-be cbtained with one of the CCS heat enchangers removed from not reduced.

service. This I,TI also included the isolation / draining of the CCS !. eat evchanger for maintenance.

I j

~ TI-146 C041 POLLER TEST FOR THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM AND/OR tLECTRIC BOARD The perf ormance of this test did nct impact any system 5

j

. ROOM A/C SYSTEM TCVS operational parameters identified in the SAR.

There was no increase in the probability of an accident or the 2

The purpose of this special test was to determine if a FISHER anurrence of a edifunction of eqaiseent. No new controller with an anti-reset wind-up feature or a direct action accident possibilities or equipment m&ifunction i

MASONEILAN controller uuld respond more quickly to temperature possibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was control valve operatic,n ov a ref rigerant machine (minimun of any not reduced.

]

one of the MCR or electrical board room machines) that has been idle f or a minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> whereby the machine would not trip on high condenser pr:;ssure and control at setpoint.

j STI-147 SYSTEM 26 HYDRAULIC PERFORMANCE There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or of mouipment This STI provided detailed steps to cetermine the hydraulic malfunction. No new accidents or malfunctior.s of performance of the fire Protection System in accordance with equipment were created. The TS margin of safety was not l

Chapter 5. Section 11 of the Fire Protection Handbook. This

. reduced.

test established simulated raw service water flows then measured static pressure, residual pressure, and velocity pressure for selected portions of the auniliary, control and D/G buildings.

STI-147 was revised following its performance to add a square root symbol that was inadvertently omitted in Rev. O.

The steps l

were then recalculated.

STI-148 FULL STROKING Of t%Ik i.TMi ISOLATI0's VvvES The probability of any accident discussed in the SAR was unchanged by this activity. Closing one MSIV dces not This STI provided detailed steps to obtain full stroke time change the probability that any other MSIV will tiose on information u-q a single train of actuation for the MSIVs in demand. There was no increase in the probability of Mode 3, 4. or S.

This test was performed on Unit 1.

failure si other safety-related equipment. There was no increase in the consequences of an accident peeviously evaluated. This activity did not modify the fucction of any safety-related equipment. No new actident or equipment malfunction possibilities were created. The activity was consistent with the TSs. The test did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TS.

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. 7 s

OTHER SAFETY EVALUATIONS I

l DESCRIpflON

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SUMMAR l

I

+

89-0401 This SE was prepared to address the significance of minor These leaks were repaired with Unit 2 in #9 ode 4 There f

leakage in peripheral systems connecte' to the RCS.

was no increase in the probability of o(currence or Specifically, slight leak in the leak-of f line for RHR valve consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment 2-rCV-74-35. a slightly larger leak through the draic valves important to safety. No new accident possibilities were for Unit 2 RHR heat exchanger 2A, acd a small leak through created.

Th.. margin of safety as defined in the basis 4

the leak-off line for Containment Spray Valve 2-fCV-72-20.

for any TS was not reduced.

89-0403 This SE addressed the revision to GOI-2, " Plant Startup f rom This change did not impact the safety function of any of f

Hot Standby to Minimum toad - Units 0, 1 & 2," which raises the af fected systems or components. ' e change in the the steam generator water level at low power (0 to 20 nominal water level at low power (0 to 20 percent) was parcent) from 33 percent to 44 nercent of narrow range needed to provide margin between the steam generator i

t,an.

This SE was applicable to both Units 1 and 2.

Tow-low level setpoint and nominal water level. This

[

change reduced the prebability of steam generator low-low level reactor trips due to fluctuations in steam f

generator level inventory during low power operatioc.

I There was no increase in the f robability of occurrence T

or consequences of an accioent or malfunction et 1

equi pe=*n t. No new accident passibilities were cretted.

i l

The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

[

89-0404 Th'es SE evalurted G01-5, " Normal power Operation," Revision There was no increase in the probability of an accident t

39, that provided the UO with guidance on maintaining 100 previously evaluated in the SAR. There was no increa<e t

percent reactor power. It requires that thennal power be in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated 1

monitored using an eight-hour shif t average determined f rom in the.SAR. No naw accidents or malfunction of i

hi M y thermal power calculations. The revision instructs equipment possibilities were created. The margin of F

the. 00 not to exceed the thermal power value of 3411 W and safety was not reduced.

requires that the turbine go.ernor valve limiter be set to 1

limit secondary side operational transients which could l

retuit 'in power escursions above 34*1 MW.

{

4 1-89-0405 This SE provided technical justificatier for the steps added There was no increase in the probability of occurrence l

in 501-68.2 " Reactor Coolant pumps - Units 1 and 2.*

or consequences of an accident or malfunction of Revision 36, which disables the RCP ground fault relay (50G) equipment. No new accidents or equipment malfunctions j

trip function. The relay trip function is disaoled during were created. The margin of safety was not redur*d.

the transfer of 250V DC control power from the alternate to There were no USQs.

j normal or f rom normal to alternate supply. This change i

prevents 'nadvertent actuation of the 50G relay, which will i

result in RCP trip and possible unit trip.

i 1

89-0602 This SE addressed ERCW foundation and roadway cells. The The drilling and grouting necessary for the emploratory evaluation concluded tLat the ERCW foundation and roadway program does not af fect the safety or operability of the cells are structurally adequate *.nd will function as plant. The' drilling and grouting was recommended only

[

intended under their design loads. However, a limited to ensure the conditions assumed in the Bechtel i.

emploratory program for the foundations was peoposed by TVA evaluation actually exist. All activities were t

to avgaent the available data used in the Bechtal evaluation. performed in accordance with established procedures.

J There was no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or maltunc. tion of equipment important to safety. No new accident i

possibilities were created. The margin of safety was

[

not reduced.

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i 1-f OTHER SAFETY EVALUATIONS I

j:

QESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS SLMTARJ i'

89-0607 This SE addressed the deletion of the PORC oversight section These changes to AI 48 only affected administrative functions, which were f ound in AI-48, " Plant Operations functions and the oversight of SEs. These (hanges did l,.

Review Committee (POEC) Charter." The reason for deleting not impact safety and did not degrade the Independent i

this function had been created by the TVA Nuclear Power Qualified Review process. There was no increase in the l

1 reorganization at Sequoyah. The new orianization did not probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident

['

include a PORC oversight section; therefore, these functions or malfunction of equipment important to safety. No new were transferred or deleted.

accident or equipment malfunction possibilities were i

created. The TS margin of safety was not reduced.

89-0704 This SE analyzed the use of 501-63.3. *RwST Leakage The performance of this SOI does not adversely affect I

Identification " for identifying the source of water leakage the safety of the plant since provisions in the from the RwST by removing one ESF pump from service at a procedure ensure that minimue Esrs are available.

time. The testing is permitted only if the redundant train Compliance with the action statements of applicable TSs i

j

)

meets the minimum conditions for operation required by provide assurance 7 at the performance of $0I-63.3 does applicable plant TSs.

not deorade the

.ety of the plant. The activity did not alter the control ' logic. or tb? function of the affscted components. There was no screase in the f

probability of occurrence or consequences of an ac* sdent or talfunction of equipment. No new accident or equspoent malfricti.,n scenarios were created. The margin of safet; as defined in the basis for ar.y TS was f

j' not reduced.

-F 89-0705 lhis SE provided technical justification for the issuance There was no increase in the probability of occurrence

[

and performance of GOI-9.1, "6900V and 480V Shutdown Boerd or consequences of an accident or malfunction of Ground Location and Isolation." This procedure provides equipment. No new accident or equipment malfunction The marf n of safety was i

i i

general instructions, prerequisites and precautions to possibilities were created.

j-search for and isolate ground (s) on the 5900V and 480V cot reduced. No USQ existed for this activity.

shutdown board 125V DC control buses.

j

(

l 89-0707-This SE evaluated Revision 7 to SI-185. " Fire Hose There was no increase in the probability of occurrence Connection Control valve Operability Test." that changes the or conseq:nences of an accident or malf ur.ction of i

test procedure for the fire hose connection control valve equipment important to safety, and no new accident or operability test. The test instruction change was made to equipment edifunction was created. The margin of safety allow the SI on the reactor building annulus fire hose.

was not reduced. The systems will perform as intended valves to be perf ormed in any operating mode. The revised during nomal plant operation or during accident i

f test requires breaching the reactor building secondary conditions as designed.

containment through the fire protection preaction Valve

~

.j 26-231 tria piping.

These actions did not increase the probability of

[

y 89-0708 This SE considered the RCS leakage that had increased f rom f

approximately 0.3 to 0.6 gpa between July 20-25. 1989.

occurrence or consequences of an accident or equip.aent AI-58. " Maintaining f'ognizance of Operation Status -

malfunction. No new accident or eqairment malfunction i

Configuration Status Control - Units 0. I t. 2." Appendix E, oossibilities were created. The TS margin of safety was

' isolates the BIT to BAT recirculation flow path to determin + sot reduced.

f if the increased leakage was due to seal leakage through i

i 2-FCV-63-39 or 40 to the BIT and BAT. Initially. the flow path to the HUT via 2--ICV-63-24, 71, and 84 was opened. If the BIT did not pressurize in this configuration, than 2-FCV-63-24 would be closed.

h 5

F

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t

I I

j - !

t OTHER SAFETY EVALUATIONS DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

$AFETY ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

?

89-0801 TACF 0-87-033-14 installed a strainer / filter to bypass the There was no increase in the probability of occurrence 1

}

high crud f ilter. This SE was required after CAQR or consequences of an accident or malfunction of SQQ-89-0360 was written

<4,tifying inconsistencies between equipeent important to safety. No new accident or operational procedures p.

C configuration, and supporting equipment malfunction possibilities were created. The documentation. Previces saf ety evalu.tions and screening margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS l'

reviews were written to allow use of the bag filter but did 3/4.11.1.1 was not reduced.

}

not allow discharges via the cooling tower blowdown. This SE specifically addressed the impact of discharging the condensate polishing demineralizer system regeneration waste

)]

to either the cooling tower blowdown or the turbine building l

}

semp.

i 89-802 This SE provided the 10 CFR 50.59 review of the changes to This AOI revision did not result in any modification to j

A01-6 "Small Reactor Coolant System teaks (Modes 1. 2. or the af f ected systems. The change provides the ability

3) or Shutdown LOCA (Mode 4 or 5)."

These changes were made to ic entif y an RCS leak source using the process of to allow decisionmaking, depending on plant conditions, to isolating trains and/or companents. Implementation of be made by the designated leak search coordinator in the procedure change did not alter the control. logic, j

conjunction with the 505 and the ASOS/SRO so that an RCS or function of any of the systems affected. There was l

leak source can be determined.

no increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment. No new accident or equipment malfunction

}

4 possibilities were created. All TS LCOs were adhe ed to.

The margin of safety was not reduced.

i 4

Removing the BIT to BAT recirculation from setvice did j

j 89-0821 Perf ormances of SI-137.2. " Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory " with 2-FCV-63-24 closed had indicated that the not adversely af fect safety since the BIT temperature leakage through the. BIT discharge isolation valves had was maintained at 2 165'F and before returning the BIT i

i decreased. This procedure isolated the BIT to BAT to operable status the boren concentration, temperature, i

recirculation flow path and closed 2-rCV-63-24. 71. and 84 and water volume were verified to be within to further determine if the BIT discharge isolation valves specifications. There was no increase in the were still leaking through.

probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident i

or malfunction of saf ety-related equipment. No new

/

+

accident possibilities were created.

*re was no decrease in the TS margin of safety.

[

i 89-0903

, The SE was writtee to revise the SAR to specif y a range of There was no increase in the probability of occurrence f

45 to 55 percent glycol in the ice condenser cooling or consequences of an accident or malfunction of i

systee.- The esisting specification required glycol equipment, and no new possieilities were created. The l

l'.

concentration be enactly 50 percent. Revision of the SAR to margin of safety was not reduced. No USQ was involved

[

state.a range rather than en exact valve ensures that glycol as the result of this activity. The ice condenser specifications can be practically maintained.

ref rigeration system performance was not adversely l

i impacted.

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REXPR2iv TEN fo E S 3 E E VALLEY Au740 AIRY FAGE

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j Rufc DATE: 02-14-92 SQrd RADIATION EXPOSLHE SYSTEM j

RUN TIMER 13:4 a c6 NUNiaER OF PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK. JOB FUJCTION

{

g TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS 1

5 NUMECR OF PERSONNEL () i00 M-REM)

TOTAL %AN-REM M ACTOR OPS SURVEILLANCE i

GROU" STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTA 4.

STATION UTIL.ITY CONTRACT TOTAa.

[

EMF 1 OYEES EMPLOYEES AND OTHEFS PERSONS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS M M M9 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 257 3

13 273 6.121 0.011 0.601 6.733 I

i OPERATING FERSONNEL 39 2

2 43 6.709 0.113 0.000 e.910 I

HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL 55 i

95 151 5.380 0.007 11.074 16.461 i

}

SUFERVISORY PERSONNEL 29 4

10 42 1.997 dt.6TJ3 C.405 3.057 f

ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 48 19 9

76 3.216 1.269 0.417 4.902 i

MG 427 29 129 50'E 23.503 2.055 12.505 30.063

~

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MO= ROUTINE MAINTENANCE GROUP STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL t

EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS PERSONG EMPLOYEES EMF 1 OYEES AND OTHERS M-REM'i MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 554 10 13 Sit 97.542 2.312 1.316 91.179 OPERATING PERSONNEL 33 2

0 35 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.210 j

HEALTH PMYSICS PERSONNEL 130 1

94 C

45.775 0.000 5.313 51.008 d

SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 27 4

9 40 1.443 0.019 0.296 1.743 l

ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 68 22 142 232 5.427 0.825 14.378 20.630 j

i NO 812 39 3

1109 140.397 3.156 N.093 ie4.046 I

t 3

i i

MO=IN-SERVICE INSPECTION 1

6 u

CROUP STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILIT' JNTRACT TOTAL ENFtOYEES EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS PERSONS ENFtOYEES s r.Pt :t

+ 9 OTHERS M-REPS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 116 i

O 117 12.927 0.299 0.000 14.126 OPERATING PERSONNEL 4

0 0

4 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.069 HEALTH PHYSICS PERSOreEL 67 0

52 119 21.935 4 000 20.513 42.440 SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 9

0 26 34 0.C28 0.000 4.425 4.953 ENGINEERING PERSOrNEL 12 37 175 224 3.366 19.889 98.573 120.029 l

MO 207 38 253 498 39.725

~.19. ha'.B 123.511 182.424 1

5 IA MIWWE I

j GROUP STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILTTY CONTRACT TOTA Enet01EES EnetOYEtS ANo CmERS eERSONS EnPtOYtES ENFtortES ANo OT e S w EMS 4

j-MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 388 4

12 4C4 100.468 0.e2O 2.173 111.263 i

i i-1

m s

REXPR219 TEreNES3EE vALLC f A U T H O *t I T T Fw.E -

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RtM DATE: 02-14-92 SQN RADIATION ED&OSUF E SYSTEM RtM TINE. 13:44:46 i

t NumI4R OF PERSOesNEL AND MAN-PEM BY WORM JOB FUNCTION P

i TOTAL NUMIER OF INDIVIDU.:.LS I

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL () 100 M-AG~)

TOTAL emM-AEM t

L i

)

OPERATIN(, PERfANNEL 18 i

0 19 0.171 0.001 0.000 0.172

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i HEALTH 5HYSICS PERSONNEL 54 0

92 136 4.116 0.000 25.603 2+.919 t

=

SUPERVISORY FERSONNEL 26 0

11 37 2.510 0.000 0.487 L ve 7 f

EMINEERIE PERSotedEL 56 15 129 000 13.332 1.193 82.857 v7.372 f

r10 542 20 234 796 128.L*7 1.95 111.35 241.7 5 1

b t

f r10= WASTE PROCESING GROUP GTATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOT 4L I

4 EMPLOYEES. EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS PERSONS EMPLOVEES EMFtOVEES AND OTM:TG M-+. ENS i

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 76 0

1-77 2.632 0.000 0.030 2.662 OPERATING PERSONNEL 8

0 2

10 0.078 0.000 1.790 1.376 HEAT.TH PHYSICS PERSONNEL 79 0

16 97 5.564 0.000 0.486 e.052 i

1 SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 9

2 2

13 0.182 0.024 0.013 0.219 i

ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 6

3 o

9 0.161 0.051 0.000 0.212 I

HO 178 3

23 206 6.619 0.075 2.327 11.021 1

M(> REFUEL 4

GROUP STATION UTILITY CCMTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL EMPLDYEES ENPLOTEES AND OTHERS PERSONS ENF1_OYEES OPLOYEES AND OTHET6 M-REMS MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 255 5

3 263 13.295 0.010 0.015 13.300 OPERATING PERSONNEL

~'R 1

0 29 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.50%

HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL 99 0

38 137 7.632 0.000 7.067 14.Fe9 SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 9

0 4

13 1.312 0.0C0 0.514 1.826 ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 29 12 37 78 0.255 1.714 15.402 17.371 MQ 420 is 82 520 22.991

• 1.732 22.998 47.721 2586 149 979 3714 363.832 28.012 293.954 625.7 4

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RUN DATE: 02-14-92 SON RADIATION NT SYSTEM

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RtJN TIME 13:40:46

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Nur*ECR.0F FTRSON8EL MD MMe-F{N GY WORT ( 09 FUNCTION 1

10TAL NUMECR OF INDIVIDUALS l*

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NUMBER OF FERSONNEL () 100 M-REM)

TOTAL MAN 4EM

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p GROUP STATION UTILITY CONTRACT TOTAL STATION UTILITY CONTFfCT TOTA

.,*e EMFt.OYEES ENFLOYEES AND OT W FERSONS ENFLOYEE3 ENFtOYEE3 AND CTbEFS MEM l

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MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 1646 23 42 1711 231.895 3.254 4.135 239.074 i-OPERATING FERSONtEL 130 6

4 140 7.814 0.122 1.906 9.742 i

HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL 404 2

379 865 90.404 0.007

70. m 160.667

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SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL 107 10 62 179 7.972 0.678 6.120 14.000 l

ENGINEERING PERSONNEL 21P 108 492 819 25.757 23.931 211.e27 261.315

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i' T46 149 979 3714 363.832 28.012 293.954 asas.7ve

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