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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217H6231999-10-18018 October 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 98-01 & Suppl 1, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, to All Holders of Operating Licenses for NPPs ML20217J4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-19 on 990913-17.One Violation Re Individual Failure to Follow Radiation Protection Procedures When Accessing High Radiation Area Noted & Being Treated as Noncited Violation U-603280, Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p)1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p) ML20217C0871999-10-11011 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Attachment Inadvertently Omitted from Encl 2 to Submitting Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603276, Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included1999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included U-603279, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603275, Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station1999-10-0707 October 1999 Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station ML20217A9881999-10-0101 October 1999 Advises of NRC Plans for Future Insp Activities at Facility for Licensee to Have Opportunity to Prepare for Insps & to Provide NRC with Feedback on Any Planned Insps Which May Conflict with Plant Activities ML20217A7361999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-461/99-14 & 50-461/98-12 on 990729-0908.Two Violations Identified,One Re Failure to Place Control Switch in Proper Position to Identify Piece of out-of-svc Equipment & Being Treated as NCVs ML20217J1251999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation 3-1997-040 Conducted from 971028- 980921 & Forwards Nov.Investigations Determined That During Jan 1997,supervisor Qv Dept Discriminated Against Qv Inspector in Retaliation for Inspector Contacts with NRC ML20217J1421999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation 3-97-040 Conducted from 971028- 980921 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Concluded That Recipient Engaged in Deliberate Misconduct in That Recipient Discriminated Againt Qv Inspector for Having Contacted NRC ML20212G6751999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Comment Submitted to NRC by Environ Law & Policy Ctr Re Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station U-603272, Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl1999-09-22022 September 1999 Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl U-603225, Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl ML20212G6981999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests That NRC Reject Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station & That NRC State That Public Interest in Safe Nuclear Power Industry Will Not Be Subordinated to Interest in Maximizing Profit by Limiting Liability ML20217H3421999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Licensee 990723 Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend.Response Requested within 20 Days of Receipt of Ltr 05000461/LER-1996-010, Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events 05000461/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments U-603269, Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed1999-09-10010 September 1999 Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed ML20211Q2671999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That NRC Tentatively re-scheduled Initial Licensing Exams for License Operator License Applicants During Weeks of June 5 & 12,2000.Validation of Exams Will Occur at Station During Weeks of May 15,2000 U-603229, Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl1999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl U-603243, Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.71999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.7 ML20211D2201999-08-23023 August 1999 Confirms 990817 Telcon with J Neuschwanger & D Mcneil Re Arrangements Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Plant U-603258, Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage1999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage ML20211B0871999-08-20020 August 1999 Responds to J Hopkins Inquiry Re Application for Order Consenting to License Transfer & Approving Conforming Administrative License Amend Filed by Ilpr & Amergen Energy Co on 990723 U-603259, Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired ML20211A8931999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-13 on 990611-0728.Two Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violation Re Three Examples Where Licensee Procedural Requirements for Minor Maint Work Were Not Followed U-603253, Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 9908131999-08-16016 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 990813 ML20210U3771999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Consideration of Approval of Transfer of FOL & Issuance of Conforming Amend & Opportunity for Hearing Re Amend Request for Approval of Clinton Power Station License NPF-62 Transfer to Amergen U-603250, Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9907291999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990729 U-603249, Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9908091999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990809 ML20210N2961999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Form of Nuclear Decommissioning Master Trust Agreement,Per CPS Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend U-603248, Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR551999-08-0606 August 1999 Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR55 U-603236, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS ML20210J0541999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Three Original Signature Pages of Gr Rainey for Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend, for NRC Files U-603178, Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS U-603237, Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 0001311999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 000131 U-603240, Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.711999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.71 U-603235, Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210A4401999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-10 on 990422-0610.Four Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20209G7671999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Encl FEMA Correspondence ,which Transmitted FEMA Evaluation Rept for 981118 Biennial EP Exercise at Clinton Power Station.No Deficiencies Were Observed ML20209D5691999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-12 on 990607-11.No Violations Noted.Insp Consisted of Selective Exam of Procedures & Representative Records,Observations of Work in Progress & Interviews with Personnel U-603231, Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date U-603214, Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events1999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events ML20196J9651999-07-0202 July 1999 Confirms Discussion Between Members of Staffs to Conduct Meeting on 990714 at Clinton Power Station to Discuss Results of Restart Insp & Licensee Progress in Addressing Remaining Long Term C/A Actions to Sustain Improvements ML20196J7131999-06-30030 June 1999 Informs of Closure of Response to Requests for Addl Info to GL 92-01,Rev 1,Supplement 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, for Clinton Power Station Unit 1 U-603218, Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant1999-06-28028 June 1999 Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant U-603212, Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys U-603227, Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology1999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology ML20196A3471999-06-16016 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-11 Issued on 990430.Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Inspections 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARU-603280, Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p)1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p) ML20217C0871999-10-11011 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Attachment Inadvertently Omitted from Encl 2 to Submitting Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603276, Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included1999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included U-603279, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603275, Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station1999-10-0707 October 1999 Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station U-603272, Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl1999-09-22022 September 1999 Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl U-603225, Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl ML20212G6981999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests That NRC Reject Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station & That NRC State That Public Interest in Safe Nuclear Power Industry Will Not Be Subordinated to Interest in Maximizing Profit by Limiting Liability 05000461/LER-1996-010, Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events U-603269, Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed1999-09-10010 September 1999 Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed 05000461/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments U-603229, Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl1999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl U-603243, Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.71999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.7 U-603258, Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage1999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage ML20211B0871999-08-20020 August 1999 Responds to J Hopkins Inquiry Re Application for Order Consenting to License Transfer & Approving Conforming Administrative License Amend Filed by Ilpr & Amergen Energy Co on 990723 U-603259, Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired U-603253, Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 9908131999-08-16016 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 990813 U-603250, Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9907291999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990729 U-603249, Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9908091999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990809 ML20210N2961999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Form of Nuclear Decommissioning Master Trust Agreement,Per CPS Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend U-603248, Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR551999-08-0606 August 1999 Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR55 U-603236, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS ML20210J0541999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Three Original Signature Pages of Gr Rainey for Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend, for NRC Files U-603178, Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS U-603237, Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 0001311999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 000131 U-603240, Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.711999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.71 U-603235, Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 U-603231, Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date U-603214, Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events1999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events U-603218, Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant1999-06-28028 June 1999 Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant U-603212, Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys U-603227, Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology1999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology 05000461/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Design Error Causing Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Sys to Be Outside Design Basis.Commitment Made by Util,Listed1999-06-12012 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Design Error Causing Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Sys to Be Outside Design Basis.Commitment Made by Util,Listed 05000461/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure of Motor Driven Reactor FW Pump Regulating Valve.Commitment Made by Util,Listed1999-06-12012 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure of Motor Driven Reactor FW Pump Regulating Valve.Commitment Made by Util,Listed U-603213, Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-01.Corrective Actions:Calculation 19-AK-05, Calculation for DG Load Monitoring, Was Revised Using Correct Horsepower for Hydrogen Mixing Compressors1999-05-28028 May 1999 Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-01.Corrective Actions:Calculation 19-AK-05, Calculation for DG Load Monitoring, Was Revised Using Correct Horsepower for Hydrogen Mixing Compressors ML20209G7731999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Copy of Final Rept for 981118,Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Clinton Nuclear Power Station.No Deficiencies Were Noted U-603207, Provides Util Rept Confirming Completion of Actions Required by NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECCS Strainers by Debris in Bwrs1999-05-13013 May 1999 Provides Util Rept Confirming Completion of Actions Required by NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECCS Strainers by Debris in Bwrs U-603201, Forwards 4-yr Updated Certification Rept for Plant Training Simulator.Nrc Form 474, Simulation Facility Certification Also Encl Which Was Developed in Accordance with Reg Guide 1.149 & Ansi/Ans Std Ansi/Ans 3.51999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards 4-yr Updated Certification Rept for Plant Training Simulator.Nrc Form 474, Simulation Facility Certification Also Encl Which Was Developed in Accordance with Reg Guide 1.149 & Ansi/Ans Std Ansi/Ans 3.5 U-603196, Provides Notification That Util Has Completed Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions as Described in 970619 & s in Addition to Repair of Butt Joint Described in1999-04-27027 April 1999 Provides Notification That Util Has Completed Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions as Described in 970619 & s in Addition to Repair of Butt Joint Described in U-603205, Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Clinton Power Station for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Rev 17 to ODCM for Clinton Power Station, Also Encl1999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Clinton Power Station for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Rev 17 to ODCM for Clinton Power Station, Also Encl U-603197, Provides Details of Other Activities Being Taken as Part of CPS Plan for Excellence Re Ensureing That CPS Physical Plant & Functional Characteristics Are Consistent with & Are Being Maintained IAW CPS Design Bases1999-04-24024 April 1999 Provides Details of Other Activities Being Taken as Part of CPS Plan for Excellence Re Ensureing That CPS Physical Plant & Functional Characteristics Are Consistent with & Are Being Maintained IAW CPS Design Bases U-603194, Provides Notification That Ta Staber,License SOP-31298,has Resigned Position,Effective 990401.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-04-15015 April 1999 Provides Notification That Ta Staber,License SOP-31298,has Resigned Position,Effective 990401.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired U-603189, Requests That Status of License SOP-31187-1,for Le Anderson, Be Changed to Expired,Per 10CFR50.74.Util Determined That Individual No Longer Has Need for SRO License1999-04-0505 April 1999 Requests That Status of License SOP-31187-1,for Le Anderson, Be Changed to Expired,Per 10CFR50.74.Util Determined That Individual No Longer Has Need for SRO License U-603190, Provides Update for Certain 10CFR50.74(f) Info Addressed in Licensee 980619 Submittal,But Not Included in Final Response1999-04-0202 April 1999 Provides Update for Certain 10CFR50.74(f) Info Addressed in Licensee 980619 Submittal,But Not Included in Final Response U-603185, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re CPS GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs, Program1999-03-30030 March 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re CPS GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs, Program U-603186, Forwards Rept on Status of Clinton Power Station Decommissioning Funding,Iaw 10CFR50.75(f)1999-03-29029 March 1999 Forwards Rept on Status of Clinton Power Station Decommissioning Funding,Iaw 10CFR50.75(f) U-603184, Submits Info Re Current Levels of Property Insurance & Sources of Insurance for CPS as Listed,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Info Re Current Levels of Property Insurance & Sources of Insurance for CPS as Listed,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) 05000461/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Inoperability of Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train a Caused by Inadequate Design of Control Circuit.Commitments Listed1999-03-15015 March 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Inoperability of Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train a Caused by Inadequate Design of Control Circuit.Commitments Listed U-603165, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheet for Clinton Power Station Computer Point That Inputs to Erds.Change Necessary to Support Plant Mods to Drywell Floor Drain Instrumentation1999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheet for Clinton Power Station Computer Point That Inputs to Erds.Change Necessary to Support Plant Mods to Drywell Floor Drain Instrumentation U-603179, Provides Notification That RG Giuliani & R Zacholski,No Longer Have Need for Operating License.License Status Is Therefore Requested to Be Changed to Expired1999-03-10010 March 1999 Provides Notification That RG Giuliani & R Zacholski,No Longer Have Need for Operating License.License Status Is Therefore Requested to Be Changed to Expired 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L6571990-09-19019 September 1990 Advises That Dp Hall No Longer Associated W/Facility Since Dec 1989.Mail Should Be Addressed to Js Perry JSP-739-90, Requests Expedited Review & Approval of Proposed Change to Emergency Tech Specs Re Div III Nuclear Sys Protection Sys Inverter Concerning Inoperability of Emergency Shutdown Svc Water Sys Pump1990-09-12012 September 1990 Requests Expedited Review & Approval of Proposed Change to Emergency Tech Specs Re Div III Nuclear Sys Protection Sys Inverter Concerning Inoperability of Emergency Shutdown Svc Water Sys Pump U-601729, Notifies That Bn Chambers Permanently Reassigned to Position Not Requiring Operator License.Certification of Chambers Need to Hold License Previously Provided by Dp Hall Withdrawn1990-08-27027 August 1990 Notifies That Bn Chambers Permanently Reassigned to Position Not Requiring Operator License.Certification of Chambers Need to Hold License Previously Provided by Dp Hall Withdrawn JSP-676-90, Responds to 900725 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Documented in Insp Rept 50-461/90-09. Corrective Action:Critique Initiated to Identify Precise Causes & Contributing Factors Leading to Event1990-08-23023 August 1990 Responds to 900725 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Documented in Insp Rept 50-461/90-09. Corrective Action:Critique Initiated to Identify Precise Causes & Contributing Factors Leading to Event U-601723, Forwards Results of fitness-for-duty Program for 900103-0630,per 10CFR26.711990-08-16016 August 1990 Forwards Results of fitness-for-duty Program for 900103-0630,per 10CFR26.71 U-601722, Forwards Reissued NPDES Permit IL00369191990-08-10010 August 1990 Forwards Reissued NPDES Permit IL0036919 U-601721, Provides Response to Re Process for Requalification Exam Security Agreements.Security Agreement Forms Revised to Direct Individuals Not to Participate in Any Instruction Involving Operators or Senior Operators1990-08-0808 August 1990 Provides Response to Re Process for Requalification Exam Security Agreements.Security Agreement Forms Revised to Direct Individuals Not to Participate in Any Instruction Involving Operators or Senior Operators U-601716, Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/90-10.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21(c)(2))1990-08-0303 August 1990 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/90-10.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21(c)(2)) U-601715, Provides Addl Info Re Proposed Amend to Plant Tech Spec 3/4.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating, Per .Amend Will Allow Testing Frequency of Diesel Generator to Be Returned to Monthly1990-08-0202 August 1990 Provides Addl Info Re Proposed Amend to Plant Tech Spec 3/4.8.1.1, AC Sources - Operating, Per .Amend Will Allow Testing Frequency of Diesel Generator to Be Returned to Monthly U-601708, Forwards Revised Pages to Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Repts for Jul-Dec 1988,Jan-June 1989 & Jul-Dec 19891990-07-19019 July 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Repts for Jul-Dec 1988,Jan-June 1989 & Jul-Dec 1989 U-601702, Forwards Rev 9D to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1990-07-0202 July 1990 Forwards Rev 9D to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20044A3001990-06-22022 June 1990 Forwards Update to 890817 Response to Bulletin 88-008,Suppl 3, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Unisolable Piping Connected to RCS Identified & Evaluated to Determine Which Piping Could Be Subj to Stratified Flow Phenomena ML20044A4601990-06-22022 June 1990 Provides Followup to 900622 Request for Waiver of Compliance Re Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation Concerning Standby Emergency Diesel Generator 1B.Rev to Attachment 1 of Original Request for Waiver Encl ML20043H5021990-06-19019 June 1990 Requests Changes to License NPF-62,correcting Typos, Refs to Fsar,Testing to Be Done During Initial Plant Startup & Incorporating Revised Operating Power/Flow Map for Two Reactor Recirculation Loop Operation ML20043G8221990-06-0707 June 1990 Provides Update to Util Response to Item 1 of Generic Ltr 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping. ML20043F0591990-06-0606 June 1990 Forwards Endorsements 44-50 to Nelia Policy NF-261 & 25-31 to Maelu Policy MF-121 & 10 & 11 to Maelu Policy N-85 & M-85,respectively ML20043D0531990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards 1989 Annual Rept for Illinois Power Co & Soyland Power Cooperative,Inc ML20043C7501990-05-25025 May 1990 Forwards Rev 20 to Illinois Power Nuclear Program QA Manual. Rev Evaluated by Util as Not Reducing Quality Program Commitments ML20043B4891990-05-21021 May 1990 Informs NRC of Plant Initiatives for 1990 to Improve Corrective Action Program Effectiveness,In Response to SALP Rept & Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-32. Centralized Commitment Tracking Sys Upgraded ML20043B1141990-05-17017 May 1990 Suppls 900330 Response to Station Blackout Rule.Calculation of Heatup of Main Control Room Due to Loss of Ventilation Following Station Blackout Revised to Properly Account for Heat Sinks & Credit Existing Masonry Walls ML20043D9901990-05-14014 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900413 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/90-02.Corrective Actions:Safety Evaluation Prepared & Reviewed for Level Instrumentation & Annunciators Identified in Updated SAR ML20043A9811990-05-14014 May 1990 Notifies That Wc Metzner Resigned from Position of Licensed Operator W/Util,Effective 900430 ML20042E6181990-04-13013 April 1990 Updates 890406 Response to Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Condition Rept Initiated to Address Issue to Drain Instrument Air Filter Regulators ML20012E8991990-03-27027 March 1990 Forwards Rev 9C to Physical Security Plan.Rev Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20012D9451990-03-20020 March 1990 Informs of Current Activities Re Restoration of Shutdown Svc Water (SX) Sys to Operability Following Cleaning of Div I HX Per Generic Ltr 89-13.SX Sys to Be Restored by Returning Sys Flows to Design Values ML20012D9641990-03-19019 March 1990 Lists Present Levels of Property Insurance Coverage & Sources of Insurance,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(2) ML20012D9901990-03-19019 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900216 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-38.Corrective Actions:Maint Supervision Added Critical Points to Existing Maint Work Requests & Preventive Maint Activities & Training Program Updated ML20012D4321990-03-16016 March 1990 Responds to Bulletin 88-008,Suppl 3, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Detailed Analytical Review & Proposed Schedule for Implementing Required Actions Scheduled to Be Completed by 900625 ML20012A2771990-02-28028 February 1990 Forwards Final Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1, Nonconforming Molded Case Circuit Breakers. Actions Taken by Util Have Established That All safety-related Circuits Remaining in Stock Can Be Verifiably Traced to Mfg ML20012C2511990-02-23023 February 1990 Responds to Ninth SALP Rept 50-461/89-01 for Sept 1988 - Oct 1989.Rept Concluded That Overall Performance Satisfactory & Identified Strengths in Areas of Emergency Preparedness U-601611, Notifies That Gd Setser Resigned Position W/Util,Effective 9002131990-02-20020 February 1990 Notifies That Gd Setser Resigned Position W/Util,Effective 900213 ML20011F6501990-02-12012 February 1990 Responds to NRC 900112 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-37.Corrective Actions:Radiation Protection Technicians Provided W/Method for Identifying Radiation Work Permits Which Change Radiological Conditions ML20006C6721990-02-0505 February 1990 Responds to NRC 891207 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-35.Corrective Actions:Emergency Planning Bulletin Issued to All Emergency Response Organization Members Emphasizing Importance of Attending Required Training ML20006D1951990-01-30030 January 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events. Util Intends to Discontinue Sending Ack Upon Receipt of Vendor Manual Matls ML20006A8291990-01-23023 January 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to Inservice Exam Plan. Changes to Text Described.Approval of Changes by 900601 to Allow Time to Plan Refueling Outage Activities Re Inservice Exam Program Requested ML20005H2711990-01-12012 January 1990 Advises That Licensee Will Remove Terminal Blocks for Control Circuits within 100% Relative Humidity Harsh Environ at Plant by End of Second Refueling Outage Currently Scheduled to Begin in Sept 1990 ML20006A7121990-01-10010 January 1990 Forwards Revised Pages to 1987 Radiological Environ Monitoring Rept ML20005F0001990-01-0505 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss. Util Revised Plant Operating Procedures for Hpcs,Lpcs & RHR Pumps & Vibration Monitoring Program Expanded to Include ECCS Pumps at Plant ML20006A7921989-12-29029 December 1989 Responds to 891129 Ltr Which Forwarded Insp Rept 50-461/89-31,requesting Identification of Actions Underway to Ensure That Falsification of Interim Security Screening Records Would Be Detected in Timely Manner in Future U-601573, Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10, Safety-Related Motor- Operated Valve Testing & Surveillance. Detailed Procedures Controlling Actuator Adjustments,Repair,Preventive Maint & Other Activities Used & Updated Frequently1989-12-29029 December 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10, Safety-Related Motor- Operated Valve Testing & Surveillance. Detailed Procedures Controlling Actuator Adjustments,Repair,Preventive Maint & Other Activities Used & Updated Frequently ML20005E0891989-12-27027 December 1989 Advises That Revised Fitness for Duty Program Will Meet 10CFR26 Requirements,Effective 900103.Util Intends to Test for Substances Listed at Indicated cut-off Levels ML20006C2961989-12-21021 December 1989 Responds to NRC 891121 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-32.Corrective Actions:Review Performed to Identify Surveillances Which Require Lifting of Leads in Main Control Room ML20005D9521989-12-15015 December 1989 Forwards Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1989 for Clinton Power Station Unit 1 & Corrections to Oct 1989 Rept ML20005E7781989-12-12012 December 1989 Advises That False Alarm Criteria Will Be Implemented by 900131,per Insp Rept 50-461/89-31.Util Established New Criterion of 100 False Alarms for Security Sys in 24 H Period ML20011D1741989-12-0707 December 1989 Informs of Changes Made to Util Fitness for Duty Program Procedure.Change Specifies That Supervisor - Medical Programs,Assistant Director - Labor Relations or Manager - Nuclear Planning & Support Will Generate Computer List ML19332F0071989-11-30030 November 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/89-29. Corrective Actions:Preventive Maint for Ph Monitor & Liquid & Gaseous Gamma Monitors Added to Appropriate Tracking Programs ML19332E9431989-11-29029 November 1989 Forwards Executed Amends 4 & 5 to Indemnity Agreement B-91, Reflecting Change in Ownership of License,Effective 890327 ML19332D5031989-11-27027 November 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-21 Re Status of Implementation of USI Requirements.Results of Util Review & Reporting of Status of Implementation of USIs Encl ML19332D0291989-11-22022 November 1989 Informs That Effective 891201,JS Perry Will Assume Responsibility for Mgt of Nuclear Program at Util ML19332D0431989-11-22022 November 1989 Informs NRC of Change in Schedule for Providing Info Re Environ Qualification Testing of Terminal Blocks for Control Circuits of Conax Electrical Penetrations.Wyle Labs Test Results & Util Review of Results Will Be Sent by 900112 1990-09-19
[Table view] |
Text
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1, U-0745
. 1A.120
' L30-84 (10-02)L JLLINDIS POWER COMPANY IP ' CLINTON POWER STATION. P.O. BOX 678. CLINTON ILLINOIS 61727 October 2, 198/
Docket No. 50-461 Director of-Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Request for Additional Information Concerning the Safety Parameter Display System for Clinton' Power Station
Dear.Mr. Schwencer:
Your letter of August 17, 1984 requested additional information on the Clinton Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). Attached is the
-supplemental information requested. We believe that this information will be responsive to your specific concerns on this issue.
Please contact us if you have any questions concerning the attached
- information.
- Sincerely yours, e.A o 5 j F. A. ; pang iberg Director - Nuclear Licensing and Configuration Nuclear Station Engineering DWW/Im Attachment cc: B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager I NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety i
I.
l 8410160055 841002 PDR ADOCK 05000461 F PDR 2P*j I t 1.
U-0745
. 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L bec W. C. Gerstner, B-13 D. P. Hall, V-275 H. E. Daniels, V-650 J. E. Loomis, V-650 J. G. Cook, T-31 J. H. Greene, T-31 H.'R. Victor, V-928 W. Connell, V-923 K. R. Graf, V-275 L. S. Brodsky, A-10 (3 copies)
J. S. Spencer, V-920 F. A. Spangenberg, V-928 R. E. Campbell, V-923 A. E. King, V-500 L. W. Osborne, V-900
. E. P. Rosol, V-500 D. K. Schopfer, V-270 J. R. Patten, V-922 R. K. Wyatt, V-914 H. M. Sroka, S&L (Atten: H. S. Taylor)
S. A. Zabel, Schiff,-Hardin & Waite
'J. R. Newman, Newman & Holtzinger ,
CPS Central Files, T-31
'E. W. Kant, V-928 R. Schaller, T-31 S. Foster, V-913 T. Riley, V-928 .
R. Hyndman, V-928 J. O'Brien, V-928 D. Wilson, V-920 P'
_. , . _ _ . - . . . _ _ -, , . - _ _. . , _ . , _ , ~ , . _ _ _ - _, ,,y ,
, . . l
. U-0745 !
1A.120 j L30-84 (10-02)L ;
4 ATTACHMENT Response to Request'for Additional Information Concerning the Clinton 1 Safety Parameter Display System QUESTION 420.01a For each' type of device used'to accomplish electrical isolation,'
describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is ' acceptable for its application (s). This description should include
, _ elementary _ diagrams when necessary to indicate the test configuration
. and how the maximum credible faults were applied to the devices.
RESPONSE
The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) has IE isolators from three vendors - General. Electric Company (GE), Electromax,' and Technology for Energy Corporation (TEC). The isolators provided.by CE and Electromax-have been previously reviewed and approved in SSER 2 Section 7.2.3.4.
Thus, the remainder of the responses on the isolators. address the TEC isolators only.
The TEC 2200-2 Isolation System, containing TEC 980 Analog and TEC 981-Digital Isolators will be qualified to IEEE 323-1974 and IEEE 344-1975 as required by the procurement specification (S&L Specification K-2927).
The TEC 2200-2 Isolation System completely envelopes all of the Clinton worst case requirements identified by the procurement specification (K-2927). The qualification sequence and associated criteria are as follows:
i THERMAL AGING The scope of the thermal aging is to place the 2200 System components through accelerated thermal aging to a qualified life. The Arrhenius method was used to determine the aging duration that will simulate the qualified life. The post-production test will serve as the baseline function test. After the thermal aging, the functional test will be
- repeated to verify the operability of the components.
- The chamber temperature is maintained at an average of 86* C for the j 63.3 day duration of the test.
RADIATION i
Irradiation of the 2200 Isolation System was done to a dose of 1500 Rad (Gamma) TID at a dose rate of approximately 500 rad / hour. A complete post-radiation test to be compared with the baseline test will be run on each component of the 2200 System.
SEISMIC l 'There will be two complete tests performed on the equipment. Each seismic test will involve five successful OBEs followed by one successful SSE. The equipment will be tested in such a manner as to demonstrate its ability;to perform its intended function, and sufficient i
1
. . _ _ - - . , _ . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ ~ ,_ . , .. -, _ ,
7
' L30-84 (10-02)L monitoring _ equipment will be used to evaluate performance before,-
~during and'following the test. All testing will be per IEEE 344-1975.
- EMI Susceptibility The purpose of this test is to establish that the equipment can operate
- Ln an electric field within the frequency range specified. No malfunction, undesired response, degradation of performance, or
~
permanent damage to the equipment shall occur when the equipment is operated'in the electric field with the intensities specified. The testing procedure will be Mil-Std-462 method RS03. The test levels shall be 10 volts per meter from 20 MHz to 50 MHz and_15 volts per meter 4 over the.100 MHz - 500 MHz' range. The range from 20 MHz to 50 MHz was covered in increments of 10 MHz. The range from 100 MHZ to 500 MHZ was covered in 100.MHZ increments. Spot checks were made over the 500MHz to 1000 MHz range.
QUESTION 420.01b
~
Data to verify-the maximum credible faults applied during the test were the maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how the maximum voltage / current was determined.
RESPONSE
As a qualification criteria, the maximum creditable fault or worst case Design Basis Accident was established as 2000 Vdc applied across the non-1E outputs.of the analog and digital isolators during the SSE tests.
The 1E input-side of the isolators was monitored to see that no breakdown in isolation had occurred. The maximum creditable fault current applied is that current resulting from the 2000 Vdc.
QUESTION 420.01c Data to verify that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output
- of the device in the transverse mode (between signal and return) and other faults were considered (i.e., open and short circuits).
RESPONSE
The worst-case Design Basis Accident (DBA) postulated for the TEC isolators was verified when 2000 Vdc was applied between the non-1E and IE outputs during the SSE test. The 1E input-side of the isolators were monitored to see that no breakdown had occurred. The TEC Model 159 i
. power supply and Model 981 digital isolators were functionally tested for high_and low output during the second SSE.
The isolators are designed such that an open or short circuit will not compromise the isolation integrity.
QUESTION 420.01d Define the pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.
RESPONSE
2 ;
. U-0745 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L The two criteria used to determine the performance and acceptability of
- the system were the variation between the pre-test data and the
. post-test data, end also the ability to maintain the acceptable range.
. j Acceptable ranges of performance for the system devices were ,
predetermined and documented in the form of baseline data collected before the test. program was started.. The post-production " Quality.
Control Test Procedure" (QCTP) data formed the baseline data.for the
. thermal aging._ The post-thermal aging functional test data then determined the baseline data for the pre-irradiation test.. The
. post-irradiation functional test was not.a complete QCTP, but rather a spot-check to determine if the systen was still operative prior to the seismic test.
As was predicted, the effect.of radiation on the system was negligible.
A combination of the post-thermal.and post-irradiation functional test data formed the baseline data'for the seismic test. program.
A Honeywell absolute pressure transmitter was placed in operation as the analog input to analog isolators, and the 1E inputs were recorded by a.
strip chart recorder.- During the seismic event, 2000 Vdc was applied continuously to the outputs of the isolators; no transients were recorded on the 1E input line, nor was there any damage to the input or recording electronics. See Attachment 1 for a diagram of the test setup.
QUESTION 420.01e Provide a cannitment that the isolation devices comply with the environmental qualifications (10 CFR 50.49) and the seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.
RESPONSE
The TEC isolation devices will be installed in a mild environmental zone
- adjacent to the Main Control Room. Therefore, 10CFR50.49 does not apply to these devices. The following is a comparison of the TEC 1 qualification requirements for the 2200 Isolation System and the Clinton operating condition for the zone where the equipment will be located
TEC Qualification- Clinton Operating Conditions Temperature: 15 - 40' C 18 - 40' C Humidity: 25 - 85% 5 - 60%- .
Pressure: 14.5 to 14.7 psia 14.5 - 14.7 psia Vibration: None None
- Radiation
- 1500 Rads (gamma) TID 1000 Rads (gamma) TID j The procurement specification requires the isolators to be qualified to l the Clinton seismic curves. The seismic qualification tests for Clinton l 3
-. _ _ _. _ __ , __ _ _-,.____ ~ , . _ _
, U-0745 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L are not yet complete. However, the TEC isolators will be' qualified to the Clinton seismic criteria. The fact that the " dry'.' end of the '
humidity-is not covered by TEC's qualification requirements is not-considered significant because the equipment will be located in an air conditioned area.
QUESTION 420.01f-Provide a_ description;on the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (i.e., Electrostatic Coupling, EMI,
' Common Mode and Crosstalk)'that may be generated by the SPDS.
RESPONSE
The TEC 2200_ Isolation System uses differential inputs, high impedence amplifier inputs, steel cabinet shielding and shielded IE output cables to eliminate common mode electrostatic coupling and crosstalk problems.
QUESTION 620.01a The applicant has proposed an SPDS that provides information regarding four critical safety functions (CSF) on one cathode ray tube (CRT) while providing information regarding radioactivity control (the fifth CSF) on a separate CRT approximately eight feet away. The following questions address the feasibility of such an approach.
- a. The applicant argues that no cateing is necessary on the primary SPDS to alert the opera';or to changes _in status on the ARM /PRM because the ARM /PRM has an audible alarm.
} 1. Provide evidence that the ARM /PRM audible alarm is indeed audible to the operator under degraded conditions, i.e.,
when annunciator alarms are sounding, etc.
- 2. Describe the conditions under which an ARM /PRM audible alarm will sound, and the characteristico of the alarm (s), i.e. , durat. ion, frequency, and intensity.
RESPONSE
The SPDS SS display is the primary system display with the other
, displays and the ARM /PRM systems providing secondary information for its i support. Illinois Power has addressed the lack of cueing for the ARM /PRM on the SPDS SS display and made the following change:
The ARM /PRM systems High Radiation summary alarm has been added to i the SPDS SS display. Any High Radiation alarm in the ARM /PRM system will now be audibly alarmed at the ARM /PRM console and also l displayed on the SPDS SS display. The control room operators use l the ARM /PRM console and its various displays to determine the area l of the alarn. and details of the condition. j The audible alarm on the ARM /PRM is a Mallory Sonalert Model SC628, it l provides a minimum of 80 db and will be tested during start-up to insure '
it is audible to the operator under all control room conditions and distinguishable from other control room alarms.
4 i l
,,- n
. U-0745' 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L -
The audible alarm sounds,at any' change-ofLstatus on any channel in'the
. system. It also sounds when,the system-is first started (or restarted) and when a high radiation; condition occurs. The audiblefalarm will
.' sound until the HIGH ALARM light switch is' depressed, thus' acknowledging
- the condition. The alarm is aLeontinuous audible beep of approximately
.1-second duration, at a frequency of 2900 hz and intensity of.80 db.
'For the " alert / trend" alarm. the audible alarm is a short beep.-
-QUESTION 620.0lb l The applicant argues that although the ARM /PRM is approximately eight feet from the primary SPDS. display and is not easily recd from that
- -distance, the ARM /PRM sufficiently provides an overview of radioactivity control stacus because it provides an easily. recognizable pattern (a schematic of the plant) which is overlaid with distinctive color changes when changes in radiation monitoring status occur.
- 1. Provide an explanation why the inconsistent use of color code
, meanings will not mislead the operator; that is, since yellow denotes " normal" on the primary SPDS display but denotes " abnormal" or " trending high" on the ARM /PRM, there seems to be a' risk of the operator misinterpreting.a yellow data point as being " normal" on the ARM /PRM portion of the SPDS when'it is actually trending high.
i 1
- 2. Provide discussion / analysis explaining why control of the ARM /PRM displays from the primary SPDS area is unnecessary.. The discussion should address the situation in which the ARM /PRM has been switched to a lower level display rather than the " status grid display" and has been left in that condition.
- 3. Provide a diagram of the control room showing the primary SPDS
] display location, the ARM /PRM location, the distance netween the two locations, and the viewing angle.
'1.
RESPONSE
IPC has added a " Rad Control" (Critical Safety Function - CSF) alarm to the primary SPDS display which is fed from the ARM /PRM system's High Radiation Summary Alarm (see the Attachment #2 format for the revised Primary SPDS display). With the inclusion of this alarm, the primary
- SPDS display is now a stand-alone high level indication of plant CSFs.
- Therefore, the primary SPDS will provide a complete and unambiguous
,. indication to the plant operator (s). The potential for confusion j between the color uses on Nuclenet and the ARM /PRM systems is removed.
With the inclusion of the " Rad Control" CSF alarm on thre primary SPDS, i the ARM /PRM " Status Grid" display becomes a secondary S?DS support
, display. :However, the question of operator misinterpretation of a 4
" yellow" data point as being " normal" on the status grid when the associated radiation monitor is actually in an alert / trending high condition is addressed in the format for the status grid display itself.
[ The format of the status grid display includes a " summary alarm table".
Anytime a radiation monitor enters an alert / trend (yellow) or a high ,
radiation level (red) condition, the associated radiation monitor number j 5
. s U-0745
- 1A.120
. L30-84 (10-02)L
, (and the appropriate corresponding color) also apoears'in'the " summary alarm table". Thus, the operator cannot confuse a " yellow" data point as being " normal".
All of the lower level displays of the ARM /PRM'aystem, with the exception of the group displays, have a two minute timed reset ..
associated wich them. If they are called up and left.in that condition.
-the status grid display will return'onto the scree. after the two minutes have expired. The group displays are used to monitor trends or
-evolutions in chosen. areas, and thus in these conditions a timed reset e is not desireable. In the unlikely event the ARM /PRM is.left with a h
group display present on the screen and an alarming condition develops, the. ARM /PRM audible alarm would sound and the " Rad Control" CSF alarm
. light on the primary SPDS display would illuminate " red". An operator would then need to go.to the ARM /PRM panel to clear the. alarm, at which time he could bring the status grid display back up onto the screen.
With these provisions, adequate control of the ARM /PRM system.iu +
maintained.
Figure 13.5-1 of the CPS FSAR (Attachment #3) has been marked to show
, the primary SPDS location and the ARM /PRM location. Attachments #4, 5.
and 6 show the viewing angles and distances between the displays and the 1
-operators.
F It should be noted that the final location of the ARM /PRM panel is just i
to the left of Panel P678, "The Standby Information Panel". This was
{ always to be the permanently installed location for this panel. The t
ARM /PRM panel was noted as being on the right-hand side of P678 in previous submittals. This location was only temporary. Due to restrictions associated with Fire Protection cable routing, the ARM /PRM panel cannot be installed on the right-hand side of P678. However, it 4
should be noted that, as indicated by the ?.ttached sketches, the ARM /PRM 4
panel is more readily visible to the operator from his normal work station (directly in front of the NUCLENET console) if this panel is 1
located to the left of P678. From a human factors standpoint, this location is considered most acceptable, since the operator is not required to rotate his head away from the primary SPDS display in order i to view the ARM /PRM panel.
QUESTION 620.02 The color codes proposed for the Clinton SPDS (with the exception of the ARM /PRM portion) are inconsistent with sterotypical color meanings:
i green = go, normal; yellow = caution, abnormal; red = warning, danger.
- a. Explain why the color coding of the SPDS cannot or should not be changed to be consistent with the population, convention and the ARM /PRM portion of the SPDS.
- b. Explain why inconsistencies within the SPDS cannot or should i
not be resolved, i.e., presently, within the proposed SPDS yellow means either normal or abnormal, and normal conditions are denoted by the colors green, yellow and blue.
6
~ -- - .~. - -
, - O.
U-0745' t
1A.120
' L30-84 (10-02)L
RESPONSE
The color coding scheme for.the CPS SPDS coincides with that utilized
~
for the entire PGCC/Nuclenet_ control room design.- This scheme was developed by General Electric for_use in advanced control rooms.
.Throughout the Nuclenet design, colors are us2d according to the following convention / scheme:
Red: alarm. status (digital values and graphs), equipment energized, open valves Green: equipment not energized, closed valves, scale marks for bar graphs.
Magenta: alarm status (digital valves and graphs)
Cyan: fixed background and fixed labels.
Yellow: digital and bar graphs not in alarm condition (normal).
White: invalid data.
4 These colors and conventions provide high contrast and are most readable by the operctor(s).
For the ARM /PRM system the following color code convention / scheme is used to indicate changes in radiation monitor status:
)'
Light Blue: communications failure i Red: high radiation level alarm.
1 Yellow: alert / trend alarm.
Dark .
Blue: monitor not initialized.
I White: calibration / check source, maintenance, flush, local control.
Green: normal conditione.
J The plant operators have received a significant amount of training on a i simulator which utilizes color coding in an identical fashion to that of ,
the CPS control room displays. They have also operated from the CPS l control room, during preoperational testing, using displays with this convention. The.use of the color schemes presented has not been a source of confusion for the operators. To change these schemes now could introduce such confusion.
With the inclusion of the " Rad Control" CSF alarm on the primary SPDS,
- as discussed in the response'to Question 620.01(b), there is no need to
, 7
_ .- . . _ _ _ . . . _ - -- _--_ . . - _ . m.
, U- 0745 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L change'these color: codes, since the primary SPDS display is a complete
'and unambiguous status indication.
QUESTION 620.03
- a. Provide an estimate of the density of the SPDS overview display
'with the " AIDS" function activated.
- b. Describe the method used'to estimate'or measure display density.
- c. Identify character size in inches or millimeters and in pixels.
NOTE: Provide for both SPDS and ARM /PRM if they are different.
' RESPONSE The display density with the_" AIDS" function activiated is approximately 19.6%. This meets the guidance of NUREG-0835, Section 4.5.3.
The method used to measure the display density is the ratio of active pixels to the total pixels.
-For the Display Control Systems (DCS)/SPDS each display is formed by a matrix of 72 character positions on each of 48 display lines, to produce a total of 3456 standard size character positions.
Each character position on the display consists of a matrix of 7 vertical scan lines by 7 horizontal bit positions. This meets the criteria of NUREG-0835, section 4.5.3 and NUREG-0700, Section 6.7.2.2.
Alphanumeric characters are displayed within the character position on a 5 by 5 matrix while graphic characters are displayed in the full 7 by 7 j character position pixel matrix.
, For purposes of the above display density calculation, an average of 16 i active pixels per character was used.
SPDS Nuclenet Displays ARM /PRM Displays Graphic (7 x 7) 19 inch display (6 x 8) 19 inch display Height 5.0 mm 5.3 mm l Width 4.6 mm 4.1 mm Alphanumeric (5 x 5) (5 x 7)
Height 3.8 mm 4.6 mm j Width 3.3 mm 3.4 mm j For the ARM /PRM the screen format is 80 characters per line, 48 lines per page. The characters are a 5 x 7 dot matrix within a 6 x 8 dot pattern. This meets the criteria of NUREG-0835, Section 4.5.3 and NUREG-0700, Section 6.7.2.2.
QUESTION 620.04 8
_- ~- - - .
. . U-0745-1A.1201 L30-84 (10-02)L ~
. The applicant stated on page 13 of. its February .10.1984 submittal that .
"The (data) update rate will be selected _ based upon: human factors considerations."
1 Provide further detail concerning this statement, e.g., selection ~
criteria used.
- RESPONSE -
The-primary SPDS display is updated at a minimum rate of every two.
seconds. This meets the functional criteria of NUREG-0835, Section p 4.4.2.2. 'The primary SPDS display'provides the overall safety' status of the plant. As such, the minimum two-second update rate was chosen to l~
present. current data as specified by NUREG-0835. Secondary, or:
supporting, displays such as the ARM /PRM system's status-grid display and the Nuclenet emergency operating procedure displays, provide.the status of individual systems and historical / trend informatidn.. A'five second minimum update rate for these displays is sufficient to inform the operator of the system status. There is no corresponding NUREG-0835
, ' criteria for such " support" displays. Five seconds was chosen so as not to affect the response time for the primary SPDS Critical Safety-Function monitoring (i.e. not require significant computer processing i
time).
. QUESTION 620.05a Insufficient information was provided to evaluate the adequacy of the simulated input used in validation testing. Specifically, the
, identification of the transient and accident sequence test case used for
{ performance tests of the SPDS should be provided and justified. If a 4
specific parameter is not testable in a fully simulated transient
- sequence, the source of the validation data should be identified.
RESPONSE
4 The SPDS is an integral part of the GE supplied Nuclenet system using those features originally designed into the Nuclenet system. In lieu of the transient / accident sequence testing euggested above, IP will test i the SPDS as an integral part of the Nucienet system expanding the test procedures to encompass the additional hardware, display background,
- j. alarming features, and calculated variables.
1 QUESTION 620.05b Provide a summary. description of the validation testing planned for the total, integrated system, that is the simultaneous testing of the l hardware, software, personnel, procedures / manuals, and training.
2- RESPONSE 1
i The integrated software testing, to be performed by General Electric /Honeywell, will include the followirg:
- 1) System Initialize and Testing & Reconfiguration Units -
9
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T .;
. U-0745-1A.120.
L30-84 (10-02)L Verify.that the_ cold, manual, and common memory. failure restart functions operate correctly.
- 2) ' Executive Program Operating System -
Verify that data acquisition processor (all-core) and display control processor (core-bulk) operating systems have been packaged correctly.
^
- 3) Analog Data Acquisition -
Verify that the analog data acquisition and display function
{ operates correctly and within specified response criteria.
1 4) Digital Data Acquisition -
Same as for analog data noted in Item 3 above.
- 5) Operator Display Interface -
Verify the correct operator interface. capabilities with the DCS/SPDS data available at the DCS console. .
- 6) Display Format and Conventions -
i Verify the data translation and transformation functions work correctly.
3 7) System Restart -
Verify that DCS/SPDS software will perform adequately while encountering analog / digital data processing and hardware failures over an extended period of time.
l The verification and validation (V&V) field testing, to be performed as part of the SPDS startup and pre-operational testing program, shall
. ensure that the following are met:
(a) The as-built SPDS meets the design functional requirements; (b) The SPDS performs to establish acceptance criteria; and (c) The SPDS is maintainable.
The following examples relate to the types of testing that will be performed as part of the V&V program:
1
- 1) SPDS cperability tests
- 2) Accuracy of card input conversions and isolators
- 3) Each input is correctly connected and the signal range is consistent with the required design l u4) _ Parameter validation checks i
10
-. - . - ,~ . _ - - . .
- c. -
- ,c l
. U-0745 1A.120-
- L30-84 (10-02)L ' 1
- 5) Display. parameter setpoints and' alarm features 6)' Check color coding
- 17) Equipment-field installation verification-4
- 8) . System response to operator requests and sensor input changes.
6 Operators attend approximately two hours of classroom. training on'the functional design' of the SPDS. This training was'part of'the Emergency
. Operating Procedures operator training program. After the SPDS is ,
installed and testing is complete, operators will be trained on the operacion of the SPDS. The training wil1 include, as.a minimum,.how to l
' validate display . informatio:1, .how to~ identify a. faulted computer point,
'and how to call up SPDS on a backup CRT.
QUESTION 620.06a Identify which safety parameters.(if any) are validated by comparing redundant data points in real time. -
,. ' RESPONSE The following parameter is validated by redundant comparison:
- .. Drywell (DW) Pressure (Narrow Range)
. The technique used for redundant channel validation of data is: One of-I the variables is picked as the baes number and is displayed as well as compared to the remaining values i.e.
/DWp-DWi/ 4 K *DWp for all 1.
i
/DWp-DWi/ less than or equal to K *DWp where: DWp = the selected value DWi = the next measured value
- = multiply K' = the scaling factor (will be determined when the source
- tranducer and channel accuracy have been measured) when the value of /DWp-DWi/) K
- DWp the displayed value is turned white but continues to display the value of DWp.
f QUESTION 620.06b Provide a description of the method (s) used to validate calculated parameters.
RESPONSE
Data. validation consists of three different techniques;
- .11
U-0745 1A.120 L30-84 (10-02)L
- 1) The Data Acquisition Processor (DAP) portion of the system performs a reasonableness test on each channel as it is digitized. This is the validation test for single parsneter I: channels. All data classified as invalid turns the display white and displays'the last valid value. .There are several conditions.on a point's status which causes the value to be displayed in white:
, a) If the point is a real point (i.e., associated with a plant sensor) its value will be displayed in white if it fails the reasonable limit check.
b) If a point is a psuedo point (i.e., its value depends on a real point) its value will be displayed in white if any of its source points are: deleted from processing, failed the reasonable limit check, out of scan, undefined, or has a substituted value.
c) If a point value has been substituted regardless of being a real or psuedo point, its value will be displayed in white. The color white is used to display " low confidence" data. . Low confidence data means the sensor is no longer active for one of the above reasons. The last valid value is displayed because the data is nn longer being updated but the point is still on display.
The white color will. flag operators as to the uncertainty of the data and alert them to regard the point values accordingly.
- 2) The techniqua used for redundant channel validation of data is given in the response to question 620.06a.
- 3) The following parameters are validated by the averaging algorithm:
Average Power Range Monitor (APRM)
Source Range Monitor (SRM)
Reactor Water (Rx) Level Wide Range Suppression Pool Temperature i
X = 1/N Xi average value
']{1 n=
f
/X-Xi/ (s K*X if /X-Xi/> K
- X the display is turned white and the value is updated with average value. The value of K is determined as in the preceeding example.
QUESTION 620.06c Provide the' design rationale for indicating non-valid values by presenting the last good value displayed in white. The discussion should focus on why the proposed method is most meaningful and least misleading to the operator.
I 12
ac -
n-
, :U-0745-
'lA.120 L30-84 (10-02)L
- RESPONSE When?a signal-is determined to be invalid, the last valid value.is . . ,
substituted'and displayed in white to indicate a. low confidence. This
. . , . method of fdentifying invalid data.is most meaningful and least misleading to.the operator because-it is consistent with the~ display coding used on all other Nucienet displays throughout.the control room.-
lThrough everyday normal' operation'the operators are very' familiar with
'this display format. See-response to Question 620.06b.
QUESTION 620.06d Compare and contrast the data validation methods used within the ARM /PRM with the. data validation methods used in the balance of'the SPDS.-
Including a comparison of.the display methods used to identify a) valid data, b) unvalidated' data, and c) invalid data.
RESPONSE
The validity of the ARM /PRM data is directly affected by the operational status of the-instrument when the data was acquired. This status is always presented in the history file with the data. .The status condition is given priority according to its importance to the operator.
Status conditions are given below in order of highest priority to lowest priority, a) Not initialized (white status light & print out) b) Check source (white status light & print out) c) Calibrate (white status light & print out) d) Maintenance (white status light & print out) e) Flush (white status light & print out) f) Standby (white status light & print out) g) External fail (yellow status light & print out) h) Low fail (yellow status light & print out) " Reasonableness Checks":
Digital channel: A low count rate failure is determined when the 10-minute history file updates. A lack of counts for 10 minutes defines a failure. The failure clears when counts are again present.
Analog input channel: For an analog input channel (4-20ma current loop), a low fail exists when the input value decreases below the nominal value of 4 ma. The display value will then be 25 percent less than the value input as the-MIN scale value in the channel parameter file.
- 1) High fail-(yellow status light & print out) " Reasonableness i Checks":
Digital channel: Count rates in excess of 1.2 X 10E6 at the detector.
'=
Analog input channel: A high fail exists when the input value j increases above the nominal value of 20ma. The display value will be 25 percent-greater than the value input as the MAX scale value in the channel parameter file, l j) Alarm disable (light & printout) k) High rad level' alarm or flow out of limits (red light & print out)
-1) Alert ' radiation level alarm (yellow light & print out) m) Trend alarm (yellow light & print out)
L l ~
13
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . __ _ ~ _ _ _ _ __
g .a ,
z.. 'U-0745 1A.120 z L30-84 (10-02)L n); Normal (green light & print out) r The ARM /PRM is also equipped with'a polling method that will poll one '
. field microcomputer and,.in turn, all connected field units'. A poll I
-requests the field unit to respond with.any data or status change it may1 )
have computed or with a "no' data" message. .This provides a method of
' determining if the field unit:is still operational..
In'the SPDS, allidata-is subject to some form-of reasonableness check _or
' data validation. .For the analog data, reasonable sensor values are a L part of the Process Monitoring System:(PMS)/DCS data base. These are
~ used during each update to' insure the displayed engineering values are-
. computed from " reasonable sensor _ values". For digital _ data, each
" digital card group" is checked, and a status bit is carried into a-dataL
~
base status buffer where it is checked during each display cycle.
. QUESTION 620.0T
-Provide conclusions regarding unreviewed safety questions or changes to technical specifications.
- RESPONSE i
Technical ~ specifications for the Clinton SPDS-are not_ required since this system is not designed to Class 1E or seismic Class I criteria, is not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and does not
! affect'the actuation / trip of required safety-related systems. The operability'of the CPS SPDS will be assured through the normal plant surveillance / maintenance of the related PMS/DCS and ARM /PRM computer
. systems.
The SPDS monitors those parameters that have been determined, by detailed evaluation, as meeting NRC requirements for monitoring Critical i
Safety Functions _(CSFs). The Verfication & Validation team's review of-
. this parameter set confirms.this adequacy by an evaluation of operator information needs during a wide spectrum of postulated accident sequences (including beyond Design Basis Accidents). This review assures'there are no "unreviewed safety questions" from the standpoint
- of operator data requirements.
, Finally, as indicated by the response to_ Question 420.01, the analog / digital electrical isolation devices utilized by the SPDS' provide 4
the-required safety system protection from faults in the non-safety grade _PMS/DCS (SPDS)-computer system.. The adequacy of these isolation devices fully supports IP's position that there are no "unreviewed safety questions, and that technical specifications are not needed for the.Clinton SPDS.
QUESTION 620.08 Provide a schedule for full implementations of the SPDS including hardware, software, operator training, procedures and user manuals.
RESPONSE
14
1 l
. U-0745 ,
1A.120 '
L30-84 (10-02)L The Clinton SPDS implementation schedule includes the following key milestones:
- 1. The SPDS software design and development will be completed.in February 1985.
2.- The SPDS hardware will be completed in June, 1985, which corrcsponds to the completion of the SPDS startup and pre-operational phase testing.
- 3. SPDS operator training consists of classroom training and hands-on training. The classroom training was completed in July 1984, and the hands-on training is scheduled to be completed in July 1985.
- 4. The SPDS verification and validation program will be completed in July 1985.
- 5. The SPDS procedures will be part of the NUCLENET documentation.
1 l
15
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i ATTACHMENT #2 1
.........l........ 2........ 3........ 4........
1 5........ 6........ 7..
2 POWER RX CORE 1 RCS CNMT RAD 3 2 4 CONTROL COOLING 3 5 INTEGRITY CONDITION _
. CONTROL 4 6 ARPM ,
5 7 ':in ':" :" '"3' ! ' : lll I! l l l l l 7. 1 6
8 xxx xxx- 7. 7 9 SRM 8 10 :::- ll;;;;;;;;;; .; CPS
' " " " " ' PERIOD 9 11 x.xEx -xxx SEC 10 12 11 RX LEVEL (WR) t. .::::';;;I;;!. .; INCH 13 12 14 ""'""S -xxx
-xxx INCH 13 15 RX SIEAM FLOW 14 3u,,uu 16 ;
xx.x xx x 15 17 ,;;;:: l;;;;;; i i MLB/HR 16 RX FEED FLOW in"""i MLB/HR 18 i ;;;;!!! :'. ';i xx.x xx.x 17 19 TOT CORE FLOW ""'"*" MLB/HR MLB/HR 18 20 xx.x xx.x 19 21 20 22 RX PRESSURE (i!R) l l ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; :; ; ; ; ; ; ; ' ; ; PSIG to i u un 21 23 xxxx xxxx PSIG 22 24 DW FLOOR DRAIN i+r - - 23 25 GPM 26 SUMP FLOW $' s's' C ''''''' 'xx.x xx.x GPM 24 25 27 26 28 DW PRESSURE (GR) i' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
id 'n'a f, ' '
'''''' PSIG 27 29 x.x x,x pSIG 28 30 SUPPRESSION 29
- ;;, ;, ;;lll: :;;; ;1 DEG F 31 POOL TEMP 30 isuuuu 32 xxx.x xx.x DEG F 31 33 CONTAINMENT 32 34 PRESSURE ;-; ; ; ; ; ; - l l ll [ ! l j l l l l ; PSIG 33 35 i r , u o .i xx.x xx.x PSIG 34 36 35
- 37 1 36 2 3 4 5 6
- 38 CNMT ISOL IO IO 7 8 9 10 11 37 39 IO IO IO IO IO IO IO IO IO' 38
.40 39
- 51 40 ii2 RX WTR LVL 41
'13 -xx.x IN SUPP POOL LVL DW PRESS xx.xF 42
- 14 DW TEMP xx.x PSIG SUPP POOL TEMP xxx.xF 43
.+5 xxx.x F CNMT PRESS xx.xPSIG 44 16 SRV STATUS (OPEN/ CLOSED) CIGIT TE".P xxx.xF DW FL SUMP FLOU xx.x GPM 45
.' i7 SDV A/B LEVEL CNMT H2 CONC xx.x7. 46 18 xx/xx GAL SEC CNMT AP (FUEL / AUX) BLDG 47 ,
.........l........ 2........ 3........ 48 4........ 5........ 6........ 7..
SPDS SS DISPLAY (Revised)
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AMENDMENT 29 {
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ATTACINENT #4
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I' ATTACINEN" #6 o.
ARM /PBM Display to Operator 4
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DISPLAT
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TOP VIEW ('/-X AXIJ)
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4 y slDE VIEW ( X-1 AX I,5 )
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