ML20076H995
| ML20076H995 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1983 |
| From: | UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076H984 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1150-2-V2-B.27 NUDOCS 8306200242 | |
| Download: ML20076H995 (75) | |
Text
-_ . .- .
i
} CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY E
l SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 i
FOR INTERNAL PRESSURE LOADS A STUDY PREPARED FOR PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE BY
, UNITED ENGINEERS & CONSTRUCTORS, INC.
I f
February 1983 l
)
i O -
8306200242 830607 PDR ADOCK 05000443 E PDR
CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY j SEABROOK STATION UNITS 1 & 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS J
SECTION I
1.0 OVERVIEW AND
SUMMARY
i
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF CONTAINMENT i
! 2.1 Physical Description 2.1.1 Concrete Structure !
1 2.1.1.1 . Base Mat 2.1.1.2 Upright Cylinder
~
2.1.1.3 Dome 2.1.2 Steel Liner and Anchorage System 2.1.2.1 Base Liner 2.1.2.2 Cylinder Liner 2.1.2.3 Dome Liner 2.1.3 Containment Components j 2.1.3.1 Hatches l 2.1.3.2 Piping Penetrations 2.1.3.3 Fuel Transfer Tube l
! 2.2 Materials of Construction 1
4 2.2.1 General l 2.2.2 Concrete l 2.2.3 Reinforcing Steel j
i Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision':
+-...,.-...m- ,.,-..yye-,...-,,.w %- w.r_.-_m,,,,.....-,,,-.,m -w m..s%_m..,_..%__._ ..- - -. -,. , - ..., ., .~ e.--------I'
(__ 2.2.4 Liner Plate and Anchorage System 2.2.5 Containment Components 2.3 Original Design Criteria and Design Loads 2.3.1 General 2.3.2 Accident Pressure and Temperature Loads 2.3.3 Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) 2.3.4 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) 3.0 STUDY METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS METHOD 3.1 Cenerg
] 3.2 containment Structure _s l 3.3 Containment Components
, 4.0 CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY s
4.1 Containment Structure l
l 4.1.1 Behavior 4.1.2 Basic Structure
- 4.1.3 Discontinuity Regions 4.1.4 Base Mat 4.1.5 Liner 4.2 containment Components i 4.2.2 Hatches 1
i 4.2.2 Piping Penetrations 4.2.3 Fuel Transfer Tube
- i. 4.3 Probable Failu.re Modes .
O
\
ii Containment Ultimate Capacity i
Revision:
i j
O REFERENCES
. TABLES LIST OF TABLES 4
1 Containment Load Combinations and Factors 2 Rates of Strength Development of Concrete Cylinders for Containment .
. 3 Material Properties of Reinforcing Steel 4 Liner Anchor Displacements for Design Accident Temperature 5 Liner Strains for Design Accident Temperature 6 Containment Displacements under 146 psig Internal Pressure LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES 1 -
1 Typical Section through Containment i 2 Cylinder Anchorage System 3 Dome Anchorage System s 4 Containment Structure Equipment Hatch t
5 Containment Structure Personnel Airlock I
6 Typical High Energy Piping Penetration l 7 Typical Moderate Energy Piping Penetration 8 Typical Electrical Penetration 9 Typical Ventilation Penetration
! 10 Fuel Transfer Tube Arrangement 11 Strength Development of Concrete Cylinders 12 Containment Structure Typical Reinforcing 13 Containment Structure Typical Reinforcing 14 Containmens Structure Typical Reinforcing l 15 Containment Structure Typical Dome Reinforcing 16 Containment Structure Typical Reinforcing 17 Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Typical Reinforcing i
18 Containment Structure Equipment Hatch Typical Reinforcing 19 Containment Structure Personnel Airlock Typical Reinforcing i
ks l
iii Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
i FIGURES LIST OF FICURES (Coninued) 20 Containment Structure Typical Mat Reinforcing 4 21 Containment Structure Typical Mat Reinforcing 22 Concrete Stress - Strain Curve for Factored Load Design 23 Containment Pressure Transients following a LOCA 24 Containment Cylinder Liner Temperature Transient Curve 25 Containment Dome Liner Temperature Transient Curve I 26 Temperature Profiles through Containment Cylinder Thickness 27 Temperature Profiles through Containment Dome Thickness
, 28 Temperature Profiles through Containment Fill Mat and Foundation Mat l
i 4
a i
l l
l l
\
iv Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
.- - - . . . = _ . _ . .. . _-. -- -
l 1
I 1
SB 1 & 2 '
1 l
l
'O
,v '1.0 OVERVIEW AND
SUMMARY
The objective of the study was:
The determination of the Seabrook Units 1 and 2 containment vessels' capability to sustain extreme pressure and temperature
. conditions.
Our approach was as follows:
Define a ' limit load' for the basic structure rather than the ultimate capability. Prediction of ultimate capacity of a reinforced concrete containment entails considerable uncertainty when that capacity is in tae response regime
. characterized by nonlincar, large-displacement behavior. Our approach, therefore,.was to determine a lower bound estimate'of capacity correspon$ing to a ' limit load' defined as the ~
j O,- j\
pressure at which a general yield state of the reinforcement in f the critical membrane region of the shell is reached. This
! represents the upper limit of linear, small-displacement i
]
response of the basic structure. Deterministic predictions of capacity in this response regime can be made with a high degree i of confidence. Our analysis for this ' limit load' capacity included actual material properties (rather than specified
! minimums) and the role of the liner. The role of temperature was considered.
i Review all potentially intervening secor.dary structural and f containment component failures modes either showing that their capability exceeds the ' limit load' of the basic structure or f
establishing a new limiting condition for containment l capability. After determining the pressure corresponding to a general state of yield of the reinforcement in the membrane t
1-1 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2
(] regions of the shell, assess the capabilities of other regions O of the shell to sus tain . this pressure, including the shell at its base and in the vicinity of larger openings, the basemat, and the liner and its anchorage system. Review the capability at the hatches, piping penetrations and electrical penetrations including the role of temperature on the seal integrity.
The containment capability of Seabrook Units 1 and 2 is sunsnarized below:
CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY Containment Elements Pressure / Temperature
- 1. Containment Structure
- a. ' Basic Structure', i.e. 150 psig " limit load",
membrane regions pressure only.
145 psig @ 3500F
- b. Base Mat > 150 psig
- c. Discontinuity Regions:
o Junction of cylinder Based on moment capacity:
with base mat > 150 psig L
4 Based on shear rebar y capacity (neglecting f u hQg.' dowel action):
143 psig, pressure only d
g y 120 psig, with T > 3000F
'6 7 0jV j lP e
f q Based on shear rebar C7 '
apacity plus l' - ';
}D'I ' dowel action:
(y, 0
3 l t/lI.
J
> 150 psig with T > 3000F
.J t p rge Openings (Hatches) > 150 psig, pressure only U
h g 141.5 psig for high gy pressure and high
\ temperature - based on shear rebar capacity 1-2 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
{'
SB 1 & 2 i I
[ d. Liner / Anchor > 3500F
> 150 psig
[
l
- 2. Containment Components T t
- a. Hatches
' l > l45 psig
- b. Piping Penetrations "
> 3750F (
- c. Fuel transfer tube '
F k
I i
f t
)
l
)
l l-3 containment Ultimate Capacity i Revision. ;
i
__ _ ._ . - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._- _, -e~'
4 SB 1 & 2
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF CONTAINMENT 2.1 Physical Description
- The steel lined concrete containment is classified as a Seismic Category I reinforced concrete structure. The containment structure is comprised of two major structural elements, the rpinforced concrete structure and the steel liner. Figure I shows a typical section through the containment.
2.1.1 The concrete structure is made of three* basic structural elements, the base mat with the reactor pit, and upright cylin-drical shell and a hemispherical dome. The base mat,'cylindri-cal shell and dome behave as a single integrated structure
- under the applied loading conditions. The entire containment is enclosed by a minimum of 15" thick reinforced concrete containment enclosure which is not within the jurisidiction of this report.
!O 2.1.1.1 The base mat is a circular structure, 153'-0" in diameter and
- . nominally 10'-0" thick. There is a cavity in the base mat j under the reactor vessel. The cavity provides keying action
- and adds to the stability of the containment structure. The
- mat is founded on sound bedrock.
l i
2.1.1.2 The upright cylindrical shell extends from the tcp of the base mat to the spring line at the intersection of the cylindrical l wall and the dome, a distance of 149'-0". The inside diameter j of the cylindrical shell is 140'-0". Within the given toler-ances, the nominal shell thickness is 4'-6". The major-openings in the shell are the equipment hatch opening of 28'-0" I
in diameter and the personnel airlock opening of 7 '-14," in 4
diameter. 'Ihe area around the equipment hatch is thickened to i a dimension of 8'-9" for a diameter of 45'-0" which then tapers !
i 2-1 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
.- ... - - _ , . - - , __ .__ - , .. .,... ~ .,_ _ .. .,-, ._., , ,. ... ..,_. ._. .,___. _._ __.-_.._ _ .,_ , ,. .,.,._ .,.,,,, ._-._ _ _ _ - - . _ , _ , _ .
I SB 1 & 2 back to the shell at an angle of 450 The personnel airlock l.
area is similarly thickened to a dimension of 6'-6" for a
, diameter of 18'-1%". See Figure 1 for details.
1 1
2.1.1.3 The dome is a hemisphere of 69' - 11 7/8" inside radius and thickness of 3'-6 1/8". The dome thickness increases uniformly from a tangent point above the spring line to form a tangent where the dome meets the spring line at the outside diameter of the cylindrical shell. <
. 2.1.2 The steel liner is constructed of carbon steel plate and is anchored to the inside face of the reinforced concrete contain-l ment.
2.1.2.1 The base liner is k" thick and welded to leveling angles which are embedded to concrete. The base liner extends to and is continucusly welded to 3/4" thick knuckle plate which is formed to provide the transition between the cylinder and the base liner plates. The knuckle plate is bent to a 6-1/8" outside
- radius. Supports are provided under the knuckle to assure i
stability of the cylinder liner during construction. The base
- liner is covered with a 4'-0" thick fill mat. The fill mat is not anchored to the base liner. All welds that are inacces-i sible after the concrete is poured are covered with a struc-tural channel providing a " leak chase channel system" as a i
i means to detect leakage of the containment atmosphere through '
the welds.
l l .
s j 2.1.2.2 The cylindrical shell liner is primarily constructed of 3/8" thick steel plates in a cylindrical shape of 140'-0" diameter joined with full penetration, continuous welds. The shell liner is penetrated by a number of pipe sleeves of varying diameters, an equipment hatch (28'-0" outside diameter) and a V i 2-2 Containment Ultimate Capacity
- Revision
i
. , - - - - . _ . , - - - . ,-.----,.n- -
, - - - , , , . . . _ . . - - , . _ . , . - , , , , - - , . , . , . - , . - - , . v- -
SB 1 & 2 breech . type personnel airlock (7'-1k" outside diameter). In v these penetration areas, the shell plates are thickened to 3/4". The cylindrical shell liner which extends to the _ spring line a distance of 149'-0" above the base liner is stiffened by a pattern of vertical structural " Tees" whose stems are welded to the external side of the liner with two 3/16" continuous fillet welds, thus providing anchorage for the liner to the structural concrete shell. The vertical s tif feners are not continuous through the horizontal weld joints of the liner plates. Studs are attached to the flange of vertical tees to accomodate placement hoop rebars, as required. Anchorage studs are provided on thickened plates at the penetration assemblies.
A leak chase system is installed on all inaccessible liner plate welds. See Figure 2 for typical details of the shell liner.
2.1.2.3 The dome liner is " thick and flush with the cylinder liner on the outside face. The liner plates are jointed with full pene-tration, continuous welds and joined to the cylinder shell liner at the spring line. The anchorage system of the dome liner consists of tees on 5'-0" grid pattern. A bent stud is provided in the center of each of the 5'-0" x 5'-0" panels.
For details of the dome liner, see Figure 3.
2.1.3 The containment components include the equipment hatch and i
personnel airlock (large penetrations), piping penetrations, other penetrations and valves.
2.1.3.1 The equipment hatch is cylindrical in shape with the internal i
end closed by a flanged dished cover plate. A double gasketed flange is provided between the dished head and the hatch
! barrel. Provisions are made to pressurize the double gasketed f joint and leak chase sys tem is provided over the barrel-liner 2-3 Containment Ultimate Capacity i
Revision:
i
SB 1 & 2 O
V joint of the equipment hatch. Constructed integrally with cover plate is a compression type airlock locited in the lower
- half of the cover plate. This personnel airlock consists of two air lock doors, two airlock bulkheads, and the airlock barrel. The doors are hinged and both swing into the contain-ment. Each door is fitted with two seals that are located such that the area between doors can be pressurized for leak testing. The barrel of the equipment hatch is embedded in the concrete shell and welded to the liner. For details of the equipment hatch, see Figure 4.
The breech type personnel airlock is also cylindrical and is provided with dished caver doors at both the internal and external ends. These daors are hinged and swing away from air-lock barrel. The locking device for the doors is a rotating, third ring, breech type mechanism. These doors are interlocked in such a manner that only one door can be opened at a time.
Each door is fitted with two (2) 0-ring seals installed at each door frame t'or sealing the door in closed position. The space between the seals can be pressurized and tested for leak testing. The barrel of the personnel lock is also embedded in the concrete shell and welded to the liner. Figure 5 provides the details of the breech type personnel airlock. The center-
~
line of the airlock is located at elevation 29'-6 and an azimuth of 3150 The airlock has a clear opening of 7'-0", one outside diameter of the flange on door is 7'-9 1/8", the barrel is 5/8" thick and the sperical dished head cover is 5/8" thick, 2.1.3.2 There are various types of penetration openings located in the lower 100'-0" of the containment cylinder. The penetration assemblies provide conduits for the passage of various systems to and from the containment. These include pipings (high as well as moderate energy), fue l trans fer assembly, HVAC and n
U 2-4 Containment Ultimate capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 (N electrical penetrations, etc. In general, penetration assembly
'b] consists of a sleeve anchored in the concrete structure and welded to the containment liner. The weld to the liner is covered by a leak chase system which can be pressurized to demonstrate the integrity of the penetration-to-liner weld joints. The typical details of the containment high energy penetration assembly are shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows typical moderate energy piping penetration and Figure 8 shows the typical electrical penetration. Details of a typical ventilation penetration are shown in Figure 9.
2.1.3.3 Fuel Transfer Tube The fuel t rans fer tube assembly consists of the 20" diameter, 0.375" thick austenitic steel fuel trans fer tube, the penetra-tion sleeve, the fixed saddle on the reactor side, and the sliding saddle in the Fuel Storage Building. The fuel transfer tube is a passageway to permit passage of the fuel assembly conveyor car during the re fueling operation. During. this refueling operation, the fuel transfer tube is under 34.36 feet of static water head. A blind flange seals the Containment Building end of the tube during normal plant operation and a valve seals the spent fue l pit end of the transfer tube when the transfer system is not being used. A sketch of the fuel trans fer tube arrangement is presented in Figure 10.
2.2 Materials of Construction l 2.2.1 Ceneral l
l There are basically three materials used for the construction j of the containment vessel. These include the following:
- a. Concrete l b. Reinforcing Steel I
- c. Liner Plate including the Anchorage System O
\> 2-5 Containment Ultimate' Capacity Revision:
, SB 1 & 2
- l
'[
In order to obtain the ultimate capacity of the containment, actual material propertiest were used. Concrete compressive
- strength was established from the concrete cylinder tests.
Actual material properties of reinforcing steel and liner plate were obtained from the mill test reports. Ef fects of tempera-ture on the properties of these materials were considered in calculating containment capability.
The base mat of the containment is founded on engineered fill-concrete which extends to the sound bedrock. Controlled back-fill concrete is also placed in space between the containment vertical surfaces and bedrock, wherever required. The fill
- concrete has a 28-day minimum compressive strength of 3000 psi.
The basic specifications of the materials of construction as well as their actual material properties are discussed below:
/
2.2.2 Concrete
. Concrete is a dense, durable mixture of sound coarse aggregate, fine aggregate, cement and water. Concrete with a specified 28-day standard compressive strength of 4000 psi has been used for the entire containment structure.
c The compressive strength of concrete for this study was derived from the actual 90-day compressive strength as the mean value less one standard deviation, fe = 5500 psi. The rates of strength development of concrete cylinders were established from the actual concrete test cylinder results and these are shown in Figure 11. Table 2 gives the detailed test data of concrete. It may be noted that the actual concrete strength is expected to be 10 to 15% higher than the 90-day strength estab-lished from the cylinder tests.
2-6 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 ,
I' 2.2.3 Reinforcing Steel Reinforcing steel for the dome, cylinder and the base mat is high-strength de formed billet steel bars conforming to ASTM 4
- A-615, Grade 60. This steel has a minimum yield strength of 60,000 psi, a minimum tensile strength of 90,000 psi, modulus of elasticity of 29 x 106 psi and a minimum elongation of 7 percent in an 8-inch specimen. All reinforcing bars were spliced in accordance with the requirement of ASME Code Section III, division 2. Reinforcing bar sizes #14 and #18 were joined by mechanical butt splices known as Cadweld splices where splices required. The end plate materials for terminated rebars, wherever used, conformed to SA 537, Class I or approved equal.
Certified Material Test Report was submitted by the Manu fac-turer to assure the requirements of the chemical and physical properties of the reinforcing steel. User tests, as required lb by Division 2 and Regulatory Guide 1.15 were also performed by the Material Manufacturers on full size diameter test specimens Cadweld
~
to further verify the material properties of rebars.
~
splices used to join reinforcing were tested and qualified in accordance with the requirements of Article CC-4333 of Division l
- 2. Test results ensured that the splices did develop at least r
125 percent of the minimum yield point stress of rebars.
The actual material properties of rebars were obtained from the mill test results. The average yield strength of rebars for this study as established from these mill test results is as follows:
{
- Bar Size #18 = 72.4 Ksi i Bar Sizes #9 thru #14 = 70 Ksi Bar Sizes #6 thru #8 = 68 Ksi
, 2-7 Containment Ultimate Capacity I
Revision:
l i
-- . - - _,,, - ,._ ._._-_ .____-,,_.m , . _ _ - , _ . -
SB 1 & 2 O) lV Material properties of reinforcing steel are given in Table 3.
2.2.4 Liner Plate and Anchorage System The steel liner plate is carbon steel conforming to ASME SA-516, Grade 60. This steel has a minimum yield strength of 32,000 psi and a minimum tensile strength of 60,000 psi with an elongation of 21% in an 8" gauge length, to failure. Certified Materials Test Reports for all liner plates including welding and brazing materials were furnished by the manu fac turers.
These reports included chemical analysis, physical tests, mechanical tests, examinations, heat treatment, and Charpy V-Notch test results. For this study, the actual average yield stength of the liner steel was used and this value as estab-lished from the mill test results is 46,200 psi. Modulus of elasticity was considered as 30 x 106 psi.
g The tee anchors and all brackets and attachments to the liner plate are ASME SA-36. All stud materials conformed to Article CC-2621 of Division 2. The load-displacement relationship for the liner anchors was obtained experimentally.
2.2.5 Construction Materials for containment components 1
Containment piping penetration assemblies permit typical carbon and stainless steel piping to penetrate the containment depending on the service func t ion of the process pipe. The sleeves and end plates of the penetration are constructed
! mainly of carbon steel, typically SA 516 GR 60 and SA 333 l Gr. 1.
Material used for Personnel Airlock and Equipment Hatch with Personnel Airlock and Fuel Transfer Tube are as follows:
2-8 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
1
-. _ - . _ . . -4
,.. .m,. m_.__,, ,.m-_r__ _ , , , , . . _ _ ~ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - _ _ , _ , _ . _ . , . _ . _ _ , _ _ . _ , - . , _ . _ _ , _ . . _ , , , _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ - , - _ . _ _ . - -
..s .- a -a -. a
- - ex awc. - a .>-a ..aw .- - --
t i SB 1 & 2
!~
, Personnel Airlock (Breech Type)
\'
Plates SA-516 Gr. 70 l SA-283-G l
Bolts SA-193 Gr. B7 Pins C-1045 l Pipes SA-333 Gr. 6 l
, S.S. Plates (Tapered Wedges for door locking) SA-240, Type 304 l Equipment Hatch I i
i Plates SA-516 Gr. 60 l Bolts SA-193 Gr. B7 j Pins SA-193 Gr. B7 t
Personnel Airlock (In Equipment Hatch)
Plates SA-516 Gr. 70 Bolts SA-193 Gr. B7 l Pins (18-8) Type 304 i Seals Silicone i
Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly j 20" Pipe SA-240, Type 304 Plate for Fixed Support SB-443 o Plate for Sliding Support SA-240, Type-304 Stud for Fixed Support SA-564, Grade 630 l Stud ' for Sliding Support SA-479 Type 304 1
2.3 ORIGIN ^tL DESIGN CRITERIA AND DESIGN LOADS 4
2.3.1 General l
i The design of the containment structure included two major l structural elements, the reinforced concrete structure and the i
O 2-9 Containment Ultimate Capacity l Revision:
a i
s a.-_.
< SB 1 & 2 O
s t U steel liner, including all the anchorage systems and penetra-tion assemblies.
Reinforced Concrete Structure The reinforced concrete containment was designed to withstand i
all credible conditions of loadings which included construction l
loads, normal operating loads, test loads,' loads resulting from the design basis accident and loads due to adverse environ-mental conditions. E f fec t s due to various loads with appro-priate load factors, were combined in accordance with the
! requirements of Division 2 and these are shown in Table 1.
l Various combinations of load-e f fects were investigated under both the service and factored load conditions to determine the .
i greatest strength required of the structural sections of the
! containment.
The design of the reinforced concrete containment was performed 5
in accordance with the requirements of Division 2. In the i
design, emphasis was given to the accident and earthquake loads. The design included the consideration of both primary l (dead load, pressure load, seismic loads) and secondary l
(thermal ef fects) loads. The containment was first checked to assure that primary loads excluding all thermal effects could be resisted by the structure within the specified allowable stresses. The final design included both the primary and secondary loads. Selected critical sections were designed.
Stresses and strains in rebars and concrete due to the combined ef fects of axial forces, inplane shears and moments were deter-mined and compared with the design allowables of Division 2.
In the design, actual rebar configuration (Figures 12 thru Figure 21) was considered, and the liner plate was not used as l a strength element. Iloweve r, interaction of the liner was considered in the analysis of the concrete containment to i
l \
2-10 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
. . . - - - - - - _ ,.-- - --..-., ,.,- .,,,-. - - .,,~,, _ + -
- , . , . _ - , , - . , . . , , - , - - - , , - . - - - . , ~-.-,-,----, , . - - - -
SB 1 & 2 A
,h determine the liner behavior. Under the service load condi-i tions, the working stress-strain theory was used and the I structure was kept elastic. Under the factor load conditions, a parabolic relationship (Figure 22) between concrete stress and strain was assumed and the structure was kept below the
{
range of general yield state for primary loads.
Radial shear reinforcement was designed to resist radial shear
. forces, as required. Critical shear forces and associated axial tensile forces were considered in the design because
. tensile forces reduce the shear capacity of concrete. Radial shear forces due to thermal effects (secondary loads) were considered as primary forces. No yielding was permitted in radial shear reinforcement.
, Steel Liner and Penetration Assemblies I
The steel liner was designed for all the load combinations as
,' (O ) shown in Table 1 with the exception that the load factors for all the load cases were taken a s, 1.0. For All the loading conditions (service and factored), strains in the liner plate and displacements in the liner anchors were determined and they complied with the design allowables of Division 2; this ensured the leak-tightness of the liner. Force-displacement relation-ship of liner anchors was established from the experimental data. The adequacy of the liner subjected to various cyclic loads was considered using fatigue methods and limits of ASME
+ Code Section III, Division 1. The design of brack ets and attachments connected to the containment liner was performed in I accordance with the design requirements of Article CC-3750 of Division 2.
The penetrations were designed to resist pressure loads, thermal loads and mechanical loads, such as piping reactions,
\
2-11 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
1
n.
4 i-SB 1 & 2 etc. without loss of structural and leak-tight integrity. The anchorage system for the penetration was ' designed in accordance with the requirements of Division 2. The temperature in concrete around high energy piping penetrations was limited by controlling contour of the flued head outside the containment f and by providing thermal insulation between the penetration I
sleeve and the process pipe. Metal portions of all penetration assemblies, not backed by concrete, met the design requirements
- of various ' subsections of Division 1, as applicable. The i
effects of imposed displacements by the concrete containment on I
the barrels of the equipment hatch and personnel airlocks were
$ also considered in the analysis of the hatches. The airlock barrel has a door on each end, each of which is designed to j withstand the pressure from inside the containment.
1 2.3.2 Accident Pressure and Temperature Loads
- The Design _ Basis Accident (DBA) results in the highest postu-t j lated pressures and temperatures inside the containment and was 4 V ~
determined by considering a pipe break in the reactor coolant system. The containment design basis accident pressure, with an appropriate margin, is 52 psig. The pressure-transients following a LOCA are shown in Figure 23.
I i
The temperature transient curves for the containment liner are shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25. The maximum liner design temperature is 268.80F. Thermal gradients through the contain-l ment are also considered. Figure 26 through Figure 28 show the thermal gradients through the containment cylinder, dome and base mat at various times after the accident. For the liner
, design, transient conditions of liner temperature and corre-sponding internal pressure were considered. For the concrete
- containment, peak liner temperature and peak internal pressure
- were considered to occur simultaneously to produce the most a
l I
l 2-12 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
i
.,.,-e., .-r..~.-..,.,... ,-,_,.m,-,__,,,.,m_,..--c.,_-,-..---,-4 . . . , , . ,
. . . . _ . , , _ , . _ ,_.~,..,-,._.e.ve ,_m.,_. --e.
SB 1 & 2 l
i conservative results, wherever e f fec ts of these loads are additive.
2.3.3 Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)
These loads are generated by a ground motion with a peak hori-zontal and vertical acceleration of 0.125g. The effects of two orthogonal horizontal components and one vertical component of earthquake were considered and conbined by the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) methods.
2.3.4 Safe Jhutdown Earthquake (SSE) -
These loads are generated by a ground motion with a peak hori-I zontal and vertical acceleration of 0.25g. The e f fec ts of I
three orthogonal components of earthquake were considered and combined by the SRSS methods.
4 i
I i
4 l
i i
4 4
i 2-13 containment Ultimate capacity Revision:
- . . - - - ,,-,--,n_., ,en,g---,- ,,..,-enn.,.,,_, --n--,_ -.---e ,,n. , , - r,v-m._,ww- mw ,, re ne
SB 1 & 2 1
3 3.0 STUDY METHODOLOGY AND ANALSYSIS METHODS
' 3.1 General i- The study is focused on understanding -the behavior of the containment system under an extreme pressure and temperature environment and the prediction of its ability to maintain its leak-tight integrity in that environment. The study sepirates the containment system into two parts: structure and components. Potential ' fa ilure ' modes are identified,
, considering independent modes of the structure and containment components and coupled modes when interaction is predicted for li the system response to this environment.
- Prediction of ultimate capacity of a reinforced concrete f containment structure entails considerable uncertainty if that i capacity is in the response regime characterized by nonlinear, j large-displacement behavior. Our approach, therefore, is to
- determine a lower bound estimate of capacity corresponding to a
' limit load' defined as that pressure at which a general yield j state of the reinforcement in the membrane regions of the shell is reached. This represents the upper limit of linear, small-displacement response of the basic structure. Deterministic f predictions of capacity of the basic structure in this response l regime can be made with a high degree of confidence. Our
! analysis for this ' limit load' capacity includes actual material properties (rather than specified minimums) and the
, role of the liner. The role of temperature is considered.
- After determining the pressure corresponding to a general state of yield of the rein forcement in the membrane regions of the shell, we access the capabilities of other regions of the shell to sustain this environment. These include the shell at its 4
base and in the vicinity of large openings, the basemat, and the liner and its anchorage system. We review components iO .
3-1 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
4
--+,-,,-,e--,.,, e-r -,m,o--wp----,,--~ww.,-, , , , . ~ , ,w--,.__e,,- ,, .+,v,,,.,--,--.e- ,-----w,-----,n,- .m,--r--e-w,.
SB 1 & 2 (hatches, piping penetrations and electrical penetrations, including the role of temperature on the seal integrity) for their ability to sustain this environment. Subsequent to this analytical review, we attempt to predict the 'most probable' containment failure mode.
3.2 Containment structure The membrane regions of the shell (i.e., those regions removed from the discontinuities at the base, springline and large openings and for which the shell's response to pressure loads are in plane forces only) are identified here as the ' basic' structure. The response of the basic structure can be predicted by shell theory using hand calculations. The primary force system (membrane forces) is accurately determined since the shell response is governed by conditions of equilibrium only. Actual material strengths are used rather than the
, g nominal design values. Displacements are calculated from k strains corresponding to the above force system.
Discontinuity regions of the shell at the dome-to-cylinder juncture (springline) and cylinder-to-basemat juncture are analyzed with an axisymmetric finite element model for the pressure and temperature environment determined as the limit condition for the basic structure. The basemat is included in l
the model. Cracking of concrete and uplift of the basemat edge are two nonlinear ef fects included in the analysis. The role e
of the liner is accurately represented. The results of the analysis are compared to classical shell theory predictions j where possible.
The discontinuity regions around the large openings are reviewed for their ability to sustain this environment.
Analyses based on 3-D finite element models of a quadrant of A
l 3-2 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
l L
. -_ _ _ = _ ,
SB 1 & 2 l
/ the. containment structure, including large opening, had been
~
performed for determination of design basis forces and moments j in the shell. Pressures to 1.5 x Pa (design accident pressure, 52 psig) and temperature had been considered. Cracking of concrete had ' been included. Forces and moments from these analyses are proportioned to the pressures and temperatures consistent with the ' limit' state defined for the basic structure. These are compared to design allowables factored to account for actual material properties.
The liner and liner / anchor system are reviewed for their ability to maintain the leak-tight integrity of the containmcnt system. A liner panel is assumed to be buckled under temperature induced loads. Resulting anchor displacements are compared to ultimate displacements determined in a test program supporting the design. A special purpose computer program models the behavior of the liner / anchor system allowing for t
's nonlinear buckled '. panel stiffness and liner / anchor load-i displacement. Only static analyses are performed as all known pressure-time, records produce quasi-static responses.
4 3.3 Containment Components l
Hatches The equipment hatch and personnel airlocks are reviewed for their ability to sustain containment pressure load of 150.0 psig and imposed displacements from the containment wall growth. An assessment of each of the major steel elements in the hatch and the airlocks considering stability, material strength and ability to maintain leak tightness (distortion) is determined.
Material strength criteria are based on obtaining a stress of 90% of yield.
3-3 containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
L.-...____ _ _ _ . - - - - _ _ . - - - . _ - - - - - - - -
SB 1 & 2
/N Piping Penetrations Piping penetrations are reviewed for their ability to sustain .
containment pressure load of 145 psig, containment thermal loads from a temperature of 3750F', and imposed containment wall growth of approximately 1.7 inch in the radial direction and 1.1 inch in the vertical direction at elevation of +20 feet.
Containment pressure of 145 psig produces membrane stresses in the sleeve and pipe no larger than approximately 10% of
?
material yield strength. . _ _ .
w t KO a.#,s at
/ (O
/
Containment temperature of 3750F can readily be sustained by penetrations with design temperatures greater than h All penetrations have been designed to sustain 3000F. For penetrations with 3000F design temperature, it is estimated that thermal loads will increase by 35% oveE design values.
These thermal loads will be less than the plastic capacity of I
the pipe.
The 1.7 inch containment radial growth will not produce
- significant axial loads on the penetrations since there are no axial restraints colinear with the penetration centerline in this direction. Vertical displacement of 1.1 inch will produce loads significantly higher than those produced by the containment temperature and pressure environment.
. To envelope _ all loading conditions, the penetrations are evaluated for collapse loads applied by the attached piping.
Specific details for high and moderate energy penetrations follow.
High energy penetrations have been qualified for faulted condition design loads which are more conservative than a v
3-4 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 O collapse load set. These penetrations are considered acceptable on the basis of (a) primary membrane stress I
intensity being smaller than the lower of 2.4 Sh or 0.7 Su and (b) primary membrane plus primary bending stress intensity _
being smaller than the lower of 3.6 Sh or 1.05 Su.
Moderate energy penetrations are qualified by applying pipe plastic moment to the penetration assembly both inside and outside the containment. These loads are reacted by transverse j shear forces applied at the pipe /end plate interface. Weld stresses due to the plastic moment and the containment pressure are evaluated and are estimated to be no larger than approximately 60% of material yield strength. The end plate is qualified by evaluating the bending stress at the center of the plate if the entire plate is subject to containment pressure load. Maximum plate stress estimated is 32000 psi. This is slightly greater than material yield but less than the stress that would be determined from a full plastic plate moment acting at the center and the end plates are judged acceptable.
> Fuel Trans fer Tube The fuel trans fer tube is subject to the containment pressure and temperature environment as well as loads imposed by growth of the containment wall. The significant loads on the tube result from the 1.02 inch radial displacement and the 0.8 vertical displacement.
The inside support is able to sustain the addition load tending to push the fuel transfer tube into the fuel storage building.
Stress in the fuel transfer tube is determined to be less than yield stress. The sleeve between the containment and fuel storage building will de form plastica 11y and become a hinge.
I It is judged acceptable based on calculated strain or 1.1%
being less than 30% ultimate strain for carbon steel.
l l
l 3-5 containment Ultimate capacity Revision:
i I
c
i 1
l SB 1 & 2 O A review of the expansion joints (bellows) indicated that the expansion joint immediately inside the containnn.at wall (EP2) is subject to containment pressure of 145 psig and an axial extension of 1.0 inch. These values exceed the design pressure of 60 psig and allowable axial extension of 0.525 inch. The bellows manufacturer was contacted regarding the estimated load and deflection values predicted. Their opinion was that the bellows would not fail .
A
- O i
.l i
\
3-6 Containment Ultimate' Capacity Revision:
.m-- - -,--i-, y _m,---- _ - -
---._n-.,y-,my ry -,_mm. __y,,_-___r,.___--.____.,,-. __ v__,_ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ , _ - . , - _ . _ - . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ - . - _ , - , _
SB 1 & 2 O
v 4.0 CONTAINMENT CAPABILITY 4.1 Containment Structure 4.1.1 Behavior The reinforced concrete shell with steel liner functions as a pressure vessel for these postulated accident loads. The primary response of the structure is the development of hoop and meridional membrane forces in the plane of the cylinder and dome walls. These membrane forces are the only forces in those regions of the cylinder and dome that are removed from discontinuity areas. These membrane regions of the shell structure are re ferred to as the basic structure. The primary load carrying elements are the reinforcing bars, hoop, meridional and seismic. The liner is load sharing for the high pressure environment to its yield point and is included in the determination of the ' limit' pressure definition of containment
( capability.
The membrane forces are known from the equations of equilibrium as:
Meridional Force Hoop Force Dome: N x=f-D Ne =
Cylinder: Nx = -D Ne = PR where P is the internal pressure, R is the mean radius and D is the dead load force. The areas of hoop and meridional reinforcing steel required for the original design basis -loads were determined using these expressions. Accordingly, in the cylinder above the base, the area of hoop reinforcement is approximately twice that of the meridional reinforcement. The O
V 4-1 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 reinforcement in the dome is similarly size'd. Because the area of hoop reinforcement decreases when crossing the springline from cylinder to dome, the discontinuity at that point is J
minimal and inconsequential. The greatest area of seismic reinforcement is at the base and decreases at fixed intervals of f increasing elevations. The liner thickness is 3/8 inch in the cylinder except for locally increased thicknesses around penetrations. The liner in the dome is 1/2 inch. The effective area of steel at any section, hoop and meridional at any elevation is accurately known. Liner yield occurs at a lower stress than rebar yield but remains as a load sharing element. Elevated temperature e f fects are known, including reduction in liner and rebar yield strengths, thermal induced growth of the shell, thermal induced stress in rebar and, in combination with pressure level, creating either a load sharing or. load producing role for the liner.
s The prediction of ultimate capacity of these structures entitles considerable uncertainty if that capacity is in the response regime beyond the yield strength of the rebar. At pressure levels below rebar yielding, the structural response is linear and characterized as small displacement. The j applicable analysis methods are known to be very accurate.
i Beyond rebar yielding, the response becomes nonlinear and large displacement where analysis methods and results are more prone to error (including sensitivity to variation in material properties, methods of analysis and data interpretation). At pressure levels at and below rebar yielding, the composite nature of these reinforced concrete structures produces a load
' averaging' (essentially a load redistribution phenomenon for
- parallel elements) such that the state of general yield for a wall section is characteristic of the statistical average of l
the rebar yield strengths. At pressure levels approaching 1
-)
4-2 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2
( ultimate strength in the rebar, the phonomenon is more nearly a
' weakest-link' effect requiring a probabilistic failure criterion. Finally, the averaging nature of the response at and below rebar yield produces a structure which is relatively insensitive to material and construction related Jariables
(" faults") while the reverse is true beyond yield. This is particularly significant in consideration of the Cadwell
{ splices where high standards of quality control insure that the required strength is achieved.
There are four discontinuity regions in the containment shell:
the juncture of dome and cylinder (springline), small openings, the large openings for equipment hatch and personnel airlock, and the juncture of the cylinder to the base mat.
The discontinuity e f fec t at the springline is very small and secondary. Discontinuity between the dome and cylinder arises b
d when a mismatch in pressure induced radial expansion of the
' free' shells occurs which requires radial shear forces and bending moments to enforce compatibility. The radial expansion is controlled by the area of hoop reinforcement. Since the membrane hoop force in the dome is one-half the hoop force in I the cylinder the area of hoop rebar is reduced accordingly.
The e f fec t on radial expansion is to virtually eliminate the mismatch between the shells. There fore, the shear force and i bending moment required for compatibility are small.
1 Immediately adjacent to all openings in the containment shell, there is a " stress concentration" e f fec t locally inducing radial shear forces and bending moments and increasing its l membrane forces. This e f fec t diminishes rapidly with distance l
l from the opening. At small openings whose diameter is less I
than or equal to the nominal shell thickness, radial shear and l
(VD 4-3 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
l
SB 1 & 2 O
Q moment are small; there fore , only membrane force concentration
- was considered. A stress concentration factor of two (2) was determined around small openings. All membrane forces and f moments around the openings are resisted by rebars of the cylindrical shell. These rebars are generally continued without interruption around the openings. Bent-rebars are generally spaced (6" c/c) around the openings at half the normal spacing (usually 12" c/c), thereby providing twice the required area of membrane rebars. Therefore, no additional
, analysis is required to determine the containment capability around small openings with respect to internal pressure.
The radial shear forces, bending moments and the increase in membrane forces in the immediate vicinity of the large openings are significant, requiring analysis using finite element methods and special design detail. The shell wall is locally thickened and significant increases in rebar area are made in this ' boss'. All major shell reinforcing steel is formed
. continuous around each opening. Shear rein forcement is also l added in these ' boss' regions.
The juncture of cylinder to base mat represents a major dis-continuity e f fect due to a mismatch in radial growth for pressurization loads. The base of this containment is e f fectively restrained from radial growth. Large bending moments and radial shears are induced at this juncture in both cylinder and mat. These effects in the cylinder quickly dampen with distance above the mat. The reinforcement in this area includes increased meridional steel, addition of shear stirrups and the carrying of the hoop reinforcement fully to the base.
The radial shear is the more important discontinuity effect and requires careful evaluation. Analyses can be either classical shell equations or finite element analyses. The later is used S
)
4-4 containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
a SB 1 & 2 ma because of its better representation of the shell and mat stiffness by layering through the thickness, accurate placement of reinforcement steel and accounting for concrete cracking.
The base mat is supported on rock and restrained from radial growth by adjacent foundation and concrete fill. The meridional tensile force in the cylinder wall creates a
. vertical shear on the mat. At the extreme pressures in the i postulated accident, some uplift at the mat's edge is possible.
Bending moment and radial forces are also induced in the mat.
An idealized representation of the mat (axisymmetric geometry) is included in the finite element model of the shell. This model is satis factory for investigation of the mat forces and moments local to the wall and also in evaluating the mat uplift. A second finite element model has been used to give detailed forces and moments considering the true geometry of the basemat including the reactor cavity pit.
4.1.2 Basic Structure (Membrane Regions)
Three locations on the containment structure were reviewed:
- 1) the cylinder at 110'-0 above the base mat where its quantity of seismic rebar is reduced, 2) the dome at 300 above the springline and, 3) the dome at 600 above the springline.
Material properties were those of Section 2.2: rebar yield strength - 72.4 ksi, liner yield strength - 46.2 kai and, modulus of elasticity of steel - 29x103 ksi. Temperature reduction of yield strength was considered where appropriate.
The inplane membrane forces are determined directly from equilibrium relations.
I 4
4-5 Containment Ultimate capacity Revision:
. - . . _ - , ~ ,__.ym... _
..,,__-,,_--,.7_ _._.,_,,__..-~-,-,__,,.y
- . _ . _ _ ~ . , , . , . . . . _ , _ , . ..-,...__,.,,--m . ., - - .
SB 1 & 2 lV) The dead weight of the shell produces a precompression of 3.9 kips /in at E1. 110'-0". An internal pressure of 9 psig is required before the meridional force becomes tension. A pressure of 28.7 psig is required to overcome the precompres-sion at the base of the shell. Concrete tensile strength is approximately 0.1xf'c. The concrete in the containment structure has a strength greater than t'c = 5500 psi. Concrete tensile strength of 550 psi requires internal pressure of approximately 40 psig and 80 psig before cracking due to hoop stress and meridional stress will occur, respectively.
Including the precompression of the 'shell, cracking due to Nx requires internal pressure of 89 psig at El 110'-0".
The structural integrity test requires pressurization to 40 psig. Accordingly, the cylindrical shell will experience significant cracking due to Ne but little or no cracking due to
} Nx. This is confirmed by the SIT results of the prototype containment. For any sutsequent pressurization, the hoop stiffness of the cylinder will be largely associated with its rebar and liner while the meridional stiffness will be con-trolled by concrete until (and unless) pressures exceed 80+ psig. Bidirectional cracking in the dome is expected at l a pressure of 55+ psig. Therefore the SIT will have cracked the concrete and rebar and liner will control the dome stiffness on subsequent pressurization.
The liner will be load sharing if shell radial de formation exceeds thermal related liner growth. If the internal pressur-l ization produces a state of general yield in the hoop rebar, the ahell's radial deformation can increase to always result in a load sharing liner. Considering a load sharing liner, the
' limit load' pressure corresponding to a general yield state in l
section reinforcement occurs at approximately 150 psig with the
/D $
V
[
l 4-6 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
l l
SB 1 & 2 limiting condition being the hoop rebar yield at 110'-0 above the base. All other sections have higher capacity. Total radial displacement controlled by rebar stiffness is approximately 2.2 inches. (Contribution of concrete stiffness will reduce this somewhat). Temperatures above 3000F will reduce the yield strength of steel by approximately 10 percent.
Reduction of yield strength in liner and interior hoop rebar results in a ' limit load' pressure of approximately 145 psig for elevated temperatures greater than 3000F. Elevated temperatures will also increase the shell's radial growth beyond 2.2 inches. ' Limit load' pressure and an accident temperature of 3500F will result in a radial growth of approximately 3.5 inches. The shell's radial expansion depends on the specific pressure-temperature-time relationships but are bounded by the above values at the ' limit load' pressure.
Vertical displacements of the shell are strongly dependent upon V the specific pressure and temperature and the concrete tensile strength. The later influences the extent of cracking due to meridional force at the lower elevations of the cylinder and in the basemat. The extent of basemat cracking will significantly influence the extent of basemat uplift at the juncture with the cylinder wall. Pressures in excess of 100 psig will result in sufficient cracking in the cylinder due to meridional forces that vertical growth will be controlled by rebar stiffness. Results od a finite element analysis of the containment predict the vertical displacement of the edge of basemat (at cylinder wall), cylinder heights 10', 20', 30', 40' and 50' above the basemat to be 0.69", 0.80", 0.91", 1.02",
1.12" and 1.23", respectively. Displacements due to high pressure can produce additional loads on penetrations.
4-7 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 y 4.1.3 Discontinuity Regions:
Discontinuity Region Excluding Openings I At the major discontinuity region, i.e. junction of the cylinder with the base mat, meridional bending moments and radial shear forces due to internal pressure are significant.
i At the other discontinuity region near the springline, i.e.,
the junction of the cylinder with the dome, bending moments and radial shear forces are not large and therefore, this region is 1 not critical. Thermal load is a secondary load and it is self-relieving in nature. Concrete cracking and rebar yielding of the shell due to containment pressure corresponding to the ultimate containment capacity act to relieve the stresses / strains induced by the thermal loads. Therefore, thermal effects will not be considered to evaluate the ultimate i capacity except for the evaluation of ultimate shear capacity.
Radial shear forces due to thermal loads are considered as
' primary forces. The potential failure of shell main rebars (meridional) occur due to the combined effects of meridional moments and tensile forces induced by the containment pressure.
The shear failure of the section was studied considering the-radial shear forces and associated membrane tensile forces induced by containment pressure and the thermal loads.
Moment Capacity The most critical location of the containment at the shell-mat junction is the section in meridional direction. As shown in i
Figures 12 thru 16 inclusive, the section is heavily reinforced in the meridional direction. Additional meridional rebars have been provided locally at this section on the inside l face (tension side) of the wall to reduce rebar stresses. Hoop rebars in this region are same as those provided in the membrane region. There fore , the total quantities of meridional O 4-8 Containment Ultimate Capacity j Revision:
~ . - - . _ - - _ , _ ,,, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
SB 1 & 2 and hoop rebars as provided at the shell-mat junction are far i greater than required to resist membrane tensile forces. The bending moments at the shell-mat junction (near gross changes in shell geometry) are basically secondary because as internal pressure increases, concrete cracks and local meridional flexural stiffness decreases, thereby reducing the bending moments. The effect of decreased meridional flexural stiffness is to increase the meridional bending moment of opposite sign several feet above the shell-mat junction, and also to increase the tensile hoop forces in this region. These increased forces and moments are easily acconunodated by the quantities of rebars already provided. Finally the yielding of main rebars at the discontinuity region may be termed as secondary since formation of a hinge at the base does not violate compatibility.
In evaluating the moment capacity of the section, the combined effects of meridional bending moments and meridional tensile forces due to containment internal pressure were considered.
The liner was considered as a strength element until the yield of the liner material is reached. After this, strain in the
- liner will increase but the stress in the liner plate will i essentially remain constant at yield point. Liner acting as a l
strength element enhances the containment capability. to i
withstand an additional internal pressure.
The moment capacity of the containment section at the base without considering liner effects is sufficient to withstand an internal pressure of 128.0 psig. At this pressure, only inside meridional rebars just reach the yield point, and j outside meridional and seismic rebars are in compression.
Outer concrete block (12.94" from the outer edge) is in compression, having maximum concrete compressive stress of 3.83 ksi. Since pressure induced bending moment is always 10 4-9 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
i
, _ . , . , _ , _ . . _ - . , . . . - _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SB 1 & 2 accompanied by substantial axial tension force on the section, it is very unlikely that there will be any primary concrete failure i.e., failure of concrete before yielding of tensile rebars. Moreover, outside meridional and seismic compression rebars control concrete compression stress. Een liner effects are considered, the moment capacity increases to withstand containment pressure in excess of 150.0 psig. In addition, yielding of inside meridional rebars ' softens' the end fixity and results in base moments which increase with containment internal pressure in a nonlinear, lessened rate. This provides ,
additional capacity not accounted for in this study.
Wen the containment internal high pressure is accompanied by high temperature, the moment capacity of the section at the base is not expected to change appreciably from that with pressure alone.
O Shear Capacity In evaluating shear capacity, radial shear forces induced by containment pressure and thermal loads were combined.
Associated tensile meridional forces were also considered because tensile forces reduce the shear capacity of concrete.
Shear capacity was based on the design requirements of ASME i Code Section III, Division 2.
l In selecting the critical section at the base of the cylinder, provision of Article CC-3521.2.2, " Applied Shear Stress" was applied because most of the radial shear force is caused by internal pressure which induces compression on the outside face of the wall. Since radial shear forces are accompanied by membrane tension, Equation 7 (vc = 2.0 x [' [1 + .002 })
of Article CC-3421.4.1 was used to compute the shear stress vc carried by concrete. It was found that concrete shear stress O
- 4-10 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 equals to zero corresponding to 97.2 psig containment vc pressure and the , concrete compressive stress of 5500 psi.
There fore, in the subsequent study, concrete was assumed to provide no shear resistance. Nominal shear stress vu was based on Article CC-3521.2.1 except that 9-factor was assumed as 1.0 Liner plate was not considered as a strength element in this study.
- The shear capacity of the sections is sufficient to withstand a containment internal pressure of (i) 143.0 psig excluding all thermal e f fec ts or (ii) 120.0 psig plus thermal loads. The thermal loads include e f fec ts of both hot liner (T > 3000F) plus thermal gradient. Dowel action of main rebars (understressed or stressed in compression) was not accounted for in this study to provide additional shear capacity of the section. However, in heavily reinforced concrete sections, as is the case here, rebars located towards the center of the sections are effective as dowels for the radial shear forces.
It is demonstrated that when the dowel action of outside meridional rebars (located at 14 " from the outside wall face) is accounted for, the shear capacity of the sections is raised to withstand an internal pressure in excess of 150 psig plus the thermal loads.
Discontinuity Region Around Hatches:
Discontinuity region around the hatches includes the concrete cylindrical shell _ around the equipment hatch and the personnel airlock. The presence of the openings creates structural discontinuities in the cylindrical wall. Because of these discontinuity ef fects, there is an increase in membrane forces,
, moments and transverse shears, immediately adjacent to the openings, above the values which would have normally existed in the absence of the openings. These forces and moments diminish h
4-11 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
. _ _ . . ~ . - . . - .. . -- .
SB 1 & 2 i
rapidly with distance from the opening to original membrane state of the cylindrical shell. The main reinforcing (hoop, meridional and diagonal seismic) in the cylindrical shell is continued around the openings. Additional rebars such as, radial and ring rebars have been provided locally around these openings to insure that these areas do not form the weak points in the structures. Transverse shear ~ reinforcement as provided
, around the openings resists meridional and hoop transverse
- shears and peripheral shear, as required. Details of rebars around the hatches are shown in Figures.17 thru 19 inclusive.
i Selected critical sections around the openings were investigated for moment capacity. These sections are in tension in both meridional and hoop directions (local to the openings) due to the combined e f fec ts of axial forces and bending moments induced by the containment pressure. Design forces and moments were established from the MARC-CDC finite element analysis (Element 22, a- superparametric thick-shell
! ' element with eight nodes) using a three dimensional model of a j quadrant of containment cylinder and dome, as discussed in Section 3.2. With liner ef fects included, the moment capacity j of these sections are sufficient to withstand a containment
. pressure in excess of 140 psig. At this pressure, only inside rebars (either local meridional or local hoop) reach the yield
, point. Stresses in outside rebars in both meridional and hoop
, directions are well below the yield stress. This is because in the vicinity of large openings, the pressure induced discontinuity moments generally produce tension on the inside face (liner side) of the containment sections. There fore, the l
membrane yield state is not reached at 140 psig, thereby providing the conservatism in moment capacity.
k 4-12 containment Ultimate Capacity l
Revision:
i
.. . - . - .. . - _ ~ - -.
4 I
SB 1 & 2 l Shear capacity around the openings were investigated using s
4 provisions of ASME Code Section III, Division 2. Shear forces due to thermal e f fec ts were accounted for. Liner was not
- considered to provide any shear resistance. Because of large membrane tension forces, concrete was assumed to provide zero shear resistance. E f fects of transverse shear forces on both
. meridional (radial) and hoop surfaces local to the openings were considered. With respect to shear capacity, the regions around the openings are capable of withstanding an internal i pressure in excess of 140 psig plus the temperature loads.
Temperature loads include the e f fec ts .of both hot liner (T > 3000F) plus the thermal gradient.
Discontinuity Region Around Small Penetrations:
Based on prior discussions, the cylindrical shell around small openings (diameter f: shell thickness) has the capacity to I
withstand 150 psig containment pressure.
4.1.4 Base Mat
- The moment and shear capacities of the base mat to withstand i
containment internal pressure were investigated. The base mat transmits all the loads from the supported structures to the supporting medium, i.e. sound rock. The weights of internal j structures and equipment were applied on the top of the base
, mat as an equivalent uniformly distributed pressure. The base mat is circular in shape and has a cavity under the reactor vessel. The cavity provides keying action and adds to the j stability of the containment structure. The main reinforcing provided in the base mat to resist axial forces and moments
, consists of an orthogonal grid of rebars at the bottom face, L
and radial and circumferential rebars at the top face. Shear i
rein forcement was provided to resist transverse shear forces on O 4-13 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
,c-- y y-,--,, - . ~ . , , . , _ , _ , . , _,.,_-__,_._-_,,.,_._,_.-_.___e._,-,,,, ,, ,,y .-.,_.,7 y _, .cr....,_-,._,,_m,-,., _
1 SB 1 & 2 T
both the radial and circumferential surfaces, as required.
Figures 20 and 21 show details of mat reinforcing.
The state of stress in the base mat under the containment internal-pressure is af fected by the edge boundary conditions.
The base mat is supported on sound rock. It is enclosed by the foundation of the enclosure building. Engineered concrete is
. poured against the vertical surfaces of the reactor pit walls and the enclosure building foundation, and this concrete entends to the sound rock. These boundary conditions and the distributions of weights of the internal structures and the equipment on the top of the base mat provide restriction to the edge uplifting. At 146.0 psig, the maximum edge uplifting was ,
found to be only 0.62". The tensile forces, moments and
- transverse shears due to containment internal pressure plus the unifromly distributed pressure from internal structures and equipment were evaluated from the computer analyses, as s ) discussed. The moment capacity was determined - at selected l critical sections and it was based on the combined effects of f axial ' forces and moments. The moment capacity of the base mat I
is sufficient to withstand an internal pressure in excess of 150 psig. At 150.0 psig, stresses in the main rebars are expected to remain below yield point. In evaluating the shear I capacity, transverse shear forces and associated tensile forces acting on both the radial and circumferential surfaces were considered. The shear reinforcement was found to be capable of resisting containment pressure in excess of 150 psig.
)
4.1.5 Liner .
At high internal temperatures which could occur under abnormal i loading, the liner can experience high compressive stresses if internal pressures are low. If the liner is uniform throughout the circumference of the shell and if the liner does not buckle f
1 4-14 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 1
I %) under the imposed loads, then-the internal forces in the' liner are balanced everywhere and no load is induced in the liner anchors. Unbalanced forces on an anchor could occur under the
- following conditions
- 1) a variation of liner curvature between anchors (i.e., buckled panel condition); 2) a variation in liner thickness due to rolling tolerances or different design j thickness; 3) a variation in yield strength of the liner I material; 4) a variation in anchor spacing (e.g., missing anchor); or 5) a combination of the above. The liner-anchors are designed to resist any unbalanced forces parallel to the concrete surface that may be expected to occur.
i 1
To insure that the liner remains leak-tight under all design t
loading conditions, the ASME Section III Division 2 Code limits the allowable strains in the liner and the allowable displace-i~
ments in the liner anchors. The original liner and anchor
( design was verified by an analysis that determined the dis-
\ .
placements and strains complied with the Code requirements.
i The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The design basis peak
, liner temperature is 268.80F. The analysis incorporated the nonlinear load-displacement curves for the liner anchors as determined by test and, used nonlinear stiffness curves for buckled panels. The allowable anchor displacements are one-half the experimentally determined ultimate values or less. l Review of Tables 4 and 5 indicates that the 3/8" - 3/4" adjoining liner plates at the base have the smallest margin.
Review of the appropriate anchor load-displacement curve permits an extrapolation to liner temperatures greater than 3500F without exceeding the allowable anchor displacements.
Liner strains for buckled panels are all significantly below Code allowable except for the 3/4" plate near the base where the combined tension plus bending strain equals the allowable.,
Since these are regions adjacent to penetrations and 4-15 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2
(~')s
( accordingly are anchored by the penetrations, buckling of such panels is unlikely. Also, the Code allowable strains are significantly lower than the ultimate. Therefore, temperatures to 3500F will not jeopardize the liner integrity.
These results are conservatively based on thermal spike in the liner without internal pressure in the containment. Pressure will produce radial and vertical growth of the wall and reduce the liner strain due to temperatures.
t 4.2 containment Components 4.2.1 Hatches Containment capability as limited by buck ling, strength criteria (O'= 0.9 x S )y and distortion is presented below:
Breech Type Personnel Airlock O i. Buckling of the dished head due to pressure I
- Stability Evaluation: Pa 150 psig j ii. Buckling of the cylindrical barrel due to pressure
- Stability Evaluation: P> 150 psig iii. Over-stressing of the dished head due to pressure
[
- Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 psi l
iv. Over-stressing of the cylindrical barrel due to
! pressure
- Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 peig
- v. Rupturing of the cylindrical barrel due to the containment shell opening deformation: P> 150 psig
- O 4-16 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
SB 1 & 2 vi. Breaching of the seal integrity at the shell ring to dish head junction due to the containment shell opening deformation - Negligible.
- Equipment Hatch and Attached Compression Airlock i
- a. Equipment Hatch The failure could result from one or more of the following modes of failure:
- i. Buckling of the dished head due to pressure
- Stability Evaluation: P > 150 psig j
ii. Buckling of the cylindrical barrel due to pressure
- Stability Evaluation: P> 150 psig i
/^% iii. Overstressing of the dished hatch head due to j (b') pressure - Strength of Material Evaluation: P7 150 ,
Psig i
iv. Overstressing of the cylindrical barrel due to pressure - Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 l psig
- v. Rupturing of the cylindrical barrel due to containment shell opening deformation -
Finite Element Evaluation: P> 145 psig vi. Breaching of the seal integrity at the 3.5" barrel end to dished hatch cover junction due to the containment shell opening deformation and pressure -
Finite Element Evaluation: P> 145 psig f
(
- s.
4-17 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
~ - .- . _- . _. - - .- ,. ._
- SB 1 & 2 i
{
vii. Overstessing of the swing bolts - Finite Element and Strength of Material: P> 145 psig f b. Compression Type Personnel Airlock 1
The failure of this personnel airlock could result from one or more of the following modes of failure:
- i. Buckling of the personnel airlock sleeve
- Stability Evaluation: P> 150 psig ii. Overstressing of the personnel airlock sleeve
- Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 psig iii. Overstressing of the airlock bulkhead plate j - Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 psig iv. Overstressing of the airlock door
- Strength of Material Evaluation: P> 150 psig i
4.2.2 Piping Penetrations:
i l Penetration Sleeves Sleeve failure is considered to occur if collapse of the sleeve-occurs when subject to loads from the containment environment and simultaneously applied pipe collapse loads. Based on sleeve collapse, P> 150 psig.
i Penetration Welds Weld failure is considered to occur if weld stress attains a value of 27000 psi. This value . is obtained by applying a faulted factor of 1.5 to the weld stress from table NF 3292.1-1. Based on weld capacity, P > 150 psig.
4 0 4-18 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
.,-v. . , . . _ . . . , , . . _ , . . . . . . _ _ . . _ . . _ , _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ , . - _ _ _ _ , _ _ . . _ . _ , , . . _ . . - , _ . . . _ , , _ . , , _ , , .. ._, _ ,, - - , _ . , - ,
SB 1 & 2 Penetration End Plates (Moderate Energy)
Under faulted loads of pipe plastic moment and containment pressure, plates were considered acceptable if the stresses at the center of a simply supported plate under pressure load are
.less than the stresses produced by a full plastic plate moment.
e High local deformations at the end plate / pipe interface are i expected to occur and will result in local secondary stresses
, in excess of yield stress. Strains resulting from these secondary stresses will be much lower than the ultimate strain values of 0.3 in/in for carbon steel or 0.4 in/in for stainless 1 steel. Based on end plate capability, P > 150 psig.
4.2.3 Fuel Transfer Tube l
Capability of the fuel transfer tube is established based on stresses in the fixed support bolts, sleeve, and tube being g less than yield stress for that portion of the tube assembly
!3 inside the containment. Sleeve outside containment is judged acceptable based on strain being less than 0.30 in/in for carbon steel. Bellows large deflections and excess pressure load are judged acceptable based on manufacturer's opinion. '
4.3 Probable Failure Mode The most probable failure mode is a loss in containment integrity at the fuel trans fer tube due to stress produced by large shell deformations (combined radial and vertical) as the pressure exceeds the ' limit load' pressure and the shell undergoes large deformations characteristic of post-yield behaviour of a structure. This would not be a catastrophic failure of the containment but would be a ' leaking' mode very probably capable of depressurizing the containment. (Note: a hole of approximately 4 in2 would be sufficient to depressurize the containment).
l 0 4-19 Containment Ultimate Capacity l Revision:
l
_ - _ . _ = _ . = , - - . _
SB 1 & 2 '
4 i j A less probable failure mode is a shear failure at the base of the cylinder with possible " tearing" of the liner and resultant loss of integrity.
. A remotely possible failure mode would be a catastrophic shell rupture probably at the site of first yield below the spring line. This would probably occur at a pressure in excess of 165 psig after radial deformation of the shell exceeding 10-20 inches. These deformations coupled with vertical deformations i expected to exceed 1 or more inches produce the severe loads on I the fuel transfer tube and that is expected to limit the containment capacity below that producing shell rupture. -
. i I
l i
l l
l e
I r
iO 4-20 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
i
l
, SB 1 & 2 i REFERENCE 3
'l. Seabrook Station FSAR, Section 3.8.
1 i
4.. UE&C Containment Design Specification, 9763.006-80-1.
t Y
- 5. UE&C Specification for Containment Equipment Hatch and Personnel
! Airlock, 9763.006-15-2.
+
l 6. " Pressure Vessel Design", John F. Harvey, D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963.
1
- 7. " Theory of Elastic Stability", Timoshenko & Cere, MrGraw-Hill, 2nd Edition.
lO 8. " Formulas for Stress and Strain," Roark and Young, 5th Edition.
l 9. ASTM Standards, 1982, Part 4 & 5.
l
- 10. Winstead, T.L., Burdette, E.G. and Armentrout, D.R., " Liner Anchorage Analysis for Nuclear Containments", Journal of the Structural Division, ASCE, July 1975, pp. 2103-2116.
- 11. Doyle, J.M. and Chu, S.L., "Some Structural Considerations in the Desgin of Nuclear Containment Liners", Nuclear Engineering Design, July 1971, pp. 294-300.
l 12. Program Wilson 1 (SAG 001) Finite Element Analysis of Axisymmetric i
j Solids Subjected to Symmetric Loads, by E.L. Wilson of the University
[
l of California, Berkeley, July 1967 - Revised November 1969.
I l
l 1
R-1 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
i i
SB 1 & 2 l 13. MARC - CDC, Nonlinear Finite Element Analysis Program, by Dr. Pedro Marcel and Associates of the Marc Analysis Corporation.
- 14. UE&C Program LESCAL.
- 15. UE&C Program LADT based on References 10 and 11.
- 16. Final Re port on Containment Liner Anchor Load Tests by E.G. Burdette for UE&C - Seabrook Station, February 1981.
- 17. UE&C Linear Anchor Analysis Report for PSNH - Seabrook Station.
- 18. PDM, " Equipment Hatch Design Report", for PSNH - Seabrook Station, Contract 14691, August 1980.
i l 19. W.J. Woolley, " Personnel Airlock Design Report" for PSNH - Seabrook Station, Serial No. 32677, June 1980.
- 20. W.J. Woolley, " Personnel (Breech Type) Airlock Design Report" for PSNH
- Seabrook Station, Serial No. 32704, August 1980.
1 R-2 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
l
6 k
NE ALLOWABLE RANGE FOR ASME l SEC.III, DIVISION 2 DESIGN _
l I
0.85 l'c 0.72 fc N
o A PARABOLA w - 85o x r e ce - 23o , c o 2, si N
x 0.001 0.002 0.003 STR AIN (IN/IN)
O CONCRETE STRESS-STRAIN CURVE PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 FOR FACTORED LOAD DESIGN CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 22
o O O 1
3 4.
52.0 4 PSIC DESIGN PRESSURE 1
f) 46.1 ULRILD i
s PSIC PEAK CALCULATED PRESSURE e
.g iBL{0M DE8:
lf i
Il t
k i, E R n
8 g ,g 8
, 5 i 13
! E i
1 is i i i n ating i i i isting n i i saung .i i i nwng i i a gasing rIns (sac) i
- PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TRANSIENTS FOLLOWING A LOCA I
CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 23
O O O Calculated Peak Liner Temperature 268.8 F
, 8 E-I 8 g - - : : -
i H 1 -
5 v
8 a.
' I8s 8
8 8
a 8
e,
~jd i i I L ITH)ct t .5 i i n tligg i a i latisgg i a i antangg i i i t a5agg ros (see)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CONTAINMENT CYLINDER LINER SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT CURVE CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 24
O O O N-g Calculated Peak Liner Temperature 268.8 F h.
8 l N q _.... -
g t
8 EH 8
E 8
b R- 4 4
l 'iv. I l i t asenid a niinuge i sign,ggg , 3 3 , , ,,,g , , , , ,
TIM (SEC)
PUBLIC SERVICE con 4PANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CONTAINMENT DOME LINER SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TEMPERATURE TRANSIENT CURVE CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 25
o t>
O O
()
C) c2.
> r
()
, t3' o! -
so.
rs i s
\
i o'
()'
1 DAY c 12 (IRS.
csa... ' ~
6 HKS.
2 HRS.
c) 1 HR.
"? 800 SECS.
.- s
\
~
i o '
<3 N^ a T s ,
c, s
I o.
t N 4
(> - ' %, ;
e c3 s ,,
t x s l ' ' '_ '4- .
g s
I .
, \, x-s, ,
- , o ,
~~ ..
3 .00 D'. 'iO l'.20 g
l '. 60 - 2'.40 /.00 I.60 /.20'j 50.
~
I i
C'iLINDER THICKNESS (FT.) -
%._ g.
, t l T. ., ';I l
'S P,UBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW Hdif.PSHIFUE TEMPERATURES PROFILES THROUGH s
SEABROOK STATION,- UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT CYLINDER THICKNESS CONTAINMENT ULTIM4TE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 26
\
o a.
m -
e ,
+
Q' j <
i -
P,,j ._-
ra ,
1 o'n
- o. ,
_..,~
~) q , 12 .
, g 6 HRS.
o 2 HPS.
i ,
- O 1 IIR.
u o Cu0 SECS.
m.. . '
- g. .-. .
A w ^
D o- ,
o
- q -
o.. .
m
^
% .00 0'.50 l'.00 ~ l '. 50 2'.00 2[.60 3'.00 3.50 DOME' THICKNESS (FT.) " -
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE TEMPERATURE PROFILES THROUGH SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT DOME THICKNESS CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 27
'~
O_
m 8'
. $3 tn..
, 1 8'
L O; 1 DAY
, 12 IIRS.
p 3
6 HRS.
- O 2 IIRS.
9 1 IIR.
84 800 SECS.
g @,
E8 8.
8 i
i O 9
00 2'.00 4'00 '6'. 00 8'.00 l'O.00 l'2.00 l'4.00 THICKNESS (fT. )
FILL HAT _g FOUNDATION HAT
=
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE TEMPERATURE PROFILES THROUGH SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT FILL MAT AND FOUNDATION MAT CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY _
REVISION l FIGURE 28
r (~
SB 1 & 2 TABLE 1 CONTAINMENT LOAD COMBINATIONS AND FACTORS (5)
I i
L 0 4 0 t II O ' I f m.>0f f .,
l ! ! i j!l A i i 1. l :
i
!= 1 1 1 je 1 i I
! i =
51 !f i J3 i il is} i} }! I li!
3
.et...r, 11 1 ! ! it i 11 s 11 mi al lla, l!1 13 A Imedl=s motettee 0)
I e s. r, r, t, t, t,88I r, r,, w v, n, e, s,, sj e e,, r,(3) e test I g.0 8.0 1.0 . 1.0 - - - - . - - - * - - *
- k]
.t .1 Iserea t 2 t.0 4.0 - - - 8.0 . . . . . l.0 - . - . 1.0 .
Severe revironmental 3 E.0 8.0 1.0
. . . - 1.0 - - - 8.0 - - - - 1.0 =
, Severe gewireneentel 4 1.0 1.3 4
- - - 3.0 . l.S ,, . -
8.0 - - . . 1.0 -
l Estreme Se 8.0 a.0 = . . l.0 . . . . l.0 m 10 . - - - 1.0 1. 0 Eastressental Sb B.0 3.0 . .
1.0
, . - - l.0 .
f.O . . - - 1.0 *
- 3 a -reen 6.
r ~
i.0 i.0 .
i . 3") . -
i.0"> . . . . . i.0 . . . . -
j l 6h 1.0 1.0 -
5.0' ' - . l.0' I - - . . . 3.25 . - - - -
j abeereel/ severe 1.0 l.3SI ')
i 4.0 . = - 3.0"I 1.25 - - - - I.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 . .
I 1
tavireneestal
} Abnereal/Es t reme a 1,0 g,g .
8.0 . . l.0 - 8.0 = . . l.0 1.0 h.0 B.0 . -
{ teviseamental i
t (3) Includes effect of merest operette# thereal leads and scaldest leeds. rer all ebeerest toed seedittene, structure eheute be checbed to eseure that accident pressure lead without thesual neeJ can be resisted by the structure wittle the spectiled alloweble stresses for thle seedities.
(3)
Psative pressure vertettoes testde the structure shall not be seesteered etsuttaneevely with outelde eagettve pressure due to tormede leedlese.
(3) ror thte lead saea the deelse beels fleed elevettee shell be the mee. growed water elevettee. I.e.. El
+30'-0".
(4) Lead cosee esentmed for esateue pressure eed its selecident liner temperature end meelem lleer cooperature with Ste solecident pressure.
(S) All Reed festere shall be taken se I.J fer the deelse of steel lleer.
(6) See Subeecties 3.8.l.3 for discues t.e et leadings.
(7) w, tecludes stootte .ff to sely.
Containtnant Ultiniata Capacity (B) for thu. loaaf case, loaoliy [ mis Eg or y inchro' ear ino'wtotaaQ. g,,1,1,,,
1/2" 6 Bent Welded Stud at Center of Each Panel
\-
- t -
"A" WT 4 7.5 0 0 "A" '
I lo o o O s "
\
l PIAN AT DOME (PARTIAL) 1/2" 6 Bent Welded Stud (Bend may turn any direction) /
1 2" ,
4 L f 1/2" Liner
_ 6 3/4" (min.) ;
j 7 1/2" (max.) j
- p __
SECTION "A-A" O PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 DOME ANCHORAGE SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 3
w kT 457.5 - '
)_ -
g- A .'
4 , . .
3/8"Linerd i AI * .
4 .'
I m' m 4'-6" e ;
[ .
i D.
, 4g -
l
- 6 ' ..
L .
Inside of Containment % -
Liner Plate ., t, -
O g
ff . i "A"
[ ,
! "A" v -
A ; , $e _ __2 -
O PIAN l
I i
"C Note l
Studs may be attached to Liner Tee to suit Field Requirements.
\ St uds as required by Field 4/p a_. w WT 4 SECTION "A-A" i
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 CYLINDER ANCHORAGE SYSTEM CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY j REVISION l FIGURE 2
q PERSONNEL LOCK L.] '
( CONTAINMENT 43*
3 r-.i,.-
ENCLO5082 BulLDING DOME g
EQUIPME NT
( HATCH LOCAflON PLAN pt r(ese9'-11 IN5IDE)%8* -
-- 1/2* ? HICK LINER FLATE FOR DOME /
[ l 9*27,54" , ,
4
$PalNG LINE EL 119' 0*
__ 180'-0* 7D _
d'-o* WALL C Y(INDER
, 15 s' 0* I.D 1
-3/a* THICK LINER PLATE FOR CYLINDER DESIGN OP INTIEldt 5f tUCfutE5 BY Of >LaCODES 8'-9*
METAL SECilONS BACKED BY CONCRETE.
-ASME SEC M. Div. 2 METAL SECflONS BACXED BY CONCRETE-l A5ME SEC E. Div. 2
\ -
\
8 J lFOeMh q EOU PMENT M AfgM I LINE R EL 37'-01/2*
E.2- , [,,, , ER50NNEL LOCK - - D.
% METAL POfflON5 OF ALL 43
p.5 INTE RN AL 80VNDAty-CONCRET AND A MORAGI ' " * ' ~
-5Y5 FEM- A 5M E SEC C. Div 2.
EXf f tNAL 80UNDAtv-
. d .
1/4" THICK LINER PLATE FOR MAT AND Pit A 5 M E SECilON 12. Osv 2 --
' FILL MAT (NOT PART OF E L. f-12 F-0 CON TAINMENI)q
_E,L (-130'-0*_
ENCLOSURE St#LolNG MAf q
, 4 4+
_['
(OTHER CODES) 7 , ,
1 8ASE MAT (Div 2) l ~~ #E ACfot Plf
,, E L I-).6 2*- 3
- 15 3'-0 01AME TER I PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TYPICAL SECTION THROUGH CONTAINMENT i %
CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 1 I
l I .- .
.y_. _ __ ._.
SB 1 & 2
]
TABLE 6 CONTAINMENT DISPLACEMENT UNDER 146 PSIG INTERNAL PRESSURE Displacements Location Above Basemat Radial Vertical Top of Basemat 0.003" 6.62 10'-0 0.43" 0.69~ .
20'-0 1. 02 O.80*
30'-0 1.45' O.91" 40'-0 1.65* 1. 02
( 50'-0 1.71" 1.12' 61'-0 1.70" 1.23" l
l l
Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
O SB 1 & 2 TABLE 5 LINER STRAINS FOR DESIGN ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE Membrana Strains (m/a2) Combined Serains (in/hD Compression & bding Tension & hding lecs. tion Calculated Allowable Calculsted Allowable Calculated Allowable Membrane 4
3/8 0.0001 0.0050 0.0011 0.0140 0.0007 0.0100 i 3/4" 0.0001 0.0050 0.0062 0.0140 0.0077 0.0100 3/$3/4' O.0001 0.0150 0.C069 0.0140 0.0061 0.0100 l
Base l
3/8' O.0013 0.0050 0.0016 0.0140 0.0012 0.0100
~
3/4 0.0013 0.0050 0.0110 0.0140 0.0100 0,o100 3/h3/4" 0.0013- 0.0050 -0.0089 0.0140 0.0085 0.0100 Dame 1/2 0.0013 0.0050 0.0016 0.0140 0.0012. Q.0100 .
l O Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
I l
SB 1 & 2 l
l TABLE 4 LINER ANCHOR DISPLACEMENTS FOR DESIGN ACCIDENT TEMPERATURE l
j Anchor Displacements (ine/D i Tee Stud Iocation Stresa Case Calculated 1 Allowable } Calculated Allowable
~
Membrana 30.0 kai 3/8 0.010 0.080 - -
3/4' - - 0.045 0.133 1 ., .
3/8-3/4- C.C07 0.080 0.067 0.193 i J Esse 49.33 kai 3/8 0.024 0.080 2 I
I l 39.85 3/4" - - 0.083 4 0.193 39.85' 3/$3/4 0.013 C.C80 0.120 0.193.
Dame 40.0 1/2 0.041 0.0800 - -
Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
..i
o O O SB 1 & 2 TABLE 3
?
I h
j MATERIAL PROPERTIES OF REINFORCING STEEL (ASTM A-615, GRADE 60) -
j Bar Specified Values per ASTM i Size Mill Test Results Yield Tensile Elongation Sample Average Standard Average
) Strength Scrength in 8 inch Standard Elongation Standard Size F y (kai) Deviation (kai) Deviation F,, Deviation
- Fy (ksi) Fu (ksi) (ksi) 1 1
(kai) 18 60 90 7% 128 72.43 3.54 108.90 2.26 12.38% 1.65%
11 60 90 232 7% 70.56 2.65 106.92 3.45 13.60% 1.04%
9 60 90 7% 112 70.06 2.34 106.85 4.32 4
13.45% 1.80%
6 60 90 9% 128 68.00 2.35 110.57 3.70 13.26% 1.1%
l l l
.]
1 l
Containment Ultimate Capacity 1,
i Revision:
1, t
SB 1 & 2 i
TABLE 2 RATES OF STRENGTH DEVELOPMENT OF CONCRETE CYLINDERS FOR CONTAINMENT _
7-Day Average 28- Day Average 90-Day Average Conc.Hix Code Mark No. of No. of No. of Sets Strength (psi) Sets Strength (psi) Sets Strength (psi) 4 AWR 67 (H.48) 1 78 4000 78 5400 24 6370 -
4 AWR 67 (H.48) 2 54 4000 54 5360 5 6100 Special 4 AWR 67 (H.50) 3 75 4070 75 5560 18 6450 4 AS 67 (H.429) 4 30 4330 30 5640 5 6440 4 AWR 67 (H.43) 5 1 4960 1 6990 1 7510 Type II from Bureau A 2580 4090 5160 of Rec. Manual-1975 Containment Ultimate Capacity Revision:
1
.w-- w-
e
~
DOCUVlENT :
PAG \m : .
~
P f_ LED 9 9
A' O, w-~
NO. OF PAGES REASON D PAGE CLLEGlBl.
l OTHER
/ 1 D BETTER COW REQUESTED ON noFtu M FLED AT: POR .
OTHER l h FEMED ON APERTURE CARD % 1%CA NO D DL 8
l 1
gw~-v----- --.,a w., _,,--m - , . , . _n _,. -_ _ -
d O
ISOLATION VALVES I
ENCLOSURE BUILDING CONTAINMENT WALL
- SLEEVE RC .
p: . I - -
I .
- .r:l::/. ..,,. :
- x 1 s r , . ..
i
\
r .
N
\I l
I I" 4 "Y '
-- .= ..',. .
umnese s ;
1 ~. . . .
L .- ,,, .o . , .
'&- l *; **:.;:.;:, -- '
is -l r-r.s .a ,
- .*q' ' s.*
e\ l %
. s u e
- ;* \ (__, is i
//
O
.* - g g le '
le 1
+
::,' l .. . . . . , -
( i i =; * . L * #
. **ll g .? g , .. '
- 'I - **
i
- h*.
';; ,"v*' i
( -,;-1-1,-
\
, ),1 ,.'.;*_* ~ *.'. m
? Q_. _ _ -
2
_ Nn?,'7' .
.'! l}),
d,
- r:,-
s ! * *,' i'i C i
,. 77..' ./* *.2 s,.y., ,- ,,
3.;.';
Up .
.g ISOLATION VALVES i
O PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE TYPICAL VENTILATION PENETRATION SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY _
REVISION l FIGURE 9
i O O O c
?
8m m 5 zm m>m I
zh $g?
o OUTBOARD CONTAINMENT WALL- INBOARD se i' F4 d5z STAINLESS STEEL
!Z o HEADER PLATE / LINER PLATE i mc' ,/
o zz
! %US THERMAL INSULATING f a
A m;j I GASKET 4[ I n BOX MOUNTING RING 3 CANISTER I
A J _
4 i ( ;Lr m -
-t ,
i E : I 11
- E w I 11 e s l n 9 i %
r -
P :
8 /
y CARBON STEEL 6 l _ 5 WELD RING b-r f/s 2!
o T t
E m
E q
k JUNCTION (TERMINAL) BOX JUNCTION BOX
- 6 l z
m pg _ - - - - - - - - _ -w, - Id%ime /ndi ni. led; f
_ , _ . vanics
.g .:.
- N.'*) t.14tA k -
_ vanics _ _
b'S _
t odTudMe-dT ditt PENCT1ElAT IOA4 { d 4 g.,q END PLATE '**
s
- 0" D
\ s y ~- - 2.s=r -
-x r-+x==h
,. . ~.u
, I d / 1 l
"f I uI.st a-Led..P /
. m -.n a: an=----n Yo*[a $aNa'[7 4 8"T W' " C' 'J %
sisi.s waco J SINGLE PENETRATION ASSEMBLY D sussot (j
g,N D8 ,
, _ cow w NMENT i.'.D vanits l Ad _
Taits comra.~ ani wAw I I4'ae-st itd ,,gg, eens.Tw.ATion w e so sustvc ,
4 q [3 C L EAL ANCK.
} /l
' set o+tus s- _ _
,,.8 4- /
a ,
l l ilR Rsf /. # [Dyp,*T'"d ' j f d 'MN."- l %END PLATE
..on us .
_- J 7 I i f' so~.a , c u r 4.ee- ,.. c.n at u.Ja,a r ,: .
-altLDwsLD MULTIPLE PENETRATION ASSEMBLY nm TYPICAL MODERATE ENERGY PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 PIPING PENETRATION CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 7
I w: _-=_
'N t 6 t o t dadTW MENT- D*v va,,g s _ Id b enduguq VARir $ 4'- 6" g CONT AtNNE4T WAW 7 "
i'.*,9 ptuctores l
- e lusutAriew 5.EEVE ~ 7 ,
r
/ 146my t, s
^
\
- a. . .. . .
- k. .
M l l Pt-de T fLM to.J Me g
, . an '
Is...
/ W O PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE TYPICAL HIGH ENERGY SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 PIPING PENETRATION CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 6
O O . O 2 O'- 0" tat,E TO FACE OF GASKET h g- T i. 6 ROWS OF 5/8" x 8 3/16" Wid,'
' I )*; STUDS, 24 STUDS PER
.33/8" 3
P1 ], p[4,g7 ROW EQUALLY SPACED
=
jT4 .;, K: LOCKl-l , , 6' ; ALL AROUND.
- ELECT'L. JO R, <
(7 V8 d . - . .. 7 4 ?
-> B PENETRATION .5582 QL . t- '
I~'
,3 *73 ;g [b[_ g '
'N s i f~ l&W1Trin:
( 5 tA
% , S' f
i s , A[a l c"flELD WELDED
# 3 k T'(JTS. FJNIT I ONLY)}
5 g i i1 e mEL. 29'-6*2s
~
', N n d ,S- fit" P "F3-i-~?s.si' o-S- tOCK N
k ) g _
_ L-HINGE I (ELECTRICAL ONTROL 7 b *' i)4 + PERSONN 3/8" LINER P
- 53/
'U *'
M @k.$. .I7.1/2" INSIDE CNTMT. ,3/8" LINER PL.[ 646 E {,p - SECTION A.A l WT4;.? B DG INSIDE CNTMr. 4
, ! .; y Yv SECTION 08 1
i l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMP5 HIRE ^ SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 ER ONNEL A R O K CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 5
e
= DOCUVlENT/ '
PAGE . PU LED
~
r l AL LC>.w~ 1 NO. OF PAGES
- REASON l O PAGE lu.EGIB2.
O HARD COPY Fn.ED AT. PDR CF ' - OTHER D BETTER COP ( REQUESTED ON / / AGE 100 E TO RLM.
,$ DCOPV FRED AT: PDR OTHER
%A%EDD h RLMED ON APERTURE CARD NO e
au-o sa .o.e. ee. o o - e= , ee*= .
= , - - - - - - - - - - - . m..-..,e,.-,.m,. _ . - - - - . - . - . - - - - - . -
5 7000 . 4 6000 ' q 1 2 sn d I l 5000 b l-0 3 SPECIFIED DE SIGM CONCRETE. W 4000 _ __
-. / COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH @28CMAS O
I 2 ,C_O M c R E T E. MIX CODE : Sc i L r . 0,, _ @ 4 Awe c7 cm.4a? i @ 4 AWR 67 (M. 48) SPEC!AL I 8 @ 4 AWR 67 (M.50)
@ 4 AS 67 (M.429) 8 y -
@ 4 Awa7 (M. 43)
W u { U g TYPE II IROM BUR, EAU OF REC. MANUAL - 1975 1000 _ l l i i i 7 28 90 CYL INDE82 AGE - DAY.S i l l . l l STRENGTH DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 OF CONCRETE CYLINDERS CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 11
O \
\) %) ~
E k R C 6eismie Rebar *19 e It*e45*sw . l_ *)BE22"\At.T.o'
?
es_I_H : 4
- 18 e 1z*
I * '* * ** *) "'* ers*e ${ 55;- o 5 sg -l oop Rebar ogo Q is C 7 2 *f ,G ar . ##
- irg z>m {~?
g - - 4 p- #- 4 ye D l **1 3
' O*] l' G n= N, E82 '
F . h1 ) i
~ ,
g' ' '
$$$ 3 g g } ns [, +
FDj n
" " 8 "i
dSz Iz< ! im Ir 3 i I-
}
-!, [ )/.
3.o j s G '& 1 mCm ; G ' E gig ofZ 4m2 r
?
~~
6: Vertical Rebar
- 2 *18 e 12" _ ge b$Y l Rddl. Vert. f "18 e12" 9' 4=% i = = ,,
y Addl. Vert. 1 *18 6 12 4* 5i m f 5 m 7 6 :
)
.larc FEU"h i O , i 4 b
- A EQ \f I
oC I E
%j _p-Ov
, ~__
. .. . a_ _ a, - uve=e.c.(mewa=> <-> ,u s ..c t.y . 3__ _ 1
' g L-LAYER b -" '
- LArtR 3 (HOOP) M .
- *ashnaurseat 2.w y e. .
c'ao'qJ,i = 7
;i..pm,,g :i_;j.. . :-
' ~ =
,, --e 9 . - . .
,, i .
(We EL\% 4l' i,
-L AYER 9 ,, ,
- IM .eit*woop t 'J!: 4m 1 h . ,, z:1. _uva n io = a' eu-m4% [.
GB e i s --unas rt* __l'l T '?,,'-
...... g! " '
'O.,%%
ilip< , " t TYPIC AL SECTION
'd ' $
4 6 R EIN F. L AY E R S D P_ CTION B-B P I
?
Y i i $ !O N* A f h! I ( l U M REIT. - ( I SEI M 1 {'
* ?- -* . e e . . _ .
4, . 3__ . J ; ; M =ah g a m.-,,n l . ; g , , a s
, . ,c-T1 it l
l
. . _ wom i ,
e-M*g -
*ise n*<>a.3 , *e I;; *ias tr' f*
9 . oYa..m Mp=a #a %s w. 3t , 1 SECTION C C SECTION D-D \V PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TYPICAL REINFORCING CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 13
- x. d * . x}.' . 1*A* T-9=
} I I
.e 7 I <e-IM h.
I% l i *e- i.
'QLt A' LC 61._5._ ]_M bL ,
11 lc 4 p TYPICAL" INCUNED STlRRUPS TYPICAL NORIZONTAL STIRRUPS CI E-75* TO' R.
. 4 7E To'-C* E
-I j -
*e e rT(456 EQ. SPA 5- \.,.^ .. .4,, , . , _
AtoN6 38C" ARC) ** ,
** ** 76612*(4$6 EQ- WS A60*s 360* ARC.)
. . , /. .
g ,, . . .. ELM ATn . .._ _ .._ _ s (-15.O* *I E, .s ,, E L *
- F C"
*s o.a.
- .. i "i f.
<a n- .. ;.9
;; *eDiase %. f h N...
.g g,,, g
, p. . .
[. h * -*
.=
. . . . . .z ;9i 9
- - ~
E:.',\ g r
'n c b. .
a$ k' N *
.5
.. 2 *ee rr y
l.,
.i. N, ..
. '--n/ "***
J p e i y . n d
.i **
st- r tb . f
- 4. t' tim 2-
- _._ j -h .
l Le.?.E. -J 1
.. trnX
,p a 1* _ . . .. . it-i *t__..
_ _ . . i. r
'T-w 1
cx ==e r.S W 2
- s ."
p,.
.N <
g
, Eb h.Jear 3r l
' N t" .AN{.: N
(,J '
' i -
- i. t-31 o
- io, ..
a .. . c_ _ x.
-j f f *
.O N eir-A.[.. 3 -
#a,J y --- ..
s d---['!
+ N, .N.. -
% .- r b
ru-*ts to d
.e .
~I- ; -
. _ ._ in
- i. p X
9 3 , C o- ..' E'2 f. . . . 7 g a,, .* g ig L g.x s ( '" " '# * #' -va siu we
- 4,
'j dg E M:g L B C4 'Bf "11' 7B I E'"25'C' G(lgWd /,NPg E ' '
j
/.,.y
-N' e ca **
4, 1
- i
- se ccu om l f*_
\s1. -
,i ,- et ae r o-rT.C lis.6.wtat 4
%p$ i t*
, ' ~
ttfate' c'2
,g st.c.)w.o"; ,i .L &, o , ~we ~ ej'"'a- l- 3 I':.ni* tune
; N it act-ow e i ;_ '
i < IR " 5 0'
, i N i
*e-g iC C3 s t+, w-e.,
su m on DET All A DETAIL F FORIZONTAL STIRRUP ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN 240'TO 300' AZIMUTF u PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TYPICAL REINFORCING CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 14
i l
= DOCUVIENT/ ~
PAGE . PU LED
~
l : A C '. w <- - = ! NO. OF PAGES <- v REASON O PAGE ILLEGIB2. O HARD COPr FILED AT. PDR CF OTHER D BETTER COP ( R50VES1ED ON / I 00 ,E TO FILM. D.CoPt FEED AT: POR . l . o1HER hFILMED ON APERTURE CARD NO MDNOhNV i
s- 42 8" l H OR I 2 O MTAL SECTIOM S.14 s. . . I,' 3. AT 30* ABO \/E SPRING LINE.
,a.
,,.,,s. =
,a. .. X 9. ,
n % :.i..W. l., : yl '5 wsa: o 2 O Y #.O 9.nJ.'. p
- t y MERIDIONAL 2#18 e 10.4, ,
b bh
- A' 2Y$h HOOP 2 *18012" E *i89*
SElsMIC 14 811"645 BW tu e I ':i 42kB N O RIZONTAL SECTION O -i
'a AT 9' ABOrc. SPRING LINE O
I4 . 4-x ,f e',e '.
. e.'.. ' '- ,4'. ;,, h e
d O /, 'R E BAl2 *
-[ .*k.!.
'p' o l 1 A ' '. . t -...
o ygqqogongg g_sgg g gg"
* ~
HOOP 4 *16 2 12" l "' SCISN1lc *18622"
^
- 14 e 22'Q ]
l
,_ 5+" a I-#cR l2 ONTA L S E C T I O N,_
- T~ i'.*V y s'd 4
,{i%' : A% X ,4 'd t.
E Ar 110'-O A BOVE. B A S E.
~
% $'heb LO$. h d.!? <
~
.s' y ,j
'y.,"'
,. *\ y g
, l REBAR*
O8g '
"'Y' Ett .
,'s de" veerice' HOOP 2 ~ 48 e 12" -
4# 18612, 80% 13* = 4": W : f5" ; s SEISMIC *18 G 22" ALT
.
- 14 e 22u Hook Rebar(Tyb.)
N Seismic Rebar I \ f (Tp.) I Verticetl Rebar \ ! 2 l 55Q* U$') \
] l- , ,
l NORIZOMTAL S E C TION h n 3...\ h AT G" ABO \/E B A S E. o 'p4
,, y]
,ap, t,.,A : .g h !;p p e ' @'- - se e %'l ," 'R.EsAe :
;_ Y'o $ .
' ' h . .C.A,k'N$'f VE RTICA L 2#18 @ 12" "p= s 3 2'ig 1 *18 G 12" ADDL M Addl. Vert.)
4 G Y4 r- 1 "18 G 12" ADDL 1c _f4% WOOP 4 #f6 @ i2"
= =
SEISMIC # 18 8 11"@ 45' B W N O PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE SEABROOK STATION - UNITS 1 & 2 TYPICAL REINFORCING CONTAINMENT ULTIMATE CAPACITY REVISION l FIGURE 16
DOCUVIENT PAGE . PU,_ LED
~
l ANO.w - . NO. OF PAGES REASON O PAGE ILLEGlB;E. O MARD COPt FILED AT. PDR CF OTHER
/ /
D BETTER COPt REQUESTED ON E 10 FLM.
,k COP (FGD AT: POR OTHER _
hFILMED ON APERTURE CARD NO DNDnk'O i , l : hoqxec>%%~ OS _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___...-}}