ML20073J894

Forwards Proposed Resolutions to Selected Outstanding Issues

ML20073J894
Person / Time
Site:	05000447
Issue date:	04/15/1983
From:	Sherwood G GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JNF-025-83, JNF-25-83, MFN-070-83, MFN-70-83, NUDOCS 8304190446
Download: ML20073J894 (12)

Text

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GENER AL $ ELECTRIC uucteAn POwen SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CAUFORNIA 95125 NFN 070-83 (408) 925-5722 M/C 682 JNF 025-83 April 15, 1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Mr. D.G. Eisenhut Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

IN THE MATTER OF 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (GESSAR II) DOCKET NO. STN 50-447 RESULUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES Attached please find proposed resolutions to selected outstanding issues.

This inforraation is provided in the following attachments:

Attachment Number Branch 1 Chemical Engineering 2 Containment Systems 3 Materials Engineering 4 Structural & Geotecnnical Engineering Sincerel;,,

d Glenn G. Sherwood, Manager Nuclear 'afety & Licensing Operation Attachment.

cc: F.J. iiiraglia (w/o attachments) C.O. Thomas (w/o attachments)

D.C. Scaletti L.S. Gifford (w/o attachments)

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ATTACHMENT NO. 1 PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH OUTSTANDING ISSUE 15 l

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l Discussiodtem 9 /

Smoke tectors will added to ti air intakes r the control 11 ding.

This 11 resolve scussion item .

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Discussio item 6 is an N staff action tem concerning he shu'tdown capabil y. Since the SAR II desig will have redun ant m mote shutd

capab ity which meets he requirene for fire sepa tion, no future neerns are xpecthd. 1 j .f t Discussion Ite 4 and 7 NP

:  % ^s-ot .O00=9..sk sfire d dampers

' s su < cm c.t.veJ in ventilation ducts used for smoke r

venting. Some of these ventilation ducts are shared systems in that they '

also provide normal ventilation. Other ducts are for smoke venting only.

Based on the discussion below the present ESSAR II design should be adequate and should be acceptable to the NRC. so that it: : ' e4 ' should be resolved.

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The auxiliary building smoke removal system is shown on Figure 9.4-4 and

described in Section 9.4.3.2.1.11. Each set of duct work serves and traverses only fire areas of one afety division. There is a smoke vent intake in each l fire area with a remote manually operated fire damper which is normally closed.

There .is a fusible link from the air operator to the vanes so that the damper

, will close on high temperature. The fire rating of the dampers is 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />.

The duct is heavy gage, welded construction which exceeds the requirements for 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated construction. Hence, the design is considered ccapletely adequate for the service.

One of the design objectives of E3SAR II is to avoid fire dampers in smoke vents, as their automatic closure would render the smoke vent inoperative at the very time it was needed. With two exceptions, smoke vents pass through safety areas only of the same division as the vented area. The two exceptions are the Division 2 cable tunnel vent and the primary containment vent.

P M The Division 2 cable tunnel located in the corridor of (-)6' # elevation of the auxiliary building has a dedicated smoke removal system Michpasses thrcugh the division 1 area. The inlet to the duct is fitted with a standard .

sprinkler head. Any heat or smoke that exceeds 1650 F will fuse the link

@oef ws/ allowing fire water to flow through the head. The duct opening is 2.5 so ft._

j,,g,,gThis deluge spray will be sufficient to cool inlet gases from eiYher direction g gf below a temperature that could cause duct failure which could allow migration of heat to other fire resistence areas. This is consistent with NFPA 13 usino_

NO 3b sprinklers to protect openings in fire resistence walls where dampers cannot be fitted for other overriding criteria. The calculated flow rate from the

@s re. cable tunnel during smoke ventginis 3000 efm. a relatively hw flow rate.

gr, kler The sprinkler is designed to flow .25 gpm per 100 square foot of floor area be ,d w ,l/ or a minimum of _15 an- therefore, 3000 cfm will be cooled by a minimum of be deknW.15 gpm water. ThiL~ is sufficient flow to cooi gases or smoke below the temperature that would weaken or coll 6pse even e duct cf standard gage construction. The duct h65 a thick wall and is all weided construction, which (adds a redundant degree of protec tion.

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The can'ftunmen+ exhautrf W :tkr enei, tier, u na n;; tr ;-1 r;; ce-t:in ;ng -M has two inboard (1 manual) isolation valves and one outboard isolation valve.

If a fire occurs, either the inboard valves or the outboard valve would be located out of the fire area and could be closed. The valve within the fuel building is located in a room with 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated walls. The room is directly accessible from the fuel building or the stair tower between the fuel and auxiliary building. All return registers except for the pool sweep are located high in the containment so that bulk mixing, sided by the dome mixing system, would occur before any combustion gases enter the ventilation duct. The containment is more sensitive to bulk air temperature than the ventilation duct. If a fire raised the bulk temperature excessively, containment spray would be initiated to protect the containment at a temperature well below the threshold of damage to the ventilation duct. For these reasons, the current GESSAR II design ha for the c nta nment Ih ventilation is gonsideredWe-ldecl hoch ie 4:heaulo 50 proper and qu jotje Wi /adge. aye. th 9 3

. sign ~l~hegw'ust c uc e<>y ys m rw inp Tne remaining smoke vents which do not have fire dampers are the two in the control building. Each one of these smoke vents serves and traverses l

one division. Since it is impossible for these smoke vents to allow the fire in the area of cne division to spread to another division, the current GESSAR 11 design is considered to be adequate and proper.

There 13 Q COh Qihn4 thy VCMf an Th g su a coh%Menf Effh Y b' d Cvir S N h1 fb C Ouk/llbtj- hl/ bin ha:ffs on agc, ); '

[be hdMS W!ar-f*are }ocaYec/ Jh Q /W OM e fe f foo t- O f [be 00)fJbGY bO/ bY/ . TbCY b00h0[Q/~/cs'hf hg: t-C0 nq sujo n ducYbctYe cf,oc2C2 -?!o a : /3M 8/rS*cYll bow fire '/O in hiYe Ybe

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ATTACHMENT NO. 2 l

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PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH OUTSTANDING ISSUES 7,8 AND 9 i

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, (7) Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage NRC concern Bypass leakage may occur prior to PLCS actuation and should be accounted for in the dose calculation.

GE response GE will calculate the transport delay time to the environment on each containment penetration line with the PLCS installed. If the transport delay time from any line is less than the PLCS actuation time, GE will re-do the dose calculation to account that particular bypass leakage.

(8) Containment Repressurization NRC concern Post-LOCA containment repressurization by the PLCS should be limited to 50% design containment pressure at 30 days.

GE response GE will comply. GE will re-do the containment repressurization calculation to a less conservative method and will consider reducing the allocated leakages of the isolation valves.

(9) Type C tests (gang vs. individual valve test)

NRC concern Gang testing of valves may not able to detect for potential single valve failure.

GE response GE will first gang test the valves with the PLCS. The acceptance criteria for this test will be the threshold leakage of a single valve (allocated leakage of the smallest single valve of the group). If this gang test exceeds the test criteria, a partial gang test will be performed with the same acceptance criteria as the first gang test. Individual valve test will be performed until the valve with excess leakage is located and corrected.

The responses to the corresponding NRC questions will be revised accordingly.

GESSAR II will be revised via amendment upon completion of the effort described above.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 3 1*

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SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH OUTSTANDING ISSUE 5

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GESSAR II 22A7007

. 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND R;v. 14 5.2.3.3.4 Moisture Control for Low Hydrogen, Covered Arc

() Welding Electrodes (Continued)

Electrodes are distributed from sealed containers or ovens as required. At the end of each work shift, unused electrodes are returned to the storage ovens. Electrodes which are damaged, wet, or contaminated are discarded. If any electrodes are inadvertently left out of the ovens for more than one shift, they are discarded or reconditioned in accordance with manufacturer instructions.

5.2.3.4 Fabrication and Processing of Austenitic Stainless Steels 5.2.3.4.1 Avoidance of Stress / Corrosion Cracking 5.2.3.4.1.1 Avoidance of Significant Sensitization m kh R m. M Ako Gm k I,44 Rev.O u el m deSx

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. I egulatory GES GuideSA R.

1.44 aadresses 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDCs 1 and 4, an ppendix B, requirements to control the application and proc essin of stainless steel to avoid severe sensitization tha ould lead to ess/ corrosion cracking.  ;

All austenitic inless steel is purchased in solution-heat-treated condit' n in accordance with a .icable ASME and ASTM specifications.

Cooling rates from solution h treating' temperatures are required to be rapid enoug i . pr ent sensitization. Non-sensitization is verif using ASTM 62, Practice A methods.

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Material cha s have been made to minimize e possibility of intergra ar stress / corrosion cracking (IGSCC). All welded ,T.

wro austenitic stainless steel in the reactor c lant pressure p"{,q

,. undary which could be susceptible to stress / corrosion acking y II low carbon nuclear grade Type 304 or Type 316 L or LN withN i

5.2-39 [*r .

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-- GESSAR II 22A7007 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND, . Rsv. 14

5. .3.4.1.1 Avoidance of Significant Sensitization (Continued)

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0.02% imum carbon content and nitrogen control. There is piping whi is service sensitive or nonconforming as defi d in NUREG-0313, vision 1.

9 For machine, automatic, and manual elding interpass temperature is restri'cted to 350*F for all a in as steel welds. High heat welding processes such as blo welding nd electroslag welding were not permitted. All we filler meta and castings are required by specificatio o have a minimum 5% ferrite. ,

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.These contr s were used to avoid severe sensitization and o comply v . Regulatory Guide 1.44, Control of the Use of Sens' tized Stainl s Steel.

F commitment and revision, see Section l~.8.. _

5.2.3.4.1.2 Process Controls to Minimize Exposure to Contaminants Exposure to contaminants capable of causing stress / corrosion

cracking of austenitic stainless steel components was avoided by i.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 4 SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING ISSUE 1 (QUESTION 220.11)

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220.11 At the time of this review, Appendix 3H which decribes the effect of (3.7.2L the concrete between the containment and the. shield building on the

.. seismic analysis, is not available. Indicate when this appendix will be provided. This inforisation should be made available prior to the forthcoming structural audit in December 1982. .

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.In the Suppression Pool region of the containment vessel the shell has been stiffened by filling the annulus between the Containment and the Shield Building with reinforced concrete, t- A seismic dynamic analysis was performed to determine the ,

effects of this added concrete on the seismic responses of --

various structures in the Reactor Building. These structures

. include the Shield Building, Containment vessel Drywell, ~

, _ _ _ . Shield wall and the RPV pedestal, e.-.

Specifically, the objective of this analysis was toVtf eteQ,, h t'  :

that the original seismic envelope curves used in the plant design .

envelope the seismic response of the Building structures with the added guncretey!te,g f actor, 3 ' ~~

y envelope curves as required. W h pdh,.

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Soil Cases Ob M.2/

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Four soil cases were used in the seismic ~ dynamic analysis -

_ - _ for the horizontal ground motion. They are the following:

CASE NUMBER DESIGNATION -

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2 GE-75-A-H2 f,  ;

4 GE-75-VP3

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6 GE-75-HR-H2  !

7 GE-FB-H2 (Fixed Base)  ;

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Two soil cases were used in the analysis for the vertical motion.- ,'

They are the following: ,

CASE NUMBER DESIGNATION 11 GE-75-A-V 12 GE-FB-V (Fixed Base)

The case numbers above refer to those listed in GESSAR Table 3A-1.

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Mathematical Model The mathematical model originally u* sed for the analysis to develop the design loads and building gespenses did not include the concrete added to the region betw(en the containment and the Shield Buildin b low elevation uts, o b c4 (-J } ft 3 in.

] (. (L For this analysis solid ents were ad ed to represent the Y

i d annular concrete, The rest of the model is similar to that used previously, (See Figure -1 ) . The computer program for yd

• axisymetric structures (AXIS) was used in the analysis.

4 Dynamic Analys s y The horizontal and vertical analyses were perforned separately, e Shell forces, shell moments and element stresses were obtained g for individual soil cases. These results were, then enveloped j $ to arrive at a set of final responses for horizontal and vertical 0 4 motions respectively. Tables '- 1 through . 18 depict the a C' final results. These tabulated values were then compared with

.5 those in Section 3.7.

b Response spectra were generated for the soil cases studied.

• They were enveloped to arrive at a final set of curves.

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