ML20069F649

Brief Supporting Wi Environ Decade 830211 Exceptions to ASLB Initial Decision.Aslb Refused to Make Prerequisite Findings on Degree of Assurance Necessary to Protect Public Safety. Affidavit of Mailing Encl

ML20069F649
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	03/16/1983
From:	Patricia Anderson WISCONSIN'S ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8303230257
Download: ML20069F649 (12)

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,G Nj.fMF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '33 ".9 21 ?I M

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Wisconsin Electric Power Company POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 Operating License Amendment (Steam Generator Tube Sleeving Program)

DECADE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS EXCEPTIONS TO BOARD'S INITIAL DECISION

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Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.762, Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. (" Decade"), hereby submits its Brier in Support of Its Exceptions to Board's Init'ial Decision, dated February ll, 198a. This brier focuses ' the refusal of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Boa r d") to first establish the degree of assurance necessary to protect the public satety before it found that the level of assurance proffered was adequate, without walving the other exceptions tnat are not specifically addressed in this brief due to limited time and resources.

THE BOARD REFUSED TO MAKE PREREQUISITE FINDINGS ON THE DEGREE OF ASSURANCE NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC SAFETY As an administrative agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (" Commission") and its designated agents must act according to clear standards, and may not act arbitrarily and capriciously. 4 2 U.S.C. S 7 0 6.

Congress has established as the statutory standard to control the Commission's action:

"In any event, no license may be issued to any person 0303230257 830316 DRADOcK05000g WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83- P3 : 5 0 2 6 6 NRC . P61-2

l witnin the United States if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of a license to such person would be inimical to the common def ense and security or to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. S2133.

In turn, the Commission has established as the administrative regulation to control its conduct, as well as its Licensing Board's actions:

"In determining that a license will be issued to an applicant, the commission will be guided by the f ollowing considerations:

"(a) The processes to be performed, the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications, or the proposals, in regard to any of the foregoing collectively provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will comply with the regulations in this chapter, including the regulations in Part 20, anc that the begith and safety of the public Will DQt be endangered." 10 C.P.R. 550.40(a). [ Emphasis added.]

"The reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, f abricated, erected, and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture." 10 C.F.R. Part 50 App. A. Crit. 14. [ Emphasis added.]

The Board had before it below a proceeding to determine whether to approve a new procedure (sleeving) intended to repair one part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (steam generator tubes) that is failing. Tr. 1385.

Sleeving involves the insertion of a nominal 3/4 inch tube, approximately (extremely thin) inch in wall thickness, into a nominal 7/8 inch tube, approximately .005 inch in wall thickness, f rom the confined radioactive primary side of the steam generator by temporary workers, and then joining the ends of the first tune to the inside f ace of the second tube by a complex proprietary process. Appl. Ex. 1.

When it made its determination as to whetner to approve this sleeving process, the Board was not f ree to act arbitarily, but WED-PA-0 3/16 / 83 - P3 : 50 26 6 NRC . P61- 2

rather it was required to make a reviewable record on whether the new procedure was " inimical to the health and satety of the public," 42 U.S. C. S 2133, whether the "public health and saf ety will be encangered", 10 C.F.R. S 5 0.4 0 (a) , and whetner it will

/ provide a " low' probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating f ailure or of gross rupture",10 C.F.R. Part 50 App.

A Crit. 14.

In making this f actual determination of whether sleeving met these tests, the Board should have compiled evidence on the consequences to "the health and safety of the public" from a sleeve induced tube failure under various accident conditions, 10 C.F.R. 5 5 0.4 0 (a) , and weigh thdt in relation to whether there is a " low probability" of such a f ailure, 10 C.F.R. Part 50 App. A Crit. 14.

Instead of proceeding rationally and in accordance with tne Commission's regulations, however, the Board improperly excluded as irrelevant evidence on botn the safety consequences of a tuce failure and on the number of such failures sufficient to precipitate those consequences. By excluding this evidence, the Board incapacitated its ability to ascertain "how saf e is saf e enough", because a lower probability of occurrence is requirec when the consequences of its occurrence are more injurious.

In our Motion Concerning Litigable Issues, dated July 21, 1982, f or example, we proffered the following evidence in support of tne proposition tnat tube failures could precipitate uncoolable conditions in the core, and that the f ailure of iust RDe tube out of 6520 tubes could lead to these conditions, sucn WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83-P3 : 50 26 6 NRC. P61-2

_4_

that an extremely high degree of assurance was required:

"The basis for our concern about the present course of actions being pursued by the task force * *-

• lies i.n the indeterminancy of the adequacy of the present code formulations. * ** [A] clear demonstration of coolability by wide margins is necessary to satisfy this uncertainties [ sic] regarding the ECCS capability; that is, cooling by narrow margins would have to be regarded by him as an essentially uncoolable situation. * *

• Some of the essential areas of uncertainty in predicting ECCS performance are reflooding and steam binding. * *

• Of paramount concern in this area, however, is the possible ef f ect of steam generator tube f ailures on the ECCS." REG ECCS Task Force, Memorandum to ECCS Task Force Members, dated June 16, 1972.

"[I]t was the consensus of the [American Physical Society] group that steam generator tube f ailure during a severe LOCA could occur f requently. Moreover, it appears that rupture of a few tubes (on the order of one to ten) dumping seconcary steam into the depressurized prim'ary side of th reactor system could exacerbate steam binding problems ano induce essentially un'coolable conditions in the course of a LOCA * * *." Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, 4/ Beziew Qf MQdern Ehysics(Summer 1975), at p. S85.

"Furtnermore, serious weakening of these tuces from similar causes [of tube degradation] could, in the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA), result in tube failures that would release the energy of the secondary system into tne containment." Begulatory Guide 1.83 (Rev. 1), at p. 1.

"If the shock loads imposed by the LOCA cause a critical number of tubes to fail, say by a double ended I (guillotine) break, the inflow f rom the secondary side can cause choking of flow during ECC preventing adequate cooling of the core. The critical number of tubes is relatively l

small." Oftice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NBC Erogram for the Besclution of Generic Issues Belated to Nuclear Enwar Elants(1978), NUREG-0410, at p. C-29.

"The failure of a number of steam generator tubes as a result of the pressure transients during a loss of coolant accident could render the emergency core cooling system iner t ective." Risk Assessment Review Group, Beport to the E S.n. NMClear Be921atQty CQGGission(197 8), NUREG/CR-0400, at

p. 48.

WED-PA-03/16/83-P3:50266NRC.P61-2 i

"Recent studies have shown that!as few as ten tunes would need to have ruptured during a LOCA (assuming a leakage rate of 130 gal / min per ruptured tuDe) bef ore the cladding temperature would be significantly affected (i.e.

peak cladding temperature (PCT) [ greater than] 2200 F)."

Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Busture Events (1980),

NUMEG-06dl, at p. I-2.

"One area [of research] that has not been considered sufficiently using recent accident analysis codes is estimation of the consequences of a transient or some other failure that might lead in turn to the failure of a significant number of tubes. Such f ailures could lead to the degradation of ECCS function." Office of Reactor Safety Research Group, Beport to the Eresident'_E Nuclear Safety Qyersight Committee (1981), at p. I-2.

"The consequences of multiple tube f ailure, excess of-the design base, have not yet been rigorously studied. ***

In the event of a LOCA, the core reflood rate could be retarded by steam binding. * *

• S [ team] G[enerat.or) tube f ailures would create a secondary to primary leak patn wnich aggravates the steam binding effect and could lead to inerfective retlooding of the co r e. " Nuclear Reactor Research, Steam Generator Statua Beport(Feb.1982), at p. 2 to 3.

In response to this prof erred evidence during the summary disposition phase of the proceeding, the Board summarily excluded even tne consideration of this critical evidence witn the statement that:

" Decade's allegedly litigable issues * *

• do not relate to the safety of tube sleeving and are irrelevant to an application for a license amendment concerning steam generator tube sleeving. These alleged issues are relevant to tuce sleeving only it tube weakening is assumed to have occu r r ed. * * *

"This is not an application to build or operate a nuclear power reactor. In an amendment proceeding, the relationship of steam generators to the remainder of the plant is not germane. In this case, applicant already has an . operating license, granted atter the sarety of its reactor was considered." Memorandum and Order, dated October 1,19 8 2, at pp. 7 to 8. ,

The Board stated that this evidence is relevant only "if tube weakening is assumed to have occurred," and then, witnout ever ruling on the possibility of tube weakening, it determined WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83- P3 : 50 26 6 NRC. P61-2

the saiety issue to be irrelevant.

FC : the limited purpose of making a pre-trial ruling on ,

which issues may be ajudicated, it would be impossible to preclude the possibility of failures in sleeved tubes, and therefore the exclusionary ruling cannot stand.

The previous problem of corrosion-inducing environments in confined spaces such as the tube-to-tubesheet crevice in steam generators at pressurized water reactors is w' ell known. Nuclear 1

Reactor Regulation, Eteam Generator Tube Experience (1982),

NUREG-0886, a t p.14. In turn, the insertion of sleeves inside the original tubes creates a new confined space, this ti.me in the sleeve-to-tuDe annulus, and,.in those cases where the original tube is degraded through-wall, secondary water with its inevitable impurities will enter the annulus and concentrate corrodents. This f act cannot be in serious dispute inasmuch as it is admittec in the Licensee's own application:

"The behavior of the annulus between the tube and sleeve, with respect to the capability to concentrate secondary side bulk water inpurities [ sic), is judged to be similar to that of that original tube /tuoesheet crevice."

Appl. Ex. 1, a t p. 6.7 Thus, the possibility of f ailures in tube f ailure's must be acknowledged, and the Board's reasoning for excluding consideration of safety must fall.

It may be expected that the Licensee will respond with claims that the effect of failures in sleeved tubes may be delayed or retarded relative to failures in unsleeved tuces for various reasons. But that kind of response of wholly irrelevant.

Regardless of the f rallity of these expected claims, even if

, taken as true,.they would only speak to the ultimate weighing of WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83-P3 : 50 26 6 NRC . P61- 2

the merits by the decision maker. They would not go to the pre-trial question of excluding f rom ajudication all evidence on the consequences of a failure and on the. number of failures necessary to precipitate those consequences, evidence which is essential to drawing conclusions on whether the public health and saf ety is adequately protected.

The Board also implied that these saf ety issues have been dealt with before, such that any further consideration would be duplicative. It should be emphasized that this is patently untrue. In fact, the Commission has not yet formally investigated the consequences of steam generator tube failure during loss-af-coolant-accident ("LOCA") conditions -- whether in a cleeved or unsleeved tube, as shown by the statements of the Commission's own staff, as well as by outside agencies:

"One area [of research] that has not been considered sufficiently using recent accident analysis codes is estimation of the consequences of a transient or some other failure that might lead in turn to the failure of a significant number of tubes. Such failures could lead t_o the degradation of ECCS f unction." Office of Reactor Safety Research Group, Egport to the ELRaidentla HuGlear Saf2LE Q2ernight CQmmitteg(1981), at p. I-2.

"The consequences of multiple tube f ailure, excess of the design base, have not yet been rigorously studied. * *

• In tne event of a LOCA, the core reflood rate could be retarded by steam binding. * *

• S [ team] G[enerator] tube f ailures would create a secondary to primary leak patn which aggravates the steam binding effect and could lead to inettective retlooding of the co r e. " Nuclear Reactor Research, Steam Generatar Status Beport(Feb.19 82), at p. 2 to 3(" Status Report"). ,

"At the times Point Beach Unit 1, Surry Unit 2, and Prairie Island Unit 1 were licensed, there were no specific analysis requirements for S[ team] G[enerator] T[ube] rupture event s. * * *

"The.statf does not require licensees to analyze loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) concurrent with an SGT break, WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83 -P3 : 50 26 6 NRC . P61-2

but doesrequireallLOCAanalysestokncludetheeftectsof the plugged tubes on reduced RCS flow." Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Eyaluation of Steam Generator Tube Bugture EEents (March 1980), NUREG-0651, at p. 1-2.

In its final order, the Initial Decision dated February 4, 1983, the Board reiterated its refusal to consider the magnitude or tne consequences of a ruptured sleeved tube in order to determine the level of assurance required. Id., at p. 5 n. 8.

This time the Board def ended its action by ,a line of argument that concluded that the probabilities of a failure is lower in a sleeved tuce than in a sleeved tube:

"We theretore conclude that there is no serious satety or environmental issue of which we are awa're that requires us tc. undertake our own f urtner inquiry." Id. , a t p. 3 4.

f As stated above, the Commission has never made any determination whetner tne possibility of a failure in an unsleeved tube during LOCA poses an unacceptable risk. That being given, it is totally irresponsible to claim that there "is no serious safety issue" f rom f ailures in sleeved tubes solely witn reterence to the possibility of failures in unsleeved tuces which has neger been considered.

The sheer enormity of the Commission's steadf ast refusal l

I over a period that spans ten Years to even consider the saf ety implications of failing steam generator tubes must be recounted.

The Commission, and its predecessor Atomic Energy Commission, has retused to act on these concerne f rom the very begining when they l were first raised in 1972 by its own scientists. Indeed, the -

Atomic Energy Commission later conceded that, although there had oeen some discussion of the subject, no one was even assigned to study tne question. In the Matter of Generic ECCS Bule

Makins, WED-PA-0 3/16/ 83 - P3 : 5 0 2 6 6 NRC . P61-2

t AEC Docket RM-50-1, Tr. 2335.

Two years later, citizen organizations uncovered these concerns that had been submerged inside the bureaucracy and attemptea to insert them into a pending Atomic Energy Commission generic safety hearing. But, the agency abruptly cut off questions on the subject. Id., Tr. 23 3 7.

That ref usal to act on saf ety concerns nearly a decade ago on its own or when pressed by others was criticized soon thereaf ter by the nation's most prestigious scientific body, the American Physical Society, which f ound that "the potential for steam generator tube leakage is a serious problem which was Brecluded frQE REaluation at the [ generic satety hearings in 1973] ." Report to the American Physical Socity bythe Study Group on Light -Water Reactor Safety, 47 BerinE of Modern Ebysics(Summer 1975), at p. S-85.

Chastized by the American Physical Society, the tube integrity issue was raised in a succeeding licensing proceeding a year later, involving the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, but the record was closed without resolution af'er "the staff made a commitment * *

• to conduct a ' generic appraisal of the likelihood and consequences of the customary transient and accident anaylses with assumed tube f ailure'". In the satter at NQtthern States Eower ComBany, Docket 50-282 and 50-306, Dec, of ALAB (Sept. 2, 1976), at p. 198, n. 41.

However, this commitment was not fulfilled. Two years later, anotner independent scientific panel known as the Lewis Committee pointed to the.still unresolved nature of the problem, Risk Assessment Review Group, Egport to the Butlear WED-PA-03/16/83-P3:50266NRC.P61-2

BREulatQrY CQEmiSEiQn(197 8), NUREG/CR-0400, at. p. 4 8, and three years later the agency's statf was still discussing what should be done to evaluate the problem at some point in the future.

Nucler Regulatory Commission, Task Action Elang for Unresglyed Safety Issues Belted to Nuclear Elanta(1980), NUREG-0649, at A-3.

Then, beginning in 1979 -- seven years after the first warning -- the nuclear industry experienc'de the outbreak of runaway corrosion in the steam generators of several nuclear plants including Point Beach. Nuclear Reactor Regulation, team GeneratOI Tube EKDarienCg(1982), NUREG-0886, at pp. 14 to 31.

Prodded by the threat of legal action from concerned citizens, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreed to hold a series of hearings on Point Beach, but, following in its earlier footsteps, the agency restricted the scope of these hearings in such a way as to exclude testimony on the very saf ety questions wnich were at issue.

This action was so f ar outside the bounds of responsible behavior that two of the five Commissioners issued a stinging dissent, stating in relevant part:

"One need not have high expectations about the contribution that a hearing might make to the safety of the plant in any given case to be distressed abou the levels of illusion involved * * *.

"The agency so misstates history that it is clearly either incapable of giving an accurate account of its own past doings or else its legal positions are being chosen after the desired result (in this case no meaningful .

opportunity for hearing) has been decided.

"The hearing being offered * *

• is a sham * * *.

"Most unfortunate of all is the way in which the Commission's pell mell retreat from meaningful public inquiry * *

• suggests to the staf f and the outside world tnat tne agency is run by people living in f ear of tnelt own citizenry.

%r - - _ .

"In the wake of the Kemeny and Rogovin Report's calls for more effective public involvement, the Commission responas with a hearing of f er that is.a transparent sham."

la the Matter of Eisconsin Electric Eower Company Docket 50-266, Order (May 12, 1980).

The Board's retusal to act rationally and in accordance witn applicable regulations in the case at bar continues the sad legacy left by the Commission itself. Unless rectitied on appeal, that unwavering adbdication of regulatory responsibility will someday, soon, inevitably lead to a nuclear nightmare.

DATED at Madison, Wisconsin, this 16 th day of March, 1983.

Respectfully submitted,

' WISC ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE, INC.

by _

PETER ANDERSON Co-Director 114 North Carroll Street.

Suite 208 Madison, Wisconsin 53703 (608) 251-7020 l

t l

WED-PA-03/16/83-P3:50266NRC.P61-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '33 MP3 21 P1:44

.. ,; n _ u r , :.C Wisconsin Electric Power Company POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 Operating License Amendment (Steam Generator Tube Sleeving Program)

DECADE'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS EXCEPTION,S TO BOARD'S INITIAL DECISION AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING STATE OF WISCONSIN)

)

COUNTY OF DANE )

CAROL PFEFFERKORN, being duly sworn on oath, deposes ano states that on March 16, 1983, she personally deposited into the Unitea States First Class Mails, a copy of the Decade's Exceptions to the Board's Initial Decision, in the above-captioneo matter, to the following Service List.

Atomic Safety and Licensng Appeal Bruce W. Churchill l Board Shaw, Pittman & Potts L Attn: Peter B. Bloch, Ch. 1800 M Street, NW l Dr. Jerry R. Kline Washington, DC 20036 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.

US Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Hugh C. Paxton 1229 41st St.

Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544 .

/

s

~~~~~~

Carol PfefferkdrF~ ~ ~ .

Subscribed and sworn to before me tnis lbtn day of March, 1983.

Y_D_t Notary Public, State of Wiscons'in Q__

l My commission is permanent.

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