NUREG-0649, Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Sys 880810 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Discuss Proposed Resolution of USI A-17, Sys Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants. Related Info, Including List of Submitted Documents Encl

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Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Sys 880810 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Discuss Proposed Resolution of USI A-17, Sys Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants. Related Info, Including List of Submitted Documents Encl
ML20206B279
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/19/1988
From:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
REF-GTECI-048, REF-GTECI-049, REF-GTECI-128, REF-GTECI-A-17, REF-GTECI-A-30, REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-EL, REF-GTECI-NI, REF-GTECI-SC, REF-GTECI-SY, RTR-NUREG-0649, RTR-NUREG-1174, RTR-NUREG-649, TASK-048, TASK-049, TASK-128, TASK-48, TASK-49, TASK-A-17, TASK-A-30, TASK-A-46, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR ACRS-2597, NUDOCS 8811150398
Download: ML20206B279 (23)


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SUMMARY

/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON AUXILIARY SYSTEMS AUGUST 10, 1988 WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTRODUCTION The ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Systems held a meeting on Wednesday, August 10, 1988, at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., to discuss the proposed resolution of USI A-17, "Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants." The entire meeting was open to public attendance. Mr.

Sam Duraiswamy was the cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer for this meeting.

A list of documents submitted to the Subcomittee is included in Attach-ment A, end a copy of the presentation schedule for the meeting is included in Attachment B.

ATTENDEES ACRS: C. Michelson (Subcomittee Chaiman), J. Carroll, W. Ke:r, C. P. Siess, and C. J. Wylie Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer)

ACRS Consultant: D. Okrent Principal Speakers NRC: R. Baer, D. Thatcher, and A. Szukiewicz ORNL: G. Murphy, M. Roberts, and L. Palko EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. Michelson, the Subcommittee Chaiman, convened the meeting at 8:05 a.m. and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to hear DNA h 2I g o 080819 2597 PNU (

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff and ORNL with respect to the following:

  • History / Scope of USI A-17

' Proposed resolution of USI A-17 for present and future plants

  • Staff's resolution of previous ACRS comments related to USI A-17
  • fiultiple System Responsa Program (MSRP) as it relates to USI A-17
  • Equipment Qualification-Risk Scoping Study as it relates to USI A-17.

He said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF USI A-17 Introduction /Backoround - Mr. R. Baer, RES Mr. Baer stated that the original concerns with systems interactions were raised by the ACRS in 1974 It was designated as a USI in 1978.

Initially, the Staff had experienced difficulty in defining the term "Systems Interactions" and develeping an explicit scope. During 1983 and 1984, major revisions had been made to the scope of USI A-17 and the associated Task Action Plan. In 1986, the Staff presented a draft resolution to the ACRS and the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR), CRGR was in agreement with the scope and approach taken by the Staff in revolving USI A-17. The ACRS felt that several of its major concerns associated with the systems interactions issue had not been addressed under the draft resolution. Consequently, the Staff has initiated PSRP at ORNL to evaluate and define the residual ACRS concerns.

i Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes ~3- August 10, 1988 Mr. Baer stated that after completion of the ACRS and CRGR review of the proposed resolution, they plan to issue it for public comment, j Dr. Okrent asked why it took such a long time (about 14 years) to identify a potential resolution for USI A-17. Mr. Baer responded that i i

in the beginning, the Staff had considerable difficulty in defining the  !

system 3 interactions issue and developing an explicit scope. Although j the issue was identified by the ACRS in 1974, the definition of this issue and the Task Action Plan for resolving it were not finalized until  !

about 1984. He believes that the delay in defining the scope of this [

issue is one of the major contributing factors to the delay in resolving (

it.  !

I Dr. Okrent comented that if one of the principal advisors to the  !

Commission raised some potential safety concerns, it is the responsibil-  !

ity of the Comission's Staff to evaluate the significance of those concerns and determine a course of action for resolving them as soon as '

possible, i i

Mr. Michelson stated he also believes that the Staff has taken too long  !

to resolve USI A-17 Taking such a long time to resolve an important  !

issue is somewhat embarrassing. l l

Mr. Baer responded that, in his opinion, the Staff has made sincere effort to resolve USI A-17. There may be several reasons for the delay ,

in resolving US! A-17, but one of them is definitely not due to lack of f attempted staff's efforts to resolve this issue, f

Overview /0efinition - Mr. D. Thatcher, RES l Mr. Thatcher provided an overview of the status of USI A-17 (Attachment C, Page 1). He stated that the technical work associated with USI A-17 i has been completed. They plan to issue the proposed resolution of this  !

issue for public coment subsequent to the completion of the CRGR  !

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1983 review. He mentioned that in a memorandum dated June 9,1988, the ACRS stated that it does not have any objection to issue the proposed resolution for public comment.

Dr. Okrent stated that industry groups have been devoting large efforts to study issues such as Charleston earthquake, severe accidents, and seismic qualification. However, they don't seem to take any initiative to look at the systems interactions issue. Most of the studies associ-ated with the systems interactions issue is at the initiative of the NRC Staff. There are one or two licensees who have initiated studies on their own to deal with this issue. Since the licensees have the ulti-

n. ate responsibility to prove that their plants are safe, why they have not formed a group to study this issue. Mr. Thatcher responded that although there are no industry groups involved in studying the systems interactions issue, Electric Power .7esearch Institute (EPRI) has perfomed studies in this area. In 1984 the Staff met with representatives of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) to see whether they want to set up a group similar to the one that was established to deal with the resolution of USI A-46, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants." AIF was very hesitant to deal with USI A-17 because of lack of an explicit definition of the issue.

Dr. Okrent commented that he does not believe that lack of an explicit definition of USI A-17 is a proper excuse for th: industry for not taking initiatives to examine this issue. In view of the fact that the industry had established groups to examine the severe accident issues even before these issues were clearly defined, he believes that it should have taken similar approach in dealing with the systems interactions issue. If the industry does not want to deal with this issue voluntarily NRC should find a way to make the industry do it.

The NRC should probably require that those who apply for license renewal for extension of plant life should have perforced a thorcugh systems interactions study for their plants prior to applying for renewal of licanse.

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 Mr. Thatcher stated that the definition of the term systems interactions is es follows:

"Actions or inactions (not necessarily failures) of various systems (subsystems, divisions, trains), components,orstructuresresult-ing from a single credible failure within one system, component, or structure and propacation to other systems, components, or struc-tures by inconspicuous or unanticipated interdependencies. The major difference between this type of event and a classic single-failure event is in those aspects of the initiating failure and/or its propagetion that are not obvious (i.e., that are hidden or unanticipated)."

A systems interaction that produces an undesirable result is called AdverseSystemsInteraction(ASI).

Mr. Michelson asked whether the definition of the systems interactions issue includes consiceration of external ever:ts. Mr. Thatcher responded that external events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and external flooding are not included in the definition. S= stems interactions initiated by internal plant flooding is included in the A-17 resoluthn; however, internal flooding is not considered to be an extertial evera.

Mr. Michelson cemented that it is not made clear in the definition that systems interactions prompted by external events are excluded. Mr.

Thatcher responded that in Section 3.4.2 of NUREG-1174, "Evaluation of Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power plants," it is made clear that the USI A-17 program did not consider the pctential for an external event to cause simultaneous multiple initiating failures and systems responses.

Mr. Michelson comented that it is not explained anphere in the pro-posed Generic Letter that systems interactions initiated by external events are not considered in the USI A-17 program. Since the licensees

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Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 l

are going to follow primarily the information included in the Generic Letter, he suggested that the Staff make it clear in that letter that I systems interactions prompted by external events are not within the i scope of USI A-17.  !

I Mr. Baer stated that it is too late to change the definition of US! ['

A-17. However, they will look into the possibility of including some ,

information regarding external events in the proposed Generic Letter. (

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Mr. Michelson stated that the original definition / scope of USI A-17 f specified in NUREG-0649. Revision 1. "Task Action Plans for Unresolved (

Safety Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants " dated September 1984 l includes consideration of external phenomena (e.g., wind, earthquake) [

which can simultaneously challenge redundant safety systems. He asked l when and why the Staff has decided to drop consideration of external events from the scope of USI A-17. Mr. Thatcher responded that he is

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not sure why the Staff has decided to drop it. l Dr. Okrent comented that the tem "unanticipated" included in the l definition of systems interactions is ambiguous. [

i proposed Resolution - Mr. D. Thatcher. RES l l

Mr. Thatcher stated that the proposed resolution includes the following:

  • No new requirements will be imposed on licensees. [
  • A Generic Letter, that will include the following, will be issued to all holders of construction pemits or operating licenses:

- The bases for resolution of US! A-17. .

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- A sumary of infomation for use in ongo!ng operating experi-ence reviews.  ;

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- A request (pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54f) for all utilities to  ;

certify that their plants are protected from internal plant l flooding and water intrusion. Specifically, all licensees should certify that they have: ,

-- Determined and documented the susceptibility of plant i t

equipment to w:ter intrusion and flooding from internal  !

plant sources in accordance with the existing require-  !

ments. If a documented analysis of internal flooding and f waterintrusion(consistentwiththeexistingrequire- l ments) is available and is applicable to the current i plant contiguration, it need not be redone. (

-- Determined whether there are deficiencies, f

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-- Documented modifications that they have made or plan to (

make to correct any identified deficiencies that need to j be corrected.  ;

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-- Documented the justification for continued operation if any deficiencies that warrant such justification have not ,

been corrected, including a description of the modifica-tion and the schedule for making any required modifica-f

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tions. It is expected that any necessary modifications [

will be made by the licensees consistent with NRC re- f quirements and guidance and within 2 refueling outages f but in no case longer than 4 years, j i

  • It will be recognized that the resolution of US! A-46 will address I seismically induced systems interactions to the extent that compo-nents and systems needed to shut down the plant safely are protect- ,

ed given the loss of offsite power. (New plants, not covered by f l

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Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 i US! A-46, have been reviewed by current requirements which address j seismicallyinducedsystemsinteractions).

' Lessons learned about ASIS will be provided for use in the review of PRAs and Individual Plant Examination (IPE). (TheStaffhas I concluded that AS!s involve subtle, and often very complicated, j dependencies. Therefore, total elimination of ASIS is unachiev- -'

able. For these reasons, the Staff is not recomending that each plant undertake a large, comprehensive study to uncover ASIS.

Instead, the Staff is recommending other, more cost-effective actions for reducing the frequency and impact of AS!s. Although the work under the Task Action Plan for US! A-17 has been com-pleted, the Staff believes that the potential for AS!s remains an important consideration in the design and operation of nuclear powerplants.)

  • Infomation on potential interactions steming from the electrical power systems developed during the resolution of US! A-17 will be provided for use in resolving Generic Issue 128, "Electric Power Reliability." Generic !ssue 128 consolidates the following issues:

- GI-48, "LCO for Class 1E Vital Instrument Buses in Operating Plants."

- GI-49, "Interlocks and LCOs for Redundant Class 1E Tie Break-ers."

- GI-A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies."

Mr. Thatcher stated that a proposed resolution of US! A-17 was initially presented to the ACRS and CRGR during 1986. B6 sed on CRGR and ACRS coments, the Staff has revised the proposed resolution. The basic conclusions in the revised proposed resolution are same as those

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 presented to the CRGR and ACRS in 1986; nowever, the implementation of the resolution has been changed to include a letter (pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54f) which requires all utilities certify that their plants are protected from internal plant flooding and water intrusion. Previously. l the Staff has proposed to rely on other activities, such as IE Notices and INPO Notifications.

Mr. Michelson commented that the guidance provided in the proposed Generic Letter concerning internal plant flooding and water intrusion is inadequate and should be expanded and clarified. Mr. Thatcher responded that CRGR also made the same coment. As a result of CRGR comments, the I Staff is in the process of revising the portion of the Generic Letter that deals with this matter to provide additional guidance.

In response to a question from Dr. Okrent, Mr. Thatcher stated that the l licensees are not required to submit information to the Staff on the e internal plant flooding and water intrusion analyses. However, they are required to keep at the plant site the necessary documents on this matter for audit by the NRC Staff.

Mr. Wylie asked whether water resulting from a severe rain stom getting into the plant through open conduits or open manholes is considered to be internal plant flooding. Mr. Thatcher responded that it is con-sidered to be an external event and is not included in the VS! A-17 program.

CRGR Coments - Mr. D. Thatcher, RES

) Mr. Thatcher stated that CRGR has provided the following comments on the proposed resolution of US! A-17 and the associated Generic Letter j (Attachment C, Page 2):

  • The Generic letter should be revised to propose flooding / water intrusion analyses as backfit

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 I

  • More specific guidance on internal plant flooding and water intru- l sion should be provided in the Generic Letter  :

' Consideration should be given to set up workshops to discuss the ,

systems interactions issue.

Mr. Carroll asked whether the Staff plans to set up workshops as sug- i gested by CRGR. Mr. Baer responded that depending on the nature of the l public coments on the proposed resolution and the associated Generic Letter, they may consider holding an information meeting with the  ;

industry to discuss any concerns that the industry may have on the  !

systems interactions issue, j Mr. Michelson stated that recently there was a workshop held by the l

Staff to discuss maintenance problems at nuclear power plants. He  :

suggested that a workshop similar to that one would be helpful in (

discussing the systems interactions issue. [

Resolution of previous ACRS Coments - Mr. D. Thatcher, RES l Mr. Thatcher discussed the Staff's responses to previous ACRS coments  !

related to USI A-17 (Attachment C, Pages 3 and 4),

t Dr. Okrent stated the results of the plant-specific seismic assessments l performed at certain plants showed that some of the large water tanks at !

t the plant site may get damaged during a seismic event and water spilled l from the damaged tanks may get into the pl:nt causing systems inter- f action problems. He asked whether the Staff has included guidance in  !

the proposed USI A-17 Generic Letter for dealing with the consequences f

of this specific source of water intrusion. Mr. Thatcher responded he  ;

believes that thi' kind of issues had already been analyzed under the f existing requirements. Mr. Baer stated that he will look into this l matter to make sure that it has not been ignored. l i

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Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 I

i 3 Mr. Michelson comented in the previous water intrusion analysis it was normally assumed that an equipment, that was intruded by water, totally

) fails to function. I t may not be a realistic assumption. The Staff

should try to analyze what exactly happens within an equipment subsequent to the water intrusion.

Stating that in one of his recent speeches, NRC Chairman Zech emphasized the importance of having a safety culture organization at each plant, Dr. Okrent wondered why the Staff does not want to require that each

licensee should have a group to study the systems interaction problems 2 at his plant. Mr. Thatcher responded that systems interactions issue is very conprehensive; unless specific guidance is provided regarding what that gdup should look for, it will not accomplish anything useful. He j does not believe that establishing such a group to look at the systems l interactions issue is a good idea. He believes that the Safety Review l Comittees that are in existence at each plant could perform such a task.

Dr. Okrent comented that the Safety Review Comittees are not intended to review the issues in depth. He does not agree with the Staff that i unless specific guidance is provided, the systems interaction group will

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not be able to accomplish anything useful.

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Mr. Michelson comented that the proposed resolution of US! A-17 does j not address how the systems interactions issues will be handled for j future plants. Also it is not even mentioned that the internal plant j flooding and water intrusion analyses should be performed for future 2

plants. Mr. Baer responded in view of the fact that there may not be a f plant built in the near future, he is not sure whether it is realistic f to provide guidance for such plants at this time.

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Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 Mr. Michelson commented that the Staff and the ACRS have already been reviewing the design aspects of Advanced Boiling Water Reactors and Westinghouse Advanced Pressurized Water Reactors. Upon satisfactory completion of the review, these plant designs are sxpected to be cer-tified by the NRC. He believes that the Staff should provide necessary guidance at the design stage of these plants on how to deal with systems interaction problems. Mr. Baer responded that they would consider including some guidance for future plants to deal with the systems interactions issue.

Multiple System Response Program - Mr. D. Thatcher, RES Mr. Thatcher stated that a number of individual organizations, most notably the ACRS, have expressed concerns that, in some cases, inade-quate coordination between issues or inconsistent assumptions for related issues may have resulted in some potentially significant safety issues not being adequately addressed. This ACRS opinion has been expressed in several of its meetings associated with the resolution of specific US!s (e.g., USI A-17 and USI A-46). To address the ACRS concerns, the NRC Staff had initiated the MSRP at ORNI. in 1986.

The objective of tne MS"P is to examine specific USIs and certain other programs (e.g., equipment qualification) in order to identify potential safety issues that require further review by the NRC.

The scope of the MSRP includes three US!s that are in the process of being resolved:

- US! A-17 Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants

- USI A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants

- US! A-47, Safety Implications of Control Systems.

4 Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 i In addition, several other previously resolved regulatory issues are being considered in the MSRP:

- Equipment qualification as implemented in 10 CM 50.49

- Fire protection rules as implemented by 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R

- Related guidelines and reviews implemented based on the Standard Review Plan, i

The role of ORNL is to examine the issues of interest, document and l define the issues as specifically as possible, and gather other related information for use by the NRC Staff in prioritizing the issues. ORNL I does not evaluate the safety significance of the concerns nor does it make judgments regarding the validity of the concerns.

MSRp As It Relates to USI A Mr. D. Thatcher, RES l

The issues related to USI A-U examined by ORNL for MSRP are as follows:

- Failure Mode Other Than "Fails to Function" J

- Multiple, Simultaneous Event - Induced Failures

- Failure to Establish NRC and Licensee Systems Interaction Organiza-tions

- Failure to Require Licensees to Conduct Spatial System Interactions J Studies

- Other Comnen Cause Failures not in the Scope of US! A-17

i Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 i

- Failure to Require Licensees to Address Systems Interaction Con-cerns identified by A-17.

l Mr. Michelson comented that the draft ORNL report associated with MSRP includes most, but not all, of the concerns exprested and documented by

! the ACRS. This document should be considered as a living document and j provisions should be made to include new issues in this document and delete those that are not of major safety concerns.

f Dr. Okrent comented that ORNL has done a good job in capturing those

) issues that have already been documented. There may be other issues i that may not have been documented. Such issues may have major safety significance. One way of obtaining information on such undocumented

! issues is by interviewing people with wide operating experience. Mr.

Murphy from ORNL responded that they have considered in the MSRP l

] primarily those issues that have already been raised and documented.

l They did not interview any personnel with operating experience to obtain 1 information on undocumented issues.

Mr. Michelson asked about the schedule for issuing the final ORNL report

on MSRP. Mr. Thatcher responded that they expect to issue it in the final form probably at the end of 1988,

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Dr. Okrent stated that sometime ago Mr. Epler, one of the previous ACRS i consultants, had raised i concern that during a major maintenance work I

an essential 3-phase AC power system could be reconnected incorrectly i

and when the power is restored it could adversely affect several equip-j ment. He asked whether such concerns are considered in the MSRP. The

! Staff responded that this issue is considered to be a maintenance error.

l and they plan to look at the systems interactions resulting from mainte-

! nance errors in the MSRP.

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 Dr. Okrent commented that ORNL may plan to look at systems interactions resulting from those maintenance errors that have already been document-ed. However, the concerns such as those expressed by Mr. Epler may not have been documented. He reiterated his previous suggestion that the Staff and/or ORNL interview personnel with wide operating experience to obtain information on additional issues.

Stating that in the proposed resolution of USI A-17 the Staff has not considered the systems interactions resulting from installation errors, design errors, manufactur <,; defects, testing and maintenance errors, certain operator erre ; ?f omission and commission, Mr. Michelson asked whether these matters will be considered in the MSRP. Mr. Thatcher responded that although it is not clearly specified in the draft ORNL report, they plan to consider some of the issues mentioned by Mr.

Michelson. They will consider including all the issues mentioned by Mr.

Michelson in the M5RP.

Stating that it is a common practice among utilities to have a single point grounding for sensitive electronic systems, Mr. Wylie *.ommented that during plant operation if that single point ground i" " advertently lifted because of a maintenance error, it will have significant impact on several cedundant systems. Mr. Bder stc'?d that this problem could be considered as a potential candidate for a new generic issue.

Mr. Michelson stated that since the advers2 invironment is changing with time and the equipment response to the environment could also be time dependent, it is likely that the loss of equipment function or the development of an unwanted action following the initiating event will be time dependent. If it is assumed that loss of equipment function is the only consideration, it may be important to identify when the loss occurs. If an unwanted action is possible, its timing may be very important to predicting the outcome. A simplifying assumption such as

l1 Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 simultaneous malfunction or failure of all components exposed to adverse environmental conditions may not be the worst case. He suggested that the Staff and/or ORNL consider including in the MSRP the time sequence of equipment response to adverse environmental conditions.

Mr. Michelson stated also that in order to evaluate the tensequences of an event which creates an adverse environment, it is necessary to determine the physical extent of the environmental change. For example,

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associated with a high-energy pipe break is a release of steam and water which may flow to several areas of the plant located far away from the location of the pipe break. This could affect the equipment located in those areas. If the initiating event is a fire, heat and smoke may propagate to areas outside the initial fire zone and damage equipment or actuate automatic fire suppression systems. It is unlikely that the

. environmental conditions will be uniform throughout the zone. It is necessary to know how fast the environmental change occurs and how it is going to affect the equipment exposed to such environmental conditions.

He suggested this type of issues be included in the MSRP.

Stating that Section 3.4.7 of the draft ORNL report related to MSRP Mentifies the issue "Evaluation of Earthquakes Beyond SSE " Dr. Okrent comented that it is not made clear what specific items will be i

considered under this program. He is not sure whether they plan to look at the behavior of seismic Category I equipment under such condition.

If they assume that seismic category I equipment will not fail under severe earthquakes, it is not a realistic assumption. He believes that there is a small probability that seismic Category I equipment may fail .

during an earthquake at SSE level or less. Mr. Thatcher responded that the issue on evaluation of earthquakes beyond SSE is listed in the ORNL report because it was raised by the ACPS when reviewing US! A-46. Mr.

Baer stated that there is a major program under way within the NRC to look at seismic issues. rhis issue will be considered in detail under

,; that program.

Auxiliary Systems Meeting Minutes August 10, 1988 In response to questions from the Subcommittee whether they plan to look at severe accident issues under MSRP, the Staff said no.

Equipment Quelification-Risk Scoping Study As It Relates to USI A Mr. Thatcher, RES Mr. Thatcher stated that they are in the process of reviewing the results of this Study. Upon completion of the review, the will decide what issues should be included in the MSRP.

SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS Mr. Michelson stated that he plans to submit a draft report, including comments and recommendations on the proposed resolution of USI A-17, and submit it to the full Committee for consideration during the August 1988 ACRS meeting. He suggested that the Staff provide a presentation to the full Committee on the proposed resolution of USI A-17 and the MSRP during the August ACRS meeting.

Dr. Okrent raiterated his previous comment that industry coold and should play a greater role in dealing with the systems interactions issues. He suggested t'so that the Staff consider having a workshop on the systems interactions issue.

Mr. Michelson thanked all participants and adjourned the meeting at 1:00 p.m.

NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from Heritage Reporting Corporation, 1220 L Street, N.W.,

Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 628-4888.

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE AUXILIARY SYSTEM 5 5UBCOMMITTEE'~

AUGUST 10, 1988 -

1. Presentation Schedule.
2. ACRS Report to Muntzing, "Systems Analysis of Engineered Safety Systems," dated November 8, 1974.
3. ACRS Report to Gossick, "Systems Interactions Study for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3," dated October 12, 1979.
4. ACRS Report to Dircks, "ACRS Comments on USI A-17, Systems Inter-actions," dated July 14, 1983.
5. ACRS Report to Stello, "ACRS Comments on Proposed Resolution of USI A-17, Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants," dated May 13, 1986.
6. ACRS Report to Chairman Zech, "Proposed Resolution of USI A-47, Safety Implications of Control Systems," dated April 12, 1988.
7. Memorandum from Stello to Ward, "Response to 1,CRS Comments on Proposed Resolution of USI A-17," dated August 1, 1986,
8. Task Action Plan for USI A-17, September 1984
9. Memorandum from Beckjord to Jordan, Transmitting the USI A-17 Resolution Package for CRGR Review, undated.
10. Draft NUREG-1229, "Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Resolution of USI A-17."
11. Draft NUREG-1174, "Evaluation of Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants."
12. Draf t ORNL Report, "Concerns Regarding Resolution of a Number of Specific Regulatory Issues." (This document is provided for Internal ACRS Use Only.)
  • rtion of the Transcript of the June 1988 ACRS meeting Related to Discussion of USI A-17.

ATTACHMENT A

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PRESENTATION SCHEDULE i ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS AUGUST 10, 1988 ROOM 1046, 1717 H'ST., N.W. -

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ACRS CONTACT: Sam Duraiswamy 202-634-3267 s

NOTE:

  • Presentation Time should not exceed 50% of the Tott.1 Time allocated for a specific item. The remaining 50% of the time  ;

is reserved for the Subcommittee ouestions and answers by the Staff or its contractors.

  • Number of copies of the presentation materials to be submitted to the Subcommittee: 25 copies.  ;

i TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME

1. EXECUTIVE SESSION -- 15 mins 8:00 - 8:15 am
2. HISTORY / RESOLUTION
  • History and Scope of Dale Thatcher 15 mins 8:15 - 8:30 am ,

USI A-17

  • Proposed Resolution 45 mins 8:30 - 9:15 am (Present and Future Plants)
  • Resolution of Previous 15 mins 9:15 - 9:30 am ACRS Comments 9:30 - 10:45 am
3. MULTIPLE SYSTEM RESPONSE 75 mins PROGRAM (MSRP) A5 IT RECX7EE TO USI A-17
      • BREAX *** 15 mins 10:45 - 11:00 am

'4. OTHER ISSUES AND 45 mins 11:00 - 11:45 am EXAMPLES

  • Equipment Qualification-Risk Scoping Study as it Relates to USI A 17
5. CRGR COMMENTS 15 mins 11:45 - 12:00 N
6. SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS -- 30 mins 12:00 - 12:30 pm
      • ADJOURN **** 12:30 pm A rrne w & av B

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USI - A - 17 '

OVERVIEW

. TECHNICAL WORK COEPLETED DEVELOPED A PROPOSED RESOLUTION i

NRR DIVISIONS IIAVE REVIEWED AND AGREE WITH PROPOSED RESOLUTION PROPOSE GENERIC INF0PflAITON LLTTER 8 50.5f1(F) REQUEST GUIDANCE FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT POLICY IMPLEMENTATION SEEKING CRGR RECOMMENDATION TO ISSUE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ACRS MEMO "N0 OBJECTION TO ISSUE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT" Arra c utur c C-I

~. . - .-. - - . - _ . - - -_ _. _ - .

. 15 '

~

A-17 RESOLUTION ',

CRGR COMMENTS

- REVISE GENERIC LETTER TO PROPOSE FLOODING / WATER INTRUSION ANALYSES AS BACKFIT

- ADD MORE SPECIFIC GUIDAliCE TO GENERIC LETTER

- CONSIDER NEED FOR WORKSHOPS

- DISCUSS UTILITY ACTIONS PER INPO SOER

- STILL DON'T REQUIRE SUBMITTALS, REQUIRE CERTIFICATION (DOCUMENTATION TO BE AVAILABLE ON SITE)

O C-E

. ver A-17 RESOLUTION PREVIOUS ACRS COMMENTS (1986) AND STAFF RESPONSES COMMENT - REQUIRE MORE SPATIAL INVESTIGATIONS ,

RESPONSE -

A fG l TO INCLUDE SEISMICALLY - INDUCED SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS A-17 RESOLUTION WILL REQUIRE FLOODING / WATER INTRUSION ANALYSIS i

i INCLUDED IN MSRP j

i f COMMENT - REQUIRE A "SYSTEMS INTERACTION" OPGANIZATION AT ALL LICENSEES i

^

RESPONSE - NOT PROPOSED, sis RECEIVE ATTENTION REGARDLESS OF ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN MSRP C-3 l

. II A-17 RESOLUT10fl (CONT-) '

C0FMENT - STifDY ALL POTENTIAL FAILUPE f:0 DES INCLUDING MORE THAN "FAILS TO FUNCTION" PESPONSE - TO BE INCLUDED IN MllLTIPLE SYSTEM RESPONSE PROGRAM COMPEllT - CHANGE SRP FOR REVIEW OF FUTUPE PLANTS RESPONSE - EDUAL TO PRA TYPE GUIDANCE c-4