ML20056G902

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Insp Repts 50-369/93-10 & 50-370/93-10 on 930621-25 & 0729. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness
ML20056G902
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/19/1993
From: Barr K, Salyers G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056G899 List:
References
50-369-93-10, 50-370-93-10, NUDOCS 9309070292
Download: ML20056G902 (13)


See also: IR 05000369/1993010

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UNITED STATES

/pa af a\g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

y* ~a REGION 81

E, 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900

3  : y ATLANTA, GEORGIA 3032M)199

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k *e. ,+ / AUG 191993

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l Report Nos.: 50-369/93-10 and 50-370/93-10

Licensee: Duke Power Company

P. O. Box 1007

Charlotte, NC 28201-1007

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< Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

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Facility Name: McGuire

! Inspection Conduct t June 21-25, and July 29, 1993 '

Inspecto :

v6. W. Salyer

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(JateSighed

Approved by: N,[gMrm M /1,17 7 3

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K. P'. B'a'r, thief

(jate Sitned

Emergency Preparedness Section

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l Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch

l Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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SUMMARY

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Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of emergency

preparedness, and included review of the following programmatic elements:

(1) Radiological Emergency Response Plan and its implementing procedures;

(2) emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies;

(3) organization and management control; (4) independent reviews / audits; and

(5) training.

Results: i

! In the area inspected, one violation was identified: failure to properly

! classify a loss of offsite power event as a Notification of Unusual Event

(Paragraph 2). Two Unresolved Items (URIs) were identified: (1) notification

of NRC of procedure changes within 30 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50,

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Appendix E.V (Paragraph 2), and (2) maintaining Emergency Preparedness

training current (Paragraph 6). One Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI), specify

which ERO positions require respirator qualification (Paragraph 6), was

identified.

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REPORT DETAILS l

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1. Persons Contacted  !

Licensee Employees

  • W. Duncan, Quality Verification, Audits j
  • J. Frye, Quality Verification Manager, Audits

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  • M. Geddie, Station Manager 4
  • J. Glenn, Nuclear Generation l
  • M. Lackey, Operations Training
  • J. Nagel, Security i
  • J. Schutle, Radiation Protection

Other licensee ' employees contacted during this inspection included  ;

members of the emergency response organization, training staff, and

l office personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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  • T. Cooper, Resident Inspector
  • K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector ,

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  • Attended exit interview  !

Abbreviations used throughout this report ar e listed in the last

paragraph.

2. Emergency-Plan and Implementing Procedures (82701)

This area was inspected to determine whether significant changes were

made in the' licensee's emergency preparedness program since the last

inspection, to assess the impact of any such changes on the overall '

state of emergency preparedness at the facility, and to determine

. whether the licensee's actions in response to actual emergencies were in

accordance with the Emergency Plan and its~ implementing procedures.

Requirements apnlicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16),

10CFR50.54(q), spendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the licensee's

Emergency P1an.

a. The. inspector discussed with the Emergency Planning Manager,.the

licensee's methodology for making procedural changes to the REP

and EPIPs. The inspector concluded that the licensee did not have

a procedure specifically for making changes'to the REP or EPIPs

but used the plant generic program for procedure changes.

The inspector noted that.the EPIPs consist of eighteen Response

Procedures maintained by the emergency preparedness organization,

i ten Health Physics Procedures maintained by the Health Physics

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organization, and three Chemistry Procedures maintained by the '

chemistry organization. Each group made changes to and approved

their particular procedures but, the emergency preparedness

organization was responsible for maintaining the EPIPs up-to-date.

The licensee's documentation indicated that they had made ,

approximately 42 revisions to the EPIPs since February 1991. The

inspector's review of the EPIP revisions found:

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- A June 1, 1992 letter from the licensee to the NRC indicated

a year lapsed between a procedure approval and NRC

notification. This was identified by the licensee and

corrective action was identified in the letter to the NRC.

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A September 22, 1992 letter from the licensee to the NRC I

indicated more than two months elapsed between procedure j

approval and NRC notification.

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An April 26, 1993 letter from the licensee to the NRC

indicated approximately 33 days elapsed between procedure

approval and NRC notification.

The inspector discussed with the Emergency Planning Manager the

j apparent late notification to the NRC of their changes to the

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EPIPs. In the discussion, the Emergency Planning Manager stated

the facility considers the implementation date to be the date the

Safety Assurance Manager signed off on the procedure and not the

approval date indicated on each procedure. The Emergency Planning

Manager further explained as an example, that once a procedure

change was approved, the procedures were placed in the control

room and available for use by Control Room personnel prior to the

final approval of the Safety Assurance Manager. General

distribution of the procedure did not occur until the Safety

Assurance Manager signed off as approving the procedure. The ,

inspector noted, as an example, for the September 22, 1992 letter l

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to the NRC, the Safety Manager signed off on the procedures on

September 16, 1992, but OP/1/B/6200/48, dated July 9, 1992, and

L OP/2/B/6200/48, dated July 22, 1992, were approved, approximately

l 69 and 56 days, respectively, before the Safety Assurance Manager

approval and distribution to the EPIP manuals. In a telecon with i

the licensee on August 18, 1993, the licensee was informed that

this item was identified as an unresolved item pending NRC

( determination of the implementation of these procedures.

URI 50 369, 370/93-10-01: Notification of the NRC within 30 days

of a procedure change in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.V.

The inspector reviewed four procedure change packages and verified

that an equivalent 10 CFR 50.59 or 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation had

been performed. Except as stated above, a review of licensee

records indicated that all of the REP and EPIPs changes between

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February 1991 and June 1993, were approved by management and

subruitted to the NRC within 30 days of the effective date, as

required.

By reviewing documentation and discussion with licensee personnel,

the inspector determined that the following NRC ins applicable to

emergency planning were reviewed by the licensee and distributed  :

to cognizant personnel:

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IN 91-72: Revision of EPA PAG Manual

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IN 92-08: Revised Protective Action Guidance for Nuclear

Incidents

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IN 92-32: Problems Identified With Emergency Ventilation

Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations

Facilities and Technical Support Centers

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IN 92-38: Implementation Date for the Revision to the EPA

Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions

for Nuclear Incidents

The inspector noted that corrective actions were taken when

appropriate.

b. The inspector verified that the REP and EPIPs had received the

required annual management review as stated in EP Section P.4,

" Review of Emergency Plan."

The inspector reviewed documents indicating that plant EALs were

presented to and reviewed by the State of North Carolina on

October 24, 1991 and December 29, 1992; Catawba County on

October 9, 1991 and December 17, 1992; Gaston County on October

17, 1991 and December 18, 1992; Iredell County on October 9, 1991

and December 17, 1992; Lincoln County on October 8, 1991 and

December 15, 1992; and Mecklenburg County on December 10, 1991 and

December 15, 1992. Neither the State nor the counties recommended

any changes to the EALs.

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The inspector reviewed the EALs as found in EPIP RP/0/A/5700/00,

" Classification of Emergency," dated July 22, 1992, and determined

that the procedures were consistent with the ?EP, Section D,

" Emergency Classification System /EAL Basis Document."

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The inspector compared instrumentation referenced in the EALs with '

available Control Room indication. During the comparison, the ,

inspector noted that EAL 4.1.9, initiating condition #2, under the l

NOVE category listed Lake Norman water level of 745 ft. as an  !

action level. When asked by the inspector, the Control Room

operator assisting the inspector was not aware of any Control Room

indication for Lake Norman water level and stated that it might be

on the OAC. The Unit 1 OAC identified computer point A0766 was

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Lake Norman water level and the indicated that the lake level was I

745 ft. The inspector verified from a local reading at the dam,  :

that the actual lake water level was 757 ft and therefore, the l

licensee had not exceeded their action level. i

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The inspector expressed the following concerns to the Emergency ,

Planning Manager. ,

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  • Two of the operators in the Control Room were not aware of  ;

the lake level EAL or that a Lake Norman water level  ;

indication was available in the Control Room.

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The FSAR stated that there was an alarm in the Control Room  ;

for a low = lake level (745 ft.). l

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The OAC computer indication did.not and was not programmed  :

to alarm in the Control Room, and the Control Room could  !

have missed a NOUE classification. .

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How long was. the instrument out of calibration?

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The Emergenci Planning Manager acknowledged the inspector's  !

, . concerns and indicated the licensee was evaluating the issue.  !

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Subsequent to this inspection, this issue was followed up by the j

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Resident Inspectors and was addressed as violation 50-369,370/93- '

11-01.

i Except for " Lake Norman water level" as discussed above and the l

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" Loss of offsite power,' both unit related main bus lines '

de-energized" discussed in 2.c. below, the EALs did not appear to

, contain impediments or errors which could lead to incorrect or

untimely classification. The inspector concluded that the EAls  !'

were based on parameters obtainable from Control Room

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Controlled copies'of the REP, EPIPs, and Emergency Telephone  ;

Directory in the Control Room and randomly selected controlled  !

j copies in the TSC, and EOF were audited by the inspector for the  !

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most current revision. No problems were identified.  !

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! c. Four emergency declarations were made by the licensee since the  ;

last inspection: j

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February 11, 1991, NOUE Loss of offsite power {

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July 15, 1991, NOVE Axial Flux Difference  !

>12 percent (TS shutdown) l

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April 21, 1992, NOUE Loss of "B" Train of the Solid  ;

State Protection System in i

i conjunction with a load t

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a October 23, 1992, NOUE Containment Spray Out of

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Service (Less than the minimum

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Features operable)

While reviewing the events, the inspector noted that during the

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February 11, 1991, loss of offsite power on Unit 1, it took

1 25 minutes to make a NOUE classification. Licensee procedure

RP/0/A/5700/00, dated November 27, 1990, was in effect at this ,

time. Enclosure 4.1 of the procedure specifies a loss of offsite '

l power in Modes 1-6 as an EAL for a NOVE. Enclosure 4.1 also lists

l ECCS initiation as an EAL for a NOVE. Control Room logs for

! February 11, 1991, indicate that at 13:55, Unit 1 Reactor Tripped

due to a complete loss of power; loss of 230 KV switchyard; and

blackout. The Cantrol Room logs also indicate that a NOUE was

declared at 14:20 based on a valid SI. During an interview with

the SR0 or shift during the event, the SR0 stated that "they knew

the EAL, hnd they were watching and waiting for SI to inject into

the core to make the classification." The inspector concluded

that the NOUE classification should have been made immediately on

" loss of offsite power."

VIO 50-369, 370/93-10-02: Failure to properly classify a loss of

offsite power as a NOVE.

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Inspector follow-up also indicated that a licensed operator

training instructor had been teaching operators that they had

15 minutes after entering the diagnostic portion of the E0Ps

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before they had to naake an event classification. The inspector

informed the licensee that the 15 minutes was for notification of

offsite agencies. This was corrected by the Emergency Planning

Manager.

The inspector reviewed the classification and conditions prompting

the classifications for each of the above events. Except as noted

above, the inspector concluded that other classifications were

made correctly and offsite notifications were timely.

One violation and one URI were identified.

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3. Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82701)

This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's ERFs and

associated equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were maintained in

' a state of operational readiness, and to assess the impact of any

changes in this area upon the emergency preparedness program.

Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8)

and (9), 10 CFR 50.54(q),Section IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50,

and the licensee's Emergency Plan.

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The inspector toured the licensee's TSC and EOF. The inspector was

! informed that the TSC had been remodeled in December 1991. The TSC was

an open area except for the News Group, Offsite Communicator, and

Radiological Assessment. In addition to the existing equipment, the

l inspector observed that the licensee had installed three new data

computers, which could be displayed on four overhean monitors, and six

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wireless communication headsets for different positions. Five of the  !

headsets had two-way communications capability and one headset had  ;

listen-only capability. The ERDS terminals in the TSC and E0F were  !

l successfully accessed and immediately available for use. In the TSC, l

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the inspector observed a licensee representative perform an offsite dose  !

calculation using the dose computer. The licensee provided l

documentation that indicated the dose assessment program (Mesorem) had  ;

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been compared with the State of North Carolina and the NRC's dose 1

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! assessment program and that the program test results were comparable.

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The licensee also provided documentation that indicated the newest

version of Mesorem was validated on November 18, 1991, by comparing

l eleven test cases to the previous version of Mesorem (April 1990), and

! manual calculations.

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l The licensee stated that they also conducted Augmentation Drills on

l December 17, 1991 and December 9, 1992, and met the 45 minute and

l 75 minute activation times. The licensee provided documentation

indicating that they performed the drills. The inspector reviewed this

documentation and concluded the licensee did not document the activation

times or maintain documentation to support the times. The importance of

supporting documentation was discussed with the licensee representative. ,

The Emergency Planning Manager stated they would improve their )

documentation in the future.

The licensee had numerous procedures for maintaining the emergency

facilities and equipment. Periodic test PT/0/A/4600/79, tested

emergency response equipment and was performed monthly, quarterl.v, and

annually in the TSC and E0F. Periodic test PT/0/A/4600/84, testcad  ;

Communication equipment in the EOF. Periodic test PT/0/A/4600/06,

l tracked the required drills and drill items. Based on the inspector's !

review the of this documentation, prompt corrective actions were

undertaken when equipment deficiencies were identified.

The inspector also reviewed four different test procedures and results

associated with the TSC Emergency Ventilation System:

  • PT/0/B/4450/01F, VH System HEPA and Carbon Absorber Filters Test
  • PT/0/B/4450/12F, VH Filter Train Air Flow Measurement

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PT/0/B/4450/15F, VH Filter Package Visual Inspection

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PT/0/0/4450/29, VH System Performance Test

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The tests were conduced on a staggered 18 month cycle. The test data

points monitored the D/Ps across the Pre-Filters, HEPA Filters, Charcoal

Filters, Final Filter and Total Filter D/P, TSC/outside D/P, and the

system airflow. The inspector concluded that the TSC Emergency

Ventilation System was being adequately maintained, i

The inspector toured the OSC. The OSC had been relocated to the 775'  !

elevation of the Auxiliary Building. The area was spacious and well l

organized. The inspector noted that the OSC had numerous personal ,

computers and communication equipment that would aid in accessing plant '

information during an event. l

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The inspector reviewed quarterly inventory records from June 1992 to j

June 1993, for the various emergency kits. The inspector also observed i

a licensee representative inventory several emergency kits using  !

procedures:

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PT/0/A/4600/llA, " Environmental Survey Check list Radiation

Protection Vehicle"

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PT/0/A/4600/110, " Personnel Survey Kits Training and Tech. Ctr.

Evacuation Facility Check List"

Based on review the inspectors review of records and observation of the

licensee's inventory of several emergency kits, the inspector concluded

that the licensee was properly maintaining the emergency equipment.

The ANS consisted of 53 fixed sirens in four counties: 26 in Mecklenburg

' County,10.in Gaston County,13 in Lincoln County, and 4 in Iredell

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County. Siren testing consisted of a bi-weekly silent test of sirens

that was conducted by the counties, a weekly low growl test conducted by

Duke Power, and

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full system activation that was performed quarterly by

the county E0Cs. The quarterly testing was performed under the

jurisdiction of the respective county emergency management agency, and

test results were forwarded to the licensee. Documentation indicated

t that siren system operability was 95 percent in 1991, and 98 percent in

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The inspector reviewed documentation indicating that the licensee

maintained 82 tone alert radios. The radios are intended for special

facilities where there may be concentrations of per:cns who would be i

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highly unlikely to hear the sirens or where the persons are likely to '

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slowed. special care during an evacuation such that the evacuation might be

The tone alert radios were under the control of the county E0C.

- The tone alert radios could be activate in conjunction with the

emergency sirens (ANS) or as a separate system.

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The inspector concluded that the emergency response facilities and

emergency equipment were appropriately maintained. No violations or

deviations were identified.  !

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4. Organization and Management Control (82701)

This area was inspected to determine the effects of any changes in the

licensee's emergency' organization and/or management control systems on  :

the emergency preparedness program, and to verify that any such I

changes were properly factored into the Emergency Plan and EPIPs.  :

Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) l

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and (16),Section IV.A of Appendix E,to 10 CFR Part 50, and the-

licensee's Emergency Plan.

The Emergency Planning Staff had increased by two specialists and a

dedicated office assistant. - The EP staff, prior to a reorganization,

reported to a Section head who reported to the Station Manager Now,

the EP staff reports to the Safety Assurance Manager who reports to the

McGuire' Site Vice President.

The licensee appointed a new' Emergency Planning Manager in August 1991. l

The inspector reviewed the. qualifications of new Emergency Planning

Manager.and_ concluded that she possessed the professional knowledge to

maintain the licensee's Emergency Preparedness program.

The organizational structure of the ERO had changed since the last

inspection. In August 1992, the current site ERO and programs were

implemented. The new ERO and programs incorporated the Crisis

Management Plan and emergency response functions previously performed in

the Corporate Office into the site program. Each site was given total

responsibility for Emergency Planning and facilities.

After reviewing the licensee's reorganization, the 'i.e.intenance of the

, facility, and the_ emphasis placed on the emergency preparedness drills,

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the inspector concluded that management was involved in and supportive

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.of the Emergency Preparedness Program. No violations or deviations were

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5. Independent Review / Audits (82701)

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This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee had performed

l an independent review audit of the emergency preparedness program, and

l- whether the licensee had a corrective action system for deficiencies and

[ weaknesses identified during exercises'and drills. Requirements

L applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.54(t) and the licensee's

Emergency Plan.

The inspector reviewed two audit reports, "CM-91-01" dated January 29,

1992'and "CM-92-Ol" dated December 14, 1992. Audit report CM-92-01

reviewed General Office Support, Site Emergency Plans and various plant

, . Implementing Procedures, Equipment (Communications, Monitoring,

L Alerting), Emergency Drills, Exercises, and Critiques, Siren Systems,

l Document Control, Training, and State and County Interface.

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Audit report CH-92-01 conducted November 16, 1992 to December 8, 1992,

listed three auditors. Based on review of the report and discussion

with licensee representatives, the inspector concluded that what

appeared to be a three person team

a six day audit done by one person., three week audit was, in actuality,

Although the audit report lacked detail in the individual subject areas,

the inspector concluded that the program coverage of the audit met the

minimum requirements identified in 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspector

verified that the audit findings were being tracked and adequately

resolved by the Emergency Preparedness organization.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's programs and tracking list for

follow-up of findings from audits, drills, and exercises. The inspector

concluded that the licensee was responsive in addressing and completing

identified items.

The inspector reviewed a matrix that tracked the licensee performance of

the major elements of the Plan within a five year period as stated in

the EP. The inspector did not identify any deficiencies.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Training (82701)

This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's key

emergency response personnel were properly trained and understood their

emergency responsibilities. Requirements applicable to this area are

contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and (15),Section IV.E of Appendix E to

10 CFR Part 50, and the licensee's Emergency Plan.

The inspector reviewed Section N, " Exercises and Drills" of the REP.

Section N discussed Exercises, Augmentation, Fire, Medical Emergency,

Radiological Monitoring, and Radiation Protection Drills, their

execution, critique and action item follow-up. The inspector reviewed

documentation that indicated the licensee activates the TSC, OSC and EOF

using a simulator-driven scenario each quarter. The inspector review of

the licensee'sofdrill

requirements results

Section N ofindicated

the REP. that the licensee exceeded the

The inspector reviewed the EP training program for site personnel.

Initial training for EP was conducted in a classroom environment.

Starting in August 1992, requalification was a self-study handout. The

Emergency Planning Manager conducted individual annual Communicator and

Data Coordinator Training in the TSC, E0F and CR and classroom annual

licensed and non-licensed operator Emergency Preparedness Overview

classroom training. The Radiation Protection Section conducted training

for Dose Assessment personnel, Field Monitoring Teams and the Radio

Operators. The licensee stated that they are planning to upgrade the EP

training program and are currently looking at other EP training programs

in the industry.

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The inspector reviewed the EP Training tracking system. The training

records were computerized and personnel training status was tracked by

the licensee. The system listed each individual's name and the date

they completed each training course.

The Emergency Plan requires members of the ERO to have the Emergency

Planning Overview Training and retraining on an annual basis. The

licensee procedures allowed a three months extension to their required

training date before the member was considered unqualified. The

inspector reviewed a weekly computer print out of Emergency Planning ,

Overview Training Dates to verify ERO members training was being

maintained up-to-date. The inspector identified 22 members that had

exceeded their required training date by more than three months. The

inspector concluded that the majority of the expired training members

were a result of merging the Corporate ERO training into the McGuire ERO

training. In a telecon on August 18, 1993, the licensee was informed

that this item would be identified as a URI pending verification that

the individuals with expired training were maintained on the site duty

roster. The inspecter also noted that the issue of 16 percent of the

ERO members with expired training were previously identified in EP audit

report CM-92-01, dated December 1992.

URI 50-369, 370/93-10-03: Maintaining Emergency Preparedness training

current.

The inspector accessed the computer training records for the respiratory

qualification of 33 ERO personnel. Eleven of the 3? members checked by

the inspector had expired respirator qualification. The inspector noted

lesson plan SA-MN-EP-OlS, "EP Overview," Section 1.2, " Emergency i

Response Organization Member Responsibilities Include: Basic Respiratory

Protection Training." The licensee emphasized to the inspector that

SA-MN-EP-OlS was a lesson plan. The licensee stated that to maintain

respirator qualifications, the individual was required to be trained in

use of the respirator, the individual also was required to have a

medical physical examination and be fit tested. The licensee stated

that they are evaluating who actually needs to be respirator qualified

verses having all members respirator qualified. The licensee was

informed that identification of ERO members needing respirator

qualifications would be tracked as an Inspector Follow-up Item.

IFI 50-369, 370/93-10-04: Respirator qualifications for ERO members.

The inspector verified through documentation that all qualified

Emergency Coordinators and Emergency Directors had participated in

drills in their respective positions since the last inspection.

The inspector reviewed documentation that indicated the licensee was I

meeting their commitment to offsite training as stated in Section 0.1,

"Offsite Agency Training." Documentation was reviewed for:

  • Carolinas Medical Center, February 17-19,1992

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Gilead Volunteer Fire Department (Primary), October 5,1992

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1993, May 10-12, 1993

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l One URI and one IFI were identified.

7. Exit Interview

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! The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 25, 1993, with

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those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. One licensee representative

although he agreed with the inspectors observations, questioned the

l inspectors comments concerning audit report CM-92-01 (discussed in

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Paragraph 6). On August 18, 1993, a teleconference was held between

licensee management and NRC management to further discuss the technical

issues in this report. Licensee management was informed that the issues

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maintaining training current would be identified as unresolved pending

additional NRC evaluation. Licensee management was also informed of the

violation for failure to properly implement their Emergency Plan. No

proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection.

Item Number Description and Reference

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50-369,370/93-10-01 URI - Notification of the NRC within 30 days of

a procedure change in accordance with

10 CFR 50 Appendix E.V (Paragraph 2).

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50-369,370/93-10-02 VIO - Failure to properly classify a loss of

offsite power as a NOUE (Paragraph 2).

50-369,370/93-10-03 URI - Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

training current (Paragraph 6).

50-369,370/93-10-04 IFI - Specify which ERO positions require '

respirator qualification (Paragraph 6).

8. Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report

ANS Alert and Notification System

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

D/P- Differential Pressure

EAL Emergency Action Level

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EOC Emergency Operations Center

l E0F Emergency Operating Facility

E0P Emergency Operating Procedure

EP Emergency Preparedness ,

EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure '

EPZ Emergency Planning Zone

ERDS Emergency Response Data System

ERF Emergency Response Facility

-

.

12

ER0

IFI

IN

KV

Inspector Follow-Up ItemEmergency Response O

Information

Kilo Volt Notice

NOUE

0AC

OP Operator Aid ComputerNotification Of Unusual Event

OSC Chemistry Procedure

PAG

Operational Support Center

PAR

REP Protective Action Guideline

RP

SRO

Radiological Emergency PlanProtective Action Re

Response Procedure

SI Senior Reactor Operator

TS Safety Injection

TSC Technical Specification

URI Technical Support Center

VIO Unresolved Item

Violation

,

s