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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217L7681999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-12 on 990822-1002.Four Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy RBG-45125, Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operating Licensing Exams1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operating Licensing Exams ML20217J3751999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Applicable Portions of NEDC-32778P, Safety Analysis Rept for River Bend 5% Power Uprate, Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) IR 05000458/19990071999-10-0505 October 1999 Refers to Util Ltr Re Apparent Violations Described in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07 Issued on 990804 & Forwards Nov.Insp Described Two Apparent Violations Related to River Bend Station Division I EDG RBG-45123, Informs That Error Reported to NRC by GE on 990630 Resulted from Changes to SAFER Code Models Counter Current Flow Limiting (Ccfl) in Upper Part of Fuel Bundle at Upper Tie Plate (Utp).No Changes in SAR or COLR Required1999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That Error Reported to NRC by GE on 990630 Resulted from Changes to SAFER Code Models Counter Current Flow Limiting (Ccfl) in Upper Part of Fuel Bundle at Upper Tie Plate (Utp).No Changes in SAR or COLR Required RBG-45124, Suppl to 990907 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Info to Address Specific Requests in 990920 Conference Call Re DG Assessment Completion Dates for Corrective Actions & DG Maint Rule (a)(1) Status,Encl1999-09-24024 September 1999 Suppl to 990907 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Info to Address Specific Requests in 990920 Conference Call Re DG Assessment Completion Dates for Corrective Actions & DG Maint Rule (a)(1) Status,Encl RBG-45122, Forwards Rev 3 to RBS COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle, IAW TS 5.6.5 of App a of FOL NPF-471999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to RBS COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle, IAW TS 5.6.5 of App a of FOL NPF-47 RBG-45113, Clarifies Statement Contained in NRC SER for Licensing RBS, Per Error That Became Evident During Plant Fire Protection Functional Insp1999-09-21021 September 1999 Clarifies Statement Contained in NRC SER for Licensing RBS, Per Error That Became Evident During Plant Fire Protection Functional Insp ML20212D8901999-09-16016 September 1999 Discusses 6 Month Review of Plant Midcycle Ppr.Advises of Plans for Future Insp Activities.Forwards Historical Listing of Plant Issues,Referred to as PIM ML20216F7881999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-10 on 990830-990903.No Violations Noted.Insp Covered Licensed Operators Requalification Training Program & Observation of Requalification Activities 05000458/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-02,revising Previous Rept Dtd 981005, Submitted to Clarify Reported Condition & to Incorporate Final Root Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Plan for Event.Complete Rev & No Change Bars Used in Documents1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards LER 98-003-02,revising Previous Rept Dtd 981005, Submitted to Clarify Reported Condition & to Incorporate Final Root Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Plan for Event.Complete Rev & No Change Bars Used in Documents ML20211Q7721999-09-0909 September 1999 Expresses Appreciation for ,In Response to NRC 990702 Re Denial of Notice of Violation Cited in Concerning Insp Rept 50-458/98-16.Reply Found to Be Responsive to Concerns Raised in NOV RBG-45109, Provides Comments on Reactor Vessel Integrity Database. Requests That Data Be Corrected as Noted1999-09-0808 September 1999 Provides Comments on Reactor Vessel Integrity Database. Requests That Data Be Corrected as Noted ML20211Q3921999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-08 on 990711-0821.One Violation Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20211Q5541999-09-0808 September 1999 Discusses Meeting Conducted on 990830 in St Francisville,La Re Overall Performance Issues During 990403-0703 Refueling/ Maintenance Outage.Due to Proprietary Nature of Some Subject Matters,Meeting Closed to Public.Attendance List Encl ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) RBG-45095, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Corrective Actions:Fuel Pump Coupling Was Reworked Using Loctite & Division I DG Was Returned to Operable Status1999-09-0707 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Corrective Actions:Fuel Pump Coupling Was Reworked Using Loctite & Division I DG Was Returned to Operable Status RBG-45097, Requests Approval of Proposed Alternative to Second Interval Inservice Testing Program,Allowing One Time Extension of Test Interval for 20% of Full Set Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests Approval of Proposed Alternative to Second Interval Inservice Testing Program,Allowing One Time Extension of Test Interval for 20% of Full Set Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves RBG-45094, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-16 Between 990720 & 0807.Corrective Actions:River Bend Will Submit Changes Associated with Lcn 15.06-006 & Accompanying Evaluation1999-08-25025 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-16 Between 990720 & 0807.Corrective Actions:River Bend Will Submit Changes Associated with Lcn 15.06-006 & Accompanying Evaluation ML20211E2071999-08-23023 August 1999 Discusses Insp Rept 50-458/99-07 in Which 2 Violations Were Identified & Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Response Should Be Submitted Under Oath or Affirmation ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 RBG-45093, Forwards FFD six-month Program Performance Data Rept for Rept Period 990101 Through 990630,containing Statistical Data & Trend Analysis Compiled by FFD Dept1999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards FFD six-month Program Performance Data Rept for Rept Period 990101 Through 990630,containing Statistical Data & Trend Analysis Compiled by FFD Dept ML20211A9291999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-11 on 990719-23.Areas Examined Included Portions of Licensee Physical Security Program. No Violations Noted ML20210T8881999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Replacement Pages 9-18 for Insp Rept 50-458/99-09, Issued on 990730 IR 05000458/19980101999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards Summary of 990805 Mgt Meeting with Licensee in Arlington,Tx Re Radiological Control Problems Noted in Insp Repts 50-458/98-10 & 50-458/99-04.With Attendance List & Licensee Presentation ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210U3751999-08-12012 August 1999 Informs That Info Contained in Presentation, River Bend Station Fuel Recovery Project,Dtd 990622, Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure Pursuant to 10CFR2.790(b)(5) & Section 103(b) of Atomic Energy Act of 1954,as Amended ML20210Q7691999-08-11011 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Licensee River Bend Individual Plant Exam External Events,Under GL 88-20,suppl 4,dtd 910628 ML20210R4591999-08-10010 August 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Transmitted Plant Emergency Plan,Rev 20 Under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section V.Nrc Approval Not Required,Based on Determination That Changes Does Not Decrease Effectiveness of EP ML20210N1641999-08-0404 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-07 on 990530-0710.One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as NCV, Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20210K4641999-08-0303 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 180-day Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Power-Operated Gate Valves, Issued on 950817 ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210K1351999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-09 on 990510-28 with in-office Insp Until 990701.Three Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20210J9691999-07-30030 July 1999 Discusses 990719 Meeting with Util in Arlington,Tx Re Region IV Staff Findings of Root Cause Investigation Into Fuel Cladding Failures That Occurred During Recent Cycle 8 Operation.List of Attendees & Organization Chart Encl RBG-45072, Submits Final Response to GL 94-02, Long-Term Solution & Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal- Hydraulic Instabilities in Bwrs. Ltr Documents Completion of Reporting Requirements Contained in Subject GL1999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Final Response to GL 94-02, Long-Term Solution & Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal- Hydraulic Instabilities in Bwrs. Ltr Documents Completion of Reporting Requirements Contained in Subject GL ML20210E9001999-07-23023 July 1999 Informs That as Result of Staff Review of Licensee Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 Rai,Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 RBG-45073, Requests Withholding of Info Presented in 990719 Meeting of EOI & NRC Region IV Re Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles During 1999 RFO at Rbs.Affidavit Executed IAW Provisions of 10CFR2.790(b)(1),encl1999-07-20020 July 1999 Requests Withholding of Info Presented in 990719 Meeting of EOI & NRC Region IV Re Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles During 1999 RFO at Rbs.Affidavit Executed IAW Provisions of 10CFR2.790(b)(1),encl RBG-45071, Forwards Rev 2 to River Bend COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle,Iaw TS 5.6.5 of App A.Affected Pages of GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept, May 1999 Submittal & List of Effective Pages,Encl1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to River Bend COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle,Iaw TS 5.6.5 of App A.Affected Pages of GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept, May 1999 Submittal & List of Effective Pages,Encl 05000458/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-01,IAW 10CFR50.73.Supplemental Rept Details Root Cause Analysis for Reported Condition. Commitments in Document Annotated on Commitment Identifier Form,Attachment 11999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-01,IAW 10CFR50.73.Supplemental Rept Details Root Cause Analysis for Reported Condition. Commitments in Document Annotated on Commitment Identifier Form,Attachment 1 ML20196L0501999-07-0606 July 1999 Informs That NRC Insp Rept 50-458/99-03 Issued on 990519 with Errors in Tracking Numbers Assigned to Seven Noncited Violations & Error Re Actual Location of SRO During Refueling Activities.Revised Pages 2 & 4 Encl ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl ML20196K6851999-06-30030 June 1999 Ack Receipt of & Denial of NOV in Response to Transmitting NOV & Insp Rept 50-458/98-16.Listed Info Documents Results of Review of Response to Violation Re fire-induced Circuit Faults ML20196K0671999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-04 on 990412-16 & 28-29.Five Violations of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violations,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy.Meeting Scheduled for 990726 RBG-45048, Forwards Rev 1 to Rbs,Cycle 9 COLR, IAW TS 5.6.5 of License NPF-47.GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept,Dtd May 1999, Is Included.Without GE Rept1999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Rbs,Cycle 9 COLR, IAW TS 5.6.5 of License NPF-47.GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept,Dtd May 1999, Is Included.Without GE Rept RBG-45047, Informs of Util Expectation to Complete Review of Final Rept Supporting Power Uprate & Submits TS Changes in Jul 1999,per Licensee to NRC Re Increasing Power Output1999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs of Util Expectation to Complete Review of Final Rept Supporting Power Uprate & Submits TS Changes in Jul 1999,per Licensee to NRC Re Increasing Power Output ML20196H5171999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Withholding of Info Being Presented in Meeting of Entergy,General Electric & NRC Staff.Licensee Requested Meeting with NRC to Present Info on Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles.W/Affidavit 05000458/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,IAW 10CFR73.Commitments Contained in Document Identified on Commitment Identification Form1999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,IAW 10CFR73.Commitments Contained in Document Identified on Commitment Identification Form RBG-45035, Requests That Encl RBS Fuel Recovery Info Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per Provisions of 10CFR2.790(a)(4).Info Is Being Presented at Meeting to Discuss Recent Anomalous Conditions Found.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests That Encl RBS Fuel Recovery Info Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per Provisions of 10CFR2.790(a)(4).Info Is Being Presented at Meeting to Discuss Recent Anomalous Conditions Found.Proprietary Info Withheld ML20196E0601999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-458/99-05 on 990418-29.Four Violations Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations 05000458/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARRBG-45125, Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operating Licensing Exams1999-10-18018 October 1999 Forwards Voluntary Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03, Preparation & Scheduling of Operating Licensing Exams RBG-45123, Informs That Error Reported to NRC by GE on 990630 Resulted from Changes to SAFER Code Models Counter Current Flow Limiting (Ccfl) in Upper Part of Fuel Bundle at Upper Tie Plate (Utp).No Changes in SAR or COLR Required1999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That Error Reported to NRC by GE on 990630 Resulted from Changes to SAFER Code Models Counter Current Flow Limiting (Ccfl) in Upper Part of Fuel Bundle at Upper Tie Plate (Utp).No Changes in SAR or COLR Required RBG-45124, Suppl to 990907 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Info to Address Specific Requests in 990920 Conference Call Re DG Assessment Completion Dates for Corrective Actions & DG Maint Rule (a)(1) Status,Encl1999-09-24024 September 1999 Suppl to 990907 Response to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Info to Address Specific Requests in 990920 Conference Call Re DG Assessment Completion Dates for Corrective Actions & DG Maint Rule (a)(1) Status,Encl RBG-45122, Forwards Rev 3 to RBS COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle, IAW TS 5.6.5 of App a of FOL NPF-471999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to RBS COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle, IAW TS 5.6.5 of App a of FOL NPF-47 RBG-45113, Clarifies Statement Contained in NRC SER for Licensing RBS, Per Error That Became Evident During Plant Fire Protection Functional Insp1999-09-21021 September 1999 Clarifies Statement Contained in NRC SER for Licensing RBS, Per Error That Became Evident During Plant Fire Protection Functional Insp 05000458/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-02,revising Previous Rept Dtd 981005, Submitted to Clarify Reported Condition & to Incorporate Final Root Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Plan for Event.Complete Rev & No Change Bars Used in Documents1999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards LER 98-003-02,revising Previous Rept Dtd 981005, Submitted to Clarify Reported Condition & to Incorporate Final Root Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Plan for Event.Complete Rev & No Change Bars Used in Documents RBG-45109, Provides Comments on Reactor Vessel Integrity Database. Requests That Data Be Corrected as Noted1999-09-0808 September 1999 Provides Comments on Reactor Vessel Integrity Database. Requests That Data Be Corrected as Noted RBG-45095, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Corrective Actions:Fuel Pump Coupling Was Reworked Using Loctite & Division I DG Was Returned to Operable Status1999-09-0707 September 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/99-07.Corrective Actions:Fuel Pump Coupling Was Reworked Using Loctite & Division I DG Was Returned to Operable Status ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) RBG-45097, Requests Approval of Proposed Alternative to Second Interval Inservice Testing Program,Allowing One Time Extension of Test Interval for 20% of Full Set Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves1999-08-31031 August 1999 Requests Approval of Proposed Alternative to Second Interval Inservice Testing Program,Allowing One Time Extension of Test Interval for 20% of Full Set Main Steam Line Safety Relief Valves RBG-45094, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-16 Between 990720 & 0807.Corrective Actions:River Bend Will Submit Changes Associated with Lcn 15.06-006 & Accompanying Evaluation1999-08-25025 August 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-16 Between 990720 & 0807.Corrective Actions:River Bend Will Submit Changes Associated with Lcn 15.06-006 & Accompanying Evaluation ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 RBG-45093, Forwards FFD six-month Program Performance Data Rept for Rept Period 990101 Through 990630,containing Statistical Data & Trend Analysis Compiled by FFD Dept1999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards FFD six-month Program Performance Data Rept for Rept Period 990101 Through 990630,containing Statistical Data & Trend Analysis Compiled by FFD Dept RBG-45072, Submits Final Response to GL 94-02, Long-Term Solution & Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal- Hydraulic Instabilities in Bwrs. Ltr Documents Completion of Reporting Requirements Contained in Subject GL1999-07-23023 July 1999 Submits Final Response to GL 94-02, Long-Term Solution & Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal- Hydraulic Instabilities in Bwrs. Ltr Documents Completion of Reporting Requirements Contained in Subject GL RBG-45073, Requests Withholding of Info Presented in 990719 Meeting of EOI & NRC Region IV Re Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles During 1999 RFO at Rbs.Affidavit Executed IAW Provisions of 10CFR2.790(b)(1),encl1999-07-20020 July 1999 Requests Withholding of Info Presented in 990719 Meeting of EOI & NRC Region IV Re Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles During 1999 RFO at Rbs.Affidavit Executed IAW Provisions of 10CFR2.790(b)(1),encl RBG-45071, Forwards Rev 2 to River Bend COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle,Iaw TS 5.6.5 of App A.Affected Pages of GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept, May 1999 Submittal & List of Effective Pages,Encl1999-07-19019 July 1999 Forwards Rev 2 to River Bend COLR for Ninth Fuel Cycle,Iaw TS 5.6.5 of App A.Affected Pages of GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept, May 1999 Submittal & List of Effective Pages,Encl 05000458/LER-1999-002, Forwards LER 99-002-01,IAW 10CFR50.73.Supplemental Rept Details Root Cause Analysis for Reported Condition. Commitments in Document Annotated on Commitment Identifier Form,Attachment 11999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-002-01,IAW 10CFR50.73.Supplemental Rept Details Root Cause Analysis for Reported Condition. Commitments in Document Annotated on Commitment Identifier Form,Attachment 1 ML20209B6081999-06-30030 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Encl RBG-45047, Informs of Util Expectation to Complete Review of Final Rept Supporting Power Uprate & Submits TS Changes in Jul 1999,per Licensee to NRC Re Increasing Power Output1999-06-29029 June 1999 Informs of Util Expectation to Complete Review of Final Rept Supporting Power Uprate & Submits TS Changes in Jul 1999,per Licensee to NRC Re Increasing Power Output RBG-45048, Forwards Rev 1 to Rbs,Cycle 9 COLR, IAW TS 5.6.5 of License NPF-47.GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept,Dtd May 1999, Is Included.Without GE Rept1999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Rbs,Cycle 9 COLR, IAW TS 5.6.5 of License NPF-47.GE Suppl Reload Licensing Rept,Dtd May 1999, Is Included.Without GE Rept ML20196H5171999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests Withholding of Info Being Presented in Meeting of Entergy,General Electric & NRC Staff.Licensee Requested Meeting with NRC to Present Info on Recent Anomalous Conditions Found During Insp of Fuel Bundles.W/Affidavit RBG-45035, Requests That Encl RBS Fuel Recovery Info Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per Provisions of 10CFR2.790(a)(4).Info Is Being Presented at Meeting to Discuss Recent Anomalous Conditions Found.Proprietary Info Withheld1999-06-21021 June 1999 Requests That Encl RBS Fuel Recovery Info Be Withheld from Public Disclosure,Per Provisions of 10CFR2.790(a)(4).Info Is Being Presented at Meeting to Discuss Recent Anomalous Conditions Found.Proprietary Info Withheld 05000458/LER-1999-012, Forwards LER 99-012-00,IAW 10CFR73.Commitments Contained in Document Identified on Commitment Identification Form1999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-012-00,IAW 10CFR73.Commitments Contained in Document Identified on Commitment Identification Form 05000458/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl1999-06-0909 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl 05000458/LER-1999-010, Forwards LER 99-010-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 for River Bend Station,Unit 1 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept,Encl RBG-45021, Informs That Cycle 9 Operation Will Remain within MCPR Safety Limits Approved in Amend 105 to TS Issued by NRC in1999-05-26026 May 1999 Informs That Cycle 9 Operation Will Remain within MCPR Safety Limits Approved in Amend 105 to TS Issued by NRC in 05000458/LER-1999-009, Forwards LER 99-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Contained in Ltr Are Identified on Commitment Identification Form1999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Contained in Ltr Are Identified on Commitment Identification Form RBG-45017, Informs NRC of Addition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Code Case N-496-1 to RBS Inservice Insp Program.Commitment Made by Util,Encl1999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs NRC of Addition of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Code Case N-496-1 to RBS Inservice Insp Program.Commitment Made by Util,Encl ML20206N1921999-05-10010 May 1999 Provides Revised Attachment 2 for Alternative Request IWE-02,originally Submitted 990429 Re Bolt Torque or Tension Testing of Class Mc pressure-retaining Bolting as Specified in Item 8.20 of Article IWE-2500,Table IWE-2500-1 05000458/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in LER Are Noted in Attachment 11999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00 IAW 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in LER Are Noted in Attachment 1 05000458/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Unplanned Automatic Standby Svc Water Initiation,Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Commitments Identified in Rept Noted in Attachment 11999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Unplanned Automatic Standby Svc Water Initiation,Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Commitments Identified in Rept Noted in Attachment 1 05000458/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Identified in LER Are Noted in Attachment 11999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Identified in LER Are Noted in Attachment 1 RBG-44993, Forwards RBS Annual Individual Monitoring Rept for Jan-Dec 1998,per Requirements of 10CFR20.2206(b).File Info Listed. Without Encl1999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards RBS Annual Individual Monitoring Rept for Jan-Dec 1998,per Requirements of 10CFR20.2206(b).File Info Listed. Without Encl RBG-44998, Informs of Missing Documentation Re Examination Results Reported in RBS Owners Activity Report Forms Submitted to NRC on 9802241999-04-30030 April 1999 Informs of Missing Documentation Re Examination Results Reported in RBS Owners Activity Report Forms Submitted to NRC on 980224 ML20206E7811999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposes Alternatives to Requirements of ASME B&PV Code Section XI,1992 Edition,1992 Addenda,As Listed.Approval of Alternative Request on or Before 990915,requested 05000458/LER-1999-003, Forwards LER 99-003-00,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept Are Noted in Attachment 11999-04-23023 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Identified in Rept Are Noted in Attachment 1 RBG-44968, Submits Addl Info Re 981008 LAR 1998-02 Re Implementation of Bwrog/Ge Enhanced Option I-A (EI-A) Reactor Stability long- Term Solution.Clarifies Certain Aspects of Proposed Ts,Per 990406 Telcon with NRC1999-04-15015 April 1999 Submits Addl Info Re 981008 LAR 1998-02 Re Implementation of Bwrog/Ge Enhanced Option I-A (EI-A) Reactor Stability long- Term Solution.Clarifies Certain Aspects of Proposed Ts,Per 990406 Telcon with NRC RBG-44965, Responds to 990324 Telcon RAI Re SLMCPR Calculation Method for RBS Cycle 9 Slmcpr,Per LAR 1998-15 Re Change to TS 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Safety Limits. Proposed TS Pages, Encl1999-04-0808 April 1999 Responds to 990324 Telcon RAI Re SLMCPR Calculation Method for RBS Cycle 9 Slmcpr,Per LAR 1998-15 Re Change to TS 2.1.1.2, Reactor Core Safety Limits. Proposed TS Pages, Encl RBG-44959, Withdraws 981120 LAR 1998-20,allowing Adjusting Control Pattern for Plant Startup If Outage Had Occurred Before Planned Refueling Outage.No Plant Outage Was Conducted & Plant Is Now in Eighth Refueling Outage1999-04-0808 April 1999 Withdraws 981120 LAR 1998-20,allowing Adjusting Control Pattern for Plant Startup If Outage Had Occurred Before Planned Refueling Outage.No Plant Outage Was Conducted & Plant Is Now in Eighth Refueling Outage ML20205F1781999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Consolidated Entergy Submittal to Document Primary & Excess Property Damage Insurance Coverage for Nuclear Sites of Entergy Operations,Inc,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) RBG-44939, Forwards Rbs,Unit 1 Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, Per TS 5.6.1.Rept Consists of Tabulation of Exposure for Personnel Receiving Exposures Greater than 100 Mrem Per Yr1999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Rbs,Unit 1 Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, Per TS 5.6.1.Rept Consists of Tabulation of Exposure for Personnel Receiving Exposures Greater than 100 Mrem Per Yr ML20196K7101999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Reporting & Recordkeeping for Decommissioning Planning,Per 10CFR50.75(f)(1) RBG-44899, Provides Notification of Termination of Licensed Operator, AA Rouchon,License OP-42416-1,due to Resignation.Reactor Operator License Data,Listed1999-03-25025 March 1999 Provides Notification of Termination of Licensed Operator, AA Rouchon,License OP-42416-1,due to Resignation.Reactor Operator License Data,Listed ML20204G8701999-03-15015 March 1999 Responds to NOV Described in NRC Correspondance to Util ,expressing Disappointment in NRC Determination That AD Wells Deliberately Provided Incomplete & Inaccurate Info to NRC During Meeting on 971015 RBG-44925, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Investigation Rept 4-97-059.Corrective Actions: Mgt Expectations for Communicating with NRC Issued to Site Personnel on 980212,by RBS Vice President,Operations1999-03-15015 March 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Investigation Rept 4-97-059.Corrective Actions: Mgt Expectations for Communicating with NRC Issued to Site Personnel on 980212,by RBS Vice President,Operations RBG-44924, Informs That Util Response to NOV Re Investigation Rept 4-97-059,will Be Issued by 990315,as Extended by NRC Ltr .Encl Check for $55,000 Is for Payment of Civil Penalty IAW Instructions in .Without Check1999-03-0505 March 1999 Informs That Util Response to NOV Re Investigation Rept 4-97-059,will Be Issued by 990315,as Extended by NRC Ltr .Encl Check for $55,000 Is for Payment of Civil Penalty IAW Instructions in .Without Check RBG-44912, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-13. Corrective Actions:Matls & Training Were Provided to Expedite Implementation of Existing Procedural Guidance to Supply Compressed Air1999-03-0303 March 1999 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/98-13. Corrective Actions:Matls & Training Were Provided to Expedite Implementation of Existing Procedural Guidance to Supply Compressed Air RBG-44904, Informs NRC of Date Change Re Commitment Made in Response to NOV 50-458/98-05-01.New Commitment Date 9912161999-02-25025 February 1999 Informs NRC of Date Change Re Commitment Made in Response to NOV 50-458/98-05-01.New Commitment Date 991216 RBG-44384, Submits Response to Fuel Cladding Defect Issues Raised in 10CFR2.206 Petition.Clear Technical Basis Exists in Info Provided by River Bend Station to Deny Petition1999-02-11011 February 1999 Submits Response to Fuel Cladding Defect Issues Raised in 10CFR2.206 Petition.Clear Technical Basis Exists in Info Provided by River Bend Station to Deny Petition ML20203C4201999-01-25025 January 1999 Submits Denial of NRC Request for Advance Info Re Concerns Raised by Ucs in 10CFR2.206 Petitions on River Bend & Perry Plants.Petitioners Were Not Required to Provide NRC with Info in Advance of Informal Public Hearings 1999-09-09
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i GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY ,
i
&a , E P El htiMA.hDN POL f (.T f U.f FCF T/3 hT f MW S ol.LF LOU!5;ANA 7077$ l AFM A CO! S 604 f.M {VP44 340 br:f. I June 16, 1993 ,
RBG- 38643 l File Code No. G9.5, G15.4.1 l Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory . Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket 50-458 Inspection Repon 93-11 EA 93-060 Pursuant to 10CFR2.201, this letter provides Gulf States Utilities Company's (GSU) reply to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty for NRC Inspection Report No. 50-458/93-11 and Enforcement Action EA 93- ,
060. This inspection was conducted Febmary 25 - March 30,1993, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License NPF-47 for River Bend Station Unit 1.
The attached reply to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty addresses the violations cited by the NRC. Also, enclosed is a check for '
$50,000 in payment of the civil penalty.
Sincerely, OWS P.D. Graham Vice President River Bend Nuclear Group JEB/JPSdRII/FRC/D JMAS/kym ,
cc: Regional Administmtor >
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV
, 61i Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
/ -
Arlington, TX 76011 1,p c NRC Resident Inspector M0050 I
P.O. Box 1051 y,I k t))(h)' 1)
St. Francisville, LA 70775 g 62gg g { b o00 50 G PDR :3
]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STATE OF LOUISIANA )
PARISH OF WEST FELICIANA )
Docket No. 50-458 In the Matter of )
GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY )
(River Bend Station - Unit 1)
AFFIDAVIT Philip D. Graham, being duly sworn, states that he is a Vice President of Gulf States Utilities Company; that he is authorized-on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
--e Philip' D. Graham 1
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and Parish above named, this lloR day of QN tuu ,
19 6 . My Commission expire's with Life.
h ChhA IM Claudia F. Hurst Notary Public in and for West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana
.-a,, --e. .mga- a s. - . a,s .1- s. s. ,,a - s a f
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ATTACIIMENT REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION LEVEL III GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY RIVER BEND STATION DOCKET 50-458 LICENSE NO. NPF-47 INSPECTION REPORT 93-11 EA 93-060 >
REFERENCES i
NRC Inspection Repon 50-458/93 dated April 12, 1993 Notice of Violation - Letter from J.L. Milhoan (NRC) to P.D. Graham (GSU) dated May 21, 1993.
VIOLATIONS A. 10 CFR Section 50.59 states, in pan, that the holder of a license authorizing operation -
of a production or utilization facility may make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report, without prior commission approval, unless the propo' sed char.ge involves an unreviewed safety question. A change is deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment imponant to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis repon may be increased.'
'i The River Bend Station Updated Safety Analysis Report,' Section 3.8.2.1.3.1, Personnel Air Lock, states in pan, that the air lock doors are electrically coupled and mechanically
- interlocked, so that one door cannot be opened unless the other door is closed and sealed.
Contrary to the above, on October 25,1991, the licensee failed to perfonn an adequate safety evaluation prior to the permanent removal of the electrical interlock on the drywell ;
and containment airlock doors. The removal of the electrical interlock was a change to j the facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report and involved an i unreviewed safety question, i.e., an increase in the probability of a malfunction of the j airkxk. The change was made without prior Commission approval. l B. Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 states, in part, that each primary containment air lock shall be operable in Operational Conditions 1, 2, 3, and when irradiated fuel is being ,
handled in the primary containment and during core alterations and operations with a 6 1
9
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potential for draining the reactor vessel. Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 Action Statement b. requires, in part, with the interlock mechanism inoperable, that the licensee maintain at least one operable air lock door closed and either return the interlock to service with in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock one operable air lock door closed; and, that personnel entry and exit through the air lock is pemiitted provided cue operable air lock door remains locked at all times and an individual is dedicated to assure that two doors are not open simultaneously.
Contmry to the above, from October 1990 to March 11, 1993, with the plant in Operational Conditions 1, 2, or 3 at various times, the interlock mechanism on both containment airlock doors was inoperable because the licensee had removed power from the electrical portion, and the licensee did not return the interlock to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or lock one opemble airlock door closed or control personnel entry and exit through the containment airlock with an individual who was dedicated to assure that two doors were not open simultaneously. '
C. Technical Specification 4.6.1.4 states, in part, that each primary airlock shall be demonstrated operable at least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each airlock can be opened at a time.
Contrary to the above, from October,1990 to April,1993, the licensee did not perform a surveillance test that was adequate to verify that only one door in each airlock could be opened at a time. Surveillance Test STP-057-0401, which was used to test the safety-related containment airlock interlocks, was inadequate because the electrical ponion of the interlock was identified as optional and was not tested when de-energized.
ADMISSION OF TIIE VIOLATIQE GSU admits the violation.
REASON FOR TIIE VIOLATION On February 25,1993, it was discovered that two incidents occurred which apparently caused j the interlock mechanism in the upper containment airlock at elevation 171' to operate !
improperly. In one incident the seals on one airlock door were partially deflated while the other airlock door was not completely closed. In the other incident, the. mactor door started to equalize while the outer door was not secured and sealed. Both of these cases constituted breaches of containment. ;
The first incident occurred at 1350 on Febmary 25,1993. An individual entered the j containment airlock from the outer door, auxiliary building side. He attempted to manually close the outer airlock door from inside the airlock. He rotated the handwheel towards the "close" position, unaware that the airlock door was not seated completely in its frame.
Movement of the handwheel into the " seal" position caused the seals to innate while the airlock lI 2 I
door was still outside its frame. Additionally, the door's latch pins were extended. Movement of the handwheel to the closed position released the mechanical interlock in the reactor door.
IIowever, due to the door's position, the latch pins were not in their keepers. The individual then proceeded to attempt to open the reactor door. The reactor door handwheel was rotated towards the "open" position which initiated depressurization of the seals.
Having the seals dedated on the reactor door, while the outer door was slightly ajar, caused a momentary breach of the containment. The individual inside the airlock promptly closed and -
secured the reactor door upon being infonned by individuals on the auxiliary building side of the airlock that the outer door was not sealed properly. He opened and then properly closed and secured the outer door. STP-057-0401 " Primary Containment Airlock Door interlock Test" was performed immediately after this incident to verify operation of the mechanical interlocks.
The second incident occurred at approximately 1940 on Febmary 25, 1993. An individual entered the upper containment airlock from the auxiliary building to check radiological postings ;
within the airlock. As he entered the airlock, the outer door swung shut but the handwheel was not rotated to the closed position. The individual was in the airlock only momentarily when he heard equalizing air from the reactor door and noticed the reactor door handwheel moving as an individual was attempting to enter the airlock from the containment. This caused a momentary breach of the containment through the airlock equalizing valve. The person inside the containment physically stopped the movement of the handwheel from inside the airlock immediately after he heard the reactor door stan to equalize. He then rotated the handwheel to ,
the closed position. He secured the outer door by rotating the handwheel from the open to the closed position. The reactor door was then opened to allow the other individual to enter the airlock and the control room was immediately contacted. Maintenance work order No. R174728 was genemted by the Shift Supervisor to inspect and correct the interlock malfunction following the second incident.
As identined in the vendor's operation and maintenance manual (3219.711-056-001), the two doors, one at each end of the airlock, are designed to be mechanically interlocked so that one door cannot be opened unless the other is completely closed and scaled. When the handwheel ;
on one door is rotated to the open position, the mechanical interlock mechanism is designed to prevent opening of the opposite airlock door so that the containment cannot be breached during ,
access through the airlock.
When operating the doors manually, as identified in the vendor manual, special care must be taken by the individual when the door is in the open position. Operating instmetions are posted ;
on each airlock door identifying the proper operation of the doors in the manual and automatic l mode.
In addition to the mechanical interlock, the airlock is designed with a solenoid activated handwheel locking mechanism. The purpose of the handwheel locking mechanism is twofold.
Under complete automatic operation, with power supplied to the airlock, the handle lock solenoid mechanism functions as part of the differential pressure monitoring system. If a '
3 3
differential pressure of more than 0.5 psi exists across the airlock door, the handwheel locking mechanism is energized and for personnel safety prevents the continuation of the opening sequence until the pressure is equalized. 1 In addition to being used as a part of the differential pressure monitoring system, under automatic conditions, the handwheel locking mechanism energizes when the door is opened. This prevents rotation of the handwheel while the door is in the open position. The handle locking mechanism that prevents the handwheel from rotating when the door leaves its frame, will not function when the door is operated in the manual mode (with control power off). Movement of the handwheel to the " seal" position de-activates the mechanical interlocks. If this occurs with the door not fully closed, the seals will inflate, potentially damaging the seals and creating a personnel hazard.
The handwheel locking mechanism, which would have prevented the handwheel from mtating when the door was in the open position, was de-energized prior to the two incidents described 7 above.
Originally, the airlock doors were designed to opemte by a pushbutton which actuated a sequencing system to automatically deflate / inflate the door seals and hydmulically open/close the door. A review of modification requests (MRs) and condition reports (CRs) regarding the '
airlock interlocks indicates that since August 1985 repetitive problems have been occurring with the handle lock solenoid and the hydraulic operating system. The corrective actions implemented did not substantially reduce the airlock problems.
In August,1986, CR No. 86-1296 was generated to address a condition in the upper containment airlock (lJRB*DRAl) in which the outer airlock door was ajar with the seals inflated and the inner door was opened. This condition existed for approximately two minutes. As a result of this incident, MR No. 86-1438 was generated to relocate the door's open/close limit switch from the door hinge to above the door frame. Note that this limit switch controls the actuation of the handwheel locking mechanism. The purpose of this MR was to ensure the reliable operation of the handwhccl locking mechanism. Modification request (MR) 86-1438 stated that the testing of the handwheel locking mechanism (electrical interlock) shall be included in STP-057-0401, .
" Primary Containment Door Interlock Test." The STP was revised in accordance with the MR; however, it indicated that the testing of the handwheel locking mechanism is not Technical Specification - related and is only applicable when power is supplied to the airlock. The unreviewed safety question determination (USQD) generated for the MR indicated that the handwheel locking mechanism was not safety related. In addition, the USQD did not indicate that the handwheel locking mechanism was required for the safe and reliable operation of the airlock interlock. system to ensure that the Technical Speci0 cation requin:ments for the interlock are met. The 1986 review of the design requirements versus the licensing basis was inadequate.
In October,1990 four people were trapped inside the Upper Containment Airlock (1JRB*DRA1) after the airlock doors were locked up in the closed position and the handle lock solenoid started smoking and burning (Ref. CR 90-0934). As a result of this incident, a decision was made to 4
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disconnect the electrical power as well as the automatic hydraulic operating system and opemte the doors manually. The solenoid activated handwheel locking mechanism which would have ,
prevented the handwheel from rotating when the door was in the open position was de-energized when the electrical power was disconnected.
Repetitive operational and maintenance problems associated with the handle lock solenoid and hydraulic system led to the decision to disconnect the electrical power supply and opemte the doors manually. The basis for this decision was as follows:
. The design of the doors enabled them to be operated in the manual mode with the power on or off.
The airlock doors were designed to be mechanically interlocked so that one door could not be opened unless the other is completely closed and sealed. When one door is open, the mechanical interlock mechanism is designed to lock the opposite airlock door so that the containment cannot be breached during access through the airlock. Regardless of the condition of the power supply to the airlock and the mode of operation the mechanical interlock-system was designed to prevent breaching of the containment. The mechanical interlock relies on proper manual operation of the door.
. The electrical equipment including the handwheel locking mechanism is non-safety related.
. As part of the disposition of CR 90-0934, the design requirements were reviewed +
against the licensing basis. The USAR indicated that both doors are mechanically latched and hydraulically swung. The USAR also stated that the doors are interlocked such that, in the event one door is open, the other cannot be actuated. ;
It also stated that in the event of a power failure, it is possible to operate the airlocks manually. Consistent with the design, the engineer interpreted the USAR to mean that the airlocks could be manually operated during nonnal plant opemtion and not just during a power failure. He believed that the USAR sections did not prohibit or restrict the operation of the doors in a manual mode.
- However, NS AC 125 " Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations" indicates that changing the function of a structure, system or component from automatic to manual operation could be considered as a change to the facility as described in -
the Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the 10CFR50.59 evaluation OSEE) for CR 90-0934 was not perfonned in accordance with the guidance of NSAC 125 as identified in engineering procedure ENG-3-004, " Safety and Environmental Evaluations."
4 Based on the above the mechanical interlock alone was considered sufficient for the continued operation of the airlock and maintaining containment integrity while the airlock was being used ,
in either an automatic or manual mode. l l
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After the decision was made to climinate the electrical power and operate the airlock doors manually a modification request was initiated to remove the components exclusively associated with automatic operation. Since the airlocks were designed to operate in the manual mode, the modification request was not considered to be essential for the continued operation of the airlocks in the manual mode, but rather was considered to be an enhancement to the design configuration of the airlocks. Therefore, when it appeared that the configuration of the plant should be changed, a timely design change was not implemented.
A review of maintenance work orders (MWOs) indicates that since 1985 corrective and preventative maintenance on the airlocks was not given adequate priority to restore them to their original design mode (i.e., automatic operation). It appears that maintenance was not provided t to the extent necessary to preclude handle lock solenoid and hydraulic system problems.
Therefore, adequate management attention to long standing equipment maintenance problems was not applied. Frequent discussions with the airlock vendor indicate that the airlock was designed for about 2000 cycles per year; however, the airlocks at RBS are cycled more than 2000 times in one month.
The root cause of this event consists of five causal factors. as detennined by a cause and effect task analysis:
- 1) The original design was inadequate for the level of service at RBS.
- 2) The 1986 review of the design requirements versus the licensing basis was inadequate.
- 3) The 10CFR50.59 cvaluation (ISEE) for CR 90-0934 was not performed in accordance with the guidance of NSAC 125 as identified in engineering procedure ENG-3-004,
" Safety and Environmental Evaluations."
- 4) When it appeared that the configuration of the plant should be changed, a timely design change was not implemented.
- 5) Adequate management attention to long standing equipment maintenance problems was not applied.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TIIAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND TIIE RESULTS ACIIIEVED Upon identifying the first incident, STP-057-0401 " Primary Containment Airlock DoorInterlock Test" was perfonned to verify operation of the mechanical interlocks. Maintenance Work Order No. R174728 was generated by the Shift Supervisor to inspect the interlock malfunction following the second incident. As a compensatory measure, GSU took actions consistent with the Action Statement of TS 3.6.1.4, " Primary Containment Airlocks."
Prompt modification request (PMR)93-009 has been completed. The handwheel lock solenoid has been modified to energize directly from the airlock door open/close limit switches during 6
l l
l
manual operation of the door, with control power supplied to the airlock. This will prohibit movement of the door handwheel when the door is outside its frame. This change ensures that the mechanical interlocks are maintained even if an attempt is made to misoperate the equipment.
In addition, prohibiting movement of the handwheel will ensure that the seals are not inflated when the door is open, which could result in personal injury and/or damage to the seals.
To ensure safe and proper operation of the airlock doors, detailed operating instructions were posted at each airlock door as required by PMR 93-0009. These instructions contain appropriate caution statements warning individuals of the potential personnel injury consequences of improper operation of the door.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TIIAT WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTIIER VIOLATIONS A high perfonnance team has been organized to thoroughly review the airlock design. With .
assistance froa the airlock vendor this team will perfonn a detailed design review of the River Bend airlocks. This design review will concentrate on the past and present airlock design, operational and maintenance problems. Following evaluation, necessary modifications of the airlocks will be initiated to enhance their perfonnance. These modiGcations will be implemented no later than the Rfth refueling outage (RF-5).
Several corrective actions were identified during the enforcement conference with the NRC Region IV on April 21, 1993 and in subsequent discussions with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. A case study training class using the details of the airlock incidents has been developed to provide additional training and guidance in the performance of 10CFR50.59 evaluations. This training has been provided to all appropriate personnel in the Engineering Department as well as numerous individuals in other departments. Other individuals on site who !
are qualified to perfonn 10CFR50.59 evaluation reviews and those who review dispositions of condition repons will be provided with this case study training as well. The expected completion date for this additional training is September 1,1993. In addition, clarification will be provided in the procedures related to 10CFR50.59 evaluation to reflect conclusions from the training session.
Previous 10CFR50.59 evaluations will be reviewed for conditions similar to the airlock situation.
This review will encompass modification requests (MR) and condition reports (CR) that have been completed since 1985. If similar conditions are identified, the 10CFR50.59 evaluation will be reviewed in detail and, if necessary, re-performed using the guidance provided by the case study training. The initial reviews of the CRs and MRs are expected to be complete by July 31, 1993. Depending on the quantity of additional 10CFR50.59 evaluations required it is expected that they will also be completed by July 31, 1993. Included in this completion of additional 10CFR50.59 evaluations will be engineering correspondence that in the past has provided guidance to operations on various operating scenarios in the plant.
A review has been perfonned of all outstanding maintenance work orders (MWO) to identify any items of potential concern that should be reviewed under 10CFR50.59. Fourteen items were 7
.. w',
- 5 identified that require further review. These reviews will also be completed by the July 31, 1993 date. hiaintenance is developing an upgraded work control program that will incorporate this type of review for degraded conditions and potential safety implications that may mquire a 10CFR50.59 evaluation. The expected implementation date for the upgraded work control program is July 31,1993.
In order to reduce the rate of usage of the airlocks, operations will develop a plan to reduce the entries to less than 1000 per month per airlock. This plan will be fully implemented by l December 1,1993. Integral to this plan is the resolution of fire protection issues within the containment building. This will allow removal of firewatches from containment which )
represents ahnost half of the current entries. In order to ensure reliable functioning of the interlock system the Operations Department has also revised STP-057-0401 to include testing-of the handle lock solenoid as part of the Technical Specification required interlock system.
This frequency of this STP has been administratively increased to once per week for a minimum of six months. In addition, the Maintenance Department has revised the monthly preventive -
maintenance task for the airlock door to include additional checks on the interlock system.
The description in the USAR of the operation of the airlocks was revised with PMR 934)009.
Additional clarification of both the USAR and the Tech Specs will be provided with the modifications for the pennanent upgrade to the airlock system.
The drywell airkick has also been eworked to ensure that the handwheel locking solenoid and the mechanical interlock system are fully functional. This was completed during the current forced outage (FO 93-01).
On April 23,1993, the Plant Manager held a briefing on airlock issucs for plant staff personnel, and other River Bend Nuclear Group personnel who hold at least a Supervisory position. ;
I ATE WIIEN FULL COAIPLIANCE WILL HE ACIIIEVED l
Full compliance was achieved when the airlock door interlock was mstored to an opemble status. !
Additional corrective actions will be completed as described above. ,
f 8