ML20039B728
| ML20039B728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1981 |
| From: | Finamore B, Scherr S National Resources Defense Council |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112230489 | |
| Download: ML20039B728 (30) | |
Text
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Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc.
SUITZ 600 WASlilNGTON, D.C. 20C C 6 New York 0$ce Western 0$ce
- EAsr 4 No STREET December 16, 1981 85 KEARNY STREET N EW YO R E, N.Y.10 3 6 8 S AN FRANCISCO, CALIF. g(108 818949-0049 c4 Oy;\
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Mr. Samuel L. Chilk p ', '08g 3 Secretary of the Commission -
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l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. C:\ [ <" /%
lith Floor, Room 1135 [ ~ d.
N; Washington, D.C. 20555 ,w-
/ RE: Clinch River 3reeder Reactor Plant Docket No. 50"537
Dear Mr. Chilk:
In accordance with the Memorandum of Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, In Opposition to Applicant's Request to Conduct Site Preparation Activities (p. 28),
we are hereby placing on file with the Commission the enclosed letter dated August 21, 1981, from the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to James Edwards, Secretary of Energy (requesting revised LMFBR programmatic statement).
Sincerely, L .
Barbara A. Finamore s.Q,L % k S. Jacob Scherr, Attorneys for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Enclosure
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'81 DEC 21 A8 :51 !!
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Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc.
1725 I STREET, N.W.,
, SUITE 600 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
' New 1'ork Ofice Western Ofice 3 22 E AST 4 2 N D STR E ET 25 KEARNY STREET N EW YO R K. N.Y.1016 8 9 # SAN FRANCISCO, CAI.IF.g(108 at: 949-0049 4 54st-65 61 The Honorable James Edwards Secretary of Energy Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Sir:
RE: EIS Required for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactar Program We are writing on behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council (MRDC), a national non-profh.t environmental organization with a membership of 35,000. NRDC has long been .
concerned about the fast breeder reactor program in the United States, and in particular about the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. Our specific concern at this time is that there appears to be a likelihood that decis ns may be made permitting the Clinch River project to go forward, without the legally required environmental review of the program of which it is a part.
In December 1974, a Proposed Final Environmental Statement
~
h for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program (hereafter PFES) was issued by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission -(AEC) .
The PFES was then reviewed by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) , which succeeded to some of the functions of the AEC in January 1975. The Administrator of Cr 73 rooy, Rec}c!cd Paper .
-- ~
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- i .
e 2-ERDA found the PFES was insuf ficient to. enable 111m to determine, among other. things, whether LMFBR test and demonstration facilities were conservatively designed to protect the health and safety of the public. - Administrator's
' Findings on the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program Proposed Final Environmental Statement, p. 7 (hereafter Administrator 's Findings) .
On December,1975, ERDA issued a Final Environmental Statement (hereaf ter FES) which attempted to respond to the Administrator's criticisms. . The FES incorporates the entire PFES by reference with only minor substantive changes. 'The FES also provides supplemental ~information on a number of issues and a discussion of alternatives to the LMFBR program.
As part of the udFBR program, the Nuclear Regulatory .
Commission (NRC) issued a site-specific environmental impact statement for the Clinch River project in February 1977 (NUREG-10139). ' That statement focusses on the specific l
questions concerning that project, relying on the 1975 programmatic FES for consideration of broader matters.
We submit th'at as a matter of law, as well as of sound l
policy, the LMFBR final environmental statement must be thoroughly reevaluated and revised to reflect the significant .
new information and changes'in conditions since the FES was issued in 1975. This revision, through either a ' supplemental statement or a totally new statement, must be accomplished in
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o accordance with the procedures of the National Environmental -
Policy Act before any major decision under that program, such as one concerning the Clinch River reactor, can be made or-even considered.1!
In his review of the PFES, the Administrator of ERDA specifically acknowledged the uncertainties which were inherent i
in a development program of this type. He recognized that the-presence of "significant new information" would require supplementation of the FES after it was issued, or "even a new Statement" in order to meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. Administrator 's Findings, p. 8. - As a matter of administrative policy, "significant new information" clearly now exists. As a matter of law, the 1975 final environmental statement, whether or not it was adequate .
when published, simply cannot now be considered an adequate analysis in the light of the many changes, new developments ,
reassessments, and events which have taken place in the past five and one-half years. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, the agency now in charge of the LMFBR program, cannot make rational decisions on the future of that program based on the outdated information, proposals, and lapsed timetables
- contained in the FES.
i l
l 1/ Following full review and revision of the programmatic impact statement, the site specific statement for the Clinch River project will doubtless require review and possible supplementation as well, in light of the new information l
l developed for the whole program.
9 r The regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) specifically call for preparation of a supplement to an environmental impact statement if "[t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or~its impacts." 40 C.F.R.
150 2.9 (c) (1) (ii) . CEQ has recently elaborated on that I provision, noting that "if the proposal has not yet been implemented, * *
- EISs that are dore than 5 years old should be carefuliy reexamined to determine if the criteria in Section 1502.9 compel preparation of an EIS supplement." 46 Fed. Reg. 18036.
It is well established that a supplemental impact statement must be prepared when significant new information becomes available af ter the preparation of the original statement. .
Sqe, e.g. Society for Animal Rights v. Schlesincer , 512 F.2d 915, 917-918 (D C. Cir . 1975) ; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway_, 524 F.2d 79, 91-92 (2nd Cir., 1975) ; Essex County Preservation Ass'n. v. Campbell, 526 F.2d 958, 961 (lst ,
Cir. ,197 6) ; Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble_, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023-1024 (9th Cir. ,19 80) ; Red Line Alert v. Adams, 10 ELR 20314, 20316 (D. Mass.1980) ; Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. '
Thus, in Warm Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493, 500 (D. Neb.1978) .
17.
4 the Court of Appeals Sorinas Dam Task Force v. Gribble, supra, for the Ninth Circuit held that under NEPA "a federal agency has a continuing duty to gather and evaluate information-
rele 7 ant to the environmental impact of its abtion" and must prepare a supplemental impact statement upon obtaining significant new information relevant to environmental concerns. 621 F.2d at 1023. .Similarly, in Natural R3 sources Defense Council v. Callaway, supra, 524 F.2d at 91, 92, the Court of Appeals held that a supplemental EIS must be prepared in order "to amend an EIS to consider changes in the proposed f ederal action." . And, in Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon, suora, the court held, in considering whether the addition of a prison f acility to a neighborhood' development plan required preparation of a supplemental EIS (452 F. Supp. at 500):
Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act does not cease upon preparation of an EIS. The author of an impact statement has an ongoing duty to review its continuing vitality in light of changing conditions. New developments may render the EIS inadequate, in'which case a supplemental impact statement is required.. W. Rogers, Handbook of Environmental Law, 57.7 at 774 (1977).
We submit that since 1975 there have been highly significant new circrmstances and a great deal of important I- information which bea r on the program and its implementation.
L I
In the following discussion, which should not be considered' .
I complete, we shall point out four areas covered in the FES which are most in need of supplementation and revision.
I I In both the Administrator's Findings and the Report to. the l
Administrator on the Droposed Final Environmental Statement for I the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program by an ERDA l
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i i
t Internal Review Board (hereafter Internal Review Board Report) ,
the "significant problems identified in the LMFBR concept" were identified as "those related to reactor safety, safeguards, health effects, and~ waste management * * * ."
Administrator's Findings, p. 5; Internal Review Board Report, pp. 7-8. In addition, the Internal Review Board Report noted the " analysis of economic costs and benefits of the LMFBR program" as a major issue. Id . at 8. Although the FES attempts to provide supplemental information on these significant problems, this information is itself outdated in many respects, and must be thoroughly revised. Tha discussion belcw will focus primarily on the topics in the PFES and FES which relate to these issues.
Siting One of the first topics in the LMFBR environmental statement which is especially important to safety questions is siting. The PFES, as revised and incorporated in the FES, states:
Decisions relating to the siting of LMFER power plants are expected to be guided by
- practices, guidelines, and criteria that will,have been developed and established through experience gained in the construction and operation of nearly one f ull generation of large LWR nuclear power ,
plants. and siting of LMFBR demonstration power plants.
PPES p. 4.2-3; FES p. III A-3.
o The NRC is deeply involved at present in revising the policies, guidelines, and criteria governing reactor siting and the FES should reflect this reevaluation. On July 29, 1980, NBC published an advance notice of rulemaking on the revision of reactor siting criteria (4 5 Fed. Reg . 50350) . On December 2, 1980, NRC recognized the magnitude of this issue, and published a Notice of Intent to prepare an environmental impact statement on the rulemaking revisions (45 Fed. Reg. 79820) .
The advance notice of rulemaking pointed out:
Events during the past year, including the events at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, have made the NRC, the Congress, and the public increasingly concerned that past siting practice may not af ford sufficient protection to the public health and safety. Considering revision of NRC siting policy using the Task Force's recommendations is, therefore, particularly relevant at this time.
45 Fed. Reg. 50350. Moreover, the NRC recently articulated its l
intent "to re-emphasize the desirability of site isolation
( As a result, the -siting discussion must
' ***" Id. at 50351.
l be fully reconsidered in the light of the current position of l
) N RC. As just one example, the statement contained in the PFES,
- p. 4.2-6, that "as more experience is gained in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants, the use of
~
l locations nearer to population centers is expected to be possible * * *" is obviously no longer accurate.
The siting decisions 'for the' Clinch River project will also f
have to be reevaluated in the light of the siting criteria l
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which are in the process of being developed. .This is
,particularly _ essential because it has been acknowledged that the Clinch River site was not the best alternative, from the j .
standpoint of public health and safety, even using the criteria then applicable. In the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Clinch. River Breeder Reactor Plant, pp. 9-22 to 9-23, it is admitted that radiological exposure at alternative sites would be significantly lower -- by as much as a 'f actor of 10 --
[ than at Clinch River, and that-alternative sites would offer a i relative advantage with regard to accidental. releases of i radioactivity. Nonetheless, because of time constraints imposed by the 1986 ERDA deadline for its decision on - the' overall commercialization potential of the breeder reactor, the l
Clinch' River site was favored by the NRC staff. Clearly, now.
that these time constraints do not exist,- and the criteria for siting are being revised to provide greater protection to the public, the dericion as to the site of the Clinch River plant must be totally reconsidered.
1-Accidents The FES contains detailed proposals concerning DOE's -
research and.' development program on LMFBR safety, including projected dates for completion of key programmatic milestones. ,
Most of these completion dates have already passed. See, e.g. ,
FES Tables-III B B-ll.- Since LMFBR research efforts have
_g.
continued despite deferral of the Clinch River project, much of the research results must now be available, and should be included in an updated statement. Unless information on completed research is included in the FES, the five-year old description of the proposed R&D program is both meaningless and useless for decisionmaking purposes. .
The FES also incorporates, with only minor revisions, a lengthy discussion in the PFES on the safety-related characteristics of LMEBRs in general. This section must be completely redone for two reasons. First, it is based on the experience available at the time of the 1974 PFES, and does not reflect the wealth of information gathered since that date.
See, e.a. PFES Vol. II, p. 42-93 (explaining the information base "used in making projections of the potential for and ,
consequences of accidents in commercial LMFBRs) ." Cecond, the discussion'is based on several hypotheses and assumptions which have subsequently been discredited. .
One such discredited assumption concerns the potential magnitude and consequences of reactor accidents. At the time the PFES was written, the Commission's (then Atomic Energy Commission) guidelines for the consideration of accidents were contained in the so-called Annex, first published f or comment on December 1, 1971. As recently described by this Commission, "the discussions (in environmental impact statements] have reiterated the guidance of the Annex and have relied upon the
Annex's conclusion that the probability of occurrence of a Class 9 event is too low to warrant consideration * * * ."E!
The PFES for the LMFBR program specifically adopts this approach, referring to Class 9 accidents as "a residuum of conceivable accident sequences" which are "at the very low ,
probability end of the spectrum of all possible events." PFES, Vol, II, p. 4.2-101. This comment, apparently quoted from an AEC technical report, goes on to conclude that "it is -the judgment of the AEC that these events are of such low likelihood as to present in sum an acceptable risk in view of the benefits derived from the electricity produced by a nuclear power plant." Ibid.
The discussion of various risks in the PFES is predicated on the assumption that an accident of the magnitude of Class 9 .
would not occur. An example is the discussion of a possible nuclear explosion. According to the 1971 classification of accidents, "the occurrences in Class 9 involve sequences of t
! postulated successive failures more severe than those ,
postulated frons the design basis for protective systems and l engineered safety features." Annex, quoted in 45 Fed. Reg. 40101. In response to comments on the draft impact statement regarding the potential of an LMFBR accident resulting in a
!' 2/ A Class 9 accident has become the ~ term commonly used to l describe tt:a most serious type of accident, loosely equivalent
'tx) a core melt accident. 45 Fed. Reg.-40102. It is the accident which exceeds design hypothesis.
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l nuclear exp!r sion, the PFES dismisses. these concerns by saying 4
(Vol. II, p . 4. 2-115) :
It is true that compaction of the fuel will add reactivity. However, the implication that this f eat can be realistically accomplished is not correct. The fuel material is high density * * *, the structural materials * *
- are steel. These mater' tis are not easily deformed or compac ted. By design, LMFBR fuel configurations are precluded from any significant compaction so long as the fuel elements remain intact. Because of the l
built-in features, including plant protection systems, there is no real likelihood of a " nuclear runaway reaction,"
which could lead to loss of fuel element integrity.
Other comments regarding potential safety problems were similarly answered: " Plant systems and the plant protection system are designed to provide margins of -safety against just
' such contingencies.[ accidents]." Id.'at 4.2-119. By relying on such factors as design and " built-in features", the PFES' i
does not deal at all with the Class 9 situation -- failures Fore severe than postulated for the design basis.
The Internal Review Board Report recognized this treatment, t
j noting that "the PFES concludes that hypothetical core I
disruptive accidents (HCDA) will be found to be physically unrealizable and that the upper' bound consequences can be economically contained * * *." Internal Review Board' Report
- p. 8. NRC was one of the primary commenters questioning "the f assertion .of the PFES that HCDA's either will not occur or can be economically contained * *-*." -Ibid.
t l
The FES does not respond to these comments by discussing Instead, the potential consequences of a Ciass 9 accident.
af ter incorporating virtually the entire PFES discussion, it describes proposed R&D efforts designed to establish public confidence in LMFBR safety and demonstrate that the probability of the' occurrence of a " core disruptive accident" is so low
! that it need not be considered' as a basis of design. FES, pp.
III B-24,-III B-28. The FES assumes that such R&D effcits will' be successful, and devotes very little space to a meaningful I discussion of the consequences of a failure to achieve these-objectives.
Experience since 1971, and since 1975 when- the FES was
- issued, has caused the Commission to radically change its As stated last l position on the question of a Class 9 accident. *
+
year, "Our experience with past NEPA. reviews of accidents and the TMI accident clearly leads us to b'elieve that a' change is f needed.' 45 Fed . Reg . 40102. Thus, environmental' impact l
statements, and particularly the LMFBR impact statement, must l
now-include consideration of a wide range:of environmental l~
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. risks, specifically including " sequences that can result 'in l
F . inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and -led to melting of :the i
reactor core.'"1/ Id . ' a t 4010 3. Even external events "which p
1/- A report has been ' issued giving an analysis ofAn~
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whole coreand Analysis accidents-for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
Evaluation 'of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Core Disruptive This study is Accident Energetics, NUREG-0122,. February 1977.
i now out of date, however, because of changes in the core design.
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are considered possible contributors to the risk associated with the particular plant shall also be discussed." Ibid. The result is expected to be "more detailed discussions of accident risks than in previous environmental statements * * *." Ibid.
The FES does not include such a discussion in sufficient detail.
Even without this sharp change in policy altering "the' 4 former, erroneous position on Class-9 accidents" (Ibid.), the FES for the LMFBR program would have to be carefully reviewed and modified as to its safety analysis because of.its reliance on the draf t of the Reactor Safety Study Report, commonly called WASH-1400 or the Rasmussen Report. A summary report of the draf t study appears as Annex E of the safety discussion in
' the PFES, pp. 4.2-237 to 4.2-258, and was incorporated into the FES. .
This study, published in draft form in August 1974 and in final. form in October 1975, has been significantly discredited. A Risk Assessment Review Group was formed in 1977 to advise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the NASH-1400 report. The report of this " group, published in 1978, pointed to numerous shortcomings in the WASH-1400 report, particularly in the Executive Summary, and found that the report "may have been used prematurely as an estimate of the absolute risk of reactor accidents without full realization of the wide band of Risk uncertainties involved. Such use should be discouraged." ,
Assessment Review Group Report taa the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.d
t Commission, NUREG/CR-0400, p. x. The Report found that it could not be determined (id. at viii):
whether the absolute probabilities of accident sequences in WASH-1400 are high or low, but we believe that the error bounds on thoce estimates are, in general, greatly understated. This is true in part because there is in many cases an inadequate data base, in part because of an inability to quantify common cause failures, and in part because of some questionable methodological and statistical procedures.
As a result of this review the Commission issued the NRC Statement of Risk Assessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-14 00) in light of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report, January 18, 1979. The Commission therein expressly withdrew "any explicit or implicit past andorsement of the Executive Summary" and further concluded that "in light of the Review Group conclusions on accident probabilities, the .
Commission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident."
If the WASH-1400 study is now being considered unreliable, even in part, then clearly an impact statement analysis which incorporates significant aspects of that study and appenrs to rely upon it must itself be considered unreliable. It should be obvious that in considering nuclear energy development, especially a new technology, the question of accidents and safety is by long odds the most important single subject for The continuing analysis as far as the public is concerned.
furor over the Three Mile Island accident has dramatically proven this public concern. Therefore any erosion in the scientific support for conclusions as to safety must be taken with the utmost seriousness.
The LMFBR program and its proposed demonstration plant, the Clinch River project, by definition deal with a new technology. All considerations affecting the safety of such a plant and of the underlying technology must be analyzed in light of the best possible information. Reliance upon an analysis which at best is out-of-date and has been shown to be based upon now invalid assumptions simply cannot be justified for such a program. The conclusion is ine'scapable that the environmental impact statement analysis must be thoroughly revised and supplemented. .
A topic, closely related to safety, which is not discussed in the PFES or FES as all, is that of of f-site emergency response. In the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency proposed upgraded emergency management regulations, and issued interim guidance criteria for use by nuclear power licensees.A!
This aspect of the safety measures for breeder reactors must S/ Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, November 1980.
9 be analyzed in order fully to consider the issue of safety, as well as because such plans are of great relevance to site selection.
Economic Costs and Benef its A crucial issue in deciding whether to undertake an entirely new technology program is whether the benefits of the program outweigh the costs. The Internal Review Board pointed to several assumpt39ns employed in the PFES cost-benefit analysis which are largely dependent on speculative future events. The Board emphasized the necessity of supplementing the record and reevaluating the course of 'the program as new, better information becomes available. Internal Review Board Peport, pp. 27-28. The doubts expressed by the Internal Review .
Board in 1974 over the costs and benefits have been confirmed by experience since that dat'e.
The 1975 FES contains a substantially revised cost-benefit i
analysis which reflects in part extensive public criticism and comment on the original study. This five-year old analysis is also extremely out-of-date, relies on economic assumptions which have been shown to be incorrect, and is simply unusable
~
' as a decisionmaking tool.
The 1975 cost-benefit analynis must be reworked to reflect new information on, among other things, electrical energy demand projections, uranium resource estimates, and capital l
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cost differentials betwe3n LMFBR and LWR power plants. For example, both the PFES and FES analyses assume that the capital cost differential between the two types of nuclear plants will decline to zero by the year 2000 because of a presumed manufacturing learning curve. Yet the economies hoped for through a manufacturing learning curve have not been evident for light water reactors. Increased, and increasing, concern for safety as well as generally rising prices have resulted in higher than projected costs. There is no reason to believe that the same pattern would not hold for the breeder reactor.
Recent French experience with its breeder reactor program is instructive. The French now estimate that their projected commercial size breeder reactor , the follow-on to the Super Phenix, will cost more than twice as much as a conventional .
light water reactor. At this cost differential, uranium would
-- about five times have to rise to more than $150/16. U 038 the current price -- before breeders would be competitive with l
3 8.ght water r eactors. If uranium use e *ficiency in light water reactors is improved, as is likely, uranium break-even prices would have to climb even higher, perhaps to as high as $300 per pound. This seene extremely unlikely, since demand for uranium has declined so sharply that prices are now depressed.
There has been a wealth of economic studies since 1975 concerning nuclear power, . energy dema'id and resources, and the role of various energy alternatives in economic growth. One t
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3 i y[ w studywhichmustbeconsideredin'arevised'orsupplement'al;E{$ lNy t w is "The Nuclear Strategy of the Department of Energy," preparedy Qj n.
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in 1978-79 by DOE's' Office of Energy Research.
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This study M evaluates the techni, cal and economic parameters for several
[- G 1 zi alternative breeder commercialization: strategies.' It conclude.4
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A' strategy to delay the decis' ion to build 'a
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breeder demonstration reactor is the most consistent with the . largest space of f uture " ~
events analyzed in this study.... Strategies ts. '
to move forward rapidly with breeder developmentare not supported; by the ,
analysis. ,
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The most comprehensive cost-benefit analysis?of the' breeder ' fj \
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reactor program to date is Economic Comparision of Breeders and_' ]
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. Light Water Reactors, prepared in 1979 f or- the U.S. Arms .>
s N' Control and Disarmament Agency by Brian G. Chow. After an ,
extensive review of past LMFBR' studies, tihis report concludes ,
' that the cost assumptions ahd various demand and supply projections used in studies.' supporting early breeder-introduction are unrealistic. Drawing on recent. studies, i,t also concit,3es' that the breakeven prices for LWR-LMFSR transition are high, and that the LMFBR is eveil less attractive when the. costs of proliferation and d' iversion risks are
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internalized. I_d.'at 94.
A . number'. of other recent studies < show very differenti s
projections for energy demand than were used in the FES and provide a more realistic, present day basis for calculati'ng ~ the 1,
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' of- the FES#aT[ simply'not valid at' the present Q
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- t licht .of .f ac.tsr ias they .are nowj and projections which can '
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' it mak'es, no sense to b.ase an enormously s
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'. s which are clearly no longer valid.
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_57 Ross s . Williams, Our Energy - Regaininq Control, McGraw-Hill ~
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} (1981) ; Gibbons & Chandler, Energyr q The Conservation Revolution; h
National Nidubon Society Energy Plan ( April 1981) ; Union of Concerned S'pierttists, . Energy Strategies ~ .(1980) ; Demand and. .
.Conservat'ionManel of ' the Committee on Nuclear and' Alternative b Energy: System'sh Alternative Energy Demand Futures to 2010 (1979);-
i- Rodberg, EmDlovment Impact of the- Solar Transition (1979) ; Sant,
' y et' al. , The 'Least-Cost Eneroy Strategv:- Minimizing Consumer Costs Through Compet_ition (1979) ;: The E235_ Alternative Energy Futures t
-An Assessement of U.S..
s(+ Study- Ootions' Team, to..~2025 Alternative f(J.979) Energv ;_Stobaugh'& Futures: Yergin, Energy Future: Reoort' l,
' of the Energy Pro-ject at the' Harvard Business School, Harvard..
~ Univer sity: (1979) ;. Taylor, The Easy Path Enercy Plan- (1979) ; Leach -
ej aj. , A Low ^ Energy ' Strategy for the United Kingdom (1979);
t-s, s.Christensen,-Craig, et al. , Distrbuted Enercy Systems ' in-J Californias-Future _(Interim Report) -(197 8)-; Brooks , Economic
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ry -Impact of Low Eneray Growth in Canada: An Initial Analysis (1978) .
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r It is extremely important that the FES be redone or supplemented to reflect, the wealth of new research. and
- information on the weapons proliferation risk of the. f ast:
' /
breeder reactor"and the adequacy or inadequacy of safeguards systems. lIt is now fecognized that recycle systems, including the, breeder. reactor, $re far more vulnerable to use for the production of nuclear weapons than are once-through fuel s
/. cycles.' This use could occur directly by nations or through r i the ' illicit diversion of nuclear material, since the products
+ of recjcle systems are materials which are " considered to be weapons-usable materials, whether in oxidd or metallic form,"
- without important modification. Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, DOE /NE-0001, June 1980, Executive. Summary (hereaf ter NASAP report) p. 3. As the NASAP Report states, " Recycle systems would be vulnerable to a wide range of threats, whereas current once-through fuel cycles are susceptible to only the most sophisticated threats.' Id . a t 6. In plain language, the m terial produced by recycle systems could be used by terrorist groups, or even t
individuals, since they would not require the sophisticated knowledge and technological capability which only nations would be likely to have.
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I Even preliminary.. work on-the breeder program carries with
' it risks of nuclearLproliferation (NASAP Report p. 22):
[P]lanning for breeders must take into account -that although commercial deployment . r of1the fast breeder reactor is several
' decades' away, both here and abroad, proliferation risks associated.with fast br'e'eders are not.' Research, development, land demonstration programs require the use o
of sensitive f acilities and materials which,
' although not of'the same magnitude as those of a commercial-breeder economy, present significant proliferation vulnerabilities.
The FES must thoroughly examine and reasonably quantify the;
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kncwn proliferation risks posed by use of the LMFBR, a risk' wh'ich- noL system of safeguards can . completely eradicate. -
I DOE must.also completely update the FES section on i safeguards ~ to reflect the results of: the safeguards R&D ' effort outlined in' the FES, as well as more recent efforts.. The- ..
4 Internal Review Board Report realized that "this effort (to f
improve the_ design and evaluation of safeguards systems] has-not progressed beyond the . problem definition . phase.. Apparently f
the nature,. magnitude, and frequency of the problems and their potential solutions are largely. unresolved at this time."
Internal Review' Board Report p.15.
The. FES . saf eguards discussion ' confirms this analysis, since; I: it does little. more than ou' li'ne t ' the methodology of the -various proposed and ongoing safeguards research and development -
e efforts.. The FES assumes that these efforts will be successful,-and; states-that "the [ DOE] . Safeguards. Program;is l
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expected to provide, in the 1980-82 time period, definitive safeguards-related information relevant to a (DOE) management decision on the acceptability of the LMFBR for future wide-commercial use." FES Volume I, at p. III C-13.
Since the results of the R&D program are now available the FES must discuss these results as fully as possible. As the Internal Review Board pointed out in relation to the PFES:
Social choices should be made on the basis of a reasonably precise quantification of the risks to be incurred rather than' upon a necessarily imprecise projection of the degree of protection deemed attainable in advance. We recognize, of course, that the statement of objectives or _ standards of performance in the PFES is also tather meaningless until the results of this research become available.
Internal Review Board Report at pp. 13-14.
The results will point to conclusions quite different from -
those projected in the FES. Since the time the FES was issued, there has been no development in security or safeguards-systems l
to inspire confidence that illicit diversion of nuclear s l
i materials could be prevented, particularly if nuclear systems requiring regulation of weapons-usable materials become On the contrary, terrorist activities have not widespread.
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l dissipated world-wide and there is no reason Lo 'think that they will in the future. Recent events undermine the FES assertion l
l that "the f act that malevolent events have not occurred, even in the very substantial plutonium operations conducted by the government for'the past 30 years, is corroborating evidence cf l
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the effectiveness of the system." FES Volume I, p. III C-1.
Yet India has already used civilian nuclear materials supplied by the U.S. for the manufacture of an atomic bomb, and there is evidence that Israel may have diverted such materials for weapons purposes. A number of non-weapons states have already been encouraged to embark upon small breeder reactor research programs which may provide them with access to stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium. Existing international safeguards and controls are inadequate to assure the protection or timely warning in the event of plutonium diversion or thef t, particularly in light of the greatly increased presence of plutonium in commerce which would accompany the development of the LMBFR. The recent bombing of an Iraqi nuclear facility, which was perceived as necessary to prevent its use in the .
Production of nuclear weapons, demonstrates vividly the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation to .our nation's security interests.
A new environmental statement should consider recent f studies of the problems of nuclear proliferation and various
! safeguards, such as the NASAP Report quoted above. These studies should be carefully reviewed and their conclusions and recommendations weighed before any. decision is made regarding l further. use of- plutonium recycle systems such as the breeder reactor. A matter as important as this cannot be ignored simply because the' precise event cannot be exactly described or
the occurrence of the risk may not be readily quantified.
Moreover, it is extremely important that these risks be weighed in the newly considered balance of economic costs and benefits. To f ail to do so would be to ignore one of the serious threats to human life in - the present world.
Manacement of Radioactive gastes The FES incorporates the conclusion of the PFES that high level radioactive wastes from LMFBR fuel reprocessing plants can be successfully managed by retrievable storage facilities for the near term and by disposal in geological formations for the remainder of their hazardous lives. T'he FES also claims that a geological disposal pilot plant will have been completed by 1983, and that (FES Vol, I, p. S-8): .
Since it-is expected that the geologic disposal pilot plant might be. converted to a full-size f acility if it proves successful, l
there does not appear to be any constraint l
on the LMFBR program imposed by disposal l
requirements for high level or transuranium l radioactive wastes.
i l The Internal Review Board, noting that "a critical re-examination of . waste storage strategies is durrently underway in this agency * * *" (id . a t 18) , states (ibij.):
The conclusion that a timely permanent j
disposal solution will be found may be j premature but further research and l' development on waste management. strategies must precede a final determination on the environmental significance of this aspect of the LMFBR fuel cycle.
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I The re-examination referred to is indeed underway. In 1979 the NRC published a notice of proposed rulemaking explaining (4 4 Fed. Reg . G1372-3) :
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission is conducting a generic proceeding to reassess its degree of confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear 'f acilities will be safely stored until they are safely disposed of.
A significant reason for this proceeding is stated to be to
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(ijl. a t 51373 ) :
take account of new data and recent developments in the federal waste management plan, most notably the Report. to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Waste Management, TID-29442 (March, 1979)
(the 'IRG Report').
We submit that it is clear that this new information, still in the process of elucidation and evaluation within the agency, must also be used to update, through a supplemental or new.
statement, .the discussion of this issue in the FES.
Other Topics Which Must Be Reevaluated The volume of information which has been developed since the publication of the FES in 1975 is so great', on so many of the subjects covered in the statement, that it can be safely said that every portion will have to be substantially revised to reflect present day analysis and circumstances.
For example, the FES incorporates a PFES section on fuel reprocessing which is fatelly out-of-date. PFES Vol. II,
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pp. 4.4 et sea. It is implicit in the discussion that fuel reprocessing will be done by commercial, non-governmental plants. However, in a recent meeting of utility and nucleat supply company representatives with DOE and OMB officials, 3 virtually all private sector representatives expressed doubt about the viability of commercial reprocessing. Minutes of April 23, 1981, DOE /OMB Meeting on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing.
The effect of such lack of interest on the potential availability of fuel for breeder. reactors will have to be analyzed. Moreover, the experience of reprocessing in other countries must also be weighed.
New studies on plutonium' toxicity and'other health effects 5
must'likewise be analyzed to make current the information in The the-final environmental statement. FES Vol. I Sec. III-G. ..
FES notes that "a major program is underway to obtain additional information on plutonium toxicity. The data base is constantly expanding and various components of the studies are expected to be completed over the next 3 to 20 years." FES, Vo] . I p. S-9. The results of this considerable research into plutonium toxicity, as well as research on rad'iation effects in general, must be reviewed and utilized so that the statement will reflect current knowledge in these subjects. See, e.g.,
EPA, Bioloaical Effects of Ionizino Radiation , 1980. The
!nternal Re view- Board termed the analysis in the PFES "as adequate for decisionmaking as the state of the art will-
,T- *---,--w em -'- w y
' allow." Internal Review Board Report p. 20. The new analysis-must now incorporate the " state of the art" as it presently exists.
Alternatives In any environmental impact statement, -the discussion of alternatives to the proposed action is the " linchpin" of the environmental analysis process. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Voloe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2nd Cir. , 1972) . Although i the PFES completely omits any discussion _of alternatives, -the 1
FES presents to'some extent both programmatic and technological options to _the breeder program. These sections must be expanded and revised to reflect widespr ead changes in energy development. .
i It is an obvious fact that the field of energy development
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is one of the . fastest growing, most rapidly changing economic and technological areas in modern life. Even if the discussion of technological alternatives had been ideal in 1975, it wo.uld ,
long since have been rendered obsolete by events, such as the ever-changing economics of fossil fuels and technical developments in the production of energy. For example, the change in the relative economics of nuclear-generated electricity versus coal-generated power indicates that the
- 'latter is now a major, viable, and reasonable alternative. See Komanoff, Power Plant Cost Escalations, Kcmanoff Energy
c I s e Associates, 1981. Similarly, several of the economic discussions referred to earlier contain new information on the relative desirabiity of other technologies, such as solar energy and biomass. See e .g. , ~ the Audubon Energy Plan, supra.
Conservation,-with its recent impact on energy demand, also requires serious consideration as an alternative to further nuclear generating capacity, either alone or in combination with other energy sources.
The advice of CEQ thr2t impact statements over five years old should be carefully reexamined (46 Fed. Reg. 18036) is particularly applicable to the analysis of energy development.
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Consequently, the crucial topic of alterna'tives will have to be completely and thoroughly reviewed, to reflect current conditions.5/ .
5/ In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that the Comm.ission l
did not have to consider facts brought before it after the close of the administrative record but could reasonably rely '
on the information available to it. The situation in the case of the breeder reactor program is markedly different i
since the lapse of time -- nearly seven years -- is far l
longer than would be expected in an administrative I proceeding between the close of record and final decision.
Further, the changed facts which should now be considered are not just one or two points, but rather essential information underlying most, if not all,lof the discussion of the entire statement. A good deal of that information i
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has been, or is being, developed by NRC itself. In these circumstances, the agency must obey the warning of the Court, to explore alternatives as they become better known and understood. 4 3 5 U . S . a t 5 51. .
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In sum, it is the position of NRDC that the 1975 environmental statement-issued for the LMFBR program is legally deficient to support any further decisions as to the continuation of that program in its present form or any decision as to particular projects intended to implement that program. The statement must be thoroughly reviewed and revised .
in the light of present knowledge. To go forward with any aspect of _ this multi-billion dollar program based on pre-1975 information would not only be extremely foolish; it would be legally erroneous.
We appreciate your attention to these comments.-
Sincerely, 4-
. fw- ffOn M f Barbara A. Finamore Attorney
, , Mr f.Lj _
S. Jhcob Scherr Attorney ,
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!- Thomas B. Cochran Senior Staff Scientist cc: Nunzio J. Palladino Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
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