ML20039B527

Response to NRC & Util Answer to Supplemental Petition of Coordinated Intervenors Re Contentions.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20039B527
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	12/21/1981
From:	Lewis M LEWIS, M.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8112230196
Download: ML20039B527 (7)

Text

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,, 1Ri1TED STATES OF A!GRICA  ;

NUCLFAR RMUIA'IORY C0rRISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFEIT AND LICENSING BOARD %(.KQEC In the matter of 0*

Philadelphia Electric Co. Dockets Nos o g g5 g aa$ @ -353 (b (LimerickGeneratingStation#1and2)

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s/ ggCEgg c3 INTERVENOR LEWIS"S RE3PONSE 'IO PECO AND NRC ANSWEfiS [/ ^ # I n DEg221981n3

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Th3 following are Intervenor Lewis's responses to the Staff's and PECo's t mE.Q, "areeg 8

An:ver to Supplemental Petition of Coordinated Intervenors for Interveno % R$* 8f //

Lewis's Contentions only. ~

I-49. The Applicant and the Staff has attacked this contention on similar _ ' 1TT

grounds.(10CFR 50.13)As far as their attack has gone , their attack is proper.

Th3 deficiency in the Applicanth and Staff's attack is that their attack is

• linited to (a) "emeny of the United States" and (b)use or deployment of weapons incident to U.S. defense activities."-

Th;re are a plethora of credible scenarios which would expose Limerick to EMP without being involved with either of the two above elements of 10CFR 5013 Ona hypothetical case would be as follows:

An ally or " friendly " nation tests out an atmospheric nuclear device. The

, cissile guidance system errs and the device explodes in international waters off the Northeast coast of the United States ,several hundred miles in the upper stratosphere.

'Ih3 EMP seen by the Limerick Nuclear Power plants would be sufficient to cause c common mode failure , Class 9 accident and loss of life for some of the public.

Tha above scenario would have no element of enemy action or US Defense activities.

Although the chance of this mrticular scenario is presently low, the chance for this scenario will always grow as new nations are added to the Nuclear Club and this scenario is only one of a plethora of credible scenarios. The sum of all these scenarios is large enough to constitute a very credible risk.

The Applicant and the Staff have not attacked the Contention adequately. For this reason and because the area of concern of this centention is so very vital, this contention shculd be litigated in this proceeding.

I I-50 Tne Applicant mischaractarize.s this contention as an attack on 10CFR 73 '

10CFR 73 refers to "physica2 %rotection" which is government jargon for  !

sccurity against theft and sabotage. (10CFR 73 See" Purpose'.') This contention I has nothing to do with sabotage or theft directly. It refert to the design deficiencies (such as fire resistance) and lack of adequate insurance due to ths possibility of accidents gro war than Class 9 related t) design deficiencies.

Further the Applicant attacks this contention en the grounds that "offsite fusi shipments are not involved in this proceeaing." This is true only as long Dg3 cs those off site shipments do not impact upon the fixed site. One obvious S l

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impact of a nearby transportation accidentwould be to adversely impact the Lilerick Emergency Plan. There are many ottier inpacts such as " latching" that could cause common mode failure if enough highly ionizing aerosols / /

wsro dispersed from a ne"r by accident. a11221 0

g 2 h f 05000 g G

.With properly designed shipping casks , the chance of a accident would be sufficiently low to fit within the regulations. However, this contention

Boss to th) qu:stion whsth:r tha inadequato design and tha advsrso dstography of tha area of Linsrick provide sufficient assuranco for tha henith and cafety b the general public.

For design deficiencies regarding fire only, several new studies have come to light attacking the original basis of Table S4 Footnote 1 (Data ... Wash 1238 Dec 1972 and Supp.1 Nureg 75/038 Apr 75)

These new studies include AN ASSESSfENT OF THE RISK OF TRANSPORTING SPENT NUCIEAR FUEL BY TRUCK Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Nov 78. and ASTUDY ON THE TEMPERATERE DISTRIBlTTION IN THE SHIPPING CASK OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEIS AT IDCA by Hiroshi Nakai and Toshinobu Shibata Kyoto University Vol.XLIII Part I January 81. .

Table S4 is only a part of the regulation where better more exact

• specific information is noWavailable. To ignore experimental data and cleave to a guide that is published in the regulations for use only where specific data is not available invites disaster (such as the TMI@2 accident) and is totally illogical.

The above answers the Staff's objections to this contention. The Staff

- centered its objections around 10CFR 51.20 Table S4. The applicant and the staff's objections to this contention have been answered. This contention

• inv61ves issues which can affect the health and safety of the ,

public. I respectfully request tlatihis contention be accepted for litigation in this proceeding.

Finally thic contention is not an attack on the regulation in Table S 4.

This contention is an attack in the design of casks. The design of casks is deficient to the point where that design cannot be relied upon to hold the adverse environmental effects down to those reported in Table S4. Therefore the design of the casks is deficient, and Table S4 provides the rationale for this contention.

Further this contention is not limited to the fire resistance of the casks.

There are many demographic features of the Limerick area that pose greater threats than those specified in the Regulatory Guides for the qualification of spent fuel casks. Therefor e the casks must be designed to specific site demgraphy and not to the regulatory guides ard NUREGS unless those documents are specific to the greater dangers posed by the demography of the Li merick site.These demmgraphic features include drops greater than the design drops immersions longer than the design immersion, and roads less available than the design roads ani population greater than the design population for the regulatory guides and NUREGs.

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1-51. Apparsntly th2 staff agrs:2 that this is a litigablo contrntion. The Applicant obj; cts on tha ground 2 cf applicability and lack of 1cgitimata issu2. ,

Although inerting should preclude a hydrogen spike such as occurred at i the TMI#2 accident, there are times that the containment will not be in rted, but an accident which produces hydrogen could occur at those times. .

GE refers to such a time specifically in its SDV studies where the reactor goes into a shutdown mode and the core becomes uncovered due to an SDV piping break. Also there is a question as to the tech specs on the hydrqpn inerting system ;to wit, will the reactor be allowed to operate if the inerting system is non-functioning temporarily?

There are manyother times when the inerting may not be in operation , but a hydrogen spike could still issue from an accident.These are legitimate areas of concern, litigable issuesand important points for inclusion in the Technical specifications for Limerick.  ;

I-52. Upon rereadin6 this contention , I believe that this is properly a part of VI-1. It is one more example of poor Q/A and careless workmanship -

which ultimately will lead to an unsafe piant.

I petition that this contention be considered e. part of VI-1, and the defense of this part of the contention will be addressed in the defense of VI-1.

I-56. This contention and LEA's contention I-55 chare the same basic concerns.

}{owever my specific concerns are very different than LEA's as far as I could tell in preliminary discussions. I believe that IEA's contention talks to the specific iscue of the SDV actually being able to perform ~

ite safety function. My contention talka to the issue of SDV pipe breaks causing major accidents whether or .t the SDV performs its safety function.

For instance in the case of a pipe break during a refueling mode, the subsequent flooding can cause all available cooling systems to malfunction. The core would then become uncovered. Subsequent heating may well result in a fire leading to a zirconium hydrogen reaction. The hydrogen would then cause a spike, because the inerting system is not activated in the refueling mode. This '

spike would be sufficient to cause a breach of containment.

This is only one specific scenario to which I do not believe the LEA contention speaks. My other areas of concern include ,

a. human factor preparation sufficient to perform the prophylactic measures prescribed by General Electric.

b. emergency operating procedures which da not address SDV breaks

c. " " " " " " " keeping core covered during an SDV break.

d. emergency procedures which do not address protecting against loss of ECCS equipment function during an SDV break

e. concerns about the long term heat removal systems during and after and SDV break and subsequent flooding.

These are concerns other than and subsequent to the safety function of SDV piping .

I be1Nve that the above answers the staff's concern about reformulation and respects. It also provides real issues that should be litigated before the operating license is issued.,

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,I-57. First I chall discuss som2 flaws in th2 Applicant's and staff's cttack upon this contention, and thsn I Ehall provida a defensa of this cont:ntion. -

Applicant "" sufficient water is stored onsite to meet all NRC requirements."

This sufficiency was determined prior to the Brown's Ferry rod drop incident and subsequent SDV studies.

This contention , therefore , asks if sufficient water is available in light of the new SDV pipe break problem.

"DitBC's approval of the water use for the Station permits the use d Schuylkill River at any time . " I do not fault this stdement. What I fault in the erroneous assumption that when the plant is in a river follower mode, there will be enough water in the Schuylkill for the pumps to pump.

I am a resident of the area and have seen the schuylkill so low that a nan could walk across and not get his sock muddy.

Therefore, pumping of the Schuylkill during low water times where the plant is in a river B11ower mode is speculative at best.

Staffs" Petitioner sets forth no basis for his assumption that the onsite sources of emergency core cooling water are inadequate."

Au contraire, the SDV pipe break problem puts new and unusual demands upon the water inventory as set forth in the GE studies. These are also referred to in NURDG 0785 Thisis the basis'for an assumption that the' water inventory may be inadequate.

" petitioner is mistaken in his belief that the water from the spray pond would have to be borated before use for core dooling."

Depending where this water is used and how the above statem n has some truth. However, in an ATWS such as a failure to scram caused by an SDV pipe break, adding unborated water to the core would have adverse effects.

The attack by staff and applicant upon this contention is highly flawed.

I have pointed out som e of the deficiendies of their objections. Because of the deficiency of the attack upon this contention , and the importance of hav ing adequate water in the instance of an ATWS due to an SDV pipe break , I respectfully request that this contention be accepted .

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, Id2. I point out that a problem has been discovered in FIR'O. I ask that the cxistanca of that probico for F<'R'n be deternin d.

Th3 applicant agrees that the problem has be:n discovered in WRa. Hs obbets to looking for the problem in 5'Rs on the basisthat "there is no evidence

- that vessel failure resulting from thermal shock and other contributing factors is a problem for FdRs."

The applicant ignores the fact that the reason that there is no evidence so far is that no one bss looked.

The health and safety of the public is not protected by not looking. For this reason, I urge that this contention be accepted.

IV-1. Agin staff andapplicant assert that I am attacking a Commission regulation. That is the furthest thing from my mind 'in this proceeding.

I do not assert tnat these regulations are adequate. I only assert that those programs established to meet the regulation be adequate 'to do so.

This is not the case with the training program for spent fuel drivers.

The training program for spent fuel drivers is such that it increases the danger to the health and safety of the public. This cannot be the intent of the regulation or the regulation would be in contradictionto the Atomic Energy Act an1 the National Environmental Protection Act.

I only ask that this training question be litigated to the extent of determing whether or not the training program meets the requirements of the regulation.10CFR Appendix D and 10 CFR 51.21(g).

The training program for spent fuel drivers trains them to run police barricades, ignore police instructions and perform other unsafe practices.

This training program is not adequate to protect the health and safety of .

otect the the public. Mischaracterisation of the contention does health and safety of the public from disclosure of unsafe nog %M practices.

IV-2.If this contention were amatter of pure speculation , I would agree with the applicant about the inadmissability of this contention. However, this is not a matter of pure speculation .

1. Cheat'ng has been admitted to by Met 91 in the training of TMI SR0s and ROs.

2. The senior operating officer of GPU has based his defense upon the testing meeting past NRC practices.

3. If these past NRC practices fostered chaating at one facility, there -is reason to believe that those past NRC practices at least allowed for cheating at all fac31ities.

4. Some assurance is necessary that in every facility past NRC practices have not allowed unqualified R0s and SR0s into positions of trust and responsibility.

In respect to the applicant's excellent point about " alleged improprietiet,",

I would like to limit my contention to the above points only.

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, V[-1. Th3 staff makes no objection to this contention.

The applicant objects thesa deficiencies are isolated minor events and that they khavo not besn shown to " increase ths risk of an accidsnt."

Partially the applicant is correct. These may or may not be a list of isolated ,mir.or events which will not increase the risk of an accident.

That is exactly what I wish to litigate with this contention:

1. Are the infractions so far known and reported '

a. adequately resolved

b. do not constitute a pattern of neglect

c. do not " increase the risk of an accident"

d. and are not the tip of an iceberg of unreported ad dangerous pattern of infractions. .

Further I personally would limit my contention only to those infractions that pose a danger to the health and safety of the public.

.VIII-8. I agree that portions of this contention may be premature in that radioprotective drugs have not been specified - adequately in the present emergency plan.

I therefore wish to reformulate my contention merely to state the issue that --

the present plan is inadequate h that it has not eraluated radioprotective

.- drugs for use in an emergency.

VIII-16. I agree wholeheartedly with the staffh3 imitation which quotes my contention,"the requirement that R0s contact offsite management -

before declaring an evacuation emergency renders the emergency plan unworkable."

The objections of the applicant confirm my worst fears about the inadequacey of the emergency proceedured. In a very fast moving ej[gency , there would not be time to set up a Interim Emergency Director.

Also the applicant does not object to the contention on the basis that keeping tie phone numbers confidential is not a dangerous practice in an emergency , but rather on the basis that the Director NRR wants it that way. (Apparently the Director NRR assumes that giving out phone numbers can also be a dangerous practice.)

I respectfully re' quest that this contention be litigated within the staff's suggected limitatinns.

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" E T Eri Certificate of Service l l

IherebycertifythatcopiesofMarvinLewis'srbpoEh2s1 b A10:43 to PECO and NRC Staff Answers to Contentions for the Limerick Operating License Proceedings have been served on the,-fplyowing, by deposit in U.S. first class mail, on Dec. 16,ih198g.{gjiERV: CE Chairman Lawrence Brenner Dr. Richard F. Cole Dr. Peter A. Morris Frank Romano Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel--U.S. NRC Docketing and Service Section--U.S. NRC Edward Bauer, PECO Troy Conner Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel--U.S. NRC James M. Neill Dr. Judith Johnsrud,ECNP Thomas Gerusky, DER PEMA, Director -

John Shniper Robert Anthony, FOE ,

Judith Dorsey, LEA Donald Bronstein, Lawyers G6ild Walter Cohen, Consumer Advocate Robert Adler, DER Randall Brubaker, DER Joseph White Steven Hershey, CEPA Alan Nogee, Keystone Alliance Robert Sugarman, Del-AWARE William Lochstet .

Stephen Lewis, NRC Staff Charles Bruce Taylor Marvin Lewis 6504 Bradford Terrace Phila., Pa. 19149 O