ML20154D577

Petition of Rl Anthony & Friends of the Earth for Leave to Intervene & Request for Hearing

ML20154D577
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	02/15/1986
From:	Anthony R ANTHONY, R.L., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20154D574	List: ML20154D572 ML20154D577
References
2.206, OLA, NUDOCS 8603060262
Download: ML20154D577 (3)

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, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... SECRETARY OF TIE COMMISSION M*

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PHILA. ELEC.CO.

Licorick Gon.Sta. U=it3 1 & 2 BOCKET NO.

50-352,353.

p Feb. 15,1986 INTERVENOR R.L. ANTHONY / FOE REQUEST FOR A HEARING AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO i

INTERVENE IN THE LIGHT OF THEISSUANCE 05 2/6/86 0F AMENDNENT 1 TO LIC. NO.NFF 39 WITHOUT A HEARING,AND PETITION FOR STAY OF OPRRATION AFTER 2/19/86, LIMIT FOR TESTS l

AnthMF05 received on 2/12/86 a copy of Amendment No.1 to operating license NPF-39 issued to FEco em 2/6/86. We onil theSecretary's attenties -

to our interest in this matter as evidenced by ourpetition for review and a stay directed to the Commission on 2/12/86, our amendment to our petition for a hearing and leave to intervene of 2/5/86, and our first letter to the Secretary request-ing a begring and the right to' intervene of 1/30/86.

We are disturbed by the issuance of the amendment without a hearing because of the severe safety hazarda involved in granting the eztestion of time for essen-urvei 1ance tests. We protest this teenance.

We assert that the NRC err-tial gdSEN}ag t$at that no significant hasards were involved and further erred 8

i ed in is not making"a final determination on the issue of so significant hasarde con-sideration",afterahearingwasroguestedbyAnthony/FORen1/30/86and2/5/86.

l NRC thereby failed to fogoQhe published requirements from p. 52875 F.R.12/26/8!;

The " Safety Italuation"Awhich accompanied Amendment No.1 containe a mistaken con-olueios that so final determination regarding so significant hasards consideration is needed.( p. 2 para.3 0)

" No publio comment on suoh finding within the time l

Provided" is not the controlling factor.

We assert that the Commission to obli-gated to follow the Fed. Reg. notice (p. 52875) and "If a hearing is requested,the I

Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hasards consideration. The final determination will serve to deoide when the hemiing is held."

l SUBMISSION OF CONTENTIONS Simoe we believe that the Commission intende to honor its instructions in F.R. notice 12/26/85,p.52875,weexpecttohear i

shortly when the date for the hearing will he scheduled.In preparation for thie l

heasing,s hereby submit the following contentions.

CONTENTION 1. The amendment is in violation of 10CFR 51.22(e)(9). It does g

mot meet the elegibili,tgeriteria for categorical exclueton since it does, sub-o

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ject us and the publie to W M of significant increases in amounts,possible g

g5 change in types in effluents released offsite,and significant increase in individ-Ca o ual and cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

D CONTENTION

2. It is la violatieg of 10CFR 51.22(b) since based on #1,above, (V o for g

an environmental impact statenest and environmental assessment are required.

CONTENTION g.5. The postponement of surveillance tests required under Tech.

Spoo. (TS) 4 6 3 4 violates the maximum time limit set by NRC for the safe opera-tion of the instrum. station lines excess flow check valves,and there can be no assurance during the added 14 weeks,of safe plant operation and protectica of the public and employees from failure of the valves and release of radioactivity.

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i CONTENTION 4.

Tho "cztoaded otcrtup program cebodulo' (Safoty Evs1.NRR, l

2/6/86, p.1) reinforces rather than eliminates the need for the surveillance I

teste en schedule,ainee there could have been more deterioration of the valves without power wyeration than with it. Changes is ecoling water pressure and starts and stope of the reactor could exert more otr in that continuous operation.

a CONTENTION 5 The hasards from the malfumettoming of the valves is high-lighted by (p.2 Safefval NRR):

operaties (because This) operation cannot be perFbrues during normal powerthat...would involve potential ha of the line in the unlikely event that one of the valves fails to check and releases fluid that is both at a high temperature and radiosotive... and...

would result in multiple engineered safety feature systen and/or reactor pro-i tection system actuations.'..

,l The extreme danger from the malfusotion of gvgv gvhprovestheneedfor the surveillance test on schedule sinceAthese valves oculd precipitate disaster.

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CONTENTION 6.

The amendment does not specify the amabar of valves or teste l

covered,but it does isolude (F.R. 52874) "(Primary Coatsinnent Isolation Yalves) l 1

Table 3 6 3-1 Part B "

Psrt B lists,67 instrumentation lines. Some of these l

i isolude multiple valves.

It is obvious that the amendment involves a large sun

• ber of valves operating in most of the plant's key systems, for example, Main Steam Line, Rooiro, Pump EPCI, RPY,LPCI, Jet Pump, Core Plate,RCIC,RWCU, etc.

The failure of one or more of these valves and instrument linee could cause radioactive releases and precipitate other failures,resulttag la catastrophy.

COMTENTION 7.Theeffectsoffgteinthecheckvalvesorleaksinthe lines could have severe consequences samy of the instrument lines listem in 3

Part 3 (above) " since t'he line many serve as an instrumentation manifold with multiple transmitters.." (Safe.Ival.NRR,p.2.).The check valves and lines there-j fere, in case of failure could precipitate other faults and even out off the functions of instruments needed for safe shutdown.

CONTENTION

8. The hasards to biling water plant safety from the interaction i

of systems failures are pointed out,with particular relevance to this amendment I

as set forth in PRA Insights,NUREG/CR-4405,3NL/NUREG-51931, Deo. '85, p.x111, "In the two PRAs(Millstone and Seabrook) which specifically documented risk con-tribution by sequencess interfacing systems LOCA represente over 98% of the total contribution to early fatalities."

The other study," Insights Gained from P.R. A.s", Sarah M. Davis, 9/20/84 oites check valves specifically, p.24,

" 8.

Interfacing systems LOCAs...For nasy plante the e

valves of concern are the check valves in the RRR or Low Pressure Injection lines.

Part B (above) lists a number of LPCI lines and valves. The amendment includes in-terfacing systems,therefore, with strong likelihood for acoident intereotion.

CONTENTION 9 As we pointed out isourlettertotheSecretary,1/30/86, j

instruhentation lines were found to be vulnefable to jet impinge 1ent loads froa the rupture or shipping of adjacent pipes.(See Torrey Pines, Independent Desige

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Roviou of Licorick - Coro Sprey Syoten, Nov.1984, Exocutivo Surcory, Vol.1.

p. 12.

It is possible that many and perhaps most of the 67 instrumentation l

lines ( Part B) have this vulnerability and likelihood of sooident. As we stated is our letter,1/30P/86, we have no assurance or indication that adequate. pre-i eliminate teotive measures have been taken to Jhese sooident prospects which were warned l

l of in the Torrey Pines report.

This further emphasises the necessity of test-ing the check valves and their lines within the original Tech.Spoo. time limit.

1 CONTENTION 10.

(Amendment No 1, Soot.1. A.,B.,C.,D.,E)fhe amendment violates the requirements of,and intention of the A onio Energy Act and the regu-t lations under 10 CFR Chap.1, including Part 51.

To extend the time for essential surveillance tests is ac4 in keeping with the Act or the Regulations which were designed to see that plaats operate is a way actto endanger health and safety I

of the publio. Asthecententionsaboveprove,theinstrumantapionlinesand check valves are at the center of safe operation of the plant an(kmeans for shutting down safely in case of seed. To postpone these tests amounts to playing Russian roulette with the safety and lives of the public and employees.

CONTENTION 11.

It appears that in' a self serving move which seems financial-ly motivated, PEco applied to out corners, on these tests and the NRC is conspir-l ing to fall in with this unless it immediately determines that the plant must not operate beyondthe 2/19/86 limit without the testabeiag carried out.

Further evidence of bad faith asi betrayal of the public safety on PECe's part comes clear from the record of in December the operation was at 10-1$%gation of the remoter. For instem then the I g g gd PRCo was apparently testing bus temperature and the plant cou$4 ha ve been shut l

down in connections withthese reductions in power for a long emengh period to l

carry out the check valve tests. PEco thus seems willing to discount the safety j

of the public and employees for the sake of corporate convenience and profit.

PETITION FOR STAY.

We petition the Commission to grant a stay of operation of l

the Limerick No.1 reactor to go into effect on 2/19/86 and continue in effect until all the requires tests under TECE. SPECS 4 6 3 4 have been satisfactorily j

carried out. In oossideration of this stay we submit

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I (1.)We are likely to prevail on the merits because the test were included i

in the Specifications to assure that reactor operation would not pose 6 hasard by continuing beyond a predictable safe limit. An extention of 14 weeks gambles liv (2) We could be irreparably injured in a possible breakdown because of the neglect of these tests,and,siso, further injury is threatened by such a precedent.'

l (3) PEco has had ample opportunity to complete the tests up to now,1f it had had the incentive to protect the public and its employeesJ and they osa new be carried out with minimum loss,which should be PEco's responsibility because of its utgloot of prior opportunities to eary out these tests.

(4) There is no guestion that the publio interest lies above all else in insuring safety and health and lives. Postponing the teste means' a gamble with these,k to suerend the effectiveness and implementation of 4

We as the Commission this amendment which constitutes such a gamble.

g I certify service by nati on:NRC-Commies, Legal Dir.,

es eotfully submiMed

• f'MoyIan// nEud'f 4.

Docketing & Serv. W.R. utler/,$/ed'(, M

,Pa. 1906p Conner & 8etterhahn y

/gy Box 186

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