ML20245J368

Request by Intervenor Rl Anthony to Be Continued as Intervenor in Licensing Process for Unit 2 & for Hearing Under 42 ESC Section 2239(a) as Affected Person,Endangered by Philadelphia Electric Failure to Satisfy Plant....*

ML20245J368
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	06/23/1989
From:	Anthony R ANTHONY, R.L.
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#389-8824 OL-2, NUDOCS 8907030015
Download: ML20245J368 (3)

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T IW UNITED STATES NUCLF).R REGUIATCRY CCMMISSICN 6/23/89 RE: PHIIA.ELEC. CO. Limerick G:n: rating Sta., Units 1 & 2 g o g fg g , y S3 AS AN INTERVENOR IN THE REQUEST BY INTERVENOR ROBERT L. ANTHONY TO BE CONTINUED LICENSING P30 CESS FOR UNIT 2 3 AND FOR A HEARING UNDER 42 U$0cSec.2239(a).AS AN AF-FECTED PERSON,ENDANCERED BY PHIIA. ELECTRIC'S FAllDRE TO SATdFTtRIANT'5AFETY FEAIURES, EMEPGENCY PIANS,AND COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR Sec. 2.104 andNEPA AW1YCFR FART 51.

INTERVENOR'S UNDERSTANDING OF UNIT 2 STATUS. We wish the Commission. @RC}to know that we have not been informed on the status of Unit 2 and we are aware only through a copy of NRC's order of 6/8/89 that it has pending before it a motion by FECO " request-ing that the Commission clarify the status of Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2,with regard to issuance of an operating license."

We are not aware that PECO has appled for an operating license for Unit 2. IT it has,we requent that NSC grant a hearing as provided in 42 USC #2239(a). If NRC has (we assert in error) determined that a hearing is not required under the Act,we ask to be informed of the date of the publication of proposed action on PECO'S application under 10 CFR # 2.105, er the proposed date for publication. We further assert our right for a hearing unter Sec. 2239(a) after the Fed. Reg. notice, and we apply for in-tervenor rights and status.

We request a hearing to present evidence that FECO has not complied with the laws and regulations which must be satisfied before fuel loading and low pcwer operation ~

l can be authorized. We state our opposition to fuel loading or operation at any level or the granting of an exemption under 10 CFR # 51.6 and # 50.12 until there has been ' l I

a heuing on the cafety of the plant and watkable emergency plans have been approved and tested under 10 CFR # 50.47 ,etc.,and licensing procedures satisfied as pre- l I

scribed in 10 CFR PART 2,Subpart A.,and applicable parts of PART 50 and PART 51.

A3SENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA AND 10 CFR PARIS 2.50,31. We are aware that the l Third Circuit Appeals Court ruled in 1989 on Limerick Ecology Action's petitions # 85-  !

a 3431,86-3314,and 87-3565 that PECO must consider design changes in Unit 1 to provide  ;

I possible severe accident mitigation design alternatives which NRC refused to consider in the licensing process (SAMPAs). The Court's ruling applies equally to Unit 2,as ,

to NEPA requirements and safety features to protect the public from the effects of f 1

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severe accidents: , , ,

NEPA requires that the environmental impacts of agency action be given careful con-

- sideration and that the public be: informed .of them. Here,the NRC excluded consider-  !

ation of design alternatives..... ( Third Circuit Slip Opinion p. 47.) --

s-The Court romanded this matter for consideration of SAMDAs. These have to be con-sidered before a possible operating license for Unit 2,as i$ plied by the Court (p.48,N.27.

. m c _s rs 10 CFR # 50.47(c)(1) (1988)which is applicable,provides as follows:

Failure to meet the applicable standards set forth in parsgraph (b) (emergency plan requirements) of this section may result in the Cornission declining to ,

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issue an operating license; . .. .

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A hearing before any authorization of fual loading or start up of Unit 2 $s nasind to determine whether " there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective mass-ures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR #50.47 We show below that there can be no such assurance without alternative plant design and revision and new implementation plans for protection of the public.

The Third Circuit decision in the LEA case,above, requires equally, reconsideration of safety design elements in Unit 2 ,as for Unit is

..the NRC's regulations implementing NEPA require it to consider " the alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental and other effects." 10 CFR

1. 5171(d) ( incorporated by reference in 10 CFR # 5190). And the Commission's most recent NEPA policy statement makes clear that asong the alternatives to be con-sidered are alternative plant designs. 49 Fed. Reg. 9352,9354 (1984).( 3rd Cir. slip p.2h We wish to remind NRC that under 10 CPR #2.104 (c) it is obligated in its notice l of the hearing on a license which we requested,above, to state." matters in controversy amond the parties". We assert that" alternative plant designs" are in this category.

We also assert that the inadequate emergency plan for Limerick Unita 1 and 2 aust be reviewd in the hearing and revised before any license is issued for Unit 2 or any fuel loading or low power testing or operation authorized. We set forth below the lacks in the Limerick emergency plan which make it unable to protect the public.

EMERGENCY PIAN's FAILURES 14) PROTECT PUBLIC. Without consideration of alterna-tive designs to protect against SAMI1s, there can be no assurance that radioactive gasesandliquidacan)Inventedfromreachingthepublicintheevent'ofaradiolog- )

ical emergency involving Unit 2 and/or both units. In addition to duign alternatives the hearing must evaluate whether the emergency p3an can be implemented on site and j off site. There is no assurance that the energency plan covers the interaction of )

the two units when both go into operation. The most recent emergency plan revisions, I

1. 19,5/89 make no reference to unit 2 as far as we can determine except in Para. 6.3:

Corrective action any include a shutdown of the offdading unit. When both unita ,

are operating a shutdown of the second unit s_az (line added) also be advisamble.  ;

We submit that such a loose, permissive approach to the kind of emergency which would i require the shutdown of one unit without specifying under what conditions the second ,

could continue to operate must be reviemiin a hearing in which the public interest will be represented by interveners from the public. ~i Other provisions of Revision 19 sees calculated to confuse and demoralize staff reactions under an energency. For instance, in Pars.6 5 1 " EMERGENCY. PERSONNEL EK-POSURE CRITERIA" there"are "Three dategories of risk versus benefit" which the workers apparently must evaluate before they act, and if they act,they an aske their decision as to whether to arry through,since: (Para.651 c.)

To avoid restricting actions that any be necessary to save lives,it shall be left to the judgment of the individual to determine the amount: of exposure that he

. will accept to perform an emergency action that will result in.tha saving of human life.  :

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...s It is probable that nost actions in a radiological caergracy would be directed to- ,

ward saving human life,directly,or by wider connected interactions,on site or off a hence individual worker decisions on risk could realistically cause individuals and groups to be immobilized or demoralized in an emergency. It is conceivable that all emergency personnel would refuse assigned duties since they are free"to aske informed decisions as to the amount of exposure they are willing to accept to accomplish the I'

wide Isnge of emergency actions..." (Emerg.Pl. Rev.19 6 51 c.)

The choice of emergency person-UNCERTAINTY 'IO IMPLDUiST OFF SITE EMERGENCY PIAN.

nel to avoid personal radiation exposure is also a key factor in a Limerick accident,cffsha We assert that training in this respect as well as evacuation plans have been allow-j ed to lapse. This must be one of the safety considerations in a hearing on Unit 2.

In 10 CFR Part 50 App.E (1983) a full scale onsite and offsite exercise was required for evaluation of the public's safety in a hearing for a license, Union'of Ca.Sc. v. 1 i

US NRC. 735 F2d 1437 (1984) 91440. NRC's attempt to eliminate this the Court stopped .l

... Congress did not grant the Commission discretion to remove so material an issue i as the results of offsite energency preparedness from required section 189(a) hea- l' ings. The adoption of such a rule was beyond NRC's statutory authority accord-ingly we vacate the Amendment. (Above,USC 91451) i 1

In accordance with this Court decision in USC we assert that NRC is required to l evaluate in a hearing,in which we ask to be a citizen intervenor, whether there is j assurance the public can be protected in a Limerick emergency (10 CFR # 50.47) and whether offsite energency plans are able to be implemented for an accident involving Unit 2,or either or both units.

We are prepared to present evidence that the evacuation plans for the area adjacent to Limerick are no lenger workable. The Wacuation Time Estimates prepared ~ in 1984 by the PECO consultant HMM Associates are not valid in 1989 bermuse of vast increases j in business and resident population and complex traffic congestion. Many of the evacu-ation highways acheduled for use East, South and West from Limerick are now subject to work day or shopping peak tie-ups,often for miles. The enormous commuter and shopper influx in Valley Forge and King of Prussia,because of increased building l causes almost daily gridlock on Routes 76,276,and 202 Peak travel in Valley Forge Park can lack up for miles twice daily. The use of Route 252 in a Limerick emergency >

would probably be possible only in the first minutes'after an alara. This would also hold true of the other routes in that area picked out for evacuation west, south and east.

CONCLUSION. We assert that the public cannot be 'jrotected by the previous offsite energency plan because it is, presently unworkable. ' Revisions <mnnot solve the probles:

a new emergency plan will have to be prepared. We call for a hearing on the threats to the public safety from Unit 2 and petition for a freeze on fuel loading or any operation.1 Respectfu y pubmitted, 4 I certify copies to: NRC Docketing, Staff,M.B.Margulies ,

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