ML20010J217

Forwards Itemized Responses to Sections 2.2,2.3 & 2.4 of NUREG-0612 Re Control of Heavy Loads,Per NRC 801222 Request

ML20010J217
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/22/1981
From:	Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07972, TAC-7972, NUDOCS 8109290723
Download: ML20010J217 (16)

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912H5s6000 435 Smth Avenue My'S">* September 22, 1981 Director of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' C#) ,x Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief

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Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 p ,

Division of Licensing h A

Washington, DC 20555 _

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Reference:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 [ kJ Docket No. 50-334  %'-  %

Control of Heavy Loads - NUREG-0612 Y  % <

D / Tyt (O Gentlemen:

Attached for your review are the itemized responses as requested by your letter dated December 22, 1980. The three Sections submitted are:

2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools.

2.3 Specific Requirements of Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Containment.

2.4 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equiprent Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling.

Very truly yours, 2

. J. Carey Vice President, Nuclear cc: Mr. D. A. Beckman, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclesr Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission b

c/o Document Management Branch j Washington, DC 20555 ll 8109290723 810922 PDR ADOCK 05000334 PDR.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Control of Heavy Loads - NUREG-0612 Attachment A 2.2 Requirements. for Overhead Haddling Systems in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools 2.2.1 Identify by name,. type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e. , ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall.into the spent fuel pool.

RESPONSE Name: Moveable Platform Crane Type: Electric Overhead Traveling Capacity: 2-10 Tons (each)

Equip. Designation: CR-27 Note: Incorrectly listed as 5 tons each in Table 1 of June 23, 1981 submittal 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer .than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that fm. any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage pool.

RESPONSE Fuel Cask Grane is shown on Figure 3A of the June 23, 1981 submitta' a- ehis subject. This crane travels the length of the Decontamination- Building and into the northwest section of the Fuel Building. The Bel Building -is oriented such that the fuel cask crane travel does not pass over the spent fuel pool. The sIent fuel cask laydown r area is separated by a concrete wall (2 feet thick) from 4

the spent fuel pool. The only penetration is a 24 in. slot to allow for passage of spent fuel elements into the laydown area. This slot is entirely above the storage

'icvel of the spent fuel elements in the pool, thereby

providing assurance that the loss of- water via the . slot could not uncover the fuel. The movement of the fuel cask l within the fuel cask laydown area is handled in a two-?if t t operation with both levels of cask placement resulting in the cask remaining below the top of the 2 foot thick' concrete wall. The only time that the cask is lifted above i the level of the wall is to clear the platform hoist rail at the side of the fuel building. The time over this point is minimal and the distance 'to the fuel pool is the maximum possible. Thus, the - physical arrangement o f '. the Fuel Building is such that a cask drop accident would not cause damage to the stored spent fuel assemblies.

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. l Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 l

. Control of Heavy Loads, NUREG-0612 ]

Attachment A Page 2 l 2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2. 2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood cf a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaulation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design j featu res ) . For each crane so evaluated, provide the load- )

handling-system (i.e., c rane-load-combination) information I specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE None ~

I 2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized accord- I ing to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the c rite ria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response 20 Section 2.4 of this request.

With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of conpliance. This response should include the following information for each crane: l

a. Which niternatives (e.g. , 2, 3, or 4) from those identi-fied in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, have been selected.

RESPONSE Alternative 2 i

b. If Alternative 2 or 3 is selected, discuss the c rane motion limitation imposed by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops and indicate the circumstances, if any, under which these protective devices may be bypassed or removed. Discuss any administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of bypass or removal, and i provide any related or proposed technical specification (operational and surveillance) p rovided to ensure the operability of such electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

RESPONSE The moveable platform crane spans the spent fuel pool and' carries two electric hoists (one spent fuel and one new l fuel). Fuel assemblies are moved within the spent fuel l pool by means 'of a long-handled tool suspended from the l hoist. 1 l

The hoist travel, tool, and sling length are designed to l limit the maximum lift of a fuel assembly to a safe j shielding depth. The motor-driven platform is also used l to upend the new fuel assembly shipping container (its 1

-heaviest load). The upending operation consists of a hoisting motion concurrent with a traversing motion of the platform.

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 ,

Conttol of Heavy Loads', NUREG-0612 Attachment A Page 3 Although this is the heaviest load lif ted by the crane, it' is not truly a lif ted load because the shipping contair.er is never entirely lifted, only up-ended. Additionaly, this is not lifted near the spent fuel.

Further, the moveable plat form load limit switch is set for 50 lb. over the weight of the fuel assembly and its handling tool. The c rane design safety factor of 5 coupled with the load limiter results in a factor of safety of approximately 25.

In addition, loads in excess of l.5 tons are prohibited from travel over the . fuel assemblies in the Spent . Fuel->

Storage Pool Building by Technical Specification 3.9.7.

This restriction on movement of loads over fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that no more than the contents of one fuel assembly will be damaged in the event of a fuel handling accident. Thus , a fuel handling accident ~

does not result in potential offsite~ exposures in excess .

of those listed in ICCFR100.

c. Where reliance is placed on crane operational limitations with respect to the time of the storage of certain quantities of spent fuel at specific post-irradiation decay times , provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

RESPONSE Reliance is not placed on the time of storage of spent fuel.

d. Where reliance is placed on the physical location of specific fuel modules at certain post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or. proposed technical speci-fications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

RESPONSE Reliance is not placed on ~ the physical location of specific fuel elements.

e. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance - with . Cri-teria I through III should conform to the guidelines of ~

NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken-to these guidelines, and ' provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, ' or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

RESPONSE Load drop analysis is . not required in this case.

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ ____________.__ ____u

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Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 3b. 1 Control of Heavy Leads, NUREG-0612 Attachment A Page 4 2.3 Requirement for Overhead Handling System in Containment 2.3.1 Identify by nau, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no c redit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE Name: Containment Polar Crane Type: Electric Overhead Circular Traveling Capacity: Trolley No. 1 main hook 130 tons aux. hook 15 tons Trolley No. 2 main hook 130 tons Equip. Designator: CR-1 2.3.2 Justify the exclusior. sf any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are pe: unently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system fail-ure, the load may land in or on the reactor essel.

RESPONSE (a) The Refueling Manipulator Crane (CR-5) lifts a maxinum load of one fuel element and handling tool. By definition (NUREG-0612), this is not a heavy load. The results of a drop from this crane have been previously addressed in a detailed study entitled " Fuel Handling Accident Evalu-ation" dated October 31, 1977. In addition, the crane is scheduled to be modified tc provide a dual cable heist and various safety feature improvements.

(b) The Neutron Detector Carriage (CR-16) does not lift any heavy loads.

2.3.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as having su f ficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop er.tremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1_.6, or partial conr-pliance supplemented by suitable alternetive or additional design featu res ) . For each crar.e so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) informa-s tion specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE The Beaver Valley Unit 1 polar crane was designed with a minimum safety factor of 5 in accordance with EOCI Specification 61 and meets the later requirement of CMAA

70. The crane bridge was designed for 200 tons, with an occasional overload of 25 pe rcent ; and was ' capable of withstanding the one-time ' overload lif t of 375' tons for the reactor vessel and a 345 ton lif t with bridge rotation

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Control of Heavy Loads, NUREG-0612 Attechment A Page 5 for each steam generator. The centerline of the 375 ton load was located between the centerline of bridge and a point 37 f t, f rom centerline of bridge toward the extended girder end.

See Enclosure 1 for the 13ad-handling-system information specified in Attachment 1.

2.3.4 For cranes identified in 2.3-1, above, not categorized accord-ing to 2.3-3, demon strate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaulation of c rane ope ra tion in the containment and your d^ termination of compliance.

RESPONSE There are no cranes in this category 2.4 Requirements for Overload Handling Systems in Proximity to Safs Shutdown Equipment 2.4.1 Identify any c ranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design featu re s to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be ca rried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial com-pliance supplemented by suitable alterna*ive or additional design featu re s ) . For each crane so evaluated, p rovide the load-handling-system (i.e. , crane-load-combination) informa-tion specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE As discussed in Section 2.1.3f and Section 2.33, the polar c rane (CR-1) was conservatively designed such that the possibility of a load drop is small. In addition to the design fea tu re s , the rigorous administration controls imposed by refueling procedures and comprehensive opera-tor training provide an in depth defense against load d rop. Fu rt he r, the inclusion of NUREG 0612 requirements in maintenance procedures and of ANSI B30.2 requirements for inspection, testing, and maintenance will increase the margin of safety.

The load-handling-system information is provided in En-closure 1 2.4.2 For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-tailure proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive haza rd evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:

. Beever Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Control of licavy Loads , NUREC-0612 Attachment A Page 6

a. The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads iduntification should include designation and weight or c ros s-re fe rence to information provided in 2.1-3-c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other mcthod such that the impact area :an be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.

RESPONSE Table 1 shows the matrix of heavy loads and potential impact areas.

b. For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact a rea combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site -specif * : consideratic as.

RESPONSE Table 1 provides this information.

c. For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4 b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evalisated as having sufficient design features to make the liked' hood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for chis evaluation (i.e.,-complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitabic alternative or addi-tional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., c rane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSU Thir information is included in the response to 2.4.1

d. For intt ractions not climinated in 2.4-2-b o r 2,4-2-c ,

above, Jemonstrate using appropriate analysi , that damage would not preclude operation of suf ficient equipinent to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).

RESPON_SE All interactions were eliminated.

Encircure I to Attcchment A Load - Handling - System Data Nace: Polar Crane (CR-1)

Cranc Mf r: P6H (a product of Harnischfeger)

Design Rated Load: 375 Tons (main trolleys) 15 Tons (aux. hoist)

Max. Critical Load: 130 Tons (main trolleys)

The Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 1 containment polar crane (CR-

1) was purchased in 1969 prior to the publishing of NUREG-0554 (1979). The design was compared to the NUREG, and the results are outlined below.

SPECIFICATION AND DESIGN CRITERIA This crane was designed and fabricated to comply with the requirements of EOCI Specification No. 61, however, it does meet the later requirements of CMAA 70. The design rated load exceeds the maximum critical load by almost a factor of 3. Its design took into account the containment environnent to which it would be subjected.

A coldproof test as recommended as an alternative for operating plants (NUREG-0554) using a singic dummy load equal to 1.25 times the MCL is not considered necessary for this polar crane, All construction loads were far in exceas of this load and were pet formed over a period during which the containmen. was not closed and during the months of June thru December. A nondestructive examination of all critical areas was conducted after each const ruction lif t.

The crane structure is fairly ficxible and a review of crane drawings has not revealed any welds which would be susceptible to lamellar tearing. Most welds are small fillet welds. In most cases, welded parts on this crane are made of carbon steel. These steels have good weld ability. This crane was a shop fabricated structure and all welding was perforned to manufacturers standard procedures.

The crane will perform only a limited number of lif ts (several hundred) throughout the life of the plant. Of these lif ts, the heaviest expected load is that of the reactor vessel head each refueling. Because the number of cycles is small and the maximum stresses are well below yield stress, fatigue failure is highly unlikely.

SEISMIC ANALYSIS The method of analysis employed by the crane manufacturer (Harnischfeger Corp.) was computational in natu re and was based upon the matrix d isplacement method (d irec t stif fness method). The first step in this method was to approximate the actual configu ration as a st ruc tu ral framework which was defined as a stable system of uniform (constant cross section), weightless beam segments, and joints at which loads are applied and weights are lumped. This model information along with the structural

.. Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1

' Control of Heavy Lords - NUREG-0612

. Enclosure 1 to Attachuent A Page 2 loading (static loads and dynamic loading in the form of a shock spectra input) is used by the computer to perform the computations to provide the following information:

, 1. Displacements , = Nen t and axial fo rces , and moments of members for static loadings.

2. Reactions and equilibrium checks at each joint for static loadings.

! 3 .' Frequencies and' node shapes.

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4. Displacements , shear and axial' fo rc e s , and moments of members for each of first six forced nodes of vibration.

The polar crane meets the requirementt of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic

, Design Classification" and is designed for all normal operating loads l acting simultaneously with both horizontal and vertical seismic loading.

The horizontal and vertical operating basie seismic loading is combined i directly considering a single horizontal direction earthquake. The stress level due to these combined loading condition does not exceed 90 percent of

the minimum yield strength. The following design cases were analyzed

Case I In this case the crane analysis considered the sum of the following:

l Dead Load: This is the weight of all effective

parts of the bridge s t ruc tu re , ma-l' chinery parts,' and the fixed equipnent supported by the structure.

]i Live Load: This is wieght of the trolleys and the lifted load (rated capacity - 200 tons).

Impact Allowance

This is an additional load equal l to 15 percent of the rated capa-

city.

Case II In this case an analysis was performed considering all dead loads and a 380 ton construction live load.

l Case III In this case an analysis was performed considering all dead loads and a 418 ton test load.

Case IV i

a This analysis was for the operating base earthquake (OBE) considering the sum of all dead loads and live loads (no lifted load).

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. Betver Velley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Control of lietvy Lords - NUREG-0612

, Enclo:ure 1 to Attachment A Page 3

b. This analysis was for the design base carthquake (DBE) considering the sum of all dead loads and live loads (no lifted load).

SAFETY FEATURES Crane motor controls are of the " dead man" type wica spring return to "0FF" position. The bridge movenent is controlled by four (4) self adjunting, hyd raulically ope ra ted , brakes which a re mounted on the bridge motor extension shaf t and actuated by a foot Icver located in the cab. Each main hoist and auxiliary hoist has three brakes, an eddy current load brake and two s p ring-se t , electrically released, double shoe type load holding brakes. All are rated at 150 percent of motor full load torque. The holding brakes are automatically applied to the motor shaf t when the motor is deenergized. The trolley traverse motor has a helf-torque brake which is automatically applied to the motor shaf t when the motor is deenergized.

Limit switches have been provided to limit travel of the hoists in both the upward and downward directions.

IIDISTING MACllINERY The basic hoisting system used on the polar crane hoists consiste of a hoist drum driven by an electric motor through a gearcase. The hoist drum is used to takeup and payout the wire rope used to raise and lower the load.

A nagne to rque load brake rated for 150 percent of full motor torque is located between the motor and gearcase. The magnetorque is an electro-magnet exerting torque on the motor to preload the motor and to provide the speed control of a normally loaded motor without the use of a mechanical load brake. Magnetorque control provides superior speed regulation over any other AC crane control and actually exceedr the control available with DC dynamic lowering control. An additional feature of Magnetorque control is ths- it is impossible for the load to lower with the controller on any hoist position. OFF position braking is a safety feature with Magnetorque

< >n t ro l . With the controller in the OFF position, the Magnetorque unit is excited at a reduced voltage. In the case of an electric motor brake f a ilu re , the load will overhaul the hoisting unit, but the Magnetorque brake will exert a braking torque to slowly lower the overhauling load to the floor, thus preventing a f ree falling load.

In addition to the above braking system, each hoist is equipped with two (2) shoe-type electric brakes. These brakes are spring-set and electri-cally released.

The hoisting ropes used on the main hoists are 12 part, 1-1/8 inch, 6 x 37, ext ra-high-s t rengt h ropes with independent wire rope centers. The hoisting rope used on the auxiliary hoist is 4 part, 5/8 inch, 6 x 37 improved steel plow cable. The attachment of the cabic ends to the the

Besver Velley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Control of Heavy Loads - NUREG-0612 Enclosure 1 to Attachment A Page 4 d rums is such that if all but two wraps of the rope were unwound, the attachment would be strong enough to carry the load with a factor of safety of at least five.

Drums, sheaves, bottom blocks, and hoisting ropes were designed such that when raising or lowering, no twisting of the cables occurs. Bottom sheave blocks are of the enclosed type with guards to prevent cables from leaving the sheaves. Limit switches have been provided which limit the travel of hoists in the upward direction, thereby preventing two-blocking.

Maximum hoisting speed for the critical load for the polar crane is in compliance with the requirements of CMAA Specification #70.

A static load test was performed on each hook in addition to the 418-ton load test described under " Testing and Preventive Maintenance". Physical measurements of the hooks were taken prior to and af ter the load test and again af ter each special construction lif t and were acceptable. Hooks were magnetic particle tested for cracks and flaws before and after the load test, and af ter each special construction lif t. The hook bottom blocks and main pinion shaft fillets (on the drum side of each shaf t) were ultra-sonically tested for cracks and flaws at the same time.

BRIDGE AND TROLLEY Bridge structure braking is accomplished by four type DH brake assemblies.

All are shoe-type hydraulic applied and spring-released brakes. The DH type brake is self-adjusting and does not require any adjustments during normal operation. Depressing the pedal on the master cylinder, pumps hydraulic fluid to the wheel cylinder on the brake.

Trolley movement is controlled by a disc-type electric b rake which is spring-set and magnetically released. Operating the motion control device associated with a crane motion closes the circuit which applies power to both the motor and b rake coil. Energizing the b rake coil pulls the armature which compresses the spring and release t he b rake . Returning the motion control device to the OFF position, opens the circuit to both the motor and brake coil, and the spring sets the brake.

The c rane speed limits a re in compliance with those specified in Specification CMAA #70.

DRIVERS AND CONTROLS The polar crane main hoists are driven by 50 HP wound rotor motors, while the auxiliary hoist is driven by a 15 HP motor. Each of the motors are protected by thermal overload relays and speed controlled by PVA timed Magne torques . Hoisting movement is limited in the up direction by P6H type HB weight operated limit switches and in the down direction by geared type limit switches. All control c ircuits , hoisting, b raking, and holding

l ~, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Control of Heavy Lords - NUREG-0612

, Enclosure 1 to Attachment A Page 5 systems hava been satisfactorily tested and are further described in other sections of this response. The complete operating control system and provi* ions for eme rgency controls for this crane are located in the operators cab on the bridge.

OPERATING MANUAL AND INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS The requirements of NUREG-0554 concerning the manufacture's issuing of a manual of information and procedures for use in construction, checkout, testing, control and operation of the polar c rane have been fully satisfied.

TESTING AND PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE Af ter erection of the polar crane and prior to acceptance, the c rane undement a complete testing program and a e 18-ton load tests This load test was 321% of the maxinum critical load to ba lif ted by the crane. The test consisted of raising the 418-ton load 0.5 inches and stopping it to check the holding of the hoist brakes (duration of hold was one hour).

After successful completion of this test, the load was raised at the lowest speed position possible (#3); and as the load came approximately one inch off the floor, the main power was shut off in the operator's cab. The brakes held satisfactorily under this loss of power. The load was then raised using the 3rd, 4th, and 5th speeds to a suitable height (about 15 feet). The load was then lowered through all five speeds, and when within one foot of the floor, the power was again shut off in the cab, and the brakes again held satisfactorily. The load was then raised to a height of 5 feet and the bridge and tr Lley t ravel we re tested with the load traversing to the mid-span of the bridge.

At the completion of the above test, an NDT and a visual inspection was performed on the hooks and on the critical points.

A thorough visual examination of the entire c rane was performed for evidance of permanent deflection or wear resulting from the load test. The crane was then used for the successful installation of the reactor vessel, pressurizer vessel, and three steam generators.

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TABLE 1 ,

IDAD/ IMPACT AREA MATRIX .

\

!!AZARD

. 2.1.3.a S.**ETY RELATED y ELIMINATION LOAD WEIGIIT(TONS) pi c, , EQuli> MENT COORDINATES ELEVATION CATEGORY

-CRANE NONE 7.5 5C RIVER WATER K, 11 1/2 713 a2,b l CR-9

' ( 76 6 '-7")

• SPECIFIED PIPING

CR-15 3

( 79 8 '-4")

• S<E'tT FUEL 21.5 3A FUEL POOL P-R, 8 1/2 766 a ,b,d SIIP G. C AL'K COOLING PIPING

CR-17 RIVER WATER 4 RIVER WATER C-D, 2-6 705 a 5 ,b

( 74 5 ' -0")

• PUMP 6.5 PIPING MOTOR 2.7 SERVICE WATER PUMPS & PIPING (BVPS-2)

RAW WATER 4 RIVSR WATER 'C-D, 2-3 & 705 a,b PUMP 9.3 PUMP & PIPING 5-6 MOTOR -

3.8 SERVICE WATER PUMPS & PIPING ELECTRIC FIRE 4 R1'IER WATER D-E, 2-3 666 a,b PUMP 3.0 PIPING MOTOR 2.0 DIESEL FIRE 4 RIVER & D-E, 2-6 666 a,b PUMP 3.0 SERVICE WATER ENGINE 1.9 PIPING IlYDRO- 1.2 4 RIVER WA'?ER D-3, 2-3 666 a,b PNEUMATIC PIPING TANK REMOVABLE 4.3 4B RIVER & SERVICE C-E, 2-6 705 a,b COVERS (largest) WATER PUlIPS &

PIPING SERVICE WATER 13.8 4 RIVER & SERVICE C-E, 3-6 705 a,b PUMP & MOTOR WATER PUMPS &

PIPING ,

TABLE 1

• LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX ,

IIAZARD 2.1.3.a SAFETY RELATED ELIMINATION CRANE- LOAD WEIGIIT (TONS) Fia. EQUIPMENT COORDINATES 1 ELEVATION CATEGORY CR-17 TRAVELING 6 ,

( 74 5 '-0 ")

• SCREENS 10.4' 4A cont. (heaviest)

STOP LOGS 6 10 4A CR-19 4 NONE 13.9 NONE CABLES ON TIIE

( 751'-6")

• SPECIFIED (MAX) LEVEL BELOW F-II , 5-9 725 b CR-20

( 742 '-0")

• CIIARGING 5C REMAINING G 's/8-J, 722 b7 PUMP 3. 8 CIIARGING PUMPS 8 /8-10 1/ 4 MOTOR 2.0 . & PIPING ItEMOVABLE 5.0 SC REMAINING . G 7/8-J, 722 b7 COVE RS (MAX)

CIIARGING PUMPS 87/8-101/4

& PIPING ,

CR-21

( 746 '-0") *

• COMPONENT SC AUX. BUILDING K-L,9 3/8-11 732 b,c COOLING WATER VENT.EXII AUST PUMP 1.5 (CliARGINO PUMP M(7FOR 1.7 ZXIIAUSTS INTO THIS DUCT)

CR-23 SEAL WATER 1.1 5C' RIVER WATER J-K,11 1/2-13 730 d

( 76 0 ' -0 ") *

• IIE AT PIPING EXCIIANGER NON 4.3 5B " " "

d REGENERATIVE IIEAT EXCIIANGER DEBORATING 1.0 SB d

DEMINERALIZER CESIUM REMOVAL 1.0 5B " " " " d.

ION EXCIIANGER

TABLE 1 .

LOAD / IMPACT AREA MATRIX

• IIAZARD 2.1,.3.a SAIT;TY RELATED ELIMINATION CRANE LOAD WEIGHT (T'ONS) Fig. EQUIPMENT COORDINATES 1 ELEVATION CATEGORY

( con t. ) FUEL POOL 1.0 SB RIVER WATER J-K, 11 1/2-13 730 d ION EXCIIANGER PIPING REMOVAB LE 8.5 "iB d COVERS (largest)

SEAL FILTER 7.5 REMOV71 SIIIELD SB d CR-24 ** REMOVABLE 6.0 SA CIIARGIMG AND -J-L, 8 7/8- 753 a8 A&B COVE RS VOLUME CONTROL 9 3/8

( 78 2 '-0") PIPING CR-27 ** NEW FUEL 2.5 3B FUEL POOL IIEAT' P-R, 10 3/4- 741 a,b,d 9 (788'-6") S!!IPPING (fully EXCIIANGERS 11 3/4 NTAINER '.oaded)

FAILED FUEL 1.5 3A FUEL POOL M-R, 8 1/8- 741 a

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ASSY. STORAGE ( full) COOLING 10 3/4 CAN PIPING NOTES:

1. Coordinates are column designations from plant equipment location.

2. Redundant line: 2 4 " - WR 151 - 03,

3. Redundant line: 6" - FC 152 - Q3.

4. CR - 19 13.9 ton load limit discussed in 2.1.3.f remains ir effect.

5. The entirely separate auxiliary intake structure provides redn.J3ancy as well as the redundant river water pumps and piping.

6. These loads, listed in response to 2.1.3c, are physically prevented (because of their size) from being lifted over any safety related .

equipment.

7. These lifts will be controlled to maintain the minimum lift height possible (generally less than 6") and to insure that the load passes over no floor opening other than that required to gain access to the i af fected equipment.

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NOTES: cont. '! .

8. In the unlikely case that a floor plug would be dropped in such a manner that it passed through the smaller sized floor opening and then damaged either boric acide, transfer pump suction pipe (2"-Cll-41-15 3WQ3 or 2 "-

CII-42 -15 3W-03) , the other transfer pump would remain unaffected and would continue to perform its intended function. Also emergency boration means exist by lining up cperating charging pump with the borated re fueling water supply tank.

9. This load is never fully lifted, only upended. In addition the lift is restricted by the crane safe load path. Finally, the fuel pool cooling system contains 100 pc1 cent redundant pumps and heat exchangers which would continue to perform their intended function in the event of a load drop sufficient to cause damagc to either of the "a"or "b" train equipment.

The river water system is also provided as an emergency means of cooling the spent fuel pool, if required.

• Elevation of the top of the crane rail.

• • Elevation of the hook at maximum height.

. HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES :

a. System redundancy and separation preculudes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop.

b. Sufficient administrative controls exist to prevent lifting this load to a height sufficient to penetrate the concrete floor separating the lif ting device and load from the safety related equipment.

c. Sufficient time exists to allow repair of any damage caused by this drop before loss of capability of this system to perform its safety-related function would occur.

d. Administrative controls exist to maintain the load within the bounds of the safe load path and to prevent the movement of the load over the safety related equipment.

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