ML20009F448

Final Deficiency Rept Re Unauthorized Field Welded Attachments on Containment Vessel Shell,Initially Reported on 810416.Special Repair Procedure Issued to Correct/Remove Weld Deficiencies

ML20009F448
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/18/1981
From:	Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, L-81-208, NUDOCS 8107310163
Download: ML20009F448 (3)

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n May 18, 1981 L-81-208 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

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101 tiarietta Street, Suite 3100 W g.*P "J-'ym~ @ 11 +q Atlanta, Georgia 30303 2( e JUL 3 01981 t. >

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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\ ,f RE: RII:JP0 50-389 s Attachments Welded To Containment Vessel i D h.k*

As previously reported to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement on April 16, 1981, we have identified unauthorized field welded attachments on the containment vessel shell at two locations.

Pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) requirements, a final report is attached.

4 Very truly yours, ,

- 2-. hA 3 i ' Robert E. Uhrig VJ Vice President AdvancedSystems& Technology [

REU/TCG/ah Attachment cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555(w/att.)

Harold F. Reis, Esquire

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8107310163 810518 PDR ADOCK 05000389 S PDR

T FINAL DEFICIENCY REPORT Attachments Welded to Containment Vessel Name of Station: St. Lucie Plant - Unit 2 Owner: Florida Power & Light Company Architect / Engineer: Ebasco Services, Incorporated NRC Notification: April 16,1981 Final Report Filed: May 18, 1981 g --, ,- - -

O' g I. Summa ry

, During a general inspection of the containment vessel, unauthorized field welded attachments, which do not meet applicable ASME Code requirements, l.

were identified at two locations on the vessel.

Per the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e), the event was deemed potentially reportable and per telecon, FPL notified the NRC on April 16, 1981 of such.

Upon further evaluation of the matter, we deem the event reportable and this final report is being submitted to advise the NRC of the description of the deficiency and the correctise actions that have been taken.

II. Dercription During a general inspection of the containment vessel, unauthorized welding wasdiscoveredonthegesselshellattwolocations. The first unauthorized weld is at Azimuth 189 and Elevation 147' -5" on the inside surface of the vessel. The weld is a 3/8 inch diameter burr which indicated something had been attached and remoged, leaving only the burr. The second unauthorized weld is at Azimuth 187 and Elevation 145' -0" on the inside surface of the vessel. The weld is a 3/6 inch (approximately) fillet weld 2 inches long attaching a clip. There is no evidence that preheat was used for either weld.

The St. Lucie Urit 2 contain.nent vessel is designed per the requirements of ASME Code,Section III,1971 Edition through Summer 1972 Addenda. Part NE paragraph NE-4430 of the Summer 1972 Addenda details the requirements of 4

the welding of attachments. The two unauthorized welds in question constituted a Code violation of four subparagraphs of partgraph NE-4430. The four subparagraphs violated are NE-4431, NE-4432, NE-4535 and NE-4436.

, III. Corrective Action A nonconformance report (NCR#1704M) has been issued which identifies the deficiency. Chicago Bridge & Iron (C8&I) has issued a Special Repair Procedure SR-9 to correct / remove the identified weld deficiencies. Corrective action has been taken in accordance with the procedure.

IV. Safety Inalication The identified weld deficiencics found during a general inspection, if remained undiscovered during the plant's 40 year life, could have had a potential effect on the structural integrity of the containment vessel shell.

V. Conclusion The two weld deficiencies on the containment vessel shell have been corrected utilizing CB&I's Special Repair Procedure SR-9.

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