ML20023C662

Deficiency Rept Re Potential Significant Safety Hazard Concerning Defect in Stainless Steel Tubing Pressure Boundary Component.Initially Reported on 830504.Selected Tubes Returned to C-E Tubes for Reinsp

ML20023C662
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/06/1983
From:	Scherer A ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To:	Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
LD-83-040, LD-83-40, NUDOCS 8305170527
Download: ML20023C662 (10)

Text

r C-E P:wir Sy:tims .

Tel 203/688-1911 Combustion Engineering. Inc Telex. 99297 1000 Prospect Hill Rcad Windsor. Connecticut 06095 H POWER SYSTEMS May 6,1983 50-336 LD-83-040 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Report of Potential Significant Safety Hazard Related to Material Defects in a Stainless Steel Tubing Pressure Boundary Component

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

This letter confirms our May 4,1983 verbal notification by Mr. J. B. Kingseed (C-E) to Mr. W. Mills (NRC) pursuant to reporting of a potential significant safety hazard related to a defect in stainless steel tubing used in a component which is part of the NSSS pressure boundary.

Combustion Engineering's (C-E's) Nuclear Product Manufacturing Facility (East Windsor, Connecticut) procured stainless steel tubing from C-E's Chattanooga Tube Mill (C-E Tubes) for use in the Upper Pressure Housing of Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDMs) and for Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) assemblies. This tubing was ordered specifying adherence to Section III of the ASME Code. During fabrication of a RVLMS flange assembly (pressure housing),

C-E discovered defects in some tubing. Further investigation revealed that some material from the suspect lot was used in the manufacture of the St. Lucie Unit 1 RVLMS assemblies. This component has been installed in the plant and thus far has been in service for about one year. St. Lucie Unit 1 is presently shut down for refueling and maintenance and, as such, there is no immediate safety concern nor is any immediate action required.

Corrective actions have been initiated to address the problem at hand.

Arrangements are presently being made to have the St. Lucie Unit 1 RVLMS flange assembly reinspected prior to the plant's return to power. Furthermore, all material in the order from which the suspect lot of tubing originated has been located and quarantined. Selected tubes from this order have been returned to C-E Tubes for reinspection by ultrasonic methods to further quantify the nature of this problem. In addition, an investigation into the failure of the inspection and rework procedures to eliminate the defects is being carried out. Appropriate measures are also under consideration to reduce the possibility for recurrence of this problem in the future.

8305170527 830506 .

PDR ADOCK 05000335  ?

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Mr. Richard C. DeYoung LD-83-040 May 6, 1983 Page 2 While Combustion Engineering is concerned with the discovery of rejectable indications in previously accepted tubing and the possible consequent generic implications of a failure in the inspection and rework procedure to ensure delivery of essentially fault-free material, C-E does not now have information to indicate that the problem cited above is present in any other lot of tubing. To the contrary, there are indications that earlier tubing lots were free of defects.

The Attachment provides additional information pursuant to the reporting of potential significant safety hazards.

If you have any questions on the above, please feel free to contact me or Mr. C. M. Molnar of my staff at (203) 688-1911, Extension 4765.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.,

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. E. Sdrsr Ma Director Nuclear Licensing AES:tmr Attachment cc: J. M. West, C-E 1

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LD-83-040 Attachment Page 1 of 3 r

INFORMATION CONCERNING P0TENTIAL SIGNIFICANT SAFETY HAZARD RELATED TO MATERI AL DEFECTS IN A STAINLESS STEEL TUBING PRESSURE BOUNDARY COMPONENT

1. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Connission.

1 Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road P.O. Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

! 2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component which is the subject of this report is a lot of stainless steel . tubing used for the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) assembly, which is a primary system pressure boundary component. This mat rial was used in fabriction of the RVLMS which has been delivered to and installed at St. Lucie Unit 1. It should also be noted that

material of this type is used in the fabrication of Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDM's). However, that material is not the subject of this report.

i

3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or' supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The material in question was fabricated by:

Combustion Engineering, Inc.,

Chattanooga Tube Mill Chattanooga Operations 911 West Main Street Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402 This C-E manufacturing facility is refered to as C-E Tubes, i

LD-83-040 Attachment Page 2 of 3

4. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

Stainless steel tubing was fabricated by C-E Tubes under manufacturing orders requiring adherence to Section III of the ASME Code. During fabrication of a RVLMS flange assembly, inspection by the C-E East Windsor Manufacturing facility using dye penetrant examination of a weld revealed a flaw indication adjacent to the weld area in the stainless steel tubing.

Following discovery of these indications, the entire heat of fifteen pressure tubes, procured for the manufacture of level monitoring system assemblies, was shipped to C-E Tubes for reinspection by the ultrasonic methods initially used in qualifying the material under the Code. The result of the reinspection showed that two tubes failed to meet ASME Code requirements, one more failed to meet C-E requirements, which are more stringent than the code, and twelve contained no rejectable indications.

C-E considers the defects found to be a matter of concern since the failure to screen out unacceptable tubing could lead to a reduction in the engineering safety factor of material which was procured for primary system pressure boundary service. The defects are believed to be limited to one shipment of tubes, of which only two tubes have seen service in an operating reactor. These were used to make Vessel Level Monitoring assemblies for St. Lucie Unit 1 and have been in service for about one year. The tubing in question (heat of 15 tubes) came from an order placed in June, 1980. At that time, 194 tubes were ordered for fabrication of upper pressure housings. The remaining tubes in that order have been accounted for and none of them have been delivered.

Although tubing of this type from the same source (C-E Tubes) has been used in other C-E reactors, there is no indication that the deficiency in defect elimination now observed existed then. In fact, there is evidence that the opposite is true. In 1977, 66 tubes were reinspected by Automation Industries when the ASME Code requirements for ultrasonic inspection methods were changed and made more elaborate. At that time, all 66 tubes passed the tests satisfactorily. In light of this, C-E believes that the problem may be limited to the present set of tubes, only two of which have been made available for service.

LD-83-040 Attachment Page 3 of 3

5. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

Verification that two tubes did in fact fail to meet the ASME Code upon reinspection by C-E Tubes was obtained on April 11,1983. The evaluation of this deviation was completed on May 3,1983, concluding that a defect may exist.

6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Two RVLMS assemblies utilizing material from the tubing lot in question have been installed at St. Lucie Unit 1 and have been in service for about one year. To the best of C-E's knowledge, no other application of this tubing has been made.

7. The corrective action which has been, is being, o. will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

Arrangements are being made to have C-E's Inspection Services reinspect the RVLMS installed at St. Lucie Unit 1.

Since St. Lucie Unit 1 is currently shutdown for refueling and maintenance there is no immediate safety concern.

Inspection of the assembly will be completed prior to returning the plant to power.

C-E's Nuclear Product Manufacturing Facility (East Windsor, Connecticut) has located and quarantined the remaining tubes from the June, 1980 order. Ninety-one tubes are being reinspected by C-E Tubes to further quantify the suspected defect. Other appropriate corrective actions including potential modifications to the inspection and rework procedures are being considered to reduce the possibility for recurrence of this problem in the future.

8. Any action related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

None.

- C-E Power Systems Tel. 203/688-1911 Cornbustion Engin*.:nng. Inc. Telex: 99297

. 1000 Prosp;ct Hill Road .

Winasor. Connecticut 06095 ,

POWER H SYSTEMS May 6,1983 LO-83-040 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Report of Potential Significant Safety Hazard Related to Material Defects in a Stainless Steel Tubing Pressure Boundary Component

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

This letter confirms our May 4,1983 verbal notification by Mr. J. B. Kingseed (C-E) to Mr. W. Mills (NRC) pursuant to reporting of a potential significant safety hazard related to a defect in stainless steel tubing used in a component which is part of the NSSS pressure bounda,ry.

Combustion Engineering's (C-E's) Nuclear Product Manufacturing Facility (East Windsor, Connecticut) procured stainless steel tubing from C-E's Chattanooga Tube Mill (C-E Tubes) for use in the Upper Pressure Housing of Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDMs) and for Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) assemblies. This tubing was ordered specifying adherence to Section III of the ASME Code. During fabrication of a RVLMS flange assembly (pressure housing),

C-E discovered defects in some tubing. Further investigation revealed that some material from the suspect lot was used in the manufacture of the St. Lucie Unit 1 RVLMS assemblies. This component has been installed in the plant and thus far has been in service for about one year. St. Lucie Unit 1 is presently shut down for refueling and maintenance and, as such, there is no immeciate safety concern nor is any immediate action required.

l Corrective actions have been initiated to address the problem at hand, i

Arrangements are presently being made to have the St. Lucie Unit 1 RVLMS flange assembly reinspected prior to the plant's return to power. Furthermore, all material in the order from which the suspect lot of tubing originated has been located and quarantined. Selected tubes from this order have been returned to C-E Tubes for reinspection by ultrasonic methods to further quantify the nature of this problem. In addition, an investigation into the failure of the l inspection and rework procedures to eliminate the defects is being carried l out. Appropriate measures are also under consideration to reduce the I

possibility for recurrence of this problem in the future.

l

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung LD-83-040 May 6, 1983 Page 2 While Combustion Engineering is concerned with the discovery of rejectable indications in previously accepted tubing and the possible consequent generic implications of a failure in the inspection and rework procedure to ensure delivery of essentially fault-free material, C-E does not now have information to indicate that the problem cited above is present in any other lot of tubing. To the contrary, there are indications that earlier tubing lots were free of defects.

The Attachment provides additional information pursuant to the reporting of potential significant safety hazards.

lf you have any questions on the above, please feel free to contact me or Mr. C. M. Mol.nar of my staff at (203) 688-1911, Extension 4765.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.,

f , - isj

.E.Sdrer Director Nuclear Licensing AES:trar Attachment l

cc: J. M. West, C-E

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LD-83-040 Attachment Page 1 of 3 INFORMATION CONCERNING POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANT SAFETY HAZARD RELATED TO MATERIAL DEFECTS IN A STAINLESS STEEL TUBING PRESSURE B0UNDARY COMPONENT

1. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

Combustion Engineering, Inc.

1000 Prospect Hill Road P.O. Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

i The basic component which is the subject of this report is a lot of stainless steel tubing used for the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) assembly, which is a primary system pressure boundary component. This material was used in fabriction of the RVLMS which has been delivered to and )

installed at St. Lucie Unit 1. It should also be noted that material of this type is used in the fabrication of Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDM's). However, that material is not the subject of this report.

3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The material in question was fabricated by:

Combustion Engineering, Inc.,

Chattanooga Tube Mill Chattanooga Operations 911 West Main Street Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402 l

This C-E manufacturing facility is refered to as C-E Tubes.

LD-83-040 Attachment Page 2 of 3 i

4 Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

Stainless steel tubing was fabricated by C-E Tubes under manufacturing orders requiring adherence to Section III of the ASME Code. During fabrication of a RVLMS flange assembly, inspection by the C-E East Windsor Manufacturing facility using dye penetrant examination of a weld revealed a flaw indication adjacent to the weld area in the stainless steel tubing.

Following discovery of these indications, the entire heat of i

fifteen pressure tubes, procured for the manufacture of level monitoring system assemblies, was shipped to C-E Tubes for reinspection by the ultrasonic methods initially used in qualifying the material under the Code. The result of the reinspection showed that two tubes failed to meet ASME Code requirements, one more failed to meet C-E requirements, which are more stringent than the code, and twelve contained no rejectable indications.

C-E considers the defects found to be a matter of concern since the failure to screen out unacceptable tubing could le&d to a reduction in the engineering safety factor of material which was procured for primary system pressure boundary service. The defects are believed to be limited to one shipment of tubes, of which only two tubes have seen service in on operating reactor. These were used to make Vessel Level Monitoring assemblies for St. Lucie Unit 1 and have been in service for about one year. The tubing in question (heat of 15 tubes) came from an order placed in June, 1980. At that time, 194 tubes were ordered for i

fabrication of upper pressure housings. The remaining tubes in that order have been accounted for and none of them have been delivered.

Although tubing of this type from the same source (C-E Tubes) has been used in other C-E reactors, there is no indication that the deficiency in defect elimination now observed existed then. In fact, there is evidence that the

, opposite is true. In 1977, 66 tubes were reinspected by Automation Industries when the ASME Code requirements for ultrasonic inspection methods were changed and made more elaborate. At that time, all 66 tubes passed the tests sati s f actori ly. In light of this, C-E believes that the problem may be limited to the present set of tubes, only two of which have been made available for service.

I

LD-83-040 Attachment '

Page 3 of 3

5. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

Verification that two tubes did in fact fail to meet the ASME Code upon reinspection by C-E Tubes was obtained on April 11,1983. The evaluation of this deviation was completed on May 3, 1983, concluding that a defect may exist.

6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Two RVLMS assemblies utilizing material from the tubing lot in question have been installed at St. Lucie Unit 1 and have been in service for about one year. To the best of C-E's knowledge, no other application of this tubing has been made.

7. The corrective action which has been ,is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

Arrangements are being made to have C-E's Inspection Services reinspect the RVLMS installed at St. Lucie Unit 1.

Since St. Lucie Unit 1 is currently shutdown for refueling and maintenance there is no immediate safety concern.

Inspection of the assemoly will be completed prior to returning the plant to power.

l C-E's Nuclear Product Manufacturing Facility (East Windsor, Connecticut) has located and quarantined the remaining tubes from the June, 1980 order. Ninety-one tubes are being reinspected by C-E Tubes to further quantify the suspected t

defect. Other appropriate corrective actions including l

potential modifications to the inspection and rework procedures are being considered to reduce the possibility for recurrence of this problem in the future.

8. Any action related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

l None, t -