ML19350D636
| ML19350D636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1980 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350D635 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105180246 | |
| Download: ML19350D636 (32) | |
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POST-EXERCISE EVALUATION STATE OF ILLINOIS AND GRUNDY AND LASALLE COUNTIES EXERCISE OF ThE ILLINOIS PLAN FOR RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS FOR LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, OTTAWA, ILLIN0IS December 4,1980 PREPARED BY:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, REGION V FEDEPAL ~~NTER BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN 49016 18105180
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. e TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................... 1
- 1. FEtiA Responsibilities - Role of the Regi onal Advi so ry Commi ttee ( RAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- 2. Ex e rci s e 0 bj e ct i ve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- 3. Critique.......................................................... 2
- 4. P u b l i c Me e t i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 5. RAC Eval ua ti on Obj ecti ves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 6. Pa rticipating State & Local Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 7. Fe de ral Ob s e rve r Te am. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
- 8. Evaluation Criteria............................................... 3
- 9. Remedial Action Procedures........................................ 3
- 10. Revi ew and Approval Procedu res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 II. E X E CUT I VE S UMMA RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 III. EXE RC I S E S CEN ARI O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Syn o ps i s a n d C ri t i q ue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Re c o rm e n d a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 I V. EVALUATIONS.....................................................'...... 10 A. ASSIGNMENT OF RES PONSIBILITY (ORGANIZATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S t a t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. . . . . . . .
Recommendations.........................................
L aS a l l e -G rur y Co un t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 s .
Re c o mm e n d a t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . .13. . . . . . . . .
B. ONS I TE E MB RG EN CY O RGANI Z AT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 (A licensee related function only.)
C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 S t a t e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Re c o mme n d a t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 D. EME RGEN CY CLASS I FI CAT ION SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 S t a t e - lo c a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Recommendations................................................... 16 E. NOTI FI CATION METHODS AN D P ROCE DURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 S t a t e - L a S a l l e Co un ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Recommendation.................................................... 17
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F. EME R GEN CY C OMMUNI C AT IONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 State.......................................................... 18 Recommendation................................................. 18 G. P UBLI C EDUCATION AN D IN FO RMATI ON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 State-Local.................................................... 19 Recommendation................................................. 19 H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUI PMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 S t a t e -Lo c a l E0 Cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 Recommendations................................................ 20 I. ACCI DENT AS S ESS MENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 State.......................................................... 22 Recommendations................................................ 22 J. P ROT E CT I VE RE S P0N S E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 State-Local.................................................... 24 Recommendations................................................ 24 K. RADI OLOGICAL E XPOSURE CONTR0L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Recommendations................................................ 25 L. MEDI CAL AND P UB LI C H EALTH S UP P0 RT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Re c o mmen d at i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6 M. RE- ENT RY AN D RE C0VE RY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 Recommendations................................................ 27 N. E XE RCI S ES AN D DRI LLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 Recommendations................................................ 28
- 0. RADIOLOGI CAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Local.......................................................... ....... 29 Recommendations................................................ 29
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I. INTRODUCTION On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site r nuclear planning and response.
- 1. FEMA's inmediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility -
Radiological Emergency Planning include:
- a. Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and review and l evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
- b. Decermining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon i observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these !
jurisdictions.
- c. Coordinating.the activities of all of the involved Federal and volunteer agencies:
(1) ' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) .
(2) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
(3) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(4) Department of Energy (DOE)
(5) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
(6) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
(7) Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the States and
- 4 involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by the exercising, critiquing, and evaluation of those plans. A followup Public Meeting is held to acquaint the citizenry with contents of the plans, answer questions about them and receive suggestions on the plans. i
- 2. A radiological emergency exercise was conducted December 4,1980, '
between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. by the State of Illinois to assess the adequacy of the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA) and preparations to protect the public in the event of a . radiological emergency involving the laSalle Nuclear Power Plant, operated by the Commonwealth Edison Company near Ottawa, Illinois. ,
Parts of Grundy and LaSalle Counties are within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) affecting about 16,600 residents. '
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- 3. A Critique of the December 4 exercise was held at 10:00 a.m.,
December 5, 1980, at the Ramada Inn, Ottawa, Illinois. ;
- 4. A public meeting was conducted at 2:00 p.m. , December 5,1980, at the Ramada Inn, Ottawa, Illinois.
- 5. - General RAC objectives for the operational phase of the plans were to exercise and evaluate the following elements as described-in the All-State Letter to State Emergency Services Directors .
[ . in Region V, August 28, 1980:
Communications rnd Warning Accident Assessment Capability of Field Assessrent Teams dse of Protective Action Guides (PAGs)
Public Information
- Evacuation Methodology that would be used Provisions for Re-entry and Recovery of the Affected Area Direction and Control l
Conments on those general areas follow. The basic planning docement on which the State and local plans were developed was NUREG 0654-FEMA REP-1.
L i 6. Participating organizations were:
- a. Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA), at the State E0C in Springfield, and the ESDA mobile Command Post i located at Grand Ridge. .
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- b. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) at Springfield, and at its mobile lab located at Streator.
- c. Local Governments: Grundy County (at its EOC in Morris),
LaSalle County (at its E0C in Ottawa), and towns of Grand Ridge, Marseilles, and Seneca, at their E0Cs.
- d. The Commonwealth Edison Company, at its Headquarters in Chicago, at the LaSalle nuclear pcwer plant, and at.the j licensee's EOF near the LaSalle plant.
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- 7. Federal Observers were:
OBSERVER AGENCY SITE FUNCTION (S)
- 1. P.McColloughl/ FEMA Reg. V Various Overview
- 2. G.Wenger FEMA Reg. V Various Overview
- 3. R. Lee FEMA Reg. V State ESDA E0C Public Information
- 5. W. Grant NRC State ESDA EOC Accident Assessment
- 10. S. Rifkind FEPA Reg. V LaSalle Cty E0C All Functions
- 12. S. Swanson FEPA Region V Grundy Cty E0C All Functions
- 13. F. Kishton FEMA Region V Grundy Cty E0C All Functions 14 D. King FEMA Region V DNS Mobile Lab Accident Assessment
- 16. P. Frost FEPA Reg. V State ESDA CP Communica tions
- 18. D. Smaston FEPA Reg. V Utility EOF Communications
- 22. R. Sherman FEMA Reg. V Marseilles E0C All Functions
- 23. W. Curtis FEMA Reg. V Seneca 3./ All Functions
- 26. J. Eldridge FEMA Reg. IX Various Visitor - Overview
- 27. S. Warren FEMA Reg. I Various Visitor - Overview
- 28. R. Zakaris FEMA Reg. I Various Visitor - Overview
- 29. B. Bailey FEMA Reg. V (Secretarial support to RAC) 1/ RAC Chairman 2_/ Center for Planning and Research (Under contract to FEMA) 3_/ Also observed Evacuation Center at Pontiac 3
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- 8. Major functions witnessed by Federal observers were evaluated in accordanc.e with the following criteria:
Capability outstandinc; excellent demonstration.
Capability good; exceeds minimum standards - some improvements recommended.
Capability acceptable; meets minimum standards - significant improvement needed.
Capability weak; does not meet minimum standards - significant improvements needed.
Capability not demonstrated or lacking.
- 9. State and local jurisdictions are required to take remedial actions responsive, on a point-by-point basis, to the formal recommendations of tne RAC. One month from receipt of thir document State and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take. If remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately, then a detailed plan scheduling and implementing remedial act'ons must be provided.
' Recommendations for correcting deficiences are listed in continuing numerical sequence following tne critique of each observed function.
Herein is an example of the format to be used when indici2 ting remedial actions.
CRITIQUE: "The exercise was terminated without proper reduction from the ' General Emergency' classification."
Sample: RECOMMENDATI0fl #1 - Remedial Action:
Exercise Controllers have been directed to terminate future exercises after the nuclear plant is released from "GENEPAL EMERGENCY" status and appropriate re-entry and recovery actions are taken according to State and local plans and procedures.
- 10. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, Radiological Emergency Planning, Washington, D.r.., that any deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and such corrections incorporated in the plan.
A State which seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan, with annexes, shall submit an application for review and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the Region in which the State is located. The application, in the form of a letter from the Governor, or other State official as the Governor may designate, shall contain one copy of the completed State plan with an indication that deficiencies have been corrected.
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Upon receipt of a State plan from the Regional Director, the
-Associate Director shall cause copies of the plan together with the Regional Director's evaluation, to be distributed to the ,
members of the Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee 1 (FICCC) and other FEMA offices with appropriate guidance relative to their assistance in the FEMA review process as described in 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123, Tuesday, ,
June 24,1980 (Review and Approval of State and local Radiological '
Emergency Plans and Preparedness). The Associate Director shall conduct such review of the State plan as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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(@i bF II. EXECUTIVE SUMPARY The consensus of the 25-member Federal Observer Team indicated that the objective of the exercise, which was to assess the adequacy of the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPPA) as it applies to State and local nuclear emergency response capability for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant, was achieved.
ae exercise focused on the utility and the local off-site response .since the State had successfully demonstrated its capabilities during the Dresden exercise five weeks earlier. Thus, the State's primary role was to support the utility and local exercise by fully participating in all interface activities.
The exercise demonstrated an outstanding State capability to protect the public in event of a nuclear accident.
LaSalle County and its local jurisdictions were participating in such an exercise for the first time and demonstrated an acceptable capability to protect the public. Some deficiencies were noted, but most were relatively minor and none prevented an acceptable performance though some improvements are recommended.
Grundy County had an opportunity to demonstrate an improved capability based on the recent Dresden exercise. However, Grundy County failed to demonstrate improvements apparently because of an attitude that participation in three exercises during a period of six months required too much time and effort.
Positive observations included:
- a. Improvemerit of the previously demonstrated high quality operations at the State EOC.
- b. Evidence of good teamwork at the LaSalle Plant's EOF, particularly in the public.information function.
- c. Dedication by most of the local participants, and the support by their elected officials. This was particularly noteworthy at Grand Ridge, and generally occurred at the cther participating jurisdictions within LaSalle County, at the LaSalle County E0C, and at the evacuation center at Pontiac.
d, The actual evacuation of a nursing home at Marseilles.
Areas of deficiencies noted by observers included:
- a. An inadequate exchange of information among the State and County EOCs, and between County E0Cs and local municipalities. {
This was particularly evident concerning radiological data. J 6
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- b. Lack of familiarity by some local officials and staff of.their roles and responsibilities, including no evident checklist or procedures present. This inoicates -
the need for more experience and training.
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- c. Inappropriate release of exercise scenario information to some participants.
- d. The need for improvement of displays at most local E00's and a demonstration of ability to display stat'is of events satisfactorily. ,
- e. Failure to conduct shif t change at county and local (except at Grand Ridge).
i A simulated change was accomplished.
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III. EXCERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS AND CRITIOUE:
The exercise scenario was developed by Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety to provide an outline of a possible course of events leading to and including a nuclear emergency at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station (LNPS), simulated on December 4, 1980.
There was a simulated occurrence of a plant transient at 8:30 a.m. when the reactor scrammed, with no indication of fuel cladding failure. A Site Emergency condition was declared, and notification procedures followed.
At due10:00 a.m., the to primary station was activity containment placed inexceeding a " GENERAL 3.8 xEMgRGENCY" 10 r/hr and anclassification imminent release being anticipated. At 12:00 p.m. monitors indicated that a radioactive release to the atmosphere had begun as a result of several failed primary containment vent and purge valves. The release was passing through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS). The release ra' indicated were noble gases 9.7 x 103 Ci/sec, and Iodine 2.1 x 10 IesCi/sec.
By 2:00 p.m. the primary containment vent and purge valves were repaired and the radioactive gas release was terminated, thus the duration of the release was about two hours. AT 3:45 p.m. the reactor was in a cold shutdown status.
A recapitulation of the s enario events, leading to State and local response, is shown in the table below.
EVENT OR CONDITION TIME OF EVENT Normal conditions at LNPS Prior to 8:30 Reactor scrammed, resulting in Site Emergency 8:30 condition at LNPS (Wind speed 4 mph from the west - 2700)
General Emergency condition initiated at LNPS 1000 (witn imminent release predicted)
Release occurs at LNPS (Wind conditions same as above) 1200 End of release 1400 Wind speed increased to 15 mph from the west - 2700 1430 Cold shutdown status at LNPS 1545 Re-entry procedures are initiated 1600 End of exercise 1700 All times shown were real times for the exercise date of December 4,1980.
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(N. sig The exercise scenario dragged during the final four to five hours, largely because the scheduled simulated protective actions were carried out mostly before the simulated release occurred (although in accordance with the scenario and the IPRA). However, State exercise controllers interjected ,
additional free play problems (some not specifically related to radiological accidents) which kept the exercise moving at most locations.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 1. Since mobilization of State personnel and equipment to the accident scene has been demonstrated, future scenarios might be shortened to reduce the time demands on the participants. Based on this scenario, one method could be to initiate the simu ited release shortly after the
" GENE .AL EMERGENCY" declaration rather than two hours later. However, care must be taken to avoid shorter scenarios that would result in inadequate demonstraticns and preclude a demonstration of'a sh'ft change.
(
Reference:
NUREG 0654 N.1 and N.2).
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IV. EVALUATIONS A. ASSIGNMEf6 0F RESPONSIBILITY (ORGANIZATION CONTROL)
JTATEJ The exercise clearly demonstrated to Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) observers that the primary responsibilities for State emergency response had been assigned and that supporting organizations at each level were aware of their responsibilities.
Improvements were noted in organization control at the State ESDA EOC since the Dresden Exercise.
The State Plan (IPRA) assigns to the State ESDA Command Post (CP) the responsibility for coordinating the response of State agencies operating near the scene in event of a nuclear power plant emergency affecting adjacent communities. Whereas there was token operacional activity, the exercise at the CP was primarily a comunications test demonstrating competent handling by operating personnel. Key responsible State officials did not visit this installation and there was not much exercise play of operational coordination.
The demonstration by the State to conduct continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period was acceptable. In lieu of a shift change, a list of persois who were designated to relieve the initial shift was provided the obse,rve rs .
The lack of information from the State ESDA to the local EOC's (as noted during the Dresden exercise) continues, particularly concerning radiological conditions. The exception is the major status and emergency class changes transmitted over NAP.S.
The staff at the State ESDA CP functioned well during the limited simulation. Nevertheless, there is need for a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to tie the entire operation together, including coordination of the several State agency elements present (IDOT, State Police, etc.). There is also the need for radiological information at this site for the coordination of operations to have relevance to the emergency situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 2. While it may not be appropriate to repeatedly exercise proved State-level competence (especially at Springfield), it is necessary to fully support local response exercises in the field. At the same time, to shorten the exercise scenario, the State and personnel vans could be prepositioned near the scene. Therefore, consideration should be given in future exercises to including more State ESDA CP agency and Staging Area activity in order to derive maximum training benefits from such exercises, and fully support local exercise activities.
(Reff NUREG0654H.4,N.2,N.3).
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- 3. An actual shift change should be demonstrated with each initial participant being relieved during the exercise as if a full shift period had been completed. (Ref: NUREG 0654 A.1 and A.4).
- 4. There must be a two-way street of informat:on between EOCs for overall effective direction and control to take place. The State ESDA should provide more information, not just directinn to the local EOCs.
(Reference NUREG 0654 A.2, F.1, H.3).
- 5. An 50P should be developed concerning the functioning of the State ESDA CP for coordinating State agency activity in accordance with the existing plans (IPRA) and implementing document. A radiological 50P should be included covering guidance on staff radiological procedures and field operations in affected areas (exposure control, etc.). (
Reference:
NUREG 0654 A.3, H.!, P.1, P.4).
LASALLE/GRUNDY COUNTIES:
This was the first exercise for LaSalle County and it showed that more experience is needed. Staffing at the LaSalle E0C, which included top county officials, was generally appropriate. Most of the staff appeared serious and dedicated and demonstrated an acceptable capability to protect the public. Decision-making involving staff at LaSalle County may have been performed, but was not apparent from the discussions seen. Staff briefings primarily consisted of announcements which were then posted. There was 1ittle interface or discussion with the staff, and there were no overall briefings as to the situations, what was being done, or by whom. There was poor followup to messages and actions and no initiative in followup. Part of the overall problem may have been delays in logging of messages and the poor display of the status of events. Also, while it is appropriate that the local ESDA Director receive guidance and assistance from the State Area ESDA Director, it appeared that the State Exercise Controller and Area ESDA Director were generally running the exercise. No checklists or SOPS were seen or consulted. It seemed that there were few specific functions for LaSalle County, consequently there was little to observe except message processing.
It was not apparent that all members of the assembled emergency staff really knew their assigned functions and responsibilities.
Internal message handling, logging, and posting in'the LaSalle County EOC was an ad hoc process apparently developed during the exercise. This appeared to increase the time necessary fcr messages to be acted upon. It took too long to record tte NARS messages (generally in excess of 20 minutes) before following external notifications and internal processing of the information within the E0C occurred. While the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) volunteers were dedicated to their task of logging and posting the messages, they were not trained and did not have adecuate message logs for use. There was confusion as to the distinction between incoming, outgoing, and internal messages, and how they were to be handled and logged. The CAP volunteers were underutilized, primarily performing clerical functions which would not normally be their CAP function in an actual emergency. (Use of CAP aircraft was not programmed for this exercise).
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Ability to conduct continuous 24-hour operations was demonstrated by deferring an actual shift change until after the termina-tion of the exercise according to the scenario. Thus, in lieu of a shift change, each organization provided a list of persons designated to relieve the initial staff that was mobilized for the exercise. However, a full shift change actually took place at Grand Ridge since they apparently did not (St the word on simulating a shift change.
The status board was used to post all messages without a priority system as to significance. For example, confirmation of messages was posted in the message log and on the status board instead of only being noted on the conmunicator's logs.
Minimum staff participation with minimal attention to details and no briefings were observed in Grundy County. This may have been a reaction by County officials from having three exercises within six months, as well as perceived minimal involvement in the play of the exercise, although the i
direction of the simulated release was into Grundy County. The Dresden exercise five weeks earlier revealed several deficiencies in Grundy County, some of which were observed to have been reduced, but many still remain.
There was better coordination observed among departments. As before,
' the plans were available, but not consulted, and no checklists were evident. The minimum activity called for in the exercise scenario apparently did not stress the staff to demonstrate improvement in their knowledge of what their roles requira.
All local E0Cs provided adequate security except at the Grundy County EOC. In the LaSalle County E0C, the security was not enforced enough as no identification was required for registration, and no accounting for signing in or out movement was subsequently required. Entry to the EOC area through the Detective Captain's office (which was unlocked) was not controlled, thus access was open to anyone faniliar with *.he floor plan of the facility.
Essential operations were directed and controlled at the municipal EOCs with the operation at Grand Ridge exceeding minimum standards.
Calls for busses were made from Marseilles, Seneca and Granci Ridge directly to the bus company, which normally handles bus transportation for the schools, rather than to the Grand Ridge EOC where the bus company president was stationed, contrary to chain of command procedures.
The utility was not represented at principal governmental E0C's, nor were the counties represented at the utility's interim E0C. Thus, except for informa-tion on event classes transmitted over NARS, the counties knew little of the radiological situation. NUREG 0654 C.?, addresses the desirability for providing local representatives at the near site EOF who can provide direct information to their parent organizations, and for sending a utility repre-sentative to each principal off-site governmental E0C.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
- 6. Additional training should be provided through exercises, following development of internal EOC procedures for LaSalle County. (
Reference:
NUREG 0654 A.1, A.2, H.4, N.1, P.1, P.4).
- 7. LaSalle County should provide staffing as if an actual emergency had >
occurred, specifically provide other sources for clerical support, and ,
have CAP conduct (or simulate) their actual emergency function in future exercises. (Re#'ence: NUREG 0654 A.1, A.4 and H.4).
- 8. LaSalle County should develop internal message handling procedures, as well as the necessary forms, status boards, and specific instructions for the scaff. They should conduct drills on message handling procedures. A means should be developed for speeding up the handlina of NARS messages, possibly by streamlining the form. (
Reference:
NUREG 0654 F.1, F.3, H.3, N.3).
- 9. See Recommendation ir3.
. 10. Security enforcement should be tightened and all access areas to the LaSalle County E0C should be controlled or locked. (
Reference:
NUREG 0654 H.3).
- 11. Each jurisdiction should participate in every exercise to the fullest
. extent possible. An exception may be allowed if it is determined that a minimum demonstration of the response role will be acceptable due to a previous fully acceptable demonstration in a recent exercise.
(
Reference:
NUREG0654,N.1,N.3,N.5).
- 12. Assure that procedures for raquesting bus transportation are clarified in local plans so that calls will be made to the proper location.
Since the bus company apparentij haadles transportation for LaSalle County schools, it may be more effective to have the bus company representative stationed at the County E0C at Ottawa, thus part of the LaSalle plan should be reviewed. (
Reference:
NEREGA.2,J.10,P.4).
- 13. The IPRA should provide for each County to have a representative at the utility's near-site EOF who can be in direct telephone contact with the County on the status of events. The utility should provide a 4
representative at the State and each County to provide technical
- information for decision making and also for public information briefings
- for the news media. (
Reference:
NUREG 0654 C.2, H.2, H.3).
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B. ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Section B. NUREG 0654 FEMA - REP 1, pertains only to licensee responsibilities for emergency response and is not includad in the exercise evaluation of State and local-plans.
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C. EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT At!D RESOURCES STATE The State adequately demonstrated the capability for contacting and requesting the use of available Federal resources under the Department of Energy;s Radiological Assistance Plan and the Interagency Radio-logical Assistance Plan. (These documents are currently under revision and will be issued as the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Pl an. )
It should be noted that a primary objective of the exercise is not to exercise the Federal response program but is intended to assure that the interface exists among State and Federal agencies for activating available resources.
. RECOMMENDATIONS None T
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D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STATE
- LOCAL Knowledge of the standard emergency classifications and action level
,. scheme as described in the utility, State and local response plans was adequately demonstrated during the exercise. The State;and local imple-
, mentation of this section of their plan is acceptable.
RECON 1ENDATIONS None s
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.sg= th:1 E. NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES STATE-LA SALLE COUNTYY The State and local activities demonstrated an acceptable ca of involved organizations (licensee, State as4 local jurisdictions (pability to inplement the initial notification procedures reavired by their plans.
Simulated notification of the public was carried out by means of emergen.cy vehicles actually traveling the necessary routes in the La Salle County jurisdictions. It was felt by observers that 20 mirutes time for notification of the public in Seneca was too long.
Exercise security was deficient at some locatiens as most of the La Salle County officials and staff were at nearsite locations although not in the irmediate EOC area.before initial notification of a " Site Emergency." Therefore, notification, alerting and mobilization of officials and staff was not fully demonstrated.
RECOMMENDATIONY
- 14. Mobilization of staff should be demonstrated which will indicate the time required for notification and reporting for duty and re.aal any related problems. (RefA NUREG-0654 E.2).
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p ?@i F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS !
STATE The exercise demonst:ated that acceptable provisions exist for prompt ecmunications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
State-level comunications systems between sites, and also the Utility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) were cbserved to exceed minimum standards. Internal comunications within the La Salle County EOC were weak and it took too long for delivery of messages from time of receipt at the Sheriff's Office to Operations and subsequent action within the EOC.
Minimal inter-county comunication activities were observed or were judged to be slow. Specifically, difficulty with inter-county radio communi-cations was noted between the Grundy County EOC and the La Salle County EOC as Grundy County obtained no response during two attempts. Little or no feedback of infonnation was forthcoming fron the La Salle County EOC to Marseilles and Seneca (this could be an operational or procedural difficulty rather than a communications system problem).
RECOMMENDATION
- 15. Comunications systems and procedures should be checked periodically, and fully utilized as appropriate to the scenario during exercises. Comunications drills , i.e. ,
comunications with State and local governments within the 10-mile EPZ shall be tested monthly, including the aspect of understanding the content of messages. (Ref NUREG-0654 F.1, F.2,F.3,N.1,N.2).
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G. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION STATE-LOCAL Public information operations at the Utility's EOF which constituted the primary center for State and local public information activities, were carried out successfully and a good capability to provide the public with emergency information was demonstrated.
While the Public Information functions were well carried out at the interim EOF, there was little, if any, coordination between the State and local levels. With the current procedures, there is apparently no way for the State and local PIO's to know what each other were giving the media.
The State ESDA PIO performed very well with the media and demonstrated outstanding communication abilities. Good backup PIO support was demonstrated at the State EOC.
Little public information activity occurred at the local level except at LaSalle County EOC where one reporter was briefed in the morning and a
- statement was read by the Chairman of the County board to a simulated news media gathering during the afternoon.
RECOMMENDATIOgi
- 16. Consideration should be given to relieving individual local jurisdictions of the Public Information responsibility by establishing a joint media center at cr near the near-site E05 staffed by representatives of the State, affected Counties and municipalities, the Utility, and by involved Federal agencies.
Local PIO representatives could keep abreast of local develop-ments by telephone and participate in briefings for the media, as appropriate. (Ref? HUREG 0654 G.3, G.4).
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$g 'm H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT STATE-LOCAL E0C;s The State demonstrated an outstanding capability to observers that adequate emergency facilities and equipment can be provided to support an emergency response to carry out response functions, and that each organiza-tion can provide for activating and staffing the E0C in a timely manner.
Significant improvements were observed to have been made since the Dresden exercise at the ESDA EOC.
The La Salle County EOC is housed in a relatively new building and generally has sufficient space and resources. However, it is an interim facility with tables, phones, displays arranged and set up a specifically for the exercise. The arrangements would have to be re-established in the event of an actual emergency. The setting up of furniture and displays reportedly takes about 20 minutes, but the additional telechenes were reported to have been placed several days earlier, thus there is a question as to how long it would actually take La Salle County to become fully operational in their EOC if an emer gency occurred in the future. It is understood that space earmarked for a permanent EOC exists in the basement of the same building which may be utilized in the near future.
Deficiencies observed at the Grundy County E0C during the recent Dresden exercise still exist or were not shown to be rectified. The emergency power generator was not tested so the faulty venting of the exhaust may still exist. There was no facility security demonstrated, nor were improve-ments made to the facility. Display maps were improved although there was minimal display of information on the status board.
Local E0Cs generally had minimal displays and all lecked or improperly used their status boards. Maps observed were of various sceles, which usually did not provide sufficient detail on routes, locatior of such items and dairy farms, etc., and generally were too small to be cleely seen from the operational positions.
ftnicipal E0Cs were considered at least minimally acceptable for the juri: 41ctional area and the nature of their operations. The Seneca EOC was in a trailor since their facility had burned six weeks earlier. The Marseilles EOC had inadequate emergency pcwer and no fallout protection. The Grand Ridge EOC in the fire station needed minor improvements including provision of more telephone service and improvement of ma;5 displays to permit remarking as the changing situation warranted.
The interim Utility EOF served its purpose, although far from ideal in terms of a physical facility. A permanent EOF is needed which can meet the needs of the Utility, as well as facilitate ccordination of the Utility-State-local response.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 17. A standardized status board should be desigr.ed and provided to each of the local ESDA Directors for incorporation in each E0C.
It should provide a means to retain a record of key events and hr problems, showing at a minimum (1) the time of the event, M
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(2) description statement, (3) where the responsibilit is assigned (e.g., local department or agency), and (4)y time when action is completed. Standardized types of maps and other displays should be developed and made a requirement, also covered with p1r tic for ease of change of condition.
Finally, training shi.id be provided for key operators and :
plotters on proper use of displays and status boards.
(Ref: HUREG-0654 H.3, J.10 and 0.I).
- 18. La Salle County should expedite establishment of their permanent EOC facility where operations for a possible radiological emergency could commence as soon as the staf #
is notified and reports to the EOC.
(Reft NUREG-0654H.3andH.4).
- 19. Grundy County needs to make improvements to its EOC which were recommended following the- Dresden exercise (Reff NUREG-0654 H.3).
- 20. Seneca needs to rebuild a permanent EOC with adequate space, emergency power, protective factors, etc. (Ref!5NUREG-0654 H.3)
- 21. Marseilles needs to increase its emergency power capacity and improve protection factors. (Ref: H'JREG-0654 H.3)
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- 22. Grand Ridge neeO to increase telephone service and improve map displays (primarily cover with plastic) and obtain newer maps (Ref! NUREG-0654 H.3)
- 23. The Utility should initiate steps to build a permanent EOF in accordance with guidelines in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0695. In
. view of the close proximity of the three nuclear plants, Dresden, Braidwood and La Salle, consideration might be given to pro-viding a single EOF to serve all three power plants (cne at a time since it is extreme!y unlikely that more than one facility would have an emergency simultaneously.) The vicinity of Mazon on Illinois Route 47 about 8 miles south of Morris appears to be a feasible location for a combined EOF as it would be nearly equidistant (about 10 miles) from each plant. (Ref: NUREG-0654 H.1). i 1
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I. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT STATE The State demonstrated a good capability for providing methods, equipment and expertise for rapid assessment of real or potential radio-logical hazards existing in the liquid or gaseous pathway. This included activation, notification, transportation, communications and monitoring equipment.
State-level functions, primarily by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (DNS), were successfully carried out at Springfield and at the DNS Mobile lab in Streator.
Infomation concerning the developing radiological situat! ion was not made available to the staff located in the three vans which constituted the State ESDA Comand Post (CP). The State Police Captain-in-charge advised that whereas only 4 actions were simulated in this exercise in an actual emergency at least 100 State Police Vehicles would be operating in the effected area, dispatched from the mobile State Police Van at this CP, Similarly ESDA and DOT conducted emergency operations from their vans. It is elementary that these key officials be appraised of the developing radiological situation --
the failure to do so in this exercise detracted from an otherwise well-run operation at the CP.
There was almost no information on radiological conditions passed from DNS to local EOCs, thus local RD0s (where they exist) could not effectively apply and monitor exposure controls or response actions. Although this function is the responsibility of the State DNS, even where local capability may exist, some observers question the complete dependence on centralized expertise, as well as the lack of radiological information provided to the County EOCs.
This requires the County to play an entirely passive role of blindly following advice from external sources. It hat been observed elsewhere that where the County staff closely followed the radiological situation, they were able to avoid unnecessary actions that would have followed from garbled radiological information received.
REC 0ftiENDATIONS
- 24. Consideration should be given to including the State ESDA CP in the information flow chain to receive radiological infoma-tion on a continuing basis (e.g., readings from key locations, predictions, wind infomation, etc.) Perhaps a trained IDNS official should be assigned to this key installaticn to give advice to officials there who are conducting operations and making important decisions affecting the health and safety of emergenc workers, as well as the public (Ref: NUREC 0654 F.1, F.2, I.8, J.9 and J.10 22
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-25. Procedures should be developed for DilS to provide essential infomation to each County EOC so that.the County Radiological ;
Defense Officers where they exist can follow and interpret
- the radiological situation and be in a position to advise or pending decisions and explanations
. for local officials actions.
protective of likely(Ref: flVREG-0654 I.8 and J.10.) '
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2 Y5 J. PROTECTIVE RESPONSE STATE-t0 CAL The State Emergency Plan includes a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public and provides guidelinesfor choosing such actions during an emergency.
During the exercise the State demonstrated an acceptable capability to make appropriate decisions regardirg protective actions during an emergency.
However, significant improvements are recommended.
The timing for comencing the evacuation was viewed by several observers as premature in light of the simulated emergency conditions, although in accordance with the IPRA. IPRA apparently calls for a very conservative approach for taking protective actions and implementing exposure control measures.
At the evacuation reception center in Pontiac, an acceptable demonstra-tion was provided but there was an indication of a lack of full response by appropriate agencies, some confusion of duties and procedures, and notification procedures. For instance, the Red Cross had to inform the County ESDA. More registrars, nurses, and monitors were needed. This apparently was the first experience at this location, and more training drills are needed.
Little was observed of functions directed by the La Salle County E0C except reported traffic ecrtrol measures simulated by the County Highway Department in accordance with the locations planned and displayed on a map.
There was considerable confusion about both rail and highway traffic control measures which were not clearly defined and not displayed in the E0C. There was little apparent coordination with the Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic, which has the primary responsibility for deciding on closing of highways, assigning of detours , etc. This overall function was weak at the LaSalle County. E0C. ,
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 26. The timing of protective actions is not considered as a deficiency per se, but does raise cuestions suggesting that the conservative approach in the IPRA should be reviewed.
(Ref: NUREG-0654 J.9, J.10, K.4).
- 27. The functions of traffic control, highway and rail closings, and the State-County roles need to be clarified. All such closings should be clearly delineated and displayed in the affected County and local EOCs. (Ref: HUREG-0654 J.10 and K.3).
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K. RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL The exercise demonstrated to observers that the capability to control radiological exposure for emergency workers was the means for accomplishing this objective do exist.
Exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Life-saving Activity Protective Action Guides were available, There was a 24-hour-a-day capability to determine the doses received by emergency personnel involved in a nuclear accident.
REC 0f41ENDATIONS None. '
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,- ,e E@ Y L. MEDICAL At1D PISLIC HEALTH SUPPORT The exercise demonstratdd the capability of the State and local jurisdictions to cope with contaminated and injured individuals and provide them with medical services.
The State and local levels of emergency government took the necessary steps to insure adequate planning for medical problems which may occur.
It was evident that transportation of injured persons to hospital facilities had been arranged for and that the capability existed on a stand-by basis during the exercise.
A listing of emergency facilities capable of providing containment treatment for patients was not observed nor was its use demonstrated. However, demonstration of evacuation of a nursing home to a pre-set relocation point was considered outstanding.
RECOMMENDATIONi
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9 M. RE-ENTRY Afl0 RECOVERY The State and local emergency response plans contain instructions for re-entry, recovery and post-accident operations, which were demonstrated previously during the October' 28,1980 Dresden exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS None ;
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. N. EXERCISES AND DRILLS -
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 28. Future exercices should test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations.
(Ref: NUREG 0654 - N.1.2)
- 29. Future exercises should include mobilization of State and local personnel and resources adequate to verify the cap-ability to respond to an accident scenario requiring response.
(Ref: NUREG 0654 - N.1.b)
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O. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING LOCAL There was a noticeable lack of training in familiarity with radio-logical matters at the local level for officials and in specific radiological skills of emergency services personnel.
RECOMMENDATIONS
. 30. Appropriate familiarization and skills training in radio-logical matters should be provided to local officials and emergency services (police, fire, rescue, highway, etc.)
personnel in all localities within the plume EPZ.
(Reff NUREG-06540.1,0.4,and0.5)
- 31. Additional training of Pontiac reception center personnel should be provided which stress full participation and duties of the personnel (Ref: NUREG-0654,J.10,J.12,N.3).
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