Final Deficiency Rept for Significant Const Deficiency 15 Re Procedural & Performance Deficiencies in Ultrasonic Testing of Structural Welds.Caused by Mfg Procedural & Ebasco ASME Insp Deficiencies.Mfg & Insp Responsibilities EstablishedML19330B664 |
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Waterford |
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Issue date: |
07/31/1980 |
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From: |
Aswell D LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
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References |
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LPL-14739, NUDOCS 8008050348 |
Download: ML19330B664 (9) |
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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML18065B1351998-01-0606 January 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Use of Deltstrat Code for RCS Flow Rate Determination.Code Corrects for Temps to Determine Hot Leg Bulk Coolant Temp ML20203J2521997-12-0101 December 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Failed Mdr Relays at Entergy Operations Inc,Waterford 3 Nuclear Generation Station.Caused by Contaminated Grease.Housekeeping Procedures Formalized & Added Enclosed Booth Isolating Mdr Final Assembly LD-97-033, Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relays, Models 170-1 & 7032.Extended Problem to Include All Mdr Relay Models W/Date Codes 93XX-95XX.Root Cause Analysis, Written Rept & Recommended Corrective Actions Due by 9712011997-11-20020 November 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relays, Models 170-1 & 7032.Extended Problem to Include All Mdr Relay Models W/Date Codes 93XX-95XX.Root Cause Analysis, Written Rept & Recommended Corrective Actions Due by 971201 LD-97-028, Part 21 Rept Re Contamination of Lubricant Which Has Led to Hardening of Lubricant in Certain Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relay Models 170-1 & 7032.Will Distribute Copy of Rept to Utils Having ABB-CE Designed Nuclear Steam Supply Sys1997-10-13013 October 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Contamination of Lubricant Which Has Led to Hardening of Lubricant in Certain Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relay Models 170-1 & 7032.Will Distribute Copy of Rept to Utils Having ABB-CE Designed Nuclear Steam Supply Sys LD-97-024, Part 21 Rept Re Error in Energy Redistribution Factor Used in LOCA Analysis for Listed Plants for Which ABB-CE Performed Analysis.Issued Recommendations Info Bulletin 97-0041997-08-14014 August 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Error in Energy Redistribution Factor Used in LOCA Analysis for Listed Plants for Which ABB-CE Performed Analysis.Issued Recommendations Info Bulletin 97-004 ML20140A9661997-05-29029 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Ksv Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure.Caused by Jacket Water in Combustion Chamber. Recommends That Users Verify That Crown Thickness at Valve Cutout Be 100 Minimum ML18065B0111996-10-18018 October 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Application of Certain Aspects of ABB-CE Safety Analysis Methodology ML20117K9731996-09-10010 September 1996 Follow-up Part 21 Rept of Re Failures of Waterford 3 Dedication Testing Process of Seven Commercial Grade Barksdale Pressure Switches ML20116C7031996-07-29029 July 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Failures Identified by Waterford 3 Dedication Testing Process of 7 Commercial Grade Barksdale Pressure Switches ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs LD-96-009, Part 21 Rept Re Potential Instrumentation Decalibr at Low Power.Affected Utils Should Ensure That Log Power Channels Properly Calibr & cross-correlated to Linear Power Channels at 100% Reactor Power1996-04-15015 April 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Instrumentation Decalibr at Low Power.Affected Utils Should Ensure That Log Power Channels Properly Calibr & cross-correlated to Linear Power Channels at 100% Reactor Power ML20077D3431994-11-29029 November 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Suspect Master Connecting Rods & Contains Info Location in Engine for Rods ML20078G3051994-11-0909 November 1994 Rev to Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Master Power Connecting Rods.Vendor Recommends Listed Utils Perform Visual Insp of Master Rods to Determine Applicability of Rept LD-94-019, Suppl Part 21 Rept Re Notification of Potential Defect in motor-driven Relays Supplied by ABB-CE to Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.Entergy Oparations Aware of Info1994-03-16016 March 1994 Suppl Part 21 Rept Re Notification of Potential Defect in motor-driven Relays Supplied by ABB-CE to Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.Entergy Oparations Aware of Info LD-93-177, Part 21 Rept Re Potter & Brumfield motor-driven Relays Models 7032,7033 & 7034 Supplied by ABB/C-E to Entergy Operations Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3.Eighty- Two Percent of Affected Relays Tested1993-12-23023 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potter & Brumfield motor-driven Relays Models 7032,7033 & 7034 Supplied by ABB/C-E to Entergy Operations Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3.Eighty- Two Percent of Affected Relays Tested LD-93-003, Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Model 170-1 Relay.One of Two Rotor Return Springs Broke & Portion of Spring Lodged Between Rotor & Stator.Rotor Springs Supplied by Lewis Spring Co.Info Bulletin Being Prepared1993-01-13013 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Model 170-1 Relay.One of Two Rotor Return Springs Broke & Portion of Spring Lodged Between Rotor & Stator.Rotor Springs Supplied by Lewis Spring Co.Info Bulletin Being Prepared ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127M5201992-11-24024 November 1992 Final Part 21 Rept Re Reject Lot Serial Numbers of Defective Fuel Nozzle Tips,Consisting of Corrected Page 6 of 921102 Rept Re Reject Lots for Fuel Injector Assembly ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20115D6331992-10-15015 October 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Nuclear Logistics Inc 10CFR21 Notification for Gnb Industrial Battery Co Batteries.Util Will Obtain Replacement Batteries from C&D Power Sys,Inc & Alarm Features to Be Tested by End of Refuel 5 ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option ML20101Q9311992-07-0808 July 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Comply w/1 Minute Rating of NCX-17 Cells Mfg by Gnb Battery Co (Formally Gould).Addl Testing of Cell Sizes & End Voltages Scheduled to Begin on 920713 & Be Completed on 920815 L-91-002, Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl1991-01-0404 January 1991 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl ML17223A7451990-01-26026 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Backup Rings Furnished in Spare Parts Seal Kits & in 25 Gpm 4 Way Valves as Part of Actuators Made of Incorrect Matl.Rings Should Be Viton & Have Been Identified as Buna N ML20246P7111989-07-17017 July 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Quench Cracks in Bar of A-SA-193 Grade B7 Component.Quench Cracks Found in One Bar of Matl.Listed Purchasers Informed of Potential Defect.Next Rept Will Be Submitted When Addl Info Becomes Available ML20247P7991989-04-0404 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Atmospheric Dump Valves.Cause of Failure Speculative But Result of Piston Ring That Failed to Seal. Resolution to Problem Requires Increasing Pilot Valve Capacity & Reworking of Plug to Enlarge Pilot Flow Area ML20234C7351987-06-23023 June 1987 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Silicone Foam Seal Anomolies at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20211P7211987-02-23023 February 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Rockbestos Coaxial Cable Used in Sorrento Electronics Digital & Analog high-range Radiation Monitor. Insulation Resistance at High Temp Not High Enough for Ion Chamber & Associated Electronics to Operate Properly ML20215G6801986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20215G5351986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20153D8861986-02-17017 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Penetration & Conduit Seal Configurations During Fire Tests.Initially Reported on 860214.Evaluation of Number & Location of Defective Seals in Progress.Nrc Assistance Requested ML20140A5281985-12-19019 December 1985 Part 21 Rept Forwarding Ltr Sent to Customers Re Check Valves Missing Lock Welds on Hinge Supports or Hinge Support Capscrews,Per 851121 Request.List of Customers Receiving Ltr Also Encl ML20135E1161985-09-0505 September 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Use of Connectron non-IEEE Qualified Matl in Spare Part Terminal Blocks Supplied to Facilities. Appropriate Customers Notified.Terminal Blocks Should Be Reviewed to Identify Defective Matl W3P85-1442, Final Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Preventive Maint Program Implemented.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)1985-08-0101 August 1985 Final Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Preventive Maint Program Implemented.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) ML20133G9741985-07-31031 July 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Anchor/Darling Valve Co Swing Check Valves W/Loose Set Screws &/Or Missing Lock Welds,Reported by Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.All Customers W/Similar Valves Notified.Ltr Re Waterford 3 Valves Encl W3P85-1420, Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Submittal of Written Rept on Deficiency Rescheduled for 8508011985-06-27027 June 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Submittal of Written Rept on Deficiency Rescheduled for 850801 W3P85-1400, Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time Needed to Evaluate Deficiency. Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 8507011985-05-29029 May 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time Needed to Evaluate Deficiency. Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 850701 ML20128G5101985-05-24024 May 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Heat Numbers to Be Added & Deleted from Sublist Sheet A,Based on Review of NRC W3P85-1240, Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Written Rept Submittal Date Extended Until 8505311985-04-29029 April 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Written Rept Submittal Date Extended Until 850531 W3P85-0785, Interim Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Required. Submittal of Written Rept Rescheduled for 8504301985-03-25025 March 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Required. Submittal of Written Rept Rescheduled for 850430 W3P85-0551, Significant Const Deficiency Rept 93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve.Potential Exists for Valve to Stick Open Due to Thermal Contraction.Testing Under Temp Conditions Being Performed1985-03-0606 March 1985 Significant Const Deficiency Rept 93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve.Potential Exists for Valve to Stick Open Due to Thermal Contraction.Testing Under Temp Conditions Being Performed W3P85-0544, Supplemental Final Significant Const Deficiency 93 Re Failure of Containment Isolation Valve CVC-103 to Close After Plant Cooldown.Details Will Be Provided on Valve Failure When Info Obtained1985-02-27027 February 1985 Supplemental Final Significant Const Deficiency 93 Re Failure of Containment Isolation Valve CVC-103 to Close After Plant Cooldown.Details Will Be Provided on Valve Failure When Info Obtained W3P85-0509, Interim Rept of Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Needed.Next Rept Delayed Until 8503291985-02-26026 February 1985 Interim Rept of Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Needed.Next Rept Delayed Until 850329 W3P85-0337, Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-80 Re Unsatisfactory Stroking of Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply shut-off Valves.Pneumatic Operators for Valves 2MS-V611A & V612 Replaced w/D-C Motors1985-02-22022 February 1985 Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-80 Re Unsatisfactory Stroking of Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply shut-off Valves.Pneumatic Operators for Valves 2MS-V611A & V612 Replaced w/D-C Motors W3P85-0339, Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency.Vendor Repaired Valve W/New Seats Sized for Max Interference Fit1985-02-21021 February 1985 Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency.Vendor Repaired Valve W/New Seats Sized for Max Interference Fit W3P85-0338, Final Part 21 & Const Deficiency Rept SCD-37 Re Unreliable Temp Signals from Resistance Temp Detectors (Rtd).Initially Reported on 810710.Safety-related RTDs Replaced or Environmentally Sealed.Design Change Notice Issued1985-02-21021 February 1985 Final Part 21 & Const Deficiency Rept SCD-37 Re Unreliable Temp Signals from Resistance Temp Detectors (Rtd).Initially Reported on 810710.Safety-related RTDs Replaced or Environmentally Sealed.Design Change Notice Issued W3P85-0083, Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Safety-related & Environmentally Qualified Equipment Manuals to Be Reviewed.Next Rept Anticipated by 8502281985-01-14014 January 1985 Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Safety-related & Environmentally Qualified Equipment Manuals to Be Reviewed.Next Rept Anticipated by 850228 1999-03-12
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217F2891999-10-13013 October 1999 Drill 99-08 Emergency Preparedness Exercise on 991013 05000382/LER-1999-014, :on 990910,reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow,Occurred.Caused by Rotating Baffle failure.Two-piece Rotating Baffle of Original Design Was Located & Installed,In Order to Repair RCP 2B1999-10-12012 October 1999
- on 990910,reactor Shutdown Due to Loss of Controlled bleed-off Flow,Occurred.Caused by Rotating Baffle failure.Two-piece Rotating Baffle of Original Design Was Located & Installed,In Order to Repair RCP 2B
ML20217G7211999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses. with 05000382/LER-1999-013, :on 990825,exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rate Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Content & Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Page 2 of 2 in Attachment 2 of Incoming Submittal Not Included1999-09-23023 September 1999
- on 990825,exceeding TS Limits for RCS Cooldown Rate Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Content & Inadequate Implementation of TS Requirements.Page 2 of 2 in Attachment 2 of Incoming Submittal Not Included
05000382/LER-1999-012-01, :on 990812,potential Operation with Both Control Room Normal Outside Air Intakes Valves Inoperable Occurred.Cause for Event Was Indeterminate.Seat Leakage Requirements Calculated.With1999-09-13013 September 1999
- on 990812,potential Operation with Both Control Room Normal Outside Air Intakes Valves Inoperable Occurred.Cause for Event Was Indeterminate.Seat Leakage Requirements Calculated.With
ML20211Q2141999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Waterord 3 Ses.With 05000382/LER-1999-011-01, :on 990801,with Plant Operating 100% Power, Lowering RCP Seal Pressures,Along with Dropping Controlled bleed-off (Cbo) & Increasing Cbo Temp Discovered.Caused by fatigue-induced Failure of Rotating Baffle of RCP 2B1999-08-31031 August 1999
- on 990801,with Plant Operating 100% Power, Lowering RCP Seal Pressures,Along with Dropping Controlled bleed-off (Cbo) & Increasing Cbo Temp Discovered.Caused by fatigue-induced Failure of Rotating Baffle of RCP 2B
05000382/LER-1999-010-01, :on 990726,discovered Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Portable Pumps Were Installed in Each Dry Cooling Tower Areas to Ensure Sufficient Pumping Capacity1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990726,discovered Inadequate Pumping Capacity in Dry Cooling Tower Area.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Portable Pumps Were Installed in Each Dry Cooling Tower Areas to Ensure Sufficient Pumping Capacity
05000382/LER-1999-009-01, :on 990727,discovered App R Noncompliance Condition Involving Inadequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Cables.Caused Design Analysis Deficiency.Compensatory Measures Were Established1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,discovered App R Noncompliance Condition Involving Inadequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Cables.Caused Design Analysis Deficiency.Compensatory Measures Were Established
ML20210Q6361999-07-31031 July 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3 ML20210S0581999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.With 05000382/LER-1999-008-01, :on 990629,failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Was Noted.Cause for Testing Charcoal Samples Contrary to TS Could Not Be Determined.All Future Analysis Will Be Performed IAW ASTM D3803-1989,per GL 99-021999-07-29029 July 1999
- on 990629,failure to Perform Testing of ESF Filtration Units Per TS Was Noted.Cause for Testing Charcoal Samples Contrary to TS Could Not Be Determined.All Future Analysis Will Be Performed IAW ASTM D3803-1989,per GL 99-02
05000382/LER-1999-007-01, :on 990625,operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven EFW Pump & Steam Supply Piping,Was Discovered.Caused Indeterminent. Entergy Will Submit 10CFR50.90 to NRC Staff1999-07-23023 July 1999
- on 990625,operation Outside Tornado Missile Protection Licensing Basis for turbine-driven EFW Pump & Steam Supply Piping,Was Discovered.Caused Indeterminent. Entergy Will Submit 10CFR50.90 to NRC Staff
ML20210D8951999-07-23023 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 - ISI-020 05000382/LER-1999-006-01, :on 990614,plant Experienced Automatic Reactor Trip Following Loss of 7kV Bus.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Relay on Either RCP 1A or 2A.Personnel Performed Final Switchgear Walkdown with Indications Normal.With1999-07-14014 July 1999
- on 990614,plant Experienced Automatic Reactor Trip Following Loss of 7kV Bus.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Relay on Either RCP 1A or 2A.Personnel Performed Final Switchgear Walkdown with Indications Normal.With
ML20209H3781999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses. with 05000382/LER-1999-005-01, :on 980702,determined That Four Contacts in Control Circuits of EFW Control Valves Were Untested.Caused by Personnel Error.Untested Contacts Have Been Tested1999-06-24024 June 1999
- on 980702,determined That Four Contacts in Control Circuits of EFW Control Valves Were Untested.Caused by Personnel Error.Untested Contacts Have Been Tested
ML20195J8951999-06-17017 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief for Listed ISI Parts for Current Interval,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(iii) ML20195J9741999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 152 to License NPF-38 ML20207E8631999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 990114 Submittal of one-time Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code IST Requirements for Pressure Safety Valves at Plant,Unit 3 ML20195D5491999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 151 to License NPF-38 ML20195K3391999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses.With ML20195C3041999-05-28028 May 1999 Annual Rept on ABB CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models 05000382/LER-1999-004-02, :on 990415,discovered That Complete Response Time for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Response Time Testing Deficiency. Procedures Will Be Revised to Include Subject Testing1999-05-14014 May 1999
- on 990415,discovered That Complete Response Time for ESFAS Containment Cooling Function Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Response Time Testing Deficiency. Procedures Will Be Revised to Include Subject Testing
ML20206S7401999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Waterford 3.With ML20205T2621999-04-22022 April 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990216,contract Employee Inappropriately Granted Unescorted Access to Plant Protected Area.Caused by Personnel Error.Security Personnel Performed Review of Work & Work Area That Individual Was Involved with ML20206A9641999-04-21021 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 150 to License NPF-38 05000382/LER-1999-003-02, :on 990311,determined That Four Containment Vacuum Relief valves,CVR-101,CVR-201,CVR-102 & CVR-202,were Not Tested.Caused by Contractor Supply of Misinformation. Details of Event Discussed with Contractor.With1999-04-0909 April 1999
- on 990311,determined That Four Containment Vacuum Relief valves,CVR-101,CVR-201,CVR-102 & CVR-202,were Not Tested.Caused by Contractor Supply of Misinformation. Details of Event Discussed with Contractor.With
ML20205N9671999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses.With ML20205E8531999-03-30030 March 1999 Corrected Pages COLR 3/4 1-4 & COLR 3/4 2-6 to Rev 1, Cycle 10, Colr ML20205A6331999-03-25025 March 1999 SER Accepting Request to Use Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assemblies as an Alternative Repair Method,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Reactor Coolant Sys Applications at Plant,Unit 3 05000382/LER-1999-002-03, :on 990225,discovered RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage on Two Inconel 600 Instrument Nozzles.Caused by Axial Cracks Near HAZ of Nozzle Partial Penetration Welds Resulting from Pwscc.Leaking Nozzles Have Been Repaired1999-03-25025 March 1999
- on 990225,discovered RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage on Two Inconel 600 Instrument Nozzles.Caused by Axial Cracks Near HAZ of Nozzle Partial Penetration Welds Resulting from Pwscc.Leaking Nozzles Have Been Repaired
ML20204H1401999-03-23023 March 1999 Rev 1 to Engineering Rept C-NOME-ER-0120, Design Evaluation of Various Applications at Waterford Unit 3 ML20204H1231999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 1 to Design Rept C-PENG-DR-006, Addendum to Cenc Rept 1444 Analytical Rept for Waterford Unit 3 Piping ML20204H2451999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to C-NOME-SP-0067, Design Specification for Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (Mnsa) Waterford Unit 3 ML20204F0791999-03-17017 March 1999 Rev 1 to Waterford 3 COLR for Cycle 10 ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207F3491999-03-0505 March 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990203,contraband Was Discovered in Plant Protected Area.Bottle Was Determined to Have Been There Since Original Plant Construction.Bottle Was Removed & Security Personnel Performed Search of Area.With ML20204B5141999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Waterford 3.With ML20203H8151999-02-17017 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 149 to License NPF-38 ML20203H8591999-02-17017 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Second Ten Year ISI Program & Associated Relief Requests for Plant,Unit 3 05000382/LER-1999-001, :on 990105,TS 3.0.3 Was Entered.Caused by Less than Adequate Chiller Thermostat Control.Placed Tamper Seal on Chiller Thermostat.With1999-02-0404 February 1999
- on 990105,TS 3.0.3 Was Entered.Caused by Less than Adequate Chiller Thermostat Control.Placed Tamper Seal on Chiller Thermostat.With
ML20202H9161999-02-0202 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 148 to License NPF-38 ML20199H6261999-01-21021 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Classification of Instrument Air Tubing & Components for Safety Related Valve Top Works.Staff Recommends That EOI Revise Licensing Basis to Permit Incorporation of Change 05000382/LER-1998-020, :on 981204,determined That Certain Core Power Distribution SRs Had Been Incorrectly Scheduled.Caused by TS Change Implementation Error.Will Perform Final Review of TS SRs with 4.0.4 Exemption.With1998-12-31031 December 1998
- on 981204,determined That Certain Core Power Distribution SRs Had Been Incorrectly Scheduled.Caused by TS Change Implementation Error.Will Perform Final Review of TS SRs with 4.0.4 Exemption.With
ML20199C9101998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Waterford 3.With ML20198F4691998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 147 to License NPF-38 ML20196F4911998-12-0101 December 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief ISI2-09 for Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3 & Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 2 ML20206N4131998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Waterford 3.With ML20195C4841998-11-0606 November 1998 SER Accepting QA Program Change to Consolidate Four Existing QA Programs for Arkansas Nuclear One,Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,River Bend Station & Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Into Single QA Program 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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LPL 14739 0-3-A35.07.15 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc=ission Office of Inspection & Inforcecent 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012
Subject:
Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 15 " Procedural and Perfor:ance Deficiencies in Ultrasonic Testing of Structural Welds Performed by Industrial Engineering '4orks"
Reference:
LPSL Letter LPL 14395 dated June 27, 1980
Dear Mr. Seyfrit:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hersby providing two copies of the Final D.eport of Significant. Construction Deficiency No. 15, " Procedural and Perfor=ance Deficiencies in Ultra-sonic Testing of Structural Welds Performed by Industrial Engineering
~4orks".
Very truly yours, D. L. Aswell DLA/LL3/grf Enclosure ,
I cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission Washington, D.C. 20555 O/7 I i
(with 15 copies of report) $ l
- 2) Direcror, Office of Management Information and Progra: Control //
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Washington, D.C. 20555 s (with 1 copy of report) 80080503[/g
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1 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 ;
Final Report of Significant Construe:1on Deficiency No. 15 Frocedural and Performance Deficiencies in Ultrasonic Testing of Structural Welds Performed By Industrial Engineering Works 1
Reviewed by
, A , ,
Crnich - Site Manager 7h O/ [O
' ' Date /
Reviewed by # -w 8# D R. J7 MidIiiser - Proj ect Superintendent Date Reviewed by ,
/M [- 88 " ((
J. H' art - Project LicenAng Engineer Date Reviewed by O i R. A. Hartnett - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date July 28, 1980
FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO 15
. PROCEDURAL AND PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCIES IN ULTRASONIC. TESTING OF STRUCTURAL WELDS PERFO.tfED 3Y INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING WORKS INTRODUCTION This report is sub=itted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes procedural and performance deficiencies in Ultrasonic Testing of structural welds by Industrial Engineering Works-(IEW) for Louisiana Power & Light Company, Water-ford Steam Electric Station Unit No. 3. The problem was identified on November 26, 1979, by Ebasco's Corporate ASNT Certified Level III Examiner during a routine surveillance visit of IEW's facility. In addition, this report in-cludes all corrective =easures .taken by Ebasco and IEW to correct deficiencies and preclude recurrence.
DESCRIPTION The extent of the deficiencies which are identified on Nonconfor=ance Reports in accordance with Parts 1 and 3 of Ebasco's Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual (ETR-1001) is as contained herein.
I. PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCIES Insufficient Ultrasonic Examination a .' Affects Purchase Order NY 403573 and NY 403611.
In accordance with the ASME Section III Subsection NF Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Ultrasonic Examination is required of the-entire weld. Furthermore, Paragraph T535.2D.1 of the .
2 code specifies'that "The search unit shall be placed on the contact surface with the beam aimed at about 90 degrees to the veld and manipulated laterally and longitudinally so the
, Ultrasonic beam passes through all of the weld metal in two different approaches of the beam to the reflector."
- b. Affects Purchase Orders NY 403593, NY 403573, and NY.403611.
In accordance with AWS Dl.1,100* volumetric inspection is required when specified by the design engineer.
The IEW examination was performed in one direction only using a single search unit from the web surface (s) only. This resulted in not achiev-ing 100 volumetric coverage. The attached sketch of a typical "T" well representing the worst condition illustrates the area where the beam did not pass through the 'reld in rwo directions. The portion of the weld ; that did not receive complete examination was approximately 20".
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II'. IMPROPER CALIBRATION Potentially all , Purchase Orders with IEW affected.
The Ebasco Corpora:e ASNT certified Level III Examiner during his November 26, 1979, surveillance visit at IEW's facili:y, noted that IEW was not calibrating its equip =ent in strict accordance with Para.
6.18 of AWS Dl.1 edition or 1:s1own procedure UT-120, Revision 1.
The Ebasco Level III Exaniner required IEW~to calibra:e equip =en:
.as specified by its procedure in order for him to verify compliance with AWS Dl.1. The ' equip =ent was calibrated by IEW with Ebasco's Level III Exa=iner present. It was deter =ined : hat when equipment calibration was perfor=ed as specified by its procedure, UT-120, Revision 1, IEW complied with or exceeded applicable AWS Dl.1 re-quirements, :hereby eli=inating :he following:
(a) Insufficien: Ul: asonic Tes:ing Sensitivity (b) Equipment not meeting performance requirements (c) Incorrect range and location calibration III. ?RCCEDURAL ' DEFICIENCIES .
A) Affects NY Purchase Orders 003573 and 403611.
Incorrec: procedure requirements in shop drawings
- The IEW Procedure csed for UT exa=ination was in accordance with ASMI See: ion III,. Subsection NF requirements in lieu of Ebasco's specification requirement of AWS Dl.1
- 3) Affects NY ?urchase Orders 003593 and 403611.
Incorrec: requirements for detecting and evaluation of fusion line indications Note: Item III.3 should have been discussed as a Performance De-ficiency and was incorrectly identified as a Procedural De-ficiency _in the Interin Report dated January 2,1980.
SAFETY IMPLICATION The below listed Ebasco Purchase Orders require Ultrasonic examination on Seismic I full penetration welds to ensure that the subject velds comply with the quality standard of the ASME or the AWS Code, when specified by the Design Engineer. The welds requiring Ul:rasonic examination are associated with the following' structures:
ASME Welds a) Reactor Coolant Pu=p Suppor:s NY_ Purchase Order NY 403573
-b) Reactor Coolant Pipe Stops NY Purchase Order NY 403573 '
c) Pressuricer Support NY Purchase Order.NY~403611 l i
Note: These welds were' designed in accordance with AISC requirements 1 but welded and examined _in accordance wi:h the requirements of l the ASME Code See:1on III Subsection NF.
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AWS Welds a) ' Pipe. Whip Restraints NY Purchase Order NY 403593 b) . Safety Injection Tank Suppor:s NY Purchase Order NY 103611 c) Fra=ing over steam' genera:or NY Purchase Order NY 403573 If corrective action had not been taken, potential weld defec:s may have existed in these Seismic I structures and may not have been detected. Such
_ potential weld defects may under certain condi: ions lead to higher than allow-able s tress levels on Lehese structures and if lef t uncorrected result in f ail-ure of the weld and possible subsequen: failure of the affected component when subjected to the dynamic events postulated as the basis for design.
. CORRECTIVE ACTION Due to the ~ findings of Ibasco's ASNT Certified Level !!! Examiner during his November 26, 1979, surveillance visit at IEW's f acility, the following steps were i= mediately taken by Ebasco's Quality Assurance Engineering Group to en-i sure that construction progress did no: preclude problem evaluation and any required correc:1ve action. All equipment on site and a: the supplier's fa-cility was placed on restricted hold in accordance wich_Section QA-III-6, Revision 1, Nonconfor=ances, and QA-III-10, Revision 1, Iden:1fication and
' Control of Items, of Ebasco's Nuclear Quali:7 Assurance ?rogram Manual. In addition, the Ebasco Project Manager, Project Superintendent, and Projec: En-gineer were. no:ifed resulting in :he establish =en of an Ebasco project team with the Project Quality Assurance Engineer acting as team coordinator. This team solicited IEW's input and in conjunction with IEW, established IEW and Ebasco discipline responsibili:ies.and determined' priori:1es for. Engineering evaluation, reinspection and possible rework of welds in :he field based on Engineering s tatus, safety i= pac: and construction schedules. The priority list and rates: progra= were based on construe: ion schedule requirements to the extent practicable, taking into consideration the final position of the structural members and the resultant access for re-examination and possible rework in place. In order to syste=atically accomplish the above, the follow-ing responsibilities and corrective action i=plementation requiremen:s were established by IEW and Ebasco.
IEW a - Initiation and disposition of nonconformance reports.
b - Preparation of NDE procedures for ul::asonic testing in the field to assure uniformity of inspection techniques. One procedure was prepared by IEW in accordance with the requiraments of ASME Section III, Subsection NF.
This procedure was deter =ined to provide acceptable examination of compo-nents which _ hai previously been partially examined in the IEW shop using either ASME or AWS criteria.
c - Qualification for ASNT certification of ultrasonic technicians (levels 1,=2, and 3) as applicable per ASME.
d - Correction of all performance deficiencies.
e - U1:rasonic examination or re-examination either at its facility or in the
-field.
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f - Rework of all welds deter =ined to be unsa:isf actory. 1 g - Sub=1ttal of a, b, c and d to Ebasco for review and coc=ent.
E3ASCO The project tea = consis:ing cf =e=bers fron Engineering, Quality Assurance Engineering, Ma:erials Application, Construction and Licensing was responsible
'for the following:
a - Identifying field and shop' welds of concern (Engineering) .
b - Verifica: ion of codes used (Engineering, QA & Materials Application).
c - Weld accessibility to support UT Re-exa=ination and possible rework (Engineering, QA & Construction) .
d - A co=plete review of all IEW Shop Drawings, including identifying all af fected welds and indicating classification of each weld (Fngineering) .
e - A s:ress investiga:ica by Engineering was conducted to determine whether stress levels actually encountered in operation would require the pre-viously specified full penetra:icn welds.
- A tabulated presentation of all concerned welds for each purchase order drawing and each jcin: to indicate the classification, design criteria, and code standards (All).
3 - Preparation of his:orical data fro = the PSAR stage, :hrough design and
, specification develop =ent, and in:o the present status of the FSAR to in-clude standards involved, design classifica: ion, design cri:eria and code standards (Engineering and Licensing) .
h - Review of IEW UT procedures to AWS and ASME-NF require =ents (QA).
1 - Develop =en and =aintenance of Priority Lists (Construction, QA) .
Ebasco Engineering conducted an engineering analysis based on design criteria to deter =ine which welds actually required full penetration welding in ac-cordance with AISC, AWS 31.1 and Ebasco Standard Practices for Structural De-sign. Based on this engineering study it was deter =ined that certain welds specified as full penetration actually could have been designed as partial penetrations and as such would not have required ultrasonic examination.
3ased on this engineering evaluation, all full penetration welds which could have been designed as partial penetration welds were identified and reinspec-tion by Ultrasonics was not performed. The engineering evaluation perfor=ed was as follows:
There are a total nu=ber of one thousand two hundred four:een (1,214) weld joints associated with the reactor coolan: pu=p supports and reac:or coolan: pipe stops. One thousand sixty-six (1,066) welds were reclassified as partial penetration leaving the re=aining one hundred forty-eight (148) weld =ents as full pene: ration. The pressurizer support structure had one hundred sixty-six (166) weld joints in which all welds were reclassified as partial penetration welds. Data suppor:ing this analysis is available in Ebasco's Engineering files.
The result of' this effort was the determination tha: 148 full penetration weld =ents required re-examination by ultrasonics at the Waterford III Site.
Parallel.with and aided by the engineering analysis, on January 3, 1980,
. IEW =obilized on site and co==enced ultrasonic tes ting. Prior to start- '
ing; UT Examina: ion.Ebasco reviewed IEW NDE procedures and personnel quali-fications.
Ultrasonic examination at the site was conducted in order to re-inspect ite=s previously :ested at the IEW facili:y to ensure 100 percent volu=e:ric exa=ination of the required welds. To minimize impact on construction scheduling, initial UT was performed without removal of A=ercoat 71 and Amercoat 90 paint coatings. Since the surf ace to be scanned was coated, it was therefore necessary to develop a technique (documented by Addendum A :o procedure UT-124) for ul::asonic attenuation correction required to co=pensate for the surf ace coating.
During the week of February 25, 1980, a team of Quality Assurance Engineers from Ebasco's New York Office revisited the Waterford III Cons truction Site. The purpose of this visit was to analyze test.
results being obtained from IEW's ultrasonic examination of struc-
- ural s: eel 1:e=s.
To maximize the effectiveness of this investigation, attention was
' directed in the following =ajor areas:
A. Equipment Suitability
- 3. Personnel Qualifications C. Procedure and Technique A. The ultrasonic equipment being used by IEW consisted of both Krautkra=er and 3ranson instruments and a variety of transducers.
Equipment certifica: ion records and linearity checks were main-tained by IEW. In addition, IEW had calibration blocks repre-senting the range of wall thickness for the welds involved.
- 3. Additional certification records for IEW NDE personnel were re-viewed. This review disclosed one =inor deficiency which was immediately resolved.
C. The procedure used by IEW for on-site exa=ination was UT-124, Revision 1, dated 12-8-79 supplemented by UT-124S for defect sizing. The procedure and supple =ent had been reviewed by Ebasco prior to use and it was observed that IEW was implementing the procedure properly.
D. The variables in coating condition and :hickness were such that required confidence in the results could not be obtained and the procedure was determined to be ineffective and discarded. Based on this decision, all items in the field requiring reinspection by UT examination were stripped of all coatings by =echanical means and cleaned prior to examination. Testing validation of'this con-clusion is discussed in Paragraph F. Further, Ebasco deter =ined tha:
the additional nitrasonic. testing would be performed on only those welds classified as full penetration welds to satisfy stress levels.
E. The required UT re-examinations were made with test sensitivity established in accordance with procedure UT-124, Revision 1. Both straight and angle bea= exa=inations were perfor=ed with satis-factory resul:s.
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4 F. Welds- as specified by the Design Engineer representing various join: configura ions no: previously inspected 1000 volu=etrically were re-exa=ined. This re-exa=ination resulted in no rejectable indica:icns based on signal response. However, three (3) indica-1ons were interpre:ed as " lack of fusion" and were rejected.
These rejec:able indica:icns were recorded and disposicioned as accep:able on Nonconfor:ance Repor: W3-1802-007 Add A.
On March 20, 1980, the sa=e team revisited the Waterford III Site to review the results of all IEW field activities related to UT reinspection and to assist si:e personnel in the close-out of IEW's site activities.
G. During ultrasonic re-exa=ination of eight_(S) stops known as '_'D" S: ops ,
it was de:er=ined by IER.tha: the four;(1) welHs at :he top' of ^each of these eigh: "D" Stops had been =ade as par:ial penetration velds in lieu of full penetra: ion welds. This problem was docu=ented on Nonconfor=ance Report W3-lS02-Oli dated March 19, 1980. Exploratory ultrasonic testing was perfor:ed on these welds to establish the depth of weld penetration for the welds. An engineering evaluation of :his infor:a: ion concluded that based on :he stress levels in :hese welds, partial penetration welds were acceptable. At the request of a Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission Inspec:ce during the week of April 7, 1960, these "D" Stops were sand blasted and reinspected. During this reinspection, it was noted that s=all areas of non-fusion or incomplete weld existed a: each end of the seven-inch welds at the top of the "D" Stop. This proble= was then docu=ented on a Nonconfor=ance Report W3-1992. The "D" Stops were returned to the =anufac:urer's facility for repair and rework. As a result of this proble=, IEW reviewed their inspection procedures with IEW inspectors and established additional weld inspec-tion criteria to preclude recurrence of this type of proble=. Ibasco i Vendor Mechanical / Welding' Inspectors were provided' copies.cf the J l entire documentation package relating to the "D" Stop proble=s as a training aid .and guidance for their future inspec: ions :o preclude re-currence of this type of proble=. The "D" Stops are planned for return to the Waterford III Site on August 4, 1980.
H. The items listed in the DESCRIPTION paragraph of the Interi= Report dated January 2, 1980, were further evaluated during the progress of this effort. I:e=s listed in paragraphs II and III.3 were deter =ined to be isolated occurrences not contributing to the overall proble=.
CONCLUSION Since all AWS and certain NT welds were reclassified by Engineering as partial pene: rations based on low stress levels , re-exa=ination by UT was not required.
This determination was further reinforced by the fact that the UT inspection (approxi=ately- 80% of weld in lieu of 1000) ini:ially performed did not uncover discontinui:ies .which exceeded code acceptable li=its.
As a result of :he analysis and testing progra= described herein, it has been deter =ined that the original proble= definition should have been li=ited to proper'i=ple=entation of procedures to assure that 100 percen: volumetric
- examination of all required welds was acco=plished. As stated above, all IEW
- welds requiring: full penetration'to satisfy stress levels were re-exanined at the Waterford III Site and found acceptable.
TTPICAL "T" WELD JOINT ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION COVERAGE l
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Weld & HAZ Examined with Ultrasonic Beam Passing
\NN through in two directicas E Weld & HAZ Exa=ined with Ultrasonic 3eam Passing through in one direction HAZ - Heat Affected Area