Similar Documents at Surry |
---|
Category:Memoranda
MONTHYEARML23151A5472023-06-0101 June 2023 Public Meeting Summary - 2022 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding North Anna Power Station, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339; and Surry Power Station ML22255A1862022-10-0303 October 2022 Tornado Classification of the Fuel Handling Trolley Support Structure License Amendment Request Audit Plan ML22130A1702022-05-20020 May 2022 Summary of April 21, 2022, Public Meeting to Discuss Potential Emergency Preparedness License Amendment Request ML22130A0332022-05-0909 May 2022 Public Meeting Summary 2021 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding North Anna Power Station, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339; and Surry Power Station, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Meeting Number 20220349 ML22034A3932022-02-16016 February 2022 Calendar Year 2021 Security Baseline Completion Memo ML21131A1612021-05-11011 May 2021 Public Meeting Summary - 2020 Annual Assessment Meeting Regarding Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-395; North Anna Power Station, Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339; and Surry Power Station, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Meeting ML21067A0922021-04-20020 April 2021 Documentation of Decision by NRC Staff That EPRI Report 3002012988, Alternative Approaches for Addressing Seismic Risk in 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization, Meets Criteria for a Federal Record ML21027A0232021-01-28028 January 2021 Summary of January 26, 2021 Closed Meeting with Dominion Energy Regarding Performance of Force on Force Exercises in a Pandemic Environment ML20176A5632020-06-24024 June 2020 Reconciliation - Analysis for April 30, 2020 Surry, Units 1 and 2 for NRR Response, Subsequent License Renewal Letter ML20161A1922020-06-15015 June 2020 SLRA - Delay in Issuance of Surry Subsequent Renewed Licenses ML20136A1752020-05-15015 May 2020 Sur 2019 Aam Meeting Summary ML19304C1462019-11-20020 November 2019 Correction to Summary of August 13, 2019 Category 2 Public Meeting Related to the Safety Review of the Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 SLRA ML19283B6222019-10-10010 October 2019 Subsequent License Renewal Application Safety Review - Documentation of Draft Third Round Requests for Additional Information ML19253D7082019-09-24024 September 2019 Summary of August 13, 2019, Category 2 Public Meeting Related to the Safety Review of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML19253A7002019-09-0606 September 2019 (FEMA Letter to NRC 09-06-19) Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) for the Surry Power Station ML19219A2842019-08-13013 August 2019 July 29, 2019, Summary of Category 2 Public Meeting Related to the Safety Review of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML19128A3372019-05-0808 May 2019 Public Meeting Summary - 2018 Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Surry Power Station Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281 ML18144A0712018-05-23023 May 2018 Summary of Annual Assessment Public Meeting Regarding Surry Power Station ML18129A3142018-05-16016 May 2018 04/17/2018 Summary of Pre-Application Meeting with Dominion Energy Regarding the Surry, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML18057A2752018-03-0101 March 2018 February 7, 2018, Summary of Pre-Application Meeting with Dominion Energy Regarding the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Subsequent Renewal Application ML17123A1162017-05-0303 May 2017 Summary of Meeting to Discuss Annual Assessment of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 with the Public for Period of January 01, 2016 Through December 31, 2016 ML15132A2642015-05-11011 May 2015 EOC 2014 Public Meeting Memo - Spring 2015 ML14101A1132014-04-11011 April 2014 Summary of Meeting with Public to Discuss Annual Assessment of Surry Power Station with the Public for the Period of January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013 ML13322B2272013-11-20020 November 2013 G. Suber Memo Surry Power Station Trip Report for October 21-25, 2013 ML12277A0722012-09-20020 September 2012 Initial Exam 2012-301 Post Exam Comments - Addendum ML13196A2202012-06-0606 June 2012 Memo from B. Balsam, NRR and D. Logan, NRR to J. Susco, NRR on Summary of Section 7 Consultation Activities Related to the National Marine Fisheries Service'S Final Rule to List the Atlantic Sturgeon ML12087A3502012-03-27027 March 2012 Surrey Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding License Amendment Request - Permanent Alternate Repair Criteria for Steam Generator Tube Inspection and Repair ML1208705282012-03-26026 March 2012 Memo C Bladey, Adm, Notice of EA and Fonsi - VEPCO, Surry Power Station (72-1030, 72-55, 50-280, 50-281) ML1206600702012-03-0606 March 2012 02/21-22/2012 Meeting Summary with State-Of-The-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (Soarca) for Public Meetings at Peach Bottom and Surry ML11271A1782011-10-0303 October 2011 Review of Topical Report, Revision 11 for Kewaunee Power Station and ISFSI, Millstone Power Station, Units 1, 2, & 3 and ISFSI, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 and ISFSI, Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 and ISFSI (Tac ME6649, ME6650, ML0933400282009-11-0404 November 2009 2009 Surry FEMA Exercise Report Letter ML0925404602009-09-10010 September 2009 Summary of Phone Call with Industry to Issues Related to Eccentricity of the Steam Generator Tube-to-Tubesheet Joints in the Finite Element Model Used for the Technical Basis of the Permanent Alternate Repair Criteria License Amendment Requ ML0807400842008-03-14014 March 2008 Draft Regulatory Guide for Comment ML0730304052007-10-31031 October 2007 E. Marinos Memo Technical Assistance Request-Dominion Resources, Inc.'S December 6, 2006, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 74.13(a) Requirements Regarding Material Status Report Submittal Time Frame ML0632605122006-11-22022 November 2006 Forthcoming Meeting with Virginia Electric and Power Company. Regarding Main Control Room and Emergency Switchgear Room for Surry Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 ML0605902732006-09-12012 September 2006 Letter, Response to TIA 2004-04, Acceptance of Proceduralized Departures from Tss. (TAC Mc 4331 and TAC MC4332) ML0625505772006-09-0707 September 2006 Memo. E-Mail Transmission of Request for Additional Information ML0617805592006-07-10010 July 2006 Revised Closeout Letter for Bulletin 2003-01, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors. ML0617203662006-07-0606 July 2006 Trip Report - September 19-22, 2005, Tour of the North Anna River, Lake Anna, and the Surry Alternative Site ML0602700902006-01-27027 January 2006 Forthcoming Meeting with Virginia Electric and Power Co. and Westinghouse to Discuss License Amendments to Increase the Lead Rod Average Burnup Limit to 62,000 Mwd/Mt at Surry Power Station, Unit 1 ML0525202452005-09-22022 September 2005 Unit 2 - Closeout Letter for Bulletin 2003-01, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculation at Pressurized-water Reactors ML0525606282005-09-13013 September 2005 Notice of Category 1 Meeting W/ VEPCO Surry and ISFSI Related Criticality Analysis Between Part 50 and 72 ML0507004112005-03-10010 March 2005 RAI on TS Amendment Nos. MC4410, MC4413, MC4745, MC4746 and MC4747 ML0506300702005-03-0202 March 2005 January Monthly Report on the Status of Open TIAs Assigned to NRR ML0505500832005-02-24024 February 2005 Facsimile Transmission Draft RAI (TAC MC4414, MC4415, MC4415, MC4417, MC4418. MC4419 and MC4420) ML0501202612005-01-12012 January 2005 December Monthly Report on the Status of Open TIAs Assigned to NRR ML0434802422004-12-29029 December 2004 November Monthly Report on the Status of Open TIAs Assigned to NRR ML0421003322004-06-30030 June 2004 Close-out of Tacs Relating to the Review of 35-day Letters Submitted in Response to the April 29, 2003, Orders Revising the Design Basis and Security Guard Force Training Enhancements and Physical Fitness Requirements ML0404800192004-02-17017 February 2004 Transmission of Issues to Be Discussed in Conference Call ML0404104222004-02-0404 February 2004 Request Approval of Excused Absence for Employees Affected by Inclement Weather Conditions 2023-06-01
[Table view] |
Text
Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 September 6, 2019 MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Casey, Director MICHAEL S Digitally signed by MICHAEL S CASEY Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate CASEY Date: 2019.09.06 18:32:57 -04'00' U.S. Department of Homeland Security- FEMA THROUGH: Vanessa Quinn, Chief Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate U.S. Department of Homeland Security- FEMA THOMAS A FROM: Thomas Scardino, Chief/RAC Digitally signed by Chair Technological Hazards THOMAS A SCARDINO Branch National Preparedness Division FEMA Region III SCARDINO Date: 2019.09.06 15:22:20 -04'00' U.S. Department of Homeland Security- FEMA
SUBJECT:
Preliminary Capabilities Assessment - Surry Power Station
Background:
On Tuesday, September 3, 2019, Hurricane Dorians path threatened the Commonwealth of Virginia and the EPZ counties surrounding the Surry Power Station. Hurricane Dorian brought rain and strong winds and caused localized flooding. Although Hurricane Dorian did not make landfall in Virginia, the storm did require major protective actions and response efforts by federal, state, and local authorities. The risk and host counties of Surry County, Isle of Wight County, York County, James City County, City of Newport News, and City of Williamsburg implemented protective actions that included: activation of emergency response centers; mandatory evacuation for coastal zones; sheltering and mass care activities; and emergency public information and warnings. During the storm, Dominion Energy maintained both units operating at 100% and did not shut down.
FEMA Region III, in coordination with NRC Region II and Dominion Energy, held discussions with representatives from the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and Offsite Response Organizations (OROs). These discussions were held on September 6th, to assess the offsite capabilities potentially affected by Hurricane Dorian.
On Friday, September 6, 2019, based on the Preliminary Capabilities Assessment performed and our review of available information gathered in discussions with state and local government agencies, FEMA Region III has concluded that offsite radiological emergency preparedness remains adequate to provide a reasonable assurance determination. Appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the Surry Power Station.
At this time, FEMA Region III is not recommending actions to conduct a Disaster Initiated Review of offsite emergency preparedness within the Surry Power Station 10-mile emergency planning zone. The Regional Administrator and the Federal Preparedness Coordinator are aware of this decision.
FEMA Region III assessed the offsite capabilities of the response organizations as it relates to the Surry Power Station. The assessment is as follows:
Assessment:
- 1. Emergency Response Facilities The state emergency operations center in Midlothian, VA was activated at Level 1 (full activation), with FEMA FCO and IMAT support. The Risk Jurisdiction EOCs were activated.
The emergency operation centers were not compromised and were capable of coordinating emergency response operations in support of the Surry Power Station.
- 2. Communications Primary and secondary communication systems were operable. No irregularities or failures were noted in the communication networks among Dominion, the state, and risk and host counties. In fact, communications systems were bolstered during this event by ancillary communications systems brought in, to include FEMA MERS.
- 3. Emergency Response Organizations State and county emergency response organizations were capable of performing the activities required of them in accordance with approved plans and procedures.
- 4. Public Alert and Notification The prompt alert and notification system for the 10-mile emergency planning zone was operable.
The risk counties had the resources to conduct backup route alerting if needed. The states joint information system had the capability to make emergency public information and instructions relative to the Surry Power Station in a timely manner.
- 5. Access and Functional Needs and Transportation Resources The state and risk counties maintained enough transportation assets to fulfill requirements.
Movement of transportation dependent populations to include disabled, access/functional needs, and schools were unencumbered.
- 6. Evacuation Routes The state and risk counties maintained satisfactory law enforcement assets to perform the duties required of them. Primary evacuation routes inside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone were not impacted.
- 7. Accident Assessment The Virginia Department of Health (VDH) had the resources available to provide independent radiological dose assessment and recommendations to decision makers on protective actions for the health and safety of the public. VDH could have deployed the states radiological field monitoring teams to monitor and assess a radiological plume. Additionally, the risk counties had the ability to monitor and decontaminate the public and emergency workers.
- 8. Support Services The risk and host counties had resources to operate reception and congregate care centers in accordance with their plans and procedures. The supporting county emergency medical services were not degraded and were capable of responding, treating, and transporting a radiologically contaminated injured individual. Noteworthy, a REP mass care center was activated for this event in the City of Newport News.
- 9. Population Shifts There were no population shifts due to Hurricane Dorian.
- 10. Supporting Documentation All supporting documentation gathered will be retained on file at FEMA Region III.
==
Conclusion:==
In part, and along with this capability assessment, all community lifelines remain stable. The Commonwealth of Virginia and affected counties surrounding the Surry Power Station have the ability to implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures as written. A formal Disaster Initiated Review is not recommended.