ML18153C924

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LER 92-003-00:on 920214,incomplete Engineered Safety Features Testing Due to Procedure Deficiency.Testing Procedures Were Changed & Actuation Testing of Low RCS Average Temp Relays Performed satisfactorily.W/920304 Ltr
ML18153C924
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/1992
From: Kansler M
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
92-154, LER-92-003-01, LER-92-3-1, NUDOCS 9203090446
Download: ML18153C924 (4)
v • d • e


Text

e Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry*Power Station P.0.Box315 Surry, Virginia 23883 March 4, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 92-154 Document Control Desk Dock.et No.:

. License No.: DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical* Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1.and 2 ..

  • REPORT NUMBER 92-003-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee.

Very truly yours, Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 46 920304 920309 04 05000280 POR ADOCK PDR s

I'"""'". .

J 16-89)

- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 11 I i°OCKET NUMBER 121 I PAGE JI Surry Power Station, Unit 1 TITLE 141 o 15 Io Io Io 1218 I 0 1 loF 013 Incomplete Engineered Safety Features Testing Due to Procedure Deficiency EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE 17) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Bl MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I\?

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER Vi( REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI Surry, Unit 2 o I 5 I o I o I o 12 I 8 1l I4 9 2 91 2- 01 013 - *010 012 1 013 0 14 912 0151010,0, I I OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RcOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

MODE (9) N 20,402(b)

,__ 20.4061c)

,_ 60.73(o)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

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0TH ER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

- 50. 73(1) (2) (viii) (Bl 50.73(1)(2)(*)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER

}{ R. Kansler, Station Manager AREA CODE 8 I O14 3 1 s 17 1 - 13 11 1 s 14 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC- REPORTABLE  :::::::: MANUFAC* REPORTABLE  ;*.*

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I I I I I I I  ::::;:;:;::: ;:;:::;  ::::::::: I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED

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SUBMISSION

-i YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/ NO DATE 1151 I I I ABSTRACT (Limir ro 1400 spaces, ,.e., approximately fifteen single-space rypewrirren lines) (16)

On February 14, 1992 at 1343 hours0.0155 days <br />0.373 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.110115e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 90% and 100%

reactor power, respectively, it was determined that certain Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system logic actuation relays associated with automatic initiation of safety injection and main steam line isolation were not being fully tested in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Table 4.1-1, Item 26. Specifically, actuation of the relays which energize on low reactor coolant system average temperature were not being verified. The affected channels were declared inoperable, and a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requiring hot shutdown within six hours and cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> *was entered for each Unit in accordance with TS Tables* 3.7-2 and 3.7-3. Actions were promptly initiated to test the actuation of the affected relays and, following successful testing, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 LCOs were exited at 1413 and 1434, respectively: Since the relays were verified operable, no safety implications were posed by this event. This event occurred because a procedural error* was made when specifying the methodology for verifying proper operation of these relays. These procedural errors were identified during the rev1s1ons to certain surveillance test procedures, which were being performed as part of the Surry Procedure Upgrade Program, and have been corrected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).

NRC Form 366 16-891

NRC FORM 366A (6-89) e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104

. EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 .HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO

.. THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. .

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LEA NUMBER (6) PAGE (31 Surry Power, Station, Unit 1 0 I5 IO IO IO I 2, 8 I O 912 - 0 10 *I 3 - 0IO O12 OF O I3 TEXT (ff more IS/JIICtl is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's/ (171

1. o DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On February 14, 1992 at 1343 hours0.0155 days <br />0.373 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.110115e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 90% and 100% reactor power, respectively, it was determined that
  • certain Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) system logic actuation relays [EIIS-JE,RL Y] associated with automatic initiation of safety injection** and main steam line isolation were not being fully tested in accordance with-T_echnical Specification (TS) Table 4.1-1, Item 26. Specifically, actuation of the relays which energize on low reactor coolant system average temperature were not being verified. These procedural errors were identified during the revisions to certain surveillance test procedures which were being performed as part of the Surry Procedure Upgrade Program.

Automatic initiation of safety injection and main steam isolation will occur when a high steam flow condition in two of three steam lines exists coincident with either a low stearri line pressure greater than or equal to 525 psig in two of three steam lines or a low average reactor coolant system (RCS) teinperature greater than or equal to 543op in two.

of three RCS loops. TS Table 3.7-2, Item le, and Table 3.7-3, Item 2a, require that a minimum of two low RCS average temperature channels must be operable. TS Table 4.1-1, Item 26 requires that Logic Channel Testing, consisting of a channel functional test, be performed monthly.

In this particular instance, the monthly surveillance test procedures verified continuity of the low average RCS temperature relay coils, but did not verify actuation of the relays. This is contrary to the Technical Specification definition of a channel functional test which requires verification of trip initiating action.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

2. O SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Following discovery that the trip initiating actuation of the relays had
  • not been verified, the low average RCS temperature relays were tested and determined to be operable. Additionally, the high steam flow low steam line pressure protection function, for which the high steam flow/low average . temperature protection serves as a backup, was being tested and verified operable in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. No safety implications were posed by this event and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

I NRC Form 366A (6-891

NRC FORM 366A 16-89) e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO i' 1"HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER 16) PAGE (3) .

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 TEXT /ff more space is mquired,

  • use additional NRC Form 3l5l!'A 'sl (17) 0 1s IO I ci 1.0 I2 I s, 0 9 I 2 - 01 013 - 0 I O O 13 OF O 13 3.0 CAUSE OF THE EVENT This event was caused by procedural errors. An improper test methodology had been specified during the original preparation **of the test procedures. The weakness in the methodology was identified during the Surry Procedure Upgrade Program.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION<Sl The affected channels were declared inoperable and a LCO requiring

  • hot shutdown within six hours and cold shutdown within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> was

. entered for each Unit in accordance with TS Tables 3.7-2 and 3.7-3 at 1343 on February 14, 1992. Additionally, a Station Deviation Report was submitted.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION<Sl The test procedures were changed and actuation testing of the low RCS average temperature relays was performed satisfactorily. This allowed Unit 1 and Unit 2 to exit the LCOs at 1413 and 1434, respectively, on February 14, 1992.

6. O ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The event was identified though the Surry Procedure Upgrade Program.

This program will continue until the remammg surveillance test procedures have been upgraded. Any additional discrepancies will be appropriately dispositioned and reported in accordance with the Station's deviation reporting and corrective action programs:

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS LER S2-91-007~oo Failure To Full Flow Test 2-RH-47 Due To Procedure Deficiency 8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION .

None.

NRC Form 366A (6-89)

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