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LER 89-019-01:on 891122,noted That Flood Protection Dikes Removed from One Side of Valve Pits for Svc Water Supply motor-operated Valves to Recirculation Spray Hxs.Caused by Personnel Error.Flood Dikes reinstalled.W/900824 Ltr
	ML18153C341
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	08/24/1990
From:	Kansler M; VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	90-528, LER-89-019, LER-89-19, NUDOCS 9008310127
	Download: ML18153C341 (9)
	v • d • e

ACCELERATE:D DISjRIBUTION DEMONST~TION SYSTElv1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:90013310127 DOC.DATE: 90/08/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET#

FACIL:50-281 Surry Power Station, Unit 2, Virginia Electric & Powe 05000281 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION KANSLER,M.R. Virginia Power (Virginia Electric & Power Co.)

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 89-019-01:on 891122,svc water MOVs to RSHXs inoperable due to personnel error in removing flood protection.

W/9 ltr. D DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR } ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),-Yncident7Rpt, etc.

/ SIZE: s s I

I NOTES:lcy NMSS/IMSB/PM. 05000281 A

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D PD2-2 IJ1. 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY 1. B 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 s AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEBlO 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEABll 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D .1 1 NRR/DST/SICB.7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1

1 1

1 d~LB8g~ 1 1

1 1

RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 R

NOTES: 1 1 I

D S I I

Al D

D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

s PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONT ACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROO!'vl Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELHvllNATE YOUR NAME FROl\1 DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 34 ENCL 34

Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station P. 0. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 August 24, 1990.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 90-528 Document Control Desk Docket No.: 50-281 Washington, D. C. 20555 License *No.: DPR-37 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to* Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following updated Licensee Event Report for Unit 2.

REPORTNUMBER 89-019-01 This report has been reviewed by the Station. Nuclear

Safety and Operating Committee andl will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Very truly Enclosure cc: Regional[ Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW 0 1 ",,t,.,**

~ \

Atlanta, Georgia 30323 I.;

.,1

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19-83, unDATED t < REPORT POW 28-06-01 U.S. NUCLlAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AP,.ROVED OMII NO. Jllill-OIIM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI EXPIRES: l/31/E FACILITY NAME 111 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 IDOCKET NUMIER 121 I

, IOF PAGE 131 01s10101012,s I 1 017 TITLE ,,

Service Water. HOVs to the RSIIXs Inoperable Due to Personnel Error in Removing Flood Protection EVENT DATE IS, LE R NUMBER 16, REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR )\ SEQUENTIAL NUMBE" :/ "EVl!IIO"< MONTH NUMBE" DAY" YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMIIERISI 01s1010101 I I 1 I1 21 2 8 9 sl 9 - o J1 I 9-- oJ 1 ois 2 I4 9 Jo 0 1s10 IO I OI I I THIS REFORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUA';T TO THE REOUIREMEI\ITS OF 10 CFR i: IC"'I~* :,r,1 o* ';0'1 C' '"~ *o**OrN*f'lg/ f11l OPERATII\IG MOOE 19, N 20.1102101 20.-lcl

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- ZO.*IOIII 111llt.l 20.00111,11111,1 II0.7311112HMI I0.731all2111111 IID.731111211.iiillll II0.731tll2Hxl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. R. Kansler, Station Manager 81014 3j 5 I 71 -13 I 11814 COMPLETE ONE LINE FC>R EACH ~NENT FAILUIIE DESCRIIED IN THIS IIEl'ORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TURER REPORTABLE TO I\IPRDS

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~EPORTABLE TO NPROS i::;=:1;=1::=ttt:::::!::'.:::rm: r 1{}??'}{\\\\(({*,:;:_..... . . ::::::::!\:\\\ti:\\\:(l(\j\\\:(f\:\\ii I I I I I I I :---*-:-:-:-*-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: I I I I I I I I I I I I I I :l:i::lili:iiiil:!:!:ililllifi~i::llf\/liii:!i!!!l'. I I I I I I I liiilliiii!iililil!!!l!lil!jjlj/lllllllliilllllllli aw,LEMENTAL IIDOIIT IJOIICTID 11'1 MONTH DAY YEAII EXPECTED

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IUIMISSION l Yl!I /If..-.~,. EXf'ECTED .SUIIMIS$10N DATE/ NO DATE 1151 I I I AISTflACT /Limit ro r400 u,ac~. ,.,., ,,>Pro*m1*r,1,- fiftHn tin11**11>>C1 n,,i,9-,,;ran l,naJ-1111 On November 22, 1989 at 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months , Unit 2 was at *hot shutdown. During routine walkdowns in the Unit 2 turbine building, in preparation for a unit startup, it was noted that the flood protection oikes had* been removed from one side of the valve pits for the service water (SW) supply motor operated valves (MOVs) to the recirculation spray heat exchangers (RSHXs). Work was in progress near the valve pit area for replacement of the SW piping. The affected valves, MOV-SW-

203A/B/C/D, were declared inoperable and a 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months action statement to cold shutdown was entered. ..

A four hour non-emergency report was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10CFR50.72, paragraph (b)(2)(i) on the November 22, 1989 event. The dikes were replaced on November 22, 1989 at 2053. On December 13, 1989 with Units 1 and 2 at 100% power, it was discovered that backflow preventers were not in place m the two emergency* switchgear room floor drains. A flood watch was already in place at the time of discovery of the missing devices because of other concerns identified during engin,eering review. The backflow preventers were reinstalled on January 31, 1990.

NIIC,_ . .19-131

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366A APPROVEO 0MB NO. 3150-0104 16-891 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICEINSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) *INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555. AND TO 1*HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE 131 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 0 j 5 IO IO IO I2 J 8 I 1 819 - 0 I 11 9 - 0Jl O 12 OF O17 TEXT (If more space;, n,quired, uu additional NRC Form 3ti&4 '*11171

1. 0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On November 22, 1989 at 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months , Unit 2 was at hot shutdown * (HSD).

During routine walkdowns in the Unit 2 turbine building, in preparation for a unit startup, it was noted that the.* flood protection dikes *(EiIS:-BAF) were removed from one side of the valve pits for the service water. (SW) (EIIS-BI) supply motor operated valves (MOVs) (EIIS-ISV) to the

. recirculation spr.ay heat exchangers (RSHXs) (MOV-SW-203A/B/C/D). At the time of- the discovery, work was in progress near the valve pit area for' replacement of the SW p1pmg to the mam control room (MCR)/emergency switchgear room (ESGR) chillers and charging pump SW pumps. The work was being performed 1n accordance with design change procedure DC-87-34. The flood dikes were removed on October 25, 1989 Ill accordance with a field change to the procedure to facilitate insta11ation of missile protection plates for the new SW piping.

WhHe the dikes were removed, the Unit 2 reactor coolant

syte.m exceeded a temperature and pressure of 350 degrees Fah:renheit/450 psig

during two time periods: from November 6 at 0555 hours0.00642 days 0.154 hours 9.176587e-4 weeks 2.111775e-4 months to Novembver 7 at 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months and from November 20 at 2256 hours0.0261 days 0.627 hours 0.00373 weeks 8.58408e-4 months until the dikes were reinstalled on November 22 at 2053 hours0.0238 days 0.57 hours 0.00339 weeks 7.811665e-4 months . The RSHXs are required to be operable whenever unit conditions exceed 350 degrees Fahrenheit/450 psig.

The four (4) SW supply MOVs

to the RSHXs were declared ino1,>erable at 1500 hours0.0174 days 0.417 hours 0.00248 weeks 5.7075e-4 months , and a 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months action statement to ach:leve cold shutdown was entered. A four hour non-emergency report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72, paragraph (b)(2)(i).

~

NRi; FORM 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO oM*B NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BU~DEN PER. RESPONSE :ro COMPLY *wTH THIS LICEI\ISEE EVENT REPORT (LEB) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD

.. . TEXT CONTINUATION COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-5301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555. AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (6) . PAGE (3)

FACILITY NAME Ill.

YEAR

. Surry* Power Station, Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 8. 9 - 0 1 9 - 0 1 0 *3 OF O 7 TEXT /ff mar-. :,pace is raquir-.d, use *ddition*I NRC Form 366A'*I 117)

On December 13, with Unit 1 and 2 at 100% power, during walkdowns - performed to identify potential deficiencies. that may exist in flood protection devices

for safety related equipment, it was determined that the backflow preventers (EIIS-BFP) were not in place in the two ESGR floor drains (EIIS-PRN). These backflow devices were designed to prevent backflow of *water *from the turbine building, through the floor drains, into the ESGR in the event of a turbine. building flood.

2. 0 SAF:ETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS -

The reci~culation spray system consists of four independent traillls, each containing a pump, heat _exchanger

and discharge spra,y ring.

The system is* required to be operable whenever the reactor coolant system temperature *and. pressure is greater than 35_0 degrees Fahrenheit/450 psig. The recirculation . spray (RS) system is used in conjunction with the containment spray

system (EHS-BE) following a design basis accident (DBA) to depressurize the

containment* below atmospheric *pressure and maintain it depressurized for an extended period. The RS systiem also provides for long-term heat removal capability folh>wing a DBA. Each of the four trains is 50% capacity.

Service water is used as *the cooling medium for the heat exchangers and is provided through

the subject MO Vs. The MOVs are

1ocated in two adjacent valve pits at the 9' 6" elevation of the turbine building. The valves are physically located below the floor elevation. Analyses conducted

during 1972.:74 determined that the safety related MOVs io the RSHXs could be adversely affected by flooding caused* by circulating water (CW) or fire protection water piping rupture. The dikes were _installed to ensure the MOV s would remain operable in the event of flooding.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRG.FORM 366A APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 16-891 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICEMSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION *AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-5301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE 131 FACILITY NAME 111 REVISION YEAR NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 8 9 - 0 1. 9 - 0 1 0 4 OF O 7 TEXT /ff more Sf!"ctJ is n,quimd, u.., oddition*I NRC Form 366A '*I 1171 The consequences of the dikes being removed is minimized by the following:

Water level . sensors are provided m pits located near the CW Hne expansion . joints (a potential source of *flooding).* These expa.nsion joints were replaced with safety* related components in both units during the . most recent outages making the probability of their failure remote.

Alarms are provided in the control room to quickly alert the operators . of an abnormal condition. Operators would* take the necessary actions to e*nsure the plant was maintained in* a safe* condition following recei.ipt of an alarm.

Floor drains in the turbine building, Unit* 1 ESGR, and cable tunnel are connected to a common piping system . that drains into the turbine building sumps. Flood dikes are provided .at entrances to*. the ESGRs to prevent water from entering the rooms in the event of* flooding in adjoining areas. With the backflow devices removed from the floor drains, the potential existed for water to enter the ESGR from the adjoining turbine building in the event of a turbine building flood.

The consequences of the backflow devices being removed are minimized by the following:

Ther. e are two drains, each 3" in diameter, in the ESGR. The wate:r level in the turbine building is not expected to exceed one foot during the postulated turbine

building flood.

Consequently, the flow through the drains irito the ESGR would be a.t a low rate due to the low hydraulic head. This low rate, coupled with the early warning of a turbine building flood provided by the level sensors discussed above, would allow operators . sufficient time to take the necessary corrective actions prior to the water level in the ESGR obtaining a height that could *affect safety related equipment.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY_ COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 16-891 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICEI\ISEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORW/IRD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS Tl:.XT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BR_ANCH (P-5301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER (21 PAGE 131 LER NUMBER 161 .

YEAR ':::::::*::. SEQUENTIAL ::'.::::? REVISION

. NUMBER

:::::::: NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 2 01s101010121s11 819 -01119- 011 01s oFol7 TEXT (If more -co is required, use addroonol 1VRC Form 366A'si 1171 In addition, turbine building flooding coincident with a design basis accident is not postulated to occur. Consequently, the health and safety of the £Ublic were not affected.

3.0 CA.!!.S.E.

The event was caused by personnel error. The removal of the dikes was authorized via a field change to Design Change 87-

34. The engineers preparing the field change failed to address the controls that would be _required for the re_moval of the dikes. In addition, the documents used to provide the instructions for the removal of the dikes were inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of subsequent

reviews required for final approval of the field change. The field change controlling document stated that -the revision was necessary to provide

additional details -and instructions for installation of the new SW line missile protection covers. Removal of the dikes was not specified in the field change controlling document. The instruction to remove the dikes was placed on a revised drawing in the form of a note on a construction detail for the installation of the covers. The note stated *that the dikes were to be removed and reinstalled as required with no stipulation of required unit conditions or required contingency actions.

The backflow devices were originally installed in 1977 as part of a flood protection design change. It could not be determined when or why these devices were -removed.

4. 0 IM.ru[EDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION{S)

The four SW supply MOVs to the RSHXs were declared inopf:rable, and a 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months action statement to CSD was entered.

Construction personnel were directed to reinstall the flood dikes.

. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366A APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 (6-891 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P,530). U.S. NUCLEAR _

REGULATORY COMMISSION; WASHINGTON. DC 20555. AND TO 1'HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20503 .

DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 . PAGE (3)

FACILITY NAME (11 YEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000 281 89 0 6 OF O 7 TEXT (If mon, space is n,quired, use eddftion*I NRC Form 366A'sl (171 No immediate actions were required after the. discovery of the miss.ing

backflow devices since a flood watch had been established earlier as a precaution due to deficiencies in flood protc!ction equipment previously identified. during engineering review.

5. 0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

The flood dikes were reinstalled at 2053 hours0.0238 days 0.57 hours 0.00339 weeks 7.811665e-4 months on November 22, 1989, the 30 hour3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months Technical Specification action statement

. was exited.

An ,engineering evaluation was performed

to allow installation of plugs in the drains as an interim measure until the appropriate backflow devices could be obtained and installed.

The backflow devices were reins.talled on January 31, 1990.

6. 0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE A memorandum describing the removal of the flood dikes was sent to design engineering personnel in,* order to heighten their awareness. The memorandum also reemphasized that instructions for specific work

for design control documents must be included in the controlling procedure )and not mer~ly added to sketches and drawings.

An engineering review has been initiated to review the commitments and design bases relating to flood protection of safety related equipment. As part of this review, walkdowns of plant areas requiring flood protection .were conducted to identify and document any additional deficiencies. In addition to rninstalling the backflow preventers, cover plates over the component cooling and bearing cooling heat exchanger service water supply valves were replaced with dikes to enhance flood

I I

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366A (6-89) - APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO

'THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (6) PAGE 131 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 0 15 IO ID ID 121 8J l 8J 9 - Oil 19 -0 J l O 17 OF O 17 TEXT /If more .,,.co is required, use additional N8C Form 366A's/ 1171 protection. Draft procedures have been generated to identify the necessary attributes* to be monitored as part of routine verification of the mechanical integrity of existing flood protection -dikes and ESGR backflow devices. These measures -

are to be incorporated into station preventive maintenance schedules.

Flood protection dikes throughout_ the plant . have been stenciled* with a cautionary legend. Cautionary plaques have also been installed near the backflow preventers.

7. 0 SIMILAR EVENTS None.

8. 0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER NIA.

ML18153C341

Text

SUBJECT:

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